

1 **I. Introduction and Overview**

2 **Q. Please state your name.**

3 A. My name is Samuel C. Hadaway.

4 **Q. Did you previously file testimony in this proceeding?**

5 A. Yes. My direct testimony on cost of capital was filed with the Company's case on  
6 August 4, 2004.

7 **Q. What is the purpose of your rebuttal testimony?**

8 A. The purpose of this testimony is to rebut the rate of return of equity (ROE)  
9 recommendations of Division of Public Utilities (DPU) witness Artie Powell and  
10 Committee of Consumer Services (CCS) witness Daniel J. Lawton. I will also  
11 respond to the comments of AARP witness Ronald J. Binz on cost of capital. I  
12 will first describe deficiencies in the other parties' ROE recommendations and  
13 demonstrate that their ROE estimates are not consistent with current market data.  
14 I will then update Dr. Powell's analysis with more reasonable assumptions to  
15 show that his ROE estimates are below current market expectations. I will also  
16 respond to Dr. Powell's and Mr. Lawton's criticisms of my initial testimony and  
17 to Mr. Binz's general comments concerning ROE and his Scottish Power stock  
18 price comparisons.

19 **Q. What are the parties' positions on rate of return?**

20 A. The Company is requesting an overall rate of return (ROR) of 8.663%. The  
21 Company's request is based on the test year capital structure (47.80% equity,  
22 51.00% debt, 1.20% preferred) and projected costs for long-term debt (6.40%)  
23 and preferred stock (6.75%). With Dr. Powell's December 17, 2004

1 Supplemental Testimony, it appears that DPU, CCS, and the Company are in  
2 agreement on capital structure and the cost for debt and preferred stock.  
3 The parties' ROE recommendations, however, are significantly different. The  
4 Company is requesting an ROE of 11.125%, which is based on my estimate of  
5 ROE for a group of single-A rated electric utilities comparable to PacifiCorp. Dr.  
6 Powell and Mr. Lawton use the same comparable group as mine, but their ROE  
7 recommendations are lower. They both recommend reducing PacifiCorp's ROE  
8 from the 10.7 percent established in the Company's 2003 case (Docket No. 03-  
9 2035-02) to a rate of only 10.0 percent. With the Company's requested capital  
10 structure and cost rates for debt and preferred stock, a 10.0 percent ROE produces  
11 an overall ROR of 8.195%. Mr. Binz and AARP do not offer a specific ROE or  
12 ROR recommendation.

13 **Q. What causes such a large difference between the parties' estimates of ROE?**

14 **A.** There are three main differences:

- 15 1) In the DCF analysis, Dr. Powell and Mr. Lawton use much lower  
16 growth rates than I, and they criticize my efforts to conform currently  
17 low short-term growth estimates (from *Value Line* and other analysts)  
18 to the long-term requirements of the DCF model;  
19
- 20 2) Dr. Powell and Mr. Lawton refuse to accept the implications of their  
21 own CAPM and risk premium checks of reasonableness, which clearly  
22 show that their DCF based recommendations are too low; and  
23
- 24 3) Dr. Powell and Mr. Lawton do not reasonably consider the fact that  
25 long-term interest rates are expected to rise significantly during the  
26 coming year.

27 I will show that our ROE positions are much closer when a more reasonable view  
28 of long-term growth rates is taken. I will also show that had Dr. Powell  
29 reasonably considered his CAPM results, or if Mr. Lawton had not confused the

1 projected interest rate issue, both their checks of reasonableness would have  
2 rejected their own ROE recommendations and would have confirmed the  
3 Company's requested ROE.

