- 1 Q. Please state your name.
- 2 A. My name is A. Robert Lasich.
- 3 Q. Are you the same A. Robert Lasich who has testified previously in this case?
- 4 A. Yes I am.
- 5 Q. What is the purpose of your rebuttal testimony?
- 6 A. The purpose of my rebuttal testimony is to:
- 7 1. Rebut the testimony of Utah Division of Public Utilities ("DPU") witness
- 8 Mr. Michael J. McGarry regarding DPU's proposed disallowance of the
- 9 Company's Fuel Stock in the amount of \$57,097,424;
- 10 2. Agree with the testimony of UAE Intervention Group ("UAE") witness
- 11 Mr. Kevin C. Higgins that the Company's forecast for the High Plains wind-
- powered generation resource ("High Plains project") of \$236.4 million should be
- used for ratemaking purposes;
- 14 3. Agree with the testimony of Division of Public Utilities ("DPU") witness
- Ms. Joni S. Zenger that a cost of \$59.2 million for the McFadden Ridge I wind-
- powered generation resource ("McFadden Ridge I project") should be used for
- 17 ratemaking purposes;
- 4. Agree with the testimony of DPU witness Ms. Zenger that the McFadden
- 19 Ridge I project is a prudent investment;
- 20 5. Rebut the testimony of DPU witness Ms. Zenger regarding the DPU's
- 21 position that all future wind projects should have disallowance associated with
- 22 estimated contingency costs; and
- 23 6. Rebut the testimony of DPU witness Mr. Charles E. Peterson regarding

24		the DPU's proposed disallowance for the Rolling Hills wind-powered generation
25		resource ("Rolling Hills project") of \$9,083,448 and for the High Plains project of
26		\$21,103,448 (adjusted downward to \$16,233,422 for the number of months in the
27		test year).
28	Reply	y to DPU Witness Mr. McGarry
29	Q.	Please summarize the adjustment that DPU witness Mr. McGarry
30		recommends in regards to fuel stock.
31	A.	Mr. McGarry proposes to adjust the coal inventory level for the Utah plants from
32		185 days burn inventory level to 85 days based on his interpretation of the
33		Company's Inventory Policy ("Inventory Policy").
34	Q.	How long has the Inventory Policy been in effect?
35	A.	The Company's Inventory Policy was developed over fifteen years ago. The
36		Company established long-range inventory targets for the Company's coal plants.
37		These policies are reviewed and updated periodically to incorporate factors such
38		as potential supply interruptions, coal quality, market conditions, etc. The last
39		update was prepared earlier this summer and provided in response to a data
40		request from the DPU. (See Confidential Attachment DPU 26.4).
41	Q.	Do you agree with Mr. McGarry's calculation of the days of coal inventory
42		for the Utah plants and his interpretation of the Company's Inventory
43		Policy?
44	A.	No. Mr. McGarry's analysis and interpretation of the Company's Inventory Policy
45		is flawed.

46	Q.	Does the Company agree with DPU witness Mr. McGarry that an adjustment
47		to the Company's fuel stock is warranted?
48	A.	No. The Company does not believe any adjustment is appropriate. Mr. McGarry's
49		adjustment is premised on an incorrect interpretation of the Company's Inventory
50		Policy for the Utah plants. Mr. McGarry states "[t]he Company policy is to limit
51		coal inventory to no more than 90 days and in most cases much shorter." Mr.
52		McGarry also claims that "[t]his level of inventory is more than double what the
53		Company has stated is its inventory strategy for these Utah plants" Neither of
54		these statements is accurate.
55	Q.	What is the Company's Inventory Policy for the Utah plants?
56	A.	While the Company has established a range of 60 - 90 days as the inventory target
57		for the Utah plants, the Inventory Policy expressly contemplates increasing
58		inventory levels beyond the 90 days if the Company can procure coal at below-
59		market prices. Specifically, the Company policy states "similarly to the
60		[tons] of additional coal acquired from Arch pursuant to the Electric
61		Lake settlement, if there are future opportunities to procure Utah coal at below-
62		market (distressed prices), the Fuels Department is prepared to pursue such
63		purchases. There is sufficient storage capacity between the Utah Plants and the
64		Prep Plant to store over 4 million tons of coal." (See Confidential DPU 26.4).
65	Q.	What is the Electric Lake settlement?
66	A.	Canyon Fuels Company, L.L.C., a wholly owned subsidiary of Arch Coal Inc.,
67		owns the Skyline Mine which is located near Electric Lake, the Huntington
68		Plant's water source. The Company claimed that Skyline's mining operations

