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**Q**.

### Please state your name, business address and present position with PacifiCorp, dba Rocky Mountain Power ("the Company").

3 My name is Brian S. Dickman. My business address is 825 NE Multnomah Street, Suite A. 4 600, Portland, Oregon 97232. My title is Director, Net Power Costs and Load 5 Forecasting.

**Oualifications** 6

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#### Briefly describe your education and business experience. 0.

8 A. I received a Master of Business Administration from the University of Utah with an 9 emphasis in finance and a Bachelor of Science degree in accounting from Utah State 10 University. Prior to joining the Company, I was employed as an analyst for Duke Energy 11 Trading and Marketing. I have been employed by the Company since 2003 including 12 positions in revenue requirement and regulatory affairs, and I assumed my current role 13 managing the Company's net power cost group in March 2012.

#### 14 **Q**. Have you testified in previous regulatory proceedings?

- 15 A. Yes. I have filed testimony in proceedings before the public utility commissions in 16 California, Idaho, Oregon, Utah, and Wyoming.
- 17 **Q**. What is the purpose of your testimony?

18 My testimony supports the Company's April 30, 2015 filing to update Schedule 37, A. 19 Avoided Cost Purchases from Qualifying Facilities. The Company is required to update 20 Schedule 37 rates annually, with filings made by April 30 of each year or within 30 days of filing an Integrated Resource Plan ("IRP") or IRP Update, whichever is sooner. This 21 22 year the Company filed its 2015 IRP on March 31, 2015, making the annual Schedule 37 23 update due April 30, 2015. In its filing, the Company has updated the inputs to the

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calculation of Schedule 37 rates and proposed one change to the way avoided costs are
 calculated for Schedule 37. My testimony supports the change proposed by the Company.

# Q. Please describe the change to the calculation of Schedule 37 rates proposed by the Company in this filing.

28 The Company proposes that avoided cost rates during the sufficiency period no longer A. 29 include capacity costs related to the deferral of a simple cycle combustion turbine 30 ("SCCT"). During the sufficiency period the Company has no plans to procure additional 31 thermal capacity resources. The 2015 IRP calls for the Company to utilize front office 32 transactions ("FOTs"), which represent short-term firm wholesale market purchases, to 33 meet its capacity needs. Rather than imputing capacity costs based on a fictitious SCCT, 34 avoided costs during the sufficiency period should be calculated using the GRID model 35 including the value of short-term firm market purchases that can be displaced by a 36 qualifying facility ("QF"). The sufficiency period prices calculated in GRID should also 37 be differentiated into on- and off-peak periods based on the relationship of Palo Verde on-38 and off-peak market prices. The Company's proposed change results in avoided cost 39 prices that best represent the costs that will actually be avoided during the sufficiency 40 period. As described later, the Company's proposal eliminates an unnecessary difference 41 that remains between the calculation of avoided costs for small QFs under Schedule 37 42 and large QFs under Schedule 38. Details supporting the Company's proposed avoided 43 costs were provided as appendices to its filing; specifically Appendix 1, Appendix 2, and 44 Confidential Appendix 3. Confidential Appendix 4 was also provided which includes the 45 calculation of avoided costs consistent with the Commission's orders issued January 16, 46 2015, and February 13, 2015 in Docket Nos. 14-035-55 and 14-035-T04.

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#### Has the Company proposed this change before? If so, how is this proposal different?

A. Yes. In its May 7, 2014, filing to update Schedule 37 the Company also proposed to
eliminate the SCCT fixed costs during the sufficiency period. However, in that filing,
when the costs of the SCCT were removed from the sufficiency period, the resulting
Schedule 37 prices were simply equal to the average avoided costs from the GRID
model, with no recognition of the value of QF energy during on- and off-peak periods.
The Commission cited this as the deciding factor leading to its conclusion to not adopt
the Company's proposal:

55 "In PacifiCorp's Schedule 37 proposed method, without any value for the 56 SCCT, the rates for on-peak and off-peak energy are the same. Thus, the rates 57 paid to a QF delivering all its energy on-peak will understate costs avoided 58 and the rates paid to a QF delivering all its energy off-peak will overstate the 59 costs avoided by the QF....[The] deciding factor for this issue is the fact that 60 in the proposal in front of us, with the SCCT cost removed, the peak and off-61 peak prices are identical during the period of resource sufficiency."<sup>1</sup>

