

BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH

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|--|---|-----------------------------|
| In the Matter of the Application of Rocky Mountain Power For Authority to Increase its Retail Electric Utility Service Rates in Utah and for Approval of its Proposed Electric Service Schedules and Electric Service Regulations. |) | |
| |) | DOCKET NO. 13-035-184 |
| |) | DPU EXHIBIT 4.0 DIR-REV REQ |
| |) | |

PRE-FILED DIRECT TESTIMONY

GEORGE W. EVANS

ON BEHALF OF THE

UTAH DIVISION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES

May 1, 2014

REDACTED

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4

5 **INTRODUCTION**
6

7 **Q. Please state your name, business address, employer, and current position or**
8 **title for the record.**

9 A. My name is George W. Evans, and my business address is 358 Cross Creek Trail,
10 Robbinsville, North Carolina 28771. I am the President of Evans Power
11 Consulting, Inc.

12 **Q. For whom are you providing testimony in this case?**

13 A. I am providing testimony on behalf of the Utah Division of Public Utilities (DPU
14 or Division).

15 **Q. Please describe your education and work experience.**

16 A. I received a Bachelor of Science in Applied Mathematics from the Georgia
17 Institute of Technology in 1974. In 1976, I received a Master of Science in
18 Applied Mathematics, also from the Georgia Institute of Technology. My area of
19 concentration was probability and statistics. In 1980 I joined Energy
20 Management Associates, Inc. (EMA), the company responsible for the
21 development of the premier electric utility modeling tools, PROMOD[®],
22 PROSCREEN[®], PROVIEW[®] and MAINPLAN[®]. While at EMA, I worked with
23 some fifty (50) major electric utilities in the United States and Canada in the

24 application of these modeling tools for generation expansion planning, the
25 development of net power costs, fuel budgeting, the analysis of power purchases
26 and the development of optimal maintenance schedules for generating units.

27 In 1989 I left EMA to join GDS Associates, Inc., a consulting firm located in
28 Marietta, Georgia. At GDS I was a principal and the Manager of System
29 Modeling. In this position I was primarily responsible for performing analyses
30 and presenting expert testimony concerning integrated resource planning, the
31 forecasting of system production costs, developing estimates of the likelihood of
32 service interruptions, developing estimates of replacement power costs and related
33 activities.

34 In August of 1997 I left GDS to join Slater Consulting as a Vice President. In
35 December of 2011, I left Slater Consulting to form Evans Power Consulting, Inc.

36 **Q. Where have you testified before?**

37 **A.** I have provided expert testimony on over 40 previous occasions, before the public
38 utility commissions in Pennsylvania, Georgia, Michigan, Arkansas, South Dakota,
39 Colorado, Illinois, Mississippi, Alabama, Delaware, South Carolina and
40 Oklahoma; and also before the FERC (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission),
41 and in state court and federal court. A complete list of the proceedings that I have
42 testified in is included in DPU Exhibit 4.1.

43 **Q. Have you appeared before the Public Service Commission of Utah (the**
44 **Commission) in the past?**

45 **A.** Yes, I have. I presented expert testimony on behalf of the DPU in the following
46 dockets:

- 47 • Docket No. 09-035-023 – the 2010 general rate case for Rocky
48 Mountain Power Company (the Company),
- 49 • Docket No. 10-135-124 – the Company’s 2011 general rate case,
- 50 • Docket No. 11-135-200 – the Company’s 2012 general rate case, and
- 51 • Docket No. 12-035-092 – the Company’s request for approval of
52 selective catalytic reduction systems at Jim Bridger Units 3 and 4.

53

54 **PURPOSE OF TESTIMONY**

55 **Q. What is the purpose of your testimony in this proceeding?**

56 **A.** The purpose of my testimony is to identify and quantify certain recommended
57 adjustments to the Company’s Net Power Costs (NPC) as proposed in the current
58 Utah rate case. In this rate case PacifiCorp, which does business in Utah as Rocky
59 Mountain Power Company, proposes a rate increase of \$76.3 million, which
60 includes approximately \$5.1 million directly attributed to increased NPC, based
61 upon a test year beginning July 1, 2014 and ending June 30, 2015.

