

Gary A. Dodge, #0897
HATCH, JAMES & DODGE
10 West Broadway, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: 801-363-6363
Facsimile: 801-363-6666
Email: gdodge@hjdllaw.com
Attorneys for Complainants

BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH

<p>In the Matter of the Formal Complaint Against Questar Gas Company Regarding Nomination Procedures and Practices for Transportation Service Customers</p>	<p>Docket No. 14-057-19</p> <p>PREFILED REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF MATTHEW MEDURA</p>
--	--

The Complainants in this docket hereby submit the Prefiled Rebuttal Testimony of
Matthew Medura of CIMA Energy LTD.

DATED this 10th day of September 2014.

HATCH, JAMES & DODGE

/s/ _____
Gary A. Dodge

Attorneys for Complainants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served by email this 10th day of September 2014 on the following:

Questar Gas Company:

Colleen Larkin Bell	colleen.bell@questar.com
Jennifer Nelson Clark	jennifer.clark@questar.com
Barrie McKay	barrie.mckay@questar.com

Division of Public Utilities:

Patricia Schmid	pschmid@utah.gov
Justin Jetter	jjetter@utah.gov
Chris Parker	chrisparker@utah.gov
Artie Powell	wpowell@utah.gov
Carolyn Roll	croll@utah.gov

Office of Consumer Services:

Brent Coleman	brentcoleman@utah.gov
Michele Beck	mbeck@utah.gov
Danny Martinez	dannymartinez@utah.gov

Utah Association of Energy Users:

Gary Dodge	gdodge@hjdllaw.com
Kevin Higgins	khiggins@energystrat.com
Neal Townsend	ntownsend@energystrat.com

Nucor Steel:

Damon E. Xenopoulos	dex@bbrslaw.com
Jeremy R. Cook	jrc@pkhlawyers.com

Federal Executive Agencies:

Karen White	Karen.White.13@us.af.mil
Christopher Thompson	Christopher.Thompson.5@us.af.mil
Gregory Fike	Gregory.Fike@us.af.mil
Thomas Jernigan	Thomas.Jernigan@us.af.mil

US Magnesium:

Roger Swenson	roger.swenson@prodigy.net
---------------	---------------------------

Summit Energy:

Larry R. Williams	larry@summitcorp.net
-------------------	----------------------

Utility Cost Management Consultants:

Floyd J. Rigby	FloydR@ucmc-usa.com
Travis R. Rigby	TravisR@ucmc-usa.com
Bruce Floyd Rigby	Bruce@ucmc-usa.com

The Home Builders Association of the State of Utah:

Ross Ford	ross@utahhba.com
-----------	------------------

Dunford Bakers, Inc.:

Dale Hatch	dhatch@dunfordbakers.com
------------	--------------------------

Utah Asphalt Pavement Association:

Douglas E. Griffith	dgriffith@keslerrust.com
Reed Ryan	reed@utahasphalt.org

Emery County Economic Development:

Michael McCandless	mikem@emery.utah.gov
David Blackwell	daveb@emery.utah.gov

Industrial Gas Users:

William J. Evans	bevans@parsonsbehle.com
Vicki M. Baldwin	vbaldwin@parsonsbehle.com

Shell Energy North America (US), L.P.:

Katherine B. Edwards	kbe@kbelaw.com
John Paul Floom	jpf@kbelaw.com
Erica L. Rancilio	elr@kbelaw.com
Amy Gold	amy.gold@shell.com

/s/ _____

BEFORE

THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH

Rebuttal Testimony of Matthew Medura

On behalf of Complainants

Docket No. 14-057-19

September 10, 2014

1 **INTRODUCTION**

2 **Q. Are you the same Matthew Medura who submitted direct testimony on behalf of the**
3 **Complainants in this docket?**

4 A. Yes, I am.

5 **Q. What is the purpose of your rebuttal testimony?**

6 A. I will respond to direct testimony filed by Questar Gas Company (“Questar”) witnesses Tina
7 M. Faust and William F. Schwarzenbach. I will also briefly respond to the direct testimony
8 of Division of Public Utilities witness Douglas Wheelwright and Office of Consumer
9 Services witness Gavin Mangelson.