62 In its Order issued October 21, 2014, the Commission directed the Company "to 63 file a potential adjustment to the Schedule 37 method that produces distinct peak and offpeak prices in the resource sufficiency period."<sup>2</sup> To remedy the issue identified by the 64 Commission, in this filing, the proposed Schedule 37 prices during the sufficiency period 65 66 have differentiated on- and off-peak prices based on the relationship of Palo Verde on- and 67 off-peak market prices relative to flat Palo Verde market prices. Later in my testimony I show that the prior method of adding SCCT fixed costs to the GRID modeled avoided 68 69 costs overstates the prices that should be paid for energy and capacity during the 70 sufficiency period.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Docket Nos. 14-035-55 and 14-035-T04, Order Partially Addressing Rocky Mountain Power's Petition for Reconsideration, Review or Rehearing of the Commission's December 30, 2014 Order on Review and Motion for Stay, January 29, 2015, page 7.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Docket Nos. 14-035-55 and 14-035-T04, Report and Order Issued October, 21, 2014 page 19.

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#### **Q**. What is the impact on avoided cost rates if the SCCT fixed costs are eliminated from

72 the sufficiency period?

Table 1 compares the current Schedule 37 rates to updated rates using the currently-73 A. approved method (i.e., including the SCCT costs during the sufficiency period)<sup>3</sup> and 74 75 updated rates based on GRID modeled results excluding the SCCT costs but with 76 differentiated on- and off-peak prices.

Table 1							
20 Year (2016 to 2035) Levelized Prices (Nominal) @ 6.66% Discount Rate (\$/MWH)							
			SOLAR	SOLAR			
	BASE LOAD	WIND	FIXED	TRACKING			
Current Rates (Includes SCCT costs during sufficiency period)	\$54.33	\$37.71	\$54.27	\$58.52			
Updated Rates (Includes SCCT costs during sufficiency period)	\$45.01	\$32.75	\$42.67	\$45.94			
Proposed Rates (No SCCT costs, differentiated on/off-peak prices)	\$39.34	\$32.08	\$38.53	\$40.26			
Impact of Removing SCCT Costs	(\$5.67)	(\$0.68)	(\$4.14)	(\$5.68)			

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77 As shown in Table 1, if the fixed costs of a SCCT continue to be imputed in 78 Schedule 37 avoided costs during the sufficiency period, the Company's retail customers 79 will pay prices for OFs that are higher than the avoided cost of energy and capacity from 80 other sources, contrary to the customer indifference standard in the Public Utility 81 Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 ("PURPA"). 82 As background information, please describe the currently-approved method for 0. 83 calculating avoided costs for small QFs qualifying for published rates under Schedule 37. 84 85 The framework for the calculation of rates under Schedule 37 was first approved by the A. Commission in Docket No. 94-2035-03. In its July 1995 order, the Commission approved 86

a combined differential revenue requirement and proxy method for determining avoided 87

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Capacity contribution of intermittent resources is based on the values originally approved by the Commission in Docket No. 12-035-100, and included in Docket No. 14-035-T04.


costs. Since that time various adjustments have been made to the calculation details, with
the most recent changes effective February 20, 2015. Published rates under Schedule 37
are available to cogeneration facilities up to 1 MW and other small power production
facilities, including wind and solar resources, up to 3 MW.

92 The determination of avoided costs is divided into two periods: resource sufficiency and resource deficiency. During the sufficiency period, avoided costs are 93 94 calculated using GRID, the Company's production cost model. Net power costs ("NPC") 95 are calculated using two system dispatch simulations, one without any new QF resources 96 and one with an additional 10 MW QF resource included as a system resource at zero cost. The period of resource deficiency begins coincident with the next deferrable 97 resource identified in the Company's most recent IRP or IRP Update. During the 98 99 deficiency period avoided costs are equal to the fixed and variable costs of a proxy 100 resource, currently a combined cycle combustion turbine ("CCCT").

