BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH

In the Matter of the Joint Notice and Application of Questar Gas Company and Dominion Resources, Inc. of Proposed Merger of Questar Corporation and Dominion Resources, Inc.	Docket No. 16-057-01
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REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF JAMES R. CHAPMAN

FOR JOINT APPLICANTS

July 28, 2016

Joint Notice and Application Exhibit 7.0R

JOINT NOTICE AND APPLICATION EXHIBIT

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1		I. INTRODUCTION
2	Q.	Please state your name and business address.
3	A.	My name is James R. Chapman. My business address is 120 Tredegar Street, Richmond,
4		Virginia 23219.
5	Q.	By whom are you employed and what is your position?
6	A.	I am employed by Dominion Resources, Inc. ("Dominion") as Senior Vice President-
7		Mergers & Acquisitions and Treasurer.
8	Q.	What are your qualifications to testify in this proceeding?
9	A.	In my capacity of Treasurer, I am responsible for the structuring and execution of all capital
10		market and other fund-raising transactions for all Dominion entities (which aggregate to
11		some \$75+ billion of market value at present). I am also responsible for leading
12		Dominion's credit rating agency and bank/financial institutional relationships, and I am
13		integrally involved in the company's investor relations activities, in particular those
14		involving fixed income or credit investors. I have listed my qualifications in more detail
15		in Joint Notice and Application Exhibit 7.1R.
16	Q.	Have you previously filed testimony in this case?
17	A.	No.
18	Q.	Are you sponsoring any exhibits?
19	A.	I am sponsoring Joint Notice and Application Exhibits 7.1R through 7.9R.
20	Q.	What is the purpose of your rebuttal testimony?
21	A.	The purpose of my rebuttal testimony is to support the approval of the proposed merger
22		("Merger") between Dominion and Questar Corporation ("Questar Corp."), including
23		Questar Gas Company ("Questar Gas"). After the Merger is effective ("Effective Time"),
24		Questar Corp. will become a wholly-owned subsidiary of Dominion that will continue to

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exist as a separate legal entity (herein referred to as "Dominion Questar"), and Questar Gas (herein referred to as "Dominion Questar Gas") will remain a direct, wholly-owned subsidiary of Dominion Questar and will continue to exist as a separate legal entity with its own complete set of books and records.

In my rebuttal testimony, I will respond to the concerns expressed by the Division of Public 29 Utilities ("Division") and the Office of Consumer Services ("Office"). Specifically, I will 30 respond to certain portions of the testimony from Division Witnesses Douglas D. 31 Wheelwright ("Wheelwright"), Charles E. Peterson ("Peterson"), and Kathleen Kelly 32 ("Kelly") and from Office Witnesses Gavin Mangelson ("Mangelson"), Lane Kollen 33 ("Kollen"), and Richard A. Baudino ("Baudino"). First, I will address concerns raised 34 about credit ratings, the cost of capital, and Merger transaction financing. Second, I will 35 36 address financing concerns relating to Wexpro Company ("Wexpro") and Questar Pipeline Company ("Questar Pipeline"). Third, I will address concerns regarding capital structure 37 38 for Dominion and Dominion Questar Gas. Fourth, I will address protections from the potential financial implications of affiliate operations and activities. Finally, I will address 39 40 additional protective financial provisions Division and Office witnesses recommend.

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II. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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Q. Mr. Chapman do you have any general rebuttal comments?

A. Yes. In this proceeding, various witnesses have articulated concerns with respect to the
financial integrity of Dominion Questar Gas following the Merger. These concerns and
associated recommendations can be boiled down into two broad questions: 1) will there
be any adverse impact to Dominion Questar Gas' access to capital and cost of capital
because of the Merger?; and 2) will Dominion Questar Gas be sufficiently and properly
insulated from other Dominion affiliates in order to protect its financial integrity?

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49 To address such concerns, the Joint Applicants initially proposed a robust package of commitments addressing both of these issues, and have added significantly to these 50 51 commitments in connection with this rebuttal testimony, as I will discuss. With these commitments, along with the nature of this transaction, which involves entities that are 52 53 uniformly committed to the prudent and cost-effective management of financial resources 54 for the benefit of their public utility customers, there will not be an adverse impact to 55 Dominion Questar Gas' access to capital and cost of capital and Dominion Questar Gas will be sufficiently and properly insulated from other Dominion affiliates to protect its 56 financial integrity. My rebuttal testimony will explain why further conditions are 57 unnecessary and not in the best interests of Dominion Questar Gas' customers. 58

59 First, Dominion is committed to preserving the strong credit quality of Ouestar Gas, just 60 as it has with its other regulated operating subsidiaries. Dominion Questar Gas will continue to maintain separate, rated long-term debt. Planned debt offerings by Dominion 61 62 Questar Gas in the near term are limited, and there is no reason to believe that debt financing costs - long-term or short-term - will be adversely impacted by the Merger. Post-63 64 Merger, Dominion will provide equity funding as needed to Dominion Questar Gas to preserve current ranges of equity vs. debt in the capital structure. To date, neither the 65 bondholders of Dominion nor of Questar Corp. entities have expressed or demonstrated 66 any negative reaction to the Merger announcement. While one of the three ratings agencies 67 68 did adjust its rating for the Dominion consolidated family, it notably did not reduce its independent "a" anchor rating for Questar Gas. 69

In short, the credit quality of all Dominion entities is a high priority, and the Commission should be comfortable that Dominion is committed to avoiding any adverse impact to Dominion Questar Gas' credit quality, liquidity or financing costs resulting from the Merger. To substantiate this, the Joint Applicants are committing that, for the first four years following the Effective Time, in any rate proceeding where Dominion Questar Gas' rate of return is established or the utility seeks to reset the previously authorized rate of

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return on rate base, Dominion Questar Gas will demonstrate that its cost of debt proposed
for recovery in rates is not greater than it would have been absent the Merger.

Second, many of the Division's and Office's recommendations revolve around concerns 78 that affiliation with other Dominion entities introduces new or incremental risks to 79 Dominion Questar Gas' customers. Properly structured, Dominion Questar Gas' risk 80 profile will in fact be enhanced in important ways by this Merger with a larger, stable and 81 diversified entity. The question before the Commission is: what is the optimal level of 82 financial separation and protection among the affiliates that will protect customers, on the 83 one hand, but not impose extraordinary burdens or inhibit potential customer benefits of 84 85 the Merger on the other hand.

The Joint Applicants firmly believe that their commitment package strikes the appropriate 86 legal and functional balance. In fact, it is equal to or stronger in all material respects to the 87 88 protections surrounding Dominion's other regulated affiliates and standards for similarly situated market participants. Dominion Questar Gas will be a separate legal and operating 89 entity from other Dominion affiliates, with its own management structure and independent 90 91 access to the debt markets, stand-alone credit ratings and unique books, records, and 92 financial statements. The Joint Applicants commit that Dominion Questar Gas will not 93 transfer material assets or assume liabilities of Dominion or any other subsidiary without Commission approval. Nor will it transfer debt or lend funds to other Dominion entities 94 95 absent such approval.

96 The Division points out other Dominion affiliates own and operate several nuclear 97 generation facilities, which carry an attendant set of risks that are not part of Questar Gas' 98 current basket of risks. However, the risks are appropriately mitigated by legal separation, 99 regulatory oversight, operational experience, federal legislative protection, nuclear 100 decommissioning trusts, and insurance coverage with excess coverage exceeding several

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billion dollars, among other mechanisms. The Joint Applicants are proposing to establishand maintain ample protections for Dominion Questar Gas as part of the merged entity.

