1	STATE OF UTAH		
2	Public Service Commission		
3 4			
4	In the Matter of the Application of Rocky Mountain Power for Authority to Increase its Retail Electric Utility Service Rates in Utah and for Approval of its Proposed Electric Service Schedules and Electric Service Regulations	Docket No. 10-035-124	
5	<u>v</u>		
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8 9			
10	Direct Testimony of		
11	William Steinhurst, Ph.D.		
12			
13	On Behalf of		
14	Sierra Club		
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23 26	May 26, 2011		

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1 1. INTRODUCTION AND QUALIFICATIONS

2 **Q.** Please state your name and occupation.

A. My name is William Steinhurst, and I am a Senior Consultant with Synapse
Energy Economics (Synapse). My business address is 32 Main Street, #394,
Montpelier, Vermont 05602.

6 Q. Please describe Synapse Energy Economics.

A. Synapse Energy Economics is a research and consulting firm specializing in
energy and environmental issues, including electric generation, transmission and
distribution system reliability, ratemaking and rate design, electric industry
restructuring and market power, electricity market prices, stranded costs,
efficiency, renewable energy, environmental quality, and nuclear power.

12 Q. Please summarize your work experience and educational background.

13 A. I have over thirty years of experience in utility regulation and energy policy, 14 including work on renewable portfolio standards and portfolio management 15 practices for default service providers and regulated utilities, green marketing, 16 distributed resource issues, economic impact studies, and rate design. Prior to 17 joining Synapse, I served as Planning Econometrician and Director for Regulated 18 Utility Planning at the Vermont Department of Public Service, the State's Public 19 Advocate and energy policy agency. I have provided consulting services for 20 various clients, including the Connecticut Office of Consumer Counsel, the 21 Illinois Citizens Utility Board, the California Division of Ratepayer Advocates, 22 the D.C. and Maryland Offices of the Public Advocate, the Delaware Public 23 Utilities Commission, the Regulatory Assistance Project, the National Association 24 of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC), the National Regulatory 25 Research Institute (NRRI), American Association of Retired Persons (AARP), 26 The Utility Reform Network (TURN), the Union of Concerned Scientists, the 27 Northern Forest Council, the Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board, the U.S. 28 EPA, the Conservation Law Foundation, the Sierra Club, the Southern Alliance

1		for Clean Energy, the Oklahoma Sustainability Network, the Natural Resource
2		Defense Council (NRDC), Illinois Energy Office, the Massachusetts Executive
3		Office of Energy Resources, the James River Corporation, and the Newfoundland
4		Department of Natural Resources.
5		I hold a B.A. in Physics from Wesleyan University and an M.S. in Statistics and
6		Ph.D. in Mechanical Engineering from the University of Vermont.
7		I have testified as an expert witness in approximately 30 cases on topics including
8		utility rates and ratemaking policy, prudence reviews, integrated resource
9		planning, demand side management policy and program design, utility financings,
10		regulatory enforcement, green marketing, power purchases, statistical analysis,
11		and decision analysis. I have been a frequent witness in legislative hearings and
12		represented the State of Vermont, the Delaware Public Utilities Commission
13		Staff, and several other groups in numerous collaborative settlement processes
14		addressing energy efficiency, resource planning and distributed resources.
15		I was the lead author or co-author of Vermont's long-term energy plans for 1983,
16		1988, and 1991, as well as the 1998 report Fueling Vermont's Future:
17		Comprehensive Energy Plan and Greenhouse Gas Action Plan, and also
18		Synapse's study Portfolio Management: How to Procure Electricity Resources to
19		Provide Reliable, Low-Cost, and Efficient Electricity Services to All Retail
20		Customers. In 2008, I was commissioned by the National Regulatory Research
21		Institute (NRRI) to write <i>Electricity at a Glance</i> , a primer on the industry for new
22		public utility commissioners, which included coverage of energy efficiency
23		programs. In 2011, NRRI commissioned a second edition of that work.
24		My resume is attached to this testimony as Exhibit SC-10 (WS-1).
24 25	Q.	
	Q. A.	My resume is attached to this testimony as Exhibit SC-10 (WS-1).
25	-	My resume is attached to this testimony as Exhibit SC-10 (WS-1). On whose behalf are you testifying in this case?

