BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH

|) In the Matter of the Application of Rocky Mountain Power for Authority to) | DOCKET NO. 10-035-124 Exhibit No. DPU 4.0 |
|---|--|
| Increase its Retail Electric Utility ServiceRates in Utah and for Approval of ItsProposed Electric Service Schedules andElectric Service Regulations. | Direct Testimony and Exhibits Charles E. Peterson |
|) | |

FOR THE DIVISION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE STATE OF UTAH

Direct Testimony of

Charles E. Peterson

May 11, 2011

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| 1 | | Testimony of Charles E. Peterson |
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| 2 | | |
| 3 | | I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY |
| 4 | | |
| 5 | Q. | Please state your name, business address and title. |
| 6 | A. | My name is Charles E. Peterson; my business address is 160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, |
| 7 | | Utah 84114; I am a Technical Consultant in the Utah Division of Public Utilities (Division, |
| 8 | | or DPU). |
| 9 | | |
| 10 | Q. | On whose behalf are you testifying? |
| 11 | A. | The Division. |
| 12 | | |
| 13 | Q. | Please summarize your educational and professional experience. |
| 14 | A. | I attended the University of Utah and earned a B.A. in mathematics in 1978 and a Master of |
| 15 | | Statistics (M.Stat.) through the Graduate School of Business in 1980. In 1990, I earned an |
| 16 | | M.S. in economics, also from the University of Utah. |
| 17 | | |
| 18 | | Between 1980 and 1991, I worked as an economic and financial consultant and business |
| 19 | | appraiser for several local firms or local offices of national firms. My work frequently |
| 20 | | involved litigation support consulting and I have testified as an expert witness in both federal |
| 21 | | and state courts. |
| 22 | | |

| 23 | In 1991, I joined the Property Tax Division of the Utah State Tax Commission. In 1992, I |
|--|---|
| 24 | was promoted to manager over the Centrally Assessed Utility Valuation Section. I have |
| 25 | provided expert testimony regarding valuation, economic and cost of capital issues, both in |
| 26 | deposition and formal hearing before the Utah State Tax Commission. |
| 27 | |
| 28 | I joined the Division in January 2005 as a Utility Analyst; in May 2006, I was promoted to |
| 29 | Technical Consultant. I have worked primarily in the energy section of the Division. In |
| 30 | 2007, I earned the Certified Rate of Return Analyst (CRRA) from the Society of Utility and |
| 31 | Regulatory Financial Analysts (SURFA). |
| 32 | |
| 33 | My current resume is attached as DPU Exhibit 4.1. |
| 34 | |
| 35 | Q. Please outline the projects you have worked on since coming to the Division. |
| 36 | A. I was involved in evaluating cost of capital issues in the 2004 rate case that was settled in |
| 37 | February 2005. In 2006 I provided written and oral testimony on cost of equity supporting |
| 38 | the stipulation that settled most issues in the PacifiCorp general rate case in Docket No. 06- |
| 39 | 035-21. In May 2008 I provided written and oral testimony on cost of capital and related |
| 10 | issues in both the PacifiCorp and Questar Gas Company general rate cases (Docket Nos. 07- |
| 40 | |
| 40 41 | 035-93 and 07-057-13, respectively). In early 2009 I provided written testimony and oral |
| 40 41 42 | 035-93 and 07-057-13, respectively). In early 2009 I provided written testimony and oral testimony in support of the stipulation on Cost of Capital in the PacifiCorp rate case Docket |
| 40 41 42 43 | 035-93 and 07-057-13, respectively). In early 2009 I provided written testimony and oral testimony in support of the stipulation on Cost of Capital in the PacifiCorp rate case Docket No. 08-035-38. Subsequently I provided written testimony and oral cost of capital testimony |
| 40 41 42 43 44 | 035-93 and 07-057-13, respectively). In early 2009 I provided written testimony and oral testimony in support of the stipulation on Cost of Capital in the PacifiCorp rate case Docket No. 08-035-38. Subsequently I provided written testimony and oral cost of capital testimony in the previous PacifiCorp general rate case Docket No. 09-035-23. |

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| 46 | I have worked on DSM, HELP, and service quality and customer guarantees involving |
|----|--|
| 47 | PacifiCorp. I was the Division lead on an internal research project regarding ring-fencing that |
| 48 | resulted in a report to the Utah Public Service Commission (Commission). I have been the |
| 49 | lead on a number of QF contract cases. I was the lead of the economics and finance group |
| 50 | within the Division assigned to evaluate the proposed acquisition (Acquisition) of PacifiCorp |
| 51 | (Company) by MidAmerican Energy Holdings Company (MEHC). Please see Docket No. |
| 52 | 05-035-54. I testified on behalf of the Division in PacifiCorp's purchase of the Chehalis |
| 53 | power plant on July 17, 2008 (see Docket No. 08-035-35). More recently, I was the |
| 54 | Division's primary witness in the ECAM docket (Docket No. 09-035-15) and the All Source |
| 55 | RFP docket (Docket No. 10-035-126). |
| 56 | |
| 57 | Q. What is the purpose of your testimony in this matter? |
| 58 | A. My testimony discusses issues related to the cost of capital of the Company. ¹ Cost of capital |
| 59 | includes capital structure, cost of common equity, cost of debt and cost of preferred stock. |
| 60 | Cost of equity and overall cost of capital are important parts of the revenue requirement of a |
| 61 | regulated utility. I provide testimony supporting the Division's position that currently the |
| 62 | appropriate cost of equity for PacifiCorp is 10.0 percent. The Division does not challenge at |
| 63 | this time the Company's requested returns on long-term debt and preferred stock, or its |
| 64 | requested capital structure. |
| 65 | |

¹ Rocky Mountain Power (RMP) is an operating division of PacifiCorp primarily performing the retail distribution operations of PacifiCorp in the eastern part (i.e. Utah, Wyoming and Idaho) of PacifiCorp's system. RMP runs no electric generators, and more importantly for my purposes, it has no debt, no preferred stock and no common stock. The fact that PacifiCorp files with the Commission under the name Rocky Mountain Power, doesn't change the fact that any cost of capital calculations are necessarily of the whole company (i.e. PacifiCorp) and not its local division. Therefore, throughout this testimony I will primarily refer to PacifiCorp, rather than RMP.

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| 66 | | The Company's most recent long-term debt issuance was for \$1.0 billion in January 2009 at |
|--|-----------------------|---|
| 67 | | an average cost of under 6.0 percent. The Company anticipates issuing \$400 million of |
| 68 | | additional long-term debt in May 2011 and another \$600 million in January 2012. The |
| 69 | | average forecast cost of this additional debt is approximately 5.71 percent, ² during the test |
| 70 | | period in this docket. The Division accepts PacifiCorp's proposed long-term cost of debt of |
| 71 | | 5.81 percent. The Division has no disagreement with the Company's preferred stock return of |
| 72 | | 5.43 percent. ³ |
| 73 | | |
| 74 | Q. | In a previous PacifiCorp rate case, you testified that you were asking the Commission |
| 75 | | to modify its view of the use of different methodologies. What is your position on this |
| | | |
| 76 | | subject in this rate case? |
| 76 77 | A. | subject in this rate case? The Commission's decisions in Docket Nos. 07-035-93, 07-057-13 and 09-035-23 made |
| 76 77 78 | A. | subject in this rate case? The Commission's decisions in Docket Nos. 07-035-93, 07-057-13 and 09-035-23 made reference to different methodologies, but did not discuss the merits of the methodologies. ⁴ In |
| 76 77 78 79 | A. | subject in this rate case? The Commission's decisions in Docket Nos. 07-035-93, 07-057-13 and 09-035-23 made reference to different methodologies, but did not discuss the merits of the methodologies. ⁴ In this case I continue to use the same methodologies (cost of equity estimation techniques) as I |
| 76 77 78 79 80 | A. | subject in this rate case? The Commission's decisions in Docket Nos. 07-035-93, 07-057-13 and 09-035-23 made reference to different methodologies, but did not discuss the merits of the methodologies. ⁴ In this case I continue to use the same methodologies (cost of equity estimation techniques) as I did in those dockets and in Docket No. 08-035-38. |
| 76 77 78 79 80 81 | A. | subject in this rate case? The Commission's decisions in Docket Nos. 07-035-93, 07-057-13 and 09-035-23 made reference to different methodologies, but did not discuss the merits of the methodologies. ⁴ In this case I continue to use the same methodologies (cost of equity estimation techniques) as I did in those dockets and in Docket No. 08-035-38. |
| 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 | А. Q. | subject in this rate case? The Commission's decisions in Docket Nos. 07-035-93, 07-057-13 and 09-035-23 made reference to different methodologies, but did not discuss the merits of the methodologies. ⁴ In this case I continue to use the same methodologies (cost of equity estimation techniques) as I did in those dockets and in Docket No. 08-035-38. Please briefly summarize the work and investigations that you have performed in this |
| 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 | А. Q. | subject in this rate case? The Commission's decisions in Docket Nos. 07-035-93, 07-057-13 and 09-035-23 made reference to different methodologies, but did not discuss the merits of the methodologies. ⁴ In this case I continue to use the same methodologies (cost of equity estimation techniques) as I did in those dockets and in Docket No. 08-035-38. Please briefly summarize the work and investigations that you have performed in this matter. |
| 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 | А. Q. А. | subject in this rate case? The Commission's decisions in Docket Nos. 07-035-93, 07-057-13 and 09-035-23 made reference to different methodologies, but did not discuss the merits of the methodologies. ⁴ In this case I continue to use the same methodologies (cost of equity estimation techniques) as I did in those dockets and in Docket No. 08-035-38. Please briefly summarize the work and investigations that you have performed in this matter. I have reviewed data and commentary on the economy generally. I have reviewed and |

² Direct testimony of Bruce N. Williams, Exhibit RMP (BNW-4), page 2 of 4.

³ Direct testimony of Bruce N. Williams, page 2.

⁴ In particular, I advocated giving some credence to the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) due to its wide use and acceptance, while at the same time recognizing the difficulties previously discussed by the Commission in implementing this model in practice. I also suggested that the Commission may want to consider other models as they are from time to time offered and supported by testimony.

