BEFORE THE

PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

In the Matter of the Application of Rocky Mountain Power for Authority To Increase its Retail Electric Utility Service Schedules and Electric Service Regulations, Consisting of a General Rate Increase of Approximately \$161.2 Million Per Year, and for Approval of a New Large Load Surcharge Docket No. 07-035-93 Direct Testimony of Philip Hayet for the Committee of Consumer Services

APRIL 7, 2008

Table of Contents

I.	Introduction and Summary	2
II.	SMUD Contract Modeling Adjustment	5
III.	Monthly Outage Rates Adjustment	17
IV.	Deration of Unit Capacity, Heat Rate, and Uneconomic Generation Adjustment	22
v.	Biomass Non-Generation Agreement, Sunnyside QF Contract, and Schwendiman QF Contract Adjustments	28

1		
2		I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
3	Q.	PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME AND BUSINESS ADDRESS.
4	А.	Philip Hayet, 215 Huntcliff Terrace, Atlanta, GA 30350.
5	Q.	PLEASE STATE YOUR OCCUPATION, EMPLOYMENT, AND ON
6		WHOSE BEHALF YOU ARE TESTIFYING.
7	А.	I am an Electrical Engineer, and work as a utility regulatory consultant. I am
8		President of Hayet Power Systems Consulting ("HPSC"). I am appearing in this
9		case as a witness on behalf of the Utah Committee of Consumer Services
10		("Committee").
11	Q.	BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THE NATURE OF THE CONSULTING SERVICES
12		PROVIDED BY HPSC.
13	А.	HPSC provides consulting services in the electric utility industry. Our clients
14		primarily include state agencies. The firm provides expertise in resource planning
15		and fuel supply issues. Current clients include the Georgia and Louisiana Public
16		Service Commissions, and the Utah Committee of Consumer Services.
17		
18		
19		

20 Q. PLEASE STATE YOUR EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND.

A. I graduated from Purdue University in 1979 with a B.S. degree in Electrical
 Engineering, and in 1980, I received a M.S. degree in Electrical Engineering from
 the Georgia Institute of Technology, with a specialization in Power Systems.

24 Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR QUALIFICATIONS AND APPEARANCES.

A. I have more than twenty years of experience in the electric utility industry in the
 areas of generation resource planning, economic analysis, and rate analysis. I have
 participated in and filed testimony concerning numerous cases involving
 PacifiCorp net power cost issues. My qualifications and appearances can be found
 in Exhibit CCS 5.1 attached to my testimony.

30 Q. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR TESTIMONY?

A. I, along with Committee witness Randall J. Falkenberg, address modeling issues
related to PacifiCorp's calculation of Net Variable Power Costs ("NVPC") using
its Generation and Regulation Initiatives Decision ("GRID") model for the
projected test period, January 1 through December 31, 2008. All of the
adjustments that I propose will be incorporated into Mr. Falkenberg's Table 1.

36 Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR TESTIMONY.

A. I have identified and quantified the following adjustments and issues regarding
PacifiCorp's GRID modeling in this proceeding:

39

40 <u>Long T</u> 41	erm Firm ("LTF") Contract Adjustments
42	 Sacramento Municipal Utility District ("SMUD") contract
43	• Sunnyside qualifying facility ("QF") contract
44	Biomass QF contract
45	Schwendiman QF contract
ŀ6	
7	
8 <u>Monthl</u>	ly Outage Rates Adjustment
9	
	The Company computes generating unit forced outage rates that it models in GRID
	using actual data covering a four-year historical period. Instead of using the more
	common utility industry practice of creating annual average forced outage rates
	from this data, and using that in its production cost modeling, the Company creates
	average monthly forced outage rates. This approach is contrary to standard
	industry practice and we recommend the use of annual average forced outage rates.
	Mr. Falkenberg has computed an adjustment based on the use of annual average
	forced outage rates, which is included in his Table 1.
3	
	on of Unit Capacity, Heat Rate, and Uneconomic Generation Adjustment
)	We have identified several modeling issues including immerse dention of writ
	We have identified several modeling issues including improper deration of unit
	capacity, the use of incorrect heat rates, and uneconomic generation which occurs in GRID. The deration and heat rate issues are easily correctable, and we have
	made adjustments to properly account for those problems. We have also identified
	a problem in which GRID commits generating units in a sub-optimal manner,
	which as I will discuss stands in stark contrast to the objectives of a production
	cost model. Mr. Falkenberg has developed adjustments for each of these items,
	which he also discusses in his testimony, and the results are found in Table 1 in his
	testimony.
0	
1	
· •	

II. SMUD CONTRACT MODELING ADJUSTMENT

73 Q. PLEASE DISCUSS THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE 74 SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT ("SMUD") 75 CONTRACT.

76 The SMUD contract is a 30-year sales contract scheduled to expire in 2014, Α. 77 whereby PacifiCorp supplies SMUD 350,400 MWh of on-peak power (at a rate of 100 mW per hour).¹ The 2008 contract price is \$21.46/MWh, based on a formula 78 tied to the average cost of Jim Bridger fuel and O&M costs (see PacifiCorp 79 80 response to DR CCS 13.9). This price is substantially below market. In this 81 proceeding, the Company proposes to price the contract in GRID at \$37/MWh 82 rather than the actual contract price. This treatment is based on decisions the Commission made in the 1999 and 2001 General Rate Case proceedings, Docket 83 84 Nos. 99-035-10 and 01-035-01, respectively.

