


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Synapse 2012 Carbon Dioxide Price Forecast



Synapse
Energy Economics, Inc.

2012 Carbon Dioxide Price Forecast

October 2, 2012

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1. Executive Summary

Electric utilities and others should use a reasonable estimate of the future price of carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions when evaluating resource investment decisions with multi-decade lifetimes. Estimating this price can be difficult because, despite several focused attempts, the federal government has not come to consensus on a policy (or a set of policies) to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the U.S.

Although this lack of a defined policy certainly creates challenges, a “zero” price for the long-run cost of carbon emissions is not a reasonable estimate. The need for a comprehensive effort in the U.S. to reduce GHG emissions has become increasingly clear, and it is certain that any policy requiring, or leading to, these reductions will result in a cost associated with emitting CO₂ over some portion of the life of long-lived electricity resources. Prudent planning requires a reasonable effort to forecast CO₂ prices despite the considerable uncertainty with regard to specific regulatory details.

This 2012 forecast seeks to define a reasonable range of CO₂ price estimates for use in utility Integrated Resource Planning (IRP) and other electricity resource planning analyses. This forecast updates Synapse’s 2011 CO₂ price forecast, which was published in February of 2011. Our 2012 forecast incorporates new data that has become available since 2011, and extends the study period end-date to 2040 in order to provide useful CO₂ price estimates for utilities planning 30 years out into the future.

A. Key Assumptions

Synapse’s 2012 CO₂ price forecast reflects our expectation that cap-and-trade legislation will be passed by Congress in the next five years or so, and the resultant allowance trading program will take effect in or around 2020. These assumptions are based on the following reasoning:

- We believe that a federal cap-and-trade program for GHGs is a key component of the most likely policy outcome, as it enables the reduction of significant amounts of GHGs while allowing those reductions to come from sources that can mitigate their emissions at the least cost.
- We believe that federal legislation is likely by the end of the session in 2017 (with implementation by about 2020) prompted by one or more of the following factors:
 - technological opportunity;
 - a patchwork of state policies to achieve state emission targets for 2020 spurring industry demands for federal action;
 - a Supreme Court decision to allow nuisance lawsuits to go ahead, resulting in a financial threat to energy companies; and
 - increasingly compelling evidence of climate change.

Given the interest and initiatives on climate change policies in states throughout the nation, a lack of federal action will result in a hodgepodge of state policies. This scenario is a challenge for any company that seeks to make investments in existing, modified, or new power plants. Historically,

this pattern of states and regions leading with initiatives that are eventually superseded at a national level is common for energy and environmental policy in the US. It seems likely that this will be the dynamic that ultimately leads to federal action on greenhouse gases, as well.

In addition to the assumptions regarding a federal GHG program described above, this paper also expects that regional and state policies will lead to costs associated with GHGs in the near-term (i.e., prior to 2020). Prudent planning requires that utilities take these costs into account when engaging in resource planning.

B. Study Approach

To develop its 2012 CO₂ price forecast, Synapse reviewed more than 40 carbon price estimates and related analyses, including:

- McKinsey & Company's 2010 analyses of the marginal abatement costs and abatement potential of GHG mitigation technologies
- Analyses of the CO₂ allowance prices that would result from the major climate change bills introduced in Congress over the past several years, including analyses by the Energy Information Association (EIA) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
- The U.S. Interagency Working Group's estimates for the social cost of carbon
- Analyses of the factors that affect projections of allowance prices, including analyses by the EIA and Resources for the Future
- CO₂ price estimates used by utilities in a wide range of publicly available Integrated Resource Plans

Because we expect that a federal cap and allowance trading program will ultimately be adopted, analyses of the various Congressional proposals to date offer some of the most relevant estimates of costs associated with greenhouse gas emissions under a variety of regulatory scenarios. It is not possible to compare the results of all of these analyses directly, however, because the specific models and the key assumptions vary.

Synapse also considered the impact on CO₂ prices of regulatory measures outside of a cap-and-trade program—such as a federal Renewable Portfolio Standard—that could simultaneously help to achieve the emission-reduction goals of cap-and-trade. These “complementary policies” result in lower CO₂ allowance prices, since a smaller amount of CO₂ reductions would need to occur under the cap-and-trade program.

C. Synapse's 2012 CO₂ Price Forecast

Based on analyses of the sources described above, and relying on its own expert judgment, Synapse developed Low, Mid, and High case forecasts for CO₂ prices from 2020 to 2040. These cases represent different appetites for reducing carbon, as described below.

- The Low case forecast starts at \$15/ton in 2020, and increases to approximately \$35/ton in 2040.¹ This forecast represents a scenario in which Congress begins regulation of greenhouse gas emissions slowly—for example, by including a modest emissions cap, a safety valve price, or significant offset flexibility. This price forecast could also be realized through a series of complementary policies, such as an aggressive federal Renewable Portfolio Standard, substantial energy efficiency investment, and/or more stringent automobile CAFE mileage standards (in an economy-wide regulation scenario).
- The Mid case forecast starts at \$20/ton in 2020, and increases to approximately \$65/ton in 2040. This forecast represents a scenario in which a federal cap-and-trade program is implemented with significant but reasonably achievable goals, likely in combination with some level of complementary policies to give some flexibility in meeting the reduction goals. Also assumed in the Mid case is some degree of technological learning, i.e. assuming that prices for emissions reductions technologies will decline as greater efficiencies are realized in their design and manufacture and as new technologies become available.
- The High case forecast starts at \$30/ton in 2020, and increases to approximately \$90/ton in 2040. This forecast is consistent with the occurrence of one or more factors that have the effect of raising prices. These factors include somewhat more aggressive emissions reduction targets; greater restrictions on the use of offsets (nationally or internationally); restricted availability or high cost of technology alternatives such as nuclear, biomass and carbon capture and sequestration; or higher baseline emissions.

