

1 **Introduction and Summary of Rebuttal Testimony**

2 **Q. Please state your name and affiliation.**

3 A. My name is Samuel C. Hadaway. I previously filed direct testimony in this
4 proceeding on behalf of Rocky Mountain Power (hereinafter RMP or the
5 Company).

6 **Q. What is the purpose of your rebuttal testimony?**

7 A. The purpose of my rebuttal testimony is to respond to the return on equity (ROE)
8 recommendations of Division of Public Utilities (Division) witness Mr. Charles E.
9 Peterson and Office of Consumer Services (OCS) witness Mr. Daniel J. Lawton.
10 In my analysis, I will evaluate their rate of return recommendations and
11 demonstrate that their recommendations are below the cost of equity for RMP. I
12 will also respond to these witnesses' comments on the methodology that I used in
13 my direct testimony to estimate RMP's cost of equity, and I will update my ROE
14 analysis for current market costs and conditions.

15 **Q. What are the parties' ROE recommendations?**

16 A. Mr. Lawton recommends an ROE of only 10.0 percent. His ROE is more than 50
17 basis points below the ROE established in RMP's previous rate case from 2008
18 and 52 basis points lower than the most recent average ROE allowed by other
19 regulators around the country during the second quarter of 2009. (See my Table 3
20 below.)

21 Mr. Peterson recommends an ROE of 10.5 percent, but he combines that
22 ROE with a reduction to the equity percentage of capital in RMP's capital
23 structure. That combination reduces the overall allowed rate of return, which

24 effectively reduces the Company's opportunity to earn the ROE he recommends.
25 RMP witness Mr. Bruce N. Williams will address Mr. Peterson's proposed
26 adjustment to the common equity ratio.

27 I continue to support an ROE of 11.0 percent. My updated discounted
28 cash flow (DCF) analysis indicates an ROE range of 11.0 percent to 11.5 percent,
29 as compared to the DCF range in my June 23, 2009 direct testimony of 11.5
30 percent to 12.0 percent. My updated risk premium analysis indicates a range of
31 10.47 percent to 11.21 percent, as compared to my initial risk premium range of
32 10.77 percent to 11.66 percent. This analysis shows that my initial ROE
33 recommendation was extremely conservative, given then existing market
34 conditions, and that 11.0 percent remains a conservative estimate of PacifiCorp's
35 cost of equity capital.

36 **Q. What is your general assessment of the other parties' rate of return**
37 **positions?**

38 A. The other parties' recommendations are below RMP's cost of equity capital. Their
39 ROEs appear to be based on a mistaken belief that the cost of equity has declined
40 directly with the yields on high quality debt (Lawton at 3-4, Peterson at 9). While
41 it is true that utility interest rates have dropped from the high levels they reached
42 in late 2008, the Company's requested ROE was below my DCF estimates and
43 was never based on those extreme data. Even though my initial DCF analysis,
44 prepared in May of 2009, indicated an ROE range of 11.5 percent to 12.0 percent
45 and portions of my risk premium analysis produced ROE estimates above 11.5
46 percent, I estimated and the Company requested an ongoing cost of equity capital

47 at 11.0 percent. Additionally, my updated analysis shows that utility stock prices
48 remain depressed, that dividend yields remain high, and that the DCF model
49 based on these factors indicates higher, not lower, ROEs than existed a year ago.¹

50 Although Mr. Lawton recommends an ROE of only 10.0 percent, his own
51 analysis supports a significantly higher result. Without any adjustments or
52 technical corrections, his DCF analysis supports an ROE range of 10.25 percent to
53 10.5 percent (See Lawton direct testimony Table 3 at 23). Additionally, his basic
54 bond-yield-plus-equity-risk- premium analysis supports an ROE of 10.39 percent
55 (Lawton at 24, line 634). Only by resorting to the geometric mean risk premium
56 in an "alternative" risk premium analysis and a so-called "empirical" capital asset
57 pricing model (ECAPM) can Mr. Lawton point to lower estimates of ROE. Even
58 with his alternative risk premium analysis, based on the arithmetic mean equity
59 risk premium in that analysis, the estimated ROE is 11.32 percent (Lawton at 25,
60 line 643). Mr. Lawton's attempt to average these results down by offering low
61 alternative risk premium and ECAPM estimates is misleading and should be
62 rejected. I will show that Mr. Lawton's midpoint ROE estimate, with no
63 adjustments or technical corrections of any kind, should have been at least 10.4
64 percent. With more reasonable growth rate assumptions in his DCF analysis, I
65 will show that his ROE estimate should have been near 11.0 percent.

66 Similarly, the reliable portions of Mr. Peterson's DCF analysis support an
67 ROE estimate higher than the 10.5 percent he recommends. His constant growth

¹The DCF range from my Supplemental Exhibit RMP___(SCH-SS3), Docket No. 08-035-38, November 2008, was 10.7 percent to 11.2 percent. My updated DCF range in the present case, as shown in Exhibit RMP___(SCH-5R), is 11.0 percent to 11.5 percent.

