#### BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH

In the Matter of the Application of Rocky
Mountain Power for Authority to
Increase Its Retail Electric Utility Service
Rates in Utah and for Approval of Its
Proposed Electric Service Schedules and
Electric Service Regulations.

DOCKET NO. 10-035-124

Exhibit No. DPU 15.0-SR RR

Surrebuttal Testimony and
Exhibits

Richard S. Hahn

# FOR THE DIVISION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE STATE OF UTAH

Surrebuttal Testimony of

Richard S. Hahn

July 19, 2011

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1		Testimony of Richard S. Hahn
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3	I.	INTRODUCTION
4		
5	Q:	Please state your name, business address and title.
6	A:	My name is Richard S. Hahn. I am employed by La Capra Associates, Inc. ("La Capra
7		Associates") as a Principal Consultant. My business address is One Washington Mall,
8		Boston, Massachusetts, 02108.
9		
10	Q:	On whose behalf are you testifying?
11	A:	The Division of Public Utilities of the State of Utah (the "Division" or the "DPU").
12		
13	Q:	Have you previously filed testimony during this proceeding?
14	A:	Yes. On May 26, 2011, I filed direct testimony in this docket. That testimony was
15		marked as Exhibit 15.0 D-RR.
16		
17	Q:	Have you previously testified in other dockets before the Public Service Commission
18		of Utah?
19	A:	Yes. In Docket No. 10-035-126, which pertained to the decision of Rocky Mountain
20		Power (the "Company") to pursue the Lake Side 2 plant, I filed direct, supplemental, and
21		surrebuttal testimony.
22		

23	Q:	What is the purpose of your testimony?					
24	A:	On or about June 30, 2011, Mr. Duvall filed rebuttal testimony on behalf of the					
25		Company. In that rebuttal testimony, Mr. Duvall attempted to respond to some of the					
26		issues that I raised in by direct testimony in this docket. The purpose of my surrebuttal					
27		testimony is to respond to the rebuttal testimony of Mr. Duvall.					
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29	Q:	Does the Company's rebuttal testimony cause you to change any of the conclusions					
30		and recommendations contained in your direct testimony?					
31	A:	No, it does not. I stand by the conclusions and recommendations contained in my direct					
32		testimony. I continue to believe that the Company prematurely terminated negotiations					
33		with LSPower over the acquisition of the Apex plant. This inappropriate action caused					
34		harm to Utah ratepayers by denying them the benefits of a needed and economic resource					
35		made available through a Commission-approved RFP.					
36							
37	II.	THE DUVALL REBUTTAL TESTIMONY					
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39	Q:	What issues does Mr. Duvall raise in his rebuttal testimony to which you wish to					
40		respond?					
41	A:	In his rebuttal testimony, Mr. Duvall attempts to defend the Company's decision to					
42		terminate negotiations with LSPower over the acquisition of the Apex plant on December					
43		12, 2010 and to rebut my direct testimony in this proceeding and in Docket No. 10-035-					
44		126. In formulating this defense, Mr. Duvall attempts to make five arguments related to					
45		(1) the methodology used to evaluate Apex, (2) the cost of unmet energy, (3)					

transmission costs, (4) the appropriate imprudence remedy, and (5) regulatory examples from other jurisdictions. I disagree with the arguments made in the Company's rebuttal testimony. I will respond to each of these assertions in the remainder of this surrebuttal testimony. A lack of response to any issue raised in the Company's rebuttal testimony should not be construed as concurrence.

#### III. RESPONSE TO ISSUE #1 - STUDY METHODOLOGY

In his rebuttal testimony, Mr. Duvall states that "the decision to terminate

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negotiations for the Apex facility was made after a comprehensive and thorough evaluation and due diligence process". Do you agree?

No. In fact, the exact opposite occurred. The comprehensive and thorough evaluation and due diligence process that was used to assess project bids received via the RFP began on or about mid-2010. It resulted in the selection of the Lake Side 2 unit proposed by CH2M Hill. On Thursday, December 9, 2010, after several months of evaluation, the Company wrote a memorandum recommending that the Apex plant also be acquired by the Company. This recommendation was discussed with the IE on Friday December 10, 2010. The comprehensive and thorough due diligence cited by the Company actually led to the recommendation to acquire the Apex plant. Suddenly, and without warning or discussion with the DPU or the IE, the Company wrote another memorandum dated Sunday December 12, 2010 recommending termination of the Apex negotiations. Thus, the decision to terminate the Apex negotiations was made over a two-day weekend, and not by the comprehensive and thorough process cited by the Company.