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DPU Exhibit 4.0
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| 86 | | Treasurer, and Samuel C. Hadaway, Ph.D., an outside cost of equity witness. Mr. Williams |
|-----|----|---|
| 87 | | provided testimony regarding cost of debt, cost of preferred stock and capital structure. Dr. |
| 88 | | Hadaway filed testimony on cost of equity. I have also performed my own independent |
| 89 | | estimation of cost of capital, particularly with respect to cost of equity. |
| 90 | | |
| 91 | Q. | Please outline the scope of your testimony. |
| 92 | A. | First, I review the general economic situation in the United States. Second, I will review and |
| 93 | | comment on the basis of the Company's capital structure request. Next I will review and |
| 94 | | comment on the Company's requests for cost of preferred stock and long-term debt. |
| 95 | | |
| 96 | | Then, I will describe the methods, data, and analyses that I used to arrive at the Division's |
| 97 | | recommendation for cost of equity including the selection of comparable companies. Finally, |
| 98 | | I will review and comment on those areas of Dr. Hadaway's testimony with which I agree |
| 99 | | and disagree. |
| 100 | | |
| 101 | | In order to prepare testimony, I set a cut-off of April 25, 2011 for stock prices, and the |
| 102 | | weekly average debt yields for the last two weeks in April. |
| 103 | | |
| 104 | Q. | What is the Company's filed position regarding cost of capital? |
| 105 | A. | In its filing dated January 24, 2011, the Company asked for the following cost of capital rates |
| 106 | | of return: ⁵ |
| 107 | | |

108

⁵ Williams Direct testimony, January 2011, page 2.

| 109 | | | | |
|-----|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------|--|------|
| 110 | | | | |
| 111 | Component | Structure | Cost | |
| 112 | Long-Term Debt | 47.8% | 5.81% | |
| 113 | Preferred Stock | 0.3% | 5.41% | |
| 114 | Common Stock | 51.9% | 10.50% | |
| 115 | WACC | 100.0% | 8.25% | |
| 116 | | | | |
| 117 | Q. What have you concluded wi | ith respect to the C | Company's filed testimony? | |
| 118 | A. As outlined above, I concluded | d that the costs of th | e preferred stock and long-term debt are | е |
| 119 | reasonable. I have also conclue | ded that the request | ed capital structure is not unreasonable | |
| 120 | given the Company's on-going | g capital expenditur | e program. I believe that the cost of equ | ity |
| 121 | range estimate recommendation | on by Dr. Hadaway | is on the high side. I believe the public | |
| 122 | interest would be better served | l if PacifiCorp's aut | horized cost of equity were set lower at | |
| 123 | 10.0 percent. | | | |
| 124 | | | | |
| 125 | DPU Exhibit 4.2 summarizes t | the capital structure | and cost of capital point estimates | |
| 126 | supported by the Division. The | e final weighted ave | erage cost of capital is 7.98 percent. The | ; |
| 127 | following table summarizes th | e capital structure a | nd cost of capital point estimates support | rted |
| 128 | by the Division. | | | |
| 129 | Component | Structure | Cost | |
| 130 | Long-Term Debt | 47.8% | 5.81% | |
| 131 | Preferred Stock | 0.3% | 5.43% | |

| 132 | Common Stock | 51.9% | 10.00% | |
|-----|---|------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------|
| 133 | WACC | 100.00% | 7.98% | |
| 134 | II. REVIE | W OF THE CURI | RENT ECONOMY | |
| 135 | | | | |
| 136 | A. The United States Economy | | | |
| 137 | Q. Please briefly summarize the | current state of th | e United States econor | ny. |
| 138 | A. The U.S. economy officially su | ffered through a re | cession between Decem | ber 2007 and June |
| 139 | 2009. ⁶ This recession was chara | acterized by declin | ing housing prices, mort | gage foreclosures, |
| 140 | rising unemployment, and, of c | ourse, nearly unpre | cedented turmoil in the | financial markets. |
| 141 | The severe difficulties in the ba | nking systems hav | e resulted in bankruptcie | es of financial |
| 142 | companies and massive govern | ment intervention, | both domestically and a | round the world in |
| 143 | order to stave off the collapse of | of the financial syst | em. This recession was | probably the worst |
| 144 | since the 1930s. ⁷ | | | |
| 145 | | | | |
| 146 | Since the summer of 2009, the | U.S. economy has | been growing. The stock | c market is |
| 147 | essentially up 100 percent since | e its March 2009 lo | ws. Unemployment has | declined, although |
| 148 | not as much as hoped for, indus | strial capacity utiliz | ation has improved, and | l corporate profits |
| 149 | are up from their recession low | s which have been | driving the stock market | t upward. In spite |
| 150 | of the improvement in the econ | omy since the end | of the recession, econon | nic growth has been |
| 151 | somewhat sporadic with unemp | bloyment and housi | ng being notable laggar | ds. Indeed, the |

⁷ The Value Line Investment Survey, "Economic and Stock Market Commentary," August 29, 2009.

⁶ National Bureau of Economic Research, Business Cycle Dating Committee, Report, September 10, 2010. <u>http://www.nber.org/cycles/sept2010.html</u> Last accessed May 4, 2011.

Also see Bernanke, Ben S., "Reflections on a Year of Crisis" (Speech), Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, August 21, 2009.

⁽Footnote 9, continued) "This Downturn is Noticeably Different," by Mark Knold, Trendlines, Utah Department of Workforce Services, September/October 2009.

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| 152 | Federal Reserve's Open Market Committee (OMC) recently stated that "investment in |
|-----|--|
| 153 | nonresidential structures is still weak, and the housing sector continues to be depressed." ⁸ |
| 154 | However, the OMC also noted "that the economic recovery is proceeding at a moderate pace |
| 155 | and overall conditions in the labor market are improving gradually."9 |
| 156 | |
| 157 | Value Line estimates that real U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) will increase by 3.1 |
| 158 | percent in 2011 and 3.2 percent in 2012. Value Line forecasts inflation as measured by the |
| 159 | GDP price deflator to remain fairly subdued at about 1.8 percent over the next 3 to 5 years. ¹⁰ |
| 160 | Other forecasts of GDP include the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), which forecasts real |
| 161 | GDP to increase by 3.1 percent in 2011 and 2.8 percent in 2012. ¹¹ The Energy Information |
| 162 | Administration (EIA) forecasts 2011 GDP to grow 2.2 percent and 3.9 percent in 2012. ¹² |
| 163 | Despite the somewhat disparate forecasts, the important point to note is that these forecasts |
| 164 | all suggest moderate growth for the United States economy. |
| 165 | |
| 166 | Q. Are there economists and other experts forecasting a return of the recession coupled |
| 167 | with high interest rates and commodity prices? |
| 168 | A. Yes. Some economists and market pundits have considerable concern that the high levels of |
| 169 | U.S. government debt coupled with strapped state budgets will be a drag on the economy that |
| 170 | will result in slower growth and even another recession when the Federal Reserve's (Fed) so- |
| 171 | called Quantitative Easing 2 ends in June. Quantitative Easing 2 is the Fed program to put |
| | |

⁸ Federal Reserve "Press Release," April 27, 2011. <u>http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20110427a.htm</u> Accessed May 4, 2011. ⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Value Line Investment Survey, Economic Series, April 29, 2011.
¹¹ CBO, Economic Projections, Table 2.1, January 2011.

¹² Energy Information Administration (EIA), "Annual Energy Outlook 2011," DOE/EIA-0383(2011), Release Date: April 26, 2011.

DPU Exhibit 4.0

| 172 | money into the economy through the market purchase of U.S. Treasury securities. It is feared |
|-----|--|
| 173 | that when this support is lifted interest rates will rise, slowing economic activity. High |
| 174 | commodity prices, such as oil, are affected more by international events than by what |
| 175 | happens in the United States. These commodity prices may not come down much even with a |
| 176 | slowing U.S. economy and little wage growth, perhaps starting a period of "stagflation." ¹³ |
| 177 | |
| 178 | Q. What does this mean for PacifiCorp? |
| 179 | A. It likely means that electric load growth for PacifiCorp will remain sluggish, that is below |
| 180 | trend, for a few more quarters. Of course, if things worsen, then loads could decline. For |
| 181 | now, though, PacifiCorp has been experiencing growing revenues and load demand over the |
| 182 | last year or so. ¹⁴ |
| 183 | |
| 184 | Q. What opportunities might this slower growth create for the Company? |
| 185 | A. One opportunity is that the Company might be able to slow its capital spending for a few |
| 186 | quarters, thus reducing interest expense and the need for further debt financing. |
| 187 | |
| 188 | B. The US Stock Market |
| 189 | Q. What has happened in the stock market since last year? |
| 190 | The financial markets are generally supporting the view that the economy is expected to |
| 191 | continue to grow. The market indices have risen approximately 100 percent from their March |

¹³ See for, example, the following recent articles last accessed May 10, 2011: <u>http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2011/03/04/global-stagflation-is-here-to-stay/</u> <u>http://dailycaller.com/2011/04/29/stagflation-is-here-declares-cnbcs-larry-kudlow/</u>

¹⁴ Energy Information Administration (EIA), Form EIA-826, "Monthly Electric Utility Sales and Revenue Report with State Distributions."

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| 192 | | |
|-----|-----------|--|
| 193 | | 2009 lows to date. The upward trend has continued with the Standard & Poor's 500 Index |
| 194 | | increasing over 7.0 percent so far in 2011, not including returns from dividends. |
| 195 | | |
| 196 | Q. | What effect does a rising stock market have on cost of capital calculations? |
| 197 | A. | Everything else equal, rising stock prices are an indication that investors view future risks as |
| 198 | | diminishing, in other words, that the cost of equity is declining. |
| 199 | | |
| 200 | Q. | So, from general stock market conditions you would expect cost of equity to be lower |
| 201 | | now than a year ago. |
| 202 | A. | Generally, yes. Of course, with specific companies and specific industries this may not be |
| 203 | | true, so one must look at the specific data for a company or industry. |
| 204 | | |
| 205 | <u>C.</u> | The U.S. Bond Market |
| 206 | Q. | How would you characterize the bond markets? |
| 207 | A. | Over the past year, or so, the bond markets appear to have behaved more or less normally. |
| 208 | | |
| 209 | Q. | Do interest rates generally support this view? |
| 210 | A. | Yes. DPU Exhibits 4.14 sets forth data from the Federal Reserve comparing Aaa and Baa |
| 211 | | corporate bond rates. These data show the rates and the spreads have returned to their levels |
| 212 | | prior to the 2008-2009 financial crisis. In absolute terms, the Baa bond rates are now below |
| 213 | | their levels in 2006 and 2007. Similarly, Aaa bonds are essentially trading at, or slightly |
| 214 | | below their yields before the financial crisis. Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke |
| | | |

| 215 | recently commented that "corporate bond issuance has been strong" ¹⁵ which also suggests |
|-----|---|
| 216 | that the markets for long-term corporate debt are functioning fairly normally. |
| 217 | |
| 218 | Short-term rates likewise show improvement as set forth on DPU Exhibit 4.16 that compares |
| 219 | 90-day T-Bill rates with 90-day LIBOR (London Inter-Bank Offer Rate) rates. The Exhibit |
| 220 | shows that rates and spreads are more favorable now than they were during the peak of the |
| 221 | financial crisis. The lower rates and the narrower spreads are indicative of improved liquidity |
| 222 | and market conditions. |
| 223 | |
| 224 | Q. What are your conclusions concerning the financial markets? |
| 225 | A. The financial markets appear to have largely returned to their pre-crisis operations. The |
| 226 | stock market in particular has retraced a significant amount of its loss over the past two years |
| 227 | and long-term interest rates are now similar to what they were prior to the crisis. I conclude |
| 228 | that at this point the financial markets are fairly stable and functioning. |
| 229 | |
| 230 | D. Summary of the Utah Economy |
| 231 | Q. Has Utah's economy been affected by the downturn in the U.S. economy? |
| 232 | A. Yes. Although as pointed out by the Utah Governor's Office of Planning and Budget |
| 233 | (GOPB), "Utah fared better than the nation during the recession, and is poised to lead the |
| 234 | U.S. into the recovery." ¹⁶ |
| 235 | |
| 236 | |
| | |