68 DCF model, based on his earnings growth rate projections, supports an ROE
69 range of 10.71 to 10.89 percent (DPU Exhibit 1.5). His constant growth DCF
70 model based on his adjusted dividend growth forecast supports an ROE of 10.74
71 percent (DPU Exhibit 1.5). His two-stage DCF model, with growth based on
72 projected earnings and dividends, supports an ROE range of 10.58 percent to
73 10.74 percent (DPU Exhibit 1.5). Only when Mr. Peterson injects much lower
74 growth rates from less traditional growth rate sources ("PacifiCorp IRP" growth at
75 4.14 percent; his estimate of GDP growth at 4.51; and his estimate of "average
76 utility" GDP growth at 4.08 percent) into the second stage of his two-stage
77 analysis does he produce lower ROE estimates. I will explain in more detail
78 below that these near-term growth rates are currently low because they are based
79 on real growth rates that are depressed by current economic conditions and
80 inflation rates that are far below historical averages for the U.S. economy. I will
81 show that if more reasonable growth rates had been used, Mr. Peterson's midpoint
82 ROE would have been at least 10.75 percent.

83 **Overview of Current Capital Markets**

84 **Q. Why do you say that the other parties' ROE recommendations are not**
85 **consistent with current capital market conditions?**

86 A. The other parties seem to hold a mistaken belief that equity capital costs for
87 utilities have decreased, not increased, over the past several months. This
88 contention is simply wrong. While governmental policies and "flight to safety"
89 issues have driven down short-term interest rates for banks and yields on higher
90 grade debt securities, the cost of equity for utilities has not declined over the past

91 year.² I will show that PacifiCorp's required ROE has increased and that the other
92 parties have not reasonably included current capital market conditions in their
93 recommendations.

94 **Q. In your direct testimony, you provided capital market data through May**
95 **2009, which demonstrated wider corporate interest rate spreads relative to**
96 **treasury bond interest rates and increased corporate borrowing costs. What**
97 **do the most recent data show?**

98 A. The month-by-month interest rate data updated through August 2009 are
99 presented in Exhibit RMP____(SCH-1R), page 1. Those data are summarized
100 below in Table 1.

² The term "flight to safety" refers to the tendency for investors, during periods of market turbulence, to remove money from more risky investments, such as corporate bonds and stocks, and to put the money into government securities such as Treasury bills and bonds. The effect causes a reduction in the supply of funds to corporations and an increase in funds invested in government securities. The result is wider "spreads" between corporate bond and government bond interest rates and higher capital costs for corporations.

Table 1
Long-Term Interest Rate Trends

Month	Single-A Utility Rate	30-Year Treasury Rate	Single-A Utility Spread
Jan-07	5.96	4.85	1.11
Feb-07	5.90	4.82	1.08
Mar-07	5.85	4.72	1.13
Apr-07	5.97	4.87	1.10
May-07	5.99	4.90	1.09
Jun-07	6.30	5.20	1.10
Jul-07	6.25	5.11	1.14
Aug-07	6.24	4.93	1.31
Sep-07	6.18	4.79	1.39
Oct-07	6.11	4.77	1.34
Nov-07	5.97	4.52	1.45
Dec-07	6.16	4.53	1.63
Jan-08	6.02	4.33	1.69
Feb-08	6.21	4.52	1.69
Mar-08	6.21	4.39	1.82
Apr-08	6.29	4.44	1.85
May-08	6.28	4.60	1.68
Jun-08	6.38	4.69	1.69
Jul-08	6.40	4.57	1.83
Aug-08	6.37	4.50	1.87
Sep-08	6.49	4.27	2.22
Oct-08	7.56	4.17	3.39
Nov-08	7.60	4.00	3.60
Dec-08	6.52	2.87	3.65
Jan-09	6.39	3.13	3.26
Feb-09	6.30	3.59	2.71
Mar-09	6.42	3.64	2.78
Apr-09	6.48	3.76	2.72
May-09	6.49	4.23	2.26
Jun-09	6.20	4.52	1.68
Jul-09	5.97	4.41	1.56
Aug-09	5.71	4.37	1.34
3-Mo Avg	5.96	4.43	1.53
12-Mo Avg	6.51	3.91	2.60

Mergent Bond Record (Utility Rates); www.federalreserve.gov (Treasury Rates).

Three month average is for June 2009 through August 2009.

101 The data in Table 1 vividly illustrate the market turmoil that has occurred.

102 During the extreme market conditions that existed in late 2008 and earlier in

103 2009, single-A utility interest rate spreads (the difference between single-A yields
104 and yields on U.S. Treasury bonds) widened to unprecedented levels. While such
105 spreads have narrowed in recent months for higher quality single-A bonds, the
106 effects of the market crisis continue for lower quality issuers and in the market for
107 utility stocks. In fact, increased risk aversion and market volatility continue to
108 increase the cost of equity. While the effects of market turbulence may not be
109 easily captured in financial models for estimating the rate of return, the market's
110 turbulence and continuing elevated risk aversion should be considered in
111 estimating the cost of equity capital.