- 1 **Q.** What is the purpose of your testimony?
- 2 A. The purpose of my testimony is to consider whether investments in certain
- 3 environmental upgrades made by Pacificorp, doing business as Rocky Mountain
- 4 Power in Utah (the company) were prudent and should be allowed recovery. I also
- 5 address the question of coordination between the company's integrated resource
- 6 plan (IRP) activities and its rate case requests.
- 7 Q. How is your testimony organized?
- 8 A. My testimony is organized as follows:
- 9 1. Introduction and Qualifications.
- 10 2. Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations.
- 11 3. Prudence and the Company's Proposal
- 12 4. Recommendations

13 2. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

14 **Q.** Please summarize your primary conclusions.

- 15 A. My primary conclusions are summarized as follows:
- (1) The company seeks recovery in this proceeding for the capital and operating
 costs of major environmental upgrades (Current Case Retrofits) at certain
 power plants.
- 19 (2) Over the near- to mid-term, the company faces substantial additional costs due
- to known and likely environmental regulations that will have to be made to
 keep those plants in operation, and the company knew or should have known
 that those known and likely regulations would impose such costs.¹
- (3) The available evidence indicates that the company failed to determine whether
 the Current Case Retrofits would be cost effective in the light of those known

¹ As explained below and in the prefiled testimony of Sierra Club witness Dr. Jeremy I. Fisher, those known and likely upgrades fall into two categories, which he and I refer to as Company Projected Retrofits and Emerging Retrofits. His prefiled testimony details the items included in all three categories (Current Case Retrofits, Company Projected Retrofits, and Emerging Retrofits).

1and likely environmental regulations. Failure to determine whether the2Current Case Retrofits would be cost effective in the face of those known and3likely future costs, which the company knew or should have known would be4required, constitutes imprudence.

5 (4) The available evidence also indicates that the company continues to fail to
6 properly reflect those known and likely environmental regulations or their
7 potential costs in its resource planning.

8 Q. Please summarize your primary recommendations.

9 A. The Commission should disallow the costs of the company's Current Case
10 Retrofit investments, including associated operation and maintenance (O&M)
11 costs and costs due to lost output from the affected plants, unless and until the
12 company shows decisively that the incremental capital costs requested in this case
13 were prudent in light of known and likely future investments and were in keeping
14 with least cost principles.²

15 The company is requesting the opportunity to recover significant costs from 16 ratepayers associated with the continued operation of its existing coal-fired power 17 plants. The Commission should also require the company to provide a full 18 analysis and accounting for the impact of existing and upcoming environmental 19 regulations affecting its fleet of coal plants, as well as the full range of options for 20 addressing those regulations, including both supply- and demand-side resources 21 as well as alternatives to continued operation such as retirement or repowering. 22 The Commission should require the company to use existing and appropriate 23 venues for evaluating the company's planning and decision-making regarding 24 existing coal-fired units. The costs facing the existing fleet should include not 25 only the costs requested for meeting environmental compliance criteria today, but

² By "costs due to lost output from the affected plants," I mean the cost of replacement power or additional production needed by the company due to any plant or unit downtime caused by the installation or operation and maintenance of the Current Case Retrofits, plus the cost of additional production or replacement power needed by the company due to either parasitic loads or reduced capacity at any

1also the capital and operating expenses associated with reasonably anticipated2environmental retrofits and other environmental mitigation requirements, as well3as a price on carbon dioxide (CO2) representative of likely regional and federal4policies on greenhouse gas emissions. Such analyses should provide the5Commission and intervenors with an opportunity to evaluate the proposed6investments in the context of the full range of costs that the company will face at7its units in order to determine if ratepayers should bear the costs.

8 Without such an analysis, it is impossible for the Commission or any intervener to

9 fully assess whether the company's plans for the maintenance, upgrades, and

- 10 operations of its fleet of plants is in keeping with least-cost principles, and
- whether the company's proposed investments represent a suitable use of ratepayermonies.
- 13 3. PRUDENCE AND THE COMPANY'S PROPOSAL

14Q.What are the costs that the company is seeking to recover and that you15conclude are imprudent?