62 **Q. What is the amount that the Company has filed as a Total Company NPC for**
63 **the test year?**

64 **A.** As identified in the direct testimony of Company witness Mr. Gregory N. Duvall
65 (page 2, lines 43-44), the Company originally filed normalized NPC for the test

66 year of approximately \$1.522 billion, with approximately \$641.1 million of these
67 costs allocated to Utah. However, on April 10, 2014, the Company submitted
68 updated NPC of \$1.510 billion, with \$636.1 million allocated to Utah. The
69 Company's update incorporates the impacts of four (4) corrections and eleven
70 (11) separate updates to the originally filed NPC.

71 **Q. How does the Company compute its proposed NPC?**

72 **A.** As in previous rate cases, the Company utilizes its computer model GRID to
73 compute NPC.

74 **Q. What recommendations are you making in this filing?**

75 **A.** I am recommending eleven adjustments to the Company's updated NPC, as listed
76 in Table 1. My adjustments reduce the amount from the Company's filed position
77 (as updated) to \$1.466 billion with \$617.5 million allocated to Utah..

78 **Q. How have you developed your adjustments?**

79 **A.** For the most part, I have used the Company's GRID model and the Company's
80 GRID data, with appropriate modifications. Adjustments 1, 3, 9 and 11 did not
81 require the GRID model.

Table 1
(Millions of Dollars)

| | <u>System</u> | <u>Utah</u> |
|---|-------------------|-----------------|
| Company's Updated Net Power Costs | \$1,510.21 | \$636.14 |
| <u>Proposed Adjustments:</u> | | |
| Wind Integration Costs: | | |
| 1 Shortfall in OATT collections from Non-PacifiCorp Wind Generators | -\$0.25 | -\$0.10 |
| Contracts and Market Sales and Purchases: | | |
| 2 Removal of Market Caps | -\$16.14 | -\$6.80 |
| 3 CAISO Energy Imbalance Market Benefits | -\$10.23 | -\$4.31 |
| 4 Remove Constellation Purchase | -\$1.36 | -\$0.57 |
| 5 DC Intertie | -\$4.62 | -\$1.95 |
| Fossil Generation Issues: | | |
| 6 Heat Rate Deration | -\$6.09 | -\$2.57 |
| 7 Lake Side 2 and Naughton 3 Gas EFOR | \$2.21 | \$0.93 |
| 8 Lake Side 1 EFOR | -\$2.31 | -\$0.97 |
| 9 Startup Energy | -\$2.46 | -\$1.04 |
| Other Possible Adjustments: | | |
| 10 Line Losses | -\$3.02 | -\$1.27 |
| 11 Solar Integration Charges | -\$0.02 | -\$0.01 |
| <u>Total Adjustment</u> | -\$44.28 | -\$18.65 |
| <u>Adjusted Net Power Costs</u> | \$1,465.93 | \$617.49 |

82 **Q. Will you describe each of these recommended adjustments?**

83 A. I will describe each of these proposed adjustments to NPC in the following
84 sections of my testimony. I am also making certain recommendations concerning
85 the Company's update to NPC, and three additional issues, which appear at the
86 end of this testimony.

87 **Q. What are these additional issues?**

88 A. In this case, the Company has modified its methodology for handling station
89 power usage, resulting in an improper and confusing allocation of station power
90 to the Company's generating units. Also, the cost of coal in NPC has risen
91 dramatically in recent years, even as the country is moving away from coal-fired
92 generation. Finally, the avoided costs included in recent Qualifying Facility (QF)
93 contracts are inexplicably higher than in recent history.

94 **WIND INTEGRATION COSTS**

95 **Q. How has the Company included wind integration costs in NPC?**

96 A. The Company relies on its 2012 Wind Study (the Wind Study) as the basis for
97 claimed wind integration costs¹. The Wind Study was filed with the Commission

¹ Lines 496-498 on page 24 of Mr. Duvall's direct testimony.

98 in the 2013 Integrated Resource Plan docket. Intra-hour wind integration costs are
99 reflected in NPC by increasing the reserve requirements in the GRID model and
100 inter-hour integration costs are included in NPC by the inclusion of an inter-hour
101 wind integration cost rate in the NPC spreadsheet.

