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BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH

<p>In the Matter of the Application of Rocky Mountain Power for Authority to Increase its Retail Electric Service Rates in Utah and for Approval of its Proposed Electric Service Schedules and Electric Service Regulations</p>	<p>Docket No. 13-035-184 UCE Exhibit 2.0 (DT) [COS + RD]</p>
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DIRECT TESTIMONY OF SARAH WRIGHT

ON BEHALF OF

UTAH CLEAN ENERGY

[COST OF SERVICE AND RATE DESIGN]

May 22, 2014

1 **INTRODUCTION**

2 **Q: Please state your name and business address.**

3 A: My name is Sarah Wright. My business address is 1014 2nd Ave, Salt Lake City,
4 Utah 84103.

5 **Q: By whom are you employed and in what capacity?**

6 A: I am the Executive Director of Utah Clean Energy, a non-profit public interest
7 organization whose mission is to lead and accelerate the clean energy transformation with
8 vision and expertise. We work to stop energy waste, create clean energy, and build a
9 smart energy future.

10 **Q: On whose behalf are you testifying?**

11 A: I am testifying on behalf of Utah Clean Energy (UCE).

12 **Q: Did you file testimony in the revenue requirement phase of this rate case?**

13 A: Yes.

14 **Q: Please review your professional experience and qualifications.**

15 A: I am the founder and director of Utah Clean Energy. Through my work with Utah
16 Clean Energy over the last 11 years, I have been involved in a number of regulatory
17 dockets, including Integrated Resource Planning, rate cases, tariff filings, and other
18 dockets relating to energy efficiency, renewable energy, and net metering. I serve on
19 Rocky Mountain Power's DSM Steering Committee and both Rocky Mountain Power's
20 and Questar Gas Company's DSM Advisory Committees.

21 I have over 13 years of energy policy experience working on state, local, and
22 national energy policy, providing expertise and policy support for renewable energy and
23 energy efficiency. I have served on numerous energy policy working groups and

24 taskforces, including the Energy Efficiency and Energy Development Committees
25 supporting Governor Herbert's Energy Task Force and Ten Year Energy Plan; the
26 Governor's Utah Renewable Energy Zone Task Force; Governor Huntsman's Energy
27 Advisory Council and Blue Ribbon Climate Change Advisory Council; Utah's
28 Legislative Energy Policy Workgroup, and Salt Lake City's Climate Action Task Force.
29 I also served on the State of Utah, Division of Air Quality PM2.5 State Implementation
30 Plan workgroup.

31 Currently, I serve on two committees for Governor Herbert's Your Utah Your
32 Future Project (the Utah Clean Air Action Team and the Energy and Emergency
33 Preparedness committee). Additionally, I serve on Mayor Becker's local Climate
34 Committee that supports his membership on the **White House Task Force on Climate
35 Preparedness and Resilience**. I serve on the Board of Directors for Interwest Energy
36 Alliance and the Interstate Renewable Energy Council Regulatory Advisory Board for
37 the US Department of Energy Sunshot Initiative.

38 For 15 years prior to founding Utah Clean Energy, I was an occupational health
39 and environmental consultant, working on occupational health and ambient air quality
40 issues for a wide variety of commercial, industrial, and governmental clients across the
41 west. I have a BS in Geology from Bradley University in Peoria, Illinois and a Master of
42 Science in Public Health from the University of Utah in Salt Lake City.

43

44 **OVERVIEW AND CONCLUSIONS**

45 **Q: What is Utah Clean Energy’s interest in this phase of the rate case?**

46 A: Utah Clean Energy prioritizes a more efficient, cleaner, and smarter energy future.
47 We envision and enable increased utilization of energy efficiency, distributed generation
48 and utility-scale renewable energy. Our long-range vision of the smart energy future
49 includes a more modern, agile, diversified and secure energy system that can readily take
50 advantage of new capabilities for saving energy and expand the use of electric vehicles,
51 distributed generation, demand response, energy storage and use of information and
52 control technologies.

53 Rate design decisions have a direct influence on consumers’ utilization and
54 adoption of energy efficiency and distributed generation technologies. In order to
55 facilitate a smooth, cost conscious and orderly transition to a smarter energy future, and
56 given the impact today’s decisions have over the long-term, it is important that this
57 Commission approve rate designs that send appropriate price signals to ratepayers and
58 maintain and effect clean energy in Utah.

59 **Q: What is the purpose of your testimony?**

60 A: The purpose of my testimony is to support residential rate design that promotes
61 smart, efficient and distributed energy use in the interests of mitigating costs and risks for
62 ratepayers. I also acknowledge and address the Company’s concerns over fixed cost
63 recovery and net energy metering (NEM). Utah Clean Energy witness Rick Gilliam will
64 respond to the Company’s proposed NEM fee.

65 Throughout direct testimony, Company witnesses reference the concept of an
66 “energy services” utility. RMP President Rich Walje explains that the Company’s role is

67 changing from a producer and seller of electricity to a “facilitator of energy services from
68 customers and third parties.”¹ I will address this transition and recommend that the
69 Company develop a plan for this transition, rather than a piecemeal approach that targets
70 specific customer groups for making personal investments that utilize competitive
71 demand-side opportunities (in this case net metering customers).

72 **Q: Please provide a brief outline of your testimony.**

73 A: I address the following issues in order: residential rate design principles, the
74 monthly customer charge, net energy metering issues (including costs and benefits) and
75 the residential minimum bill.

76 **Q: Please summarize your conclusions and recommendations.**

77 A: I make the following conclusions and recommendations:

- 78 • UCE continues to support the Commission-approved methodology for
79 calculating the monthly customer charge.
- 80 • No net metering charge should be implemented without consideration of a
81 full cost/benefit analysis across all customer classes.
- 82 • The minimum bill should be eliminated as it is not cost-justified and
83 prevents NEM customers from receiving fair value for the benefits they
84 provide.
- 85 • The Commission should work with stakeholders to conduct a full analysis
86 of the costs *and benefits* of net metering and other valuable customer
87 demand side choices to ensure that any new rate designs fairly value utility
88 services and value and compensate customer choices that benefit all
89 ratepayers.

90

¹ Direct Testimony of A. Richard Walje at lines 26-28.