101 The current method also calls for additional capacity costs, based on the fixed 102 costs of a SCCT, to be added to the avoided costs produced by the GRID model during 103 the sufficiency period. As described above, the issue of whether it is appropriate to 104 include SCCT costs during the sufficiency period was raised in Docket Nos. 14-035-55 105 and 14-035-T04. In those dockets, the Commission declined to change the current 106 method but directed the Company to propose an alternative in its next Schedule 37 107 update.

### 108 Q. Is the currently approved method for Schedule 37 used to calculate avoided costs for 109 large QFs under Schedule 38?

110 A. No. Avoided costs for large QFs are calculated using the Proxy/Partial Displacement



111 Differential Revenue Requirement ("PDDRR") method. The methods are similar in that 112 both utilize the GRID model to determine avoided costs during the sufficiency period and 113 both include capacity costs of a CCCT beginning with the next deferrable resource in the 114 Company's IRP. The Proxy/PDDRR method, however, continues to use a combination of 115 the GRID model and partial displacement of a CCCT during the deficiency period rather than basing avoided costs solely on the proxy CCCT. Furthermore, during the sufficiency 116 117 period the Proxy/PDDRR avoided costs include displacement of FOTs and do not include 118 additional capacity costs from a SCCT. The Commission recently affirmed this treatment 119 is appropriate in Docket No. 12-035-100 when it found: 120 "We are persuaded the Proxy/PDDRR method properly reflects avoided

- "We are persuaded the Proxy/PDDRR method properly reflects avoided capacity costs associated with FOTs during the period of resource sufficiency. The evidence proffered by PacifiCorp and the Office shows a QF's displacement of FOTs, as determined within the GRID model, results in what PacifiCorp would have otherwise paid for capacity purchases. Thus, the inclusion of additional capacity value when a FOT is displaced would over-compensate the QF and violate the ratepayer neutrality objective."<sup>4</sup>
- 128 When the Commission approved new Schedule 37 rates in Docket Nos. 14-035-
- 129 55 and 14-035-T04 several changes were adopted that were designed to enhance
  130 consistency with the Schedule 38 calculation, including: reflecting the integration costs
  131 and capacity contribution of intermittent resources, excluding future CO2 taxes from the
  132 official forward price curve, and eliminating separate payments to the QF for capacity
- and energy.

## 134 Q. Has the Commission previously addressed avoided capacity costs during the 135 sufficiency period for Schedule 37?

A. Yes. In Docket Nos. 14-035-55 and 14-035-T04, the Commission initially approved the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Docket No. 12-035-100, August 16, 2103 Order at 35.

- 137 Company's request to remove the SCCT costs from the sufficiency period, but later
- reversed its decision until additional evidence could be presented. In its October 21, 2014
- 139 order the Commission stated:
- 140 "Among other things, this order approves PacifiCorp's proposal to eliminate the annual fixed costs of a SCCT during the period of resource sufficiency. 141 142 This action is based, at least in part, on our Schedule 38 Order that finds wholesale power purchased to meet capacity constraints already contains 143 144 capacity value; therefore, adding the SCCT value to the wholesale market 145 price is excessive. We note, however, the peak and off-peak rates PacifiCorp 146 proposes for Schedule 37 are equal during the resource sufficiency period 147 (with the SCCT costs removed). In other words, the capacity value contained 148 in the wholesale power purchase to meet peak hour constraints is averaged 149 across all hours in the proposed rates...To examine the effects of this 150 particular difference in the Schedule 37 and 38 methods, we direct PacifiCorp 151 to file a potential adjustment to the Schedule 37 method that produces distinct peak and off-peak prices in the resource sufficiency period."<sup>5</sup> 152
- 153 In its December 30, 2014, Order on Review the Commission stated:
- 154 "While it remains our goal to produce logically consistent avoided cost 155 pricing in Schedule 37 and Schedule 38, we recognize the record in this case presents no alternative means, aside from the fractional SCCT value, 156 for calculating the full Schedule 37 avoided capacity cost during resource 157 158 constrained months in the period of resource sufficiency. Thus, pending 159 receipt of additional evidence in a future proceeding, we will maintain the 160 SCCT cost component in Schedule 37 to account for the value of capacity avoided in the constrained months during years in which PacifiCorp is 161 otherwise resource sufficient. We await the presentation of evidence in 162 future Schedule 37 proceedings describing any alternative approach for 163 164 valuing avoided capacity costs and peak and off-peak avoided costs during the period of resource sufficiency."<sup>6</sup> 165
- 166 The Company's proposal in this case to eliminate the fixed costs of an SCCT from the
- 167 sufficiency period and to differentiate on-and off-peak prices paid to the QF is consistent
- 168 with the Commission's past orders and is also consistent with the approach used for
- 169 Schedule 38.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Docket Nos. 14-035-55 and 14-035-T04, Report and Order Issued October, 21, 2014 page 18.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Docket Nos. 14-035-55 and 14-035-T04, Order on Review, December 30, 2014, page 14.