Table ES-1, below, presents Synapse’s Low, Mid, and High case price projections for each year of the study period, as well as the levelized cost for each case.


¹ Throughout this report, CO2 allowance prices are presented in \$2012 per short ton CO2, except in reference to a few original sources, where alternate units are clearly labeled. Results from other modeling analyses were converted to 2012 dollars using price deflators taken from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis. Because data were not available for 2012 in its entirety, values used for conversion were taken from Q2 of each year. Results originally provided in metric tonnes were converted to short tons by multiplying by a factor of 1.1.

Table ES-1: Synapse 2012 CO₂ Allowance Price Projections (2012 dollars per short ton CO₂)

Year	Low Case	Mid Case	High Case
2020	\$15.00	\$20.00	\$30.00
2021	\$16.00	\$22.25	\$34.00
2022	\$17.00	\$24.50	\$38.00
2023	\$18.00	\$26.75	\$42.00
2024	\$19.00	\$29.00	\$46.00
2025	\$20.00	\$31.25	\$50.00
2026	\$21.00	\$33.50	\$54.00
2027	\$22.00	\$35.75	\$58.00
2028	\$23.00	\$38.00	\$62.00
2029	\$24.00	\$40.25	\$66.00
2030	\$25.00	\$42.50	\$70.00
2031	\$26.00	\$44.75	\$72.00
2032	\$27.00	\$47.00	\$74.00
2033	\$28.00	\$49.25	\$76.00
2034	\$29.00	\$51.50	\$78.00
2035	\$30.00	\$53.75	\$80.00
2036	\$31.00	\$56.00	\$82.00
2037	\$32.00	\$58.25	\$84.00
2038	\$33.00	\$60.50	\$86.00
2039	\$34.00	\$62.75	\$88.00
2040	\$35.00	\$65.00	\$90.00
Levelized	\$23.24	\$38.54	\$59.38

Figure ES-1, below, presents Synapse’s Low, Mid, and High price forecasts as compared to a broad range of CO₂ allowance prices used in utility Integrated Resource Planning to date. Synapse forecasts are represented by black lines, while utility forecasts are represented by grey. As shown in this figure, Synapse’s projections lie solidly in the middle of the utility forecasts.

Figure ES-1: Synapse forecasts compared to a range of utility forecasts



2. Structure of this Paper

This paper presents Synapse’s assumptions, data sources, and estimates of reasonable future CO₂ prices for use in resource planning analyses. The report is structured as follows:

- Section 3 discusses the key assumptions behind Synapse’s estimates
- Sections 4 through 8 present data from the sources reviewed by Synapse in developing its estimates of the future price of CO₂ emissions
- Section 9 presents Synapse’s 2012 Low, Mid, and High CO₂ price forecasts, and compares these projections to a range of utility forecasts
- Appendix A provides a more detailed discussion of state and regional GHG initiatives. Collectively, these initiatives suggest that momentum is building toward federal GHG action

3. Discussion of Key Assumptions

A. Federal GHG Legislation Is Increasingly Likely

Congressional action in the form of cap-and-trade or clean energy standards is only one avenue in an increasingly dynamic and complex web of activities that could result in internalizing a portion of the costs associated with emissions of greenhouse gases from the electric sector. The states, the federal courts, and federal agencies are also grappling with the complex issues associated with climate change. Many efforts are proceeding simultaneously.

Nonetheless, we believe that a federal cap-and-trade program for GHGs is the most likely policy outcome, as it enables the reduction of significant amounts of GHGs while allowing those reductions to come from sources that can mitigate their emissions at the least cost. Several cap-and-trade proposals have been taken up by Congress in the past few years, though none yet have been passed by both houses. (More discussion of this topic is provided in Section 5 of this report.)

We further believe that federal action will occur in the near-term. This 2012 CO₂ price forecast assumes that cap-and-trade legislation will be passed by Congress in the next five, and the resultant allowance trading program will take effect in 2020, prompted by one or more of the following factors:

- technological opportunity;
- a patchwork of state policies to achieve state emission targets for 2020 spurring industry demands for federal action;
- a Supreme Court decision to allow nuisance lawsuits to go ahead, resulting in a financial threat to energy companies; and
- increasingly compelling evidence of climate change.

Given the interest and initiatives on climate change policies in states throughout the nation, a lack of federal action will result in a hodgepodge of state policies. This scenario is a challenge for any company that seeks to make investments in existing, modified, or new power plants. Historically, this pattern of states and regions leading with initiatives that are eventually superseded at a national level is common for energy and environmental policy in the US. It seems likely that this will be the dynamic that ultimately leads to federal action on greenhouse gases, as well.

B. State and Regional Initiatives Building toward Federal Action

The states—individually and coordinating within regions—are leading the nation’s policies to respond to the threat of climate change. In fact, several states, unwilling to postpone and wait for federal action, are pursuing policies specifically because of the lack of federal legislation. These policies are described below, and are discussed in more detail in Appendix A of this report.

Cap and Trade Programs

The Northeast/Mid-Atlantic region and the state of California have developed, or are in the last stages of developing, greenhouse gas caps and allowance trading.²

Under the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), ten Northeast and Mid-Atlantic states have agreed to a mandatory cap on CO₂ emissions from the power sector with the goal of achieving a ten percent reduction in these emissions from levels at the start of the program by 2018.

Meanwhile, California’s Global Warming Solutions Act (AB 32) has created the world’s second largest carbon market, after the European Union’s Emissions Trading System (EU ETS). The first compliance period for California’s cap-and-trade program will begin on January 1, 2013, and will cover electricity generators, carbon dioxide suppliers, large industrial sources, and petroleum and

² The Midwest Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord was developed in 2007. Though the agreement has not been formally suspended, the participating states are no longer pursuing it.

natural gas facilities emitting at least 25,000 metric tons of CO₂e per year. The initial cap is set at 162.8 million metric tons of CO₂e and decreases by 2% annually through 2015.