91 **RESIDENTIAL RATE DESIGN**

92 *Introduction*

93 **Q: What is Utah Clean Energy’s general position with regard to residential rate**
94 **design?**

95 A: Utah Clean Energy views residential rate design as an important component of
96 smart energy policy. Residential rate design affects the information, including price
97 signals consumers receive from their energy bills and can influence customer choices and
98 energy consumption. Residential rate design implicates many issues (directly or
99 indirectly): cost causation, cost recovery, customer contribution to peak, price signals for
100 consumers, etc. As the utility and customers transition to more efficient, cleaner and
101 distributed energy system (and as the utility transitions to an “energy services” utility), it
102 is important to be clear and accurate in designing residential rates in order to send
103 appropriate price signals while also facilitating appropriate cost recovery for the utility.

104 **Q: What principles of rate design support Utah Clean Energy’s rate design position?**

105 A: Residential rate design is an exercise in balancing policies and objectives while
106 recovering the Company’s residential revenue requirement. The Commission has
107 recognized numerous policy objectives in establishing residential rate designs, including
108 intra-class equity, cost-based rates, revenue stability, gradualism, rate stability,
109 appropriate energy price signals, and incentives for energy conservation. In developing
110 Utah Clean Energy’s position on residential rates, I tried to account for and balance these
111 rate design objectives.

112 *Customer charge*

113 **Q: What is Utah Clean Energy’s position with regard to the residential monthly**
114 **customer charge?**

115 A: The customer charge is the proper mechanism for requiring that each customer
116 pay for the costs they impose upon the system regardless of energy usage.² I recommend
117 a customer charge based on costs caused by each customer each month regardless of
118 energy consumption. Utah Clean Energy supports the customer charge method
119 established by the Commission in Docket No. 82-057-15, implemented for Rocky
120 Mountain Power in Docket No. 84-035-01 and reaffirmed in Docket Nos. 90-035-06, 97-
121 035-01, 06-035-21, and 09-035-23.

122 In Docket 82-057-15 (a natural gas case) the Commission found that “a customer
123 charge does require each customer to pay those costs that he imposes upon the system
124 regardless of whether or not he uses any gas” and concluded that “expenses that should
125 be included in the customer charge calculation are those expenses which are caused by
126 every customer each month. Costs that generally increase with the number of customers,
127 but are not caused by each customer should be excluded from the customer charge and
128 instead be included within the commodity portion of Mountain Fuel’s rates.”³ I agree
129 with the clear intention of this language that the customer charge is not the proper

² Docket No. 82-057-15, In the Matter of the Application of Mountain Fuel Supply Company for a General Increase in Rates and Charges Incident to Natural Gas Service Rendered, *Report and Order on Rate Design and Cost Allocation* (Issued July 1, 1985) (hereinafter *08-057-15 Order*), page 27. See also Docket No. 84-035-01, In the Matter of the Application of Utah Power and Light Company for Approval of its Proposed Electric Rate Schedule and Electric Service Regulations, *Report and Order on Rate Design and Spread Issues*, pages 11-12 (“The Commission has previously made the finding that a customer charge results in the payment by each customer of those costs that he imposes upon the system, which are independent of actual energy consumption during a given month” (citation omitted)).

³ *82-057-15 Order*, page 27.

130 mechanism for recovering costs that are not caused by customers each month and costs
131 that vary with usage.

132 This is appropriate because different levels of consumption contribute different
133 demands on Rocky Mountain Power's system: higher consumption and load drive more
134 costs relative to lower consumption and load. For example, distribution system
135 investments are sized according to demand, so it is consistent with cost causation to
136 collect revenues associated with distribution system investments volumetrically from
137 customers—either through volumetric energy rates alone or through energy and demand
138 charges together.

139 In Docket No. 09-035-23, the Commission found that recovering costs for local
140 distribution facilities in the customer charge, that is, equally from all customers
141 regardless of usage, was not equitable because it ignored differences in peak use.⁴
142 Additionally, setting the customer charge consistent with the Commission-approved
143 method allows energy rates to be set with consideration of long run marginal costs—that
144 is, in a way that captures the longer-term cost impacts of energy use.⁵

⁴ Docket No. 09-035-23, In the Matter of the Application of Rocky Mountain Power for Authority to Increase its Retail Electric Utility Service Rates in Utah and for Approval of its Proposed Electric Service Schedules and Electric Service Regulations, *Report and Order on Rate Design* (Issued June 2, 2010), page 30.

⁵ Another reason for setting energy rates consistent with long run marginal costs is the following:

If retail prices are lower than long-run marginal costs, NEM [net energy metering] will give the seller less compensation than the value of his or her product. In this situation, simply avoiding a (low) retail rate provides the NEM customer with less compensation than the NEM resource brings to the grid, and will lead to less than the optimal amount of NEM resources being developed. If the NEM supplier is providing power to the grid at less than long-run marginal costs, then the “have-not” customers are receiving the benefit of that power at a price lower than the utility would otherwise incur to acquire that power. One solution to this is for the utility regulator to raise end-block energy rates, and to reduce grid access fixed charges and initial block rates, in order to align tailblock rates with long-run marginal costs. If this is done, the NEM customer will receive fair compensation through avoidance of the tailblock retail rate.

Carl Linvill, John Shenot and Jim Lazar, *Designing Distributed Generation Tariffs Well—Fair Compensation in a Time of Transition* (Regulatory Assistance Project, November 2013), page 35.

145 **Q: What is the Company’s proposal for the residential monthly customer charge?**

146 A: As described in the testimony of Company witness Steward, the Company has
147 proposed raising the customer charge from \$5.00 to 8.00 per month and collecting the
148 balance of the rate increase through proportional increases to the volumetric energy
149 charges. It is the Company’s position that distribution and retail costs (as classified in the
150 Company’s cost of service study) are “fixed” costs that should be included in the monthly
151 customer charge. Based on my review of Witness Steward’s testimony, it appears that the
152 Company is defining “fixed costs” as any demand-related embedded costs. These “fixed
153 costs” (embedded costs) are not customer-related costs caused by *each customer each*
154 *month* regardless of usage or demand.

155 The Company argues that the cost of service study supports a customer charge of
156 \$25.00, and possibly that a customer charge of \$56.00 would be appropriate in order to
157 recover the “fixed costs” associated with generation and transmission.⁶ The company
158 argues that an increase of \$3.00 in the customer charge is a “reasonable and balanced
159 step.”⁷ Further, the Company argues that it is inappropriate to recover “fixed costs”
160 (embedded costs) through the variable energy components of rates because the utility
161 then has an incentive to sell more kWh.