Other "ring-fencing" measures proposed by the Division, including certain bankruptcy-103 104 related recommendations such as the creation of a special purpose entity, independent 105 bankruptcy director or non-consolidation opinion that the entity is bankruptcy remote, are not warranted, cost-effective or net beneficial to customers. There are more than 100 106 regulated electric and gas utilities in the United States, and these types of measures are the 107 108 exception and not the rule. The exceptional circumstances would be a foreign parent company; a significantly weaker parent company credit profile; or a parent company with 109 110 differing industry or operating experience from its subsidiary (e.g., a private equity fund owner). None of those exceptional circumstances exist here. 111

112 My rebuttal also responds to the suggestion of an independent board of directors for 113 Dominion Questar Gas with a designated percentage of independent directors. As my 114 testimony will show, this suggestion would not provide a net benefit, particularly given the 115 commitment to a continued strong local management structure for Dominion Questar Gas 116 with operational autonomy.

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III. FINANCING, CREDIT RATING, AND COST OF DEBT ISSUES

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Credit Rating and Cost of Debt Issues

119 Q. Please describe the reaction of the credit agencies to the announcement of the 120 Merger and related transaction financing.

A. As is the norm for transactions of this nature, Dominion held confidential discussions with each of the major credit rating agencies immediately prior to the announcement of the proposed Merger. Therefore, publications of reports by the agencies on the day of the Merger announcement were based on a detailed understanding of Dominion's plans, including the proposed plan for the financing of the Merger.

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126	The specific relevant actions taken on the Merger announcement date by each of the major
127	credit rating agencies are summarized below:
128	• Moody's affirmed its "Baa2/stable" long-term rating of Dominion and affirmed its
129	"A2/stable" long-term rating of Questar Gas.
130	• Fitch affirmed its "BBB+/stable" rating of Dominion. Fitch does not currently
131	rate Questar Gas.
132	• Standard & Poor's ("S&P") made no change to the standalone "anchor" rating of
133	Questar Gas, which is "a". S&P downgraded the long-term Issuer Rating of the
134	consolidated Dominion credit family to "BBB+" from "A-" and revised the rating
135	Outlook upwards to "Stable" from "Negative." Given S&P's consolidated rating
136	methodology, it placed Questar Gas on "CreditWatch Negative" and suggested that
137	the Questar Gas rating would be modified to the Dominion consolidated rating upon
138	closing of the Merger.
139	To put the S&P action relating to Dominion in proper context, the BBB+ rating has
140	been the long-standing publicly disclosed parent company ratings target of
141	Dominion. Exhibit 7.2R shows Dominion's publicly stated ratings targets as of
142	April 2016.

143To summarize, set out below is a table of the relevant credit ratings and the manner in144which they have (or have not) changed since the announcement of the Merger.

	Prior Rating & Outlook				Expected Rating & Outlook upon close			
	Moody's	Fitch	S&P Issuer	S&P Anchor	Moody's	Fitch	S&P issuer ¹	S&P anchor
Dominion	Baa2/Stable	BBB+/Stable		a-	No Change	No Change		No Change
Questar Gas	A2/Stable	N/A		а	No Change	N/A		No Change

¹ S&P downgraded DRI issuer rating on 2/1/2016; Similar issuer rating downgrade expected for Questar Gas, currently rated A/Credit Watch Negative. * Shading indicates only areas of change

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Q. Please discuss your understanding of the difference in S&P's Issuer Rating and its standalone "anchor" rating.

A. S&P uses a strict "consolidated" rating methodology for Issuer Rating. S&P assesses the 148 credit health of an entire corporate family and then places one consolidated maximum 149 150 Issuer Rating on the parent company and on all rated subsidiaries, regardless of the varying credit characteristics of each individual entity. Given this approach—by definition—the 151 152 Issuer Rating for Questar Gas following the completion of the proposed transaction will be adjusted to match the Issuer Rating of Dominion (BBB+). However, this action by S&P 153 would not be an indicator to the capital markets of the credit strength of Ouestar Gas; 154 instead, it would summarize the credit picture of the entire Dominion corporate family after 155 the proposed Merger. I would also not expect that action to impact the cost of long-term 156 debt of Questar Gas. 157

Because of the widely recognized limitations of the consolidated rating methodology as it 158 159 relates to standalone subsidiaries, S&P itself publishes in its credit reports an indicator of the nature of an entity's credit quality before "consolidated" or "family" considerations are 160 161 incorporated into the ratings process. This indicator, which S&P calls the "anchor," was at the "a" level for Questar Gas both prior to the announcement of the proposed Merger 162 163 and as published in the S&P release following its announcement (the anchor ratings are based on the same "AAA+/-" to "BBB+/-" scale, but are denoted with lower case letters to 164 165 distinguish them from overall credit ratings). Again, given that no changes are expected 166 to Questar Gas' profile as a result of the proposed Merger, Dominion would not expect, following the Merger closing, any change to the standalone "anchor" credit profile, which 167 168 is the rating most closely representative of the standalone financial rating of Dominion Questar Gas. 169

In my experience, investors are very familiar with this "consolidated" nuance of S&P's
methodology. As such, for an opinion of the entity-level credit quality of Dominion
Questar Gas, the Joint Applicants expect that investors will rely primarily upon Moody's

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entity-level rating, S&P's "anchor" rating, and of course their own credit analysis, and less
upon the S&P Issuer Rating.

Based on the unchanged S&P standalone "anchor" rating, unchanged Moody's "A2" for Questar Gas, and widespread appreciation in the debt markets for the limitations of the S&P consolidated methodology, I do not believe that there is any reason to expect that this one nominal, and expected, credit rating change in relation to the Merger announcement will adversely impact Questar Gas.

Dominion's operating subsidiary, Virginia Electric and Power Company 180 Q. ("VEPCO"), experienced a change in its S&P Issuer Rating at the time of the Merger 181 announcement based on the S&P consolidated methodology. You suggest that a 182 183 similar Issuer Rating change is likely at Dominion Ouestar Gas following completion 184 of the Merger. Is it possible to derive any conclusions about the potential effect of this rating change at Dominion Questar Gas from the bond market's reaction to 185 VEPCO's similar rating change? You have also suggested that Dominion Ouestar 186 Gas' S&P "anchor" rating will not change as a result of the Merger. Did VEPCO's 187 188 anchor rating change at the time of its S&P Issuer Rating change?

A. As I explained above, with S&P's consolidated credit rating change, our regulated electric
utility subsidiary, VEPCO, also became "BBB+" S&P rated. Yet, neither S&P's "anchor"
rating nor Moody's "A2" rating for VEPCO changed. In that respect, this is highly
analogous to the expected pro forma ratings of Questar Gas for the Merger.

VEPCO's debt, which is primarily in bond format and therefore trades actively on a market with fully disclosed pricing information, provides us with a transparent and unbiased illustration of how debt investors would likely view the same fact pattern at Questar Gas (*i.e.*, an unchanged Moody's rating of "A2" and an adjustment to the consolidated group rating to Dominion's "BBB+" but no change to the S&P standalone "anchor" rating).

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More specifically, Exhibit 7.3R shows an analysis of the trading activity of one actively traded VEPCO bond before and after the downgrade in the consolidated rating. There was no discernible impact on the trading levels (and therefore, cost of debt) due to the announcement of the Merger and the related rating agency commentary. Given the similar fact pattern between VEPCO and Questar Gas, it would be reasonable to expect Questar Gas' trading activity to parallel VEPCO's and therefore, I would expect there to be no discernible impact on the cost of debt for Questar Gas.

