**Richard S. Collins** Gore School of Business Westminster College 1840 South 1300 East Salt Lake City, UT 84105 Telephone: 801-832-2665 Facsimile: 801-832-3106 Email: rcollins@WestminsterCollege.edu **Representing Southwest Energy Efficiency** Project (SWEEP) and Utah Clean Energy (UCE)

## **BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH**

In the Matter of the Application of Rocky Mountain Power for Authority to Increase its Retail Electric Utility Service Rates in Utah and for Approval of its Proposed Electric Service Schedules and Electric Service Regulations

Docket No. 09-035-23

## SURREBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF RICHARD COLLINS

## **ON BEHALF OF** SOUTHWEST ENERGY EFFICIENCY PROJECT (SWEEP) and **UTAH CLEAN ENERGY (UCE)**

SWEEP and UCE submit the Rebuttal Testimony of Richard Collins in this docket.

DATED this 7<sup>th</sup> day of April, 2010.

/s/\_\_\_\_\_\_Koward Geller Representing SWEEP Sanah Wight  $|\mathbf{s}|$ 

Representing UCE

- Q. Please state your name and occupation. 1 2 A. My name is Richard S. Collins. I am an Associate Professor of Economics and Finance at Westminster College located at 1840 South 1300 East, Salt Lake City, UT 84108. 3 4 **O**. Are you the same Dr. Richard Collins who submitted direct and rebuttal testimony in this proceeding on behalf of Southwest Energy Efficiency Project, (SWEEP) and 5 **Utah Clean Energy, (UCE)?** 6 7 **A:** Yes, I am. What is the purpose of your rebuttal testimony? 8 0: A: I provide comments and surrebuttal testimony in response to the rebuttal testimony of 9 10 Rocky Mountain Power, (the Company) and the Office of Consumer Services, (OCS or SWEEP-UCE continue to support the recommendation of the Division of Office). 11 Public Utilities (Division) to implement a decoupling mechanism that will recover the 12 fixed costs associated with the residential distribution costs identified by the Company in 13 its direct testimony. The adoption of the decoupling mechanism should be combined with 14 SWEEP-UCE's rate design for residential customers. This will provide greater assurance 15 that the Company will recovery its fixed costs and will meet the goal to provide 16 incentives for residential customers to utilize electricity more efficiently. 17 SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY 18 **O**: Can you provide a summary of your rebuttal testimony? 19
- A: SWEEP-UCE responds to the criticism of the Company about the accuracy of our calculations of billing determinants and rates for the residential class in our Direct Testimony. SWEEP-UCE acknowledge that errors in calculation occurred and make

corrections to our testimony. In addition, we respond to a variety of issues brought up by
the Office in connection to the Division's proposal to decouple rate recovery from kWh
sales for the fixed distribution costs of residential customers.

Could you describe the Rebuttal Testimony of William Griffith with respect to the

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**O**:

# Division's decoupling proposal?

The Company is supportive of the Division's proposal to decouple the fixed distribution A: 28 29 costs from kWh sales. This mechanism is designed to recover of these fixed costs regardless of kWh sales. The Company expresses some concern about the reconciliation 30 process that assures cost recovery. The Company wants these fixed distribution costs to 31 be based on the number of customers served and have these fixed cost adjusted in 32 between rate cases if the number of customers changes. The Company expresses concern 33 about a six month true-up schedule and states its preference for an annual true-up 34 schedule. It requests a due date for its first report's of March 1, 2011. The Company 35 also recommends that the second year forecast be optional. The Company proposes a 36 new residential rate design that applies all of the 2.20 percent residential rate increase to 37 the residential customer charge which would increase this charge by \$1.45 to \$4.45. 38

# 39 Q: Do you care to comment on the Company's proposed revisions to the Decoupling 40 Mechanism?

# 41 A: Yes. SWEEP-UCE supports the Company's request to adjust residential fixed costs in 42 between rate cases to reflect changes in the number of customers. This will assure that 43 the fixed distribution charges are collected for the residential class. It assumes that if the 44 residential class grows in size then the fixed distribution costs will also grow

45 proportionally. Thus, this recommendation is based on the assumption that the actual 46 additional distribution cost per residential customer will be the same as the amount that is 47 collected for each additional customer. It should be the Company's burden to verify this 48 assumption. SWEEP-UCE agrees with the Company that an annual true-up schedule is 49 preferable to the six month schedule as it will save administrative costs. We also agree 50 that the first report should be due on March 1, 2010, but we maintain that the second year 51 forecast should be required.