85

In the 1999 proceeding, the Commission required additional revenues to be imputed on the basis that the contract prices charged to SMUD were unreasonably low. In its Final Order in the 2001 case, Docket No. 01-035-01, the Commission summarized the history of this issue:

90As in the immediately preceding general rate case for this91Company, Docket No. 99-035-10, this Commission is asked to

¹ In GRID, PacifiCorp specifies the SMUD energy value as 351,400 MWh. The Company incorrectly included more energy than the actual contract energy, because it adds energy for the leap day in February. Mr. Falkenberg addresses this issue in his testimony.

92 impute revenues to a 1987 long-term firm wholesale contract with 93 SMUD to counter the contract's adverse impact on the net power cost portion of jurisdictional revenue requirement. In that Docket, 94 95 the Commission did order imputation because the contract obligated the Company to serve SMUD at \$16.85 per MWh at the 96 time it was entered, a rate much below the then-current rate for 97 power. In addition, SMUD paid the Company \$94 million at the 98 outset of the contract that it retained and was not used to benefit 99 ratepayers. Nor was this the first time the imputation had been 100 made. In connection therewith, both here and in other PacifiCorp 101 102 iurisdictions, a contract with Southern California Edison (SCE) entered at about the same time for \$42 per MWh had been 103 104 considered an appropriate benchmark for imputation. The evidence in Docket No. 99-035-10 showed that the SCE contract 105 had been renegotiated to a rate of \$37 per MWh due to structural 106 changes in the wholesale market. In other words, the Commission 107 recognized that wholesale prices, which had fallen, were now on a 108 different path. This, and the fact that the renegotiation was closer 109 110 in time to the test period, persuaded the Commission to select the 111 \$37 rate as the basis for imputation, a rate indicating how such a contract might perform over time. Re PacifiCorp, UPSC Docket 112 No. 01-035-01, Report and Order at 24-25 (Sept. 10, 2001). 113

114 Q. HAVE ANY SUBSEQUENT CASES ADDRESSED THIS ISSUE?

- 115 A. The settlements in the recent cases did not specifically address the issue of what
- the proper price for SMUD should be.

117 Q. WHY SHOULD THE COMMISSION RE-EXAMINE THE SMUD

118 CONTRACT ISSUE FOR THIS CASE?

119 A. There are three important reasons why the Commission should address this issue

- 120 now. <u>First</u>, wholesale power prices have continued to increase since the adoption
- 121 of the Utah order in the 2001 case. Indeed, the SCE contract that was the basis for
- the \$37/MWh was subsequently renegotiated and the most recent contract prices

```
CCS 5D Hayet
```

Page 7

123	have been much higher. In 2001, the price was \$84.5, and since 2002 the price has
124	been \$60/MWh. Second, the SCE contract terminated in September 2006, and
125	since SCE was selected by the Commission as a prudent benchmark contract
126	contemporaneous to SMUD, the basis for imputing the price of \$37/MWh no
127	longer exists. Consequently, the Commission should decide again on the proper
128	basis for handling this issue for the remaining seven (7) years of the SMUD
129	contract.

130

Finally, the \$37/MWh figure was questionable from the start, and did not actually 131 reflect prices used in the SCE contract. In fact, in 2001 the Commission itself 132 133 questioned the basis for the \$37/MWh rate but did retain that as the proxy price because it believed it to be compensatory, as will be discussed later. Review of the 134 135 final order in Docket No. 01-035-01 suggests that the Commission's basis for 136 selection of the \$37/MWh price is no longer appropriate and that the Commission 137 invited parties to address this issue again in subsequent cases. The Commission's Order stated, "Consequently, we accept the \$37/MWh figure and await further 138 139 argument in a future case." (PacifiCorp, UPSC Docket No. 01-035-01, Report and Order at 25, Sept. 10, 2001) 140

141 Q. WOULD IT BE PROPER TO BASE REVENUES FROM THE SMUD 142 CONTRACT ON THE CURRENT SMUD CONTRACT PRICE?

CCS 5D Hayet

Page 8

143 A .	No. The actual SMUD contract price (\$21.46/MWh in 2008) is not compensatory.
144	The Company entered into this contract after receiving an up-front payment of \$98
145	million, which it retained for itself. ² As a result, PacifiCorp shareholders, not
146	ratepayers, should bear the risk of this contract until it expires. Exhibit CCS 5.2
147	provides a copy of the Company's response to CCS DR 6.28, which explains the
148	history of the transaction as of 1991. This was in the form of a letter from Mr.
149	Gregory Duvall to a regulatory Commission in another state.
150	
151	Noteworthy in this history is that when the Company first entered into the SMUD
152	agreement, it appears that the Company expected it would obtain low cost power
153	from BPA in concert with the SMUD sale, and would assign that power to SMUD.
154	(Response to CCS DRs 6.29 and 6.30) The low cost power from BPA became
155	available through an agreement between BPA and PacifiCorp that settled a lawsuit
156	related to PacifiCorp's interest in the uncompleted WNP-3 nuclear unit. The
157	Company, however, ended up deferring the right to accept the BPA power, and in
158	1996 forfeited those rights when it let the agreement with BPA expire.
159	
160	As a result, the Company failed to obtain the low cost power that it could have

used to supply the SMUD contract, but kept the \$98 million up-front payment, and
ended up supplying the SMUD contract through other available system resources.

² The Commission's orders mention a \$94 million payment, while the Company's response to DR CCS 6.28 providing the history of the SMUD contract mentions the payment was \$98 million.

