

1 **Q. Please state your name, business address and present position with Rocky**  
2 **Mountain Power (the Company).**

3 A. My name is Bruce N. Williams. My business address is Lloyd Center Tower, 825  
4 NE Multnomah, Suite 1900, Portland, Oregon, 97232. I am the Vice President  
5 and Treasurer.

6 **Q. Are you the same Bruce N. Williams who previously submitted Direct and**  
7 **Supplemental Direct Testimony in this proceeding?**

8 A. Yes, I am.

9 **Purpose of Testimony**

10 **Q. What is the purpose of your rebuttal testimony?**

11 A. I will respond to certain issues raised in the Direct Testimony filed by Mr. Daniel  
12 J. Lawton for the Committee of Consumer Services and by Mr. Charles E.  
13 Peterson for the Division of Public Utilities, Department of Commerce for the  
14 state of Utah.

15 **Q. Please enumerate the issues you will address in your rebuttal testimony.**

16 A. I will comment on the following issues raised by Mr. Lawton and Mr. Peterson.

- 17 1. (Peterson and Lawton) Cost of new long-term debt.
- 18 2. (Peterson) Compliance with MidAmerican Energy Holdings Company  
19 Acquisition Commitment No. 37.
- 20 3. (Lawton) Rating agency coverage ratios.
- 21 4. (Peterson) Rating agency business position.

22

23 **Cost of New Long-Term Debt**

24 **Q. Have other parties proposed adjustments to the Company's cost of long-term**  
25 **debt?**

26 **A.** Yes, both Messrs. Peterson and Lawton are suggesting a reduction to the  
27 Company's cost of long-term debt through adjustments to the prospective new  
28 issuance rate. Mr. Peterson is proposing a 21 basis point reduction in the coupon  
29 rate of the prospective new debt issuance and Mr. Lawton is recommending a 45  
30 basis point reduction on the new issuance.

31 **Q. On what basis do the parties propose such a reduction?**

32 **A.** Both parties cite a decline in yields on U.S. Treasury bonds since my direct  
33 testimony was originally prepared.

34 **Q. Do you agree with these proposed reductions?**

35 **A.** No. The Company cannot borrow funds at the U.S. Treasury bond rate and must  
36 pay a premium or credit spread over those rates. While it is true that U.S.  
37 Treasury bond rates have recently declined, it is also true there has been a nearly  
38 equal and offsetting increase in the credit spread that investors are requiring when  
39 purchasing corporate debt securities. Presently, the Company's estimated interest  
40 rate on the new long-term debt is actually slightly higher than the rate in my direct  
41 testimony.

	Direct Testimony	April 2008
Forward Treasury Rate	4.91%	4.47%
Credit Spread	1.52%	1.98%
Issuance Costs	0.09%	0.09%
All-in Cost	6.52%	6.53%

42 **Q. What is the Company recommending that the Commission adopt as to the**  
43 **cost of debt?**

44 A. The Company disagrees with the other parties as to the cost of debt for the reason  
45 cited above. The Company continues to believe that 6.30 percent is the  
46 appropriate cost of long-term debt .

47 **Acquisition Commitment No. 37**

48 **Q. Please describe Acquisition Commitment No. 37.**

49 A. Mr. Peterson outlines the commitment in his Confidential Appendix to his Direct  
50 Testimony on page 44. The commitment states in part:

51 MEHC believes that PacifiCorp's incremental cost of long-term debt will  
52 be reduced as a result of the proposed transaction, due to the association  
53 with Berkshire Hathaway. Historically, MEHC's utility subsidiaries have  
54 been able to issue long-term debt at levels below their peers with similar  
55 credit ratings. MEHC commits that over the next five years it will  
56 demonstrate that PacifiCorp's incremental long-term debt issuance will be  
57 at least a spread of ten basis points below its similarly rated peers.  
58 MEHC's demonstration will include information from a third party  
59 industry expert supporting its calculation and conclusion.

60 **Q. Please describe Mr. Peterson's concern.**

61 A. Mr. Peterson expresses a concern that Rocky Mountain Power's testimony  
62 evidencing the achievement of the 10 basis point reduction relied upon an analysis  
63 that incorporates estimates known as "new issue premiums." Mr. Peterson goes  
64 on to state that the amount to include as the new issue premium is based on a  
65 judgment made by the investment banker.

66 **Q. Is Rocky Mountain Power's evidence on this issue limited to judgments made**  
67 **by its investment bankers?**

68 A. No. The evidence presented analyzes the Company's issuances of long-term debt

69 through several methods. Mr. Peterson is correct that under certain methods, the  
70 investment bankers appropriately added a new issue premium to the quoted  
71 secondary levels to make the analysis to PacifiCorp's issuance comparable. This  
72 adjustment is necessitated by the fact it is common for investors to seek a new  
73 issue premium in order to incentivize them to buy new bonds versus simply  
74 buying existing bonds in the secondary market.