# 52 Q: Do you agree with the Company's rate design proposal to collect the entire 53 additional revenue requirement in the customer charge which will increase the 54 customer charge by \$1.45?

A: No, I do not. SWEEP-UCE strongly opposes this proposed rate design for a number of 55 reasons. First of all, by requesting a customer charge that is greater than the amount 56 calculated under the Commission's approved methodology, the Company is implicitly 57 proposing that the Commission abandon its customer charge methodology. My 58 understanding is that under the Commission's approved method, the customer charge 59 should be \$3.83 and the Company is requesting \$4.45. The Company does not provide 60 any justification to the Commission for abandoning its long established methodology. 61 The Company's request is unreasonable given the fact that the decoupling mechanism 62 assures the Company that it will collect all of its fixed distribution costs which include 63 the costs of meters, meter reading and billing. Even if the customer charge is zero, the 64 Company will recover its fixed distribution costs. The Company's proposed rate design 65 66 is akin to buying mortgage insurance when you have already paid off the mortgage.

Secondly it robs the Commission the opportunity to lower revenue requirements in the 67 long run by increasing volumetric rates. Implementing higher volumetric charges along 68 with removing the throughput incentive through a decoupling mechanism will help 69 70 decrease growth of demand, which will help put a downward pressure on rates, given that new generation is more expensive than existing generation Adding more generation 71 resources will put greater pressure to raise rates to cover the higher costs. We are in 72 73 favor of decoupling because we feel that it addresses one of the main concerns about a steeply tiered rate design that the Company could potentially be at risk for not collecting 74 its fixed distribution charges. The decoupling proposal put forth by the Division 75 eliminates that concern. SWEEP-UCE support the decoupling mechanism as a means to 76 keep customer charges low while advancing a rate design that promotes energy efficiency 77 and conservation. 78

# 79 Q: Could you describe the Rebuttal Testimony of William Griffith with respect to 80 SWEEP-UCE's residential rate proposal?

A: The Company did not support SWEEP-UCE's residential rate design proposal and our proposed fourth tier which would increase the summer tail-block price by 34 percent. The Company contends that this would significantly increase revenue volatility and erode the Company's ability to recover its fixed costs. Moreover, given the errors contained in the workpapers and calculations, Witness Griffith suggests that the SWEEP-UCE proposal should be dismissed.<sup>1</sup>

## 87 Q: Would you care to respond to the Company's criticism of SWEEP-UCE's proposal?

<sup>1</sup> See Griffith Rebuttal Testimony page 14 lines 7-8

A: The Company is correct that there was a miscalculation of billing 88 Yes, I would. determinants and this error produced rates that could have led to an over collection of 89 revenues. The error occurred when the spreadsheet failed to include customers with 90 91 usage over 5000 kWh. So when calculating rates to collect the revenue requirement, those rates were spread over fewer kWh resulting in higher rates than necessary. The 92 error has been corrected and our recommended rates recalculated. We intend to resubmit 93 94 our Direct Testimony with the corrections to the Commission and parties to the docket. However, we do not feel that an error in calculation is adequate reason to reject our 95 We hope that the Company is not suggesting that any testimony or 96 proposal. recommendation that contains an error in calculation be dismissed summarily by the 97 Commission. We are confident that the Company would not want the Commission to 98 adopt such a policy universally. 99

With regards to the Company's concern about revenue volatility and its ability to recover 100 its fixed costs, it should be noted that SWEEP-UCE share that concern and suggested that 101 102 an elasticity adjustment in the calculation of rates could be used. We feel that the Division's proposed decoupling mechanism provides better assurance that the Company 103 will collect its fixed distribution costs for residential customers than such an elasticity 104 105 adjustment. Thus, decoupling and the SWEEP-UCE rate proposal will meet both important goals of rate design, to allow the Company the opportunity to recover its costs 106 and to send a price signal to customers to utilize their consumption of electricity 107 efficiently. The Company's proposal addresses the first goal of revenue assurance but 108 109 fails to address the efficiency goal.