Page 9

163 Subsequently, the Commission began imputing a price to the transaction, as 164 discussed above.

165 Q. IS THE \$37/MWH PRICE COMPENSATORY AT THIS TIME?

166 A. No. This price is substantially below current wholesale market prices, and the 167 revenues derived based on this price are insufficient to cover PacifiCorp's cost to 168 serve the contract. The SMUD contract is modeled in GRID as a call option for on-peak power. This means that the model optimizes the delivery schedule of the 169 170 energy sold to SMUD, under the terms of the contract, in order to maximize the 171 benefit to SMUD. Removing PacifiCorp's obligation to serve SMUD from within 172 GRID, and removing the revenues based on the \$37/MWh that have been imputed 173 for the sale to SMUD results in a savings to PacifiCorp's NVPC of \$13.7 million. 174 In other words, at the cost that it takes to serve the SMUD contract, PacifiCorp's 175 customers would have to receive an additional \$13.7 million in revenue just to 176 break even on the contract. Therefore, an imputed price of \$37/MWh is not 177 sufficient for PacifiCorp's customers to even recover the cost to serve the SMUD 178 contract.

179 Q. PARTIES HAVE RAISED THIS ISSUE IN OTHER CASES. HOW HAS 180 THE COMPANY RESPONDED?

181 A. The Company has made various arguments. In the most recent Washington case,
182 Company witness Mark Widmer made two primary arguments: 1) Re-pricing

SMUD, just because it has been below market is inequitable. He argued that other
low cost contracts such as Mid-C could just as well have been re-priced for the
same reason.³ 2) He also argued that the SCE contract was renegotiated, thus the
"original" SCE contract remains the relevant comparison.⁴

187 Q. HOW DO YOU RESPOND TO THESE ARGUMENTS?

To address the Company's first point, it is important to understand that the history 188 A. of the SMUD transaction was far different than that of the Mid-C contract. In 189 effect, the Company provided SMUD with a long term below market source of 190 191 power in exchange for an up-front payment. This entire transaction was 192 undertaken to resolve a problem related to an unregulated nuclear project 193 cancellation, as discussed above. The Company also knew from the beginning that the SMUD contract price was below market.⁵ None of these circumstances are 194 195 present with the Mid-C contract. Unless the Commission makes an adjustment to address the effects of the SMUD contract, the Company will have retained the 196 197 benefits of the up-front payment, while ratepayers will continue to pay the high 198 cost of serving the below market contract. There is no basis for assuming that the conditions that existed with regard to the SMUD contract are equivalent to the 199 200 conditions associated with the Mid C contract. In the case of SMUD, it is a matter 201 of prudence and reasonableness of costs. It is not prudent, or reasonable for

⁴ Id.

³ Rebuttal Testimony of Mark T. Widmer WUTC Docket Nos. UE-061564/UE-060817, page 32,

http://www.utahpower.net/Regulatory_Testimony/Regulatory_Testimony72406.pdf

⁵ Id, page 31.

- 202 PacifiCorp to sell power below market, at ratepayer's expense, in exchange for an203 up-front payment that only benefited the shareholders.
- 204

228

- 205 The Company's second argument is even more dubious than the first. The fact is
- that the "original SCE contract" (the \$37/MWh contract) as the Company refers to
- it, was never relevant to anything. As the Commission's 2001 order points out, the
- 208 contract had actually been renegotiated *downward* from \$42/MWh to \$37/MWh in
- 209 1999. However, the \$37/MWh price was never actually used for contract pricing,
- as it was renegotiated again *upward* to \$60/MWh. Further, the Commission
- 211 discovered after adoption of the \$37/MWh price in 1999 that even that price was in
- error. Instead, the actual test year contract price for the 1999 test year was
- 213 \$49.42/MWh:
- PacifiCorp informs us that power cost data in Docket No. 99-03510 contains a test-year SCE contract price of \$49.42, which, it
 alleges, should have been used if the intention was to base
 imputation on a test-year contract price.
- 219We seek a reasonable basis for imputation, once we decide an220imputation must be made. In the previous Docket, \$37 was such an221amount, because it was the most current contract price debated on222the record and it recognized structural changes in the wholesale223market. No party advocated the test year figure of \$49.42 the224Company now calls to our attention. In fact, no party mentioned225the figure in that Docket and we were not aware of it.226Re PacifiCorp. UPSC Docket No. 01-035-01. Report and Order
- 226<u>Re PacifiCorp</u>, UPSC Docket No. 01-035-01, Report and Order227at 24 (Sept. 10, 2001)

229	In fact, the \$37/MWh was never really a relevant price for SCE. In 1999, the
230	contract price was \$49.42/MWh as discussed above. In 2000 and 2001, the actual
231	contract prices were \$47.5/MWh, and \$84.5/MWh, respectively. From 2002 to
232	2006, the SCE contract price was \$60/MWh. In the end, the \$37/MWh was never
233	used for anything other than ratemaking purposes and was itself the result of a
234	contract renegotiation of the earlier SCE contract. While the Commission was
235	satisfied to not adjust the price in its September 2001 order, the Commission stated
236	that its real objective was to find a contract price that was compensatory, which, at
237	the time, the Commission believed the \$37/MWh to be. Indeed, the Commission
238	even indicated it would await further arguments on this issue in future cases.
239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248	Our objective is to impute revenues to the SMUD contract to make it <u>compensatory</u> . The only proposals before us are to apply \$37 or \$47.70 to the SMUD contract. After the testimony and argument in this case, there are enough questions about the SCE contract as an appropriate reference that we will not depart from our previous decision by increasing the imputation to \$47.70. Consequently, we accept the \$37 per MWh figure and await further argument in a future case. (Underline added for emphasis). <u>Re PacifiCorp</u> , UPSC Docket No. 01-035-01, Report and Order at 25 (Sept. 10, 2001) ⁶
249	Given that currently, much higher market prices for power now exist, the
250	\$37/MWh price is clearly no longer compensatory.