- A. As explained in the prefiled testimony of Sierra Club witness Dr. Fisher,
 approximately 26% of the requested rate base increase is from new retrofits to
 meet environmental regulations at old coal plants in the company's fleet (the
 Current Case Retrofits). I will explain below why those investments, along with
 their associated operation and maintenance (O&M) costs and costs due to lost
 output from the affected plants, are imprudent. Dr. Fisher lists those specific
 Current Case Retrofits in his prefiled testimony.
- Q. Has the company presented information sufficient for the Commission to be
 able to evaluate the prudence of the capital investments in pollution control
 proposed for recovery in the current docket?
- A. No. The company has presented testimony by witnesses to provide information
 supporting the prudence of capital investments in pollution control equipment and

plant or unit caused by the operation of the Current Case Retrofits, less the variable costs of production avoided at the plants or units affected by the installation and operation of the Current Case Retrofits.

1		additional generation plant, mining, transmission and hydro projects being placed
2		in service during the test period. However, while that information was necessary,
3		it is not sufficient to demonstrate prudence. As explained in the testimony of Dr.
4		Fisher, the amount that the company is requesting in this rate case is only a
5		portion of the costs that it anticipates in its overall emissions reduction plan (the
6		Company Projected Retrofits) and only a portion of the total costs that it is likely
7		to face over the next few years for environmental compliance activities at its
8		power plants (including the Emerging Retrofits). Beyond the pollution controls
9		that are likely to be required to comply with current and upcoming EPA rules, the
10		question of the types of costs that will likely arise due to emissions of greenhouse
11		gases, such as CO2, presents a potentially significant cost to the company. The
12		likely costs for greenhouse gas control regimes must be addressed in any
13		reasonable review of the cost effectiveness of investments aimed at the continued
14		operation of a power plant with high carbon emissions.
15	0	

15Q.Please explain your understanding of prudence determinations and their16effect in a rate case.

A. It is my understanding that only prudently incurred expenses, including recovery
of and on prudently incurred investments, including used and useful for the
provision of utility service, may be recovered in retail rates. In addition, only
prudent investments used and useful for the provision of utility service may be
included in rate base. Conversely, imprudently incurred expenditures are
traditionally disallowed. Finally, costs must also be reasonable, necessary and
verifiable in order to be recoverable.

24Q.Who must demonstrate the imprudence or non-used and useful status of
costs?

A rate-regulated utility traditionally enjoys a rebuttable presumption that its expenditures and investments are prudent, as well as used and useful. That presumption can be rebutted by factual evidence demonstrating imprudent utility expenditures or investments that are not used and useful. Once that presumption has been rebutted, then the burden shifts to the utility to provide evidence sufficient:

1		(1) to form the basis for findings that costs were prudent and used and
2		useful; and,
3		(2) to overcome any evidence to the contrary.
4 5	Q.	Please explain your conclusions regarding prudence determinations and used and useful determinations for the company's Current Case Retrofits.
6	A.	The investments in Current Case Retrofits, which the utility seeks to put into rate
7		base, are not "used and useful" for several reasons. First, EPA has not yet
8		finalized a regional haze rule under the Clean Air Act, thus, the company has no
9		way of knowing whether its premature retrofit work will meet federal
10		requirements. For example, Dr. Fisher demonstrated that it is likely, depending on
11		the particular regulation, that additional technology will ultimately be required. If
12		so, the company will have to go back and expend additional resources meeting
13		EPA requirements and may have acted prematurely.
14		Instead, Rocky Mountain Power wants authority to gamble on the installation of
15		pollution controls that it hopes will meet EPA's final requirements. Such a
16		gamble violates the principle that utility property must be used and useful for
17		public convenience at the time of rate consideration. See <u>Re U.S. West</u>
18		Communications, Inc., Docket No. 94-049-08, 183 P.U.R. 4th 382, (1997) ("We
19		continue to uphold the used and useful ratemaking principal because it demarcates
20		as asset's in-service and productive status which in turn triggers capital
21		recovery"). Further, including expenses for the Current Case Retrofits in rate
22		base prior to completing construction of the retrofits, as Rocky Mountain Power
23		proposes here, violates the used and useful principal (unless there is a future test
24		period exception in Utah). By including the retrofit costs in rate base now, Rocky
25		Mountain Power wants ratepayers to fund an equity return on those future assets
26		before they are in productive service. This type of ratemaking treatment is
27		inequitable and improper. Id. In sum, since Rocky Mountain Power's
28		expenditures for pollution retrofits (the Current Case Retrofits) are premature,
29		they do not qualify as used and useful. The Commission should not approve
30		recovery of those costs through rates at this time.