205Q.On page 9 of his testimony, Division Witness Peterson asserts that Dominion's206commitment to maintain strong investment grade credit ratings is ambiguous because207an investment grade rating can be as low as an S&P rating of BBB-. Do you have a208response to that statement?

- A. Our stated intention is to "maintain credit metrics which are supportive of <u>strong</u> investment grade ratings." While there is no well-defined delineation between "strong" and "other" investment grade ratings that I am aware of, a reasonable interpretation would be that "strong" applies to an "A" range of rating and above, as opposed to BBB range.
- Exhibit 7.2R shows the investing public Dominion's target rating for its various entities with ratings from the credit rating agencies. This information is available on Dominion's website and used in investor meetings (including meetings with fixed income investors), and demonstrates that the target is notably "A" range for Dominion's operating companies, which would include Dominion Questar Gas following the Merger, and "high BBB" range for Dominion.

Q. Division Witness Kelly (at 22) and Office Witness Baudino (at 7) both raise concerns that following the proposed Merger financing costs for Questar Gas can materially increase and negatively impact customer rates. Do you think these concerns are warranted?

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7.0R Rebuttal Testimony of James R. Chapman

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
- A. I do not think it is likely that financing costs will increase as a result of the Merger or cause
 harm to customers. In fact, the Joint Applicants commit to hold customers harmless against
 any Merger-related increases in cost of debt, as I discuss above.
- Additionally, the total amount of long-term debt outstanding at Questar Gas as of June 30, 2016, was approximately \$535 million, all of which is in the form of fixed-rate bonds. Thus, regardless of the market-perceived credit quality of Questar Gas in the coming years and regardless of credit market conditions or interest rates, the interest expense borne by Questar on its existing long-term debt will not change as a result of the Merger. Until those existing bonds mature, there will be no change to their interest rates, up or down.
- Therefore, any change in long-term debt cost experienced by Questar Gas in the coming years will only come when there are new issuances of long-term debt, which are expected to be modest in size and frequency. For example, in the next 2.5 years, the following are the currently planned (subject to change) issuances for Questar Gas:
- 236 237 238

Accordingly, potential changes in interest rates at Questar Gas are not likely to have any material impact to customer rates.

For context, one may assume that due to the Merger the borrowing cost of Questar Gas changes by 5 basis points (or 0.05%) or 10 basis points (or 0.10%), up or down, although I am aware of no reason to expect any such change. Current credit spreads for Questar Gas on a 10-year basis are in the 115 basis point range. The table below reflects the change in borrowing costs based on different potential changes in credit spreads. For this hypothetical case, the right-hand column indicates the amount that would, through future rate proceedings, be borne (or avoided) by all customers, in all states, that Questar Gas

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248 serves.



Dominion, like Questar Gas, takes the procurement of low-cost debt at its regulated utility entities very seriously, regardless of magnitude. Most importantly, even if there were an increase in financing costs as a result of the Merger, Dominion has committed to hold customers harmless against any Merger-related increases in cost of debt.

253 Q. How do you respond to Mr. Baudino's assertion on pages 7-8 that because a credit 254 downgrade by S&P would require a higher return on equity, which would negatively 255 impact customer rates, "Questar's return on equity should be based on a comparison 256 group of A-rated gas utilities"?

A. As noted above, I don't believe that the move of the Questar Gas credit rating to the consolidated issuer rating of Dominion by S&P will impact the cost of borrowing of Questar Gas. Regardless, the Joint Applicants believe that the factors used to determine Dominion to Questar Gas' return on equity should be reviewed in a general rate case, not in the Merger docket.

Q. Division and Office testimony suggests that the announcement of the Merger and credit rating downgrade translate into higher cost of debt for Dominion and Questar Gas. How do you respond?

A. We have examined investor trading activity, investor communications, and actual borrowing costs associated with Questar Gas' recent long-term financings, and based on

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267 my evaluation of this data, there is no evidence that Questar Gas' cost of debt has increased 268 since the Merger announcement, nor do we expect it to increase in the future due to the 269 Merger.

270 <u>Investor Trading History</u>

271 We can assess market activity surrounding Questar Gas bond trading to understand investor 272 reaction to the announced Merger plans and rating agencies statements related to that announcement as an indicator of potential impacts to Questar Gas' debt. Questar Gas has, 273 274 over the years, issued bonds that are available for trading at any time. When a bond trades, the data regarding each trade must be publicly disclosed through information services such 275 as Bloomberg. Thus, when announcements are made regarding actions or plans which 276 investors view as credit-negative, they fear that the value of their investment in those bonds 277 will go down and they will react. In other words, if professional investors, who have 278 279 hundreds of millions of dollars invested in Questar Gas bonds, thought that the announced Merger and the related credit implications were negative for Questar Gas, the first thing 280 281 they would be expected to do is to sell (or at least offer to sell) their holdings, immediately.

We reviewed all the data regarding these sales and offers to sell. Since the first trading day of this year up until the week preceding the filing of my testimony, *not a single* Questar Gas bond has traded hands based on all available public data. In fact, we could find no evidence of bonds for Questar Gas even being offered for sale. *See* Exhibit 7.4R.

So, while I understand the concerns expressed by the Division and the Office witnesses, there is no evidence that the debt investors who stand to be immediately and directly impacted by any increase in Questar Gas' borrowing costs (which would drive prices of the bonds they hold downwards) share those concerns, at least as is reflected in trading activities on Questar Gas' existing bonds.


291 Investor Feedback

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- 292 Companies such as Dominion and Questar Corp. have very active dialog with their debt 293 and equity investors through the normal investor relations process. Typically, when 294 something happens—an event or an announcement of a planned event (such as a merger)— 295 which is perceived to negatively impact the value of an investor's holdings, the norm is for 296 that investor to quickly and directly communicate its negative perception to the company 297 through company management and its investor relations team.
- If the debt investors who have purchased and hold some \$535 million of Questar Gas bonds expect that the announced Merger will cause its debt costs to increase (which would drive the value of existing bonds downwards), we expect that they would communicate that to Questar Gas or Questar Corp.
- 302 But, to date I understand that the investor relations and management team at Questar have 303 received no such communications from existing bondholders of Questar Gas nor have the 304 investor relations and management team at Dominion.
- 305 <u>Actual Borrowing Costs</u>
- Unrelated to the Merger itself, Questar Gas is in the process of launching a long-term financing. Given that potential investors and bond underwriters (*i.e.*, global investment banks) are certainly aware of the pending Merger and the expected credit rating action(s), and have their own informed views of true impact of those pending actions on the appropriate borrowing costs of Questar Gas, it provides us an opportunity to compare the cost of Questar Gas in recent long-term financings both before and after the announcement of the Merger.



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As the credit spreads (ignoring movements in treasuries) have potentially decreased since the time of these pre-Merger announcement transactions, it seems reasonable to assume that the announcement of the Merger and the related credit rating agency commentary has not led to increased borrowing costs for Questar Gas.

Q. Even though you have presented proxies and actual data to show there is little risk of increased borrowing costs for Questar Gas, how do you propose to protect Dominion Questar Gas' customers if this analysis proves to be incorrect?