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70	Q:	How do you respond to Mr. Duvall statement that the methodology used by the				
71		Company to evaluate the Apex plant was approved?				
72	A:	Again, I disagree. The evaluation methodology established and approved by the				
73		Commission called for the Company to issue an RFP for new generation resources to be				
74		available between 2014 and 2016. The Company also stated in a cover letter				
75		accompanying the RFP dated November 16, 2009 that it would consider proposals				
76		commencing prior to 2014. If the Company wished to have its own resources				
77		considered as part of the RFP and evaluated against other bid projects, it was required to				
78		submit a proposal for its own resources in the form of a benchmark bid. The Lake Side 2				
79		unit was the only benchmark bid submitted by the Company. And yet, later in the				
80		evaluation process after the Apex plant was included on the short list, the Company				
81		moved the in-service date of the Currant Creek 2 unit to 2016 from 2018 in the evaluation				
82		of the RFP bids. Thus, the Company is using its own proposed project for a second unit				
83		at the Currant Creek site as an unauthorized benchmark bid. This is a flagrant violation				
84		of the approved evaluation process, one that is unfair to other bidders.				
85						
86	Q:	Has the Commission already determined that comparing Apex to the Currant				
87		Creek 2 unit is not in compliance with the approved evaluation process?				

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Final Report of the Utah Independent Evaluator: PacifiCorp All Source Request for Proposals (January 25, 2011) at 37.

88	A:	Yes. In the Report and Order for Docket No. 10-035-126 issued on April 20, 2011, the
89		Commission found that it was inappropriate for the Company to compare the Currant
90		Creek 2 unit to Apex. Specifically, Finding #6 on page 25 states as follows:
91 92 93 94 95		"The Company's supplemental analysis comparing the costs of a "hypothetical" Currant Creek 2 plant, which was not vetted or reviewed by the IE, to the Apex plant, with actual costs, did not comply with the approved evaluation process."
96	Q:	But doesn't the Company claim that allowing resources to "float" after 2016 as you
97		suggest is inconsistent with the approved methodology?
98	A:	The Company does make that claim, and it is true that the "approved methodology" did
99		call for timing and amount of post-2016 resources to be fixed per the latest RFP.
100		However, it is important to note that the Company does not argue that it is incorrect to
101		allow the timing and amount of post-2016 resources to float so that they can be optimized
102		to reflect resource acquisitions made for the 2011 to 2016 time period. Indeed, the
103		Company cannot make that argument. Any decision made to add significant resources in
104		the 2011 to 2016 time period will definitely affect the amount, timing, and type of
105		resources after 2016 that are part of a least cost resource plan. Allowing these resources
106		to float or be optimized is necessary to arrive at the best long-range plan for Utah
107		ratepayers. The Company should not be allowed to hide behind the "approved
108		methodology" to avoid doing what is right for Utah.
109		
110	Q:	Does the Company also claim that the Apex plant was uneconomic at the time the
111		decision was made?

112	A:	The Company does make that claim as well. On page 107 of the Duvall Rebuttal
113		testimony at lines 2327 to 2330, Mr. Duvall states:
114 115 116 117 118 119		"First, I will show that consistent with the Commission's Approved Evaluation Methodology for this RFP, which was approved by the Commission in Docket No. 10-035-126, the economic evaluation of Apex results in a \$12 million present value revenue requirement (PVRR) customer harm on a Utah basis <sup>2</sup> ."
120		As noted in the footnote from the Company's rebuttal testimony, the basis of this
121		statement in the response to DPU Data Request 2.7 in Docket 10-035-126. According to
122		Mr. Duvall, the response to DPU Data Request 2.7 shows that Apex would increase the
123		Company's costs by \$28 million, of which Utah's share is \$12 million.
124		
125	Q:	Do you agree with this interpretation of that response?
126	A:	No. The response to DPU Data Request 2.7 clearly shows that Apex will save the
127		Company \$ million on a PVRR basis. In order to derive a loss of \$28 million due to
128		Apex from this response, it is necessary to exclude unmet energy costs of \$ million
129		and the risk adjustment of \$ million. By removing unmet energy costs, the Company
130		is implicitly assuming that the portion of the energy supply that not met by actual
131		generation is provided at a zero cost. Clearly, this is not correct. Furthermore, the
132		Company included a risk adjustment in its evaluation of all other resources. It should not
133		exclude these costs simply to arrive at a result they like. Bottom line – the confidential
134		response to DPU Data Request 2.7 shows that Apex will produce savings for Utah.
135		