1 Rocky Mountain Power's proposal similarly violates the Commission's "known 2 and measurable" standard because, without a final EPA rule, the full costs of the 3 pollution retrofits remain unknowable at this time. This includes future costs that 4 are uncertain in rate base and shift the risk from shareholders to ratepayer. In re 5 PacifiCorp, Docket No. 97-035-01, 192 P.U.R.4th 289, 315 (1999) (removing uncertain hydro-dam removal costs where no contract agreements had been made 6 7 and the outcome of negotiations was unknown). The company is asking 8 ratepayers to bear the risk that the requested retrofit investments will be sufficient 9 to meet EPA's final rule. It is inappropriate for Rocky Mountain Power to force 10 ratepayers to bear this risk where the choice to assume such risk is entirely within 11 the company's control.

12 Clearly some form of investment on the part of the company will ultimately be 13 necessary because EPA regulations will require substantial pollution reductions; 14 however, Rocky Mountain Power's proposed investments do not position the 15 company to best deal with these future regulations. To the contrary, the decision 16 to install controls today to meet an unknown standard creates a risk that the 17 retrofits may fall short of meeting EPA requirements. Under such a scenario, 18 Rocky Mountain Power would be forced to either reinvest in different or 19 additional technology, which could render the currently proposed investments 20 redundant or obsolete, or to decommission plants entirely, in which case the 21 ratepayer funded investments would be abandoned. The prudent action here is to 22 fully evaluate the likelihood and costs of future regulations and to act on that 23 knowledge as required to provide long term least cost service.

To the extent Rocky Mountain Power insists on making these investments, shareholders must bear the risks until the retrofits are put into service and the utility can conclusively demonstrate that the retrofits are necessary *and* sufficient to meet final EPA requirements. "This classic regulatory view of risk-sharing underlines the importance of regulatory lag. It is an inducement to management efficiency." In re PacifiCorp, Docket No. 97-035-01, 192 P.U.R.4th 289, 315 (1999). Excluding the retrofit costs from the revenue requirement until after the retrofits are used and useful would also ensure that the pollution retrofit costs are
 known and measurable.

With respect to prudence, Rocky Mountain Power's actions count as imprudent for several reasons. First, installing the Current Case Retrofits is highly inefficient, and is therefore also imprudent. Rocky Mountain Power may be forced to completely revamp its pollution controls or, even repower or retire plants, once EPA issues its final rules. The proposed investments may result in inefficiencies by installing controls that may be redundant, unnecessary or obsolete.

10 Second, the company chose to exercise its discretion and to invest in premature 11 controls in such a way that ratepayers may bear substantial and unnecessary costs, 12 a clear abuse of discretion by the management of an enterprise entrusted with the 13 public good, and it therefore imprudent as described above.

14Third, the most basic duty of a public utility is to provide adequate service at just15and reasonable rates, but the Current Case Retrofit costs have not been shown to16be necessary or least cost for the provision of utility service over the long term.17Therefore, rates that include recovery for these costs are inimical to the public18interest, create economic waste, and would be, by definition in excess of just and19reasonable rates. In sum, the company's Current Case Retrofit decisions were20imprudent.

21 Fourth, Rocky Mountain Power has not properly considered a number of 22 emerging federal requirements that will require additional expenditures on control 23 technology (Emerging Retrofits) or may lead to plants being repowered or retired. 24 In this way, the company is asking ratepayers to fund piecemeal work that could 25 be done more efficiently or not at all once it has a better understanding of the full 26 suite of federal requirements. Instead, the company wants to gamble on the 27 installation of pollution controls that it hopes will meet (or be a cost effective 28 foundation for meeting) EPA's final requirements. This gamble not only violates 29 the principle that utility property must be used and useful for public convenience