While the Joint Applicants believe that the concerns about potential increases in Dominion 330 A. Questar Gas' cost of debt are not warranted, this is certainly a legitimate issue for 331 discussion in a merger proceeding such as this one. The Division and Office have raised 332 valid concerns about customer impacts. Responding to these questions and concerns, the 333 Joint Applicants commit as follows: for the first four years following the Effective Time 334 of the Merger, in any rate proceeding where Dominion Questar Gas' rate of return is 335 336 established or the utility seeks to reset the previously authorized rate of return on rate base, Dominion Questar Gas will demonstrate that its cost of debt proposed for recovery in rates 337 is not greater than would have been incurred absent the Merger. 338

Q. Data provided at the Technical Conference in this proceeding shows that Dominion's borrowing costs overall are lower than Questar Corp.'s. Are there reasons that the

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341 borrowing costs are lower for a company like Dominion compared to a company like 342 Ouestar Corp.?

A. Yes. The cost of existing debt within the Dominion family is actually currently lower than the cost of debt within the Questar family. Exhibit 7.6R shows (based on Bloomberg function WACC) the current consolidated average debt coupon rates for Dominion, Questar, and a number of peer companies (both large cap utility/infrastructure companies and smaller gas-local distribution companies). This analysis shows Dominion's overall costs of borrowing are significantly lower (by approximately 100 basis points, or 1%) than those of Questar Corp., even when considering Dominion's longer average tenor.

There are several reasons that the borrowing costs, as summarized in Exhibit 7.6R, are 350 lower for a company like Dominion versus a company like Questar Corp. First, bond 351 352 issuances, which are large enough to be "index eligible" (at least \$250 million for each tranche), generally achieve superior pricing (*i.e.*, cheaper debt) to those which are not that 353 354 large. Similarly, issuances that are even larger than that threshold achieve better pricing to the degree investors believe they are large enough to be traded with significant liquidity in 355 356 the after-market (for example, in the \$500-\$750 million range). Dominion and several of its major financing subsidiaries are large enough to consistently issue bonds in this larger 357 and more attractive "index-eligible" size range, while Questar is constrained given its size 358 to generally smaller (and often not index-eligible) bond offerings. 359

Second, credit issuers within large "credit families" (like Dominion, for example), can often achieve better pricing than those from smaller, less widely followed and more infrequent issuers like Questar Corp. As an illustration, Dominion is currently covered from a research perspective by about 25 Wall Street and financial institutional research analysts, while Questar Corp. is covered by approximately 7. In general, more analyst coverage results in greater informational transparency to the market and better capital market execution.

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Q. Do you have any comments on Division Witness Kelly's assertion that the Joint Applicants have not provided any quantifiable analysis that Dominion, as a larger company, has improved access to capital markets that will benefit Questar Gas customers?

- A. I disagree with Ms. Kelly's assertion. First, I am aware of no direct linkage between credit ratings and size based on net property, plant, and equipment as Ms. Kelly suggests. Credit ratings are based on a wide variety of qualitative (e.g., management quality, degree of supportive regulatory framework) and quantitative (e.g. credit metrics, primarily focused on cash coverage type metrics) factors. I am also not aware that any submission by Dominion in this proceeding has suggested such a relationship between size and credit rating.
- However, as noted above, within generally similar credit rating categories, larger corporate families tend to attract capital on an advantageous basis for several reasons. They have larger levels of debt and other securities outstanding. They are more frequent issuers and are well understood in the capital markets. And, they are covered by larger number of research analysts.

Dominion has provided two analyses in support of this assertion. The first is found on Exhibit 7.6R, as I just described above. The second analysis relates to a more direct comparison of long-term financing costs of similarly rated utility issuers within the Dominion and the Questar families. The table below, also shown on page 23 of Exhibit 1.19 attached to the First Supplement to Joint Notice and Application, is a summary of 2013 debt issuances by Questar Gas, and Dominion subsidiaries VEPCO and Dominion Gas Holdings ("DGH").¹ Despite slightly lower S&P ratings at VEPCO and DGH, the

390 Dominion subsidiary bond offerings in 2013 priced on average 20 basis points lower than

¹ While these issuances were on different days, it does demonstrate credit costs on the same tenor basis (all of the below are 30 year tenors) in the same year.

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391 Questar Gas' offering that year.

				Size	Spread	Comparison
		Moody's	S&P	(\$	(basis	to
Date	Issuer	rating	rating	million)	points)	Questar Gas
1/3/2013	VEPCO	A3	A-	\$500	+93.0	27 bps lower
12/20/13	Questar Gas	A3	А	\$90	+120.0	
8/12/2013	VEPCO	A3	A-	\$585	+95.0	25 bps lower
10/17/2013	DGH	A3	A-	\$400	+112.0	8 bps lower
Average						20 bps lower

- 392Q.Much of your testimony focuses on Questar Gas' long-term debt costs. Would any393potential impacts of the Merger on Questar Gas' short-term borrowing costs affect394Questar Gas' rates?
- A. No. The costs of short-term debt are excluded from the cost of debt used to determine
 Questar's revenue requirement; therefore, the costs of short-term debt do not impact
 Questar Gas customer rates.
- 398 Questar Gas currently borrows short-term from its parent (and in the future will borrow 399 primarily directly from the commercial paper market) to fund seasonal working capital. It 400 does not borrow short-term to fund the investment in rate base assets or otherwise to 401 permanently support the regulated capital structure of the entity. As a result, I understand 402 that short-term borrowings are not included in the capital structure used for setting of rates 403 of Questar Gas in rate proceedings.
- 404 Similarly, I understand that the actual cost of servicing short-term debt is not accounted for 405 in the "regulatory accounts" which are used to determine actual and appropriate returns in

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406		rate proceedings. ² Therefore, I do not believe that any changes to the short-term borrowing
407		costs (upwards or downwards) have any material impact on rates or customers.
408	Q.	On page 17 of his testimony, Division Witness Wheelwright compares the short-term
409		interest rate for Questar Gas of 0.39% to the short-term interest rate for Dominion
410		and Dominion East Ohio of 0.58%. With Dominion's higher short-term interest rate,
411		Mr. Wheelwright and Ms. Kelly (at pages 19-20) believe this could impact Dominion
412		Questar Gas customers. How do you respond?
413	A.	First, as I indicated above, Questar Gas' customers are not impacted by short-term debt
414		financing.
415		Second, to provide a much simpler and more meaningful indication of the short-term
416		borrowing costs of Questar Gas and Dominion, we set out below the rates offered
417		specifically for 1 month tenors of commercial paper ("CP") by the CP dealer banks of each
418		firm. This data reflects offered rates as of July 18, 2016, and on each side includes issuance

firm. This data reflects offered rates as of July 18, 2016, and on each side includes issuance
costs/dealer fees. Note that CP costs vary day to day, and as is shown in the below data
even different dealers have different pricing on the same day.

1 month Commercial Paper Dealer Quotes - July 18, 2016

	Bank 1	Bank 2	Bank 3	Bank 4	Bank 5	Bank 6	Bank 7	Average
Dominion Resources	0.76%	0.85%	0.77%	0.78%	0.80%	0.85%	N/A	0.79%
Questar Corp	N/A	N/A	0.80%	0.80%	0.78%	N/A	0.83%	0.80%

421

 $^{^{2}}$ I would note, however, that in some specific situations there could be a very slight impact of short-term debt costs in the Allowance for Funds Used During Construction ("AFUDC") rate, which does include the cost of short-term debt. Given the current and expected Construction Work in Progress balances to which this blended AFUDC rate is applied, any impact of variations in the short-term cost of debt for Questar Gas debt, up or down, would be expected to be immaterial.

