Witness OCS – 1D

BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH

In the Matter of the Request of Dominion Energy Utah for Approval of a Voluntary Resource Decision to Construct an LNG Facility

Docket No. 18-057-03

DIRECT TESTIMONY OF

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BELA VASTAG

FOR THE

OFFICE OF CONSUMER SERVICES

AUGUST 16, 2018

1 Q. WHAT IS YOUR NAME, BUSINESS ADDRESS AND OCCUPATION?

A. My name is Béla Vastag. My business address is 160 East 300 South Salt
Lake City, Utah 84111. I am a Utility Analyst for the Utah Office of
Consumer Services (Office).

5 Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR EDUCATION AND WORK EXPERIENCE.

6 Α. I have a Bachelor of Science degree in physics with a minor in mathematics 7 from Virginia Tech and a Master of Science degree in finance from the 8 University of Utah. I have worked for the Office for the past 8 years and 9 have filed testimony and memoranda in numerous electric and natural gas 10 proceedings before the Utah Public Service Commission. Prior to joining 11 the Office, I held positions as a Data Analyst for the Utah State Board of 12 Education, as a Financial Manager for the Utah State Library and as a 13 Budget and Revenue Analyst for the Salt Lake City Department of Airports.

14 Q. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR TESTIMONY?

A. I will introduce the additional witnesses testifying on behalf of the Office and
provide the Office's overall recommendation. I will also discuss why the
Office finds Dominion Energy Utah's (DEU or Company) filing, i.e. its
request for approval of a resource decision to construct an LNG facility, to
be inadequate.

20 Q. PLEASE INTRODUCE THE OFFICE'S ADDITIONAL WITNESSES.

A. Alex Ware, a Utility Analyst for the Office, and Jerome D. Mierzwa of the firm of Exeter Associates have also prepared direct testimony on behalf of the Office in this proceeding. Mr. Ware reviews the regulatory history which

24 shows how the Company has failed to identify for regulators the need for an 25 LNG facility to address reliability concerns. Mr. Mierzwa provides an 26 overview of the Company's LNG proposal and its cost, discusses typical 27 gas industry practices for supply reliability and LNG facilities, examines 28 whether DEU has properly evaluated all alternatives to constructing an LNG 29 facility, shows how DEU's current system is very resilient in addressing gas 30 supply shortages and avoiding outages and concludes that if an LNG facility 31 is constructed, transportation customers should share in its cost.

32 Q. WHAT IS THE OFFICE'S OVERALL RECOMMENDATION ON THE 33 COMPANY'S REQUEST FOR RESOURCE DECISION APPROVAL?

34 Α. The Office cannot support the Company's decision to construct an LNG 35 facility to address supply reliability, i.e. to address potential supply shortfalls. 36 The Office recommends that the Utah Public Service Commission 37 (Commission) deny the Company's request for approval of a resource 38 decision to construct an LNG facility. On the DEU system, no outages have 39 occurred from supply shortfalls. A very high degree of due diligence should 40 be required from the Company before committing ratepayers to a new and 41 very expensive resource to address potential outages. As the Commission 42 stated on page 9 of its July 13, 2018 Order in Docket No. 17-057-20: "We 43 expect that a reasonable utility would perform a higher degree of due 44 diligence in creating defensible modeling practices for a large expense than 45 it would perform for a smaller expense."

46 The Office believes that the Company has not clearly demonstrated
47 that an LNG plant is needed to address potential gas outages due to supply
48 disruptions. The Company's evidence and analysis are inadequate.

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50 Q. WHY DOES THE OFFICE BELIEVE THAT THE COMPANY'S DUE

- 51 DILIGENCE IS INADEQUATE?
- 52 Α. The Company's actions and filings have not provided sufficient evidence of 53 the existence of a supply reliability problem or that an LNG facility is the 54 best long-term solution to potential future supply disruptions. These 55 shortcomings include 1) poor evidentiary support in identifying a supply 56 reliability problem in this filing, 2) lack of evidence for both the reliability 57 problem and the proposed LNG facility in the Company's previous 58 regulatory filings, and 3) insufficient system analysis and development of all 59 possible solutions to address future supply disruptions. Mr. Ware discusses 60 item number two in his testimony and Mr. Mierzwa discusses item number 61 three. I will discuss shortcoming number one.

Q. IN ITS APPLICATION, THE COMPANY HAS ATTEMPTED TO JUSTIFY
 THE NEED FOR AN LNG FACILITY. DOES THE OFFICE BELIEVE THAT
 THE EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY THE COMPANY IS SUFFICIENT TO
 ENABLE THE COMMISSION TO APPROVE THIS RESOURCE
 DECISION?