4 The Company's requested 11.125% ROE is approximately the midpoint of my  
5 DCF range of 10.7 percent - 11.4 percent (rounded midpoint 11.1%). As Mr.  
6 Lawton points out, 11.125% is also the average result from my DCF and risk  
7 premium analyses, with the highest and lowest results excluded. I developed my  
8 results from the DCF model and risk premium data, and gave explicit weight to  
9 projections for much higher interest rates for the coming year. At the time I  
10 prepared my initial testimony, corporate interest rates had increased from record  
11 lows by about 50 basis points (0.50%) and were projected to increase by an  
12 additional three-quarters to one percent from their June 2004 levels (Hadaway  
13 Direct Exhibit UP&L\_\_\_ (SCH-2), pages 2 and 3). Later in this testimony I will  
14 present more recent economic forecasts, which continue to show higher interest  
15 rates for the coming year. As I discussed in my initial testimony, it does not seem  
16 reasonable to estimate the cost of capital based on data from the bottom of a "V"  
17 in the interest rate cycle, only to have higher rates in the coming year. That  
18 approach would underestimate the cost of capital, and it would virtually assure  
19 that a new rate case would have to be filed as soon as is practical.

20 Although Dr. Powell (at 26-29) and Mr. Lawton (at 16-17) discuss interest rate  
21 forecasts, Dr. Powell (at 29) concludes that all such data are already included in  
22 his market based models, and Mr. Lawton (at 16) mixes rates for 10-year notes  
23 (from Mr. Williams' Direct Testimony at 6) with longer-term rates in a confusing

1 and entirely inappropriate manner. In reality, it is not clear that either Dr. Powell  
2 or Mr. Lawton gave any explicit consideration to the explicitly higher interest  
3 rates that are projected for the coming year. In fact, had either of them done a  
4 more complete analysis by testing their DCF results against risk premium data  
5 and the much higher interest rates expected for the coming year, they would have  
6 found that their recommendations do not meet a basic test of reasonableness.  
7 As I explained in my initial testimony, state regulatory commissions around the  
8 country have recently granted ROEs that imply equity risk premiums of over 400  
9 basis points relative to interest rates on utility debt. With long-term single-A rates  
10 projected to be in the 6.7 percent range during the coming year, a 400 basis point  
11 risk premium supports an ROE of at least 10.7 percent (6.7% interest rate + 4.0%  
12 risk premium = 10.7% ROE). These failures by Dr. Powell and Mr. Lawton to  
13 reasonably consider economic forecasts for higher interest rates are significant  
14 shortcomings in their analyses, which cause their ROE recommendations to fall  
15 well below the reasonable cost of equity for PacifiCorp.  
16 Moreover, under present market and utility industry conditions, Dr. Powell's and  
17 Mr. Lawton's applications of the DCF model inherently understate investors'  
18 long-term growth expectations. This feature contributes directly to their low DCF  
19 estimates of ROE. With current relatively high utility stock prices and with  
20 continuing efforts in the utility industry to reduce dividend payout ratios, utility  
21 dividend yields are at historically low levels. Similarly, with high stock prices,  
22 and with interest rates expected to rise, utility analysts are not optimistic about  
23 future stock performance, and they have trimmed their growth forecasts

1 accordingly. This combination of historically low dividend yields and modest  
2 growth expectations produces extremely low DCF results. Had Dr. Powell and  
3 Mr. Lawton reasonably considered their own checks of reasonableness and  
4 explicitly considered higher expected interest rates, they would have seen that  
5 their ROE recommendations are unreasonably low.

6 **Q. Should the Commission explicitly consider higher interest rates in its**  
7 **evaluation of ROE?**

8 A. Yes. Performing an ROE analysis with data from the bottom of an interest rate  
9 cycle, which includes the lowest interest rates in 40 years, causes a substantial  
10 underestimation of the ROE expected by investors. I have included as Exhibit  
11 UP&L\_\_\_ (SCH-1R), recent interest rate projections from *Standard & Poor's* and  
12 *Value Line*. Although these data, or projections like these, were available to Dr.  
13 Powell and Mr. Lawton when they prepared their testimony, they effectively  
14 ignored these important economic facts. The final result is an unrealistically low  
15 ROE – a result that can be avoided with an appropriate, more broadly based  
16 approach to estimating ROE.