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422 As this table demonstrates, when viewed on an apples-to-apples basis, the short term 423 borrowing costs of Questar Gas and Dominion are effectively equivalent (on this particular 424 day, the average rate offered to Dominion was lower by one basis point).³

425

Merger Transaction Financing Issues

- Q. Mr. Wheelwright on page 16 of his testimony disputes Dominion's stated financing of
 the Merger purchase price with 67% equity and 33% long-term debt, and instead he
 argues that on the closing date the purchase price will be funded by 11.4% equity and
 88.6% debt. Do you agree with his characterizations of the financing?
- A. No, I do not. First, to clarify, there is no financing contemplated at the Questar Gas entity
 in relation to the Merger, nor will any Merger financing costs at Dominion or other
 affiliates be allocated to Questar Gas in any way.
- 433 As shown on Exhibit 7.7R, Dominion divided the total amount of "permanent financing" 434 into debt and equity components, with the debt component consisting of the Dominion 435 Senior Notes (\$1.45 billion) and all of the other elements categorized as equity (again, as 436 stated in the Technical Conference presentation, only financing on a "permanent basis").
- Mr. Wheelwright correctly notes that not all of the "permanent financing" will be in place
 at the time of closing of the Merger. For example, the Dominion Midstream equity, which
 is to be issued to repay the \$1.2 billion short-term loan that will be funded at closing, will
 not be completed as of the Merger closing date. Instead, it will be issued and become
 "permanent" in the months following closing of the Merger, the specific timing of which
 will depend on market conditions.

³ The rates reflected in the above table are significantly higher than those set out for historical periods in Witness Wheelwright's and Witness Kelly's testimony due to CP rate fluctuation. CP rates (and certainly 1-month CP rates) move day to day very much in line with 1-month LIBOR. Given 1-month LIBOR has increased significantly over the last year or so (even as more often-quoted long term rates have fallen), there have been dramatic increases in CP costs for Questar Corp., Dominion, and basically every other issuer of CP.

JOINT NOTICE AND APPLICATION EXHIBIT

7.0R Rebuttal Testimony of James R. Chapman

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443	Mr. Wheelwright categorizes the proposed Dominion issuance of Mandatory Convertibles
444	as debt, not equity. However, a fundamental component of Mandatory Convertibles is the
445	investor's contractual obligation to purchase Dominion common stock, and consequently
446	it differs from conventional views of being equity from the perspective of:
447 448 449	 Investors in new mandatory convertibles, which are <u>equity</u> portfolio managers at <u>equity</u> investment firms, and certainly not fixed income or debt investors;
450	• Holders of existing mandatory convertibles, who absolutely
451	bear equity risk, including on the downside and the upside based on stock
452	price movements, unlike fixed income or debt;
453	• Investment banks and underwriters who handle Mandatory Convertible
454	transactions within their equity divisions and not their fixed income or
455	debt divisions;
456	• Credit rating agencies, which assign equity credit for Mandatory
457	Convertibles given they are not simply debt; and
458	• Public <u>equity</u> research analysts, who upon the issuance of a Mandatory
459	Convertible immediately add the common shares to share counts in
460	future years.
461	Mr. Wheelwright notes that these securities do not become equity for three years.
462	However, by focusing on the date the instruments convert from one type of equity to
463	another as the determinative factor of whether they are debt or equity, ignores the substance
464	of these securities.
465	If the investing community viewed this financing plan as too risky or aggressive, we would

466 expect some form of negative reaction. For example, one may expect to see increases in
467 borrowing costs. But there have been no such increases. Moreover, Moody's concludes

7.0R REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF JAMES R. CHAPMAN

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468		that, compared to recent utility acquisitions by The Southern Company and Duke Energy
469		Corp., "Dominion is least exposed to a decline in financial metrics, given the lower
470		premium it will pay for Questar (7.3x Questar's 2015 reported EBITDA) and the more
471		balanced mix of debt and equity that is expected to finance it." ⁴
472		Therefore, based on these factors, the financing of the Merger purchase price at the
473		Dominion level is properly recognized as primarily equity (67%, as shown on Exhibit 7.7R)
474		on a "permanent basis."
475	Q.	On page 16 of his testimony, Mr. Wheelwright notes that the transfer of Questar
476		Pipeline in exchange for the master limited partnership ("MLP") drop proceeds,
477		which represents 27.3% of equity funding to finance the Merger, will take
478		approximately one year. Is that correct?
479	A.	No. Dominion has indicated that it has structured acquisition financing that provides the
480		flexibility (through a prepayable one-year term loan which will be funded on the day of
481		Merger closing) to raise the equity and repay that term loan at any time within that one year
482		term. Depending on market conditions, that transaction could be undertaken at any time
483		as soon as practicable following the Merger closing, but not to exceed the one-year term.
484		IV. WEXPRO AND QUESTAR PIPELINE
485	Q.	On pages 17-18, Mr. Wheelwright asserts that it is unclear how Wexpro will be
486		financed and that it appears likely Wexpro will participate in Dominion's money pool.
487		Is this accurate?
488	А.	No. After considering different options to finance Wexpro, Dominion commits that
489		Wexpro will not be a party to a money pool. To the extent that short-term working capital
490		is required at Wexpro, it will be provided under the terms of a one-way intercompany note
491		at the actual cost of that short-term debt at the Dominion level. As described above, this
	⁴ See 1	Moody's Report Number 1016760 published March 21, 2016.

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would not likely have a perceptible impact on the cost of such short-term debt as compared
to the current status quo. Additionally, consistent with the existing Wexpro Agreements,
Wexpro will not be financed with long-term debt. Instead, it will be financed in this oneway short-term funding format, when necessary.

496 Q. Mr. Wheelwright notes that Dominion stated that Wexpro is "MLP eligible." Does 497 Dominion plan to transfer Wexpro to Dominion's MLP?

- A. No. MLP eligibility (*i.e.* whether the activities of an entity generate qualifying income) is
 determined by the Internal Revenue Code, not by Dominion. Dominion simply provides
 its investors a list of all its businesses categorized as MLP-eligible and non-MLP-eligible
 in its normal course investor relations activities. Dominion does not plan to transfer
 Wexpro assets to the MLP or include Wexpro in its MLP, and Dominion will not seek to
 include Wexpro in its MLP without Commission approval to do so.
- 504

V. CAPITAL STRUCTURE

- 505Q.On pages 7-8 of his testimony, Mr. Wheelwright is concerned about different capital506structures between the holding company and operating entities and states that "[w]ith507lower equity at the parent company level, the same earnings from the operating508entities calculates to a higher return on equity at the corporate level." Please address509his concerns.
- 510 A. As is typical, the capital structures for the regulated utility entities within Dominion and within Questar Corp. are being managed to meet their specific capital and financing needs 511 512 separately, while maintaining their respective targeted credit ratings. This is of course 513 consistent with sector norms, in which regulated entities are very conservatively financed 514 (a relatively equal balance of debt and equity), partly in order to obtain an optimal cost of debt for the utility and its customers, but also in order to ensure an adequate equity "buffer" 515 516 exists to allow the entity to weather unforeseen market-disrupting events. In this respect, 517 interests are aligned between the utility and its customers.

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518 The consolidated capital structure of Dominion reflects a more highly-levered capital 519 structure due to activity related to acquisitions and divestitures, and activity within its non-520 utility operations. For the non-regulated entities comprising the consolidated Dominion 521 capital structure, management and investors have a different view regarding the tradeoff 522 between leverage, risk, and the market cost of debt.

