

BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH

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In the Matter of the Application of	)	Docket No. 09-035-15
Rocky Mountain Power for	)	Direct Testimony
Approval of its Proposed Energy	)	Paul Wielgus
Cost Adjustment Mechanism	)	For the Office of
	)	Consumer Services

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**REDACTED**

June 16, 2010

Phase II, Part 1

Direct Testimony on Issues Relating to Hedging and  
Reliance on Market Energy in Connection with an ECAM

1           **INTRODUCTION**

2           **Q.    WHAT IS YOUR NAME, OCCUPATION, AND BUSINESS ADDRESS?**

3           A.    My name is Paul J. Wielgus. I am a Managing Director with GDS  
4           Associates, Inc (“GDS”). My business address is 1850 Parkway Place,  
5           Marietta, GA, 30067.

6

7           **Q.    PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR FIRM.**

8           A.    GDS is multi service consulting firm focused primarily on energy and utility  
9           related matters. Our main office is in Marietta, GA. We have over 150  
10          employees and have clients across the U.S.

11

12          **Q.    HAVE YOU PREPARED A SUMMARY OF YOUR QUALIFICATIONS  
13          AND EXPERIENCE?**

14          A.    Yes. I have attached Appendix I, which is a summary of my experience  
15          and qualifications.

16

17          **Q.    ON WHOSE BEHALF ARE YOU APPEARING?**

18          A.    GDS was retained by the Utah Office of Consumer Services (“OCS”) for  
19          this Docket. Accordingly, I am appearing on behalf of the OCS.

20

21          **Q.    HAVE YOU PREPARED ANY EXHIBITS IN SUPPORT OF YOUR  
22          TESTIMONY?**

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23 A. Yes. I have prepared Exhibit OCS 4.1, which is attached to this testimony.

24

25 **Q. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR TESTIMONY?**

26 A. The purpose of my testimony is to generally discuss natural gas hedging  
27 transaction costs and other related matters.

28

29 **Q. WHAT DO YOU MEAN BY TRANSACTION COSTS?**

30 A. The cost of a commodity usually includes the cost of the physical  
31 commodity itself, the cost of handling the commodity, the cost of  
32 transporting it, along with other incidental physical costs, such as storage,  
33 needed to get the physical commodity from its source point to its end use  
34 point. In addition to these physical costs, there are costs associated with  
35 completing and administering the transaction, such as legal and  
36 accounting costs. When companies move from very short term, point in  
37 time spot market pricing to a longer term fixed price for the commodity,  
38 additional costs are incurred to transact this way. Not only might some of  
39 the costs just mentioned with the physical commodity increase, but there  
40 will be additional hedging transaction costs that will be incurred. This is  
41 the case with natural gas, which is a traded commodity.

42

43 **Q. WHAT DO YOU MEAN BY HEDGING TRANSACTION COSTS?**

44 A. Hedging transaction costs can include a number of expenses. They can  
45 include the cost of the ongoing additional organizational functions needed

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46 to plan for and implement the price hedging along with the associated risk  
47 management administrative activities and controls, which activities and  
48 controls are very specialized areas of expertise and services. These  
49 organizational functions can include traders, risk managers and  
50 administrators, and specialized modeling expertise to help evaluate and  
51 monitor the hedges. In addition, there are the costs for the necessary  
52 information technology or IT systems, the cost of credit associated with or  
53 as required by hedge counterparties, and other overhead costs such as  
54 additional legal, reporting, and accounting.