⁶ The \$47.70 price was based on another proposal that the Commission had to consider in the 2001 docket for pricing the SMUD contract. It was the 2001 SCE contract rate in place during the 2001 rate case test period.

251 Q. HOW MIGHT THE COMMISSION ADDRESS THIS ISSUE AT THIS 252 TIME?

253 A. The simplest approach would be to remove SMUD from GRID. This would 254 automatically have the effect of imputing revenue at the current market price and 255 would therefore be *compensatory*. The assumption with this approach would be 256 that any cost to serve the contract would be perfectly matched with any revenue 257 received from SMUD and therefore, PacifiCorp customers would not incur any 258 additional costs as a result of PacifiCorp serving the SMUD contract. Removing 259 the SMUD contract in GRID would produce a reduction to NVPC of \$13.71 260 million compared to the GRID run supported by the Company and included in Mr. 261 Duvall's Exhibit GND-1S to his Supplemental Direct Testimony.

262 Q. WHAT DO YOU RECOMMEND THAT THE COMMISSION DO TO 263 RESET THE SMUD PRICE IN THIS RATE CASE?

264 Α. Since the \$37/MWh figure was originally accepted, the Company has continued to 265 increase the price charged to SMUD. The Company's responses to CCS 13.8 and 266 13.9 show that in 1999, the Company charged SMUD \$15.29/MWh, and in 2008 267 the Company is expected to charge an increased amount of \$21.46/MWh. As a 268 result, the Company is now collecting more of the cost of the SMUD contract than 269 it did when the \$37/MWh was first approved for revenue imputation. Thus, the 270 amount of the Company's disallowance has gotten smaller, while the cost of 271 serving SMUD has increased substantially.

CCS 5D Hayet

Page 14

272

273 In the 1999 case, the Company estimated market prices to be approximately \$20.57/MWh and estimated the SMUD contract revenue price to be \$14.66.MWh.⁷ 274 In this case, the market price can be viewed as the cost that PacifiCorp would have 275 276 to be paid in order to break even. Without imputing any additional revenues, the 277 customers would have suffered a loss for each MWh sold of \$5.91/MWh (20.57 – 278 14.66). Therefore, at that time, the \$37/MWh imputed price effectively shielded 279 customers from the energy cost of serving SMUD, and provided customers with 280 additional revenues for each MWh sold of 16.43/MWh (37 - 20.57). These additional revenues effectively provided customers capacity payments to 281 282 compensate for the fact that the SMUD contract required that firm capacity be 283 available to make the sale. In other words, for resource planning purposes, 284 PacifiCorp has to include the SMUD load as a firm load obligation as it determines 285 how much capacity it needs to satisfy its system requirements. In recognition that 286 PacifiCorp received an up-front payment of \$98 million, the imputed revenues in 1999 effectively cost PacifiCorp \$22.34/MWh for each MWh sold to SMUD (37 – 287 288 14.66).

289

In contrast, by 2008 the market price for power has increased substantially based on GRID results. Based on the 2008 test period, the true cost of serving SMUD is \$76.02/MWh for each MWh sold. This is the actual energy rate that PacifiCorp

CCS 5D Hayet

Page 15

293	would have to be paid in order to break even on serving the SMUD contract. This
294	is based on the annual difference in cost between GRID runs with and without the
295	contract, divided by the annual energy sold to SMUD, and it ignores for the
296	moment any revenues that SMUD has to pay under the contract. ⁸ At present, this
297	means that customers are absorbing far more of the cost of serving the contract
298	than the Company. Since the annual cost to serve SMUD is actually \$76.02/MWh,
299	and customers through the regulatory process receive imputed revenues of
300	\$37/MWh, then customers incur losses of \$39.02/MWh for each MWh sold
301	(76.02 - 37). Since revenues have been imputed that the Company is responsible
302	for, it also incurs losses. However, the Company's losses are far lower than the
303	customers, \$15.54/MWh for each MWh sold (37 - 21.46, which is the imputed
304	price less the actual 2008 SMUD contract price).
305	

Continuing to impute revenues based on \$37/MWh, means that as market prices have increased, the cost to customers from SMUD has increased also, while at the same time, the disallowance imposed on the Company has gotten smaller. As a matter of fairness, the Commission should at least require that the disallowance it imposes should reflect the fact that the Company obtains higher revenue each year from the contract. Consequently, I recommend that the Commission index the imputed price (the heretofore \$37/MWh) to the contractual SMUD price. As the

 $^{^7}$ Thus, there was a small mismatch between the actual contract price and that assumed in the 1999 case. 8 \$26,713,389 / /351,400 MWh = \$76.02/MWh