Mr. Wheelwright suggests that the "holding company has no ability to generate revenue or 523 retire the debt and the pension liabilities are due to employees at each of the operating 524 525 entities." However, this is not the case here. Dominion is not just a holding company – it owns and operates a number of assets, including, but not limited to: the Cove Point 526 liquefied natural gas facility; Hope Gas, Inc., a gas retailing business; a large contracted 527 utility-scale solar business with power purchase agreements with electric utilities around 528 529 the country; and a large baseload non-regulated generation fleet, etc. It is also the owner of the General Partner of Dominion Midstream and owns approximately 63% of the limited 530 531 partnership units in that entity as well. Additionally, Dominion has the ability to, and frequently does, issue equity, equity linked and other securities into the capital markets. It 532 533 has ample ability to meet the debt service and other requirements (including pension obligations), in addition to just utilizing dividends received from its regulated utility 534 subsidiaries for those purposes. 535

536Q.On page 14 of his testimony, Mr. Wheelwright suggests that there are some537discrepancies between the percentages of debt and equity in the generally accepted538accounting principles ("GAAP") accounts of Dominion versus those represented in539the Joint Notice and Application. Can you please clarify?

A. Yes. First, "debt to capital" and "equity ratio" are not defined GAAP measures. Therefore,
users of Dominion's GAAP financial statements can at times come to varied conclusions
regarding the appropriate calculation. For example, including or excluding short-term
debt, working capital, or lease obligations could result in different calculations. However,
the definition of "total funded debt to capitalization" as is set out in Dominion's revolving

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545 credit agreements, which are published in full on Dominion's investor website and for 546 which calculations are referenced in quarterly and annual financial statements provides a 547 precise and standard definition.

- 548 Second, given the investment grade rating of Dominion and all of its affiliates, within all 549 of the financing agreements and indentures of Dominion, the only financial covenant which 550 exists is the "debt to total capital," as referenced in its revolving credit agreements. 551 Therefore, Dominion considers this calculation to be the most relevant measure for 552 practically any user of its published financial information.
- 553 Third, Dominion believes that the definition of "total funded debt to capitalization" in its 554 revolving credit agreement accurately reflects the sometimes ambiguous or complex nature 555 of certain securities and agreements, regardless of how they are presented under more rigid 556 GAAP standards. Additionally, 21 of the largest financial institutions in the world, namely 557 those which are parties to the Dominion revolving credit agreement, apparently agree with 558 the appropriateness of this approach.

Q. On page 15 of his testimony, Mr. Wheelwright expresses concerns with the "lower equity position" of Dominion as compared to Questar Corp., as it "can impact a company's credit rating and borrowing costs." How do you respond?

- A. The lower equity position of Dominion as compared to Questar Corp. should not impact
 the stand alone rating or borrowing costs of Questar Gas.
- First, there is no proposed change to the equity position or debt of Questar Gas in relation to the Merger. No Merger-related financing is being undertaken at Questar Gas and no liabilities or assets will be transferred into or out of Questar Gas as a result of the Merger. Further, no acquisition financing costs or interest expense will be allocated or "pushed down" to Questar Gas from Dominion or any affiliate entities. Therefore, as explained

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569above, I do not believe that the Merger will negatively impact Questar Gas' borrowing570costs.

Second, generally speaking, in the analysis of credit strength of regulated utilities, equity 571 position or debt/capital type ratios are generally not primary factors. While they are often 572 quoted by general observers, in my experience they are not an area of significant focus for 573 fixed income investors (who collectively set the cost of borrowing for a utility company) 574 or credit analysts. Instead, credit analysts and investors primarily measure cash coverage 575 by the ratio of funds from operations ("FFO") to total debt ("FFO/Debt"), which assesses 576 a utility's ability to meet its obligations for the timely repayment of principal and interest. 577 As there will be no material impact to Questar Gas' FFO/Debt ratio as a result of the 578 Merger, Ouestar Gas' credit strength should not be negatively impacted. 579

580 VI. PROTECTIONS FROM AFFILIATE OPERATIONS AND ACTIVITIES

581Q.On page 58-59 of Ms. Kelly's testimony, she states that Dominion Questar may need582to generate increased earnings, profits and cash at the parent level to satisfy583Dominion's investors based on the "above-market premium" it paid to Questar584Corp. She is concerned that if sufficient savings or synergies are not produced, then585customers could be harmed. Please respond.

A. Ms. Kelly is suggesting that Dominion will need to raise customer rates at Questar Gas if adequate synergies are not realized from the Merger. This suggestion ignores the regulatory construct for Questar Gas and the undertakings and commitments already proposed by the Joint Applicants, which would protect customers from such increases.

First, it is not reasonable to suggest that customer rates at Questar Gas could be increased
simply because Dominion needs additional earnings or cash flow. To raise rates, Questar
Gas must file for rate relief and the Commission determines the appropriate rate level based

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593 on a thorough review of cost of service and other relevant factors. Thus, the regulatory 594 process and protections would prevent such occurrences.

In addition, the Joint Applicants have made commitments to maintain customer service at 595 or better than current levels; to upgrade and maintain facilities for safe reliable operations; 596 597 and to maintain environmental monitoring and maintenance programs. (See Merger commitments "f" – "h" in the Joint Notice and Application) Joint Applicants have also 598 599 committed not to seek recovery of any acquisition premium cost or transaction costs associated with the Merger from Dominion Questar Gas' customers. 600 (See Merger 601 commitment "u") These commitments, taken together, would prevent such harm. Joint Applicant Witnesses Thomas F. Farrell II and Diane Leopold address these and other 602 603 service quality issues in their direct testimonies, as do Joint Applicant Witnesses David A. 604 Christian and Craig C. Wagstaff in their rebuttal testimony.

605Q.On page 15 of his testimony, Office Witness Kollen suggests that there is risk of606liability from Dominion's non-regulated activities through numerous affiliates that607have riskier business and financial profiles. Do you agree?

608 A. No. Dominion is very familiar with and sensitive to the need to ensure that separate legal 609 entities are respected and maintained, and that liabilities and expenses are appropriately 610 allocated and/or isolated to the correct entity within that organizational structure. This is not only of interest to regulators and customers in our utility businesses, but is also of 611 612 utmost importance to our fixed income/debt investors in various entities within the 613 Dominion family. To that end, Dominion Questar Gas will remain as a separate legal entity following the Merger, and will not be responsible for the obligations of, or adverse 614 consequences that may arise at, other entities within Dominion. 615

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Furthermore, the Commission will continue to exercise its regulatory authority over Dominion Questar Gas in the same way it does today, thereby ensuring continued protection of the interests of its customers. Dominion Questar Gas will retain its own capital structure, its own credit ratings, and will be effectively isolated from any credit issues that may arise at Dominion or any of its other subsidiaries. The Joint Applicants have made numerous commitments that will help insulate and protect Dominion Questar Gas' credit quality and customers.

I would also note that the professional investor community understands the structure of separate legal entities and related issues, and even though Dominion does own and operate certain assets which are not regulated utilities, this results in an overall cost of borrowing for the Dominion family which is lower than the overall cost of borrowing for Questar Corp. Therefore, I would say that the investor community as a whole does not seem to share Mr. Kollen's view that these affiliate issues are somehow credit issues which could impact the cost of borrowing for Questar Gas.

Q. On page 15 of his testimony, Mr. Kollen specifically expresses concern about risks to Questar Gas customers from Dominion's ownership and of operation of nuclear facilities. Please comment.