¹⁵ Ibid.
¹⁶ GOPB, "Economic Outlook 2011," page 5.

| 237 | Q. | what is the current economic situation in Utan? |
|--|-----------------|---|
| 238 | A. | As of February 2011 Utah's unemployment rate was 7.7 percent compared to the national |
| 239 | | unemployment rate of 8.9 percent. Growth in employment in Utah was running at about 1.6 |
| 240 | | percent annually versus 1.0 percent for the nation as a whole. ¹⁷ However, wages and personal |
| 241 | | income, while growing, were lagging somewhat behind the national averages through the end |
| 242 | | of 2010. Personal income in Utah grew at an annual rate of 3.4 percent compared to 3.9 |
| 243 | | percent in the nation; wages in Utah grew at a 1.6 percent rate and were forecast to grow 2.1 |
| 244 | | percent in 2011. In the nation, wages are forecast to grow 3.3 percent in 2011. ¹⁸ |
| 245 | | |
| 246 | Q. | What is the outlook for Utah? |
| 247 248 249 250 251 252 | A. | Economic growth in Utah is expected to accelerate during 2011. Employment is forecast to increase 1.4% for the year as a whole, with larger increases as the year progresses. Construction employment is forecast to increase 3.3%, the first year of growth following three years of contraction. Housing permits are forecast to move up slightly from historic lows. As the overall unemployment |
| 253 254 | | rate declines to 7.1%, the improving labor market will support increased consumer spending and a broad based recovery. ¹⁹ |
| 253 254 255 | | For class to move up slightly from instance lower fits the overall unemployment rate declines to 7.1%, the improving labor market will support increased consumer spending and a broad based recovery. ¹⁹ As cited above, there is an expectation that growth will continue in Utah and the rest of the |
| 253 254 255 256 | | rate declines to 7.1%, the improving labor market will support increased consumer spending and a broad based recovery.¹⁹ As cited above, there is an expectation that growth will continue in Utah and the rest of the nation. |
| 253 254 255 256 257 | | As cited above, there is an expectation that growth will continue in Utah and the rest of the nation. |
| 253 254 255 256 257 258 | Q. | For course to move up slightly from instance rows it is the overall difference rate declines to 7.1%, the improving labor market will support increased consumer spending and a broad based recovery. ¹⁹ As cited above, there is an expectation that growth will continue in Utah and the rest of the nation. Given the current economic situation, what are some of the ramifications for |
| 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 | Q. | For construction in the original proving labor market will support increased consumer spending and a broad based recovery. ¹⁹ As cited above, there is an expectation that growth will continue in Utah and the rest of the nation. Given the current economic situation, what are some of the ramifications for PacifiCorp? |
| 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 | Q. A. | Forecase to more up singlely from instorte rows its the order in themptoy inclusion rate declines to 7.1%, the improving labor market will support increased consumer spending and a broad based recovery. ¹⁹ As cited above, there is an expectation that growth will continue in Utah and the rest of the nation. Given the current economic situation, what are some of the ramifications for PacifiCorp? As mentioned above, PacifiCorp may be able to reasonably delay some capital spending and |

¹⁷ Utah Department of Workforce Services, Press Release, March 17, 2011.
¹⁸ GOPB, "Economic Summary," April 2011.
¹⁹ Ibid.

| 262 | | electricity in PacifiCorp's service territory, including Utah, will likely also be slow-growth |
|-----|----|--|
| 263 | | over the next few quarters. Longer term, there is reason to expect that PacifiCorp will |
| 264 | | participate in the return to more normal economic growth. |
| 265 | | |
| 266 | | |
| 267 | | III. CAPITAL STRUCTURE |
| 268 | | |
| 269 | Q. | What is PacifiCorp's current capital structure? |
| 270 | A. | I examined the latest actual capital structure of the Company that was available from the |
| 271 | | Company's SEC Form 10-K as of December 31, 2010. As of December 31, 2010, the capital |
| 272 | | structure was 53.0 percent common equity, 46.7 percent long-term debt and 0.3 percent |
| 273 | | preferred stock. Subsequent to the end of 2010, the Company paid dividends in February and |
| 274 | | April 2011 to its parent company totaling \$550 million. These dividend payments, combined |
| 275 | | with the issuance of long-term debt in May 2011, mentioned earlier, will have the effect of |
| 276 | | reducing the common equity ratio. The Company has indicated it intends to pay dividends in |
| 277 | | 2012 as well. |
| 278 | | |
| 279 | Q. | What are the capital structures of the comparable, or guideline, companies you used in |
| 280 | | your analysis? ²⁰ |
| 281 | A. | DPU Exhibit 4.16 sets forth calculated capital structures for common equity for the |
| 282 | | comparable companies I used. It shows that as of December 31, 2010, none of the guideline |
| 283 | | |

 $^{^{20}}$ The selection of the comparable companies will be described in detail in the cost of equity section of my testimony.

- companies had common equity percentages above 50 percent. The average equity percentage
 is about 46.5 percent 6.5 percentage points below PacifiCorp's.
- 286

| 287 | Q. Dr. Hadaway uses some companies as comparables that you did not use. Do Dr. |
|-----|---|
| 288 | Hadaway's comparable companies support an equity percentage above 50 percent? |
| 289 | A. According to the March 2011 AUS Monthly Report, two of Dr. Hadaway's guideline |
| 290 | companies, ALLETE and Duke Energy, had common equity ratios of 55 and 54 percent, |
| 291 | respectively. The remaining companies appear to have common equity ratios typically in the |
| 292 | mid-40 percent range, similar to my guideline companies. I did not include ALLETE in my |
| 293 | list of guideline companies because of its small size relative to PacifiCorp. I did not include |
| 294 | Duke Energy this year because it is in the process of acquiring Progress Energy. ²¹ |
| 295 | |
| 296 | Q. What are the effects of PacifiCorp having a stronger balance sheet, as represented by |
| 297 | its higher equity percentage, than the average of your comparable companies? |
| 298 | A. Having a stronger balance sheet helps PacifiCorp maintain its Standard & Poor's A bond |
| 299 | rating, which in turn helps the Company to obtain debt financing at relatively favorable |
| 300 | interest rates. On the negative side, increasing the common equity percentage increases costs |
| 301 | to the Company's ratepayers, all other things held equal. |
| 302 | |
| 303 | Q. What common equity percentage in the capital structure are you recommending? |
| 304 | A. I am not disputing the Company's requested capital structure at this time. The Company is in |
| 305 | a build cycle and arguably is viewed more favorably on Wall Street because of its relatively |

306 strong capital structure. This helps the Company to finance its projects more readily at

²¹ I included both Duke and Progress in my list of guideline companies in Docket No. 09-035-23.

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| 307 | favorable costs. As pointed out by Mr. Williams in his direct testimony, the Company's |
|-----|---|
| 308 | requested capital structure is similar to its requests in recent years. ²² Mr. Williams also state |
| 309 | that the long-term capital structure should approximate 50 percent common equity. ²³ At this |
| 310 | point I have no strong basis to try to "fine tune" the capital structure. |
| 311 | |
| 312 | |
| 313 | IV. COST OF DEBT AND PREFERRED STOCK |
| 314 | |
| 315 | Q. What did you do with respect to the cost of preferred stock? |
| 316 | A. I studied the testimony of Company witness Bruce Williams and the related exhibits. Mr. |
| 317 | Williams requested the cost of preferred stock be set at 5.43 percent. The 5.43 percent figure |
| 318 | is the imbedded cost of preferred stock. PacifiCorp has not issued new preferred stock in |
| 319 | several years and has, in fact, retired most of the preferred stock it had outstanding ten years |
| 320 | ago. The Company has not indicated any intention of issuing new preferred stock in the |
| 321 | future. I recommend accepting the Company's cost of preferred stock rate of 5.43 percent. |
| 322 | |
| 323 | Q. Do you have any issues with the Company's long-term debt rate? |
| 324 | A. As stated above, Mr. Williams' direct testimony indicates that the Company intends to issue |
| 325 | \$400 million in long-term debt in May 2011. The expected rate for this debt is 5.65 percent. |
| 326 | In January 2012 the Company anticipates issuing \$600 million in long-term debt at an |
| 327 | estimated rate of 5.823 percent. The estimated overall debt rate of 5.81 percent appears |
| 328 | |

²² Williams, Op. Cit., page 13.²³ Williams, Ibid., page 3

| 329 | reasonable. Therefore, the Division does not dispute the pro forma embedded cost of debt of |
|-----|---|
| 330 | 5.81 percent. |
| 331 | |
| 332 | Q. Do you have any further comments regarding Mr. Williams' testimony? |
| 333 | A. No. |
| 334 | |
| 335 | |
| 336 | V. COST OF COMMON EQUITY |
| 337 | |
| 338 | A. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS |
| 339 | Q. Please summarize your cost of equity calculations and conclusion. |
| 340 | A. First I identified comparable (proxy or guideline) companies that I would use to estimate the |
| 341 | cost of equity for PacifiCorp. These comparable companies are summarized in DPU Exhibit |
| 342 | 4.4. I will explain the selection process for the comparable companies later in my testimony. |
| 343 | |
| 344 | Then, using data from public sources related to the comparable companies, I calculated |
| 345 | several variations of the standard single-stage discounted cash flow (DCF) model and the |
| 346 | two-stage DCF model. In calculating these models, I used the average closing price covering |
| 347 | 30 trading days ending April 25, 2011. ²⁴ I considered several variations of the capital asset |
| 348 | pricing model (CAPM) using different historical periods to estimate the market risk |
| 349 | premium, different sources of beta, and the 20-year U.S. Treasury bond and the 90-day U.S. |
| 250 | |

350 Treasury bill rates as estimates of the risk-free rate.

²⁴ In previous dockets I have also used a "spot" price for each guideline company. However, I have concluded that the spot price analyses in previous dockets added little to the discussion, and would not have made a significant contribution in this Docket. Therefore, I have not included spot price analyses.