17 **II. Rebuttal of Dr. Powell**

18 **Q. Are there similarities between Dr. Powell's DCF analysis and yours?**

19 A. Yes. In our analyses, we use the same group of comparable companies and our  
20 DCF models are mechanically similar. Dr. Powell summarizes his results on page  
21 23. His Constant Growth DCF range is from 9.2 percent to 10.5 percent, as he  
22 disregards the unusually low outcome from the “25/75 weighting” approach. His  
23 Two-Stage DCF range is from 9.0 percent to 10.0 percent, as he again disregards

1 the “25/75 weighting” approach. He calls the outcome from his Market Model  
2 “unusually low” (Powell at 21) and also disregards it entirely.

3 Like Dr. Powell, I offer two versions of the Constant Growth model (based on  
4 different growth rate sources) and also a Two-Stage Non-constant Growth model  
5 based on *Value Line*’s very low near-term dividend projections and then a higher  
6 projected growth rate in later years. The results of my initial DCF models are  
7 shown on page one of my Direct Testimony Exhibits Schedules 3. My initial  
8 DCF range was 10.7 percent to 11.4 percent. As I will demonstrate below, the  
9 principal differences between our DCF results stem from the growth rates we used  
10 in our respective models.

11 **Q. What does Dr. Powell’s DCF analysis show when other combinations of his**  
12 **growth rates are considered?**

13 A. In my Exhibit UP&L\_\_\_ (SCH-2R), I demonstrate the sensitivity of Dr. Powell’s  
14 DCF analysis to his selection and averaging of growth rates. My updates to Dr.  
15 Powell’s analysis are based on two general premises: 1) Negative *Value Line*  
16 growth rates should be eliminated. It is not reasonable to expect that a company  
17 would sustain negative dividend or earnings growth into perpetuity; and 2) near-  
18 term dividend growth should not be included in the Constant Growth models.  
19 Current near-term dividend growth rates are abnormally low and are not  
20 indicative of long-term sustainable growth. Furthermore, in the Two-Stage  
21 model, Dr. Powell and I both already include low near-term dividend growth in  
22 the first stage of the Model with higher growth rates in later years.  
23 A summary of my updates to Dr. Powell’s DCF analysis is contained on page 1 of

1 Exhibit UP&L\_\_\_ (SCH-2R). Line 1 of this Exhibit shows Dr. Powell's original  
2 results (10.0% to 10.5%) for the Constant Growth and Two-Stage Models, using  
3 the same 5.85 percent GDP growth rate he uses. The second line of Exhibit  
4 UP&L\_\_\_ (SCH-2R) shows the ROE results (10.2% to 10.7%) with a 20-year  
5 GDP growth rate of 6.0 percent, as accepted by Mr. Lawton. The third line  
6 reflects the ROE range (10.5% to 11.1%) with Dr. Powell's update of the 40-year  
7 GDP growth rate (6.4%) that I used in my initial testimony.<sup>1</sup>  
8 Lines 4-6 of Exhibit UP&L \_\_\_ (SCH-2R) show the revised results of Dr.  
9 Powell's Constant Growth DCF analysis if only earnings growth and GDP growth  
10 are considered. This approach is reasonable because current near-term dividend  
11 growth is abnormally low and including such low growth rates in the DCF  
12 analysis unreasonably biases the analysis downward. Because the Two-Stage  
13 model already considers low near-term dividend growth in the first growth stage,  
14 it was only run under scenarios that also included long-term GDP growth in the  
15 second growth stage. Line 4 of Exhibit UP&L\_\_\_ (SCH-2R) reflects the  
16 Constant Growth DCF result if earnings growth rates from Zacks and Value Line  
17 and GDP growth of 5.85 percent (Dr. Powell's figure) are considered. Lines 5 and  
18 6 show the same results when Mr. Lawton's and the updated 40 year GDP growth  
19 rate is used. The Constant Growth DCF model (lines 4-6) produces a range of  
20 10.0 percent to 10.3 percent. Combining all the revised DCF results as shown in  
21 Exhibit UP&L\_\_\_ (SCH-2R), Lines 9-11, produces a range of 10.0 percent to  
22 11.1 percent, with a midpoint of 10.6 percent.