102 **Q. How have wind integration costs changed over the last few rate cases?**

103 A. In the Company's 2011 general rate case, the Company requested \$6.58 per MWh
104 for wind integration costs. In the 2012 general rate case, the request was for \$3.44
105 per MWh. In this case, the Company is requesting \$2.03 per MWh for wind
106 integration costs.

107 **Q. What issues do you have with the Company's current wind integration costs?**

108 A. The Company has within its territory five wind generators that are not owned by
109 the Company and do not provide wind energy to the Company, but wheel wind
110 energy to other parties, using the PacifiCorp transmission system.

111 **Q. Are wind integration costs for these non-owned wind generators included in
112 NPC?**

113 A. Yes – the intra-hour costs to integrate these non-owned wind generators are
114 included in NPC. Inter-hour integration costs for these generators are not
115 included.

116 **Q. Does the Company charge these wind integration costs to the non-owned**
117 **wind generators?**

118 A. Through Schedules 3 and 3A under PacifiCorp's Open Access Transmission
119 Tariff (OATT), the Company charges the generators for the costs of integrating
120 this non-owned wind generation, and provides a credit to the NPC through
121 wheeling revenues. Unfortunately, the OATT charges fall short of completely
122 covering the wind integration cost included in NPC

123 **Q. What is the shortfall?**

124 A. The OATT revenue credit falls short of the wind integration costs by
125 approximately [REDACTED] on a company-wide basis. This is my adjustment 1
126 shown in Table 1. The Company's ratepayers should not be required to make up
127 this shortfall in the OATT collections.

128 **MARKET CAPS**

129 **Q. Has the Company included market caps that limit interaction with the**
130 **wholesale power markets in GRID?**

131 A. Yes. In previous cases, the Company has included in GRID market caps, or
132 hourly limitations (above and beyond transmission limitations) that restrict the
133 size of transactions with all of the major wholesale markets. In this case, the
134 Company has removed the market caps for the Mid-Columbia and Palo Verde


135 markets, but has left in place market caps for the COB, Four Corners, Mona and
136 Mead markets².

137 **Q. Are these remaining limits appropriate?**

138 A. No. The Company based these limits on a four-year historical average of spot and
139 short-term firm wholesale transactions³. By basing the market caps on average
140 actual transactions, the Company is eliminating all those transactions that were
141 larger than the average transaction. In addition, the market caps appear to limit the
142 level of coal generation in the Company's GRID study to a level that is well
143 below actual recent levels of coal generation, as shown in the following chart.

² See lines 411-417 on page 19 of Mr. Duvall's direct testimony.

³ See lines 375-376 on page 17 and lines 377-379 on page 18 of Mr. Duvall's direct testimony.




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145 **Q. How have you addressed this problem in your NPC adjustments?**

146 A. I removed the Company’s market caps in all of the major markets, except for the
 147 Mona market⁴, allowing GRID to produce additional coal generation for sale into
 148 these markets. Adjustment 2 reflects this change to market caps. The adjustment
 149 reduces system NPC by \$16.14 million and Utah NPC by \$6.8 million. The

⁴ The Mona market is a small market with limited participation.

150 following chart compares historical coal generation to the coal generation
151 produced in the GRID run without market caps.



152

153 **CAISO ENERGY IMBALANCE MARKET**

154 **Q. What is the issue concerning the proposed CAISO Energy Imbalance**
155 **Market?**

156 A. The Company plans to participate in an Energy Imbalance Market (EIM⁵) with
157 the California Independent System operator (CAISO) beginning October 1, 2014.
158 The Company claims that “Participation in the EIM is expected to produce
159 benefits to customers in the form of reduced net power costs, partially offset by
160 costs for initial startup and ongoing operation.”⁶

161 **Q. Has the Company included reductions to NPC arising from participation in**
162 **the CAISO EIM?**

163 A. No, it has not. The Company has not included any impact of its participation in
164 the CAISO IEM in the filed NPC. Adjustment 3 would correct this situation.