State GHG Reduction Laws

Massachusetts: In 2008, the Massachusetts Global Warming Solutions Act was signed into law. In addition to the commitments to power sector emissions reductions associated with RGGI, this law committed Massachusetts to reduce statewide emissions to 10-25% below 1990 levels by 2020 and 80% below 1990 levels by 2050. Following the development of a comprehensive plan on steps to meet these goals, the 2020 target was set at 25% below 1990 levels.³ Rather than put a price on carbon in the years before 2020, this plan will achieve a 25% reduction through a combination of federal, regional, and state-level regulations applying to buildings, energy supply, transportation, and non-energy emissions.

Minnesota: In 2008, the Next Generation Energy Act was signed to reduce Minnesota emissions by 15% by 2015, 30% by 2025, and 80% by 2050.⁴ While the law called for the development of an action plan that would make recommendations on a cap-and-trade system to meet these goals, the near-term goals will be met by a combination of an aggressive renewable portfolio standard and energy efficiency.

Connecticut: Also in 2008, the state of Connecticut passed its own Global Warming Solutions Act, establishing state level targets 10% below 1990 levels by 2020 and 80% below 2001 levels by 2050. In December 2010, the state released a report on mitigation options focused on regulatory mechanisms in addition to strengthening RGGI and reductions of non-CO₂ greenhouse gases.⁵

Renewable Portfolio Standards & Other Initiatives

A renewable portfolio standard (RPS) or renewable goal specifies that a minimum proportion of a utility's resource mix must be derived from renewable resources. The standards range from modest to ambitious, and qualifying energy sources vary by state.

Currently, 29 U.S. states have renewable portfolio standards. Eight others have renewable portfolio goals. In addition, many states are pursuing other policy actions relating to reductions of GHGs. These policies include, but are not limited to: greenhouse gas inventories, greenhouse gas registries, climate action plans, greenhouse gas emissions targets, and emissions performance standards.

In the absence of a clear and comprehensive federal policy, many states have developed a broad array of emissions and energy related policies. For example, Massachusetts has a RPS of 15% in 2020 (rising to 25% in 2030), belongs to RGGI (requiring specific emissions reductions from power plants in the state), and has set in place aggressive energy efficiency targets through the 2008 Green Communities Act.

³ Massachusetts Clean Energy and Climate Plan for 2020, Available at:
<http://www.mass.gov/green/cleanenergyclimateplan>

⁴ Minnesota Statutes 2008 § 216B.241

⁵ See <http://www.ctclimatechange.com> for further details on CT plans for emissions mitigation.

4. Marginal Abatement Costs and Technologies

This chapter presents key data related to marginal abatement costs for CO₂, which were reviewed by Synapse in developing its estimates of the future price of CO₂ emissions.

The long-run marginal abatement cost for CO₂ represents the cost of the control technologies necessary for the last (or most expensive) unit of emissions reduction required to comply with regulations. This cost depends on emission reduction goals: lower emissions reduction targets can be met by lower-cost technologies, while more stringent targets will require additional reduction technologies that are implemented at higher costs. The Copenhagen Agreement, drafted at the 15th session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in 2009, recognizes the scientific view that in order to prevent the more drastic effects of climate change, the increase in global temperature should be limited to no more than 2° Celsius. Atmospheric concentrations of CO₂ would need to be stabilized at 450 ppm in order to limit the global temperature increase to no more than 2°C.⁶


In recent years, there have been several analyses of technologies that would contribute to emission reductions consistent with an increase in temperature of no more than 2°C. McKinsey & Company examined these technologies in a 2010 report entitled *Impact of the Financial Crisis on Carbon Economics: Version 2.1 of the Global Greenhouse Gas Abatement Cost Curve*. The CO₂ mitigation options identified by McKinsey and the costs of those options are shown in Figure 1. Global mitigation options are ordered from least expensive to most expensive, and the width of each bar represents the amount of mitigation likely at these costs. The chart represents a marginal abatement cost price curve, where cost of abatement is shown on the y-axis and cumulative metric tonnes of GHG reductions are shown on the x-axis. It is likely that the lowest cost reductions will be implemented first, but as reduction targets become more stringent and low-cost options are saturated, the cost of abatement technologies is likely to increase.

The expected CO₂ price at any given time is the marginal abatement cost, or the cost of the most expensive mitigation option or technology that is required to meet a specific mitigation target. The chart below provides a useful reference to the types of options and technologies that might be employed at specific CO₂ prices.

⁶ IPCC, 2007: Summary for Policymakers. In: *Climate Change 2007: Mitigation. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change* [B. Metz, O.R. Davidson, P.R. Bosch, R. Dave, L.A. Meyer (eds)], Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA.

Figure 1: Marginal Abatement Technologies and Associated Costs for the Year 2030.⁷

V2.1 Global GHG abatement cost curve beyond BAU – 2030



Note: The curve presents an estimate of the maximum potential of all technical GHG abatement measures below €80 per tCO₂e if each lever was pursued aggressively. It is not a forecast of what role different abatement measures and technologies will play.
 Source: Global GHG Abatement Cost Curve v2.1

As shown in Figure 1, technologies for carbon mitigation that are available to the electric sector include those related to energy efficiency, nuclear power, renewable energy, and carbon capture and storage (CCS) for fossil-fired generating resources. McKinsey estimates CCS technologies to cost 50-60 €/metric tonne (2005€). Converted into current dollars, this is equivalent to \$65 to \$85/short ton (\$71.5 to \$93.5/metric tonne, 2012\$). According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), “in order to reach the goal of stabilizing global emissions at 450 ppm by 2050, CCS will be necessary.”⁸ Thus, it is reasonable to expect that a CO₂ allowance price will rise to \$65/short ton (\$71.5/metric tonne) or higher under a GHG policy designed to limit the global temperature increase to no more than 2°C. However, if significant reductions could be accomplished with CCS at the high \$65-\$85/short ton CO₂ range, we would not expect CO₂ mitigation prices to significantly exceed the top of that range.