162 **Q: What is your response to the Company’s proposal?**

163 A: The Company is in a tricky position. While PacifiCorp’s IRP indicates that more
164 energy efficiency than the Company plans to acquire will reduce costs (and risks) for

⁶ Direct Testimony of Joelle R. Steward, lines 278-82.

⁷ Direct Testimony of Joelle R. Steward, lines 289-90.

165 ratepayers,⁸ the Company has an incentive to sell *more* electricity to maintain profitable
166 revenues. To address this, the Company has proposed to recover more of its embedded
167 costs through the monthly customer charge. The Company’s proposal to raise the
168 customer charge as “a step” is concerning, because it is unclear what the Company’s
169 ultimate goal is: a \$25.00 customer charge, a \$56.00 customer charge or something else.

170 What is clear is that the Company is abandoning the Commission-approved
171 customer charge methodology in favor of revenue stability and “fixed”/embedded cost
172 recovery. However, abandoning the Commission-approved customer charge method,
173 while addressing revenue stability, is inconsistent with cost-causation, promoting
174 efficiency and conservation, minimizing customer impacts (and treating customers
175 equitably and fairly) and mitigating long-term costs and risks.

176 **Q: Why is abandoning the Commission-approved customer charge method inconsistent**
177 **with cost-causation?**

178 A: The need for distribution (and generation and transmission) investments *does* vary
179 with usage, so, while the Company’s distribution investment costs may be embedded in
180 the cost of service study and allocated as demand-related, distribution (and generation
181 and transmission) costs *do* vary in the long run according to consumption and demand
182 and are not “fixed” such that they are appropriate to include in a monthly customer
183 charge. The Company’s proposal to include distribution (and apparently transmission and
184 generation) costs in the customer charge is a fundamental policy shift away from the long

⁸ Based on IRP modeling results, PacifiCorp committed, in its Action Plan, to accelerate its acquisition of demand-side management resources in the best interest of ratepayers. See PacifiCorp, *2013 IRP, Volume 1*, page 222 and 248-49.

185 approved method that a customer charge is based on customer-specific, monthly costs
186 rather than embedded costs that are affected by energy consumption and demand.

187 The Company’s arguments for “fixed cost” recovery depend on an inaccurate
188 assumption that all residential customers contribute to system costs to the same degree.
189 This is absolutely not the case. For example, picture two neighborhoods—one with new,
190 very efficient homes or apartments and one with inefficient, leaky homes (possibly with
191 oversized or multiple air conditioners, if you want to make the example more
192 pronounced). The distribution system investments (as well as transmission and generation
193 investments) the Company must make to serve these two neighborhoods will vary by size
194 and cost. The Company may invest less capital to serve the lower needs of the efficient
195 neighborhood. Distribution and other capital investments, on a per customer basis, for the
196 efficient neighborhood will be less expensive than investments in the overly-air
197 conditioned, high use neighborhood.

198 Customer usage and demand impact utility system costs. Therefore, recovering all
199 “fixed”/embedded costs through a monthly *customer* charge sends inaccurate information
200 to customers about utility cost drivers, including costs caused by different consumption
201 levels and different contributions to peak demand. Departing from the Commission-
202 approved customer charge methodology is therefore not cost-justified.

203 **Q: Why is abandoning the Commission-approved customer charge method inconsistent**
204 **with energy conservation and efficiency?**

205 A: Increasing the customer charge blunts price signals to conserve energy. A higher
206 fixed fee limits the ability to send price signals to conserve energy through volumetric
207 charges and inclining block rates. Particularly at a time when it is important to raise

208 customer awareness about the cost and risk impacts associated with inefficient and
209 wasteful energy consumption, this is an inappropriate price signal to send to customers.

210 Take the “two neighborhoods” example above. If all customers paid the same
211 amount each month in their fixed, monthly customer charge for investments driven by
212 consumption levels and variable monthly demand, customers in the low-usage
213 neighborhood would pay for costs caused by the high-usage neighborhood. In other
214 words, high-usage customers would be subsidized by low-usage customers. This sort of
215 cost shift benefits inefficient electricity consumption and penalizes efficient customers.
216 So in addition to being inconsistent with cost-causation, it is inconsistent with state policy
217 objectives prioritizing efficiency⁹ and Utah law requiring rates to promote efficient
218 consumption and conservation of resources in order to be “just and reasonable.”

219 **Q: Why is abandoning the Commission-approved customer charge method inconsistent**
220 **with minimizing customer impacts and treating customers equitably?**

221 A: A high customer charge disproportionately raises the bills of low energy users
222 compared to high energy users,¹⁰ and therefore only minimizes customer impacts for
223 higher usage customers. And it is inequitable to the extent that costs are shifted from
224 efficient, low-usage customers to inefficient, high usage customers.

225 **Q: Why is abandoning the Commission-approved customer charge method inconsistent**
226 **with mitigating long term costs and risks?**

227 A: PacifiCorp’s IRP indicates that *more* energy efficiency than the Company

⁹ Docket No. 11-035-200, Direct Testimony of Sarah Wright on behalf of Utah Clean Energy, lines 346-447. Utah Clean Energy filed extensive testimony in Docket No. 11-035-22 outlining the state policies that prioritize energy efficiency as a resource. An excerpt from this testimony is provided as *UCE Exhibit 2.2 (DT) [COS + RD]*.

¹⁰ See, e.g. Docket No. 11-035-200, UCE Exhibit 1.2D (showing disproportionate bill impacts on low-usage customers associated with increasing the customer charge).

228 currently plans to acquire will reduce costs (and risks) for ratepayers.¹¹ Sending price
229 signals that reduce customer incentives for efficiency and conservation limit the utility
230 and all ratepayers from being able to realize the cost and risk reducing benefits of
231 increased energy efficiency. Furthermore, as the utility transitions to an “energy services”
232 utility, it is increasingly important to be more accurate, not less, in terms of information
233 customers receive through rate design and bills about the longer term impacts—both
234 costs and risks—of higher versus lower energy consumption.

235 **Q: What is your recommendation for the monthly residential customer charge?**

236 A: I recognize the importance of allowing the Company to recover prudent
237 embedded costs without unreasonable revenue volatility, but this objective must be
238 balanced with maintaining appropriate and accurate price signals for consumers and
239 result in just and reasonable rates. The monthly customer charge, which is calculated
240 independent of energy usage, should not be the vehicle through which the Company
241 recovers “fixed”/embedded costs that are proportionally contributed to and driven by
242 different levels of energy consumption and demand.