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<sup>1</sup> My initial 40-year GDP average growth rate was 6.6%. The 6.4% rate is from Dr. Powell's recalculation of my average using additional data.

1 The foregoing shows that Dr. Powell's DCF analysis is quite sensitive to his  
2 particular selection of growth rate combinations and averages, and, more  
3 importantly, that his 10.0 percent recommendation is well below results he might  
4 have obtained using the very same data.

5 **Q. Is there support for using a wider range of growth rates, beyond only**  
6 **analysts' estimates, when using the DCF model?**

7 A. Yes. Although I don't disagree that analysts' 3-to-5 year forecasts may be part of  
8 the growth estimate, most regulatory economists typically consider a wider range  
9 of growth inputs. Also, as I explained previously, under present market and  
10 utility industry conditions, it appears that near-term analysts' forecasts are low  
11 relative to the longer run investor growth rate expectations, which are required for  
12 the DCF model.<sup>2</sup> In my Direct Testimony, in addition to Zacks and *Value Line's*  
13 earnings growth projections, I considered a forecast of long-term nominal growth  
14 in U.S Gross Domestic Product (GDP). My GDP growth forecast of 6.6 percent  
15 is based on various periodic historical growth rates in GDP from the past 40  
16 years.

17 **Q. Is there specific support for including GDP growth as a proxy for investors'**  
18 **long-term growth expectations?**

19 A. Yes. As Dr. Powell acknowledges, in the well regarded Brigham and Gapenski  
20 *Financial Management* text, the authors offer the following in their discussion of  
21 the DCF model:

22 Expected growth rates vary from company to company, but  
23 dividend growth on average is expected to continue in the

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<sup>2</sup> The growth rate required for the traditional constant growth DCF model is investors' expected very long run growth rate in dividends per share, technically to infinity.



1 foreseeable future at about the same rate as that of the nominal  
2 gross domestic product (real GDP plus inflation). On this basis, one  
3 might expect the dividend of an average, or “normal,” company to  
4 grow at a rate of 6 to 8 percent a year. (Eugene F. Brigham and  
5 Louis C. Gapenski, *Financial Management Theory and Practice*,  
6 9th ed., p. 335)

7 In this context, it is entirely appropriate to include longer-term, more general  
8 measures of growth that may affect investors’ long-term growth rate expectations.


9 **Q. Did you update Dr. Powell's CAPM analysis to include projected interest  
10 rates?**

11 A. Yes. This result is shown on line 8 of Exhibit UP&L\_\_\_ (SCH-2R). His CAPM  
12 result (shown on line 7 of Exhibit UP&L\_\_\_ (SCH-2R)) is based on a 30-year  
13 Treasury bond rate of 5.05 percent. I updated his analysis using *Standard &*  
14 *Poor's* projected 1st quarter 2006 long-term Treasury bond rate of 5.8 percent.  
15 This adjustment increases Dr. Powell's midpoint CAPM result from 11.05 percent  
16 to 11.8 percent. As shown on lines 9-11 of Exhibit UP&L\_\_\_ (SCH-2R), when  
17 the updated CAPM results are combined with the updated DCF results discussed  
18 earlier, the ROE range is 10.0 percent to 11.8 percent, with a midpoint of 10.9  
19 percent.


20 **Q. Is there evidence from Dr. Powell's testimony that interest rates are  
21 increasing, especially in comparison to the mid-2003 time period when the  
22 Company's last rate case was filed?**

23 A. Yes. Dr. Powell offers several charts that demonstrate the increasing trend in  
24 capital costs. Dr. Powell's chart data ended in October 2004, and I have added  
25 additional data available for November. The following are his updated Prime  
26 Rate and Inflation charts as originally provided on pages 28-29 of his testimony.