| 351 | |
|-----|--|
| 352 | Finally, similar to what I did in my previous testimony in Docket Nos. 07-035-93, 08-035-38, |
| 353 | and 09-035-23, I constructed estimates using a risk-premium model based upon Value Line |
| 354 | financial strength ratings. |
| 355 | |
| 356 | DPU Exhibit 4.3 sets forth a detailed summary of the results of the models and calculations |
| 357 | that I considered relevant to determining the cost of equity for PacifiCorp. DPU Exhibit 4.3 |
| 358 | sets forth my final recommendation, which is a point estimate of 10.0 percent as the cost of |
| 359 | common equity applicable to PacifiCorp at this point in time. I would consider a reasonable |
| 360 | range to be between 9.85 percent and 10.15 percent. |
| 361 | |
| 362 | B. AN OVERVIEW OF COST OF COMMON EQUITY MODELS |
| 363 | Q. What methods did you look at in order to estimate the current market cost of equity for |
| 364 | PacifiCorp? |
| 365 | A. I used standard discounted cash flow models (DCF) coupled with two types of risk premium |
| 366 | models to support and complement the DCF analyses. Regarding the DCF models, I |
| 367 | considered both the simple or single stage model and two-stage DCF models. Within each |
| 368 | model, I considered variations of different growth rates. |
| 369 | |
| 370 | Risk premium models included the CAPM and a model I developed at the Utah State Tax |
| 371 | Commission and included in previous testimony before this Commission that uses factors |
| 372 | based upon Value Line financial strength ratings to adjust the expected market return for |
| 373 | varying risk. |

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| 374 | |
|--|--|
| 375 | Q. Please briefly describe the Single-Stage DCF model. |
| 376 | A. The single-stage DCF model is based upon the assumption that the value of ownership in a |
| 377 | common stock is based upon the returns the stockholder expects to receive into perpetuity. It |
| 378 | incorporates the current dividend and the prospects for growth in that dividend over time. |
| 379 | Among other things, the model assumes that the expected price-to-earnings ratio for the |
| 380 | company's stock will remain constant at the current level. In the single-stage model it is |
| 381 | assumed that there exists a growth rate "g" that is constant; that is, this "g" will adequately |
| 382 | serve as a surrogate for the growth in dividends for all periods of time in the future. The |
| 383 | formula used is: |
| 384 | $k_{e} = D_{0}*(1+g)/P_{0} + g$ |
| 385 386 387 388 389 390 | Where: k_e is the cost of common equity D_0 is the current dividend P_0 is the current stock price g is the (constant) growth rate |

391 **Q. Please describe Two-Stage DCF models.**

392 A. Two-stage DCF models are based upon the same principles and assumptions that the single-393 stage models are based upon except that for an initial period of years, usually five to ten 394 years, the dividends are explicitly forecast. Following this initial period, a "terminal value" or 395 lump-sum price is calculated which represents the estimated present value of the future 396 dividends following the initial period. A discount rate is found for the explicitly forecast 397 initial period dividends and the terminal value such that the present value of the forecast 398 dividends and terminal value equals the current stock price. This discount rate is the cost of 399 equity in the two-stage DCF model.

400 401 The justification of using a two-stage model is that the analyst has disaggregated the future 402 period into two distinct parts and wants to explicitly model the different parts. Usually, the 403 analyst has two growth rate forecasts that he wants to show separately, one growth rate for 404 the initial period, and a different terminal or perpetuity growth rate. Rarely, the analyst may 405 also want to show different discount rates for the initial and terminal periods. The concepts 406 of a two-stage model are sometimes extended to a three-stage (i.e. two "initial" periods 407 followed by a terminal period) or even more. 408 409 Any multi-stage DCF model can be reduced to a single stage equivalent. Consequently, it 410 makes no sense to use a two or more-stage model if the growth rates in the different periods 411 are the same, since that would be equivalent to a single-stage model with that growth rate. 412 413 **Q.** What are the strengths and weaknesses of the DCF models? 414 A. Briefly, the strengths of the models are their simplicity and ease of application, particularly in 415 the single-stage version of the model. DCF models are derived directly from the financial 416 theory that the price of a common stock is equal to the present value of the future cash flow 417 available to stockholders. Two of the three principal components of the model are directly 418 observable in the market: the dividend and the stock price. The future growth rate is 419 necessarily an estimate, and thus can be controversial. The single-stage model can be faulted 420 for the assumption that there is a single growth rate that will apply to the company into the 421 indefinite future (theoretically, forever). As discussed above, non-constant and multi-stage 422 DCF models can handle changing growth rates in the future and even changing discount

rates, but they are increasingly complex and usually require the analyst to make manysubjective judgments.

425

426 Q. As you cited earlier, the Commission in the 2002 Questar Gas Company general rate
427 case adopted a formula using a 75 percent weighting on earnings growth estimates and
428 a 25 percent weighting on dividend growth estimates. Do you have any comments on
429 this weighting scheme?

A. For a single-stage model, this weighting appears reasonable to me. It gives consideration to
the fact that the model is theoretically about dividends and not earnings, but also reflects that
dividend growth is related to earnings growth. Implicit as well is the concept that differences
between dividend growth and earnings growth rates in the near-term have a greater effect on
the cost of equity than any such differentials in the far future. Therefore, I find that this
weighting scheme is reasonable and I use it as part of my analysis.

436

437 Q. Do you have any further comments comparing Single-Stage DCF models with Two438 Stage models?

A. Yes. The main advantage of two-stage (and even three-stage, or more) models is simply the
ability to separate out the estimate into two or more components. If the analyst has a good
basis for the specific separation of future cash flows into two or more components and has a
good basis for the length of time of the initial stage(s) as well as the growth differentials for
different components, then these models can be useful. They would also be useful if the goal
were to develop "what if" scenarios. However, in the case of cost of equity estimates, even
for a company in a mature industry, the time periods used and the growth rate differentials

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| 446 | tend to be subjective and even arbitrary. The analyst has to make more judgments and |
|-----|--|
| 447 | assumptions including the length of the periods of different growth rates, the growth rates for |
| 448 | different periods, the calculation of the terminal value (if any), and whether, or not, to |
| 449 | assume the discount rate should remain constant and if not, how is it going to be estimated. |
| 450 | Given these complexities with two-stage or higher multi-stage DCF models, they are unlikely |
| 451 | to be much better estimators of cost of capital unless the analyst has a solid basis for the |
| 452 | different growth estimates. |
| 453 | |
| 454 | As describe above, the results of a two- or more- stage DCF model have a single-stage |
| 455 | equivalent growth rate that may not be much different from the growth rates used in a multi- |
| 456 | stage model in a mature and price-regulated industry such as the electric utility industry. |
| 457 | This is especially true if the long-term growth rates are expected to be approximately the |
| 458 | same as short-term rates. However, if long-term growth rates are expected to be different |
| 459 | from the short-term rates, then a multi-stage model is more appropriate. |
| 460 | |
| 461 | Q. Please briefly describe the CAPM model. |
| 462 | A. The CAPM is a type of risk premium model. CAPM grew out of theoretical work in modern |
| 463 | portfolio theory in the 1960s. Modern portfolio theory had shown that diversified portfolios |
| 464 | could reduce the variability in the value of those portfolios and that a risk factor called "beta" |
| 465 | could be used to estimate the relative variability of a portfolio to the market portfolio. The |
| 466 | theory of CAPM is that the cost of equity is equal to the risk free rate plus a market risk |
| 467 | premium adjusted by the risk factor beta. The market risk premium is the additional return |
| 468 | over the risk free rate that a portfolio of all risky investments, i.e. the "market," would expec |

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| 469 | to earn. One of the theoretical underpinnings of CAPM is that through a diversified portfolio |
|-------------------|--|
| 470 | investors could virtually eliminate risk specific to a particular investment such that if the |
| 471 | investor were sufficiently diversified, he would only face the risk of the market, which is also |
| 472 | called systematic risk. Beta is a measure of the volatility of an investment's value compared |
| 473 | to the market as a whole and will indicate to an investor how a given investment will affect |
| 474 | the systematic risk of his portfolio. |
| 475 | |
| 476 | Under CAPM theory investors are not rewarded for the specific risks of a particular |
| 477 | investment because these risks can be diversified away. The only reward the investor |
| 478 | receives is the systematic risk, represented by the beta that an investment brings with it to the |
| 479 | portfolio. |
| 480 | |
| 481 | The calculation of the CAPM cost of equity for a company is straightforward and is based |
| 482 | upon readily available information. This model is widely taught in the academic literature |
| 483 | and is widely used in industry. ²⁵ |
| 484 | |
| 485 | The formula for the CAPM is as follows: |
| 486 | $k_{e} = RFR_{0} + \beta * (MR-RFR)$ |
| 487 488 489 | Where: k_e is the cost of common equity RFR ₀ is the current risk free rate β is beta, the risk adjustment factor |
| | |

²⁵ Modern portfolio theory and the capital asset pricing model are discussed in detail in texts on corporate finance and investment valuation. See, for example:

Brealey, Richard A., Stewart C Myers and Franklin Allen. (2006). *Principles of Corporate Finance* 8th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill Irwin.

Brigham, Eugene F. and Joel F. Houston. (2007). *Fundamentals of Financial Management 5th ed*. Mason, Ohio: Thomson South-Western.

Damodaran, Aswarh. (2002). *Investment Valuation*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Parcell, David C. (1997). *The Cost of Capital – A Practitioners Guide*.

| 490 491 492 493 494 | (MR-RFR) is the market risk premium, which can be decomposed into two factors: the overall market return, MR, and the RFR that is consistent with the way the MR was estimated. |
|---------------------------------|--|
| 495 | Q. Please briefly discuss some of the strengths and weaknesses of the CAPM. |
| 496 | A. The strengths include a firm theoretical basis for the model, its relative simplicity and |
| 497 | intuitive appeal. The model is widely taught and apparently widely used in corporate |
| 498 | America. The downside of the model is that there is little consensus on how each of the |
| 499 | factors are developed and the model implemented. |
| 500 | |
| 501 | Different analysts will choose different risk free rates, which will affect the outcome, as I |
| 502 | demonstrate in my application. Academics sometimes favor using a Treasury Bill rate as the |
| 503 | most nearly true risk free security, while practitioners (including this one) favor longer-term |
| 504 | bond rates to match the apparent holding period of the asset. Beta is calculated in various |
| 505 | ways using different base periods, market proxies and other measurement differences such as |
| 506 | the frequency of the observations and even the day of the week the observations are made. |
| 507 | Some services offer "adjusted" betas that "correct" the calculated or "raw" beta to account |
| 508 | for the apparent tendency of betas to revert to a mean over time. The available services |
| 509 | assume that the mean that the betas revert to is the market beta, 1.0. |
| 510 | |
| 511 | There is evidence that utility company betas should not be assumed to revert to a mean of |
| 512 | 1.0. Gombola and Kahl studied 109 utilities and found that the mean that their betas reverted |
| | |

513 to was 0.52. (Gombola, Michael J., and Douglas R. Kahl, "Time-Series Processes of Utility