165 **Q. How did you develop your NPC impact for participation in the CAISO EIM?**

166 A. In its response to data request DPU 1.22, the Company supplied a range of
167 potential benefits for the first eleven years of operation. I computed the average
168 potential benefits and converted that average value to a value for nine months,
169 given that the test year would include only nine months of operation of the new
170 EIM. Adjustment 3 reflects this reduction to NPC. This adjustment reduces
171 system NPC by \$10.23 million and Utah NPC by \$4.31 million

⁵ Under the EIM, PacifiCorp and the CAISO will jointly optimize the operation of all CAISO and PacifiCorp generating units to reduce generation costs and reduce the cost of providing reserves.

⁶ Lines 633-635 on page 30 of Mr. Duvall’s direct testimony.

172 **CONSTELLATION PURCHASE**173 **Q. What is the issue concerning the Constellation Purchase?**174 A. The Company has added a new power purchase, the Constellation Purchase, as
175 described by Mr. Duvall in lines 252-253 on page 12 of his direct testimony.176 **Q. Why did the Company add this power purchase?**177 A. The Company claims that the purchase will help to “ensure the Company will
178 have sufficient resources to meet peak requirements”⁷.179 **Q. Do you agree that the Constellation Purchase is necessary to ensure that the**
180 **Company will have sufficient resources to meet peak requirements?**181 A. No, I do not. According to Mr. Duvall, the system load for the Company has
182 “remained relatively flat”⁸ compared to the 2012 general rate case (GRC), and
183 Utah jurisdictional load is “lower than in the 2012 GRC”⁹. In addition, the
184 Company added a new long-term sale agreement with Shell¹⁰. Finally, I

⁷ Line 253 on page 12 of Mr. Duvall’s direct testimony.

⁸ Lines 77-80 on page 4 of Mr. Duvall’s direct testimony.

⁹ Lines 77-80 on page 4 of Mr. Duvall’s direct testimony.

¹⁰ See lines 249-251 on page 12 of Mr. Duvall’s testimony.

185 performed a GRID analysis without the Constellation Purchase which shows that,
186 without the Constellation Purchase, NPC are lower and the system is not short of
187 resources.

188 **Q. What is the impact to NPC?**

189 A. Removing the Constellation Purchase reduces the system NPC by \$1.36 million
190 and the Utah NPC by \$0.57 million, as shown in Adjustment 4.

191 **DC INTERTIE**

192 **Q. What is the issue concerning the DC Intertie?**

193 A. The cost included in NPC to utilize the DC Intertie is [REDACTED] million. Based on a
194 GRID analysis I performed, the benefit to PacifiCorp ratepayers of the
195 transactions that utilize the DC Intertie is only [REDACTED] million.

196 **Q. How did you arrive at the dollar amount for the benefits of the transactions
197 using the DC Intertie?**

198 A. I performed a GRID analysis without the DC Intertie. The NPC in this GRID
199 analysis were [REDACTED] million higher than the Company's updated NPC request.

200 **Q. Are you recommending an adjustment to NPC?**

201 A. Yes, I am. Adjustment 5 reduces NPC by the net of the cost to utilize the DC
202 Intertie and the benefits provided by the transactions that utilize the DC intertie.

203 With this adjustment, system NPC is reduced by \$4.62 million and Utah NPC is
204 reduced by \$1.95 million.

205 **HEAT RATE DERATION**

206 **Q. Please describe the heat rate deration issue.**

207 A. To account for unplanned outages on generating units, the GRID model reduces
208 the maximum capability of generating units to reflect the unplanned outage rate.
209 For example, if a 100 megawatt generating unit has an unplanned outage rate of
210 10% (is unavailable 10% of the time due to unplanned outages), GRID sees the
211 unit as a 90 megawatt generating unit. This methodology assures that the unit will
212 produce the correct amount of energy in GRID, but has the additional impact of
213 improperly increasing the generating unit's heat rate.

214 **Q. Why does this method increase the heat rate?**

215 A. Generating units are most efficient (or have lowest heat rate) at maximum
216 capability. In GRID, the deration of the unit to 90 megawatts causes GRID to
217 utilize a less efficient heat rate, namely the heat rate at 90 megawatts rather than
218 the heat rate at 100 megawatts. This is the problem that should be addressed.

219 **Q. Why is this a problem?**

220 A. If the unplanned outages are full unit outages (in which the generating unit is
221 completely unavailable), the reality is that the unit would operate 90% of the time
222 at full capability (100 megawatts) and would not operate at all 10% of the time.