## Q. Is it appropriate to rely on the Company's IRP in determination of Schedule 37 rates?

A. Yes. The current method for calculating Schedule 37 rates is directly dependent upon the
Company's IRP, including the demarcation of the resource deficiency period and the type
and cost of the deferrable resource. During the resource sufficiency period the IRP
identifies that the Company is avoiding FOTs, or short-term firm market purchases, and
therefore reflect avoided capacity costs. It makes no logical sense for the Company to pay
avoided costs based on an SCCT that it is not actually avoiding, or for it to build SCCTs
during the resource sufficiency period for QFs to avoid.

The Commission has consistently referred back to the Company's IRP when determining whether proposed avoided cost rates are appropriate. When the Commission found in Docket No. 12-035-100 that additional capacity costs should not be added in the sufficiency period for the Proxy/PDDRR method it concluded, "The evidence proffered by the Company and the Office shows a QF's displacement of FOTs, as determined within the GRID model, results in what PacifiCorp would have otherwise paid for capacity purchases."

# 186 Q. How did the Company calculate Schedule 37 avoided capacity costs during the 187 sufficiency period in this filing?

A. In this filing the Company calculated the sufficiency period avoided costs using the
 GRID model, including the displacement of FOTs identified in the IRP. The avoidance of
 short-term firm market purchases is readily identifiable in the GRID study results
 provided as Confidential Appendix 3 to the workpapers supporting the Company's filing.
 In support of its proposal to eliminate imputation of SCCT fixed costs during the

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193 sufficiency period, the Company included in the GRID model calculation the FOTs 194 identified in the 2015 IRP, and reflected partial displacement of these FOTs when 195 calculating avoided costs. This partial displacement of FOTs in the GRID model is the 196 same as done for large QFs under the Proxy/PDDRR method. To reflect the value of 197 energy generated by a QF during on- and off-peak periods, the Company shaped the 198 avoided costs produced by the GRID model into distinct on- and off-peak prices based on 199 the relationship of Palo Verde on- and off-peak market prices to flat market prices at Palo 200 Verde each month.

Q. Why is it appropriate to shape avoided costs by applying the Palo Verde market
 shape to the average avoided costs from the GRID model?

A. Calculating the avoided costs using the GRID model, with on- and off peak prices differentiated based on the shape of Palo Verde market prices, best aligns the avoided cost prices with the costs that are actually avoided during the sufficiency period and recognizes the difference in value of energy generated by a QF during on- and off-peak periods. Table 2 illustrates the price differential resulting from the Company's proposal by comparing the flat avoided costs from GRID to the on- and off-peak prices proposed in this filing for a base load QF.