112 **Q. What do forecasts for the economy and interest rates show for the remainder**
113 **of 2009 and for 2010?**

114 A. Exhibit RMP____(SCH-1R), page 2, provides Standard & Poor's (S&P) most
115 recent economic forecast from its *Trends & Projections* publication for July 2009.
116 S&P forecasts significant economic contraction through the first three quarters of
117 2009. For all of 2009, S&P forecasts that real GDP will decline by 3.0 percent.
118 S&P expects real GDP growth to become positive during the 4th Quarter of 2009
119 and for GDP to increase in real terms (before inflation) during 2010 by 1.2
120 percent.

121 S&P also forecasts that long-term government and high grade corporate
122 interest rates will rise significantly from recent levels. The summary interest rate
123 data are presented in the following table:

Table 2
Standard & Poor's Interest Rate Forecast


	Aug. 2009 Average	Average 2009 Est.	Average 2010 Est.
Treasury Bills	0.2%	0.2%	0.6%
10-Yr. T-Bonds	3.6%	3.5%	4.9%
30-Yr. T-Bonds	4.4%	4.3%	5.7%
Aaa Corporate Bonds	5.3%	5.7%	6.7%

Sources: www.federalreserve.gov, (Current Rates). Standard & Poor's *Trends & Projections*, July 2009, page 8 (Projected Rates).

124 Table 2 updates the data found in Table 2 in my direct testimony. The data in
 125 Table 2 show that long-term Treasury interest rates during 2010 are projected to
 126 increase over 100 basis points from current levels. The rate on Aaa corporate
 127 bonds is also expected to increase by about the same amount. Although in the
 128 recently turbulent market environment it has been difficult to project rates for
 129 lower rated securities, these market data offer important perspective for judging
 130 the cost of capital in the present case.

131 **Q. Have utility stock prices recovered from the large declines that occurred in**
 132 **late 2008 and early 2009?**

133 A. No. The following graph, which updates the Dow Jones Utility Average (DJUA)
 134 provided in my direct testimony, shows that the recovery for utilities has been
 135 modest. The current level of the DJUA remains over 30 percent below the levels
 136 attained in 2007.



137 In this environment, investors' return expectations and requirements for providing
 138 capital to the utility industry remain high relative to the longer-term traditional
 139 view of the utility industry. Increased market volatility for utility shares causes
 140 investors to require a higher rate of return.

141 Value Line notes the utility industry's relatively poor stock price
 142 performance but also gives the sector credit for the resulting high dividend yields:

143 **Value Line Investment Survey**

144 The Value Line Composite Average is up 18% so far this year, but
 145 the Value Line Utility Average is down 1%. This divergent
 146 performance has made electric utility equities relatively more
 147 attractive. This group's average dividend yield, at about 5%, is
 148 more than twice the median of all dividend-paying stocks under
 149 our coverage. There are numerous stocks in this industry that offer

150 a high, secure yield and good 3- to 5-year dividend growth
 151 potential. (Value Line Investment Survey, Electric Utility Industry,
 152 August 7, 2009, page 2232).

153 Credit market gyrations and the volatility of utility shares demonstrate the
 154 increased uncertainties that utility investors face. These uncertainties translate
 155 into a higher cost of capital for utilities than has been experienced in recent years.

156 **Q. How do the other parties' ROE recommendations compare to the rates of**
 157 **return authorized by other state utility commissions around the country?**

158 A. Mr. Lawton's recommendation is 50 basis points lower than the most recent
 159 average for the second quarter of 2009. Mr. Peterson's recommendation is
 160 approximately equal to the most recently allowed average ROEs.³ Table 3 below
 161 shows the average rates of return for each quarter over the past five years. It
 162 updates Table 3 in my direct testimony to include the first two quarters of 2009.

Table 3
Authorized Electric Utility Equity Returns

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
1 st Quarter	10.51%	10.38%	10.27%	10.45%	10.29%
2 nd Quarter	10.05%	10.68%	10.27%	10.57%	10.52%
3 rd Quarter	10.84%	10.06%	10.02%	10.47%	
4 th Quarter	10.75%	10.39%	10.56%	10.33%	
Full Year Average	10.54%	10.36%	10.36%	10.46%	10.41%
Average Utility					
Debt Cost	5.67%	6.08%	6.11%	6.65%	6.77%
Indicated Average					
Risk Premium	4.87%	4.28%	4.25%	3.81%	3.64%

Source: *Regulatory Focus*, Regulatory Research Associates, Inc., Major Rate Case Decisions, July 2, 2009. Utility debt costs are the "average" public utility bond yields as reported by Moody's.

³ The RRA averages include allowed ROEs for both integrated electric utilities and delivery-only transmission and distribution (T&D) companies. Because the allowed returns for the T&D companies have generally been lower than those for the integrated companies, the RRA averages, which include both types of utilities, represent a conservative estimate of the cost of equity for the integrated companies like RMP.