Page 16

313	contract price increased from the \$14.66/MWh expected in the 1999 case to
314	\$21.46/MWh for 2008, or \$6.8/MWh, I recommend the imputed price be increased
315	by the same amount. This results in an imputed price of $43.8/MWh (37 + 6.8)$.
316	This produces an additional disallowance of \$2.38 million (350.4*(43.8-37)) on a
317	total Company basis. The additional disallowance of \$2.38 million is based on the
318	fact that the Company had already built into its GRID results imputed revenues of
319	\$37/MWh for each MWh sold. However, the disallowance per MWh that the
320	Company will incur will be the difference between the actual revenue rate it will
321	receive from SMUD in 2008, \$21.46/MWh and the revised imputed revenue rate
322	of \$43.8/MWh for a total of \$7.8 million (350.4*(43.8-21.46)). This is at least a
323	little more equitable to customers because, based on the way this new adjustment
324	was designed, it is exactly equal to the disallowance the Company first
325	encountered in 1999 of \$7.8 million (350.4*(37-14.66)). Mr. Falkenberg reflects
326	this adjustment on his Table 1.

327

III. MONTHLY OUTAGE RATES ADJUSTMENT

329 Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE NATURE OF THIS ISSUE?

330 A. At the outset, when the Company prepared to project NVPC using GRID covering 331 the 2008 calendar year test period, it had to settle on numerous data assumptions in 332 order to properly model its system. One of the important data assumptions was the 333 generating unit forced outage rate input, which essentially defines the percentage 334 of time that a generating unit will likely be out of service in the future due to unexpected forced outages. Typically utility industry practice has been to develop 335 336 expected forced outage rate assumptions by averaging historical forced outages 337 over some period of time. It has been common practice for utilities to average four 338 or five years of historical data. PacifiCorp uses four years worth of historical data. 339 However, there is another aspect about PacifiCorp's methodology that is quite 340 objectionable. Instead of using this data to compute average annual forced outage 341 rates, PacifiCorp averages four years worth of monthly data to derive monthly 342 projected forced outage rate assumptions.

343 Q. DO YOU AGREE WITH PACIFICORP'S PRACTICE OF USING 344 MONTHLY FORCED OUTAGE RATES?

A. No I do not. I have been involved in preparing and reviewing power cost models
used by many utilities since 1980. In my experience utilities simply do not model
unplanned outage rates for generating units that reflect monthly variations.

Page 18

348

364 365

366 367

368

There are three reasons why I think it would be far superior for PacifiCorp to use annual average forced outage rates in its production cost modeling, versus monthly average forced outage rates.

352 Q. CAN YOU PLEASE EXPLAIN THOSE THREE REASONS?

First, it is unreasonable to assume that forced outages, which are random events, 353 A. can be predicted to occur more frequently in specific months. 354 By contrast predicting that outages will occur randomly over a twelve month period is an 355 356 entirely reasonable assumption. Modeling monthly forced outage rates adds 357 absolutely no value to the accuracy of the results, and in fact, may call the results 358 into question. Second, working with and evaluating monthly outage rates is much 359 more time consuming than working with annual outage rates. This will be 360 beneficial to all parties that continue to work with GRID. Finally, monthly outage 361 rate modeling is a non-standard practice in the industry. PacifiCorp has provided 362 no compelling evidence to prove why the use of monthly forced outage rates is 363 reasonable. In response to CCS DR 21.11, the Company stated,

> Monthly EFOR contributes to the process of normalizing power cost by recognizing that some months have a higher likelihood of outage than other months and outage costs differ by month.

369 PacifiCorp has offered no evidence to support the contention that some months370 have a higher likelihood of outages occurring in those months compared to other

371 months. In fact, a graph that I present below, shows that there is no basis to 372 suggest that outages have a higher likelihood of occurring in one month versus 373 another. I can think of only one case, involving Entergy, where that company 374 briefly used monthly outage rates. However, as I recall, after parties objected to 375 that practice in a FERC proceeding, Entergy modified its practice and has used 376 annual forced outage rates ever since.

377 Q. WHY DON'T UTILITIES NORMALLY USE MONTHLY OUTAGE 378 RATES?


A. Nothing can be readily identified related to any physical or engineering
considerations that might explain why generating units would be more likely to fail
during certain seasons or months, compared to others. Unless one can show that
on a normalized basis a systematic pattern in unplanned outage rates exists,
modeling of monthly outages is simply unrealistic, unnecessary, and antithetical to
the normalization process.

385 Q. CAN YOU PROVIDE AN EXAMPLE OF THE MONTHLY VARIATION 386 IN OUTAGE RATES THAT PACIFICORP HAS ASSUMED FOR ITS 387 UNITS?

A. The following chart shows the monthly outage rates that the Company modeled in
GRID for the Jim Bridger Units 1 - 4. The chart shows that there is no systematic
difference in outage rates from one month to the next when any unit is compared to

the others. Rather, the monthly variations tend to cancel each other out, and do not

392 result in any systematic pattern.



I have used Jim Bridger because it is one of the Company's largest plants, and one of its most important resources, and it has four essentially identical units. If there was any systematic pattern in outages from one month to the next, it should show up in this chart. Instead the chart shows a fairly random pattern of outages. For example during January, which is a cold weather month, the graph shows below average outages for three of the Jim Bridger units, and above average outages for one. February shows just the opposite: above average outages for three units and 401 below average for one. While May is the highest outage month for Unit 3, it is the
402 lowest outage month for Unit 1. This chart shows that monthly variations in
403 outage rates amount to little more than random fluctuations.