10

11 **RESPONSE TO DIRECT TESTIMONY OF TINA FAUST**

12 **Q. What is your general reaction to Ms. Faust’s direct testimony?**

13 A. I disagree with Ms. Faust’s claims that task force meetings were productive, that Questar
14 remains willing to meet with interested parties, and that TS customers are better off as a result
15 of Questar’s unilateral, unapproved elimination of its long-standing pooling/aggregation
16 service. CIMA works with and provides services to several dozen TS customers, all of whom
17 now face the increased risks of specific supply cuts, imbalance and non-curtailment penalties
18 and higher prices for natural gas supply from Questar’s changes on July 1.

19 **Q. On lines 36-41 of her testimony, Ms. Faust claims that task force meetings were**
20 **productive, that “discussions are ongoing” and that Questar is willing to continue to**
21 **meet with interested parties. How do you respond?**

22 A. In my view, the task force meetings were not productive, the discussions were not pursued in
23 good faith, and the discussions were terminated prematurely. Ms. Faust's professed willingness
24 to continue meeting with interested parties seems moot with respect to this Complaint in light
25 of the letter we received on June 18, 2014 identifying Questar Gas' "preferred solution" to the
26 issues at hand, which did not include pooling. Continued good faith discussions regarding the
27 implementation of pooling services would be most welcome by Complainants.

28 **Q. Ms. Faust's testimony refers to the December 5, 2013 gas curtailments and their impacts**
29 **on TS customers (lines 42-52). Do the events of that day support Questar's positions in**
30 **this docket?**

31 A. No. The upstream supply disruptions of December 5, 2013 are largely outside the relevant
32 scope of the issues in this docket. Questar's own gas supplies at the affected processing
33 plants were not timely delivered to the city gate that day, despite its highly trumpeted firm
34 transportation assets. Supply disruptions happen at various times regardless of the nature of
35 the upstream supply or transportation arrangements.

36 Also, Questar failed on December 5 to take simple actions that could have avoided
37 customer impacts, such as timely notifying TS customers' agents of the supply disruptions
38 (which Questar knew about hours before it communicated that knowledge to others). Had it
39 timely notified the agents, they could have promptly secured alternative supplies. Rather,
40 Questar simply issued sporadic notices to curtail usage directly to many of our TS customers
41 before CIMA had even been notified by upstream pipelines of the supply disruptions, which
42 occurred in the normal reporting process for Cycle 3. Had Questar provided timely
43 communication to CIMA of the supply curtailment issues, we could have remedied the situation

44 by bringing in alternate gas supplies in the next cycle, avoiding costly and disruptive usage
45 curtailments to many of our customers. In fact, in the confusion of that day, CIMA sold off gas
46 supply directed at its citygate customers into alternate markets while awaiting direction from
47 Questar Gas as to the extent of the requested curtailment notices.

48 In any event, the specific upstream supply and transportation arrangements used by
49 Questar and TS customer agents are not relevant to this docket. The issue is whether Questar
50 should continue to provide a pooling/aggregation service that it has long provided. We are
51 simply seeking an extension of a valuable utility service that Questar terminated abruptly and
52 without Commission approval, imposing significant new costs and risks on Utah companies.

53 QGC claims it is important for TS customers to be aware of the upstream contract
54 numbers being used by their Agents for delivering gas supply to the citygate. To the contrary,
55 it makes no difference to them. The December 5, 2013 cuts were not related to transportation
56 arrangements on Questar Pipeline. Rather, supply cuts impacted delivery volumes for all
57 transporters regardless of transportation contract number or level of service, including QGC's
58 own firm transportation contract. Questar Pipeline did not curtail transportation because of
59 pipeline constraints but rather due to a supply shortfall. By learning the upstream
60 transportation contract number the TS customer gains no knowledge of value. In contrast,
61 pooling or an ability to aggregate supply from multiple sources at the citygate into a single
62 contract for each Agent and all of the Agent's TS customers is of value, and can easily be
63 provided by QGC by simply reinstating and formalizing the pooling aggregation privilege
64 that was previously available.