163 **Rebuttal of OCS Witness Mr. Daniel J. Lawton**

164 **Q. What specific comments do you have concerning Mr. Lawton's ROE**
165 **analyses?**

166 A. Mr. Lawton's analysis does not support an ROE as low as the 10.0 percent he
167 recommends. His consistent use of low-end assumptions and his introduction of
168 lower "alternative" risk premium and CAPM analyses seem related to his efforts
169 to mischaracterize RMP's risk profile. For example, in his opening summary he
170 states:

171 The Company has failed to consider the risk reduction impacts
172 associated with fuel cost recovery and incremental capital cost
173 recovery. When these factors are considered, the equity return
174 consideration should reflect the lower end of the reasonable return
175 range. (Lawton at 3, lines 62-65.)

176 My basic review of Mr. Lawton's DCF and traditional risk premium results above
177 shows that he has selected a number that is below even the lower end of his own
178 reasonable range.

179 **Q. Is Mr. Lawton correct about RMP's cost recovery mechanisms requiring the**
180 **lower end of the range?**

181 A. No. Most important, the comparable companies that I (and Mr. Lawton) use to
182 estimate ROE have their own cost recovery mechanisms. Therefore, to make a
183 downward adjustment to ROE, when the ROE estimate is based on these
184 companies, would double count any benefits the mechanisms may provide.
185 Exhibit RMP___(SCH-2R) lists, by operating company and regulatory
186 jurisdiction, the cost recovery mechanisms that the comparable companies have.
187 This listing shows that all the companies have fuel and purchased power cost
188 recovery mechanisms, like the ECAM that RMP is requesting. In addition, Mr.

189 Lawton's recommendation appears to assume that the ECAM has already been
190 approved and implemented. While, I am certain that RMP hopes that the
191 proposed ECAM will be approved, the docket is still ongoing and approval has
192 not yet been received. With respect to the capital cost recovery rider, it is my
193 understanding that the mechanism would not decrease RMP's risk of recovery,
194 because the Company would be required to file a capital investment rate case and
195 would remain subject to full prudence reviews of all capital expenditures. The
196 process would only change the timing of recovery slightly and perhaps reduce rate
197 case costs for all participants. Based on these facts, Mr. Lawton's low-end
198 recommendation is without merit.

199 **Q. How does Mr. Lawton develop his ROE estimate?**

200 A. He relies on two versions of the DCF model and he presents risk premium and
201 CAPM estimates as well.

202 In his DCF analysis, he provides both constant growth and multi-stage
203 growth results. His constant growth model consists of an average dividend yield
204 of 4.95 percent and an average growth rate of 5.66 percent, which produces an
205 average ROE estimate of 10.62 percent. The corresponding "median" result of his
206 constant growth analysis is 10.43 percent. His two-stage DCF results are lower
207 because he applies a lower 5.30 percent long-term growth rate. On page 22, he
208 says that "the 5.3% growth estimate is the average of the EPS estimates and
209 internal growth estimates," but he does not show this calculation in his exhibits. I
210 will demonstrate later that Mr. Lawton's two-stage DCF estimates would have
211 been significantly higher if he had used a more reasonable estimate of long-term

212 growth in the second stage of his two-stage model.

213 **Q. Why should a long-term GDP growth estimate be used in the second stage of**
214 **the two-stage growth DCF model?**

215 A. The long-term GDP growth rate should be used because it is the forecast most
216 consistent with the requirements of the DCF model. GDP forecasts and economic
217 forecasts in general are difficult and are often dominated by current data and very
218 recent experience. I used the very long-term St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank data
219 to mitigate this well-known forecasting deficiency, which I will discuss in more
220 detail in my rebuttal of Mr. Peterson.

221 **Q. How are Mr. Lawton's risk premium and CAPM estimates calculated?**

222 A. He presents two versions of each model. In his Exhibit OCS 1.8, for his basic risk
223 premium model, he adopts the same approach I used in my direct testimony
224 Exhibit RMP__(SCH-5). In his analysis, however, he substitutes a lower
225 projected single-A utility interest rate, which produces an ROE estimate of 10.39
226 percent. While I disagree with his method for estimating the single-A utility
227 interest rate--he uses interest rate spreads only from 2007 and early 2008 (Lawton
228 at 25, line 649)--his result is near the lower end of the updated risk premium
229 estimates I am providing with this testimony in Exhibit RMP__(SCH-6R). As I
230 will discuss later, my updated risk premium range, based on data through August
231 2009, is 10.47 percent to 11.21 percent. Mr. Lawton carefully avoids mentioning
232 the upper end of his "alternative" risk premium range, which is shown in his
233 Exhibit OCS 1.8 to be 11.32 percent. Mr. Lawton's discussion of his risk
234 premium results is an extreme exercise in selectivity that should be evaluated

235 accordingly.