514 Betas: Implications for Forecasting Systematic Risk," Financial Management, Autumn 1990,

| 515 | pp. 84-93). A more recent study by Buckland and Fraser of British water utilities found a |
|-----|---|
| 516 | mean of about 0.7. However, this study is less compelling due to its limited scope and |
| 517 | geographic location (Buckland, Roger and Patricia Fraser, "Political and Regulatory Risk in |
| 518 | Water Utilities: Beta Sensitivity in the United Kingdom," Journal of Business Finance & |
| 519 | Accounting, 28(7) & (8), September/October 2001, pp. 877-904.) In my analyses I use |
| 520 | Value Line betas ²⁶ and betas from other sources. |
| 521 | |
| 522 | Perhaps the most hotly debated factor is the market risk premium, also called the equity risk |
| 523 | premium; that is, the premium return investors demand from stocks over the risk free rate. |
| 524 | Some practitioners support the use of the arithmetic average of the difference between |
| 525 | historical stock market returns (with the Standard & Poor's 500 Index as a proxy) and long- |
| 526 | term (approximately 20 years) treasury bond returns since 1926 as popularized by Ibbotson |
| 527 | Associates over the last 30 years or so. ²⁷ However this approach has been criticized by |

528 academics and others on a number of grounds. Some say the historical time period is too

529 long, reaching back to a much different economy than we have today. Others have cited

530 technical problems with the data Ibbotson compiled. One technical problem is referred to as

- 531 "survivor bias." Survivor bias refers to the fact that the underlying Ibbotson data are
- 532 composed of companies that were successful; losers are not included. Studies indicate that
- this bias inflates the Ibbotson-based market risk premiums by about 1 to 2 percentage
- 534

points.²⁸ For these reasons, I generally prefer to examine a 30 to 50 year time period. Thirty

²⁶ Value Line adjusts its betas for mean reversion. The formula is $\beta_a = \beta_r \times .65 + .35$, where β_a is the Value Line adjusted beta and β_r is the raw beta. Applying this formula to the 0.67 mean Value Line beta found in DPU Exhibit 1.10 results in a raw beta estimate of 0.49, which is similar to the estimated mean found in the Gombola and Kahl study. It is also similar to the mean of the non-Value Line beta estimates of 0.50.

²⁷ Stocks, Bonds, Bills, and Inflation (SBBI), any edition, published annually by Ibbotson Associates (now a division of Morningstar).

²⁸ Brigham and Houston, supra, p. 272.

- to 50 years is long enough to smooth out most of the annual fluctuation and mitigate many of
 the criticisms leveled at the Ibbotson historical period.
- 537

Another issue is the use of arithmetic averages versus geometric averages.²⁹ Ibbotson 538 539 Associates, Brealey, Myers, and Allen among others, argue that arithmetic averages produce 540 the appropriate unbiased estimates of returns. Usually a decision tree-type analysis covering 541 one or two years is produced showing how this would work. However, the use of arithmetic 542 averages significantly overstates the actual returns an investor would have actually received 543 over a long historical period of time, a time period in which the geometric average much 544 more accurately reflects the actual experiences of investors. Indro and Lee demonstrated that 545 both the arithmetic and geometric returns are biased estimates of investor returns over more 546 than one period of time (they used months as their units of time), but that for longer periods 547 of time, the geometric return becomes the better estimator. For one period forward the 548 arithmetic average is an unbiased estimator of investor returns (the geometric is biased for 549 one period as well), but if the returns are to be calculated for longer terms, the geometric 550 return becomes better. Indro and Lee advocate using a weighted average between arithmetic and geometric returns for terms of more than one period.³⁰ For these reasons and others, 551 some experts advocate geometric returns.³¹ In short, there is great dispute about how the 552

³⁰ Indro, Daniel C. and Wayne Y. Lee, "Biases in Arithmetic and Geometric Averages as Estimates of Long-Run Expected Returns and Risk Premia," Financial Management, Vol. 26, No. 4, Winter 1997, pages 81-90.
 ³¹ For a discussion of geometric versus arithmetic averages, see Damodaran, Op. Cit. pages 161-162.

²⁹ "Arithmetic" averages are simply averaging the annual changes over a time period without accounting for any compounding effects. "Geometric" averages account for compounding effects and answer the question of "what was my average annual compounded return over a given period."

PPC's Guide to Business Valuations, Volume 1, paragraph 502.8, Practitioners Publishing Company, Fort Worth Texas, February 2006. Also see Damodaran, Aswath, "Equity Risk Premiums (ERP): Determinants, Estimation and Implications, The 2011 Edition" http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/, see recently published articles. Accessed May 4, 2011.

market risk premium should be estimated.

553

554

| 555 | I have used the Ibbotson Associates data because they are readily available and widely used. |
|-----|---|
| 556 | The errors that are known, primarily the survivorship bias, can be corrected for or otherwise |
| 557 | taken into account. A distinction must be made between the Ibbotson data and the "Ibbotson |
| 558 | method." The "Ibbotson method" primarily refers to using an arithmetic average of the entire |
| 559 | historical period since 1926, without any adjustment, to calculate the market risk premium. It |
| 560 | is this "Ibbotson method" in particular that I disagree with. |
| 561 | |
| 562 | Empirical studies of stock returns have turned up anomalies that have suggested flaws in the |
| 563 | CAPM. In order to correct for these anomalies (and save the basic theoretical construction) |
| 564 | additional factors have been specified for the model such as the Fama-French three-factor |
| 565 | model or add-ons to the model such as adjustments for size or industry. None of these |
| 566 | adjustments have avoided controversy. |
| 567 | |
| 568 | The practical implementation of the model has resulted in much controversy and |
| 569 | consternation. Despite these problems the CAPM is widely used in academic literature, by |
| 570 | corporate chief financial officers and Wall Street analysts, and has an established theoretical |
| 571 | basis. These facts necessitate that an analyst at least consider the CAPM in evaluating a cost |
| 572 | of equity problem. |
| 573 | |
| 574 | |
| 575 | |

| 576 | Q. | Please briefly describe the model based upon Value Line financial strength ratings. |
|--|----|--|
| 577 | A. | This model begins with an estimate of the expected market return on common stock derived |
| 578 | | in the same manner as with the CAPM. The expected return for the entire market is then |
| 579 | | adjusted by a risk factor based upon the average Value Line financial strength rating for the |
| 580 | | comparable companies. Using the entire Value Line data set, a regression equation is |
| 581 | | matched to the average forecast total returns by financial strength rating class; this equation |
| 582 | | is constructed, in part, to estimate the returns between whole ratings. Starting with a |
| 583 | | weighted average rating for the entire Value Line universe of companies, a ratio of the |
| 584 | | expected returns to this average return is constructed. This ratio becomes the "risk factor" |
| 585 | | that adjusts the expected market return. Algebraically the formula is: |
| 586 | | $k_e = f * MR = f * (MRP + RFR)$ |
| 587 588 589 590 591 592 | | Where: k _e is the cost of common equity RFR is the risk free rate MR is the expected market return MRP is the market risk premium f is the risk adjustment factor |
| 593 594 | | Generally, the higher the rating (i.e., the lower the risks as measured by that rating), the |
| 595 | | lower the expected return. Thus, higher ratings than the weighted average will result in a risk |
| 596 | | factor less than one; the highest financial strength rating should have the lowest risk factor, |
| 597 | | and vice versa. This all comports with current financial theory: the higher the risk, the higher |
| 598 | | the expected return; the lower the risk, the lower the return. |
| 599 | | |
| 600 | | |
| 601 | | |
| 602 | | |

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| 603 | Q. | Where has this model been used? |
|-----|----|--|
| 604 | A. | I used this model as a secondary estimate of cost of equity at the Utah State Tax Commission |
| 605 | | for about ten years. ³² Its use has been included in contested cases heard by the Tax |
| 606 | | Commission where other parties' experts had the opportunity to review and comment on it |
| 607 | | and I was subject to cross-examination. |
| 608 | | |
| 609 | Q. | Do you expect the Utah Public Service Commission to rely on this model now, or in the |
| 610 | | future? |
| 611 | A. | Not necessarily. I offer it because I personally use it and compare it with other estimates. |
| 612 | | |
| 613 | Q. | What are the strengths and weaknesses of the "Value Line Financial Strength" model? |
| 614 | A. | The model is an alternative risk premium model that uses a factor based upon Value Line's |
| 615 | | widely known financial strength rating to adjust the expected market return. The market |
| 616 | | return is derived in the same way as the CAPM market return is estimated, so this provides |
| 617 | | an accepted starting point for the method. The risk factor is then empirically calculated based |
| 618 | | upon the industry financial strength rating (as represented by the comparable companies). |
| 619 | | Over several years the model has yielded reasonable results. |
| 620 | | |
| 621 | | The weaknesses include the reliance on Value Line as the source of the financial strength |
| 622 | | ratings and the relative forecast returns of the individual companies. The risks of a particular |
| 623 | | industry, e.g. the electric utility industry, may differ from companies in the Value Line |
| 624 | | universe generally even though they share the same financial strength rating. Finally, the |
| 625 | | model has not been published and consequently is not widely known or tested. |
| | | |

³² By Tax Commission rule, the primary cost of equity model is a variation of CAPM.

626

6 <u>C. COMPARABLE (PROXY) COMPANIES</u>

627 **Q.** What are the "comparable companies" you referred to and how were they chosen?

628 A. One of the first steps in the estimate of cost of equity is the selection of publicly traded 629 "comparable" companies (also referred to as "guideline" companies and proxy companies) 630 whose market returns and characteristics are studied in order to infer from them what the 631 appropriate cost of equity should be for PacifiCorp. The selection and use of comparable 632 companies is obviously critical since PacifiCorp itself is not an independent, publicly traded 633 company. However, even if PacifiCorp were publicly traded it would be advisable to 634 compare it with closely related companies in its industry. The Company's witness, Dr. 635 Hadaway, chose 20 companies as cited in his testimony. I made a selection of 9 companies, 636 all of which are included in Dr. Hadaway's list. The criteria I used to select comparable 637 companies included (1) similar bond ratings to PacifiCorp; (2) similar size to PacifiCorp; (3) significant owned generation capacity including some thermal generation,³³ (4) at least 70 638 639 percent of revenue and/or income derived from regulated electric utility operations, or 640 alternatively at least 50 percent from regulated electric utility operations and the sum of 641 regulated electric and regulated gas utility operations is over 80 percent; and (5) "Other." 642 643 More specifically, I chose companies whose bond ratings ranged from BBB+ to AA-644 (Moody's Baa1 to Aa3) from at least one of the rating agencies, Standard & Poor's or

- 645 Moody's. This range is based upon PacifiCorp's bond rating of A as part of MEHC and
- 646 BBB+ as a free-standing firm. For size, the company's annual revenues had to be between
- 647 \$1.5 and \$20 billion, and net plant in service had to be between \$5.0 billion and \$49 billion.

³³ In the past I have been stricter on this criterion; however, with several potential proxy companies engaged in merger and acquisition activity, and therefore excluded, I found it necessary to relax this criterion in order to present a reasonable number of guideline companies.

DPU Exhibit 4.0

648

DPU Exhibit 4.4 lists my selection of comparable companies along with summary data
supporting their selection. I will discuss the issues I have with the additional companies Dr.
Hadaway uses later in my discussion of Dr. Hadaway's analysis.