404 Q. DO YOU BELIEVE THE SAME RANDOM MONTHLY VARIATIONS IN

405 FORCED OUTAGE RATES WOULD EXIST FOR OTHER PACIFICORP 406 UNITS?

407 A. There is every reason to expect that this same random pattern of monthly outage
408 rates would hold for all of PacifiCorp's generating units. Therefore, I recommend
409 that the Commission require PacifiCorp to develop its estimates of NVPC using
410 annual average forced outages instead of monthly average forced outage rates.

411 Q. DO YOU HAVE AN ADJUSTMENT BASED ON THE USE OF ANNUAL

412 AVERAGE FORCED OUTAGE RATES VERSUS MONTHLY AVERAGE 413 FORCED OUTAGE RATES?

414 A. Mr. Falkenberg also discusses this issue and he replaced the monthly average
415 forced outage rates with annual average forced outage rates, and found that NVPC
416 increased by a small amount. Mr. Falkenberg includes this adjustment as part of
417 his Table 1.

418

419

420 421 422		IV. DERATION OF UNIT CAPACITY, HEAT RATE AND UNECONOMIC GENERATION ADJUSTMENT
423	Q.	ARE YOU FAMILIAR WITH MR. FALKENBERG'S ADJUSTMENT TO
424		DERATE THE MINIMUM CAPACITY OF GENERATING UNITS, AND
425		TO MAKE AN ASSOCIATED HEAT RATE ADJUSTMENT?
426	А.	Yes, I am. Mr. Falkenberg and I collaborated on the development of these
427		adjustments.
428	Q.	PLEASE BRIEFLY EXPLAIN THIS ISSUE.
429	А.	One of the important considerations in production cost modeling is the treatment
430		of generation forced outages, once the outage rates are entered into the production
431		cost model. There are three common techniques used in production cost modeling
432		to account for forced outages, including what's known as the convolution
433		technique, the Monte Carlo method, and the deration method. In GRID, the
434		deration method is used, which essentially reduces the amount of capacity of each
435		generating unit by the expected forced outage rate. For example, assume that a
436		100 MW generating unit has an expected forced outage rate of 10%. In reality, this
437		means it is expected that for 90% of the time the unit will operate at 100 MW, and
438		for 10% of the time the unit will produce 0 MWs, as it is expected to fail during
439		that period. The deration method multiplies the availability rate by the unit
440		capacity and assumes the unit is available to operate for 100% of the time at that
441		capacity, or something less than that capacity. Therefore, in the example above,

the 100 MW unit would be derated by the availability rate and could be operated
anywhere between 0 MW and 90 MW (100 * .9) for the entire time. In other
words, the deration method would never allow the unit to operate above 90 MW.

445 Q. HAS PACIFICORP DESIGNED GRID PROPERLY TO USE THE 446 DERATION METHOD?

447 A. Not exactly, we have discovered that GRID has a flaw in the way that it models 448 capacity derations. We noticed this flaw based on our detailed scrutiny of hourly 449 unit generation results. The problem is that not only should the maximum capacity 450 be derated by the unit availability rate, but each of the other capacity segments, such as the minimum capacity segment, should also be derated by the unit 451 452 availability rate. Based on my experience in instances when the deration method 453 was applied, the entire unit capacity was adjusted using the forced outage rate. Mr. 454 Falkenberg also discusses this issue in his testimony.

455

Similarly, an issue arises with regard to the heat rate curve used to account for the efficiency of the generating unit. Normally, each unit capacity point is associated with a unique point on the heat rate curve. When capacity segments are derated, an adjustment must be made to the heat rate curve so that the proper heat rate is still associated with the derated capacity. If an adjustment is made to derate the capacity of a generating unit, but no corresponding adjustment is made to the heat rate curve, then the wrong heat rate will be used for modeling purposes. Mr.

Page 24

463 Falkenberg explains this issue in greater detail and presents an adjustment intended464 to correct the problem.

465 Q. BESIDES NOTICING THESE ISSUES IN THIS CASE, HAVE YOU 466 ENCOUNTERED SIMILAR ISSUES WITH OTHER UTILITIES?

These sorts of adjustments have been commonplace in situations I've been 467 A. 468 involved with over the years. While working for a production cost model vendor, 469 Energy Management Associates and its successor companies, similar situations at 470 times arose. I have some recollection of times, in which some clients desired to 471 scale the size of a generating unit to a smaller size, but still needed to have the 472 same operating characteristics as the larger sized unit. For example, a client may have wanted to scale a 500 MW coal unit down to become a 250 MW coal unit. 473 474 This may have been of interest in evaluating joint ownership of a new generating 475 unit. To create the 250 MW unit, all capacity segments including the minimum 476 capacity segment, had to be scaled by a factor of .5, not just the maximum capacity 477 segment. Similarly, the heat rate curve had to be modified such that the efficiency 478 when operating as a 250 MW unit would be the same as the efficiency when 479 operating as a 500 MW unit. Scaling the unit in this fashion effectively requires 480 the same process as derating the capacity of the unit to account for forced outage 481 rate modeling. In fact, exactly the same results would be achieved if the company 482 conducting the modeling exercise owned 90% of the unit and another company 483 owned 10% of the unit. The same modeling technique used in adjusting the unit

- 484 characteristics when scaling a unit should be used when modeling forced outage485 rates based on the deration approach.
- 486
- Therefore, the technique proposed by Mr. Falkenberg is well accepted in the
 community of production cost modeling experts, and his adjustments to
 PacifiCorp's NVPC should be accepted by the Commission.