236 Mr. Lawton's CAPM analysis is presented in Exhibit OCS 1.9. That
237 analysis produces a range of ROE estimates from 7.11 percent to 8.56 percent.
238 Regardless of the technical merits, or lack thereof, of this analysis, the results are
239 on their face unreasonable. As shown by comparison to the RRA data in my
240 Table 3, even the top end of his CAPM range is approximately 200 basis points
241 lower than the average ROE allowed by state commissions during the 2nd Quarter
242 of 2009. These results should be dismissed and not averaged with other ROE
243 estimates.

244 **Q. Why should Mr. Lawton's CAPM results be dismissed?**

245 A. First of all, Mr. Lawton himself dismisses his basic CAPM results and one of his
246 ECAPM estimates as too low (Lawton at 27, line 709). He finally accepts a
247 second ECAPM estimate (8.6 percent) and later averages this result with his other
248 higher estimates. However, Mr. Lawton's alternative ECAPM is no more reliable
249 than his basic CAPM because it suffers from all the same data issues and broad
250 assumptions that the original CAPM suffers from. Since the Public Service
251 Commission of Utah has rejected the use of the CAPM previously, there is no
252 reason to now embrace a variation of that same model that incorporates further
253 assumptions without really correcting any of the problems of the original version.
254 With a balanced view of his risk premium analysis, and with the rejection of his
255 CAPM/ECAPM estimates, Mr. Lawton's analysis supports an ROE of at least
256 10.4 percent.

257 **Q. What average ROE is produced by Mr. Lawton's analysis when the low and**
258 **high ends of his risk premium estimates are included and when his ECAPM**
259 **estimate is excluded?**

260 A. The following table shows that result.

261 **LAWTON COST OF EQUITY SUMMARY WITH HIGH AND**
262 **LOW END RISK PREMIUM SHOWN AND ECAPM EXCLUDED**

<u>Model</u>	<u>Range</u>	<u>Midpoint</u>
Constant Growth DCF	10.43% - 10.62%	10.53%
Two-Stage DCF	10.20% - 10.25%	10.23%
Risk Premium	9.52% - 11.32%	10.42%
Average ROE Result		10.4%

263 **Q. Does this summary mean that 10.4 percent is the correct estimate of RMP's**
264 **cost of equity capital?**

265 A. No, not at all. This summary simply shows what Mr. Lawton's analysis produces
266 when the full range of his results is included and when his entirely unreliable
267 ECAPM estimate is excluded. We continue to disagree about the growth rates in
268 our DCF models, and I will show that the lower end of his "alternative" risk
269 premium analysis is suspect. The summary table is presented to show that Mr.
270 Lawton's analysis, without any corrections or any technical adjustments, supports
271 a significantly higher ROE than his 10.0 percent recommendation.

272 **Q. What is the ROE estimate from Mr. Lawton's two-stage DCF model if your**
273 **long-term GDP growth estimate is used as the growth rate in the second**
274 **stage of that model?**

275 A. In Exhibit RMP____(SCH-3R), page 1, I have redone Mr. Lawton's two-stage
276 DCF analysis substituting my long-term 6.2 percent estimate of GDP growth in
277 place of his long-term growth estimate. This adjustment increases his two-stage
278 ROE estimate to 11.0 percent.

279 **Q. Why do you say that the low end of Mr. Lawton's "alternative" risk**
280 **premium range is suspect?**

281 A. That analysis is based on the Morningstar/Ibbotson data for the period 1926-2008.
282 I have previously used this data to provide a very general perspective on the
283 overall capital market cost of equity. While I did not provide those data in the
284 present case, due to criticism from Mr. Peterson (Docket No. 08-035-38 at 22)
285 and others, in my review of those data in the prior RMP case in 2008, I stated the
286 following:

287 For example, the most widely followed risk premium data are
288 provided in the Morningstar Ibbotson data studies. These data, for
289 the period 1926-2007, indicate an arithmetic mean risk premium of
290 6.1 percent for common stocks versus long-term corporate bonds.
291 Under the assumption of geometric mean compounding, the
292 Ibbotson risk premium for common stocks versus corporate bonds
293 is 4.5 percent. Based on the more conservative geometric mean
294 risk premium, the Ibbotson data indicate a cost of equity of 11.06
295 percent (6.56% forecasted debt cost + 4.5% risk premium =
296 11.06%). Based on the arithmetic risk premium, the Ibbotson data
297 indicate a cost of equity of over 12 percent (6.56% forecasted debt
298 cost + 6.1% risk premium = 12.66%). Although I do not use the
299 Ibbotson data in my final ROE estimates, I do review the data for
300 their perspective on the overall market cost of equity capital.
301 (Docket No. 08-035-38, Hadaway Direct Testimony at 31-32.)

302 Mr. Lawton's use of these data as a direct input to his final ROE recommendation
303 is not appropriate because the data, especially the lower geometric mean equity
304 risk premium he selects, cannot closely track current market conditions or current
305 equity costs. While some may continue to find the data useful as a general
306 indication of long-run risk-return relationships, their direct use as a current
307 estimate of the cost of equity capital as Mr. Lawton has done is suspect.