69 caused water to drain from Electric Lake into the Skyline Mine, which placed the 70 Huntington Plant operations at risk. The Company incurred costs associated with 71 the loss of water from Electric Lake, primarily costs to pump the water from 72 Skyline Mine back to Electric Lake. In February 2008, the Company reached a 73 settlement with Arch thereby avoiding protracted and expensive complex 74 litigation with one of the Company's key vendors. As a condition of the 75 settlement, Arch Coal Sales Company ("Arch"), as agent for Canyon Fuels 76 Company, L.L.C., agreed to sell the Company tons of Utah coal at 77 below market prices. 78 What coal supplies were obtained through the Electric Lake settlement? Q. 79 The Company acquired tons of both and coal from A. 80 2008 through 2010. The Carbon Plant benefits from the supply of low ash, low 81 sulfur coal from Canyon Fuels Company's Mine. The Huntington and Hunter Plants benefit from high ash fusion temperature coal. 82 83 is critical to ensuring a consistent coal quality for the Hunter and Huntington 84 Plants and mitigates boiler slagging caused by consumption of low ash fusion 85 temperature coals. How do customers benefit from the settlement? 86 0. 87 coals are both premium coals (i.e. low ash and low Α. and 88 sulfur). Both coals will contribute to optimal plant performance. Second. 89 customers benefit from the low cost of inventory. The ability to store the Electric 90 Lake settlement coal will allow the Company to avoid purchasing much higher

market priced coal in the future. The average test period coal price of the Electric

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92		Lake settlement coal, inclusive of the deferred asset amortization, is \$ per
93		ton. Utah coal is currently being transacted for \$46 per ton and prices are
94		projected to increase. Based on current market conditions, the value to our
95		customers of the Electric Lake settlement coal is approximately \$21 million.
96	Q.	Is the increase in Utah inventories due solely to the coal acquired under the
97		Electric Lake settlement?
98	A.	No. The Company also entered into an agreement with West Ridge Resources in
99		2008 to purchase 275,000 tons of coal from the West Ridge Mine at below-market
100		prices from 2008 through 2010. The average West Ridge coal price over the term
101		of the agreement is \$ per ton.
102	Q.	Are both the Electric Lake and West Ridge agreements consistent with the
103		Company's Inventory Policy?
104	A.	Yes. In both situations, the Company pursued transactions that benefit customers
105		despite the impact of increasing inventories.
106	Q.	Did Mr. McGarry consider the benefits the Company's customers are
107		receiving from the coal purchased under either the Electric Lake settlement
108		or the West Ridge agreement?
109	A.	No. Mr. McGarry states "without getting into the merits of the Arch Electric
110		Lake settlement, I believe that is in inappropriate for the Company to expect
111		customers to pay for an investment in a coal inventory stockpile that it does not
112		need." Mr. McGarry does not even address the West Ridge agreement.
113	Q.	When does the Company project inventory levels will decrease?
114	A.	There are no plans to reduce Utah plant inventory levels below test year levels. In

115		fact, inventory levels are projected to continue to increase through 2011. Both
116		Arch, under the Electric Lake settlement, and West Ridge are contracted to
117		provide coal through December 2010.
118	Q.	Is there any indication of a major supply disruption that warrants the
119		increase in coal inventories?
120	Α.	Mr. McGarry fails to realize that almost all of the coal production in Utah is
121		dependent upon five longwall mining operations. Several of the low ash, low
122		sulfur coal mines will fully deplete their reserves over the next five years.
123		Underground mining is challenged with maturing mining operations, increasing
124		depth of cover, excess gases, narrowing seams, etc. All these factors contribute to
125		increase the risk of supply interruptions. The level of increased state and federal
126		regulatory activity, particularly since the unfortunate Crandall Canyon disaster, is
127		evidence of this increased risk. The Company expects the potential of a major
128		supply disruption to increase in the future with the increasingly adverse mining
129		conditions associated with mining at greater depths. To date, the Company has
130		successfully mitigated its supply risk through diversification of its supply
131		arrangements. However, these supply arrangements expire at the end of 2010.
132		The Company's risk of a major supply disruption will increase after 2010 as the
133		Company's supply options diminish.
134	Q.	Notwithstanding the Company's position that no adjustment is warranted,

- Q. Notwithstanding the Company's position that no adjustment is warranted, are there additional problems with Mr. McGarry's recommendations?
- 136 A. Yes. Mr. McGarry's calculations have numerous errors.