223 So the heat rate would be the most efficient heat rate that is achieved at 100
224 megawatts, rather than the less efficient heat rate at 90 megawatts. So GRID will
225 improperly apply higher (less efficient) heat rates, causing the unit to be modeled
226 as using more fuel than actually required.

227 **Q. Do other problems arise from the capacity deration?**

228 A. Yes. It has been argued in previous RMP general rate cases that the minimum
229 operating capacity of the generating unit should also be derated by the same
230 percentage. However, this issue presents problems, such as allowing the unit to
231 operate at lower levels than are physically possible. In any case, the dollar impact
232 of the corresponding deration of the minimum capacity is very small.

233 **Q. Was this issue addressed in previous rate cases?**

234 A. Yes, it was. In the 2009 general rate case, the Commission directed the Company,
235 DPU, the Office of Consumer Services (OCS) and other interested parties to
236 review alternatives to this issue, review actual operations in comparison to
237 modeling predictions, and work to understand the extent of the issue¹¹.

238 **Q. Did such meetings occur?**

239 A. Yes. The DPU organized a phone conference including the Company and OCS'
240 witness Randy Falkenburg. It was agreed that the Company and OCS would

¹¹ See page 57 of the Commission's order in Docket No. 09-035-23.


241 submit proposals for review by all the parties. However, only OCS provided a
242 proposal – the Company did not.

243 **Q. What do you recommend?**

244 A. I recommend the heat rate curves in GRID be modified so that the generating unit
245 heat rates at the maximum derated capability are the heat rates at the original
246 maximum capability. Adjustment 6 accomplishes this result.

247 **Q. Does this adjustment improve the accuracy of the resulting NPC?**

248 A. Yes, it does. Comparing the actual average heat rates for coal units and natural
249 gas combined cycle units to the GRID average heat rates in the Company's NPC
250 and my modified GRID result in the following chart, the Company's GRID heat
251 rates are higher than actual, and the heat rates resulting from the application of the
252 heat rate deration are more in-line with actual heat rates.



253

254 **Q. What do you recommend?**

255 A. I recommend that the Commission require that generating unit heat rates be
 256 corrected to properly account for capacity derations, which would result in
 257 Adjustment 6. This adjustment would reduce system NPC by \$6.09 million and
 258 Utah NPC by \$2.57 million.

259 **LAKE SIDE 2 AND NAUGHTON 3 GAS EFOR**

260 **Q. What issue have you identified concerning the Lake Side 2 and Naughton 3**
 261 **gas unit EFOR?**

262 A. The Lake Side 2 natural gas unit is a newly constructed combined cycle
263 generating unit that is expected to be in commercial operation by June 2014¹².
264 The existing Naughton 3 coal unit is to be removed from service and returned to
265 service as a gas-fired unit by June 2015¹³. Thus each of these units has no
266 operating history.

267 **Q. What is the EFOR and how is it normally developed?**

268 A. An equivalent forced outage rate (EFOR) is developed for each generating unit
269 modeled within GRID. The EFOR is an indication of the rate at which the
270 generating unit experiences forced (or unplanned) outages. Normally the EFOR is
271 developed from the actual forced outages that occurred in the most recent 48
272 month period – in this case the 48 months ending in June 2013. Of course, with
273 newly constructed generating units, no such history exists.

274 **Q. How did the Company select an EFOR for Lake Side 2 and the Naughton 3**
275 **gas unit?**

¹² See lines 175-176 on page 9 of Mr. Duvall's direct testimony.

¹³ See lines 179-181 on page 9 of Mr. Duvall's direct testimony.

276 A. The Company assigned an EFOR of ██████ to both of these new units, based on
277 the assumptions used in the Company's 2011 Integrated Resource Plan¹⁴ (IRP).

278 **Q. Is this a reasonable EFOR for these units?**

279 A. No, it is not. The average EFOR for the Company's existing combined cycle gas-
280 fired units (that is, those units most similar to Lake Side 2) is ██████ Also,
281 according to the national data supplied by the NERC Generating Availability Data
282 System (GADS), the actual average EFORs experienced by generating units
283 similar to Lake Side 2 for the years 2007 through 2011 was 6.5%, and for units
284 similar to the Naughton 3 unit on gas was 8.56%.