Q: OCS witness Gimble recommends that a Utah Marginal Cost Study be completed
 prior to adopting changes to the overall rate structure (p. 7 of Gimble rebuttal
 testimony, lines 183-186). Do you agree with this recommendation?

**A:** No I do not. The Commission has approved a rate increase for the Company in Phase 1 of 113 this rate case and residential rates will be increased in some fashion. SWEEP-UCE 114 believe that this should be done in a manner that reduces growth in summer peak demand 115 116 and thus avoids the need for costly new electricity supply investments. Although, the Company has not performed a Utah specific marginal cost study, it has performed such 117 studies for its Oregon and California jurisdictions. SWEEP-UCE believes that long term 118 generation costs are most pertinent cost in determining rate design because one goal of 119 our rate design proposal is to help avoid the necessity of building new generation. Thus, 120 the relevant marginal cost data for determining rates is the future cost of energy and 121 demand. State-specific distribution costs are irrelevant because the decoupling 122 mechanism, if adopted, will recover those costs. As shown in the Table 1 below<sup>2</sup>, the 123 Oregon marginal costs for demand and energy for residential customers over the next ten 124 years is 16.727 cents per kWh. This is well below the SWEEP-UCE recommended rate 125 for its fourth tier of 14.72 cents per kWh. It should be noted that the Company's estimate 126 127 for California residential customers is identical to Oregon's.

<sup>2.</sup> This table came from the Company's Marginal Cost Study provide to SWEEP in its Data Request 2.1

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			fiCorp			
	Oregon N	Marginal Cos	st Study - NCO	Method		
	S	ummary of	Marginal Costs	3		
	Dei	mand & Ene	ergy in Mills/kV	Vh		
		December	2011 Dollars			
			(A)	(B)	(C)	(D)
			Energy		Demand & Energy	
			1 Year	10 Year	1 Year	10 Year
Line	Description					
1	Residential	(sec)	63.96	72.59	63.96	167.
2						

SWEEP-UCE does not feel that a Utah specific estimate of the marginal cost of demand 129 and energy is required by this Commission to set residential rates. Our proposal also 130 minimizes the increase in the electricity bill paid by low-income households. In our 131 132 view, these objectives are worthy ones that should be advanced with or without a new marginal cost study. While the Commission has stated that marginal cost information 133 134 "can and should be used" in designing rates, it has not stated, as far as I know, that a new state-specific Marginal Cost Study must be conducted every time that rate design is 135 changed. 136

Q: OCS witness Gimble has concerns about the rate design proposal of SWEEP-UCE,
as well as proposals made by other parties, because of what he terms "lack of price
elasticity evidence" (p. 6 of Gimble rebuttal testimony). Do you agree with this
concern?

A: No I do not. First of all, price elasticity effects have not traditionally been incorporated
 into residential rate design in previous RMP rate cases. Second, if the Commission
 accepts the recommendation of the Division to adopt a partial decoupling mechanism, it

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negates concerns about elasticity effects in designing rates at least for the portion of rates
 covered by the decoupling mechanism. Under this true-up mechanism, the Company will
 collect its approved level of distribution fixed costs, no more and no less.