The study requested by the Independent Evaluator in data request DPU 2.7 in Docket No. 10-035-126, which is most closely aligned with the Approved Evaluation Methodology was \$28m unfavorable to Apex, which is \$12m unfavorable on a Utah allocated basis.

136		A brief review of the results of the economic evaluation of Apex as they evolved over					
137		time provides useful insights. The following results occurred on a PVRR basis.					
138		• Final Short List (10/7/2010): Apex saves \$ million.					
139		• Original Due Diligence (12/9/2010): Apex saves \$ million					
140		• Revised Due Diligence (12/12/2010): Apex saves (\$ million)					
141		• Errata Filing (1/13/2011): Apex saves \$ million					
142		• DPU Data Request 2.7 (1/27/2011): Apex saves \$ million					
143		• DPU Data Request 4.23 (2/16/2011): Apex saves \$133 million					
144							
145		Five of the six economic evaluations listed above showed savings for the Apex plant.					
146		The December 12, 2010 analysis showed negative savings, but this analysis contained					
147		errors. The errors in the Company's December 12, 2010 analysis were discovered shortly					
148		after the Apex negotiations were terminated prematurely. Had the negotiations for the					
149		Apex plant continued as they should have, the Company would have corrected these					
150		errors and realized that the Apex plant yielded savings to Utah ratepayers.					
151							
152	Q:	The Company claims that the acquisition of the Apex plant would have exposed					
153		Utah ratepayers to significant and certain near-term fixed costs on the gamble that					
154		long-term net variable cost savings would be realized. How do you respond?					
155	A:	There are two possible bases for this statement. The first reason is that the annual cost of					
156		the Apex plant in the early years exceeded the estimated cost of Front Office					
157		Transactions ("FOTs") and spot market balancing transactions. I believe that this is true					

for all of the projects bid in the RFP, including the Lake Side 2 unit. In the step I evaluations, all projects including Lake Side 2 had bid prices above the forward curves used by the Company for the nearest price point. The Company believes that this risk is acceptable for Lake Side II, because it chose the Lake Side 2 unit, but does not believe it to be acceptable for Apex, a contradiction that the Commission should not accept. It is also possible that the basis of the Company's statement is the difference between the cost of two portfolios; one with Apex and Lake Side 2 and one with Lake Side 2 but without Apex. This comparison is inappropriate because the portfolio without Apex has the Currant Creek 2 unit added in 2016, which as stated previously is not appropriate because the Currant Creek 2 unit is not an approved benchmark project. The RFP requires that all Company-proposed resources be submitted and approved as benchmark projects, where the costs and operating parameters are vetted by the same process as other bids. This is important because it places Company projects on an equal footing with non-Company projects and reduces any bias or implications of self-dealing. Allowing a non-benchmark project to replace a project bid in the RFP removes that protection for ratepayers.

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Regardless of the source of the Company's statement, the Commission should not rely upon it.