1		at the time of rate consideration, but it is, at bottom, imprudent.
2		Thus, the Current Case Retrofit investments are not prudent. The prudent action
3		would have been to fully evaluate the likelihood and costs of future regulations
4		and to act on that knowledge as required to provide long term least cost service.
5		To have done otherwise risks installing expensive pollution controls that fall short
6		of meeting EPA requirements and would therefore require a new round of
7		investment, shutdowns, or both.
8 9 10	Q.	Are there examples that show that the company knew or should have known about the potential cumulative effect on its coal plants of then current and emerging environmental regulations?
11	A.	Yes. The company's own documents that shows it has known of the potential for
12		such a cumulative effect. Dr. Fisher discusses this extensively in his prefiled and
13		Exhibits JIF-5. From Pacificorp's SEC 10-K of March 31, 2003:
14 15 16 17 18 19		While the Company is unable at this time to predict with certainty the level of capital expenditures relating to air quality and carbon dioxide emissions, it believes these amounts could be significant but will be spread over a number of years. The Company also believes that the impact will be mitigated by recovery through the regulatory ratemaking process.
20		There is similar material in the more recent SEC filings. For example, in the 10-K
21		for the transition from April 1 2006 to Dec 31 2006 (PacifiCorp acquired by
22		MEHC), the New Source Review section reads:
23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33		Pending or proposed air regulations will require PacifiCorp to reduce its electricity plant emissions of sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides and other pollutants below current levels. The reductions will be required to address regional haze programs, mercury emissions regulations and possible re-interpretations and changes to the federal Clean Air Act. In the future, PacifiCorp expects to incur significant costs to comply with various stricter air emissions requirements. These potential costs are expected to consist primarily of capital expenditures. PacifiCorp expects that these costs would be recovered in rates and, as such, would not have a material adverse impact on PacifiCorp financial results.
34		In the 2008 IRP Update, the company acknowledges that the impending
35		regulations may have a significant impact on its fleet:

1	There are currently a multitude of environmental regulations, which
2	are in various stages of being promulgated, as outlined on the timeline
3	below. Each of these regulations will have an impact on the utility
4	industry and could affect environmental control requirements, limit
5	operations, change dispatch, and could ultimately determine the
6	economic viability of PacifiCorp's generation assets. The US
7	Environmental Protection Agency has undertaken a multi-pronged
8 9	approach to minimize air, land, and water-based environmental impacts. Aside from potential greenhouse gas regulation, no single
9 10	regulation is likely to materially impact the industry; however, in
11	<u>concert they are expected to have a significant impact –especially on</u>
12	the coal fueled generating units that supply approximately 50% of the
13	nation's electricity. [IRP Update, p. 17, <u>emphasis</u> added].
14	This foreknowledge of the likely cumulative effect of then-current and emerging
15	regulations is precisely the knowledge that makes the company's failure to
16	comprehensively assess the costs of those regulations in its management decisions
17	a clear act of imprudence. Indeed, as of this writing, the company still has not
18	evaluated the regulations "in concert," even though it anticipated that those
19	regulations would have a significant impact on coal-fired power plants.
20	Furthermore, as pointed out by Dr. Fisher in his prefiled testimony in this
21	proceeding,
22	Shortly before the final draft [of the company's 2011 IRP] was
23	submitted to this Commission, the stakeholders confirmed through a
24	phone call with the Company that the substantial environmental costs
25	faced by the coal units were not considered avoidable in any scenario.
26	In other words, even if the high cost of continuing to retrofit existing
27	coal units was ultimately not cost effective, i.e., even if those units
28	should be retired as a form of environmental compliance, the company
29	had knowingly biased their model results through an <i>a priori</i>
30	assumption. The company had unilaterally rejected a solution that
31	could feasibly protect ratepayers from having to pay billions of dollars
32	for unnecessary environmental upgrades. [emphasis in original]
33	This kind of management behavior is the epitome of imprudence. To the extent
34	that the company makes any investment or incurs any costs based on that faulty
35	and shortsighted analysis, those investments and costs would be imprudent and
36	should not be recovered from ratepayers.

1Q.Can you identify the other costs that the company is likely to incur, and that22Utah ratepayers would be asked to bear, in the near- to mid-term for33Company Projected Retrofits and Emerging Retrofits?