55

56 **Q. PACIFICORP DOES HEDGE NATURAL GAS PRICES AND**  
57 **THEREFORE INCURS TRANSACTION COSTS, CORRECT?**

58 A. Yes, the Company does hedge natural gas prices and does incur hedging  
59 transaction costs.

60

61 **Q. DO YOU KNOW HOW MUCH THESE COSTS MIGHT BE FOR THE**  
62 **COMPANY?**

63 A. When the Company was asked, in a data request OCS DR 4.1 in Docket  
64 No. 09-035-21 to provide estimates of its energy risk management  
65 transaction costs, the Company provided the expenses associated with  
66 just their employees, including contractors and employee expenses,  
67 working in the front, middle, and back offices of the risk management  
68 organization, plus other support areas including legal. These costs were

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69 about \$25 million in 2008. The Company didn't provide estimates of  
70 additional transaction costs in the response. However, according to a

71 [REDACTED]  
72 [REDACTED]  
73 [REDACTED]

74

75 **Q. HAS THE COMPANY IDENTIFIED OTHER TRANSACTION COSTS**  
76 **ASSOCIATED WITH ITS HEDGING?**

77 A. Yes, one of the other transaction costs it identified was some of the credit  
78 costs associated with hedging. Entering into energy price hedges typically  
79 require some form of credit. [REDACTED]

80 [REDACTED]  
81 [REDACTED]  
82 [REDACTED]  
83 [REDACTED]  
84 [REDACTED]  
85 [REDACTED]  
86 [REDACTED]  
87 [REDACTED]  
88 [REDACTED]  
89 [REDACTED]  
90 [REDACTED]  
91 [REDACTED]

Redacted

92 [REDACTED]  
93 [REDACTED] In a  
94 document labeled Attachment DPU 35.6-1 provided in Docket 09-035-23,  
95 a Company Internal Audit Report on Collateral requirements for the  
96 Company's energy hedging activities notes that if the Company's  
97 unsecured credit rating dropped one rating below investment grade, its  
98 quarterly estimated potential collateral needs would have been in the  
99 range of \$300 to \$400 million per quarter for the first three quarters of  
100 2008.

101

102 **Q. DO YOU VIEW THESE TRANSACTION COSTS TO BE MATERIAL?**

103 A. Yes.

104

105 **Q. HOW WOULD YOU ESTIMATE THE VALUE RATEPAYERS RECEIVE**  
106 **FROM INCURRING HEDGING TRANSACTION COSTS?**

107 A. According to the Company's presentation at the May 2009 Technical  
108 Conference in Docket No. 09-035-21, [REDACTED]

109 [REDACTED]

110 [REDACTED]

111 [REDACTED]

112 [REDACTED]

113 The value, therefore, of the Company's energy hedging program, including  
114 natural gas hedging, assuming it is consistent with the Company's

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115 hedging policy, can be looked at by comparing [REDACTED]  
116 [REDACTED] versus the associated  
117 hedging transaction costs.

118

119 **Q. ARE THERE OTHER SOURCES THAT MIGHT CAUSE RATEPAYERS**  
120 **TO EXPERIENCE VOLATILITY THAT ARE NOT COVERED BY THIS**  
121 **HEDGING?**

122 A. Yes.

123

124 **Q. WHAT OTHER SOURCES MIGHT CAUSE RATEPAYERS TO**  
125 **EXPERIENCE VOLATILITY THAT ARE NOT COVERED BY THIS**  
126 **HEDGING?**

127 A. Another source, as per Mr. Graves' Supplemental Direct Testimony  
128 mentioned earlier, is that the Company faces unavoidable and largely  
129 uncontrollable operating and quantity risks as a result of the  
130 circumstances that are intrinsic to system balancing in the utility power  
131 industry. OCS witness Dr. Lori Schell addresses this more in her  
132 testimony in this docket. Mr. Graves goes on to say that there are  
133 practical limitations on any utility's ability to precisely forecast and fully  
134 hedge some of its key uncertainties.

135

136 **Q. WHAT ARE SOME OF THESE KEY UNCERTAINTIES?**

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137 A. Some of these other key uncertainties include weather, unplanned power  
138 pool generating and transmission outages, the price of energy and fuel  
139 supply and related services, energy and fuel related force majeure and  
140 defaults, regulatory, and economic conditions.