65 **Q. Ms. Faust claims that QGC has never offered a pooling service (lines 78, 139-140). Do**
66 **you agree?**

67 A. No. By allowing TS customers and their agents to nominate supplies to a single downstream
68 “contract” agreed to by suppliers and Agents at the citygate, the service has been available for
69 years. In practice, aggregated supplies delivered to Questar on Questar Pipeline acted as a
70 pool, and were confirmed by Questar Gas from a single upstream entity in its system.
71 Semantics aside, it is indisputable that Questar long offered, and then terminated, a valuable
72 pooling/aggregation service for its TS customers

73 **Q. Ms. Faust claims that Questar’s refusal to offer pooling/aggregation is beneficial to TS**
74 **customers because of increased transparency and because it allegedly facilitates better**
75 **communications (lines 92-118). How do you respond?**

76 A. I do not know to whom or for whom Ms. Faust is speaking in claiming that TS customers
77 benefit from the loss of supply pooling/aggregation at the city gate. The unanimous view of
78 the Agents and TS customers who are Complainants in this docket, as well as many TS
79 customers for whom CIMA provides services, is that the loss of pooling/aggregation is highly
80 detrimental to TS customers, with no measurable benefits.

81 TS customers contract with their agents for firm gas supply delivered to the city gate.
82 The firmness of the supply is the obligation of the Agent, and negotiated contractual provisions
83 protect TS customers if the agent fails to perform. CIMA has not heard from its TS customers
84 a desire to identify specific upstream assets used to deliver contractually firm gas to the citygate.
85 Upstream supply and transportation arrangements used by TS customers and their agents, as
86 well as potential non-performance by agents, are red-herring issues that are outside the scope
87 of this docket.

88 Questar's claims as to benefits of transparency are illusory. The alleged transparency
89 benefits become moot when supply disruptions occur at a processing plant before entering a
90 firm transport contract on the interstate pipeline. In fact, Questar's refusal to allow
91 pooling/aggregation at its city gate introduces greater risk to TS customers because specific
92 upstream supplies must now be tied to specific downstream contracts. Questar's own gas supply
93 customers do not face this risk, as Questar aggregates all of its sales customers' usage so that
94 the risk of supply curtailments (like December 5, 2013) is spread among all customers. That is
95 exactly what the Complainants again seek for TS customers.

96 The claim that the current process facilitates better communication is similarly illusory.
97 As described above, there was very little communication with TS customers or their agents on
98 December 5, 2013, other than a brief notice via email or by phone to many TS customers to
99 dramatically reduce usage within two hours. Moreover, the limited communications that did
100 take place between Questar representatives and our TS customers confused the customers to
101 the point that they reached out to us, as their agent, for explanations and answers about what
102 was happening. The claim that this new process will facilitate better customer communications
103 between Questar and the TS customers is false. Our customers tend to contact us for answers
104 in any case. Timely communication between Questar *and the agents* could have avoided the
105 problems of December 5, 2013, and could do so in the future. Also, a formal pooling of supplies
106 and associated rankings of pro rata supply cuts would significantly mitigate the impacts on
107 customers of supply disruptions.

108 **Q. What is your response to Ms. Faust’s claim that agents are not regulated and her**
109 **suggestion that they should not be permitted to ask the Commission for resumption of**
110 **pooling (lines 124-128)?**

111 A. That claim is unreasonable. The agents operate within the terms of the approved and
112 applicable tariffs of the upstream pipelines and local distribution companies. The agents and
113 TS customers who are Complainants in this docket are seeking Commission assistance in
114 preserving a valuable, long-term benefit previously provided to Utah businesses because the
115 Commission has ultimate control over the services provided by Questar. Questar is a
116 regulated utility because it wields monopoly power in supplying natural gas transportation
117 services within Utah. Questar Pipeline is regulated for similar reasons as to interstate
118 transportation. Others involved in the development, transportation and delivery of natural gas
119 services are not regulated because they need not be -- they operate in a competitive
120 environment and lack monopoly power. It is unfair to suggest that TS customers and their
121 agents who are at the mercy of Questar’s monopoly power should not be permitted to petition
122 the Commission for relief from unreasonable and unlawful acts of the regulated utility.

123 **Q. Ms. Faust suggests that a pooling/aggregation service would “undo” the “benefits” that**
124 **TS customers have allegedly received and allow agents to “mask” information (lines**
125 **129-134). What is your response?**

126 A. As discussed above, any such claimed benefits are illusory and of little or no value to Utah
127 companies. Most TS Customers contract for contractually firm gas supplies delivered to the
128 citygate, with financial remedies for non-performance. TS customers are not asking for
129 information on specific upstream assets or contract numbers used in performing this service.
130 Simply stated, there are no benefits to be undone.