A. To the extent Mr. Kollen is worried about potential liability from Dominion's nuclear
electric generation facilities, the Joint Applicants commit that Dominion Questar Gas will
remain a separate legal entity and therefore will be shielded from any potential liabilities.
In addition, there are protections in place to shield Dominion Questar Gas and other
affiliates of Dominion from perceived nuclear risk. For example:

Operational Experience. Dominion has a history of effectively managing the risk
 associated with the nuclear generation fleet consisting of six licensed, active units in
 Virginia and Connecticut with net summer capacity totaling 5,349 megawatts it owns

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641and operates. Dominion has a long history and track record of safe and reliable642operations for its nuclear fleet.

- *Regulatory Oversight.* The Dominion nuclear generation fleet is subject to strict
 regulation and oversight by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC"), which
 oversees all aspects of the operations and maintenance of the company's nuclear
 stations.
- Separate Legal Entities. Dominion's nuclear generation stations are owned and 647 ٠ operated by legal entities entirely separate from its gas businesses. Dominion has 648 649 experience operating both regulated and unregulated businesses and is experienced in 650 operating the various businesses separately. Dominion has never pushed nuclearrelated liabilities or expenses into other unrelated operating segments or businesses, 651 nor does it intend to prospectively. Dominion Questar Gas customers would not be 652 653 impacted by any increased liabilities or expenses related to nuclear operations. These 654 charges are solely borne at the Dominion or VEPCO levels as the owners and operators of the nuclear facilities. 655
- Federal Legislative Liability Protection. The Price-Anderson Amendments Act of 656 • 1988 sets out that, in the event of a nuclear incident at any licensed nuclear reactor in 657 the U.S., the owner could be assessed up to a maximum of \$127 million for each of 658 their licensed reactors not to exceed \$19 million per year per reactor. There is no limit 659 to the number of incidents for which this retrospective premium can be assessed. 660 Dominion and its subsidiary, VEPCO, have purchased \$375 million, as the primary 661 layer of coverage from commercial insurance pools, and together with the Price-662 Anderson Act these provide public liability, bodily injury, and property damage 663 664 protection, per incident for each reactor site. As previously discussed, Dominion Questar Gas customers will not bear the costs of these insurance premiums. 665

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- Property Insurance. Dominion's and VEPCO's nuclear property insurance coverage 666 • for Millstone, Surry, and North Anna nuclear generating stations exceeds the NRC 667 minimum requirement for nuclear power plant licensees of \$1.06 billion per reactor 668 The Kewaunee generating station, which is in the process of being 669 site. decommissioned, meets the NRC minimum requirement of \$1.06 billion. Dominion's 670 10K filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission disclose, in greater detail, 671 the parameters of its nuclear property insurance coverages. 672
- 673 Nuclear Decommissioning Trusts. In accordance with NRC standards, • decommissioning involves the decontamination and removal of radioactive 674 contaminants from a nuclear power station once operations have ceased. In general, 675 amounts collected from electric customers are placed into trusts, which invest the funds 676 to cover the expected future decommissioning costs. As of December 31, 2015, 677 Dominion and VEPCO have approximately \$4.183 billion in nuclear decommissioning 678 trusts, and believe that the amounts currently available in the decommissioning trusts 679 680 and their expected earnings will be sufficient to cover expected decommissioning costs for the nuclear units. 681

Finally, I would again refer to our analysis showing that the current overall cost of debt for the Dominion family (which includes ownership of nuclear generation) is lower than the current overall cost of debt for the Questar family (which does not), which of course implies that the overall investing market does not agree with the concerns put forward by Witness Kollen in this respect.

In short, I believe that Mr. Kollen's concern that Dominion's nuclear fleet is a risk forDominion Questar Gas is not warranted.

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689 VII. PROTECTIVE FINANCIAL PROVISIONS

690 Q. Please summarize the protective financial provisions the Joint Applicants have 691 proposed to date.

The Joint Applicants have committed to robust financial protections for Dominion Questar 692 A. Gas customers, including some that are greater protection than Questar Gas' customers 693 currently enjoy. These financial protections adequately shield Dominion Questar Gas from 694 liability risks and potential costs arising from other Dominion affiliates' operations and 695 activities. As with all of its regulated operating subsidiaries, Dominion is sensitive to the 696 need to ensure, particularly with respect to regulated utilities like Questar Gas, that separate 697 legal entities are respected and maintained, and that liabilities and expenses are 698 appropriately allocated and/or isolated to the correct entity within that organizational 699 700 structure. The Joint Applicants' commitments insulate and protect Dominion Questar Gas' credit quality and customers from these risks. The Joint Applicants' commitments, 701 702 previously made or now made, include:

703 704	 Dominion Questar Gas will be maintained as a separate legal entity (Joint Notice and Application ¶ 9).
705 706	• Dominion Questar Gas' corporate headquarters will be maintained in Salt Lake City, Utah (Merger commitment "a").
707 708	• A member of Questar Corp.'s Board of Directors will be appointed to Dominion's Board of Directors (Merger commitment "c").
709 710 711	• Dominion Questar Gas will maintain a complete set of books and records, including accounting records, for Dominion Questar Gas at its corporate office in Salt Lake City, Utah (Merger commitment "n").
712 713	• Dominion Questar Gas will maintain its current range of debt and equity capital ratios (Merger commitment "w").

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714 • 715 716	Dominion intends to maintain credit metrics that are supportive of strong investment-grade credit ratings for Dominion Questar Gas (Merger commitment "x," and Exhibit 7.8R).
717 • 718 719	Dominion Questar Gas will not transfer material assets to or assume liabilities of Dominion or any other subsidiary of Dominion without Commission approval (Merger commitment "aa").
720 • 721	Dominion Questar Gas will not transfer its debt to Dominion without Commission approval (Merger commitment "bb").
722 • 723	Dominion Questar Gas will not lend funds to Dominion or other Dominion entities (First Supplement to Joint Notice and Application at 6).
724 • 725	Dominion Questar Gas will maintain its status as a standalone issuer of long-term debt (Exhibit 7.8R).
726 • 727	Dominion Questar Gas will maintain issuer credit ratings from independent credit- rating agencies (Exhibit 7.8R).
728 • 729	Dominion Questar Gas agrees to maintain current Commission oversight of its dividend payments (Exhibit 7.8R).
730 • 731 • 732 • 733 • 734 •	For the first four years following the Effective Time, in any rate proceeding where Dominion Questar Gas' rate of return is established or the utility seeks to reset the previously authorized rate of return on rate base, Dominion Questar Gas will demonstrate that its cost of debt proposed for recovery in rates is not greater than would have been incurred absent the Merger.
735 • 736 737	Dominion Questar Gas will maintain separate long-term debt with its own long-term-debt rating supplied by at least two of the three or four recognized debt rating agencies, including Moody's and S&P or their successors (Exhibit 7.8R).
738 • 739	All of the debt and preferred stock (if any) used to capitalized Dominion Questar Gas will be kept within the regulated utility (Exhibit 7.8R).
740 • 741 742 743	The Joint Applicants agree not to assert in any future Utah proceeding that the provisions of the Public Utility Holdings Company Act ("PUHCA"), PUHCA 2005, or the related Ohio Power v. FERC case preempt the Commission's jurisdiction over affiliated interest transactions (Exhibit 7.8R).

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The Joint Applicants agree to continue to provide no less than the same access to short-term debt, commercial paper, and other liquidity that Questar Corp. currently has in place (Exhibit 7.8R).

747 Q. Why have the Joint Applicants not agreed to all of the recommended additional 748 protective financial provisions?