4 A. Yes, in broad terms. According to Dr. Fisher, EPA is poised to promulgate a 5 series of rules that will apply to generating units in the electric sector, including 6 the company's fleet of generating units. The rules will address air emissions, coal 7 combustion residue, water intake and water effluent. Dr. Fisher's testimony 8 explains that the company currently anticipates substantial additional expenditures 9 on Company Projected Retrofits to meet certain of these rules. He also explains 10 that the company is likely to face additional costs for Emerging Retrofits 11 associated with rules and regulations that are currently under development.

Q. Has the company presented information about additional costs that would ultimately be charged to ratepayers?

14 The company clearly acknowledges it will make additional investments in its A. 15 coal-fired power plants beyond those for which it requests approval in this docket. 16 For example, according to Mr. Teply, "the company takes several factors into 17 consideration when making pollution control equipment investments, including: 18 evaluation of state and federal environmental regulatory requirements and 19 associated compliance deadlines; review of emerging environmental regulations 20 and rulemaking; and analyses of alternate compliance options." (Teply Testimony 21 at 14.) Further, in its Emission Reduction Plan (Exhibit SC- (JIF-2)), the 22 company discusses capital expenditures for additional pollution control equipment 23 on PacifiCorp's coal-fired units, as well as associated annual increases to costs to 24 customers and increases in O&M expenses due to the additional pollution control equipment. (Exhibit SC-___(JIF-2) at 5-7.) The company acknowledged that the 25 26 costs do not include other costs expected to be incurred as future emission 27 reduction measures are finalized, nor did it address other applicable 28 environmental initiatives. (Exhibit SC-___(JIF-2) at 7.) In short, the company has 29 not quantified many of these known and likely costs, making it very difficult to do 30 a comprehensive evaluation of the full cost to rate payers of continuing to operate 31 specific plants in the company's fleet.

1Q.Why must the Commission consider costs outside those proposed for2recovery in the current docket?

3 A. Determination of the prudence of the company's investment and the most 4 economically efficient resource choices requires a comprehensive and detailed 5 assessment of the costs associated with a variety of options. This assessment must include a full understanding of all of the known costs associated with specific 6 7 options, as well as an understanding and evaluation of costs that can reasonably 8 be anticipated for specific options. While the company is not seeking cost 9 recovery for all of the upcoming costs in this docket, it is not possible to evaluate 10 the prudence of these expenditures in isolation from known and likely upcoming 11 expenditures.

12 Q. Please explain how a rate case is related to the company's IRP process.

- 13 A. An integrated resource planning process, by definition, must abide by two broad 14 principles. First, all resources must be considered—and considered on a "level 15 playing field." Second, the IRP process must deliver an integrated portfolio of 16 resources with the mix of resources that will provide adequate and reliable service 17 at the lowest life cycle cost, with the life cycle cost comparisons (between 18 resources or portfolios) and with an acceptable level of risk to ratepayers. The 19 company has used IRP for years, and it is appropriate that the company's rate 20 requests be consistent with these principles of IRP.
- Q. Can it be difficult for utilities to plan for compliance given the sheer number
 of regulatory activities that EPA is currently undertaking?
- 23 Although anticipating upcoming regulations can be challenging, EPA is expressly A. 24 pursuing a multi-pollutant approach to help companies comprehensively plan for 25 compliance. For example, in January, 2010, EPA announced its intention to 26 ensure better air quality, and promote a cleaner and more efficient power sector 27 and have strong but achievable reduction goals for SO_2 , NO_X , mercury, and other 28 air toxics. In other words, Rocky Mountain Power is asking for recovery of a tip 29 of the iceberg, before decision makers and ratepayers have a full understanding of 30 the magnitude of later, related costs.

1 The company's premature actions are all the more imprudent because EPA has 2 emphasized the agency's efforts to take a multi-pollutant sector-based approach to 3 regulation in order to provide certainty and clarity.³

4 In response, the company argues "customers directly benefit from the continued 5 availability of low-cost generation produced at the facilities while also achieving environmental improvements from these resources, resulting in cleaner air." 6 7 (Direct Testimony of Chad A. Teply at 16.) While additional controls would 8 result in environmental improvements, the question of whether the generation in 9 question is "low-cost" cannot be resolved without taking into account known and 10 likely upcoming rules and associated compliance costs. In evaluating additional 11 investment in existing capacity for recovery from ratepayers, the Commission 12 should be rigorous in its scrutiny and require the utility to go beyond simply the 13 question of whether a particular retrofit is mandated for continued operation.