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Q. Please explain the errors in Mr. McGarry's calculation?

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138 Α. Mr. McGarry incorrectly utilized a 13 month average of inventory balances rather 139 than the beginning and ending inventory balances for the test period. Averaging 140 of the beginning and ending balances is consistent with the Company's overall 141 treatment of miscellaneous ratebase items. The average inventory balance for the 142 Utah plants should be 3,847,917 tons and \$105,767,948 not 3,861,881 tons and 143 \$105,893,759. Next, Mr. McGarry utilized incorrect figures for 2008 consumed 144 tonnage and failed to include tonnage consumed by the Hunter Plant joint owners. 145 The actual consumption for the Utah plants, including the joint owner portion, 146 was 8,313,534 tons rather than 7,641,694 tons. Mr. McGarry overstates the days 147 of inventory when he includes one-hundred percent of the Hunter Plant fuel stock 148 balances (dollars and tons) but excludes the Hunter Plant joint owner portion of 149 consumed tonnage.

Q. Are there any additional errors in Mr. McGarry's days of inventory calculation?

Yes. Mr. McGarry's days of inventory analysis fails to exclude the 334,309 tons of high ash coal that is currently located at the prep plant. This high ash coal resides in a segregated area at the prep plant. This coal was mined by the Company's Deer Creek Mine as part of the development of the Mill Fork reserve tract. Rather than transport the coal to a refuse pile, the Company was able to stockpile the coal, which allows for future blending and reduced Deer Creek Mine costs. As the Company explained in its Inventory Policy, "...this coal will be utilized in future blending as its high ash fusion temperature will mitigate lower

160		ash fusion temperatures coals." (See DPU 26.4). This coal is excluded from the
161		Company's fueling plans since the coal cannot be consumed by any of the
162		Company's Utah plants on a stand-alone basis nor constitutes "inventory" that can
163		be readily consumed by the plants during a supply interruption period. This
164		tonnage should have been excluded by Mr. McGarry in his analysis.
165	Q.	Please summarize the errors in Mr. McGarry's calculation of days of
166		inventory.
167	A.	Had Mr. McGarry used (i) the average of the beginning and ending inventory
168		balances, (ii) actual 2008 tonnage and (iii) excluded the high ash coal pile, the
169		number of days of coal inventory would be 154, not 185 days. (See Exhibit
170		RMP(ARL-1R)).
171	Q.	How does Mr. McGarry's interpretation of the Company's Inventory Policy
172		impact his proposed disallowance of the Company's fuel stock?
173	A.	Mr. McGarry determined the amount of excessive inventory by comparing days
174		of inventory to the Company's inventory target as guided by the Company's
175		Inventory Policy. Mr. McGarry arbitrarily selected 85 days as his reference target
176		rather than the 90 days identified in the Inventory Policy.
177	Q.	How do the corrections of these errors impact Mr. McGarry's proposed
178		adjustment?
179	A.	Mr. McGarry's proposed adjustment of \$57,097,424 on a total company basis
180		would decline to \$41,216,175 based on 154 days of inventory assuming 90 days is
181		the maximum acceptable inventory limit. (See Exhibit RMP(ARL-1R)).