285 **Q. What do you recommend?**

286 A. Since there is no PacifiCorp operating history to rely upon for these two units, and
287 the units are not of the same design as existing PacifiCorp units, the Company
288 should utilize the GADS EFOR data for these two new generating units, namely
289 6.5% for Lake Side 1 and 8.56% for Naughton 3 on natural gas. I have computed
290 the impact to NPC by performing a GRID analysis using these revised EFORs,
291 resulting in Adjustment 7. This adjustment will increase system NPC by \$2.21
292 million and Utah NPC by \$0.93 million.

¹⁴ See Table 6.1 of the PacifiCorp 2011 IRP.

293 **LAKE SIDE 1 EFOR**

294 **Q. What is your concern regarding the Lake Side 1 EFOR?**

295 A. The Lake Side 1 EFOR, based on the most recent 48 months of actual outages, is
296 excessively high – [REDACTED]

297 **Q. Why is the EFOR for Lake Side 1 so high?**

298 A. Lake Side 1 experienced a highly unusual and very long outage on [REDACTED]
299 [REDACTED] involving the complete failure of a major component of the unit - the steam
300 generator. The work performed to return the unit to service included the removal
301 of the generator rotor, the shipment of the rotor to Charlotte for the rotor rewind
302 and shipment back to Lake Side, replacement of the stator, and re-installation of
303 the rotor. Such outages are very rare, and it is highly unlikely that an outage such
304 as this will occur again at Lake Side 1. I recommend that the outage be removed
305 from the computation of the forward looking EFOR utilized in GRID.

306 **Q. How would the Lake Side 1 EFOR change?**

307 A. Without this one unusual outage, the Lake Side 1 EFOR would be [REDACTED] This is
308 a reasonable EFOR that compares well with the GADS national average of 6.5%.

309 **Q. What would be the impact on NPC?**

310 A. I developed the impact to NPC by utilizing the GRID model with the revised Lake
311 Side 1 EFOR, resulting in Adjustment 8. This adjustment reduces system NPC by
312 \$2.31 million and Utah NPC by \$0.97 million.

313 **STARTUP ENERGY**

314 **Q. Please describe the issue with startup energy.**

315 A. Whenever a generating unit returns to operation after a period of inactivity, there
316 is a period of time in which the unit is producing energy but has not yet reached
317 its normal minimum operating level. The GRID simulation, like most such
318 computer models, does not simulate this start-up period.

319 **Q. Does the Company include the cost of the energy produced during the start-**
320 **up period in NPC?**

321 A. Yes, the Company included the cost of start-up energy for the start-ups that
322 occurred on combined cycle generating units. However, the Company failed to
323 include a credit for the corresponding energy produced during the start-up period.
324 So ratepayers are paying for energy without receiving the benefit of that energy.

325 **Q. How would you correct this situation?**

326 A. Adjustment 9 in Table 1 would provide an appropriate credit in NPC for the
327 energy produced during the start-up period of the Company's combined cycle
328 units. On a system basis, the reduction to NPC is \$2.46 million. For Utah, the
329 NPC reduction is \$1.04 million.

330 **LINE LOSSES**

331 **Q. Please describe the issue concerning line losses.**

332 A. In the previous GRC, the Company included within the GRID topology a new
333 high-voltage transmission line – the Populus to Terminal line¹⁵. The addition of
334 new high-voltage transmission lines will normally result in a reduction to the line
335 losses that are experienced. As shown in the Company responses to data requests
336 in Exhibit DPU 4.2, the Company claimed that this new transmission line would
337 result in reduced line losses, but did not produce any study concerning the
338 claimed reduction in line losses.

339 **Q. When was the new transmission line placed in service?**


340 A. According to the Company, the new line was placed in service on November 19th,
341 2010.

342 **Q. Then will the reduced losses from the line be reflected in the line losses used**
343 **in this case?**

344 A. Since the line loss rate used in this case is the average of the five years 2008
345 through 2012, the full impact of the new line will only be included in the two of
346 the five years. This means that the Company's NPC does not properly reflect the
347 loss reductions arising from the new line, even though that new line is assumed to

¹⁵ Lines 351-353 on page 18 of Mr. Duvall's direct testimony in Docket No. 11-035-200.