131 **Q. Ms. Faust also suggests that additional costs might be incurred with pooling (lines 135-**
132 **138). Do you agree?**

133 A. Pooling/aggregation services have been provided by Questar for years, and there is no reason
134 to think that additional costs will be incurred if those services are reinstated. In any event,
135 Questar has provided no evidence of any such additional costs. The Complainants are not
136 asking for anything other than just and reasonable services at just and reasonable rates. Cost
137 issues can be addressed, if and when appropriate, if Questar ever identifies additional or
138 incremental costs for once again providing this valuable customer service.

139

140 **RESPONSE TO DIRECT TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM SCHWARZENBACH**

141 **Q. What is your general reaction to Mr. Schwarzenbach's direct testimony?**

142 A. Most of Mr. Schwarzenbach's testimony is largely irrelevant to the issues in this docket. The
143 issue is whether Questar should be required to continue to allow supply pooling/aggregation at
144 its citygate. Mr. Schwarzenbach's testimony diverts attention from this core issue by describing
145 Questar Gas' approach to upstream supply and transportation assets and by suggesting that TS
146 customers and their agents should follow its example.

147 The nature of upstream supply and transportation arrangements used by Questar and
148 other marketers and suppliers is irrelevant to the issue of whether citygate supply aggregation
149 is valuable to Utah companies and should be resumed. Moreover, the reason that so many Utah
150 companies have sought out gas marketing companies with a variety of alternative gas supply
151 and transportation assets is presumably because those companies have demonstrated an ability
152 to deliver reliable gas supplies at reduced prices compared to the utility's service. The

153 marketing companies are well aware of all upstream supply and transportation options, and use
154 and maximize those aggressively in order to deliver benefits and lower costs to Utah companies
155 and institutions. Marketing companies do not precisely duplicate Questar's gas supply and
156 management arrangements for good reasons, including the fact that similar arrangements are
157 not always available, and are expensive. The focus of this case should remain squarely on
158 whether Questar should be permitted to capriciously eliminate a significant service within its
159 electronic system that had long been made available to Utah companies and their Agents.

160 **Q. On lines 59-63, Mr. Schwarzenbach describes how nominations used to occur. Is his**
161 **description accurate?**

162 A. His description is generally correct, although it should be noted that in practice the system
163 allowed an informal pooling contract identified and agreed to by the Agent and Supplier that
164 was confirmed when upstream supplies matched downstream nominations. It is the loss of this
165 service or privilege that led Complainants to open this docket.

166 **Q. Mr. Schwarzenbach claims that QGC is required to comply with Questar Pipeline's**
167 **policies (lines 73-79)? Do you agree?**

168 A. Generally, yes. However, it is not relevant to the relief requested in this docket that QGC
169 must comply with Questar Pipeline's electronic confirmation requirements. As explained in
170 detail in direct testimony of several witnesses, electronic confirmations with supply pooling
171 coexist on a regular basis on pipelines and local distribution companies throughout the
172 country. We support the use of electronic confirmations.

173 **Q. Like Ms. Faust, Mr. Schwarzenbach claims that QGC does not nominate to a pool (lines**
174 **81-83). Do you agree?**

175 A. No. Also like Ms. Faust, Mr. Schwarzenbach is using semantics to disguise reality. Questar
176 Gas uses only one “Contract and Entity Nomination” (Contract 9888888) for its nomination
177 to its entire pool of sales customers. Its upstream supply on QPC Contract 241 is effectively
178 nominated to a pool behind its city gate. Location, liquidity, price and other factors affecting
179 gas supply origin are irrelevant to this docket; the Complainants are simply seeking a similar
180 right to nominate to a single contract on the Questar system that we can then distribute among
181 our pools of customers.

182 **Q. Mr. Schwarzenbach claims that pools are not needed and points to a “methodology”**
183 **used by QGC for utilizing upstream transportation and supply options that would**
184 **allegedly replicate the benefits of a supply pool (lines 83-89, 163-171). What do you**
185 **think of his suggestion?**

186 A. Mr. Schwarzenbach’s testimony here appears to misunderstand the nature of Complaint. The
187 gas marketers who supply natural gas services to Utah companies are experienced and
188 sophisticated companies who are aware of, utilize and optimize all available upstream supply
189 and transportation options and assets. It is simplistic and misleading to suggest that all Utah
190 Companies should follow Questar’s example and use the same “gold plated” supply and
191 transportation assets used by Questar Gas. It is the agents’ ability to optimize available assets
192 to deliver reliable, firm supplies to Utah companies at reduced rates that cause hundreds of
193 Utah companies to seek out their services.