- 182 O. Please summarize the Company's position regarding DPU witness Mr. 183 McGarry's proposed disallowance of the Company's fuel stock. 184 The Company's position is that the Commission should outright reject the DPU's A. 185 proposed \$57,097,424 disallowance. Mr. McGarry has made several errors in his 186 calculation of the Company's inventory balance for the Utah plants, has 187 incorrectly interpreted and applied the Company's Inventory Policy, and has 188 arbitrarily adjusted inventory levels without considering the economic benefits the 189 Company's customers receive from either the Electric Lake settlement or the 190 West Ridge agreement. 191 Reply to UAE Witness Mr. Higgins
- 192 Q. Briefly explain UAE's proposed adjustment for the High Plains project.
- 193 A. UAE proposes to adjust the cost of the High Plains project to equal the forecast
 194 provided by the Company in response to DPU 42.6. In response to DPU 42.6, the
 195 Company forecasts the cost of the High Plains project to be \$236.4 million,
 196 approximately 3.7 percent (\$9.1 million) lower than the originally anticipated cost
 197 of \$245.5 million.
- 198 Q. Do you agree with the proposed adjustment?
- 199 A. The Company agrees that its response to DPU 42.6 is a more up to date forecast
 200 than that originally included in the Company's filing and, therefore, should be
 201 used. The Company disagrees with Mr. Higgins' characterization that it is an
 202 "adjustment" to the High Plains project.

203	Q.	Mr. Higgins references \$5.5 million in unused contingency costs as being a
204		portion of the \$9.1 million cost reduction reflected in DPU 42.6. What is the
205		Company's position toward estimated contingency costs when setting rates
206		using a forward test period?
207	A.	Including contingency as part of project planning and project cost is prudent and
208		consistent with standard industry and construction practice. It is the Company's
209		position, given that including contingency costs is a standard and reasonable
210		construction practice, that estimated contingency costs are valid costs when
211		setting rates using a forward test period.
212	Q.	Why is the Company agreeing to revise the estimated total cost for the High
213		Plains project such that the estimate no longer includes contingency?
214	A.	The High Plains project has been placed in-service and, as such, the Company is
215		comfortable that its current forecast is sufficiently close to the actual project costs
216		the Company will incur. If the wind project was not already in-service, or there
217		were material questions as to an estimate of final costs, the Company's forecast
218		would include estimated contingency costs. Accordingly, the Company's position
219		is that those estimated contingency amounts are prudent and valid costs to include
220		when setting rates where a forward looking test period is concerned, excepting
221		where estimated final project costs are better known such as in this case.
222	Q.	Does UAE raise any issues of prudence associated with the High Plains
223		project?
224	A.	No.

Reply to DPU Witness Ms. Zenger

- Q. Please briefly describe the adjustment proposed by Ms. Zenger for the
 McFadden Ridge I project.
- A. Ms. Zenger proposes to reduce the level of capital cost associated with the McFadden Ridge I project by \$1.1 million, an amount Ms. Zenger associates with the Company's estimated contingency for the project. Ms. Zenger then takes the position that all future wind projects should have disallowance associated with estimated contingency costs.

Q. Do you agree with the proposed adjustment?

A. The Company agrees that an amount equal to the most recent forecast provided in response to DPU 29.24 (\$60.3 million) less estimated contingency costs of approximately \$1.1 million is a reasonable estimate of final project costs given the current status of the McFadden Ridge I project. On this basis, the Company agrees with the DPU that an appropriate amount to be placed in rates for the McFadden Ridge I project should be \$59.2 million (\$60.3 million - \$1.1 million). Similar to my testimony in response to UAE witness Mr. Higgins, the Company disagrees with DPU witness Zenger's characterization that such a change to the estimated capital costs of the McFadden Ridges I project is an "adjustment." The change to the estimated capital costs of the McFadden Ridge I project capital costs is a result of timing of adjusting the previously forecasted project costs to the current forecast now that the project has been placed in service.

246	Q.	What is the Company's position toward estimated contingency costs when
247		setting rates using a forward test period?
248	A.	As stated above, the Company's position is that estimated contingency costs are
249		reasonable and prudent and consistent with standard industry and construction
250		practice, therefore, project contingency costs are valid costs when setting rates
251		using a forward test period.
252	Q.	Why is the Company agreeing to use an amount for the McFadden Ridge I
253		project that no longer includes estimated contingency?
254	A.	The McFadden Ridge I project has been placed in-service and, as such, the
255		Company has reviewed and taken into account the majority of the project costs
256		and believes \$59.2 million is sufficiently close to the actual costs the Company
257		will incur. If the wind project was not already in-service, or there were material
258		questions as to an estimate of final costs, the Company's forecast would include
259		estimated contingency costs and, accordingly, the Company's position would be
260		that those estimated contingency amounts are prudent and valid costs to include
261		when setting rates where a forward looking test period is concerned.
262	Q.	Please explain how contingency is used in estimating costs of a project.
263	A.	Contingency is an integral part of project estimating, planning and forecasting and
264		is a valid and prudent expense for inclusion in rates when forward looking test
265		years are involved.
266	Q.	Do you agree with Ms. Zenger's claim that wind projects are "basically turn-
267		key" projects?
268	A.	No. I disagree with Ms. Zenger's statement that wind projects are "basically turn-