1 I have added a third chart showing the Fed Funds rate. This chart was provided  
2 by Dr. Powell in his electronic workpapers. I have included this additional chart  
3 because it emphasizes the rapid degree to which Chairman Alan Greenspan and  
4 the Federal Reserve Board are tightening short term interest rates. There have  
5 been five increases in the Fed Funds rate in 2004 alone (with the last one on  
6 December 14, 2004), and more increases are expected. All these charts clearly  
7 illustrate the higher level of short-term rates and inflation associated with the  
8 current 2004 docket as compared to the 2003 case. Economists generally expect  
9 that these increases in short-term interest and inflation rates will eventually be  
10 reflected in long-term interest rates.




Source: St. Louis Federal Reserve



Source: St. Louis Federal Reserve

1



Source: St. Louis Federal Reserve

2

3 **Q. Based on your analysis of Dr. Powell’s DCF and CAPM estimates, what are**  
 4 **your general conclusions and recommendations?**

5 A. Dr. Powell’s analysis appears to be mechanically correct and we have no  
 6 disagreement about the comparable company group. His analysis, however, is  
 7 deficient in three areas:

- 1 1) The growth rates in his DCF analysis are below reasonable estimates of  
2 long-term investor expectations;
- 3
- 4 2) He failed to reasonably consider his CAPM results as a check of  
5 reasonableness on his final DCF-based recommendation; and  
6
- 7 3) He failed to consider explicitly the effects of higher projected interest  
8 rates in his analysis.

9 These deficiencies result in an unreasonably low estimate of ROE.

10 **Q. Beginning at page 7, Dr. Powell begins a 10-page discussion criticizing your**  
11 **use of the GDP growth rate in portions of your DCF analysis. How do you**  
12 **respond to Dr. Powell's criticisms?**

13 A. Unfortunately, a significant portion of Dr. Powell's criticism may have been  
14 caused by a mistake I made in the last page of my Exhibit UP&L\_\_\_\_ (SCH-3) and  
15 in responding to DPU Data Request No. 4.27. In the exhibit, I stated that the 6.6  
16 percent long term GDP growth was the "Average of GDP Growth during the last  
17 10 year, 20 year, 30 year, and 40 year growth periods." In the response to DPU  
18 Data Request No. 4.27, I provided a spreadsheet file that contained GDP data only  
19 for the time period 1961-2001. As Dr. Powell pointedly noted in his criticism,  
20 data through 2003 were available when I prepared my testimony in this case; and,  
21 most important, I used those more recent data in my 6.6 percent estimate of GDP  
22 growth. In fact, a printed copy of the correct GPD data through 2003, showing  
23 the 6.6 percent average GDP growth rate, was included in my workpapers when  
24 the case was filed. The Company has also now provided a corrected response to  
25 DPU 4.27, and I have included the corrected response as Exhibit UP&L\_\_\_\_  
26 (SCH-3R).

27 As shown in Exhibit UP&L\_\_\_\_ (SCH-3R), my 6.6 percent GDP growth estimate

1 is the simple average of six overlapping time periods for 1947-2003 (all the GDP  
2 data available from the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank data base). I averaged the  
3 data for 10 years, 20 years, 30, years, 40 years, 50 years, and for the entire 56-  
4 year period. My 6.6 percent estimated growth rate is the average of these six  
5 averages. This weighted average approach gives more weight to the more recent  
6 years because the data for those years are repetitively included in each longer  
7 averaging period. This estimation approach is often used under the assumption  
8 that more recent data have more effect on current expectations, but that more  
9 distant time periods should not be ignored entirely.