243 I recommend maintaining the Commission-approved customer charge
244 methodology as the most cost-justified and equitable treatment of customer-associated
245 costs. This recommendation alone, however, does not address the Company’s concerns
246 over “fixed cost recovery” or a fair valuation of the distribution services provided by the
247 utility.

¹¹ IRP modeling results indicated that portfolios that accelerated acquisition of demand-side management resources were less costly and less risky than PacifiCorp’s referred Portfolio. PacifiCorp, 2013 IRP, Volume 1, page 222.

248 **Q: Do you have a recommendation for addressing “fixed cost recovery” or fairly**
249 **collecting costs associated with the utility’s distribution services from all residential**
250 **customers in rate design?**

251 A: As discussed above, the Commission has found that recovering costs for local
252 distribution facilities in the customer charge, that is, equally from all customers
253 regardless of usage, was not equitable because it ignored differences in peak use.¹² This
254 is an important point in setting equitable rates: in order to make cost recovery for “fixed”
255 costs equitable, non-customer charge fees should be based on consumption and demand
256 to better reflect contributions to peak and cost causation. In non-residential customer
257 classes, customers pay a demand charge—a monthly fee based on metered kW demand.
258 Residential customers aren’t equipped with meters that allow the Company to measure
259 monthly peak kW demand, which makes assessing a per kW demand charge less feasible
260 for that class.

261 However, because the Company is concerned about its fixed cost recovery, and
262 because it is inequitable to ignore differences in peak use when setting a monthly
263 customer charge, I recommend that the Commission investigate practicable options for
264 designing and implementing residential rate designs that facilitate RMP’s becoming an
265 “energy services” provider and address the Company’s fixed cost recovery concerns
266 while simultaneously resulting in fair, equitable, cost-justified and just and reasonable
267 rates for residential customers. Because demand response, energy efficiency and

¹² Docket No. 09-035-23, In the Matter of the Application of Rocky Mountain Power for Authority to Increase its Retail Electric Utility Service Rates in Utah and for Approval of its Proposed Electric Service Schedules and Electric Service Regulations, *Report and Order on Rate Design* (Issued June 2, 2010), page 30.

268 distributed solar generation all happen behind the meter, this analysis should be
269 conducted in conjunction with a cost benefit analysis and stakeholder process for NEM
270 costs and benefits, as described below.

271 **Q: Why are you recommending this investigation as a solution in the current rate case?**

272 A: The Company has expressed a concern about “fixed cost” recovery, and has
273 proposed residential rates designed to begin to address that concern. The Company has
274 also expressed an interest in becoming an “energy services” utility. While the Company
275 has not explicitly defined this concept, I take it to mean that the Company has an interest
276 in facilitating the energy choices of its customers, including energy efficiency and
277 distributed generation. I support this transition, but think the Company’s residential rate
278 proposal is inconsistent with an intention to become a facilitator of energy services, in
279 addition to cost causation, mitigating risks, promoting efficiency and conservation and
280 customer fairness.

281 The common-sense implications of the Company’s residential rate design
282 proposal will be counterproductive in the utility’s transition into a facilitator of energy
283 services. High monthly fixed fees that do not reflect differential contribution to peak
284 demand are inaccurate, inequitable and blunt price signals that do not communicate to
285 customers the importance of cost saving, risk mitigating and energy efficient decision-
286 making.

287 In order to facilitate the Company becoming an energy services utility and to
288 promote smart residential energy consumption, we need to address residential cost
289 recovery issues in a new way. The Company’s actions, including the rates it sets and the
290 rate designs it implements to recover costs, need to be consistent with the utility’s

291 objective of being an energy services utility while valuing and rewarding smart customer
292 choices. This is a new frontier for this utility and should be investigated seriously,
293 without the time constraints associated with rate cases. That is why I am recommending a
294 Commission investigation into residential rate components designed to recover, in an
295 equitable manner, the fair value of the Company's services while also allowing
296 residential customers to receive the fair value of the benefits their energy choices bring to
297 the Company and ratepayers. If residential bills are headed in the direction of greater
298 complexity, it should not be at the expense of clarity, fairness or accuracy.

299 The Company should be able to recover the costs of its prudent investments
300 through just and reasonable rates that encourage smart energy consumption. Smart and
301 engaged energy efficient and rooftop solar customers are the type of customer we want to
302 encourage, rather than undermine, in order to reduce long run costs and risks. This type
303 of customer is increasingly important as we transition to a cleaner, smarter energy future
304 and as the utility transitions to an energy services utility. That is why I am recommending
305 a Commission investigation into residential rate mechanisms designed to reflect and
306 recover costs while maintaining consistency with fairness, cost causation, reducing risk
307 and promoting efficiency and conservation.

308 **Q: Do you have anything to add about the Company's incentive to sell more electricity?**

309 A: Yes, revenue decoupling is one mechanism that would address what is commonly
310 referred to as the through-put incentive.

311 *Net Energy Metering (NEM)*

312 **Q: What is the Company's proposal regarding residential NEM customers in this case?**

313 A: The Company has proposed a new \$4.25 monthly fee for all residential net
314 metered customers, regardless of the size of their rooftop solar systems. Further, they
315 have proposed a \$15 minimum bill. UCE witness, Rick Gilliam provides testimony that
316 responds more specifically to the Company's NEM fee proposal while I address NEM
317 policy (costs and benefits evaluation) more generally. I will then address the proposed
318 minimum bill.

319 **Q: What is your response to the Company's NEM fee proposal?**

320 A: Any net metering-specific rate design changes must be based on an evaluation of
321 costs *and benefits*. This is both a sound principle and a requirement of Utah law. In the
322 interest of fairness to all customers, the foundational principle underlying Utah Clean
323 Energy's net metering position is, "If it ain't broke, don't fix it." This principle is
324 consistent with Utah's net metering law as well as the Commission's practice of basing
325 its rulings on substantial evidence.

326 RMP's NEM proposal is inconsistent with both the state's NEM law at the time
327 the application was filed, and the current law. While the Commission has requested cost
328 benefit analysis in the current case, RMP has provided no evaluation of benefits (or even
329 unique costs) associated with net metering. The Company's proposal suggests a fee for
330 residential net metering customers based on their lower than average consumption as a
331 group. UCE witness Rick Gilliam addresses this proposal but recommends that the
332 Commission initiate a new proceeding to address the costs and benefits of the Company's
333 entire net metering program, as there is neither enough time nor evidence to provide a full
334 evaluation in this case.