269		key" projects. Each wind construction project has the potential to incur
270		unexpected costs. The fact that the majority of a wind project's costs is primarily
271		spread over the turbine supply and construction agreements does not mitigate all
272		the risk that there will be unforeseen circumstances or events that can impact a
273		wind construction project's cost and/or schedule. Accounting for contingency
274		dollars as part of the overall wind construction project costs is a reasonable and
275		standard construction practice that constitutes a prudent industry practice to
276		predict and address unknown costs. Contingency costs are certainly not
277		"speculative" as Ms. Zenger claims.
278	Q.	What evidence does the Company have to demonstrate that accounting for
279		contingency dollars is a reasonable and standard construction practice that
280		constitutes a prudent industry practice?
281	A.	Accounting for contingency dollars is a reasonable and standard construction
282		practice that constitutes a prudent industry practice because a number of
283		functional organizations recommend the use of including contingency in
284		establishing project estimates.
285	Q.	What functional organizations are you referring to?
286	A.	Two examples include the Association for the Advancement of Cost Engineering
287		("AACE") and the Project Management Institute ("PMI").
288	Q.	Is the Company's practice with respect to estimating contingency consistent
289		with that put forth by AACE and PMI?
290	A.	Yes.

291	Q.	Does federal law establish that contingency is part of eligible project costs?
292	A.	Yes. Part 80 of Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations states:
293		Eligible project costs mean amounts substantially all of
294		which are paid by, or for the account of, an obligor in
295		connection with a project, including the cost of:
296		(1) Development phase activities, including planning,
297		feasibility analysis, revenue forecasting, environmental
298		review, permitting, preliminary engineering and design
299		work, and other pre-construction activities;
300		(2) Construction, reconstruction, rehabilitation,
301		replacement, and acquisition of real property (including
302		land related to the project and improvements to land),
303		environmental mitigation, <u>construction contingencies</u> , and
304		acquisition of equipment; and
305		(3) Capitalized interest necessary to meet market
306		requirements, reasonably required reserve funds, capital
307		issuance expenses, and other carrying costs during
308		construction.
309		(emphasis added)
310	Q.	Are contingency costs included in contracts?
311	A.	No. Ms. Zenger's inference that contingency costs are included in contracts is
312		incorrect. Contingency costs are not included in contracts because they are
313		unknown, and therefore, contingency costs are not negotiated as part of the
314		contract. The Company clarified this fact in association with the McFadden Ridge
315		I turbine supply agreement and the McFadden Ridge I balance of plant
316		construction agreement in response to DPU 51.2 and DPU 51.3. (See Exhibit
317		RMP(ARL-2R)).
318	Q.	Does the Company agree with the DPU that the McFadden Ridge I project
319		meets the prudence standard?
320	Α.	Yes. The Company's agrees with DPU witness Ms. Zenger that the McFadden

321		Ridge I project is a prudent investment.
322	Q.	What prudence standard does Ms. Zenger articulate in her testimony?
323	A.	Ms. Zenger describes a prudence standard based on reasonableness, as informed
324		by prudent industry practice. This is the standard that the DPU used to determine
325		that the McFadden Ridge I project is a "prudent investment."
326	Q.	Does a prudence standard based on reasonableness, as informed by prudent
327		industry practices, mean that the action of the utility must be optimal?
328	A.	No. As Ms. Zenger points out in her testimony:
329		"the Company's decision to pursue the project did not have to be the
330		optimal choice, but rather reasonable and consistent with prudent industry
331		standards at the time the Company had information that was available."
332		(emphasis added)
333	Q.	How does the DPU describe prudent industry practice?
334	A.	In her testimony, Ms. Zenger describes prudent industry practices as:
335		"Prudent industry practices include those practices, methods, standards
336		and acts (including those engaged in or approved by a significant portion
337		of the power industry for similar facilities in the United States) that, at a
338		particular time, in the exercise of good judgment, would have been
339		expected to accomplish the desired result in a manner consistent with
340		applicable laws, safety, environmental protection, economy and
341		expedition."