5. Analyses of Major Climate Change Bills

This chapter presents key data related to analyses of major climate change bills proposed in Congress over the past few years, which were reviewed by Synapse in developing its estimates of

⁷ McKinsey & Company. *Impact of the Financial Crisis on Carbon Economics: Version 2.1 of the Global Greenhouse Gas Abatement Cost Curve*. 2010. Page 8.

⁸ International Energy Agency. *Technology Roadmap: Carbon Capture and Storage*. 2009. Page 4.

the future price of CO₂ emissions. Because we expect that a federal cap and allowance trading program will ultimately be adopted, analyses of these proposals offer some of the most relevant estimates of costs associated with greenhouse gas emissions under a variety of regulatory scenarios. It is not possible to compare the results of all of these analyses directly, however, because the specific models and the key assumptions vary.

A. Cap-and-Trade Proposals

In the past decade, the expectation has been that action on climate change policy will occur at the Congressional level. Legislative proposals have largely taken the form of cap-and-trade programs, which would reduce greenhouse gas emissions through a federal cap, and would allow trading of allowances to promote reductions in GHGs where they are most economic. Legislative proposals and President Obama's stated target aim to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by up to 80% from current levels by 2050.

Comprehensive climate legislation was passed in the House in the 111th Congress in the form of the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (ACES, also known as Waxman-Markey and HR 2454); however, the Senate ultimately did not take up climate legislation in that session. HR 2454 was a cap-and-trade program that would have required a 17% reduction in emissions from 2005 levels by 2020, and an 83% reduction by 2050. It was approved by the House of Representatives in June, 2009, but the Senate bill, known as the American Power Act of 2010 (APA, also known as Kerry-Lieberman), never came to a vote.

Figure 2, below, shows the results of EIA and EPA analyses of HR 2454 and APA. The chart shows the forecasted allowance prices in the central scenarios, as well as a range of sensitivities.

Figure 2: Greenhouse gas allowance price projections for HR 2454 and APA 2010





Figure 3, below, show these values as levelized prices for the time period 2015 to 2030.⁹

⁹ Consistent with EIA and EPA modeling analyses, a 5% real discount rate was used in all levelization calculations.

Figure 3: Greenhouse gas allowance price projections for HR 2454 and APA 2010 - levelized 2015-2030




B. Clean Energy Standard

The 112th Congress chose not to revisit legislation establishing an economy-wide emissions cap, and instead focused on policies aimed at fostering technology innovation and developing renewable energy or clean energy standards. In March 2012, Senator Bingaman introduced the Clean Energy Standard Act of 2012 (S.2146), under which larger utilities would be required to meet a percentage of their sales with electric generation from sources that produce fewer greenhouse gas emissions than a conventional coal-fired power plant. All generation from wind, solar, geothermal, biomass, municipal solid waste, and landfill gas would earn a full CES credit, and new hydroelectric and nuclear facilities would also earn the credit. Lower-carbon fossil facilities, such as natural gas and coal with carbon capture, would earn partial credits based on their CO₂ emissions. Generation owners would be required to hold credits equivalent to 24% of their sales beginning in 2015, and the CES requirement rises over time to 84% by 2035, creating demand for renewable energy and low-emissions technologies. The credits generated by these clean technologies would be tradable and have a value that would change depending on how costly the policy is to achieve. The Clean Energy Standard would apply to utilities with sales greater than 2 million MWh, and expand to include those with sales greater than 1 million MWh by 2025.

The EIA conducted analyses of a potential Clean Energy Standard in both 2011 and 2012.^{10,11} All of these cases result in some level of increase in nuclear, gas, and renewable generation, typically at the expense of coal. The exact generation mix, as well as the resulting reduction in emissions, is highly dependent on both the technology costs and policy design. The resulting CES Credit prices (Figure 4) vary widely, from 25 to 70 mills/kWh in 2020,¹² rising to 47 to 138 mills/kWh in 2035. The credit cap cases show a smaller rise in credit prices. When credit prices are capped at a specific value, clean energy deployment and emissions abatement is reduced.

Figure 4: CES Credit Prices in EIA Analyses of a US Clean Energy Standard



An effective CO₂ allowance price can be calculated based on the fact that this policy gives existing gas combined cycle units 0.48 credits and existing coal units zero credits, and the emissions from an average gas unit are about 0.57 tCO₂/MWh and from an average coal unit 1.125 tCO₂/MWh.¹³ For the BCES 2012 case, this results in effective prices increasing from \$18.4/tCO₂ in 2015 to \$71.4/tCO₂ in 2035.

¹⁰ US EIA. 2011. Analysis of Impacts of a Clean Energy Standard as requested by Chairman Bingaman. http://www.eia.gov/analysis/requests/ces_bingaman/.

¹¹ US EIA. 2012. Analysis of the Clean Energy Standard Act of 2012. <http://www.eia.gov/analysis/requests/bces12/>.

¹² A mill is one one-hundredth of a cent. Therefore, these CES prices in 2020 represent costs of 0.25 to 0.70 c/kWh, or \$2.5 to \$7/MWh.

¹³ EPA Air Emissions Overview, Available at: <http://www.epa.gov/cleanenergy/energy-and-you/affect/air-emissions.htm>

6. Key Factors Affecting Allowance Price Projections

Dozens of analyses over the past several years have shown that there are a number of factors that affect projections of allowance prices under federal greenhouse gas regulation. Some of these factors derive from the details of policy design, while others pertain to the context in which a policy would be implemented.