335 **Q: What do you mean “the states NEM law at the time the application was filed, and**
336 **the current law”?**

337 A: After the Company filed its proposed NEM fee in the rate case, it went to the
338 legislature to propose a change in Utah’s net metering law. So the law at the time the
339 Company proposed the fee in the current rate case was different than the law is now.

340 **Q: How is the Company’s proposal inconsistent with the net metering law in place at**
341 **the time the Company filed its application?**¹³

342 A: The Company’s proposal includes costs (lost revenues) that net metering
343 customers impose on the system, but it did *not* include analysis of the benefits that solar
344 brings to the system and ratepayers, nor did it address whether public policy would be
345 served by imposing a net metering-specific fee. Therefore, the Company’s proposal is
346 inconsistent with the net metering statute in place when the Company filed the rate case.

¹³ Utah Code Ann. § 54-15-105 (2008):

No additional fee or charge without governing authority approval -- Exception.

(1) An electrical corporation administering a net metering program may not charge a customer participating in the program an additional standby, capacity, interconnection, or other fee or charge unless the governing authority, after appropriate notice and opportunity for public comment:

(a) determines that:

(i) the electrical corporation will incur direct costs from the interconnection or from administering the net metering program that exceed benefits, as determined by the governing authority, resulting from the program; and

(ii) public policy is best served by imposing a reasonable fee or charge on the customer participating in the net metering program rather than by allocating the fee or charge among the electrical corporation's entire customer base; and

(b) after making its determination under Subsection (1)(a), authorizes the additional reasonable fee or charge.

(2) If a cost of a net metering program is allocated among the electrical corporation's entire customer base, Subsection (1) may not be construed to prohibit an electrical corporation from charging a customer participating in the net metering program for that cost to the same extent that the electrical corporation charges a customer not participating in the program for that cost.

[Amended by Chapter 244, 2008 General Session]

347 **Q: How is the Company's proposal inconsistent with the current net metering law?**

348 A: In 2014, Section 54-15-105 was replaced with the following (which took effect on
349 May 13):

350 54-15-105.1. Determination of costs and benefits -- Determination of just and
351 reasonable charge, credit, or ratemaking structure.

352 The governing authority shall:

353 (1) determine, after appropriate notice and opportunity for public comment,
354 whether costs that the electrical corporation or other customers will incur from a
355 net metering program will exceed the benefits of the net metering program, or
356 whether the benefits of the net metering program will exceed the costs; and

357 (2) determine a just and reasonable charge, credit, or ratemaking structure,
358 including new or existing tariffs, in light of the costs and benefits.

359
360 The current net metering law has similar provisions to the previous net metering
361 law, requiring the Commission to determine whether the costs that the utility or other
362 customers incur from the net metering program exceed the benefits or whether the
363 benefits exceed the costs. The law and fairness demand that the Commission accept the
364 possibility of either scenario (costs exceeding benefits or benefits exceeding costs) before
365 implementing a rate design decision. This threshold issue of evaluating costs and benefits
366 first is critical because you don't want to "fix" an alleged cost shift that doesn't exist.

367 Again, RMP's proposal only includes their view of costs associated with the
368 residential net metering program, but does not include any analysis of the benefits that
369 distributed solar energy brings to all ratepayers.

370 **Q: Has the Commission responded to the newly enacted NEM law?**

371 A: Yes. On April 16, 2014, the Commission issued a Public Notice regarding its
372 obligations under the newly enacted net metering law. The Commission explained that

373 the determinations referenced in the law will be accomplished in the context of this rate
374 case and invited public comment and written testimony on the matter.

375 **Q: How do the changes to the net metering law enacted during the 2014 legislative**
376 **session impact the Company's proposal?**

377 A: Given that both the 2008 and the 2014 statutes require a process to review the
378 costs and benefits, there is not a significant change. Both the 2008 version of the statute
379 and the enrolled 2014 statute require analysis and public input regarding the costs and
380 benefits of net metering before Commission approval of any additional fees. However,
381 there are a couple important points I would like to make. First, the NEM law deals with
382 the Company's entire NEM program while the Company's proposal impacts residential
383 customers only. Second, the 2014 statute includes reference to a *credit* for net metering
384 customers if NEM program benefits outweigh costs. Finally, the new law includes a
385 specific reference to just and reasonable ratemaking treatment in conjunction with net
386 metering rate design.

387 **Q: Has Rocky Mountain Power evaluated and presented evidence on costs that net**
388 **metering customers pose to the system?**

389 A: Rocky Mountain Power calculated and included in testimony an evaluation of
390 revenues that are not collected from net metering customers as a group, on average,
391 compared to non-net metering customers. Importantly, efficient customers without solar
392 have the same or a greater impact on utility revenues. (UCE witness, Rick Gilliam
393 addresses this issue in his testimony.) Rocky Mountain Power's presentation of costs
394 associated with net metering customers does not reflect costs that are unique to net
395 metering customers, but rather is an illustration of revenues lost through lower than

396 average consumption, which may be achieved through means other than net metering
397 (including having a small house or investing in energy efficiency).

398 **Q: Does UCE provide evidence on the costs and benefits of net metering in this docket?**

399 A: Yes, Utah Clean Energy is presenting evidence in order to address the Company's
400 NEM fee proposal and in response to the Commission's invitation to address this issue in
401 direct testimony. Last year, UCE Commissioned Clean Power Research to conduct an
402 evaluation of the value of solar in Utah, intended for an evaluation of the Utah Solar
403 Incentive Program, but relevant to the issues raised by the Company in this docket and
404 responsive to the Commission's request for comment on this issue in the current rate
405 case. I introduce this study and UCE witness Rick Gilliam uses the inputs and results to
406 make some initial conclusions about the costs and benefits of the Company's net
407 metering program. Additionally, I introduce evidence from PacifiCorp's 2013 Integrated
408 Resource Plan illustrating the value of distributed solar (and efficiency) in Utah.