141

142 **Q. WHAT ARE SOME OF THE CONSEQUENCES TO THESE**  
143 **UNCERTAINTIES?**

144 A. Lumping most of these key uncertainties into the bucket of operational  
145 uncertainty, the most notable consequence of them is that the hedge that  
146 has been put on, because of some measurable operational change, is no  
147 longer needed, resulting in a mismatch of hedged quantities to actual  
148 physical quantities. In this case, it's not likely that the associated  
149 transaction costs will provide their intended benefit. Operational  
150 uncertainties or risks usually attract a lot of attention and discussion when  
151 transacting hedges, or at least they should. The other main bucket of  
152 uncertainty is price. That is, if the spot price falls below the hedged price,  
153 the associated transaction costs won't provide the benefit of the lower  
154 price, although it did provide volatility offset benefit. Because the  
155 Company uses price swaps and not price options, this outcome is  
156 generally the case in falling markets.

157

158 **Q. WHAT WOULD BE THE BENEFIT TO RATEPAYERS IF OPTIONS**  
159 **WERE USED TO HEDGE PRICES INSTEAD OF SWAPS?**

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160 A. There would be at least two main benefits. One, the ratepayers would get  
161 the benefit of falling market prices while getting the protection from rising  
162 prices. This type of position is a much more desirable position for a buyer,  
163 which the ratepayer is, of a commodity. The other main benefit is that it  
164 can provide a more accurate view of the real costs of a buyer's transaction  
165 cost for price hedges that naturally address the buyer's short position for  
166 the commodity, in this case the commodity being natural gas.

167

168 **Q. DO YOU HAVE AN ESTIMATE OF THE COST OF TRANSACTING**  
169 **USING NATURAL GAS OPTIONS?**

170 A. Yes, but like natural gas prices, the costs of the options vary over time and  
171 with the level of price protection. Examples of historical costs of natural  
172 gas options are shown in the attached Exhibit OCS 4.1. As shown in  
173 these examples, the price of an option for the months shown, range from  
174 over \$3.00/MMBtu to less than \$0.30/MMBtu. These option prices tend to  
175 be a function of forward price trends, price volatility, level of protection or  
176 the strike price, and number of months prior to the settlement month.  
177 Generally, the more months out from settlement, the higher the option  
178 premium. A thorough analysis of transacting options as part of the risk  
179 management strategy to levelize ratepayer volatility would need to be  
180 conducted to best measure the associated transaction costs.

181

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182 **Q. ARE THERE ANY OTHER MATTERS RELATED TO HEDGING AND**  
183 **ASSOCIATED TRANSACTION COSTS THAT SHOULD BE**  
184 **DISCUSSED?**

185 A. Yes. A report by NARUC entitled “Energy Portfolio Management: Tool &  
186 Resources for State Public Utility Commissions”, dated October 2006,  
187 states that the providers of the generation component of retail utility rate  
188 face a host of major uncertainties in addition to volatile natural gas prices.  
189 The report raised the issue of Enterprise Risk Management (“ERM”) a  
190 process which tries to aggregate all of a company’s risks including market,  
191 operations, credit, and regulatory risks. ERM is widely discussed as a  
192 corporate risk management topic. Because utilities, like the Company,  
193 and ultimately the ratepayer since they carry the long run cost of the utility,  
194 face all of these risks and others with limited capital, viewing natural gas  
195 price risk management from the enterprise level may be something that  
196 should be included in this docket.

197

198 **Q. CAN YOU PROVIDE A BRIEF EXAMPLE OF HOW ERM MIGHT BE**  
199 **APPLIED IN THIS INSTANCE?**

200 A. One example may be to thoroughly analyze the transaction costs  
201 associated with natural gas hedging, and power price hedging, and to  
202 determine how this partial levelizing of some of the volatility ratepayers  
203 experience is valued versus committing some or all of these same  
204 resources elsewhere. For instance, instead of hedging natural gas to

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205 levelize ratepayer volatility, perhaps the Company can look at trading out  
206 of some of that price risk by taking on other non-natural gas capacity  
207 resources. When using option prices plus other associated transaction  
208 costs, it may be found that when taking into account all of the associated  
209 transactions costs, these hedging costs may outweigh the benefits of the  
210 partial volatility control they provide.