491 <u>Uneconomic Generation Issue</u>

492 Q. ARE YOU ALSO FAMILIAR WITH MR. FALKENBERG'S PROPOSAL

- 493 TO ADJUST GRID TO REMOVE INSTANCES OF UNECONOMIC
 494 GENERATION FROM THE MODEL?
- 495 A. Yes I am. As in the case of the capacity segment deration and heat rate adjustment496 issues, we collaborated on this adjustment as well.

497 Q. IN YOUR EXPERIENCE, IS THERE ANY BASIS FOR ASSUMING IN A

498 PRODUCTION COST MODEL THAT THE COMMITMENT AND

499 DISPATCH SEQUENCE WILL NOT OPTIMIZE PROPERLY AND WILL

500 LEAD TO A MORE COSTLY SOLUTION THAN NECESSARY?

501 **A.** I can't think of any reason, nor do I think that this is an acceptable outcome. The 502 goal of the commitment and dispatch logic in a production cost model is to commit 503 and dispatch the utility's generating unit in an optimal fashion subject to various

504 constraints imposed on the process. These constraints include such considerations 505 as must run requirements, operating reserve requirements, transmission limits, 506 ramp rates, etc. The objective of the production cost model is to find the least cost solution possible, while satisfying these operating constraints. I have worked with 507 a great number of models, and utilities over the years, and it is simply not 508 509 acceptable when something other than the least cost solution to the unit 510 commitment and dispatch process, subject to constraints, emerges from production 511 cost models. Mr. Falkenberg believes that he has identified examples in the GRID 512 model associated with the Company's filing in this case, in which all operating 513 constraints are satisfied, yet GRID does not yield the least cost solution. In my 514 experience, whenever these sorts of problems arise, it means that there is either a 515 data input problem or a problem in the modeling logic. Once such problems are 516 identified, production cost modeling experts go to great lengths to diagnose and 517 solve the problem.

518

Q.

WHAT DO YOU RECOMMEND REGARDING THIS ISSUE?

A. As discussed above, determining the least cost solution, subject to operating constraints is the required result from a production cost model according to the community of utility production cost modeling experts. Based on our analysis, the GRID model fails to meet this objective as required in the industry. For that reason, Mr. Falkenberg's proposed solutions should be adopted by the Commission. Furthermore, I recommend that the Company should endeavor to

```
CCS 5D Hayet
```

525	determine why the uneconomic behavior occurs, and then it should fix the problem
526	or problems. As Mr. Falkenberg points out, the GRID manual itself states that the
527	goal of utility production cost modeling is to achieve the least cost utilization of
528	resources. Given that there are known problems that exist, the GRID model should
529	be corrected before PacifiCorp's next General Rate Case, and Mr. Falkenberg's
530	adjustments to work around these problems should be accepted by the Commission
531	for this case.
532	

535V.BIOMASS NON-GENERATION AGREEMENT, SUNNYSIDE QF536CONTRACT, AND SCHWENDIMAN QF CONTRACT

537

534

538 Biomass Non-Generation Agreement ("BIOMASS")

539 Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE BIOMASS NON-GENERATION AGREEMENT.

540 Α. The Biomass contract is a very high cost QF contract, signed at a time when it was 541 expected avoided costs would be much higher. As a result, the current contract 542 price, \$151/MWh, per the GRID output report, makes it one of the highest cost 543 contracts on the system. For the past three years the Company has negotiated non-544 generation agreements with Biomass. Under this arrangement, for example, in 545 2007, Biomass produced no energy for a set period of time (April - June in 2007). 546 In exchange Biomass was paid an amount that represented a discount from its 547 standard contract rate.

548

549 The non-generation contract was beneficial for PacifiCorp because it got a larger 550 discount from the QF than the cost to replace that power. It was apparently 551 beneficial for Biomass because it avoided the need to purchase expensive fuel at 552 times when replacement power was available at a lower cost in the market. In the 553 end this amounted to a "win-win" situation that benefited both parties.

554 Q. SHOULD THIS ARRANGEMENT BE REFLECTED IN NORMALIZED 555 RATES?

556	A.	Yes it should. The Company has entered into such agreements for the past three
557		years, and the circumstances underlying it appear likely to continue. As a result, I
558		performed a GRID run based on the reasonable assumption that the terms and
559		conditions would be identical to the 2007 agreement. The benefit of including the
560		Biomass Non-Generation Agreement is about \$0.5 million dollars on a total
561		Company basis. Mr. Falkenberg has reflected this in his Table 1.

563 Sunnyside Cogeneration QF Contract

564 Q. PLEASE DISCUSS THE SUNNYSIDE QF CONTRACT?

565 A. The Sunnyside Cogeneraton Associates ("Sunnyside") QF Power Purchase 566 Agreement (PPA) currently operates under the terms of the Third Contract 567 Amendment. Sunnyside is a 30-year PPA that is set to expire in 2023, and is 568 associated with a 45 MW base and an additional 8 MWs of purchase capacity. Since at least 2005, PacifiCorp has been working with Sunnyside to revise the 569 570 Sunnyside PPA, which would result in implementing a Fourth Amendment to the 571 Power Purchase Agreement. The current contract energy pricing has been based on 572 a concept known as the realized marginal energy cost ("RMEC"), which has been a 573 source of contention between PacifiCorp and Sunnyside for some time. 574 Negotiations on the Fourth Amendment focused on replacing the RMEC method 575 with another approach that would be more acceptable to the parties. The 576 negotiation process has taken longer than expected due to the objections on the577 part of some of Sunnyside's bondholders.