14 In some regards, the company's planning and decision processes demonstrate 15 efforts to consider a range of compliance options at different plants, as well as 16 new resource options for meeting its customer's needs. However, the company's 17 planning and decision process is shortsightedly based on the assumption that 18 existing units must continue to operate regardless of likely costs, with ratepayers 19 bearing the burden. The company has failed to use appropriate venues, such as 20 integrated resource planning and predetermination proceedings, to allow the 21 Commission to consider in comprehensive fashion whether ratepayers should 22 fund continued operation of existing coal-fired units in light of existing and future 23 regulatory requirements. Resource retirement does not appear as an option in 24 compliance planning, nor does resource replacement emerge as an option in 25 integrated resource planning.

³ Lisa Jackson, *Remarks on the 40th Anniversary of the Clean Air Act, As Prepared*; September 14, 2010. Available at <u>http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/a883dc3da7094f97852572a00065d7d8/b6210c1d1d49b7a48</u> <u>52577fb006f435a!OpenDocument</u>. Accessed 4/8/11.

Q. Is it sufficient for the company to determine the cost-effectiveness of the retrofits currently required for compliance?

3 A. No. Such an evaluation would be incomplete, ignores relevant planning 4 information that the company's management knows or should know, and could 5 put ratepayers at risk for the costs of investments that, when considered as part of a whole, might not be cost-effective. The company is pursuing a piecemeal 6 approach—requesting cost recovery approval for a single upcoming cost (BART) 7 rather than considering the full costs to ratepayers of continuing to operate. 8 9 Without factoring in the full range of known and likely costs that ratepayers 10 would have to bear, it is not possible to assert that the power plants in question 11 produce low-cost generation. A piecemeal approach to evaluating capital 12 upgrades to existing power plants ignores the 40-year-plus trend of steadily 13 increasing and tightening environmental regulation nationwide. It is reasonable 14 for the Commission and the company to assume additional regulation and 15 additional regulatory costs will be imposed. Doing so will support evaluation of 16 individual compliance expenditures within a broader context of the full range of 17 compliance obligations and costs that the company is likely to face at a particular 18 unit rather than reviewing compliance obligations one by one.

19 The company's piecemeal approach to evaluating the upcoming costs of 20 compliance deprives ratepayers of the benefit of a comprehensive review and 21 prudence determination. In general, the scope of the Commission's consideration 22 of the company's proposal should reflect a multi-pollutant approach to evaluating 23 the known and likely costs of continued operation and retrofit, rather than 24 considering one regulation at a time. The company must promptly provide 25 information to the Commission and parties that allows for such an evaluation. It is 26 not reasonable to put ratepayers at risk of having to fund multiple modifications 27 or retrofits to meet compliance obligations if, taken as a whole, those compliance 28 activities are less economical than alternatives.

The summaries of upcoming environmental requirements presented in Dr.
Fisher's testimony evidence the potential synergistic magnitude of existing and
proposed regulatory requirements. These mandates will inevitably inform utilities

1 decisions as they make future resource allocations to meet customer demand and 2 determine the most appropriate investments for recovery from ratepayers. Given 3 the sheer number and wide coverage of these mandates, it will be essential that, for future planning purposes and rate treatment, the Commission and the utilities 4 5 consider their potential impact in a comprehensive, rather than singular, case-by-6 case basis. A step-wise, consistent decision-making process for deciding whether 7 to retrofit existing plants, new plants or employ some other resource will be 8 essential to ensuring the best outcome for ratepayers. When evaluating 9 alternatives, utilities must consider the market cost of existing, unused natural gas 10 capacity, the cost of a new combined cycle natural gas plant, as well as that of 11 wind, other renewables, demand response, and energy efficiency, in comparison 12 to the specific retrofit costs faced by an individual unit.