652

Q. Did you perform any other analyses that show that the companies you selected are generally comparable to PacifiCorp?

655 A. Yes. DPU Exhibit 4.16 was created to compare PacifiCorp with my list of comparable 656 companies using ratio and other financial measures. For a number of these measures 657 PacifiCorp is fairly typical of the comparable companies. However, the Company is 658 consistently average or below average in return on equity and return on assets and in 659 revenues per fixed assets. Part of the reason for the below average ranking for revenues per 660 fixed assets may be due to the Company's wide geographic area that services a relatively 661 small population base (i.e. the Company's customers per square mile of service territory is 662 below average). This requires PacifiCorp to invest in plant to service this large region 663 without the population density that other utilities have.

664

665 On the other hand the Company's operating income as a percentage of revenues is favorable 666 compared to the other companies which suggests relatively good cost control performance by 667 the Company. Despite this favorable performance, the Company has failed to earn its 668 authorized return on equity for a number of years.

669

670

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A. I conclude that the companies I have selected and set forth on DPU Exhibit 4.4 and following exhibits are reasonably similar to PacifiCorp. The financial ratio and rate of return analysis indicates that PacifiCorp is generally close to the average of these proxy companies, although it is not currently earning its authorized rate of return and the low revenue-to-fixed-asset ratios are probably a practical result of the Company's extensive geography.

677

671

678 D. APPLICATION OF COST OF EQUITY MODELS

679 **Q.** What is the consequence of the current economic situation on your equity models?

O. What are your conclusions regarding comparable, or proxy, companies?

A. In the first instance, all of the cost of equity models assume the existence of functioning
markets that are reasonably stable and rational. For the last quarter of 2008 through first
quarter 2009, it was questionable that this underlying assumption was valid. However, as
discussed above, the current economic situation and financial market status appears to be
reasonably "normal." Therefore, there is relatively little concern in this regard with using the
standard cost of equity models.

686

687 <u>1. Single-Stage DCF Models</u>

688 Q. Please describe how you developed the Single-Stage DCF models.

A. First, I calculated the current dividend yield for each of the comparable companies. The

dividend was based upon annualizing the latest quarterly dividend. I considered a 30 day

average closing price. The 30 day average closing price was used to smooth out random

noise that might exist in the stock price data. These stock prices were based upon the closing

693 prices as of April 25, 2011 and were obtained from Yahoo! Finance. Next, I took earnings

DPU Exhibit 4.0

| 694 | and dividend growth rates from the latest Value Line reports on each comparable company as |
|-----|--|
| 695 | well as the latest updates on Value Line's web site accessed April 21, 2011, and combined |
| 696 | those with the consensus earnings growth estimates reported on the Yahoo! Finance, Zack's |
| 697 | and Reuters web sites for each comparable company; I also considered the recent Standard & |
| 698 | Poor's and Argus Research reports on these companies (collectively, "financial sources"). |
| 699 | These financial sources were accessed via the internet on April 26, 2011. DPU Exhibit 4.5 |
| 700 | sets forth the earnings growth rate forecasts. Included in DPU Exhibit 4.5 is an alternative |
| 701 | Value Line calculation explicitly based upon the latest historical earnings per share as |
| 702 | reported by Value Line in its 3- to 5-year forecast. DPU Exhibit 4.5 also contains 3 to 5 year |
| 703 | dividend growth forecasts from Value Line and Argus Research as well as Gross Domestic |
| 704 | Product growth forecasts. |
| 705 | |
| 706 | I considered several different growth rate estimates for the single-stage models. First I |
| 707 | calculated growth rates based upon a weighted-average by applying a 75 percent weight to |
| 708 | the average earnings growth rate from the financial sources, and a 25 percent weight to the |
| 709 | average forecast dividend growth rate from Value Line and AUS, and to the earnings growth- |
| 710 | only models pursuant to the Commission's decision in Questar Gas Company, Docket No. |
| 711 | 02-057-02. For comparison I have also made dividend growth-only calculations. DPU |
| 712 | Exhibit 4.6 sets forth these calculations of the DCF model using this weighted growth rate. |
| 713 | DPU Exhibit 4.7 sets forth my adjusted rates. The adjusted rates were derived by eliminating |
| 714 | any cost of equity estimates that were less than 9.0 percent or equal to or greater than 11.0 |
| 715 | percent. The lower and upper bounds were selected based upon my judgment that a rate less |
| 716 | than 9.0 percent is unreasonable within this particular exercise and that the upper bound |
| | |

eliminated Wisconsin Energy's noticeable out-sized and likely unsustainable growth
forecasts based upon the 75-25 percent weighting. All of these estimates are summarized on
DPU Exhibit 4.5.

720

721 Additional sets of single-stage DCF estimates are included on DPU Exhibit 4.8. On this 722 exhibit I have calculated cost of equity estimates using the historical 10-year average growth 723 in earnings and dividends as reported by Value Line. In the lower portion of these exhibits I 724 have calculated an adjusted cost of equity by eliminating certain estimates that were, in my 725 judgment, too low or too high. In this case I do not believe these results based upon 726 historical growth rates warrant significant consideration in the final estimate of the cost of 727 equity for PacifiCorp. However, a comparison between the actual growth rates and the 728 forecast growth rates is useful, and highlights the possibility that analysts' forecast growth 729 rates may be optimistic.

730

As set forth on DPU Exhibit 4.6, the results of the single-stage models using the 75-25
percent weighting, on earnings, and on dividend growth resulted in a range of 9.85 to 10.15
percent. The adjusted earnings-only growth models yielded a range of 9.92 to 10.9 percent.
I have given more weight to the forecast earnings models and the 75 percent EPS and 25
percent dividend forecast growth models.

736

737

738

739

Q. In DPU Exhibit 4.5 a few earnings growth are negative. Is it reasonable to include a negative growth rate when calculating a rate of return in this instance?

A. Yes and no. The analyst growth rate forecasts are relatively short-term forecasts covering
three to five years. During a relatively brief interval a company's earnings can decline for
various reasons. For Entergy and Edison International, analysts have identified reasons for
the negative growth forecasts. Longer term, it is less reasonable to assume a negative growth
rate unless one expects a company to go out of business.

747

748 **Q. How did you deal with the negative growth rates?**

749 A. I left them in the mean growth rates calculated in DPU Exhibit 4.6 if the growth rate was 750 going to be used for short-term calculations. Specifically, in the two-stage models (discussed 751 below) if the first five years' dividend growth were based in whole or in part on the earnings 752 growth rate forecasts, then the negative growth rates were included in the estimate of the 753 near-term dividend growth. The two negative growth rates were excluded from both the 754 adjusted growth rates, which were used in all single-stage DCF models that included earnings 755 growth rates, and the two-stage models where the terminal stock price was determined by the 756 earnings growth rate forecast. In this way, the short-term growth rates accounted for the 757 possibility of negative growth, but in the longer term, such growth rates were assumed in this 758 case to be unreasonable and therefore excluded.

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- 761
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DPU Exhibit 4.0

763 <u>2. Two-Stage DCF Models</u>

764 **Q. Please describe the Two-Stage DCF models you used.**

765 A. In developing two-stage DCF models I forecast the current dividends of each comparable 766 company out five years in three different ways. First, I assumed that the dividends grew at 767 the average forecast dividend growth rate. Second, I assumed that the dividends grew at the weighted average of 25 percent average forecast dividend growth rate and 75 percent of the 768 769 average forecast earnings growth rate. And lastly, I assumed average forecast earnings only. 770 In each case, for discounting purposes, the dividends were assumed to occur in the middle of 771 the year. A "sixth" dividend was forecasted to occur at the end of the fifth year. This sixth 772 dividend was used as a factor to estimate the terminal value.

773

774 The terminal value was calculated by dividing the sixth dividend by the cost of equity less a 775 terminal growth rate. The terminal growth rate was estimated two different ways. First, I 776 estimate the long-term growth rate using the average of the long-term forecast GDP growth 777 estimates set forth on DPU Exhibit 4.6 which was 4.62 percent. The second long-term 778 growth estimate is based upon the hypothesis that long-term growth will equal the adjusted 779 forecast earnings growth. This may be optimistic since the EIA is currently forecasting long-780 term real growth in electric demand at 1.0 percent annually.³⁴ Adding a forecast long-term 781 inflation rate of about two percent, would require long-term productivity gains of 2.0 percent 782 annually to reach a five percent earnings growth rate. The high productivity gains seem unlikely for the electric utility industry.³⁵ It is more likely that electric growth will be less 783

³⁴ Energy Information Administration (EIA), "Annual Energy Outlook 2011," DOE/EIA-0383(2011), Release Date: April 26, 2011.

³⁵ The U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics compiles data on labor productivity. For the period 2001-2008, the most recent period for which I can find comparable data, labor productivity across all business

DPU Exhibit 4.0

| 784 | than long-run GDP growth due to continued efforts at efficiency. In this regard (for energy |
|-----|---|
| 785 | generally) Value Line has stated "[e]nergy use in the United States has traditionally increased |
| 786 | slowly as demand from a growing population and economy was partially offset by steady |
| 787 | gains in energy efficiency." ³⁶ |
| 788 | |
| 789 | DPU Exhibit 4.09 sets forth the calculations of the two-stage DCF growth rates based upon |
| 790 | the above forecast assumptions. The estimates from these two-stage DCF models range from |
| 791 | 9.24 percent to 10.03 percent. |
| 792 | |
| 793 | By design, the estimate based upon a terminal value using earnings growth is likely to be |
| 794 | toward the higher end of the range, because the terminal value arrived at by capitalizing |
| 795 | dividends at the earnings forecast growth rate gives the highest likely estimate. ³⁷ |
| 796 | |
| 797 | |
| 798 | |
| 799 | |
| 800 | |
| 801 | |

increased at an average rate of 2.4 percent, whereas for power generation and supply (a subset of "Utility") the growth rate was 0.3 percent.

http://www.bls.gov/lpc/ipr_aiin.pdf

http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/surveymost?pr

http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/prin_06102010.htm

http://www.bls.gov/lpc/faqs.htm

³⁶ Value Line Investment Survey, September 11, 2009, page 517.

³⁷ That is, the 5 percent average estimated growth rate is a faster growth rate than the economy as a whole is expected to grow going forward. A regulated utility is unlikely to grow faster than the economy for long periods of time. See Section <u>VI. COMMENTS ON DR. HADAWAY'S COST OF EQUITY RESULTS</u> for a further discussion regarding GDP growth rates and utility companies.

802 <u>3. CAPM Results</u>

803 Q. How did you develop your CAPM models?

A. I looked at the CAPM model using different risk free rates, time periods, betas, and market
risk premiums. I did this to give the flavor of how different factors in the CAPM affect the
cost of equity estimate. As stated earlier, there is no consensus on precisely how the
components of the CAPM should be estimated.