Factors in a forecast include: the base case emissions forecast; the reduction targets in each proposal; whether complementary policies such as aggressive investments in energy efficiency and renewable energy are implemented independent of the emissions allowance market; the policy implementation timeline; program flexibility regarding emissions offsets (perhaps including international offsets) and allowance banking; assumptions about technological progress; the presence or absence of a “safety valve” price; and emissions co-benefits. Figures 6 and 7 show the very significant ranges in emissions and allowance prices for the Waxman-Markey and APA federal cap-and-trade policies, as well as several associated sensitivities, including assumptions on banking, international offsets, technology cost and progress, and gas supply.

Figure 5: GHG Emissions in Waxman-Markey and APA policies and sensitivities





Figure 6: Allowance prices in ACES and APA policies and sensitivities



A. Assessing the Potential Impact of a Natural Gas Supply Increase

The recent shale gas boom has put substantial downward pressure on natural gas prices. Several factors could influence future gas prices, including the estimated ultimate recovery per well as well as concerns about the environmental impacts of hydraulic fracturing.¹⁴ The impact of higher or lower gas prices on carbon prices is uncertain. In the near term, lower natural gas prices are likely to make emissions mitigation in the electric sector less expensive, as gas power plants can at times be a cost-effective replacement for aging coal plants. Conversely, as marginal electricity prices are frequently set by natural gas plants, lower gas prices will contribute to lower electricity prices, potentially increasing electricity consumption and associated emissions. Lower electricity prices also make it more difficult for renewable technologies with even lower emissions than gas to compete in electricity markets.

In 2010, Resources for the Future used a version of the EIA’s National Energy Modeling System (NEMS) energy model to test effects of increased gas supply from shale gas. Under a moderate climate policy, the high gas scenario decreased the 2030 allowance price by less than 1%, from \$61.1 to \$60.8 per short ton CO₂ (\$67.26 to \$66.83 per metric tonne).¹⁵ The EIA showed similar results in its analysis of the American Power Act; increased gas supply decreased the 2030 allowance price by less than 0.1%, from \$49.80 to \$49.78 per short ton CO₂ (\$54.78 to \$54.76 per

¹⁴ EIA (2012) “Projected natural gas prices depend on shale gas resource economics” <http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=7710>

¹⁵ Brown et al (2010). “Abundant Shale Gas Resources: Some Implications for Energy Policy”. Available at: <http://www.rff.org/RFF/Documents/RFF-BCK-Brownetal-ShaleGas.pdf>

metric tonne).¹⁶ In the policies studied by EIA and RFF, the result of an increased gas supply amounted to an inconsequential reduction in CO₂ prices. At this point it appears that, while a large shale gas resource may change how each policy is met, it is not a significant driver in the CO₂ cost that utilities should use for planning. Other studies are ongoing to explore these issues further.¹⁷

7. The US Interagency Social Cost of Carbon

In 2010, the U.S. government began to use “social cost of carbon” values to account for the damages resulting from climate change.¹⁸ Four values for the social cost of carbon were initially provided by the Interagency Working Group on the Social Cost of Carbon, a group composed of members of the Department of Agriculture, Department of Commerce, Department of Energy, Environmental Protection Agency, and Department of Transportation, among others. This group was tasked with the development of a consistent value for the social benefits of climate change abatement. These values, \$4.5, \$19.1, \$31.8, and \$59.1 per short ton CO₂ (\$5, \$21, \$35, and \$65 per metric tonne, in 2007 dollars), accounted for three discount rates and one estimate of the high cost tail-end of the distribution of impacts. As of May 2012, these estimates have been used in at least 20 federal government rulemakings, for policies including fuel economy standards, industrial equipment efficiency, lighting standards, and air quality rules.¹⁹

These values are the result of analysis of the DICE, PAGE, and FUND integrated assessment models. The combination of complex climate and economic systems with these reduced-form integrated assessment models leads to substantial uncertainties. In a 2012 paper, Ackerman and Stanton²⁰ modified assumptions used by the Interagency Working Group related to climate sensitivity, the expected level of damages at low and high greenhouse gas concentrations, and the assumed discount rate, and found values for the social cost of carbon ranging from the Working Group’s level up to more than an order of magnitude greater. Despite limitations in the calculations for the social cost of carbon stemming from the choice of socio-economic scenarios, modeling of the physical climate system, and projecting damages hundreds of years into the future, this multi-agency effort represents an initial attempt at incorporating consistent values for the benefits associated with CO₂ abatement in federal policy.

¹⁶ EIA (2010) “Energy Market and Economic Impacts of the American Power Act of 2010”. Available at: <http://www.eia.gov/oiaf/servicerpt/kgl/index.html>

¹⁷ The Energy Modeling Forum will evaluate carbon constraints under cases of reference and high case supply levels in the EMF 26 study, which began in late 2011 and is ongoing (see http://emf.stanford.edu/research/emf_26/)

¹⁸ Interagency Working Group on the Social Cost of Carbon, U. S. G. (2010). Appendix 15a. Social cost of carbon for regulatory impact analysis under Executive Order 12866. In Final Rule Technical Support Document (TSD): Energy Efficiency Program for Commercial and Industrial Equipment: Small Electric Motors. U.S. Department of Energy. URL <http://go.usa.gov/3fH>.


¹⁹ Robert E. Kopp and Bryan K. Mignone (2012). The U.S. Government’s Social Cost of Carbon Estimates after Their First Two Years: Pathways for Improvement. *Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal*, Vol. 6, 2012-15. <http://dx.doi.org/10.5018/economics-ejournal.ja.2012-15>

²⁰ Frank Ackerman and Elizabeth A. Stanton (2012). Climate Risks and Carbon Prices: Revising the Social Cost of Carbon. *Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal*, Vol. 6, 2012-10. <http://dx.doi.org/10.5018/economics-ejournal.ja.2012-10>

8. CO₂ Price Forecasts in Utility IRPs

A number of electric companies include projections of costs associated with greenhouse gas emissions in their resource planning procedures. Figure 7, below, summarizes the central values of publicly available forecasts used by utilities in resource planning over the past two years.