10 Dr. Powell also criticizes my 6.6 percent GDP growth rate by noting that I have  
11 used only a 20-year average in some prior cases. Dr. Powell is correct in his  
12 observation about older prior cases, but he is incorrect in his refusal to include  
13 GDP data from more than 20 years ago. The period that Dr. Powell selects (1984-  
14 2003) is renowned for its declining and low inflation rates and for its relative  
15 stability. I expanded my data period to include a broader range of possible  
16 economic outcomes because the potential for more volatile outcomes clearly may  
17 affect investors long-term growth rate expectations, as required for the DCF  
18 model.

19 This feature is prominent in a recent *BusinessWeek* article by the Dean of  
20 Columbia Business School, Glenn Hubbard. Dean Hubbard offered the  
21 following:

22 The Federal Reserve's 20-year successful effort to rid the U.S.  
23 economic system of inflation is something Americans should  
24 value. ... That inflation is associated with macroeconomic  
25 instability *is clear in the memories* of those who lived through the

1 Great Inflation of the 1960s, '70s, and early '80s. ... High inflation  
2 acts as a tax on investment, raising rates, increasing the cost of  
3 equity-financed investment, and reducing corporate equity values.  
4 (A Gold Medal for the Fed's Inflation Fighters, *BusinessWeek*,  
5 January 10, 2005, p. 28, emphasis added.)

6 Dr. Powell's statistical analysis (at page 10) only serves to reinforce the fact that  
7 his 20-year time period is significantly different from other kinds of economic  
8 conditions that reasonably should be included in gauging investors' long-term  
9 expectations. When a more reasonable view of investors' long-term expectations  
10 is included, Dr. Powell's DCF results are considerably higher than the low 10  
11 percent ROE he recommends.

12 **III. Rebuttal of Mr. Lawton**

13 **Q. What are your general comments from your review of Mr. Lawton's**  
14 **testimony?**

15 A. Mr. Lawton's testimony is deficient and it does not support an ROE as low as the  
16 10.0 percent he recommends. In fact, Mr. Lawton's only independent ROE  
17 analysis is a brief presentation of the traditional constant growth DCF model (at  
18 pages 7-10), which produces an ROE range of only 9.2 percent - 9.3 percent. The  
19 remainder of his ROE testimony is rebuttal of my analysis based on his so called  
20 "corrections" to my methodology and input assumptions.

21 Even with Mr. Lawton's inappropriate changes to my models, however, the table  
22 on page 22 of his testimony is telling. In the right-hand column of that table, Mr.  
23 Lawton shows that, even with his best efforts to "correct" my analysis, the results  
24 produce an average ROE of 10.575% (10.6% rounded). But for his insistence on  
25 including the unreasonably low 9.2 percent constant growth DCF, with his own  
26 inputs, Mr. Lawton's "corrections" to my analysis produce an ROE of 10.6

1 percent. This result is similar to the bottom of the DCF range I presented in my  
2 initial testimony, and, along with the deficiencies in Dr. Powell's analysis I  
3 discussed previously, it shows that the CCS and DPU 10 percent ROE  
4 recommendations are unreasonably low. Given these results, the CCS and DPU  
5 should have supported, at a minimum, the 10.7 percent ROE established in the  
6 Company's 2003 case.

7 **Q. How does Mr. Lawton develop his independent ROE estimate?**

8 A. Mr. Lawton's sole independent ROE estimate is based on the traditional dividend  
9 yield plus constant growth DCF model. He describes his analysis on pages 7-10  
10 of his testimony. He uses a 6-week average of prices and calculates a comparable  
11 group "base" dividend yield of 4.3 percent to 4.4 percent. He later increases the  
12 base yield by one-half the growth rate to produce a final dividend yield of 4.4  
13 percent to 4.5 percent. For his growth rate estimate, he reviews earnings data and  
14 3-to-5 year projections from *Value Line* and *Zacks* as well as a 3-to-5 year "b  
15 times r" sustainable growth projection. From this data he selects a growth rate  
16 range of 4.5 percent to 4.8 percent, which, with his final dividend yields, produces  
17 an ROE range of 8.9 percent to 9.3 percent. At page 10, line 10, he states that the  
18 resulting ROE is 9.2 percent to 9.3 percent, which apparently he calculates by  
19 adding his dividend yields (4.4%-4.5%) to the high end of his growth rate range  
20 (4.8%).