211

212 **Q. BASED ON YOUR TESTIMONY, WHAT RECOMMENDATIONS DO YOU**  
213 **HAVE REGARDING HEDGING TRANSACTION COSTS AND RELATED**  
214 **MATTERS?**

215 A. I have the following recommendations: (1) to better evaluate the results of  
216 hedging, there should be a thorough analysis of the associated  
217 transactions costs; (2) the use of options to reduce price volatility should  
218 be evaluated; (3) the partial leveling of rates that result from hedging  
219 natural gas should be valued; (4) how the value of hedging compares to  
220 other ways to address ratepayer pricing volatility including ERM  
221 methodology should be analyzed; and (5) this process should provide  
222 ample opportunity for all of the affected stakeholders including ratepayers  
223 to have input into this process, much of which is policy formulation.

224

225 **Q. DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR TESTIMONY?**




226 A. Yes.

227

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### Exhibit OCS 4.1

## NYMEX NATURAL GAS CALL OPTION PREMIUMS vs. FUTURES CONTRACT SETTLEMENT PRICES



**EDUCATION:** Juris Doctorate, 1996, licensed in Texas  
South Texas College of Law, Houston, Texas

MBA, 1985, graduated with Honors, presented thesis on electric utility marketing to the IAEE North American Conference.  
Lamar University, Beaumont, Texas

MS, MINERAL ECONOMICS, 1979, awarded Federal Mining Fellowship.  
Thesis analyzed coal transportation pricing and structures.  
West Virginia University, Morgantown, West Virginia

BS, ECONOMICS, 1977, energy economics concentration.  
West Virginia University, Morgantown, West Virginia

**EXECUTIVE PROFILE:**

As a senior executive in the energy industry, was engaged in the development and implementation of strategic business plans, directed the start up of multiple business units for top tier industry players in the power industry, and provided the strategic, commercial and risk management experience required in formulating the direction needed for the approval and closure of large energy related transactions and capital projects. Currently advise clients in most aspects of power project development including fuel planning, contracting, and price hedging.

**PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE:**

GDS ASSOCIATES, INC, Atlanta, Georgia 2008 - Present  
Managing Director

Report to Vice President. Practice areas include energy project development and management, asset evaluation, fuels, risk management, and regulatory and expert witness testimony.

NRG Energy, New Roads, Louisiana 2006-2008  
Vice President – Development

Reported to Regional President. Developed and implemented project development and commercial marketing plans for a 700 MW pulverized coal unit and a 200 MW pet coke, coal, and biomass fueled CFB repowering unit.

GDS ASSOCIATES, INC, Atlanta, Georgia 2002-2006  
Managing Director

Reported to founding partner. Developed a comprehensive power asset risk management service targeted to electric cooperatives and municipals. Practice areas included energy assets, supply, fuels, risk management, regulatory, and expert witness testimony.

ENTERGY WHOLESALE OPERATIONS (EWO), Houston, Texas 1999-2002  
Senior Vice President - Business Management  
Reported to COO. Selected to head up newly created and expanded Business Management function responsible for the P&L and operations of asset fleet.

Senior Vice President - Business Development  
Developed and implemented a strategic business plan for the start up of a regional IPP asset development program targeted at a 10 state market.

AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER (AEP), Columbus, Ohio and Houston, Texas 1997-1999  
Vice President - Project Development - North America  
Reported to Executive Vice President. Developed and implemented a strategic business plan for the North American market.

ENRON CAPITAL AND TRADE (ECT), Houston, Texas 1991-1997  
Director  
Reported to Vice President. Developed and implemented a wide range of commercial business strategies focused on growth opportunities.

PEPSICO (FRITO-LAY), Plano, Texas 1987-1991  
Manager  
Developed and implemented a national business plan that transitioned the company's 40+ manufacturing facilities from regulated utility service to the then emerging unregulated direct purchase energy market and price hedging including cogeneration.

Continuous record of prior professional experience provided upon request.