342	Q.	what conclusion does the DPU reach with respect to the McFadden Ridge I
343		project and prudent industry practices?
344	A.	Ms. Zenger testifies that "[the] Company considered the relevant factors in its
345		justification for the McFadden project, which the Division reviewed and found
346		that the decision making process was prudent."
347	Q.	Do you have any further comments regarding Ms. Zenger's testimony?
348	A.	Yes. Ms. Zenger makes several statements concerning past renewable resource
349		acquisitions with which the Company does not agree. Ms. Zenger ultimately
350		makes four general recommendations to the Commission. In part, my testimony
351		responds to each of these four general recommendations.
352	Q.	Ms. Zenger states that the Company should consider looking at diverse wind
353		characteristics going forward in the acquisition of its wind portfolio. How
354		does the Company respond to this recommendation?
355	A.	The Company inherently looks for diverse wind resources and diverse resources
356		types, through its Integrated Resource Planning ("IRP") process, its request for
357		proposal ("RFP") acquisition process, or through the process of directly acquiring
358		resources. With each individual resource acquisition decision, the Company takes
359		diversity into account by examining alternatives and economic valuation
360		techniques that determine value based on the location of the resource, the diurnal
361		production characteristics of the resource, and other resource-specific attributes.

362 O. Ms. Zenger states that the Company should be required to submit a 363 notification letter to the Commission at the time each wind plant comes in service. How does the Company respond to this second recommendation? 364 365 A. As a matter of policy, the Commission should not require a notification letter each 366 time the Company places a capital asset in-service. The volume of notifications 367 would be burdensome on the Company and the Commission staff. The Company 368 provides the Commission and DPU with routine business updates, and as a matter 369 of course and regular business practice, the Company informs the Commission 370 and DPU regarding the status of wind project construction, to the extent any is 371 under way. Should there be a question to the Company's current activities as it 372 relates to wind projects, the DPU simply needs to ask the Company. The 373 Company has always been willing to provide the DPU with an update during any 374 one of the many meetings that routinely takes place between the DPU and the 375 Company. 376 Ms. Zenger states that the Commission should review the Company's Q. strategy of building 99 MW wind farms adjacent to each other as separate 377 projects in order to avoid the solicitation process required in Oregon for 378 379 major resource additions. How does the Company respond to this third 380 recommendation by the DPU? 381 The Company does not agree it has a "strategy of building 99 MW wind A. 382 projects." The Company's strategy is to add supply-side resources in an economic 383 fashion. As such, the Company steadfastly contends that the addition of 99 384 megawatt ("MW") wind-powered generation resources has been prudent and in

385		customers' best interest. Following completion of the rate case, the Company is
386		willing to meet with the DPU to help them further understand the Company's
387		strategy with respect resource acquisition decisions and the circumstances that led
388		the company to pursue each and every wind resource in its portfolio, regardless of
389		size.
390	Q.	Ms. Zenger states that the Company needs to report detailed accounting of
391		its capital wind projects rather than lump sum capital costs in order for the
392		DPU to complete a full prudence review of future wind projects. How does
393		the Company respond to this fourth recommendation by the DPU?
394	A.	The Company has provided sufficient detail for the DPU to complete a full
395		prudence review of resource economics associated with wind-powered generation
396		resources. For example, the Company provided detailed costs in response to DPU
397		23.10 and DPU 49.6. Following completion of the rate case, the Company is
398		willing to meet with the DPU to address any issues relative to the information
399		provided for purposes of reviewing the evaluated cost of energy associated with
400		the Company's owned and contracted wind resource acquisitions. As a matter of
401		practice, the Company judges each new resource based on its overall cost of
402		energy, not solely based on construction cost.
403	Q.	Are the four general recommendations that Ms. Zenger makes to the
404		Commission relevant to this proceeding.
405	A.	No.