	GRID Model Avoided Cost	PV Shaped Avoided Costs		Differential			
	(a)	(b)	(c)	(b) - (a)	(c) - (a)		
Year	Average	On-Peak	Off-Peak	On-Peak	Off-Peak		
2015	\$23.92	\$27.73	\$22.01	\$3.81	(\$1.91)		
2016	\$23.97	\$27.50	\$22.12	\$3.53	(\$1.85)		
2017	\$25.24	\$28.14	\$23.22	\$2.90	(\$2.02)		
2018	\$27.47	\$30.92	\$24.82	\$3.45	(\$2.65)		
2019	\$28.73	\$32.46	\$26.06	\$3.73	(\$2.67)		
2020	\$29.34	\$32.92	\$26.33	\$3.58	(\$3.01)		
2021	\$32.33	\$36.69	\$28.86	\$4.36	(\$3.47)		
2022	\$34.95	\$39.96	\$31.31	\$5.01	(\$3.64)		
2023	\$38.02	\$42.55	\$34.33	\$4.53	(\$3.69)		
2024	\$39.02	\$44.57	\$34.67	\$5.55	(\$4.35)		
2025	\$41.39	\$46.55	\$37.02	\$5.16	(\$4.37)		
2026	\$42.80	\$47.94	\$38.70	\$5.14	(\$4.10)		
2027	\$44.67	\$48.79	\$39.54	\$4.12	(\$5.13)		

Table 2

Q. Why is the Company's proposed approach more accurate than including the fixed
costs of a SCCT?

212 A. Avoided cost prices during the sufficiency period must be consistent with the Company's 213 resource procurement plans to avoid burdening retail customers with QF costs that are 214 higher than the costs actually avoided by the Company. Consistent with the customer 215 indifference standard under PURPA, the avoided costs modeled in GRID accurately 216 represent the energy and capacity costs that can be avoided during the sufficiency period, 217 including displacement of short-term firm market transactions. Imputing the fixed costs 218 of a fictitious SCCT the Company has no plans to build on top of the avoided costs from 219 GRID double counts avoided capacity costs because the average costs from GRID 220 already include avoided firm market transactions. Table 3 compares the average avoided 221 costs from GRID to the Company's proposal and to the avoided costs that would result if 222 the Company's proposed changes are rejected (i.e. SCCT costs are included in the

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sufficiency period).<sup>7</sup> Note that the off-peak prices under the SCCT method are equal to 223 the average avoided costs from the GRID model. 224

	GRID Model Avoided Cost	PV Shaped Av	voided Costs	Avoided Costs Including SCCT Costs		Difference	Difference
	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(d)-(b)	(e)-(c)
Year	Average	On-Peak	Off-Peak	On-Peak	Off-Peak	On-Peak	Off-Peak
2015	\$23.92	\$27.73	\$22.01	\$34.77	\$23.92	\$7.04	\$1.91
2016	\$23.97	\$27.50	\$22.12	\$35.08	\$23.97	\$7.58	\$1.85
2017	\$25.24	\$28.14	\$23.22	\$38.46	\$25.24	\$10.32	\$2.02
2018	\$27.47	\$30.92	\$24.82	\$39.05	\$27.47	\$8.13	\$2.65
2019	\$28.73	\$32.46	\$26.06	\$40.55	\$28.73	\$8.09	\$2.67
2020	\$29.34	\$32.92	\$26.33	\$43.42	\$29.34	\$10.50	\$3.01
2021	\$32.33	\$36.69	\$28.86	\$46.71	\$32.33	\$10.02	\$3.47
2022	\$34.95	\$39.96	\$31.31	\$51.73	\$34.95	\$11.77	\$3.64
2023	\$38.02	\$42.55	\$34.33	\$55.17	\$38.02	\$12.62	\$3.69
2024	\$39.02	\$44.57	\$34.67	\$56.53	\$39.02	\$11.96	\$4.35
2025	\$41.39	\$46.55	\$37.02	\$63.76	\$41.39	\$17.21	\$4.37
2026	\$42.80	\$47.94	\$38.70	\$63.35	\$42.80	\$15.41	\$4.10
2027	\$44.67	\$48.79	\$39.54	\$65.66	\$44.67	\$16.87	\$5.13

Table 3

225 The results in Table 3 demonstrate that adding the fixed costs of a SCCT over-states the 226 avoided capacity costs because it includes the avoided firm market transactions and costs of a resource the Company can't actually avoid. 227 228 Does this conclude your direct testimony? **Q**. 229 A. Yes.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Work papers used for the calculation of avoided costs rates which includes SCCT costs are provided as Confidential Appendix 4 to the Company's filing.