409 **Q: What are benefits provided by distributed generation/rooftop solar?**

410 A: In the last general rate case, Utah Clean Energy provided testimony on benefits of
411 distributed solar which I include here:

412 Most of the distributed generation in Utah comes from solar PV. In addition to
413 providing energy in summer peak daytime hours, distributed solar generation also
414 provides value beyond this energy benefit. Studies from other states show that
415 distributed solar provides additional value in line loss savings, generation capacity
416 savings, protection against fuel price volatility, a hedge against economic risks
417 associated with environmental regulations, [transmission and distribution]
418 capacity savings, energy security benefits, job creation/economic development
419 benefits, and environmental/health benefits, including water savings and reduced
420 air pollutants and greenhouse gases. While current market penetration of all
421 electric and plug-in hybrid vehicles is low, distributed solar has the potential to
422 provide additional transportation and air pollution benefits if applied to electric

423 vehicle charging as that market grows and expands. For maintenance and non-
424 attainment areas for EPA air pollution standards (such as most of northern Utah),
425 this affiliated transportation/air quality benefit could be significant. Additionally,
426 a study that evaluated how distributed PV would impact the need for demand
427 response for three utilities, Rochester Gas and Electric, SMUD and Consolidated
428 Edison showed that PV has the potential to dramatically reduce the need for
429 demand response.¹⁴

430

431 **Q: Do you have updated information about studies evaluating the benefits of rooftop**
432 **solar?**

433 A: Yes, since I filed testimony in the last rate case, numerous solar evaluation studies
434 have been performed across the country. In his direct testimony, UCE witness Rick
435 Gilliam discusses a meta-study that summarizes 15 of these recent evaluations.

436 **Q: Since you filed testimony in the last rate case regarding the benefits of rooftop solar,**
437 **has there been additional analysis on the benefits of rooftop solar in Utah?**

438 A: Yes. As mentioned above, UCE commissioned a study of the value of distributed
439 solar by Clean Power Research (CPR). Clean Power Research is a well-respected
440 consulting firm that specializes in distributed solar valuation software. I believe Rocky
441 Mountain Power uses some of CPR's software for its solar incentive programs in Oregon
442 and Utah. With data provided by Rocky Mountain Power and Utah Clean Energy, CPR
443 used its DGValuatorTM V2 platform to perform this study. According to CPR,
444 "DGValuator is a tool that models hourly PV production, calculates line losses and loss
445 savings, and determines value components based on user input data. It has been designed

¹⁴ Docket No. 11-035-200, Direct Testimony of Sarah Wright on behalf of Utah Clean Energy, lines 316-39.

446 to: (1) enable objective and transparent analysis; (2) employ established methodologies;
447 (3) embody correlated solar data; and (4) empower end-users.”¹⁵

448 **Q: What are the results of the CPR Analysis?**

449 A: The CPR analysis showed a levelized distributed solar PV value of \$0.116/kWh
450 when solar offset a combined cycle gas plant. Please see UCE Exhibit 2.1 for the full
451 report

452 **Q: Does the CPR analysis reflect Utah conditions?**

453 A: Yes, data inputs for the study reflect RMP’s system. Wherever possible we
454 provided CPR with RMP data for their analysis. These inputs included RMP hourly load
455 data from 1/1/2012, 12:00 am to 12/31/2012, 12:00 am, generation capital costs, years
456 until new generation resources are needed, fuel costs, heat rates, reserve margins,
457 discount rate, etc. This information was obtained from the 2013 IRP and a series of data
458 requests to the Company. (Please see UCE Exhibit 2.1 for all inputs.) In order to evaluate
459 environmental benefits associated with distributed generation, we used avoided carbon
460 regulation costs (in \$/kWh) based on the Company’s middle case IRP carbon cost
461 assumptions. No other environmental costs were included in the analysis.

462 **Q: Has CPR conducted similar analysis for other states and/or utilities?**

463 A: Yes, RMI¹⁶ summarized 15 recent studies, four of which CPR conducted.
464 Additionally, CPR just completed a stakeholder process and value of solar analysis for
465 the state of Minnesota.

¹⁵ UCE Exhibit 2.1 (DT): Clean Power Research, *Value of Solar in Utah* (January 7, 2014), page ii.

¹⁶ *A Review of Solar PV Benefit and Cost Studies*, Rocky Mountain Institute Electricity Innovation Lab (April 2013), available at www.rmi.org/elab_emPower.

466 **Q. How does CPR’s levelized value of solar for Utah compare to residential rates?**

467 **A:** The CPR levelized value of solar for Utah is close to the 25 year levelized
468 average Utah residential rate. I calculated the average residential rate using both current
469 rate structure and RMP’s proposed rate structure. For this comparison, I calculated the
470 levelized residential energy rate assuming a 2% rate increase each year.¹⁷ Please see the
471 summary table below. Inputs for the average residential rate estimations were from RMP
472 Exhibit JRS-4.

**Comparison of CPR 25 Year Levelized Cost of Solar to
25 Year Estimated Levelized Average Residential Rate**

	Current Rate Structure	Proposed Rate Structure
Ave. 25 Year Levelized Res. Rate	\$ 0.1187	\$ 0.1211
25 year Levelized Value of Solar ¹	\$ 0.1160	\$ 0.1160
Difference	\$ 0.0027	\$ 0.0051

473

474 **Q. What conclusions do you draw from the CPR value of solar analysis for Utah?**

475 **A.** I conclude that distributed solar PV provides demonstrable value to the system
476 and all ratepayers. The results are compelling and indicate that the value of solar is in line
477 with residential rates, which indicates that solar customers are *not* being subsidized by
478 other customers.

¹⁷ Based on historical increases since 1992, as tracked by the Public Service Commission, available at <http://psc.utah.gov/utilities/electric/Rate%20Changes/Rate%20Changes%20Electric%20November%201%202013.pdf>.

479 Further, the levelized value of solar (11.6 cents per kWh) is only very slightly less
480 than the calculated levelized average residential energy rates (between \$0.0027/kWh and
481 \$0.0051/kWh, assuming the current rate structure and RMP's proposed rate structure,
482 respectively). This analysis shows that the value that distributed solar brings to the
483 system is in line with the average, 25-year levelized residential rates. This indicates that
484 the costs that solar customers may impose on the system do not exceed the value that
485 solar brings to the system. The results undermine the Company's net metering fee
486 proposal and, at the very least, warrant further investigation before imposing a NEM fee.