Figure 7: Utility Mid Case CO₂ Price Forecasts



9. Recommended 2012 CO₂ Price Forecast

Based on analyses of the sources described in Sections 4 through 8, above, and relying on its own expert judgment, Synapse developed Low, Mid, and High case forecasts for CO₂ prices from 2020 to 2040. Figure 8 shows the range covered by the Synapse forecasts in three key years, 2020, 2030, and 2040. These forecasts share the common assumption that a federal cap-and-trade policy will be passed sometime within the next five years, and will go into effect in 2020. All annual allowance prices and levelized values are reported in 2012 dollars per short ton of carbon dioxide.²¹

Figure 8: Synapse 2012 Forecast Values



Each of the forecasts shown in Figure 9 represents a different appetite for reducing carbon, as described below.

- The Low case forecast starts at \$15/ton in 2020, and increases to approximately \$35/ton in 2040, representing a \$23/ton levelized price over the period 2020-2040.²² This forecast represents a scenario in which Congress begins regulation of greenhouse gas emissions slowly—for example, by including a modest emissions cap, a safety valve price, or significant offset flexibility. This price forecast could also be realized through a series of

²¹ All values in the Synapse Forecast are presented in 2012 dollars. Results from EIA and EPA modeling analyses were converted to 2012 dollars using price deflators taken from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis, and available at: <http://www.bea.gov/national/nipaweb/SelectTable.asp> Because data were not available for 2012 in its entirety, values used for conversion were taken from Q2 of each year. Consistent with EIA and EPA modeling analyses, a 5% real discount rate was used in all levelization calculations.

²² Throughout this report, CO₂ allowance prices are presented in \$2012 per short ton CO₂, except in reference to a few original sources, where alternate units are clearly labeled. Results from other modeling analyses were converted to 2012 dollars using price deflators taken from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis. Because data were not available for 2012 in its entirety, values used for conversion were taken from Q2 of each year.


complementary policies, such as an aggressive federal Renewable Portfolio Standard, substantial energy efficiency investment, and/or more stringent automobile CAFE mileage standards (in an economy-wide regulation scenario). Such complementary policies would lead directly to a reduction in CO₂ emissions independent of federal cap-and-trade, and would thus lower the expected allowance prices associated with the achievement of any particular federally mandated goal.

- The Mid case forecast starts at \$20/ton in 2020, and increases to approximately \$65/ton in 2040, representing a \$39/ton levelized price over the period 2020-2040. This forecast represents a scenario in which a federal cap-and-trade program is implemented with significant but reasonably achievable goals, likely in combination with some level of complementary policies to give some flexibility in meeting the reduction goals. These complementary policies would include renewables, energy efficiency, and transportation standards, as well as some level of allowance banking and offsets. Also assumed in the Mid case is some degree of technological learning, i.e. assuming that prices for emissions reductions technologies will decline as greater efficiencies are realized in their design and manufacture and as new technologies become available.
- The High case forecast starts at \$30/ton in 2020, and increases to approximately \$90/ton in 2040, representing a \$59/ton levelized price over the period 2020-2040. This forecast is consistent with the occurrence of one or more factors that have the effect of raising prices. These factors include somewhat more aggressive emissions reduction targets; greater restrictions on the use of offsets; restricted availability or high cost of technology alternatives such as nuclear, biomass and carbon capture and sequestration; more aggressive international actions (thereby resulting in fewer inexpensive international offsets available for purchase by U.S. emitters); or higher baseline emissions.

The following charts compare the Synapse Mid case against various utility estimates. Data on utility estimates was collected from a wide range of available public Integrated Resource Plans (IRP). We have excluded several IRP with zero carbon prices or IRP with no carbon price given, accounting for 9 of 65 collected.

Figure 9, below, shows 26 utility CO₂ price forecasts, with 2030 prices ranging from \$10/tCO₂ to above \$80/tCO₂. Due to the extended development period of many IRP, some of these forecasts may not accurately reflect very recent years; a NM Public Service forecast, for example, begins in 2010, when there was certainly not an economy-wide CO₂ price. Nevertheless, IRP do their best to represent accurate views of the future, in order to develop least-cost plans. The Synapse Mid forecast, beginning at \$20/tCO₂ and rising to \$65/tCO₂, lies solidly in the middle of the other forecasts shown here.

Figure 9: Synapse 2012 Mid forecast as compared to the reference cases of various U.S. utilities (2010-2012)²³



²³ Legend given here is common to all subsequent utility price forecast charts. While scenario names may change, colors are constant for a given utility.

Figure 10: Utility High forecasts compared to utility Mid forecasts




Figure 10, above, overlays the high case forecasts of many IRPs on top of the mid case forecasts (now shaded in grey). Not all IRP that provide mid-level forecasts also provide high forecasts. The high cases generally reflect a nearer-term policy start date, as well as a more rapid rate of increase in prices with time.

Figure 11: Utility High forecasts compared to utility Mid forecasts, with Synapse High case




Figure 11 overlays the Synapse High case forecast on top of what is shown in Figure 10. The Synapse forecast starts later than most, and rises from \$30/tCO₂ to \$90/tCO₂ in 2040.

Figure 12: Utility Low and Mid forecasts




Figure 12, above, overlays the low forecasts of many IRP on top of the Mid case forecasts. The low forecasts both start at substantially lower values (occasionally at zero values), and rise at slower rates.

Figure 13: Synapse Low forecast compared to utility Low forecasts




Figure 13 overlays the Synapse Low case forecast on top of IRP low case forecasts. The Synapse forecast starts later than most and rises from \$15/tCO₂ to \$35/tCO₂ in 2040.