348 be in service throughout the test year. The following chart compares the annual
349 losses for 2008 through 2012, the line loss rate used by the Company in GRID,
350 the 2013 losses and the average of the most recent three years.



351

352 **Q. What do you recommend to correct this situation?**

353 A. The impact of the reduction in line losses from the new line is fully reflected in
354 the 2011 through 2013 calendar year losses. I recommend that the Commission
355 utilize for NPC computations the average line losses for the three calendar years
356 2011, 2012 and 2013. This is Adjustment 10 in Table 1, which reduces system
357 NPC by \$3.02 million and Utah NPC by \$1.27 million.

358 **SOLAR INTEGRATION CHARGES**

359 **Q. What is your concern regarding solar integration charges?**

360 A. For the first time, the Company is including the cost of integrating solar
361 generation in NPC, in a manner similar to wind integration costs. The DPU has
362 received information that the solar generators believe they are being charged for
363 the integration of the energy that they produce. This would amount to the
364 Company charging twice for the integration of this power.

365 **Q. What do you recommend?**

366 A. I recommend that, if indeed the Company is recovering the solar integration
367 charge from the generators, the Company remove the solar integration charge that
368 is included in NPC, which is my Adjustment 11. This adjustment reduces the
369 system NPC by \$0.02 million and the Utah NPC by \$0.01 million.

370 **STATION POWER**

371 **Q. What is your issue concerning station power?**

372 A. Station power is the power used by a generating plant when the plant is off-line,
373 that is, not producing electricity. When a generating plant is off for planned
374 maintenance or a forced outage, the plant consumes power from other generators
375 for lighting, heating and other services. My concern is that the Company, in this

376 rate case, has modified the way that station power is accounted for in the
377 development of NPC, causing erroneous heat rates and generation levels.

378 **Q. Is there a significant impact to NPC?**

379 A. No, there is not a significant impact on NPC related to this issue. However, in the
380 NPC spreadsheet, the station power change results in [REDACTED] generation levels
381 for Chehalis and Gadsby, and erroneous heat rates (or burn rates) for Gadsby and
382 the Gadsby combustion turbines (CTs). For example, the burn rate for the Gadsby
383 CTs is given as over [REDACTED] MMBtu/MWh in the NPC spreadsheet, even though in
384 actual practice, the burn rate for these units averages under 13 MMBtu/MWh.

385 **Q. What change has the Company made regarding station power?**

386 A. In the past, the Company did not assign the consumed station power to any
387 particular generating plants, but instead made a single line adjustment in the NPC
388 spreadsheet to account for the power. In this rate case, the Company now assigns
389 consumed station power to the generating plant that consumed the station power.
390 For example, if the Gadsby CTs used 100 MWh of station power in the test year,
391 the NPC spreadsheet now assigns that 100 MWh to the Gadsby CTs, as if the
392 Gadsby CTs had generated the power.

393 **Q. Did the Gadsby CTs in fact generate the power?**

394 A. No, they did not. This is power that the Gadsby CTs consumed when off-line, so
395 the power was necessarily generated by other power plants.


396 **Q. What do you recommend?**

397 A. I recommend that the Company return to the previous methodology for station
398 power, in which station power is not assigned to any particular power plant.

399 **COAL COSTS**

400 **Q. What is your issue concerning coal costs?**

401 A. The Company's coal costs have risen dramatically in recent years, driven
402 primarily by increases built into long-term coal contracts. The following chart
403 compares actual average coal generation costs (in \$/MWh) for the most recent
404 five years to the forecasted costs in the test year.



405

406 The forecasted test year coal costs are [REDACTED] higher than the coal costs in the July
 407 2008 – June 2009 period, for an average annual increase of over [REDACTED]

408 **Q. Are you claiming that the Company has not properly managed its coal**
 409 **contracts?**

410 A. No, I am not. The problem is that the Company purchases coal primarily through
 411 long-term contracts with built-in escalators and other provisions that allow the
 412 coal providers to increase charged costs. Although long-term coal contracts have
 413 served the Company well in the past, in today’s market, the Company should do

414 everything in its power to move away from long-term contracts and purchase
415 more coal in the spot market.