487 **Q: Are you aware of PacifiCorp or RMP analysis that indicates that distributed rooftop**
488 **solar brings value to ratepayers?**

489 A: Yes. PacifiCorp's 2013 IRP analyzed distributed PV as a potential resource in the
490 20-year resource acquisition plan. PacifiCorp used the System Optimizer model to create
491 least-cost portfolios under a range of different scenarios. Utilizing projected load over the
492 20 year planning period and a variety of assumptions and scenarios, the System
493 Optimizer model created least cost portfolios for each scenario, which were then run
494 through risk analysis to arrive at the "preferred portfolio." These scenarios include
495 variation in load, gas price, environmental regulation and carbon prices. PacifiCorp
496 provides the model with load forecasts, supply curves, capital costs and fuel and O&M
497 cost assumptions for a variety of energy resources, including coal, natural gas plants,
498 wind, nuclear, etc.

499 In the 2013 IRP, PacifiCorp included the Utah Solar Incentive Program (utility
500 cost) for distributed PV as a resource in Utah. To ensure that the model did not select
501 more distributed PV than could reasonably be installed, PacifiCorp capped the amount of

502 distributed solar that the model could select each year based on its then most recent DSM
503 potential study. What is extremely compelling is that in each year of the 20 year planning
504 horizon, for each and every scenario (low gas, high gas, low carbon prices, high carbon
505 prices, etc.), the model selected all of the distributed solar resource that it could: close to
506 300 MW of distributed solar over the 20 year planning horizon, or about 20 times the
507 amount installed at the end 2013. This distributed solar resource is part of PacifiCorp's
508 2013 preferred portfolio.

509 **Q: What do take away from the IRP distributed solar findings?**

510 A: The IRP's selection of all the available distributed solar in in every scenario is a
511 clear indication that distributed solar brings value and benefits to all ratepayers and
512 indicates that distributed solar has the potential to be an important part of our resource
513 portfolio going forward. Given this potential, compounded by the fact that distributed
514 solar is in its infancy in Utah, it is in the best interest of ratepayers to carefully evaluate
515 the full benefits of distributed solar and costs of the NEM program *before* implementing a
516 new rate structure that may undermine and inhibit private investments in distributed
517 solar.

518 **Q: Do private investments in distributed solar generation, energy efficiency and**
519 **demand response provide energy services while mitigating risks for all ratepayers?**

520 A: Yes, definitely. In my revenue requirement testimony in this case, my testimony
521 in the recent avoided costs docket (No. 12-035-100), in comments on the 2013 IRP and
522 other dockets, I discuss at length the risks that ratepayers face with respect to climate
523 change, carbon regulation, environmental regulation and fuel volatility. Leveraging
524 private investments in pollution-free and fuel-free energy resources is an extremely cost-

525 effective way to mitigate risks while reducing the need for rate-based resources. Further,
526 in the IRP, PacifiCorp ran a scenario where they doubled investments and acquisition of
527 DSM in the near term. The resulting portfolio had the lowest revenue requirement and
528 was the least risky. As discussed above, I recognize the need to protect ratepayers and
529 provide adequate cost recovery for the utility, but we definitely don't want to implement
530 a rate design that undermines lower cost, risk mitigating resources that benefit all
531 ratepayers, and that customers acquire, in large part, at their own personal expense.

532 The Regulatory Assistance Project in its recent publication, *Designing Distributed*
533 *Generation Tariffs Well – Fair Compensation in a Time of Transition* makes this point
534 clearly:

535 Energy efficiency and demand response resources have become accepted as the
536 most cost effective resource in many states and the scope of services these
537 resources provide is expanding as electricity markets and institutions catch up
538 with information, communications and electric control system capabilities. Add to
539 these the possibilities for storage and it seems clear that the quantity and scope of
540 the services that customer sited resources will provide is becoming a cornerstone
541 in the power sector of the future. Given the central role of customer side of the
542 meter resources, regulators need to be proactive in ensuring that they are fairly
543 compensated. Failure to recognize the value of services provided will impede
544 their maturation, *lead to unnecessary investment in redundant resources and thus*
545 *impose unnecessary costs on all electricity customers.* At the same time, the
546 electricity grid will continue to provide important services to customers, and
547 regulators will need to ensure that utilities are adequately compensated for these
548 services.¹⁸

549
550 **Q: Do you think the Company has provided sufficient data for the Commission to**
551 **approve additional fees specifically for NEM customers?**

¹⁸ Carl Linvill, John Shenot and Jim Lazar, *Designing Distributed Generation Tariffs Well—Fair Compensation in a Time of Transition* (Regulatory Assistance Project, November 2013), page 4 (emphasis added).

552 A: No. The evidence of cost shifting provided by RMP applies to any customers with
553 lower than average consumption, not just net metered customers. Accordingly, the
554 Company has failed to tie its allegations of cost shifting in a non-discriminatory way to
555 net metering customers. Further, the Company has provided no discussion of benefits in
556 addition to costs, as required by Utah law. Finally, because Utah Clean Energy has
557 provided evidence on the benefits that distributed solar brings to the system and
558 ratepayers, at a minimum, this issue warrants further study and stakeholder input.

559 **Q: Do you think the Commission needs to act immediately on this issue?**

560 A. Not at all. We have time to get this right. Utah has a *very low* penetration of
561 residential solar customers. UCE witness Rick Gilliam shows that approximately 0.3% of
562 residential customers will have solar in the forecast year and that, on average, these
563 customers still use 74% of the average residential customer's energy consumption. This
564 indicates that we have time for a more thorough investigation and thoughtful cost benefit
565 analysis process.

566 **Q: What are your recommendations regarding RMP's proposed NEM fee?**

567 A: As will be discussed further in the testimony of Rick Gilliam, Utah Clean Energy
568 recommends not implementing a net metering fee in the current case because the
569 threshold issue of establishing that there is, in fact, a cost shift (when considering costs
570 and benefits) has not been demonstrated.

571 **Q: What are your recommendations regarding the Commission's evaluation of the
572 costs and benefits of the Company's NEM program in Utah?**

573 A: Because the evidence does not support that there is a cost shift one way or another
574 from or to net metering customers, the Commission should not implement a net metering

575 rate change in this rate case. In order to fulfill its obligations under Utah’s new net
576 metering law, the Commission should investigate the Company’s net metering program
577 in a separate investigative proceeding. Such an investigation implicates many of the
578 issues the Company raised regarding the residential customer charge, and in the interest
579 of time and efficiency, it may be appropriate to consolidate investigations in order to
580 design tariffs to fairly value both utility services and benefits provided by customers. The
581 Commission would not need to reinvent the wheel, as it were, because many other states
582 are going through the same process, and there are many resources available from entities
583 such as the Regulatory Assistance Project,¹⁹ the Rocky Mountain Institute²⁰ and the
584 Interstate Renewable Energy Council²¹ to assist states and utilities who are in the process
585 of transitioning to energy services utilities.