194 Moreover, even if all TS customers and agents used the “methodology” advocated by
195 Mr. Schwarzenbach, it would not eliminate the need to break out this aggregated supply to
196 multiple downstream QGC contracts at the city gate delivery point (rather than something

197 similar to 988888). The ability to pool to single contract at the citygate is the crux of the
198 Complaint. Thus my confusion as to his suggested methodology.

199 In any event, as discussed above, the upstream methods of any given supplier in
200 procuring supplies and facilitating delivery to the city gate, whether purchased at the city gate
201 or upstream into Questar Pipeline or other pipelines, are irrelevant. The Complainants are
202 seeking simply to preserve and improve upon an ability to nominate to a single pool contract
203 for their diverse sources of supply, similar to Questar's use of Contract 9888888.

204 Also of note, upstream capacity is often not readily available at competitive rates,
205 especially during peak winter months. This is simply not an option available to all at any given
206 time. Questar Gas refuses to release firm upstream capacity with a citygate delivery point at
207 anything other than full cost, while reserving the right to recall its capacity during peak winter
208 usage periods. Indeed, Questar called back its firm capacity last winter, as it does most winters,
209 making it less than a viable firm option.

210 **Q. Mr. Schwarzenbach claims that adequate gas supplies are available at upstream receipt**
211 **points and suggests that the QGC city gate is neither a necessary nor relevant gas supply**
212 **point for TS customers (Lines 105-116). Do you agree?**

213 A. Absolutely not. To the contrary, the QGC city gate is a very important and liquid wholesale
214 market at which prices are derived from local trading hubs/published indexes based on path of
215 delivery and alternative sale options. Questar Gas itself has listed its citygate delivery points
216 for peaking supplies solicited in an annual RFP for gas supplies, which are priced off of the
217 same published indexes.

218 Due to Questar's elimination of pooling/aggregation at the city gate, sellers are now
219 dis-incentivized to continue selling at the city gate and may elect to bypass that now-
220 complicated market for simpler alternative markets, particularly during critical winter months.
221 Prices for supplies at the city gate will increase in light of the additional nomination burdens.

222 **Q. Mr. Schwarzenbach dismisses the concern over reduction in supply liquidity at the city**
223 **gate by claiming that suppliers will be happy to sell at upstream receipt points (lines**
224 **117-121). Do you agree?**

225 A. No. Producers seek to mitigate transportation costs as much as possible and are not nearly as
226 likely to sell supply at upstream receipt points, which would require them to forgo revenues
227 and transportation cost mitigation built into current wholesale pricing at the city gate or
228 alternate markets.

229 **Q. On lines 130-139, Mr. Schwarzenbach describes potential "problems" that can result**
230 **when suppliers are responsible for transportation. How do you respond?**

231 A. Mr. Schwarzenbach attempts to invent problems that do not exist. Utah companies have
232 consistently turned to gas marketers and suppliers because of the nature of the services they
233 provide. As discussed above, gas supply delivered to Agents on a contractually firm basis is
234 the obligation and at the risk of the supplier, with financial remedies for non-performance.

235 **Q. Mr. Schwarzenbach alleges that Agents are trying to conceal the details of the risks**
236 **faced by TS customers (lines 146-148). What is your response?**

237 A. We strongly object to any suggestion that we are hiding risks from our clients. Our customers
238 understand their risks, rights and remedies, and they are secure with the firm, reliable nature
239 of our services. All firm supplies are secured by contractual damage provisions, which
240 provide the protection desired by customers.

241 **Q. In response to Complainants' confidentiality concerns, QGC argues that, by requiring**
242 **the Agent to take ownership of gas, the necessary confidentiality will be provided and**
243 **transparency will be increased (lines 187-197). What is your response?**

244 A. A formal pooling contract would best also address the confidentiality issue. As indicated
245 above, gas marketers are providing the services that their customers desire, and the specific
246 nature of the upstream assets used are proprietary and irrelevant to his docket. Questar has
247 neither the right nor the obligation to interfere with contractual arrangements between a TS
248 customer and its Agent. Nor can QGC properly dictate the level of service required by Utah
249 companies upstream of its citygate.

250 Moreover, TS customers stand to gain very little in the way of transparency even if
251 they can identify an upstream contract used for their supplies, and it would certainly not
252 eliminate the risk of a supply point or plant going through an unplanned emergency
253 curtailment. A Customer may be able to discover a transportation contract number, but that
254 would not always identify the type or level of service involved.