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179	IV.	RESPONSE TO ISSUE #2 – RELIANCE ON UNMET ENERGY
180		COSTS
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182	Q:	The Company's rebuttal testimony states that the analysis requested by the DPU is
183		flawed because it forces the Company to rely excessively on unmet energy costs.
184		Please respond.
185	A:	The Company's testimony on this issue contradicts itself. In the Duvall rebuttal testimony
186		at 2332 to 2336, he states that the studies relied upon by the DPU "force the Company to
187		substitute high-cost unmet energy for Apex, without any ability to satisfy that energy
188		demand with any other resource". And yet, at 2459 through 2467, the same Duvall
189		rebuttal testimony states as follows:
190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199		"The Company will supply any required energy identified in the 2011 Integrated Resource Plan (IRP) from either market purchases or purchases from merchant resources on the east side of the system at a cost to ratepayers that is substantially lower than the Apex project. These resources will be procured through market purchases at Mona and the Nevada/Utah border as well as from existing generation inside of Utah at a lower cost and lower risk to customers than Apex. Simply stated, Apex is not the Company's only alternative to providing power, but the DPU continues to base its position on modeling that assumes that it is."
200		If there are resources available besides the Apex plant and besides the Currant Creek 2
201		unit, then the Company should perform the analysis requested by the DPU in data request
202		46.7 and 46.8. If there are no other resources available, then it would make economic
203		sense to acquire the Apex plant. The Company cannot have it both ways.
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Furthermore, it is not the DPU that is forcing the Company to place excessive reliance on high-cost unmet energy. The approved RFP process did not allow an unqualified benchmark project such as the Currant Creek 2 unit to be substituted for a qualified bid project such as the Apex plant. If the Company truly believes that it needs additional resources and it does not believe that the Apex plant is economic, it should consider other projects bid in the RFP. This action should have been discussed in advance with the IE and the DPU. The Company's testimony on this issue should be rejected.

#### V. RESPONSE TO ISSUE #3 – TRANSMISSION COSTS

## Q: What issues does the Company's rebuttal testimony raise regarding transmission costs?

217 A:

The Company appears to try and make two points; (1) that the acquisition of the Apex plant would require new transmission upgrades to be built and (2) that the cost of those upgrades is uncertain.

A:

#### Q: How do you respond?

It is not unusual for new generating plants to require transmission upgrades in order to successfully integrate into the existing bulk power supply system. Most new plants require some transmission upgrades. This is why FERC requires all transmission owners to have an Open Access Transmission Tariff ("OATT") that contain a process for requesting estimates of the cost of any needed upgrades and having needed transmission facilities constructed. If the Company rejected all new resources that required new

229		The Company did include approximately \$ million in transmission upgrades for the
230	4	Apex plant. The Company assumes that \$ million in transmission upgrades are
231		required for the Lake Side 2 project. <sup>3</sup>
232		
233		The uncertainty about the final cost of transmission upgrades for Apex appears to be
234		based upon a study of sub-synchronous resonance. When the purchase transaction was
235		expected to close in December 2011, the study was originally expected in the second
236		quarter of 2011. If sub-synchronous resonance were truly the issue, during its hasty
237		analysis over that December weekend, then the Company should have completed the
238		study that would resolve this matter as soon as possible. To my knowledge, the study has
239		not yet been completed as of the writing of this testimony. The Company has not
240		provided any reason or explanation regarding why it had to terminate these negotiations

transmission facilities, it would have a difficult time in meeting its service obligations.

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#### VI. RESPONSE TO ISSUE #4 – IMPRUDENCE REMEDY

should ignore the Company's testimony on this issue.

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Q: How do you respond to the Company's rebuttal testimony on the DPU's proposed imprudence remedy?

over a weekend. The Company cannot continue to cite this uncertainty over sub-

synchronous resonance and then have done nothing to resolve it. The Commission

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>Confidential Attachment DPU 4.6(2) in Docket 10-035-126

The Company's rebuttal testimony states that the DPU's proposed remedy is an
"attempted use of unprecedented ratemaking to penalize the Company solely because the
DPU disapproves of the process by which the Company terminated the negotiations".
This criticism seems more directed to the testimony of Mr. Peterson. However, it has
been my experience in other jurisdictions that the type of remedy proposed by the DPU
as a remedy for the Company's imprudence is not unprecedented at all. There are
numerous instances where a state regulatory commission has reduced a utility's revenues
during a rate case or other adjudicatory process because it found that the utility did not
act in the best interest of ratepayers. For example, prior to electric industry restructuring
in Massachusetts, NSTAR owned the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station. On several
occasions, the Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities ("MDPU") found that this
unit experienced outages that the MDPU found should have been avoided. As a remedy,
certain replacement power costs were denied and excluded from rates. In another
proceeding, the MDPU issued an order in an NSTAR rate case with a zero percent return
on equity in the determination of the approved revenue requirement. This is perhaps the
harshest disallowance I can recall. These examples indicate that the remedy proposed by
the DPU in this proceeding is not unprecedented at all.

A:

#### VII. RESPONSE TO ISSUE #5 – REGULATORY EXAMPLES

Q: The Company's rebuttal testimony is critical of the regulatory examples that you provide for the Maine and Massachusetts commissions. How do you respond?