The Synapse 2012 CO₂ price trajectories are shown in Figure 14 and Table 1, below.

Figure 14: Synapse 2012 CO₂ Price Trajectories




Table 1: Synapse 2012 CO₂ Allowance Price Projections (2012 dollars per short ton CO₂)

Year	Low Case	Mid Case	High Case
2020	\$15.00	\$20.00	\$30.00
2021	\$16.00	\$22.25	\$34.00
2022	\$17.00	\$24.50	\$38.00
2023	\$18.00	\$26.75	\$42.00
2024	\$19.00	\$29.00	\$46.00
2025	\$20.00	\$31.25	\$50.00
2026	\$21.00	\$33.50	\$54.00
2027	\$22.00	\$35.75	\$58.00
2028	\$23.00	\$38.00	\$62.00
2029	\$24.00	\$40.25	\$66.00
2030	\$25.00	\$42.50	\$70.00
2031	\$26.00	\$44.75	\$72.00
2032	\$27.00	\$47.00	\$74.00
2033	\$28.00	\$49.25	\$76.00
2034	\$29.00	\$51.50	\$78.00
2035	\$30.00	\$53.75	\$80.00
2036	\$31.00	\$56.00	\$82.00
2037	\$32.00	\$58.25	\$84.00
2038	\$33.00	\$60.50	\$86.00
2039	\$34.00	\$62.75	\$88.00
2040	\$35.00	\$65.00	\$90.00
Levelized	\$23.24	\$38.54	\$59.38

The Synapse projections represent a range of possible future costs. These recommended price trajectories will be useful for testing long-term investment decisions in electric sector resource planning. There will certainly be variability and volatility in prices caused by supply and demand dynamics, as there is with other cost drivers. Nonetheless, these projections represent a useful price range for resource planning and policy analysis in the face of uncertainty.

Figure 15, below, shows Synapse’s Low, Mid, and High forecasts compared to the full range of utility forecasts shown above.

Figure 15: Synapse forecasts compared to the range of utility forecasts





Figure 16, below, compares the levelized costs of Synapse’s Low, Mid, and High cases against the levelized costs of utility estimates for 2020 through 2030, a period after the start and before the end of most forecasts. Levelizing between 2020 and 2030 results in different Synapse values than presented in Table 1, where forecasts were levelized between 2020 and 2040.

Figure 16: Levelized price of CO₂, 2020-2030, utilities and Synapse²⁴



²⁴ All forecasts are levelized with a 5% discount rate based on CO₂ prices between 2020 and 2030. Forecasts with a price for only a single year excluded.

Appendix A: State and Regional GHG Initiatives

The states—individually and coordinating within regions—are leading the nation’s policies to respond to the threat of climate change. In fact, several states, unwilling to postpone and wait for federal action, are pursuing policies specifically because of the lack of federal legislation.

This appendix provides a more thorough discussion of state and regional greenhouse gas (GHG) initiatives. Collectively, these initiatives suggest that momentum is building toward more comprehensive federal GHG action.

Cap and Trade Programs

The Northeast/Mid-Atlantic region and the state of California have developed, or are in the last stages of developing, greenhouse gas caps and allowance trading.²⁵

Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative: The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) is an effort of ten Northeast and Mid-Atlantic states to limit greenhouse gas emissions, and is the first market-based CO₂ emissions reduction program in the United States. Participating states have agreed to a mandatory cap on CO₂ emissions from the power sector with the goal of achieving a ten percent reduction in these emissions from levels at the start of the program by 2018.²⁶ This is the first mandatory carbon trading program in the nation. Recently, allowance prices have been hitting the CO₂ price floor, as actual emissions are far below the budget of 188 mtons/year.

California: In 2006, the California Legislature passed the Global Warming Solutions Act (AB 32), which requires the state to reduce emissions of GHGs to 1990 levels by 2020. The California Air Resources Board (CARB) outlined more than a dozen measures to reduce carbon emissions to target levels in its 2008 *Scoping Plan*. Those measures include a renewable portfolio standard, a low carbon fuel standard, and a cap-and-trade program. Approximately 22.5% of the emissions reductions called for by AB 32 are estimated to occur under the cap-and-trade program. California will have the world’s second largest carbon market, after the European Union’s Emissions Trading System (EU ETS).

The first compliance period for the program will begin on January 1, 2013, and will cover electricity generators, carbon dioxide suppliers, large industrial sources, and petroleum and natural gas facilities emitting at least 25,000 metric tons of CO₂e per year. The second compliance period will run from 2015-2017, and the third compliance period will cover 2018-2020. During these periods, the cap-and-trade program will expand to cover suppliers of natural gas, distillate fuel oil, and liquefied petroleum gas if the combustion of their products would result in 25,000 metric tons of CO₂e or more.²⁷ The initial cap is set at 162.8 million metric tons of CO₂e and decreases by 2% annually through 2015. When additional sources are added, the cap increases to accommodate them, but then increases the percentage reductions in emissions to 3% in 2016, rising to 2.5% in 2020. The state plans to allocate the bulk of allowances for free in 2013, but will gradually auction

²⁵ The Midwest Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord was developed in 2007. Though the agreement has not been formally suspended, the participating states are no longer pursuing it.

²⁶ The ten states are: Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont. Information on the RGGI program, including history, important documents, and auction results is available on the RGGI Inc website at www.rggi.org

²⁷ §95812 (d)(1), page 48

an increasing number of allowances between 2013 and 2020. Banking²⁸ and offsets²⁹ are both allowed under the California program.