255 While Questar claims to be protecting TS customers from supply and delivery options
256 they view as substandard, in fact the changes imposed by Questar on Utah companies will make
257 the level of service provided to them less dependable and more susceptible to individual
258 curtailment. It cannot reasonably be denied that Questar's elimination of supply
259 aggregation/pooling at the city gate impacts TS customers negatively. It will make it more
260 difficult for a TS customer to operate its business when its supply point is "allocated" or a Force
261 Majeure event is claimed. Without a pool of supply generated from multiple supply points and
262 delivery contracts, firm TS customers will suffer if the Agents cannot spread the impacts among
263 customers and enforce delivery priorities.

264 If Questar were in fact looking out for the best interests of its Utah business customers,
265 it would ask its customers if they are willing to accept increased knowledge of upstream supply
266 and delivery contracts in exchange for the loss of their Agents' flexibility and ability to mitigate
267 supply disruptions and imbalance penalties during periods of supply disruption or operational
268 constraints. Had they done so, they would have found, as we have, that our customers seek
269 reliable, reasonably priced natural gas supply and balancing services that we have traditionally
270 been able to supply them, which ability has been damaged by Questar's actions.

271 **Q. Mr. Schwarzenbach claims that you misunderstand the issue of imbalance charges, and**
272 **argues that no tariff changes have been made to the imbalance provisions and**
273 **imbalance trading is still permitted (lines 206-212). How do you respond?**

274 A. It is Questar that has misunderstood the issue. By eliminating gas pooling/aggregation,
275 individual customers are at greater risk of daily imbalances and potential daily imbalance
276 penalties during OFO periods and usage curtailments than they were when pooling was
277 allowed. With pooling, a customer was not always tied to a specific supply source and its
278 agents and suppliers could use all available resources to replace lost supplies and to mitigate
279 delivery disruptions and daily imbalance penalties. Without pooling, TS customers now face
280 much greater risks of adverse consequences during periods of supply disruption or force
281 majeure events when their specific supply sources are disrupted.

282 **Q. Mr. Schwarzenbach dismisses any concerns over daily imbalance penalties by saying**
283 **that no "additional" penalties will be imposed and that daily imbalances may be**
284 **exchanged (lines 213-216). Does this resolve your concerns?**

285 A. No. Again, Mr. Schwarzenbach has misunderstood or misstated our concerns. The imbalance
286 provisions have not changed and new penalties have not been added. However, the
287 elimination of pooling increases the risk to individual TS customers that daily imbalance
288 penalties may be imposed on them during periods of curtailment of their specific supply
289 sources.

290 **Q. Mr. Schwarzenbach claims that pooling/aggregation services do not reduce the risk of**
291 **gas supply disruptions for customers (lines 239-254). Is he correct?**

292 A. Mr. Schwarzenbach is again using semantics to confuse the issue. Complainants do not claim
293 that pools reduce the risk that a supply disruption will occur. However, pooling significantly
294 reduces potential adverse impacts of supply disruptions when they do occur with respect to
295 any given customer or group of customers whose supply source is affected. Spreading the
296 consequences of supply cuts among many customers rather than a few is the essential point of
297 pooling, as well as allowing us to readily nominate supplies in a timely manner from other
298 supply points when needed.

299 **Q. Mr. Schwarzenbach suggests that allowing smaller reductions to be spread over many**
300 **TS customers creates problems for QGC (lines 255-258). What is your response?**

301 A. I do not understand how Questar can claim that automatically spreading supply cuts among
302 many rather than a few or a single customer is not in TS Customers' best interests.
303 Operationally it is the same either way to Questar's system. But under the new regime it is
304 precisely the "schools, hospitals, greenhouses, etc." that would singularly be required to
305 curtail usage rather than perhaps having the cuts spread among many to mitigate any severe
306 curtailments or significant individual penalties. Pro rata supply cuts to a pool of many
307 customers is a standard industry practice in use on many pipelines and LDCs. In any event,

308 these claimed problems hardly outweigh the severe negative consequences of Questar's
309 actions on hundreds of important Utah companies, businesses and institutions that rely upon
310 third party agents and suppliers for reliable, reasonably priced natural gas services.