147 Q: OCS witness Gimble has concerns about SWEEP-UCE using actual data for one

148 year rather than weather-normalized data to show the percentage of bills and

149 percentage of electricity use in each of the four summer tiers proposed by SWEEP-

150 UCE (pp.7-8 of Gimble rebuttal testimony). Do you agree with this concern?

A: No I do not. The data shown in Table 5 in my direct testimony are striking. The point that a small number of customers, i.e., very high use customers, account for a disproportionate share of summer electricity use, and that a significant number of customers, namely lower usage customers, account for a disproportionately small fraction of total summer electricity use, is true whether or not it is a relatively hot, normal or cool summer. We requested weather normalized usage by usage level and the Company was unable to provide such information at that level of granularity.

Q: OCS witness Beck argues against the Division's decoupling proposal in part because she claims it is untimely and should have been proposed in the revenue requirement and cost of service phase of the proceeding (pp. 2-3 of Beck rebuttal testimony). Do

- 161 you believe this concern has merit?
- A: No I do not. I believe that the decoupling proposal is a rate design proposal and as such
   was appropriate to make in the rate design phase of the case, not in the revenue
   requirement and cost of service phase.
- 165 Q: OCS witness Beck argues against the Division's decoupling proposal in part because

#### it does not account for risk and adjust the Company's ROE or tie cost recovery to 166 performance goals (pp. 3-5 of Beck rebuttal testimony). Do you believe these 167 concerns have merit? 168

For this particular decoupling proposal I do not. The Division's proposal is to only **A:** 169 decouple the Company's recovery of approved fixed distribution costs per residential 170 customer from the level of electricity sales. It is a moderate decoupling proposal and 171 172 reduces the risk against the non-recovery of residential fixed distribution costs. A full blown decoupling mechanism may well merit an examination of the ROE but for this 173 case I do not believe a ROE adjustment is necessary. It should be noted, that the 174 decoupling proposal protects consumers - including low-income consumers - from 175 overpaying the Company for fixed distribution costs when sales exceed the level upon 176 which rates are based, and protects the Company from under collecting its approved fixed 177 distribution costs when sales are below the level upon which rates are based. The 178 mechanism cuts both ways, something Ms. Beck fails to acknowledge. 179

The notion that a decoupling mechanism "cuts both ways" is not just a theoretical claim; 180 it is born out by real world experience. The attached article on decoupling experience 181 published in the Electricity Journal in October  $2009^3$  is the best review of decoupling 182 183 experience that I know of (attached as Exhibit 1). Figure 2 (pg 86) in the paper shows that decoupling mechanisms adopted for other electric utilities have resulted in refunds 184 10 times and surcharges 13 times. In addition, the Lesh study showed that the majority of

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<sup>3</sup> Pamela Lesh, Rate Impacts and Key Design Elements of Gas and Electric Utility Decoupling: A Comprehensive Review, Electricity Journal (October 2009).

rate adjustments due to decoupling were less than  $\pm 1\%^4$ .

187 Regarding performance goals and incentives, SWEEP-UCE support providing investor-188 owned utilities performance-based incentives for superior DSM program performance. 189 Such incentives are already offered to utility shareholders in numerous states.<sup>5</sup> They are a 190 complement to decoupling, not a substitute for decoupling. And both removal of 191 disincentives and creating positive incentives for energy efficiency and conservation are 192 supported in the H.J.R. 9 resolution adopted by the Utah legislature in 2009<sup>6</sup>.

OCS witness Beck argues against the Division's decoupling proposal in part **Q**: 193 because of claimed fairness concerns within the residential class, in particular 194 because it does not discriminate among customers that are efficient and those that 195 are wasteful in their use of electricity In particular, she states "These low-use 196 customers will now pay a decoupling surcharge to compensate the Company for a 197 possible lower revenue stream due to changes in behavior of larger residential 198 users." (p. 10 of Beck rebuttal testimony lines 280-283). She also expresses concern 199 about low income customers and their ability to pay for these surcharges. Do you 200 believe these concerns have merit? 201

- A: No I do not. In regards to the intra-class equity concern, the proposed true-up mechanism applies the same charge per kWh for all residential customers, based on the amount of money in the balancing account (positive or negative). Thus in dollar terms, higher use
  - 4 Ibid.