75 However, PacifiCorp's ability to provide the ten basis points of savings  
76 required under Commitment No. 37 does not necessarily depend on including a  
77 new issuance premium. For example, on page 4 of Confidential Exhibit  
78 RMP\_\_\_(BNW-7), Lehman Brothers provides rates at which they estimate other  
79 comparably rated utilities could issue new first mortgage bonds based on trading  
80 levels of similar securities by those utilities. This schedule does include the  
81 investment banker's estimate of what the new issuance premium would have been  
82 at the time that PacifiCorp issued its bonds. Note that PacifiCorp's \$350 million  
83 issuance, including its own new issuance premium, sold at a spread to Treasury  
84 bonds of approximately 20 basis points less than the spread of comparable utility  
85 bonds. However, even if one were to exclude the estimated new issuance  
86 premiums of the comparable bonds from the analysis, PacifiCorp's \$350 million  
87 issuance still sold at a spread of 12 basis points less than its peers.

88 **Q. Is this true of the other issuances as well?**

89 A. Yes. On page 7 of Confidential Exhibit RMP\_\_\_(BNW-10), Goldman Sachs and  
90 BNP Paribas estimate that PacifiCorp's March 2007 issuance provided 19 basis  
91 points of savings as compared to a similarly rated peer group. Again, if one were

92 to completely ignore the five basis points of new issue premium, PacifiCorp's  
93 issuance still delivered 14 basis points of savings. Similarly, JPMorgan's  
94 analysis (Confidential Exhibit RMP\_\_\_\_(BNW-12)) concludes that PacifiCorp's  
95 October, 2007 issuance was 13 basis points lower than the average rate obtained  
96 by a group of comparable A-rated utility issuances of 30 year first mortgage  
97 bonds. This analysis includes no new issuance premium, again demonstrating  
98 that Commitment No. 37 was met.

99 **Q. What should the Commission conclude from these studies?**

100 A. The Commission should conclude that the Company has appropriately met  
101 Commitment No. 37 and no further action is necessary. The Company has  
102 provided a number of studies on each of its debt issuances subject to Commitment  
103 No. 37. These studies utilize several methods to assess whether the commitment  
104 was met. In the facts before the Commission, one can exclude the new issue  
105 premium from secondary levels and PacifiCorp's issuances clearly still provided  
106 the savings required under Commitment No. 37.

107 However, this does not mean that new issuance premiums should be  
108 ignored in determining PacifiCorp's compliance with Commitment No. 37. It is  
109 necessary for the investment bankers to add a new issue premium to the  
110 secondary trading levels to make a valid comparison to new-issuance levels. It is  
111 a reality of the market place that during nearly all markets an issuer must offer a  
112 premium on a new issuance relative to the yields on comparable secondary issues  
113 in order to attract investors. Therefore, in nearly all circumstances the investment  
114 bankers will need to estimate a new issuance premium and PacifiCorp will

115 continue to provide documentation of its compliance with Commitment No. 37 by  
116 providing several methods of determining if the 10 basis point spread was  
117 achieved.

118 **Rating Agency Ratios**

119 **Q. Is Mr. Lawton's statement accurate that his recommended overall cost of**  
120 **capital provides coverage ratios sufficient for the Company to maintain**  
121 **financial integrity?**

122 A. No. The major rating agencies have moved away from relying on pre-tax interest  
123 coverage as a key credit ratio. They focus more on cash flow measures rather  
124 than income as a determinant of credit worthiness. Standard & Poor's has gone as  
125 far as to eliminate pre-tax interest coverage as a key credit ratio. (June 2, 2004  
126 S&P Research Report).

127 Even if interest coverage ratios were still used by the rating agencies as  
128 primary credit metrics, Mr. Lawton's calculation is inappropriate. The rating  
129 agencies make numerous adjustments to the financial statements of a utility  
130 before calculating their credit metrics. For instance, my direct testimony  
131 described the adjustments made to account for purchase power agreements. Mr.  
132 Lawton's calculations simply ignore these adjustments and other realities of the  
133 rating agencies credit procedures. Secondly, Mr. Lawton has assumed the ratios  
134 he obtains are within the range of acceptable coverage ratios for the credit rating  
135 that PacifiCorp carries. He provides no evidence whether this is true or not.  
136 Unfortunately, since the rating agencies rely on cash flow metrics (funds from  
137 operations coverage ratios), Mr. Lawton's ratios are simply irrelevant.

138

139 **Rating Agency Business Position**

140 **Q. In footnote 7 on page 8 of his testimony, Mr. Peterson states that Standard &**  
141 **Poor's assigns a risk profile grade between 1 to 10 depending on its**  
142 **evaluation of the company's business and regulatory environment. Do you**  
143 **agree?**

144 A. No. Standard & Poor's continues to assign a business position to a utility, but  
145 they no longer use the 1 to 10 scoring system. Standard & Poor's now employs a  
146 rating of Excellent, Strong, Satisfactory, Weak and Vulnerable to represent its  
147 opinion of the utility's business risk. These Business Risk Profiles are contrasted  
148 with Financial Risk Profiles that include Minimal, Modest, Intermediate,  
149 Aggressive and Highly Leveraged. While these measures form a matrix of  
150 business and financial risk, Standard & Poor's cautions that they do not assign  
151 credit ratings strictly based on what part of the matrix a utility finds itself in.  
152 Standard & Poor's indicates that the matrix is merely a guide and there are many  
153 other positives and negatives that affect credit quality and could result in a credit  
154 rating different from that implied by the matrix.

155 **Q. Does this conclude your rebuttal testimony?**

156 A. Yes, it does.