308 **Q. On page 4, lines 93-95, Mr. Lawton says that your ROE recommendation is**
309 **overstated because you rely on outdated data and overstated GDP growth**
310 **data. How do you respond to his comments?**

311 A. I disagree with both of his contentions. I will demonstrate that my updated DCF
312 and risk premium analyses fully support an 11.0 percent ROE. With respect to
313 the GDP growth rate, Mr. Lawton provides no analysis or other data to support his
314 contention. As noted above, his 5.3 percent long-term growth rate is 90 basis
315 points lower than the specific GDP growth rate forecast I provided in my direct
316 testimony. I explain in more detail in my rebuttal of Mr. Peterson why a lower
317 long-term growth rate is inconsistent with actual market data. Mr. Lawton's
318 preference for a lower growth rate based on near-term "EPS estimates and internal
319 growth estimates" (Lawton at 22, line 580- 581) is no more consistent with the
320 long-term growth rate requirement of the two-stage DCF model than it is with the
321 long-term requirement of the single-stage DCF model. Both models require
322 stable estimates of long-term expected growth. Mr. Lawton's EPS and internal
323 growth estimates understate that requirement.

324 **Q. On page 4, lines 97-99, Mr. Lawton says that your 6.02 percent average**
325 **analysts' growth rate forecasts are "overstated, outdated, and fail to take**
326 **into account declining expectations...." How do you respond to this**
327 **assertion?**

328 A. Mr. Lawton's comment is at best partially correct in the sense that with the
329 passage of time since I prepared my direct testimony analysts' forecasts have
330 declined slightly. As shown on page two of Exhibit RMP___(SCH-5R), column
331 7, the average analysts' growth rate in my updated DCF analysis is currently 5.83
332 percent, and the indicated DCF range based on that growth rate is 11.0 percent to
333 11.4 percent. Mr. Lawton's criticism of my 11.0 percent ROE recommendation
334 based on this small decline in analysts' growth rate projections is, therefore,
335 misplaced.

336 **Q. On page 4, lines 100-102, Mr. Lawton says that your 6.2 percent long-term**
337 **GDP growth rate should be in the range of 5.0 percent to reflect more recent**
338 **history. How do you respond to this comment?**

339 A. I disagree. While again Mr. Lawton provides no analysis to support this
340 contention and he does not use a GDP growth rate in his analysis, I explain in
341 more detail in my rebuttal of Mr. Peterson, who does use a GDP growth rate, why
342 a lower long-term growth rate is inconsistent with actual market data.

343 **Q. On page 5, at lines 120-121, Mr. Lawton says that the dividend yield**
344 **estimates in your DCF analysis is 5.5 percent and that that yield is overstated**
345 **by about 50 basis points. How do you respond to this assertion?**

346 A. There are several factors related to Mr. Lawton's statement about dividend yields.

347 These factors generally illustrate Mr. Lawton's extreme efforts to support his
348 unsupportable ROE recommendation. First, the DCF dividend yield in my direct
349 testimony is shown in Exhibit RMP____(SCH-4), page 2, column 3. The median
350 and average values are 5.52 percent and 5.57 percent, respectively. The 50 basis
351 point "overstatement" that he refers to is apparently a comparison to his own
352 dividend yield estimate of 4.95 percent to 5.11 percent (Exhibit 1.6). My updated
353 dividend yield shown in Exhibit RMP____(SCH-5R), page 2, is 5.19 percent to
354 5.32 percent.

355 A careful review of Mr. Lawton's exhibits helps to explain the differences.
356 While we both use the same comparable companies, our analyses were prepared
357 at different times and we used different lengths of time to calculate the dividend
358 yields. My initial stock prices were a three-month average for March-May 2009.
359 My updated analysis uses stock prices for June-August 2009. His lower dividend
360 yields are based on stock prices for a 6-week period from July 27-August 31,
361 2009. However, a review for Mr. Lawton's DCF spreadsheets provides further
362 information. It shows that in his Exhibit OCS 1.4, page 2, he also calculated, but
363 did not report, average stock prices for an 8-week period (column N); a 12-week
364 period (column M); a 52-week period (column R); and one-day spot price for
365 September 3, 2009 (column S). For his estimated dividend yield, he then selected
366 the highest average price of the five alternatives. This selection, in turn, reduced
367 his dividend yield to the lowest possible of his five alternatives.

368 In Exhibit RMP____(SCH-3R), page 2, I have reproduced Mr. Lawton's
369 constant growth DCF estimate with his 12-week stock price averaging period,

370 which is similar to the 3-month period I used in my updated DCF analysis. That
371 analysis, with no other adjustments whatsoever, produces a dividend yield of 5.07
372 percent to 5.27 percent and indicates a ROE range of 10.64 percent to 10.73
373 percent. Mr. Lawton's efforts to criticize my ROE recommendation and
374 understate RMP's cost of equity are potentially misleading and should be
375 evaluated accordingly.