21 **Q. Is Mr. Lawton's DCF analysis an adequate basis for estimating PacifiCorp's**  
22 **ROE?**

23 A. No. It does not appear that Mr. Lawton places much weight on his own DCF

1 analysis. In fact, other than redoing my constant growth analysis with a slightly  
2 lower growth rate, the remainder of his ROE testimony focuses on my alternative  
3 DCF and risk premium models. As I noted above, from these models with his  
4 own input assumptions, Mr. Lawton produces a so-called “Hadaway Updated”  
5 average ROE of 10.6 percent (Lawton at 22, Table 5). Mr. Lawton creates the  
6 10.6 percent average in his table by initially discarding the 9.2 percent low  
7 estimate (from the constant growth model) and the 11.5 percent estimate from the  
8 Harris and Marston risk premium data. I would not disagree with Mr. Lawton’s  
9 methodology to this point. However, he then returns to the 9.2 percent constant  
10 growth DCF estimate (at 23, line 25), effectively giving it equal weight with the  
11 10.6 percent average, to rationalize his 10.0 percent recommendation. In his  
12 Table 5, if Mr. Lawton had not thrown out the low (9.2%) and high (11.5%)  
13 results, his average would have been 10.5 percent. Based on his own logic, it is  
14 inappropriate for Mr. Lawton then to use the 9.2 percent anomalous result to  
15 justify a 10.0 percent final ROE recommendation. Mr. Lawton’s  
16 recommendation, based on his own input assumptions, should have been at least  
17 10.6 percent.

18 **Q. Beginning on page 16, Mr. Lawton criticizes your risk premium analysis**  
19 **saying that your projected interest rates are not appropriate and that you are**  
20 **inconsistent in your methodologies. How do you respond?**

21 A. Mr. Lawton is correct that in some past cases I have used current interest rates in  
22 my risk premium analysis. However, as I explained in my direct testimony and  
23 have explained again in this testimony, I do not believe it is currently reasonable



1 to base an ROE estimate on recent interest rate data, which represent a 40-year  
2 low in the interest rate cycle, when consensus economic forecasts are for much  
3 higher rates in the coming year.

4 Much more important, however, Mr. Lawton's own interest rate analysis and his  
5 statements about inconsistency among my risk premium methods are simply  
6 wrong. At page 16, lines 11-13, Mr. Lawton states that Mr. Williams' forecasted  
7 interest rates for March 2005 and March 2006 are lower than my forecasts by  
8 about 50 basis points. He references page 6 of Mr. Williams' testimony for his  
9 data. On page 6 of Mr. Williams Direct Testimony, Mr. Williams develops  
10 projected rates for 10-year notes that PacifiCorp plans to issue. The interest rates  
11 in my risk premium analysis are for long-term debt, not 10-year notes, which  
12 easily explains the 50 basis point difference upon which Mr. Lawton chooses to  
13 focus. This 50 basis point maturity/yield differential is easily seen in the 10-year  
14 Treasury Note versus 30-year Treasury Bond interest rate projections from both  
15 the S&P and *Value Line* as shown in my Exhibit SCH-1R. Although Mr. Lawton  
16 ultimately reverts to a lower historical interest rate, and ignores projected rates  
17 altogether, (at 17, line 15), had he not mismatched maturities and had he  
18 reasonably considered projected rates, his own risk premium results would have  
19 been 50 basis points higher and would have produced an ROE estimate of 10.5  
20 percent to 11.1 percent, rather than the 10.0 percent to 10.6 percent he notes on  
21 page 17.