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A:

272 unresponsive to the Commission's request. Rather, the Company's rebuttal testimony 273 seems to be a legal argument that Utah law renders these examples moot. I am not an 274 attorney, and will leave the legal debate on the merits and applicability of these examples 275 to the briefs. I was simply responding as best as I could to a question from the 276 Commission. 277 The question from the Commission seemed to draw a distinction between penalizing the 278 279 Company for something it did versus penalizing the Company for something it should 280 have done. As I stated in my direct testimony in this proceeding, I did not criticize the Company's decision not to act to acquire the Apex plant. My testimony stated that the 281 282 Company erred by prematurely terminating the negotiations for the acquisition of Apex. 283 This view is shared by the IE. One of the findings of the IE was that the Company prematurely terminated these negotiations. Specifically, on page 3 of the Final Report of 284 the Utah Independent Evaluator dated January 25, 2011, the IE states the following: 285 "However, the IE is of the opinion that PacifiCorp did not follow its procedures 286 in later terminating negotiations and due diligence on the Apex project 287 prematurely and rejecting the Apex project even though the resource was 288 289 included in the lowest cost portfolio from a Risk Adjusted PVRR basis, which PacifiCorp proposed as the key criteria underlying resource selection." 290 291 It is clear from this report that the IE found that the Company prematurely terminated the 292 293 Apex negotiations, and that the IE also found that the Apex plant was part of the lowest

The Company does not appear to maintain that these examples are irrelevant or

prudence of the Company's actions regarding the Apex negotiations.

cost portfolio. So, I do not think that the Commission is precluded from examining the

#### VIII. THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE APEX TERMINATION

A:

#### Q: What is the status of the economic analysis of the Apex plant?

In Docket No. 10-035-126, the DPU had requested that the Company perform an economic analysis of the Apex plant. The results of that analysis showed that the acquisition of Apex would save the Company \$133 million on a PVRR basis. The Utah portion of this amount is the \$56.7 million figure used in Mr. Peterson's testimony. The Company was critical of that analysis, so the DPU requested that the Company perform an updated assessment. The 38<sup>th</sup> set of discovery from the Division to the Company contained six questions that are pertinent to this issue. These questions are intended to address some of the Company concerns expressed in its rebuttal testimony in Docket No. 10-035-126 regarding the \$133 million figure. The Company did not provide the requested analysis. In the 46<sup>th</sup> set of discovery from the Division to the Company, the DPU again requested that the Company perform such an updated analysis. Again the purpose of these questions was to arrive at an undisputed level of savings that the Apex plant would have provided. As before, the Company has refused to provide the updated analysis, which forced the Division to file a yet unresolved motion to compel.

Despite the Company's outright refusal to perform the requested analyses, it continues to be critical of the savings estimate from Docket No. 10-035-126. It is inappropriate for the Company to criticize the results of a study that it did perform while refusing to perform a requested study intended to address those criticisms.

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320	Q:	What then is the status of the estimate of the harm to Utah ratepayers from the
321		premature termination of the Apex negotiations?
322	A:	The most recent estimate of the savings from the Apex plant is the \$133 million figure
323		from Docket No. 10-035-126, with the Utah portion being \$56.7 million.
324		
325	IX.	CONCLUSION
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327	Q:	Does this conclude your testimony?
328	A:	At this time, yes, it does. Should additional or new information become available, I will
329		supplement this testimony as appropriate.

#### CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I Hereby certify that on this 30<sup>th</sup> Day of June, 2011, I caused to be transmitted electronically (email) a true and correct copy of the Prefiled RFP-APEX Surrebuttal Testimony of Richard S. Hahn for the Utah Division of Public Utilities in Docket 10-035-124: In the Matter of the Application of Rocky Mountain Power for Authority to Increase its Retail Electric Utility Service Rates in Utah and for Approval of its Proposed Electric Service Schedules and Electric Service Regulations:

DIVISIO	N OF	PUBL	IC U	<b>FILITIES</b>

DIVISION OF PUBLIC	<u>UTILITIES</u>		
Chris Parker	chrisparker@utah.gov	Neal Townsend	ntowns
Dahnelle Burton-Lee	dburton-lee@utah.gov	Kevin Higgins	khiggin
Patricia Schmid	pschmid@utah.gov	Gary Dodge	gdodge
David Thomson	dthomson@utah.gov		
Artie Powell	wpowell@utah.gov	Vicki Baldwin	<u>vbaldwi</u>
Thomas Brill	tbrill@utah.gov	F. Robert Reeder	bobree
Charles Peterson	chpeterson@utah.gov	William Evans	wevans
Matt Croft	mcroft@utah.gov		
Brenda Salter	<u>bsalter@utah.gov</u>	Jerold Oldroyd	oldroyd
Sam Liu	<u>hliu@utah.gov</u>	Sharon Bertelson	<u>bertelse</u>
Abdinisar Abdulle	<u>aabdulle@utah.gov</u>	Teresa Foxley	foxleyt(
Doug Wheelwright	dwheelwright@utah.gov		
Marlin Barrow	mbarrow@utah.gov		
Carolyn Roll	<u>croll@utah.gov</u>	Stephen Baron	sbaron
Joni Zenger	jzenger@utah.gov	Brian Burnett	<u>brianbu</u>
		Kurt Boehm	<u>kboehn</u>
		Pyan Kally	rvan@l

#### **COMMITTEE OF CONSUMER SERVICES**

Michele Beck	mbeck@utah.gov
Paul Proctor	pproctor@utah.gov
Cheryl Murray	cmurray@utah.gov
Dan Gimble	dgimble@utah.gov

Rocky Mountain Power		
Data Requests	datarequest@pacifiCorp.com	
Barry Bell	Barry.Bell@pacifiCorp.com	
Yvonne Hogle	yvonne.hogle@pacificorp.com	
David Taylor	Dave.Taylor@pacifiCorp.com	
Jeff Larsen	Jeff,Larsen@pacifiCorp.com	
Mark Moench	mark.moench@pacificorp.com	
Daniel Solander	daniel.solander@pacifiCorp.com	
Ariel Son	ariel.son@pacificorp.com	
Rachael Martyn	rachael.martyn@pacificorp.com	
Kaley McNay	kaley.mcnay@pacificorp.com	
Carrie Mever	carrie.meyer@pacificorp.com	

Gloria Smith	gloria.smith@sierraclub.org
Charles R Dubuc	rdubuc@westernresources.org
Steven Michel	smichel@westernresources.org
Nancy Kelly	nkelly@westernresources.org
Alex Duarte	alex.duarte@qwest.com
Mike Kegge	mlegge@usmagnesium.com
Roger Swenson	roger.swenson@prodigy.net

eal Townsend	ntownsend@energystrat.com
evin Higgins	khiggins@energystrat.com
ary Dodge	gdodge@hjdlaw.com

/icki Baldwin	vbaldwin@parsonsbehle.com
F. Robert Reeder	bobreeder@parsonsbehle.com
William Evans	wevans@pblutah.com

erold Oldroyd	oldroydj@ballardspahr.com
Sharon Bertelson	bertelsens@ballardspahr.com
eresa Foxley	foxleyt@ballardspahr.com

Stephen Baron	sbaron@jkenn.com
Brian Burnett	brianburnett@cnmlaw.com
Curt Boehm	kboehm@bkllawfirm.com

Ryan Kelly	ryan@kellybramwell.com
Steve Chriss	stephen.chriss@wal-mart.com
Holly Rachel Smith	holly@raysmithlaw.com

Karen White	Karen.white@tyndall.af.mil
Shayla McNeill	Shayla.mcneill@tyndall.af.mil

Stephen Mecham	sfmecham@cnmlaw.com
Peter J. Mattheis	pjm@bbrslaw.com
Eric Lacey	elacey@bbrslaw.com
Gerald Kinghorn	ghk@pkhlawyers.com
Jeremy Cook	jrc@pkhlawyers.com
Sophie Hayes	sophie@utahcleanenergy.org
Sarah Wright	sarah@utahcleanenergy.org
Arthur Sandack	asandack@msn.com
Sonya Martinez	sonya@slcap.org
Betsy Wolf	betsy@slcap.org

john.curl@westernresources.org
rparker@fbfs.com
Leland.hogan@fbfs.com

Bruce Plenk	bplenk@igc.org
Janee Briesemeister	jbriesemeister@aarp.org

Dennis Miller dennismiller@utah.gov