376 **Rebuttal of Division Witness Mr. Charles E. Peterson**

377 **Q. What is the basis for Mr. Peterson's 10.5 percent ROE recommendation?**

378 A. His 10.5 percent recommendation is stated at the bottom of DPU Exhibit 1.5. In
379 that exhibit, Mr. Peterson summarizes the results from seven constant growth
380 DCF models based on alternative growth rate assumptions and nine two-stage
381 growth DCF models (which are shown in detail in DPU Exhibit 1.5a and 1.10).
382 He concludes that these models support a reasonable range of 10.1 percent to 10.8
383 percent. He also presents the results of a Capital Asset Pricing Model analysis
384 and a Value Line risk premium model, although he appears to give little if any
385 weight to the very low ROE estimates that these models produce.

386 **Q. Is it clear from DPU Exhibit 1.5 how Mr. Peterson arrived at his 10.5 percent**
387 **recommendation?**

388 A. No. The printed one-page version of that exhibit may be confusing because it
389 shows a "Simple Average" and "Median" value for his estimates of 10.09 percent
390 to 10.15 percent, with his 10.5 percent recommendation shown immediately
391 below those two values. However, the electronic version of the exhibit provides
392 additional information, which shows that his 10.5 percent estimate is not as

393 generous as it might appear. In fact, in the electronic calculations, Mr. Peterson
394 finds a weighted average of 10.45 percent for his estimates and an average of
395 10.66 percent for his models based on earnings and dividend growth rate
396 forecasts. He then averages these results to obtain a further average of 10.55
397 percent. This result, rounded down, appears to be the basis for his final 10.5
398 percent recommendation.

399 **Q. What are your principal areas of disagreement with Mr. Peterson?**

400 A. I disagree with two aspects of his analysis: 1) his use of extremely low less
401 traditional growth rates in portions of his DCF analysis and 2) his failure to
402 provide a basic bond-yield-plus-equity-risk-premium analysis as a check of
403 reasonableness for his primary DCF results.

404 **Q. Why do you disagree with Mr. Peterson's alternative growth rate
405 calculations?**

406 A. Mr. Peterson offers the following statement about his current use of the two-stage
407 growth rate approach:

408 In my analyses in previous dockets I did not conclude that two-
409 stage DCF models added a lot of new information to the estimate
410 of cost of equity for the Company. However, upon further
411 reflection, especially given the continuing issue of using historical
412 GDP growth rates to estimate long-term future growth for electric
413 utilities, I have changed my mind in that the use of two-stage
414 models, with proper inputs, gives better insight to the cost of
415 equity issue than I previously asserted. (Peterson at 24, emphasis
416 added.)

417 The "proper inputs" that Mr. Peterson refers to are his very low estimates of long-
418 term growth based on PacifiCorp's load growth forecasts (2.2 percent) plus an
419 inflation adjustment (1.9 percent) and his estimates of growth in GDP (4.51
420 percent) and his so-called utility adjusted GDP (4.1 percent) (Peterson at 39-40).

421 These growth rates are 150 to 200 basis points lower than the historically based
422 GDP growth rate forecast I provided in my direct testimony on Exhibit
423 RMP___(SCH-3) and 80 to 130 basis points lower than his own 5.33 percent
424 mean of analysts' earnings growth forecasts (DPU Exhibit 1.6). His insertion of
425 "inflation adjusted load growth" into the DCF model as a measure of investors'
426 expected long-term growth is simply incorrect because it bears virtually no
427 relationship to the growth in earnings and dividends that is required in the model.
428 Furthermore, his use of currently depressed GDP forecasts and his further
429 downward adjustment to those forecasts are similarly misplaced. Mr. Peterson's
430 selection of such low GDP growth forecasts is not at all consistent with his
431 optimistic assessment of economic conditions (Peterson at 7-11). While
432 supporting the long-term GDP growth rate as a proper input for the second stage
433 long-term expected growth rate in his two-stage DCF model, Mr. Peterson's
434 efforts to average down his already modest first stage analysts' forecasted growth
435 rates is far off the mark and results in unreasonably low estimates of the cost of
436 equity capital.

437 **Q. If Mr. Peterson had included long-term GDP growth along with his analysts'**
438 **growth rate forecasts, what would his two-stage DCF models have shown?**

439 A. That analysis is provided in Exhibit RMP___(SCH-4R). In that analysis, I
440 substituted the 6.2 percent estimated long-term GDP growth rate in stage two of
441 his two-stage models. The results indicate an ROE range of 11.25 percent to
442 11.47 percent.