22 Mr. Lawton is also incorrect in his statement (at 16, line 18) that my risk premium  
23 analysis is inconsistent. While it is true that the Ibbotson and the Harris and

1 Marston risk premiums are not adjusted for the inverse relationship between risk  
2 premiums and interest rate levels, Mr. Lawton’s criticism in this regard is  
3 incorrect because average interest rates in the Ibbotson data are about the same as  
4 recent rates (6.2%). Also, given the very long-term nature of the Ibbotson data  
5 (1926-2003), I have never seen any analysis that proposes to adjust that data as  
6 Mr. Lawton suggests. Finally, as Mr. Lawton is aware, I did not average in the  
7 higher Harris and Marston risk premium anywhere in my analysis. In this regard,  
8 Mr. Lawton’s criticism of the Harris and Marston data is a red herring.

9 **IV. Rebuttal of Mr. Binz**

10 **Q. What is Mr. Binz’s position on PacifiCorp’s allowed rate of return?**

11 A. Other than his misleading graph of Scottish Power’s stock price performance  
12 (page 10), he provides no analysis to support his recommendation that  
13 PacifiCorp’s rate of return should be lowered from the 10.7 percent established in  
14 the prior case. Based on his price performance graph, Mr. Binz says that there is  
15 “circumstantial evidence that the cost of equity has fallen...” (at 11, lines 11-12)

16 **Q. Why do you believe that Mr. Binz’s graph on page 10 is misleading?**

17 A. In that graph Mr. Binz plots what he labels as “Scottish Power” versus the Dow  
18 Jones Utility Average (DJUA) and the Value Line Utilities Index (VLUI). For  
19 Scottish Power, Mr. Binz uses the price changes of the Scottish Power American  
20 Depository Receipts (ADRs), which are denominated in U.S. Dollars and trade on  
21 the New York Stock Exchange under the symbol SPI. For the period 12/1/2003  
22 to 12/1/2004 on Mr. Binz’s graph, SPI and the DJUA increased by over 20  
23 percent. Based on this result, he concludes that the cost of capital for Scottish

1 Power has declined.  
2 Mr. Binz's analysis is misleading because *at least half* of the SPI price increase he  
3 shows is due to currency fluctuations. During the period of Mr. Binz's analysis,  
4 Scottish Power's underlying shares (which trade in the UK in British Pounds  
5 under the symbol SPW) increased by only about 10 percent. This is only half the  
6 amount that Mr. Binz claims for the SPI dollar denominated ADRs. During this  
7 period, the British Pound also increased in value against the dollar by about 10  
8 percent, from \$1.72 per Pound to \$1.89 per Pound. Therefore, the dollar-  
9 denominated SPI shares in Mr. Binz's analysis (whose value is determined by the  
10 exchange ratio for SPW shares) benefited from both the 10 percent increase in  
11 underlying SPW share price plus a 10 percent increase in the value of the British  
12 Pound versus the U.S. dollar.

13 In Exhibit UP&L\_\_\_ (SCH-4R), I present the specific data required to evaluate  
14 Mr. Binz's analysis and conclusions. Column 1 of the exhibit shows that, during  
15 the period on Mr. Binz's graph, SPW shares increased from 356.23 pence to  
16 392.34 pence (10.14%). Column 2 shows, as noted above, that the \$/£ ratio  
17 increased from \$1.7209 to \$1.8948 (10.11%). Column 3 shows that the SPI ADR  
18 shares used in Mr. Binz's analysis increased from \$25.23 to \$ 30.21 (20.13%).  
19 For comparison, column 4 shows that the DJUA increased from 253.81 to 319.68  
20 (25.95%) during the same period. Directly contrary to Mr. Binz's claims, these  
21 data show that the underlying Scottish Power shares underperformed the DJUA  
22 by more than one-half. Such a result does not indicate that Scottish Power's cost  
23 of capital has declined. Mr. Binz's analysis and comments on ROE should be

1           disregarded because they are entirely misleading and based on improper  
2           comparisons.

3   **V.   Conclusion**

4   **Q.   Does this conclude your rebuttal testimony?**

5   A.   Yes, it does.