13 It is critical for companies to consider a reasonable range and intensity of risks 14 and uncertainties, particularly those associated with environmental regulation. 15 These include carbon costs, ozone regulation, mercury regulation, coal 16 combustion waste risks and requirements, and a lengthy list of pending regulatory 17 issues, as discussed in Dr. Fisher's testimony. I recommend that utilities be 18 directed to include the costs and risks of existing and emerging regulations on a 19 joint, multi-pollutant basis in evaluating investment plans, even when the final 20 form or timing of a regulation is unknown, given the capital intensive and long-21 lived nature of investments in the electric industry.

22

4. **RECOMMENDATIONS**

23 Q. What recommendations do you have for Commission?

A. I recommend that the costs of the company's Current Case Retrofit investments
be disallowed for recovery unless the company can show decisively that the
incremental capital costs requested in this case are prudent in light of known and
likely future investments and are in keeping with least cost principles. That
disallowance should include not only the capital costs of the Current Case

29 Retrofits, but also any associated operation and maintenance (O&M) costs and

1	costs due to lost output from the affected plants. The term "costs due to lost
2	output from the affected plants," means the cost of replacement power or
3	additional production needed by the company due to any plant or unit downtime
4	caused by the installation or operation and maintenance of the Current Case
5	Retrofits. This also includes the cost of additional production or replacement
6	power the company needs due to either parasitic loads or reduced capacity at any
7	plant or unit caused by the operation of the Current Case Retrofits, less the
8	variable costs of production avoided at the plants or units affected by the
9	installation and operation of the Current Case Retrofits.

- Q. Does your opinion change if construction has already commenced or is
 complete on one or more of the imprudent upgrades that is being proposed
 for cost recovery in this proceeding or if any such construction has already
 been permitted?
- 14 A. No. Such costs should still be disallowed. The disallowances I recommend are
- 15 fully consistent with traditional ratemaking, whether or not the imprudent
- 16 investment has already been made, in whole or in part.
- Q. Does your opinion change if additional investment in a specific imprudent
 upgrade is being proposed for recovery, but some of that upgrade's cost was
 already been allowed in rate base in a prior rate case?
- 20 No. The Commission should disallow as imprudent that portion of the investment A. 21 not already allowed into rate base by prior Commission Order. The Commission 22 should also consider, now and in the future, whether any of those or similar 23 investments (that is, investments now found to have been imprudent but which 24 had been allowed into rate base by prior Commission Order) are used and useful 25 in the provision of utility service. Under traditional ratemaking practice, the cost 26 of investments that have already been allowed into rate base (whether by an 27 explicit finding of prudence or in accordance with a utility's presumption of 28 prudence), but which are no longer used and useful (if they ever were) may be subject to a disallowance, the extent of which is within the Commission's 29 30 discretion.

1	Q.	Do you have additional recommendations for the Commission?
2	A.	Yes. The Commission must take a proactive approach to ensure sound decision-
3		making and to ensure that the Commission has sufficient information to evaluate
4		company decisions that could result in significant costs to ratepayers. In
5		particular, the Commission must consider establishing a comprehensive and
6		consistent process for considering utility proposals for major investments in
7		existing generating units. In general, the Commission's guidelines for such a
8		process should require:
9		(1) A thorough inventory and description of all the relevant resource
10		options, together with an assessment of their costs, benefits, uncertainties and
11		risks, as well as the probabilities of those risks,
12		(2) An objective analysis of how those uncertainties and risks affect the
13		performance of various resource plans individually and in combination,
14		(3) Development of a plan relying on a portfolio of resources that manages
15		risk and uncertainty to a reasonable level while delivering the lowest life cycle
16		cost over the fullest possible range of plausible future scenarios.
17		If the company fails to do so or fails to coordinate its rate requests with its IRP
18		planning processes and principles, the Commission should consider imposing a
19		penalty in the form of a reduction to the company's allowed rate of return.
20	Q.	Does this conclude your testimony?
21	A.	Yes, it does.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 26th of May, 2011, an original version and fifteen copies of the foregoing document, with Exhibits provided on CD, were sent via U.S. Mail to the following:

Attn: Julie Orchard Herber M. Wells Building, 4th Floor 160 East 300 South Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Additionally, I hereby certify that on this 26th day of May, 2011, a true copy of the foregoing document was sent via email to the following:

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<u>Original Signed by:</u>

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