808

809 Q. What risk-free rates did you choose?

A. I considered the average of the two weeks in April 2011 ending on the 22nd and the 29th 810 811 along with the overall April average. The average of the 90-day Treasury bill (T-bill) yield, 812 which was 0.06 percent; and the accepted figure for the 20-year Treasury bond was 4.25 813 percent. Academics have tended to use the T-bill rate, the closest rate to a "true" risk free 814 rate since it contains little inflation or time horizon risks. Practitioners often use longer-term 815 rates in order to match the assumed holding period of the asset under consideration. I favor 816 the longer-term rate and use the 20-year Treasury bond since it is approximately equivalent 817 to the long-term government bond historical series compiled by Ibbotson and Associates 818 (now part of Morningstar). Nonetheless, I show the results of the Treasury bill rate as the 819 risk-free rate in the CAPM. However, to be consistent, the estimated market risk premium 820 should correspond to the type of risk free rate one chooses.

821

One of the reasons that the Treasury bill gives noticeably lower CAPM results than the 20year bond is current Federal policy. The market turmoil of the recent past has led the U.S. Federal Reserve to maintain policies that tend to keep short-term interest rates abnormally

DPU Exhibit 4.0

| 825 | | low, especially when compared to longer-term bond rates. This is reflected in the historically |
|-----|----|--|
| 826 | | very low rate on the short-term 90-day U.S. Treasury bill. Therefore, at this time, I do not |
| 827 | | consider the CAPM results using Treasury bills to be reasonable estimates of cost of equity. |
| 828 | | |
| 829 | Q. | What beta estimates did you use? |
| 830 | A. | For four of the five CAPM exhibits I used Value Line's latest adjusted beta. However, in |
| 831 | | DPU Exhibit 4.11, page 3, I use an average of betas derived from financial sources excluding |
| 832 | | Value Line. DPU Exhibit 4.10 summarizes the beta estimates for each comparable company |
| 833 | | from the financial sources. |
| 834 | | |
| 835 | Q. | Please describe the market risk premiums you used. |
| 836 | A. | All of my market risk premiums are derived from historical data published by Ibbotson |
| 837 | | Associates. These data have been the subject of criticism for a number of reasons, some of |
| 838 | | which were cited above. I consider the 84 year "Ibbotson period" to be problematic since it |
| 839 | | reflects market situations much different than today. The most obvious examples include the |
| 840 | | rise of mutual funds for small investors and more recently exchange traded funds (EFTs) as |
| 841 | | well as the internet making public information almost instantaneously available anywhere in |
| 842 | | the world. There are also institutional changes since 1926 such as the creation of the |
| 843 | | Securities and Exchange Commission, multitudinous changes in accounting rules, and the |
| 844 | | Sarbanes-Oxley legislation. Furthermore, there have been suggestions and studies that |
| 845 | | indicate investors' expectations may change over time. Thus a long historical period may not |
| 846 | | accurately reflect today's market and expectations. |
| 847 | | |

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| 848 | Q. | What historical period, if any, would you recommend? |
|-----|----|---|
| 849 | A. | I feel most comfortable with a 30- to 50-year time period. A 30- to 50-year period is long |
| 850 | | enough to smooth out the sometimes wide fluctuations in the data, but short enough to focus |
| 851 | | on the more recent data of the modern financial markets. However, a 30- to 50-year period |
| 852 | | does not avoid all of the pitfalls of using historical data. Some authorities recommend that at |
| 853 | | least 30 years be used when basing an estimate on historical data. ³⁸ |
| 854 | | |
| 855 | Q. | Why do you include calculations in three of your CAPM exhibits that reflect the 82- |
| 856 | | year time period? |
| 857 | A. | Because this time period has been widely promoted by Ibbotson and others as the "correct" |
| 858 | | time period, I did not want to exclude it completely from my analysis. I also wanted the |
| 859 | | Commission to be able to evaluate for itself the results of using that time period but applying |
| 860 | | different betas or using geometric as opposed to arithmetic averages. |
| 861 | | |
| 862 | | However, the 1926-to-the-present period market risk premium as advocated by Ibbotson |
| 863 | | represents an estimate that in my opinion is biased upwards. For example, in the proceedings |
| 864 | | of a conference on market risk premium sponsored by the AIMR published in November |
| 865 | | 2001, of all the experts presenting at the conference, the Ibbotson representative's calculation |
| 866 | | was at the top end at 7 percent. Most of the experts thought that the market risk premium |
| 867 | | should be 5 percent or less going forward, and some were as low as 2 percent, or even less. ³⁹ |

³⁸ PPC's Guide to Business Valuations, Volume 1, paragraph 502.9, Practitioners Publishing Company, Fort Worth Texas, February 2006.

³⁹ AIMR, Equity Risk Premium Forum Report, November, 2001, pages 30-50. Also, see Shannon Pratt who discusses another reason to think the market risk premium is lower than the long-term historical Ibbotson data (Pratt, Shannon. "Values should lower equity risk premium component of discount rate," Business Valuation, 9 (11), November, 2003, pages 1,6.).

| 868 | Thus while I am willing to include the results for the 1926-to-the-present period for the |
|-----|---|
| 869 | consideration of the Public Service Commission, I believe these estimates may not be |
| 870 | appropriate. |

871

872 Q. What were your results from CAPM?

- A. The CAPM models using the 20-year T-bond yields as the risk free rate range from 7.27
- percent to 8.73. DPU Exhibit 4.11 details the CAPM calculations. I only consider the 8.73
- 875 percent as set forth on DPU Exhibit 4.3.
- 876

877 Q. Can the CAPM results be considered reasonable?

- A. They might be given some consideration since they reflect the current value given by this
- widely used model. The CAPM range is 300 to 450 basis points above the risk-free rate,
- which is fairly typical for utility companies. Given the opportunity to earn 4.25 percent on a
- Treasury bond, or 7.25 to 8.75 percent on a utility stock, an investor may well choose the
- utility stock as a reasonable expected return for the additional risk.⁴⁰
- 883

884 <u>4. Risk Premium Results</u>

Q. What were the results of your risk premium model based upon Value Line financial strength weightings?

A. The results ranged from 7.94 to 9.96 percent based upon the 20-year Treasury bond, the latter

⁴⁰ Aswath Damodaran, a professor of finance at the Stern School of Business, New York University, and a leading expert in this field publishes monthly estimates of the equity risk premium (ERP) based upon the current level of the S&P 500 index, the estimated dividend rate for the S&P 500 and the current expected growth rate for that index. His estimated ERP on April 1, 2011 was 5.31 percent and 5.16 percent on May1. This implies an expected return for the market of around 9.50 percent (by adding a 4.25 percent risk free rate to the ERP). Given that utilities are considered less risky than the stock market as a whole, the CAPM results in the 7 to 9 percent range would be considered reasonable. http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/ Last accessed May 5, 2011.

| 888 | | figure being roughly 120 basis points higher than the highest CAPM result. Again, I do not |
|-----|----|--|
| 889 | | consider the Treasury bill-based results to be particularly useful. DPU Exhibit 4.12 details |
| 890 | | these results. |
| 891 | | |
| 892 | Q. | What do the risk premium results suggest to you? |
| 893 | A. | The risk premium results support the high-end CAPM result, and the low-end DCF results. I |
| 894 | | give some consideration to them in that they are suggestive that the DCF model results may |
| 895 | | be too high. |
| 896 | | |
| 897 | | |
| 898 | | VI. COMMENTS ON DR. HADAWAY'S COST OF EQUITY RESULTS |
| 899 | | |
| 900 | Q. | Please outline your comments on Dr. Hadaway's cost of equity testimony. |
| 901 | A. | I will first comment briefly on areas that I am in general agreement with Dr. Hadaway. Then |
| 902 | | I will discuss areas of differences and disagreements. I do not attempt to comment on all |
| 903 | | statements and calculations made by Dr. Hadaway; therefore, silence regarding a particular |
| 904 | | statement or comment does not necessarily mean that I agree with what Dr. Hadaway has |
| 905 | | said or done. |
| 906 | | |
| 907 | Q. | Please outline the areas of general agreement you have with Dr. Hadaway. |
| 908 | A. | I generally agree with Dr. Hadaway's discussion of the development of the DCF models and |
| 909 | | their strengths. I also generally agree with his discussion regarding the problems with |
| 910 | | CAPM. I would continue to point out, however, that CAPM appears to remain the most |
| | | |

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| 911 | | widely used model to estimate cost of equity. The other point I would make is that all models |
|---|----|--|
| 912 | | have their supporters and detractors. This brings into question the direct use of earnings |
| 913 | | growth rates, whether forecast or historically based. The problem with these questions is |
| 914 | | what should the replacement model be? CAPM and other risk premium models have their |
| 915 | | problems as well. |
| 916 | | |
| 917 | | As I alluded to earlier, I have included in my list of comparable companies nine of Dr. |
| 918 | | Hadaway's 20 comparable or proxy companies, so I am in agreement with his comparable |
| 919 | | companies to that extent. I agree with Dr. Hadaway's general formulation of his DCF model |
| 920 | | and also agree with the use of analyst growth forecasts. That outlines my general agreements. |
| 921 | | |
| 922 | Q. | With regard to differences or disagreements, let us start with the comparable |
| 923 | | companies. Why did you not include the other 10 companies that Dr. Hadaway |
| | | |
| 924 | | included? |
| 924 925 | A. | included? The bottom part of DPU Exhibit 4.4 summarizes my reasons for excluding these 10 |
| 924 925 926 | A. | included? The bottom part of DPU Exhibit 4.4 summarizes my reasons for excluding these 10 companies in the "comments" section. ALLETE, Black Hills, DPL, Empire, IDACORP and |
| 924 925 926 927 | A. | included? The bottom part of DPU Exhibit 4.4 summarizes my reasons for excluding these 10 companies in the "comments" section. ALLETE, Black Hills, DPL, Empire, IDACORP and Portland General were judged to be too small based on the criteria I outlined earlier. Vectren |
| 924 925 926 927 928 | A. | included? The bottom part of DPU Exhibit 4.4 summarizes my reasons for excluding these 10 companies in the "comments" section. ALLETE, Black Hills, DPL, Empire, IDACORP and Portland General were judged to be too small based on the criteria I outlined earlier. Vectren has relatively low electric utility operations and is more of a natural gas utility than an |
| 924 925 926 927 928 929 | A. | included? The bottom part of DPU Exhibit 4.4 summarizes my reasons for excluding these 10 companies in the "comments" section. ALLETE, Black Hills, DPL, Empire, IDACORP and Portland General were judged to be too small based on the criteria I outlined earlier. Vectren has relatively low electric utility operations and is more of a natural gas utility than an electric utility. NextEra and Sempra have significant non-regulated operations accounting for |
| 924 925 926 927 928 929 930 | A. | included? The bottom part of DPU Exhibit 4.4 summarizes my reasons for excluding these 10 companies in the "comments" section. ALLETE, Black Hills, DPL, Empire, IDACORP and Portland General were judged to be too small based on the criteria I outlined earlier. Vectren has relatively low electric utility operations and is more of a natural gas utility than an electric utility. NextEra and Sempra have significant non-regulated operations accounting for half or more of the parent company. Finally, Duke and Progress are in the process of |
| 924 925 926 927 928 929 930 931 | A. | included? The bottom part of DPU Exhibit 4.4 summarizes my reasons for excluding these 10 companies in the "comments" section. ALLETE, Black Hills, DPL, Empire, IDACORP and Portland General were judged to be too small based on the criteria I outlined earlier. Vectren has relatively low electric utility operations and is more of a natural gas utility than an electric utility. NextEra and Sempra have significant non-regulated operations accounting for half or more of the parent company. Finally, Duke and Progress are in the process of merging. Based upon these observations, I have elected to exclude these 11 companies from |
| 924 925 926 927 928 929 930 931 932 | A. | included? The bottom part of DPU Exhibit 4.4 summarizes my reasons for excluding these 10 companies in the "comments" section. ALLETE, Black Hills, DPL, Empire, IDACORP and Portland General were judged to be too small based on the criteria I outlined earlier. Vectren has relatively low electric utility operations and is more of a natural gas utility than an electric utility. NextEra and Sempra have significant non-regulated operations accounting for half or more of the parent company. Finally, Duke and Progress are in the process of merging. Based upon these observations, I have elected to exclude these 11 companies from my comparable list. |