311 **Q. Mr. Schwarzenbach references the December 5, 2013 curtailments and claims that**
312 **“many” customers do not understand the risks of their gas supply (lines 258-261). Do**
313 **you agree?**

314 A. I have heard this claim made, but never supported by any concrete evidence. I am confident
315 that CIMA's clients understand their risks and their rights. As discussed above, TS
316 Customers contract for firm supply to the city gate with financial remedies for non-
317 performance. The specific method of delivery to the city gate is not relevant to them, or to the
318 issues raised in this docket.

319 Contracting for upstream capacity is not the panacea that Questar makes it out to be,
320 as evidenced by the events of December 5, 2013 when supply was cut at processing plants. In
321 many instances delivered gas from third party suppliers with primary in-path transportation to
322 the citygate is preferable to the secondary or “flexed firm” and recallable capacity that
323 Questar Gas generally releases into the market.

324 We have discussed with Questar an effective means of ranking supply curtailments to
325 end users within a pool. Questar acknowledged that this approach was workable. Moreover,
326 it is standard practice among most other pipelines and LDCs of which we are aware. The issues
327 of December 5, 2013, were not unique to TS customers; Questar also experienced supply cuts
328 of its gas supplies. Questar was able to utilize its pooled/aggregated supplies and other
329 upstream rights to minimize impacts on its sales customer base using the 9888888 contract. In
330 this way Questar did not have to single out any individual customer to take the cut directly, as

331 the Agents and TS customers would now have to do. Had there been timely communication
332 from Questar to TS Customers and their Agents, similar upstream assets could have been
333 deployed to compensate for the supply shortfalls for TS customers, which would have avoided
334 the need for the curtailment notices that were sent hours later. For CIMA, total customer
335 curtailments on that day greatly exceeded the affected gas supplies. Unnecessary adverse
336 consequences to Utah companies could have been avoided and could be avoided in the future
337 if Questar would consider and protect the best interests of its TS customers as it does with its
338 sales customers.

339 **Q. Like Ms. Faust, Mr. Schwarzenbach claims that pooling is not in the best interests of TS**
340 **customers (lines 276-288). What is your view?**

341 A. The evidence demonstrates to the contrary. Moreover, the suggestion that TS Customers'
342 gas supplies are significantly riskier than that supplied by Questar Gas is inaccurate and self-
343 serving. If anything, it was Questar's abrupt termination of pooling in the face of unanimous
344 customer and agent support for continued pooling that has caused increased risks to TS
345 Customers.

346 **RESPONSE TO DOUGLAS WHEELWRIGHT**

347 **Q. What is your general reaction to Mr. Wheelwright's testimony?**

348 A. I appreciate Mr. Wheelwright's testimony, including his recognition that other solutions may
349 be available that could satisfy both Questar and its TS customers (lines 111-117), that
350 elimination of pooling does not address most of the problems experienced on December 5, 2013
351 (lines 129-136), that pooling offers increased flexibility and efficiency for TS customers and
352 their agents (lines 143-145, 165-168), that pooling on Questar Gas is more efficient and simple

353 than other options (lines 175-182), and that Questar's elimination of pooling appears to have
354 negatively impacted the city gate market and TS customer costs and risks (lines 210-211, 236-
355 238, 287-294). I also applaud his call for additional exploration and collaboration on these
356 issues (lines 332-333).

357 **Q. On lines 53-78, Mr. Wheelwright lists a number of issues that he thought would/should**
358 **be addressed in the task force collaborative process. Do you agree?**

359 A. Yes. We were and are prepared to discuss all of these issues. Unfortunately, Questar steered
360 the discussions to other issues, such as additional proposed charges for TS customers, which
361 was not among the issues identified for discussion. QGC then abruptly terminated discussions
362 after announcing that it would not pursue pooling any further, and that no further task force
363 meetings were contemplated.

364 I also note that, while we were and are prepared to continue discussions on all of the
365 issues identified by Mr. Wheelwright, they are largely outside the scope of the issues raised in
366 our complaint.

367 **Q. Mr. Wheelwright identifies as a primary concern of the Division the need for**
368 **transparency and proper disclosure to end use customers (lines 83-86). How do you**
369 **respond to this concern?**

370 A. I understand the Division's concern for adequate transparency and disclosure to Utah
371 companies. However, I invite the Division to consult with Utah TS customers on these
372 issues, as opposed to unsupported claims made by Questar. We are confident the Division
373 will learn that CIMA customers are adequately informed of their risks and contractual rights,
374 and that they are happy with the services they receive. Also, we believe that facilitating

375 increased and more timely communications from Questar to TS customers and their agents
376 would be very beneficial.