A. The Joint Applicants have proposed and agreed to a number of commitments that they
believe are adequate and reflective of market standards. The measures that the Division
and Office witnesses have proposed are extraordinary ring-fencing measures that are not
warranted by the Merger.

There are more than 100 electric and gas regulated utilities in the United States, and only a very small number have – for various specific reasons – incorporated the more stringent ring-fencing measures similar to the ones the Division and Office witnesses propose. The extraordinary ring-fencing measures imposed on this small number of companies such as those noted by the Division and Office witnesses – Enron/Portland General, Scottish Power/MidAmerican/Pacificorp, Constellation/BGE – does not constitute a "market standard" in my view.

Furthermore, in all cases where extraordinary ring-fencing has been utilized, there has been a specific reason to impose the additional protections, such as: a significantly weaker parent company credit; foreign parent company; a parent company which is from a different industry and lacks experience or history in the subsidiary area; or the parent's financing structure is simply organized to maximize debt levels at subsidiaries, and having more stringent ring-fencing allows them to achieve that goal whereas in other situations their parent credit profiles would not.

None of these factors are present, nor are there other factors reflected, in this Merger that
would necessitate the extraordinary ring-fencing beyond the existing commitments by the
Joint Applicants.

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Q. Could imposition of these additional restrictive financial requirements actually harm Dominion Questar Gas and its customers?

772 A. Yes. In fact, Moody's notes that "to the extent that we see the credit quality of a stronger credit subsidiary isolated within the group, this will result in a weakening of the 773 774 creditworthiness of the rest of the group, which a rating committee might decide to reflect in notching"⁵ (*i.e.*, downgrading). Mr. Peterson also acknowledges some negative 775 consequences of overly restrictive ring-fencing provisions. He states on page 5 of this 776 testimony that "a tight ring-fence could eliminate subsidies or prevent other benefits from 777 flowing to [Dominion Questar Gas] from other affiliates of Dominion. [Dominion Questar 778 Gas] may find that it is not able to participate in economies of scale that the total parent 779 780 holding company, and non-ring-fenced affiliates, might enjoy resulting from larger purchases; or in having company-wide services such as human resources, legal, and 781 accounting." 782

783 Imposing numerous restrictive financial provisions, like the more-stringent package Division and Office witnesses propose, can increase direct and indirect costs. Increased 784 785 direct costs relate to appointing an independent director, and creating and maintaining a special purpose entity. Increased indirect costs could arise if the investing community 786 787 perceives these numerous financial provisions as signifying a less favorable regulatory environment. Rating Agencies, and investors who rely on rating agency views, base their 788 789 views of a regulated utility on a number of factors, including financial credit metrics, management track record and competency, access to capital (including access to adequate 790 liquidity), local economic factors and, importantly, quality of regulation. Regulatory 791 792 conditions or requirements, unrelated to reasonable concerns based on relevant facts and 793 circumstances, could negatively impact these investments to the detriment of Dominion 794 Questar Gas' customers.

⁵ See Moody's special comment "Covenants and Ring Fencing for Wholly-Owned Subsidiaries" May 2007.

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The Joint Applicants' commitments reflect an optimal level of ring-fencing protections and
achieve an appropriate balance between financial separation and insulation of Dominion
Questar Gas from other Dominion affiliates and provide the benefits associated with a
properly integrated corporate family – a balance that is in the best interests of Dominion
Questar Gas' customers.

Q. Mr. Peterson and Ms. Kelly recommend bankruptcy-related protective provisions. Why do you believe the Commission should not adopt these provisions?

Mr. Peterson and Mr. Kelly recommend that Dominion Questar Gas be held in a special purpose entity, with an independent director, and provide a non-consolidation opinion that the special purpose entity is bankruptcy-remote. I do not believe the Commission has ordered these bankruptcy protection provisions in previous merger approval proceedings and should not do so in this proceeding because they do not provide necessary incremental protections over and above the full commitments the Joint Applicants have made.

Mr. Peterson's and Ms. Kelly's bankruptcy-related recommendations appear to originate from the merger approval process for the MidAmerican Energy Holdings Company ("MEHC") and PacifiCorp merger. In contrast to this proceeding where the Joint Applicants firmly object to these provisions, MEHC and PacifiCorp proposed some of those bankruptcy-related provisions in their joint application and accepted others that were negotiated in the settlement stipulation in another state, which the Commission adopted.⁶

These provisions do not provide substantive bankruptcy protections beyond those contained in the commitments the Joint Applicants have made to date. True bankruptcy protection is achieved by creating and preserving financial independence of the regulated

⁶ The Commission's first Report and Order issued January 27, 2006 in Docket No. 05-035-54 approving the first stipulation did not explicitly contain the bankruptcy related provisions, but did refer to ring-fencing provisions to be provided by the joint applicants, apparently referring to those proposed in the joint application. It was through the "most favored state" process that the Commission later adopted amendments to the stipulation to incorporate this additional provision negotiated in other jurisdictions.

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utility to prevent it from being pulled into the bankruptcy proceeding of a non-regulated affiliate. The Joint Applicants have agreed to ensure this financial independence through commitments summarized in this testimony.

The Division's recommended bankruptcy-related provisions are overly restrictive given the Commission's significant regulatory oversight, the Joint Applicants' firm commitments to maintain the financial independence and health of Dominion Questar Gas, and Dominion's financial strength.

Q. Are there any other protective financial recommendations you wish to address in testimony?

- A. Mr. Peterson recommends that Dominion Questar Gas have a separate board, forty percent
 of which are independent directors having no affiliation with Dominion or any of its
 affiliated entities. This too is unwarranted.
- The Joint Applicants have proposed commitments to ensure that Dominion Questar Gas is 829 led, managed, and operated by an outstanding team with extensive public utility experience 830 831 in Utah. The Joint Applicants assure that Dominion Questar Gas will be managed from an operations standpoint as a separate regional business under Dominion with responsibility 832 for managing operations to achieve the objectives of customer satisfaction, reliable service, 833 834 customer, public and employee safety, environmental stewardship, and collaborative and 835 productive relationships with customers, regulators, other governmental entities and interested stakeholders. 836
- Additionally, in May 2016, Dominion announced the leadership team for Dominion Questar, which comprises current executives of Questar Corp. who will remain in Salt Lake City, Utah. With over 20 years' experience each in the Questar family of companies, these executives will ensure the continuity of excellent operations and customer service and awareness of important local issues. Experienced executives with extensive knowledge of

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B42 Dominion Questar Gas' operations are better for efficient cost-effective operations and B43 superior service to customers than a separate board with forty percent of outside, B44 independent directors, who may lack the operational and managerial experience specific to B45 Dominion Questar Gas and an understanding of important local issues in its service B46 territory.

Q. Are there additional responses to the various recommendations by the Division and Office that you are addressing?

- Yes. I have not addressed each of the recommendations made by the Division and Office
 Witnesses in the body of my testimony, but have limited my comments to overriding issues.
 To avoid any confusion, the Joint Applicants' responses to each recommendation are
 included in Exhibit 7.9R.
- 853 Q. Does this conclude your testimony?
- 854 A. Yes.

Commonwealth of Virginia)) ss. County/City of _____)

I, James R. Chapman, being first duly sworn on oath, state that the answers in the foregoing written testimony are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information and belief. Except as stated in the testimony, the exhibits attached to the testimony were prepared by me or under my direction and supervision, and they are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information and belief. Any exhibits not prepared by me or under my direction and supervision are true and correct to be.

James R. Chapman

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO this __ day of July, 2016.

Notary Public