The state of California has set a floor price for allowances beginning at \$9.1/short ton in 2013 (\$10/metric tonne), and rising annually by 5% plus the rate of inflation.³⁰ In 2010 the Air Resources Board modeled the CO₂ allowance price trajectory that would enable reduction targets to be met under the following five cases:

1. Scoping Plan: Implements all of the measures contained in CARB's *Scoping Plan*
2. No Offsets: Does not allow offsets in the cap-and-trade program
3. Reduced Transport: Examines less effective implementation of the transportation-sector measures
4. Reduced Electricity/Gas: Examines less successful implementation of the electricity and natural gas measures
5. Combined Measures Reduced: Examines less successful implementation of transportation, electricity, and natural gas measures³¹

These five cases represent different scenarios of regulatory programs which, although different from the cap-and-trade program, can simultaneously help to achieve the goals of cap-and-trade. These regulatory measures are known as complementary policies. Figure 17, below, shows the allowance price trajectories associated with those five cases.


²⁸ §95922 (a), page 151

²⁹ §95973 (a)(2)(C), page 156

³⁰ §95911 (b)(6), page 129

³¹ California Air Resources Board. *Updated Economic Analysis of California's Climate Change Scoping Plan: Staff Report to the Air Resources Board*. March 24, 2010. Page ES-6.

Figure 17: AB 32 Modeled Allowance Price Trajectories³²



As shown in Figure 17, when the policies that are complementary to the cap-and-trade program are less effective, greater CO₂ reductions need to occur under the cap-and-trade program, and the allowance price is much higher. Similarly, the availability of offsets lowers the allowance price in the cap-and-trade program, as compliance with reduction targets can be met with offsets. This allows banking of allowances in the beginning of the program, which can keep allowance prices lower in later years.

California's first allowance auction is scheduled for November 14. A trial auction was completed on August 30, and more than 430 entities that will be regulated under the cap-and-trade program were invited to participate. CARB does not plan to release a settlement price, but on the date of the test auction, futures for December 2013 were trading at \$14.77/short ton (\$16.30/metric ton), and forward contracts had sold for \$14.77 and \$14.82/short ton (\$16.25 and \$16.30/metric ton).

State GHG Reduction Laws

Massachusetts: In 2008, the Massachusetts Global Warming Solutions Act was signed into law. In addition to the commitments to power sector emissions reductions associated with RGGI, this law committed Massachusetts to reduce statewide emissions to 10-25% below 1990 levels by 2020 and 80% below 1990 levels by 2050. Following the development of a comprehensive plan on steps to meet these goals, the 2020 target was set at 25% below 1990 levels.³³ Rather than put a price on carbon in the years before 2020, this plan will achieve a 25% reduction through a

³² Id. Page 40.

³³ Massachusetts Clean Energy and Climate Plan for 2020, Available at: <http://www.mass.gov/green/cleanenergyclimateplan>

combination of federal, regional, and state level regulations applying to buildings, energy supply, transportation, and non-energy emissions.

Minnesota: In 2008, the Next Generation Energy Act was signed to reduce Minnesota emissions by 15% by 2015, 30% by 2025, and 80% by 2050.³⁴ While the law called for the development of an action plan that would make recommendations on a cap-and-trade system to meet these goals, the near-term goals will be met by a combination of an aggressive renewable portfolio standard and energy efficiency.

Connecticut: Also in 2008, the state of Connecticut passed its own Global Warming Solutions Act, establishing state level targets 10% below 1990 levels by 2020 and 80% below 2001 levels by 2050. In December 2010, the state released a report on mitigation options focused on regulatory mechanisms in addition to strengthening RGGI and reductions of non-CO₂ greenhouse gases.³⁵

Renewable Portfolio Standards & Other Initiatives

A renewable portfolio standard (RPS) or renewable goal specifies that a minimum proportion of a utility's resource mix must be derived from renewable resources. These policies require electric utilities and other retail electric providers to supply a specified minimum amount—usually a percentage of total load served—with electricity from eligible resources. The standards range from modest to ambitious, and qualifying energy sources vary by state.

In general the goal of an RPS policy is to increase the development of renewable resources by creating a market demand. Increasing demand makes these technologies more economically competitive with other less expensive, but polluting, forms of electric generation. Many other policy objectives drive the adoption of an RPS or renewable goal, including climate change mitigation, job creation, energy security, and cleaner air.

The impact of an RPS on CO₂ emissions is dependent on factors such as:

- the types of resources that are eligible to meet the standard,
- the target level set by the RPS,
- the base quantity of electricity sales upon which the standard is set,
- how renewable energy credits (RECs) or attributes are tracked or counted,
- how RECs are assigned to different resources,
- banking, trading and borrowing of RECs,
- alternative compliance options, and
- coordination with other state and federal policies.

Currently, 29 US states have renewable portfolio standards. Eight others have renewable portfolio goals.

³⁴ Minnesota Statutes 2008 § 216B.241

³⁵ See <http://www.ctclimatechange.com> for further details on CT plans for emissions mitigation.

In addition, many states are pursuing other policy actions relating to reductions of GHGs. These policies include, but are not limited to: greenhouse gas inventories; greenhouse gas registries; climate action plans, greenhouse gas emissions targets, and emissions performance standards.

In the absence of a clear and comprehensive federal policy, many states have developed a broad array of emissions and energy related policies. For example, Massachusetts has a RPS of 15% in 2020 (rising to 25% in 2030), belongs to RGGI, requiring specific emissions reductions from power plants in the state, and has set in place aggressive energy efficiency targets through the 2008 Green Communities Act.

Hawaii, while not part of a regional climate initiative, has an even more aggressive RPS, seeking to achieve 40% renewable energy by 2030, coupled with an Energy Efficiency Portfolio Standard with the goal of reducing electricity use by 4,300 GWh by 2030. After 2013, 2% of electricity revenues in Hawaii will go towards a Public Benefit Fund, an independent entity tasked with promoting and incentivizing energy efficiency measures across the state.