377 **Q. Mr. Wheelwright addresses confusion over monthly balancing requirements on lines**
378 **153-168. Do you agree that this issue has been confused?**

379 A. Yes. Balancing requirements are not at issue in this docket. Marketers manage imbalances
380 on an individual customer basis each month with imbalance trades among the agent's
381 customers allowed to offset out of tolerance positions. The concern we have raised is over
382 the increased risk to individual TS customers of daily imbalance penalties during OFO
383 periods or penalties for failure to curtail as a result of the loss of flexibility previously
384 available through supply pooling.

385 **Q. Mr. Wheelwright also discusses some of the difficulties in accurately forecasting**
386 **customer usage (lines 255-265). Do you have any comments?**

387 A. We make nominations and adjustments as appropriate based on the most recent consumption
388 information available from the Questline system, weather forecasts and customer input.
389 However, our task is significantly complicated by the two-day lag in Questline usage data
390 needed for Cycle 1 nominations, and by the fact that usage data that is provided is often
391 incorrect and revised several days later. With all of the tools previously available to us,
392 including supply pooling, we have been able to reasonably manage the difficulties in
393 forecasting usage. Without pooling, the job has become more difficult. Also, as indicated
394 above, more timely and direct communication of known disruptions and events would
395 significantly improve our ability to respond and assist Questar in maintaining system balance.

396 **Q. Mr. Wheelwright also discusses the potential for increased costs due to pooling (lines**
397 **295-307). Have you seen any evidence of such increased costs?**

398 A. No. As indicated above, Questar offered pooling/aggregation for years and there is no reason
399 to expect that resumed pooling will cause increased costs. There is certainly no evidence in
400 this docket supporting any such additional costs. We are not suggesting that identified and
401 demonstrated incremental costs be disregarded. We assume all utility services will be
402 supplied at just and reasonable rates as determined in an appropriate docket.

403 **Q. Mr. Wheelwright recognizes that QGC is not required to purchase and balance gas for**
404 **each customer as it is now requiring of TS customers (lines 311-314), but is unclear as to**
405 **whether or not the Agents are “taking advantage of the same opportunity” used by**
406 **QGC to nominate to a single transportation contract (lines 314-318). Can you respond?**

407 A. As explained above, the Agents employ all available upstream supply and transportation
408 options to provide secure cost-effective services. The “methodology” touted by Questar is
409 one approach, but certainly not the most economical approach. We do not think it is a
410 satisfactory answer to our complaint for Questar to simply argue that gas should be supplied
411 to all TS customers in the same manner that Questar uses for its gas customers, regardless of
412 the cost.

413 Questar delivers its various gas supplies to a single downstream “contract,” using
414 what is effectively a customer pool at the city gate. We simply seek the continued ability to
415 do the same thing.

416

417 **RESPONSE TO GAVIN MANGELSON**

418 **Q. What is your general reaction to Mr. Mangelson’s testimony?**

419 A. I agree with Mr. Mangelson's primary point that a utility service for customers that the Office
420 does not represent is of no concern to the Office or the customers it represents, so long as the
421 service does not shift costs to his customers. We believe we have demonstrated that the
422 requested pooling service is in the public interest in that it is beneficial to Utah companies and
423 institutions, and that there are no adverse impacts on Questar or its other customers. Also, as
424 indicated above, we agree that incremental costs of the requested services, if properly
425 demonstrated in a proper forum, should be borne by those benefitting from the service. At this
426 point, no such showing has been made or attempted, and we have no reason to believe that any
427 incremental costs will be incurred given that Questar has in practice provided a pooling
428 mechanism for years.

429 **Q. Mr. Mangelson suggests that some of the Complainants' testimony addresses issues**
430 **outside the proper scope of this proceeding (lines 113-118). However, he later testifies**
431 **that the Office is concerned about the manner in which imbalances are measured (lines**
432 **150-171). Is this an issue for this docket?**

433 A. No. His testimony relating to imbalance measurement is outside the scope of this docket. In
434 any event, a formal pool will provide public benefits by mitigating imbalance penalties for
435 single customers or groups of customers by spreading the risk of production cuts among the
436 entire pool of customers via rankings.

437 **Q. Does this conclude your rebuttal testimony?**

438 A. Yes.