933

DPU Exhibit 4.0

934 Q. What is your disagreement with Dr. Hadaway's DCF models?

935 A. While Dr. Hadaway computes DCF results based upon analyst forecasts, he puts little or 936 no weight on these results. As he did in his testimony in the previous PacifiCorp general rate 937 cases, Dr. Hadaway concludes that the best growth rate based upon a weighted average of 938 historical changes in nominal gross domestic product (GDP) going back to 1947, basically 939 the post World War II period. His current calculation gives a weighted average change of 6.0 940 percent. While it is omitted this time, in an earlier PacifiCorp rate case, Docket No. 07-035-941 93, he sought to bolster his assertion that GDP is a proper growth estimate by presenting a 942 chart on page 30 of his testimony comparing electric demand with real GDP. Although he 943 avoided providing the actual statistics along with his chart, two things are completely clear 944 from this chart: (1) real GDP and electric demand are positively correlated, and (2) electric 945 demand has been growing at a noticeably slower rate than real GDP at least since 1982. It 946 should not be surprising that electric demand grows at a slower rate than the economy as a 947 whole since consumers at all levels of the economy have various incentives to continuously 948 improve their energy efficiency.

949

Assuming that GDP growth is a reasonable estimate for electric utilities, the growth rate used
must reflect investors' expectations of future growth. Rather than calculate some weighted
average of past GDP growth rates, I believe Dr. Hadaway would have better served the
Commission by obtaining long-term GDP forecasts. For example, the U.S. Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) publishes 10-year GDP forecasts annually; the current version is
CBO's Economic Projections for Calendar Years 2011 to 2021 (updated January 2011).
Likewise the EIA annually publishes its long-term GDP forecast in *Annual Energy Outlook*

DPU Exhibit 4.0

2011 (April 26, 2011). Currently both the CBO forecast and the EIA is for nominal GDP to
grow 4.62 percent annually over the 2010 to 2021. If these estimates of GDP growth were
used in Dr. Hadaway's DCF models, his results would be about a percentage point less than
he reported in his direct testimony.

961

962 Dr. Hadaway computed two risk premium models whereby he analyzes average electric 963 utility authorized rates of return and compares them to average public utility bond yields as 964 compiled by Moody's over the 1980 to 2010 time period. From these data Dr. Hadaway 965 imputes an equity return of 10.24 percent for the first model, and 10.10 percent for the 966 second model. There are questions about the reliability of published authorized rates of return 967 as estimates of cost of equity and the comparability of these rates of return to the average 968 public utility bond yield. For example, many of the rates may be based upon negotiated 969 settlements for which tradeoffs between stated cost of equity rates and other parts of the rate 970 case may have been made. Another question is the policies in the different jurisdictions in 971 terms of what evidence for rate of return testimony is accepted and how the regulators 972 ultimately use that testimony. At a minimum, authorized returns are not direct market 973 observations, and should only be useful if no direct market observations were available.

974

A final observation regarding the average authorized rates of return analysis. If the point is
to use these data to support Dr. Hadaway's estimate for an authorized rate of return, it seems
straight forward to do a simple time-trend analysis. DPU Exhibit 4.13 analyzes the
authorized return data found on Schedule 5 of Dr. Hadaway's testimony in this docket along
with the utility bond data he uses. The simple trend analysis predicts that authorized returns

DPU Exhibit 4.0

| 980 | in 2011 will approximate 9.39 percent. When viewed along with the trend in the bond yields, |
|------|--|
| 981 | these data may suggest only the principal of gradualism in regulation in response to changing |
| 982 | interest rates is in operation, not some "law" of financial economics. These data may also say |
| 983 | something about the timing of rate applications; that is, a utility may choose when to come in |
| 984 | for a rate case when the utility believes the results from the rate case will be most favorable |
| 985 | to it. ⁴¹ However, a trend analysis doesn't predict changes in the trend. Thus my analysis here |
| 986 | only serves to show an alternative way to analyze Dr. Hadaway's data and not, in this case at |
| 987 | least, to estimate what PacifiCorp's allowed rate of return should be. |
| 988 | |
| 989 | Some of the differences between my calculations and Dr. Hadaway's relate to the differences |
| 990 | in time. Since Dr. Hadaway prepared his analyses, analysts have reduced their forecast |
| 991 | growth rates somewhat. Also stock prices are higher which have reduced dividend yields. |
| 992 | For reasons stated earlier, my list of comparable companies is not the same as his. |
| 993 | Additionally, since Duke and Progress have announced that they are merging, presumably |
| 994 | Dr. Hadaway would exclude them from his comparables list today. The exclusion of Duke |
| 995 | and Progress would likely reduce Dr. Hadaway's conclusion by about 10 basis points, all else |
| 996 | being equal. The effect of reducing Dr. Hadaway's historical weighted average GDP growth |
| 997 | rate to a 4.62 percent forecast GDP growth rate would reduce his estimates using GDP |
| 998 | growth by about 140 basis points. |
| 999 | |
| 1000 | |

1001 In his direct testimony, Dr. Hadaway concludes that the appropriate return on equity for

⁴¹ Phillips, Charles F. Jr. The Regulation of Public Utilities Theory and Practice. 1993. Public Utilities Reports, Inc. Arlington, VA, pages 408-409.

| 1002 | PacifiCorp should be 10.50 percent, near the high end of his reasonable range of 10.1 to 10.7 |
|------|---|
| 1003 | percent. As noted above, eliminating Duke and Progress would likely move his reasonable |
| 1004 | range to 10.0 to 10.6 percent. The other factors, such as the time differential, would move it |
| 1005 | still lower. My conclusion is that Dr. Hadaway would have arrived at a result similar to my |
| 1006 | conclusion if he had made his calculations during the same time frame I did, had not included |
| 1007 | the models based upon the 6.0 percent GDP growth rate, and updated his list of comparable |
| 1008 | companies to exclude Duke and Progress. With these modifications, Dr. Hadaway's results |
| 1009 | support my own conclusions. |
| 1010 | |
| 1011 | |
| 1012 | VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS |
| 1013 | |
| 1014 | Q. Please summarize your cost of capital and capital structure conclusions, excluding the |
| 1015 | cost of equity results. |
| 1016 | A. I have concluded that the Company's requested cost of preferred stock and long-term debt is |
| 1017 | reasonable. I have also concluded not to challenge the Company's proposed capital structure. |
| 1018 | |
| 1019 | Q. What conclusions with respect to cost of equity have you come to? |
| 1020 | A. The first conclusion is that the DCF models using analyst forecasts form a reasonable basis |
| 1021 | for a cost of equity estimate. These DCF models are compared to alternative CAPM |
| 1022 | calculations as well as my own risk premium model. All of these models support an overall |
| 1023 | conclusion of a cost of equity estimate in the 9.85 to 10.15 percent range. After reviewing all |
| 1024 | of the data I concluded that a point estimate of 10.0 percent is appropriate. |
| | |

DPU Exhibit 4.0

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| 1026 | Q. Please discuss some of the implications of your weighted cost of capital estimate and |
| 1027 | specifically your cost of equity estimate. |
| 1028 | A. In arriving at a decision on cost of capital, the Commission needs to consider principles and |
| 1029 | issues set forth in the well known U.S. Supreme Court decisions commonly referred to as the |
| 1030 | Bluefield and Hope cases. ^{42,43} |
| 1031 | |
| 1032 | The Bluefield and Hope cases established economic and financial principles for proper |
| 1033 | regulation. These principles included (1) that the utility be allowed to earn a return on its |
| 1034 | utility property generally equal to returns earned by other companies of similar risk; (2) this |
| 1035 | return should assure confidence in the financial soundness of the utility; (3) this allowed |
| 1036 | return should maintain and support the credit of the company and allow it to attract capital; |
| 1037 | (4) recognition that a return that is "right" at one time may become high or low by changes in |
| 1038 | the economy regarding alternative investments; and (5) particularly in Hope, what is |
| 1039 | important is that the "end result" of the rate order be just and reasonable; it is less important |
| 1040 | how that result is arrived at. While the above list reflects the rights of the utility, Hope and |
| 1041 | Bluefield balance those rights with the obligation that "just and reasonable" rates include |
| 1042 | fairness to the customers. |
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 ⁴² Bluefield Water Works and Improvement Company v. Public Service Commission, 262 U.S. 679, (1923).
 ⁴³ Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Company, 320 U.S. 591, (1944).

1047 Q. Do you believe your conclusions and recommendations arrive at a just and reasonable 1048 result in the public interest? Please explain.

1049 A. Yes. My recommended capital structure is well within the norms of the Company's industry 1050 as indicated by the analysis comparing the Company's recommended capital structure with 1051 the comparable companies. It is also well within the range of equity capital percentages 1052 required by Moody's and other rating agencies for the maintenance of an "A" debt rating. 1053 The use of embedded cost of debt and preferred stock is well established in regulation. The 1054 prospective future debt issuance is assumed to pay the forecast expected market return. I 1055 have demonstrated that my cost of equity estimate sits well within the estimates arrived at 1056 using standard financial models and forecasts derived from market participants. Some of Dr. 1057 Hadaway's results would also support a 10.0 percent cost of equity when adjusted for 1058 changes since Dr. Hadaway performed his analyses. As a result, I conclude that the 10.0 1059 percent cost of equity is not outside any range of expectations of Wall Street. Therefore I 1060 conclude that at this time the cost of capital estimates set forth on DPU Exhibit 4.2 are just 1061 and reasonable and in the public interest.

1062

1063 **Q. What is your recommendation?**

A. As set forth on Exhibit DPU 4.2, my recommendation is that for PacifiCorp and its division,
Rocky Mountain Power, the Commission adopt as the authorized cost of equity for its
operations in Utah of 10.0 percent and an overall weighted average cost of capital of 7.98
percent.

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1070 **Q. Does this conclude your testimony?**

1071 A. Yes.