416 **Q. How has the coal market changed?**

417 A. Utilities around the country are retiring older coal plants and making few plans, if
418 any, to construct new coal plants. As a result, there is excess supply and the coal
419 market is more of a buyers' market than ever before.

420 **Q. What do you recommend?**


421 A. I recommend that the Company, to the extent practical, move away from long-
422 term coal contracts and instead purchase coal on a short-term basis in the spot
423 market.

424 **QF CONTRACTS**

425 **Q. Do you have concerns with the cost of the QF contracts included in the NPC**
426 **calculation?**

427 A. Yes. I have compared the cost and energy purchased from the various QF
428 contracts with historical information. The forecast cost for QF contracts in the
429 test period indicates a [REDACTED] increase in cost but a lower volume (MWh)
430 purchased compared to the actual values for the 12 months ending June 2013.
431 The long-term historical information indicates that QF purchases have remained

432 fairly consistent and have averaged approximately [REDACTED] per MWh from 2009
 433 through 2013 and [REDACTED] from July to December (the first 6 months of the year
 434 ending June 2014). The calculated cost per MWh in the forecast test period is
 435 [REDACTED]. The following chart compares the actual average annual costs of QF
 436 purchases to the forecasted costs in the Company’s NPC, as updated.



437

438 **Q. Have you been able to determine which of the contracts account for the**
 439 **increase in the QF contracts?**

440 **A.** Yes. It appears that the majority of the increase is related to changes in the cost
 441 for the small QF contracts in California, Idaho, Oregon, Utah, Washington and

442 Wyoming. The six line items in the NPC study represent [REDACTED] of the total QF
443 purchase volume and [REDACTED] of the cost. However, the Company does not provide
444 detail in the filing requirements to explain the reasons behind the increase in the
445 cost. While the location and timing of the purchases could impact the cost of the
446 individual contracts, there are significant differences among the various QF
447 contracts. The California small QF contracts have an average cost of [REDACTED] per
448 MWh, while the Washington contracts have an average cost of [REDACTED] per MWh.
449 It is difficult to see how this much variation can all be calculated to be the avoided
450 cost at the time of contract execution.

451 **Q. Has the Company explained how the increase is representative of the**
452 **calculated “avoided cost”?**

453 A. In response to DPU data request 43.9, the Company explained;

454 The qualified facility (QF) contracts in the Company’s net power
455 cost (NPC) forecast are priced in accordance with their contract
456 terms. The prices in these contracts represent the Company’s
457 avoided cost at the time they are entered, and do not necessarily
458 reflect the Company’s current avoided cost.

459 Since these contracts are included in the current forecast for NPC, it would appear
460 that the increase in the price per MWh is due to recent contracts and should be the
461 Company’s recent avoided cost. While the Company has not provided the
462 calculations for avoided cost applicable to the individual small QF contracts, the

463 results appear to have a wide variation when compared to the other individual
464 contracts that have been included in the filing.

465 **Q. Do you have a specific adjustment amount for NPC related to the cost of the**
466 **QF contracts?**

467 A. Not at this time. The division may have an adjustment in the future following the
468 response to additional discovery items.

469 **COMPANY UPDATE TO NPC**

470 **Q. What concerns do you have with the Company's April 10 update to NPC?**

471 A. The Company's update is extremely complex and essentially requires that the
472 participating parties start over with their analysis of NPC. One of the updates –
473 the revised forward price curves – impacts nearly every aspect of NPC. However,
474 the filing date of the update in this case makes it very difficult, if not impossible,
475 to receive Company responses to any data requests prior to the deadline for filing
476 direct testimony.

477 **Q. What problems result from the NPC update?**

478 A. The DPU and other parties may be placed in the position of having to defer
479 testimony concerning the NPC update until rebuttal, and are therefore deprived of
480 one round of testimony.

481 **Q. What do you recommend?**

482 A. I recommend in the future that the Commission require the Company to file any
483 NPC updates at least six weeks prior to the deadline for participants to file direct
484 testimony, to allow parties the opportunity to process the updated NPC, file data
485 requests, and to receive Company responses to data requests in a timely manner.

486 **Q. Does this complete your testimony?**

487 A. Yes it does.