5 See the 2009 RAP presentation by W. Shirley, J. Lazar and L. Schwartz, for example. http://www.raponline.org/showpdf.asp?PDF\_URL=%22docs/RAP\_Lazar\_Schwartz\_Shirley\_Idaho\_Webinar\_UtilityEEfinancialIncentives\_2009\_11\_20.pdf%22.

<sup>6</sup> HJR 09 S01: Joint Resolution on Cost-effective Energy Efficiency and Utility Demand-side Management, Utah State Legislature, 2009 General Session, available: <u>http://le.utah.gov/~2009/htmdoc/hbillhtm/hjr009s01.htm</u>.

205 customers would pay more than lower use customers when the surcharge is accessed. 206 This is a fair and appropriate way to implement such a true-up mechanism. And as noted 207 above, the mechanism can result in either a refund or a surcharge depending on whether 208 the Company has under-collected or over-collected its approved fixed distribution costs 209 per customer.

Furthermore, SWEEP-UCE have proposed strengthening inverted block rates in the 210 211 summer and initiating a two-block system in non-summer months. Adopting our rate proposal would in fact enhance the affordability of electricity for low usage households. 212 But as we noted in our rebuttal testimony, our rate design proposal does add to 213 uncertainty regarding collection of the company's authorized fixed cost recovery. 214 Adopting decoupling addresses this concern and hence facilitates adoption of our rate 215 design proposal. Moreover, adopting decoupling as proposed by the Division and our rate 216 design proposal in combination will do more to enhance the affordability of electricity for 217 low usage, often lower income households, than OCS's rate design proposal along with 218 219 their recommended rejection of the decoupling mechanism.

Q: OCS witness Beck argues against the Division's decoupling proposal in part because it only applies to the residential customer class (p. 6 of Beck rebuttal testimony). Do you believe this concern has merit?

A: No I do not. The article by Pamela Lesh attached as Exhibit 1 to my testimony shows that most states with decoupling have adopted a per class calculation and adjustment (see Table 2, pg 70 in the Lesh article). This means that the mechanism determines the difference between authorized revenue and actual revenue on a per class basis and

provides the resulting refund or surcharge to that class, independent of the adjustment for 227 other classes. So if the Division had proposed and the Commission adopted a decoupling 228 mechanism for all customer classes in the same manner as is done in most states, the net 229 result would be same for the residential class as is the case with the Division's residential 230 sector only proposal. In either case, the residential true-up adjustment would be based on 231 residential revenue only, comparing authorized and actual revenue per residential 232 233 customer, period. Having said this, SWEEP-UCE do not object to broadening the scope of decoupling to include other customer classes. But not including other customer classes 234 under the pilot mechanism is not a good reason for rejecting decoupling for the 235 residential class. 236

# Q: Do you believe that the Commission must choose the rate design of a given party in its entirety or is the Commission free to make its determination of each rate element separately?

I believe that the Commission has great latitude in approving rate design. **A:** The 240 Commission should decide each rate element based on the merits of the evidence on the 241 record. Rate design requires fluidity because if one element changes then all other 242 elements must change in order to assure the collection of the authorized revenue 243 requirement. For example, if the Commission felt that the customer charge should stay at 244 \$3.00 then the SWEEP-UCE rate proposal would have to be recalculated to assure that 245 the approved revenue requirement is collected. If the Commission chooses to implement 246 a fourth tier it could choose a rate for that tier that it feels is justified based on evidence 247 that is on the record. Or if the Commission does not feel that a fourth tier is justified but 248

249	feels that a stronger price signal is necessary for the tail block rate then it can set that rate

at a higher level and not be tied to a specific party's recommendation.

# 251 Q: Is there a model or easy way for the Commission to make such adjustments?

- A: Yes, there is. SWEEP-UCE developed such a model and made it available to the OCS
- via a data request. The model can be made available to the Commission if desired.

254 Q: Does that complete your rebuttal testimony?

255 A: Yes, it does.

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was sent by United States mail, postage prepaid, or by email this 7<sup>th</sup> day of April 2010, to the following:

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