406	Q.	Please summarize the Company's position toward the DPU's position that all
407		future wind projects should have disallowance associated with estimated
408		contingency costs.
409	A.	The Company strongly disagrees with the Division's position. As my testimony
410		demonstrates, accounting for contingency dollars is a reasonable and standard
411		construction practice that constitutes a prudent industry practice to predict and
412		address unknown costs. Estimated contingency costs are valid costs when setting
413		rates using a forward test period.
414	Reply	to DPU Witness Mr. Peterson
415	Q.	Please provide an overview of the adjustment to the Rolling Hills project and
416		the High Plains project.
417	A.	DPU witness Mr. Peterson proposes a disallowance for the Rolling Hills project
418		of \$9,083,448 and for the High Plains project of \$21,103,448.
419	Q.	Please describe the analysis that Mr. Peterson uses to determine his proposed
420		disallowance.
421	A.	Mr. Peterson adjusts the cost of the Rolling Hills and High Plains projects, on a
422		cost per kW basis, to equal the weighted average cost per kilowatt ("kW") of the
423		Glenrock III, Seven Mile Hill II, and McFadden Ridge I projects. (See
424		Confidential Exhibit RMP(ARL-3R)).
425	Q.	Do you agree with Mr. Peterson's analysis for DPU's proposed adjustments?
426	A.	No. Mr. Peterson's analysis is flawed because it is based on an incorrect premise
427		that every wind project that is larger than another wind project should have
428		economies of scale that should make a larger wind project less expensive on a

429		cost per kW basis than a smaller wind project.
430	Q.	Which wind projects are specifically being referred to by Mr. Peterson?
431	A.	Mr. Peterson is specifically referring to the Glenrock III, Seven Mile Hill II, and
432		McFadden Ridge I projects as "small" wind projects whereas Mr. Peterson views
433		the Rolling Hills and High Plains projects as "large" wind projects.
434	Q.	Why is Mr. Peterson's economy of scale theory flawed?
435	A.	Mr. Peterson's theory that there should be economies of scale for larger projects,
436		when compared to smaller projects located in the same geographical location, is
437		flawed because it ignores information the Company provided the DPU regarding
438		infrastructure advantages the smaller projects enjoy that makes a cost per kW
439		analysis misleading.
440	Q.	Mr. Peterson asserts that the DPU's data requests provided little insight as to
441		why the costs per kW for a large project should be higher than that of a
442		small project. How does the Company respond to this?
443	A.	Through its response to DPU 4.12, the Company provided the internal approval
444		documents for Glenrock III, Seven Mile Hill II, and McFadden Ridge I projects.
445		In those approval documents, the Company documents that each project is taking
446		advantage of infrastructure being put in place for a nearby larger project. As a
447		result of these infrastructure advantages, the cost per kW for the smaller projects
448		is lower than that of the larger projects.
449	Q.	Was this infrastructure advantage understood by the DPU?
450	A.	Yes. DPU witness Ms. Zenger testified that the Company took advantage of
451		economies of scale when it built smaller projects at the Seven Mile Hill,

452		Glenrock, and High Plains sites. The economies of scale referenced in Ms.
453		Zenger's testimony include previously constructed interconnection facilities,
454		collector substations, roads, and operations and maintenance buildings.
455	Q.	Has the Company provided detailed cost information to the DPU indicating
456		the relative infrastructure costs savings that provide benefit to the small
457		wind projects?
458	A.	Yes. Infrastructure cost savings associated with the small wind projects can be
459		extracted and inferred from the Company's response to DPU 7.6, DPU 23.10 and
460		DPU 49.6.
461	Q.	Do the infrastructure cost savings for the three small wind projects account
462		for the variance observed by Mr. Peterson?
463	A.	Yes. My analysis is shown in Confidential Exhibit RMP(ARL-3R).
464	Q.	What does your analysis show?
465	A.	My analysis shows that the infrastructure cost savings associated with the three
466		small wind projects (Seven Mile Hill II, Glenrock III, and McFadden Ridge I)
467		approximately equals the cost per kW disallowance that Mr. Peterson proposes.
468		(See Table 2 of Confidential Exhibit RMP(ARL-3R)).
469	Q.	Are there other reasons that there may be cost per kW variances?
470	A.	Yes. Because each project is the result of a distinct resource acquisition decisions
471		taken at different points in time, it is intuitive to expect that there would be
472		variances for other reasons (e.g., the then-current market for major equipment, the
473		then-current market for construction services, the then-current market for
474		commodities like copper or steel and/or differences in permitting, legal or other