586 ***Minimum bill.***

587 **Q: What is the Company’s proposal for a minimum bill in the current case?**

588 A: Although the Company has proposed eliminating the minimum bill in previous
589 cases, the Company is proposing to retain and increase the minimum bill “at this time,”
590 for fixed cost recovery from low use customers, rather than a higher customer charge for
591 all residential customers. The Company has proposed increasing the minimum bill from
592 \$7 to \$15.

¹⁹ Carl Linvill, John Shenot and Jim Lazar, *Designing Distributed Generation Tariffs Well—Fair Compensation in a Time of Transition* (Regulatory Assistance Project, November 2013), available at <http://www.raponline.org/press-release/designing-distributed-generation-tariffs-well-ensuring-fair-compensation-in-a-time-of>.

²⁰ *A Review of Solar PV Benefit and Cost Studies*, Rocky Mountain Institute Electricity Innovation Lab (April 2013), available at www.rmi.org/elab_emPower.

²¹ *A Regulator’s Guidebook: Calculating the Benefits and Costs of Distributed Solar Generation*, Interstate Renewable Energy Council, Inc. (October 2013), available at <http://www.irecusa.org/2013/10/experts-propose-standard-valuation-method-to-determine-benefits-and-costs-of-distributed-solar-generation/>.

593 **Q: What is Utah Clean Energy’s position with regard to a residential monthly**
594 **minimum bill?**

595 A: Utah Clean Energy supports elimination of the minimum bill. It is a confusing
596 rate structure that is not cost-justified in terms of customer costs, energy costs or demand
597 costs. Additionally, to the extent that it is greater than the customer charge, a minimum
598 bill prevents net metering customers from receiving the fair value of the benefits they
599 bring to the utility and other ratepayers. The minimum bill is an unnecessary sort of
600 “band aid” rate structure that does not send meaningful price signals to consumers.

601 **Q: How does the monthly minimum bill impact net metering customers?**

602 A: The monthly minimum bill impacts net metering customers in the same way as
603 non-net metering customers—that is if net consumption falls below a certain level in a
604 given month, the net metering customer will pay the minimum bill. However, given that
605 solar customers provide value to the Company and other ratepayers, the minimum bill
606 prevents them from receiving fair compensation for that value to the extent that (1) the
607 customer charge collects proper customer-related costs and (2) the minimum bill is set
608 higher than the customer charge.

609 In 2009, in Docket No. 08-035-78, the Commission declined to exempt net
610 metering customers from application of a minimum monthly bill which was set at a level
611 less than the Commission-approved customer charge methodology indicated was
612 appropriate to recover customer-related costs. The Division calculated the customer
613 charge, utilizing the Commission’s methodology, to be \$3.75 while the minimum bill was
614 \$2.00. Therefore, the customer charge did not fully recover customer-related costs of
615 service. The Commission found, “While parties indicate the benefits associated with net

616 metering, in our view these benefits are not related to the costs recovered by the
617 minimum bill... Therefore, we find it reasonable to apply the minimum bill to net
618 metering customers who provide net excess generation during a month and direct the
619 Company to continue using the current minimum bill for all customers.”²²

620 At that time, the Commission did not rule on the value of the energy and non-
621 energy benefits of distributed generation, but rather found that there are customer-related
622 costs independent of these benefits that are properly recovered from all customers
623 regardless of usage: “Even though a net metering customer provides net excess
624 generation in any given month...a net metering customer still imposes costs on the
625 Company independent of the customer’s consumption or generation.” However, to the
626 extent that the minimum bill is *greater* than the customer charge, it is no longer linked to
627 costs that are independent of usage, and impacts the compensation of net metering
628 customers and the valuation of costs and benefits (to and from the utility) associated with
629 net metering customers.

630 **Q: What is your recommendation regarding the monthly residential minimum bill?**

631 A: I recommend elimination of the minimum bill. To the extent that the minimum
632 bill is greater than the customer charge it discriminates against net metering customers by
633 denying them fair compensation for the benefits they provide to the utility and other
634 ratepayers.

635

²² Docket No. 08-035-78, In the Matter of the Consideration of Changes to Rocky Mountain Power’s Schedule No. 135 – Net Metering Service, *Report and Order Directing Tariff Modifications* (Issued February 12, 2009), page 28.

636 **CONCLUSION**

637 **Q: Please summarize your recommendations.**

638 A: For the reasons described herein, I make the following recommendations:

- 639 • I recommend re-affirming the Commission-approved method for
640 calculating the residential monthly customer charge.
- 641 • I recommend not implementing any net metering fee in the current rate
642 case because the threshold issue of establishing that there is, in fact, a cost
643 shift (when considering costs and benefits) has not been demonstrated.
- 644 • I recommend institution of a Commission-led or facilitated stakeholder
645 process with the goals of (1) examining residential rate designs that fairly
646 value both utility services and the benefits of demand-side customer
647 investments and (2) producing an updated cost and benefit analysis of the
648 Company's net metering program across all customer classes.
- 649 • I recommend elimination of the minimum bill.

650

651 **Q: Do you have any final remarks?**

652 A: Utah Clean Energy's mission is to lead and accelerate the clean energy
653 transformation with vision and expertise. The vision guiding our work is "healthy,
654 thriving communities empowered and sustained by clean energy." Energy efficiency and
655 distributed solar generation are not only important components of a future where
656 communities are empowered and sustained by clean energy, they are more and more what
657 customers want. It appears that Rocky Mountain Power recognizes this and is beginning
658 to think about how to become an energy services utility that is responsive to customer
659 choice. Utah Clean Energy supports Rocky Mountain Power becoming a utility that
660 facilitates and benefits from risk mitigating, cost reducing customer investments in
661 energy efficiency and distributed clean energy, and my recommendations in the current
662 rate case are based on a desire to help the utility make this transition and to ensure that
663 customers are treated in a just and reasonable manner.

664 **Q:** Does that conclude your testimony?

665 A: Yes.