443 **Q. On page 23, Mr. Peterson refers to the Commission's 2002 Questar Gas**
444 **Company decision as support for his 75 percent/25 percent weighting of**
445 **earnings and dividend growth in his single-stage DCF model. Did the**
446 **Commission's Questar decision adopt this weighting scheme as its only**
447 **growth rate approach?**

448 A. No. In the Questar case, the Commission found that a 75 percent earnings/25
449 percent dividends growth rate was a reasonable approach for setting the low end
450 of the range. The Commission also recognized projected earnings growth rates for
451 establishing the entire DCF growth rate range. In fact, in that case the
452 Commission used the weighted average as the bottom of the DCF range only and
453 applied a 100 percent earnings approach to set the top end of the range. (*Questar*
454 *Gas Company*, Docket No. 02-057-02 at 34-35 (Dec. 30, 2002)). From a policy
455 perspective, reliance on dividend growth instead of earnings growth is
456 problematic because, over the long-term horizon measured by the DCF model,
457 earnings growth drives dividend growth, not the opposite.

458 **Q. On pages 44 and 46, Mr. Peterson points to his CAPM range of ROE**
459 **estimates (7.66 percent to 9.1 percent) and criticizes your lack of a CAPM**
460 **analysis. How do you respond to this portion of Mr. Peterson's testimony?**

461 A. I have two responses. First, in his spreadsheet for Exhibit 1.5, cell k35, in the
462 weighted average of his ROE estimation methods, Mr. Peterson gives exactly zero
463 percent weight to his CAPM results. Second, the Commission addressed and
464 rejected application of the CAPM in the 2002 Questar case, which Mr. Peterson
465 cites in his DCF growth rate discussion, stating flatly: “[W]e cannot rely on the

466 CAPM.” *Re Questar Gas Company*, Docket No. 02-057-02 at 34 (Dec. 30, 2002)
467 Mr. Peterson's continuing efforts to inject the CAPM into this Commission's ROE
468 deliberations is not supported by economic facts or the Commission's prior
469 findings.

470 **Q. On page 47, lines 1021-1023, Mr. Peterson says that you gave "little or no**
471 **weight" to your constant growth DCF results based on analysts' forecasts. Is**
472 **this statement accurate?**

473 A. In my direct testimony DCF analysis, Exhibit RMP___(SCH-4), the first model
474 that I offer is a constant growth DCF model based on analysts' growth rate
475 estimates. The results from that model were 11.6 percent to 12.0 percent, which
476 formed the upper end of my DCF range. In my updated DCF results with this
477 testimony, Exhibit RMP___(SCH-5R), I continue to present that version of the
478 DCF model, which now supports an ROE range of 11.0 percent to 11.4 percent.
479 It is not clear why Mr. Peterson says that I did not rely on this version of the DCF
480 model.

481 **Q. On page 48, Mr. Peterson criticizes your GDP growth rate forecast and**
482 **points to much lower growth rates in forecasts published by the**
483 **Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the Energy Information**
484 **Administration (EIA). How do you respond to these criticisms?**

485 A. Recent GDP growth forecasts from CBO and EIA are not consistent with the
486 historical growth rates in the U.S. economy. They are based on an assumption of
487 slower real growth and permanently low inflation at rates that are about 50
488 percent below actual long-term experience. For example, the CBO and EIA

489 forecasts that Mr. Peterson uses have nominal GDP growth rates of 4.17 percent
490 and 4.47 percent, respectively. Those nominal growth rates include GDP inflation
491 rates of 1.5 percent and 2.0 percent, respectively. These projected long-term
492 inflation rates compare to the actual 3.4 percent GDP inflation rate that has
493 occurred over the past 60 years in the U.S. economy. (See Exhibit
494 RMP____(SCH-3). Exhibit RMP____(SCH-3) also shows that there has not been
495 one 10-year period in the past 60 years (including the most recent 10-year low-
496 inflation era) with an average inflation rate lower than 2.4 percent per year.
497 While Mr. Peterson's low Government projections of nominal GDP growth may
498 be useful for projecting a balanced budget, protecting Social Security, and other
499 governmental purposes, they are not consistent with actual capital market data.
500 As such, the much lower growth rates discussed by Mr. Peterson are not
501 appropriate in the DCF model.

502 **Update of ROE Analysis**

503 **Q. Have you updated your ROE analysis to take into account recent data and**
504 **the current conditions in the capital markets?**

505 A. Yes. Consistent with my customary practice, I have updated my ROE analysis for
506 current conditions using the same methodologies that I employed in my previous
507 analysis.

508 **Q. What are the results of your updated DCF analyses?**

509 A. My updated DCF results are shown in Exhibit RMP____(SCH-5R). The indicated
510 DCF range is 11.0 percent to 11.5 percent.

511 **Q. What are the results of your updated bond yield plus equity risk premium**
512 **analysis?**

513 A. My updated equity risk premium analysis is presented in Exhibit RMP____(SCH-
514 6R). That analysis indicates and ROE range of 10.47 percent to 11.21 percent.

515 **Q. What do you conclude from your updated ROE analyses?**

516 A. My updated analyses show that RMP's current cost of equity capital is in the
517 range of 10.5 percent to 11.5 percent, with a midpoint estimate of 11.0 percent.
518 My updated analysis confirms that my original recommendation of 11.0 percent is
519 reasonable and that the other parties' recommendations, as discussed herein, are
520 low.

521 **Q. Does that conclude your rebuttal testimony?**

522 A. Yes.