475		project management costs).
476	Q.	What conclusion do you draw from your infrastructure costs savings
477		analysis?
478	A.	I conclude that there is no basis for the High Plains project or Rolling Hills
479		project disallowances proposed by DPU witness Mr. Peterson and that the
480		infrastructure cost savings and my analysis of that data bears this conclusion out.
481	Q.	Are there other reasons that Mr. Peterson's prudence analysis should be
482		rejected?
483	A.	Yes. Mr. Peterson's prudence analysis should be rejected because it is based on
484		the faulty premise that a prudent resource is one with the lowest initial cost. If this
485		was indeed the applicable prudence criteria then the Company would never add a
486		fuel efficient combined cycle combustion turbine ("CCCT") resource to its
487		portfolio. Instead, the Company would always opt for a lower initial cost
488		alternative, such as a simple cycle combustion turbine ("SCCT") or some other
489		alternative with low initial cost. While it is indeed appropriate to choose a SCCT
490		resource over a CCCT resource in certain circumstances based on operating
491		characteristics and resource need, the Company would nonetheless perform that
492		analysis on the basis of established utility economics for long-term resource
493		additions. Not based solely on initial cost.
494	Q.	Please describe how the Company evaluates the economics of long-term
495		resource acquisitions?
496	A.	The Company makes resource acquisition decisions based on the predicted net
497		cost of energy and other value drivers over the life of the resource, regardless if

498		that resource is being constructed, owned and operated by the Company or a third
499		party with the output sold under a power purchase agreement ("PPA"). Mr.
500		Peterson's analysis judges prudence on the basis of an installed cost analysis and
501		does not take into account the overall economics of the resource.
502	Q.	Notwithstanding DPU's proposed disallowance associated with the Rolling
503		Hills project and High Plains project, what conclusion did Mr. Peterson
504		reach regarding the Company's cost to construct the Seven Mile Hill II,
505		McFadden Ridge I, Glenrock III, Rolling Hills, and High Plains projects?
506	A.	Mr. Peterson examined installed wind plant cost information available from the
507		United States Department of Energy ("U.S. DOE") and concluded:
508		"Therefore, the Division cannot conclude that the level of the project costs,
509		i.e. about per kW, is out of line when compared with
510		projects in other states." (Confidential information redacted).
511	Q.	Has the company entered into PPAs with third parties where the resource
512		acquisition decision was based on the cost of energy and not the installed cost
513		of the resource?
514	A.	Yes. There are two very recent examples. The Company's purchase of energy
515		under the 99 MW Campbell Hill PPA and under the 200.2 MW Top of the World
516		PPA.
517	Q.	Is the Campbell Hill PPA included in this case?
518	A.	Yes.
519	Q.	Has any party taken the position that the Campbell Hill PPA is imprudent?
520	A.	No. To the Company's knowledge, no party has taken an adverse position toward

521		the 99 MW Campbell Hill PPA.
522	Q.	Please summarize the Company's position regarding the DPU's proposed
523		disallowance for the Rolling Hills project of \$9,083,448 and proposed
524		disallowance for the High Plains project of \$21,103,448.
525	A.	The Company's position is that the Commission should outright reject the DPU's
526		proposed \$30,200,000 in disallowances. The proposed disallowances are based on
527		a flawed "economy of scale theory" that is wholly incorrect and inapplicable as
528		applied to the Company's large and small wind projects. DPU witness Mr.
529		Peterson's "economy of scale theory" is flawed because the Company's smaller
530		wind projects have infrastructure advantages that, indeed, DPU witness Ms.
531		Zenger references in her testimony. Finally, Mr. Peterson introduces evidence that
532		the Company's cost to construct the referenced wind projects was in line with that
533		provided by the U.S. DOE. Therefore, the Company has met the prudence criteria
534		established by the DPU through Ms. Zenger's testimony.
535	Q.	Does this conclude your rebuttal testimony?
536	A.	Yes.