578

579 At this time an agreement has been reached between the parties regarding the 580 revised terms and conditions for the Fourth Amendment, and on March 18, 2008 a 581 hearing was conducted by the Commission to consider PacifiCorp's request for 582 approval of that Amendment (Docket No. 07-035-99). On April 3, 2008, the Commission issued its ruling approving the contract, and in its order, the 583 Commission mentions that PacifiCorp has acknowledged that the Fourth 584 585 Amendment will provide benefits to Utah's customers. (Commission Order, Page 6, Docket No. 07-035-99). 586

587 Q. HAS PACIFICORP INCLUDED THE IMPACT OF THE TERMS AND 588 CONDITIONS OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN THIS DOCKET?

A. No, it has not. PacifiCorp's GRID analysis in this docket modeled the Sunnyside
contract under the terms and conditions of the Third Amendment, as there was no
Commission order on the proposed Fourth Amendment at the time that PacifiCorp
filed its request for a general rate increase in this proceeding.

593 Q. WHAT DO YOU RECOMMEND SHOULD BE DONE REGARDING THE 594 SUNNYSIDE CONTRACT?

A. Since the Commission has now approved PacifiCorp's request in Docket No. 07035-99, I recommend that the terms and conditions of the Fourth Amendment
should be reflected in PacifiCorp's NVPC results associated with this case.

598 Q. HAS AN ANALYSIS BEEN CONDUCTED TO DETERMINE THE

599 BENEFIT ASSOCIATED WITH THE FOURTH AMENDMENT?

- A. Yes, one has. The Division of Public Utilities ("Division") requested that such an
- analysis be conducted in Data Request 2.1 in Docket No. 07-035-99. The
- 602 Division's data request and the Company's response are as follows:

603 **DPU Data Request 2.1**

604 Please provide the detail of the costs in the current PacifiCorp general rate case (Docket No. 07-035-93) that have been included in PacifiCorp's revenue 605 requirement request for the Sunnyside purchase power agreement. Please 606 calculate and show with the same level of detail the costs that would be included 607 in the revenue requirement request assuming the Fourth Amendment to the 608 Sunnyside purchase power agreement is approved and in place for the entire test 609 610 period (ending December 2008). Please summarize the system costs of the Sunnyside PPA both with and without the Fourth Amendment for the test period 611 ending December 2008. 612

614 **Response to DPU Data Request 2.1**

Please refer to Attachment DPU 2.1 which provides the net power cost effect of the Fourth Amendment to the Sunnyside purchase power agreement (PPA). These calculations are preliminary numbers and are intended to give the DPU the estimated net power cost impact of the revised Sunnyside purchased power agreement. As illustrated in the attachment, the Fourth Amendment decreases the total cost of Sunnyside PPA by \$3.6 million for the test period ending December 2008. Utah's allocated share is a \$1.57 million reduction in revenue requirement.

624

613

615

625

626 Q. THE COMPANY MENTIONS THAT THESE RESULTS ARE 627 PRELIMINARY. DO YOU KNOW WHY THIS MIGHT BE?

628 In response to the Committee's data request No. CCS 21.14, the Company stated A. 629 that "The impact of the revised Sunnyside PPA agreement will not be final until 630 the Fourth Amendment becomes effective." I assume that the Company believed, 631 at the time it prepared the discovery response, that if the Commission were to 632 approve the Fourth Amendment, then the \$3.6 million benefit would be considered 633 final on an annual basis. Now that the Commission has issued its order, it appears 634 that the \$3.6 million will be final when the Fourth Amendment becomes effective. 635 My understanding is that the effective date will be back-dated prior to the 636 beginning of the test period in this case, and will be in effect for the entire calendar year 2008 test period. 637

638 Q. WHAT IS YOUR RECOMMENDATION CONCERNING THE 639 SUNNYSIDE CONTRACT?

A. I recommend that the terms and conditions of the Fourth Amendment should be
reflected in the NVPC amount associated with this case. Therefore, I recommend
that an adjustment be made to PacifiCorp's NVPC in the amount of \$3.6 million
on a total Company basis to reflect the impact of the new contract amendment.
Mr. Falkenberg's Table 1 reflects a \$3.6 million total Company adjustment based
on the revised Sunnyside agreement.

Page 33

646 Schwendiman QF Contract

647 Q. IS THERE AN ISSUE WITH THE SCHWENDIMAN QF CONTRACT?

There is a fairly minor issue with the Schwendiman QF contract in that the 648 A. Company has set the wrong start date for the contract in the GRID input data. The 649 Company provided copies of the Schwendiman QF contract and it appears that 650 651 there are several amendments to the contract. It appears that the last revision of 652 the contract is defined as the Third Amended contract and it is dated 10/17/2007, 653 and the prior version was the Second Amended contract, which was dated 654 09/07/2007. The start of the QF contract in GRID appears to be consistent with 655 the Second Amended contract which is May 1, 2008. However, the Third 656 Amended contract, which is the more recent version, states that the start date will be November 1, 2008. I revised the start date of the contract in GRID and the 657 NVPC costs were reduced by \$164,307 on a system basis. These results are 658 659 reflected in Mr. Falkenberg's Table 1.

660 Q. DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR TESTIMONY?

661 A. Yes it does.

Docket No. 07-035-93

Committee of Consumer Services Witness: Philip Hayet

Exhibits CCS 5.1 and 5.2

April 7, 2008