A. No, the Company has provided poor evidentiary support. The Company
attempts to use the construction of an Arizona LNG facility and recent
histories of DEU system supply disruptions and outages as evidence of

need for the proposed LNG facility in the Salt Lake Valley. However, none
of this evidence convincingly demonstrates that such an LNG facility is
needed now. The Company also does not adequately address risks
associated with siting an LNG plant in the Salt Lake Valley. In addition, the
Office is concerned that guidance from DEU's corporate parent, Dominion
Energy, is a factor in the Company's decision to pursue an LNG plant.

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77 The 2011 outage in Arizona is not comparable to DEU's situation

Q. THE COMPANY USES AN EXAMPLE FROM ANOTHER GAS UTILITY
 WHERE COLD WEATHER CAUSED SUPPLY DISRUPTIONS AND
 OUTAGES. THE UTILITY THEN RECEIVED APPROVAL TO
 CONSTRUCT AN LNG FACILITY. WHAT UTILITY WAS INVOLVED AND
 WHAT WERE THE CIRCUMSTANCES?

83 Α. in February 2011, local distribution companies (LDCs) in Texas, New 84 Mexico and Arizona, including New Mexico Gas Company and Southwest 85 Gas, experienced the loss of gas service to more than 50,000 customers 86 due to reduction in gas supplies caused by record setting cold 87 temperatures. In response to a loss of service to 19,000 of its customers in Tucson, Arizona, Southwest Gas received approval from its state 88 89 commission in December 2014 to construct an on-system LNG facility near 90 Tucson, projected to be in-service by the end of 2019. The decision to 91 pursue an LNG plant came after years of investigations into the reliability 92 problem and into possible solutions.

Q. DOES THE OFFICE BELIEVE THAT THIS EXAMPLE IS COMPELLING EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE NEED FOR DEU TO CONSTRUCT AN LNG FACILITY FOR ITS SYSTEM?

96 A. No. Southwest Gas and DEU's systems are configured and operated
97 differently; and therefore, Southwest Gas' situation is not analogous to
98 DEU's. For example¹:

- The decision to pursue an LNG plant in Arizona was made after
 first attempting to develop a traditional underground storage
 facility in Arizona. Southwest Gas does not have local storage on
 or close to its system. DEU already has service from 5 relatively
 close underground storage facilities.
- Southwest Gas relies exclusively on El Paso Natural Gas interstate pipeline to deliver gas to Tucson from the Permian and San Juan Basins. DEU is connected directly to two interstate pipelines and receives gas supplies from several different areas or basins.
- Storage services for shippers on El Paso are located in Texas –
 about 700 miles away from the Tucson distribution system.
 DEU's five storage facilities are relatively close. Clay Basin is
 about 200 miles away, Ryckman 95 miles and the three aquifer
 storage facilities between 40 and 80 miles. Three of these

¹ See DEU Exhibit 2.14, Southwest Gas Corporation's application for approval of an LNG facility, application pages 4 & 6.

114facilities are located in Utah with the other two near the Utah115border in Wyoming.

116Q.DOES THE OFFICE BELIEVE THE OUTAGE IN TUCSON IN 2011 IS117ADEQUATE EVIDENCE TO JUSTIFY DEU'S NEED FOR AN LNG118FACILITY?

119 No. While the Office acknowledges that gas shortfalls can occur due to cold Α. 120 weather, DEU has not presented an analysis that adequately compares its 121 upstream and local distribution systems to those in Texas, Arizona and New 122 Mexico that experienced an outage due to the cold weather event. It is not 123 adequate to simply say that because two LDCs experienced service 124 outages because of cold weather that DEU would also experience a similar 125 event. It is necessary for regulators to be fully informed and assess whether 126 there are differences in DEU's infrastructure and/or gas supply sources. 127 These differences may include the existence for DEU of many diverse 128 alternatives in accessing gas supplies and upstream infrastructure 129 redundancies that can ensure the delivery of gas supplies that could 130 insulate the Company from a similar cold weather event, before the need 131 for an LNG facility can be justified. It is DEU's burden to conduct such 132 analysis and present it to its regulators before such an LNG facility should 133 be approved.

134 Q. DID REGULATORS INVESTIGATE THE COLD WEATHER EVENT IN
 135 2011 WHICH CAUSED GAS OUTAGES IN ARIZONA, NEW MEXICO
 136 AND TEXAS?

A. Yes. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and the North
American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) issued a joint report in
August 2011 outlining their findings and recommendations following the
cold weather event in Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas. FERC and NERC
presented 12 key findings and 6 recommendations for the natural gas
industry.

143 Q. WHAT ARE THE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE NATURAL GAS

144 INDUSTRY FROM THE FERC/NERC REPORT?

- 145 Α. While the report does state in one of its key findings that "additional gas 146 storage capacity in Arizona and New Mexico could have prevented many of 147 the outages"² experienced during the 2011 cold weather event in the 148 Southwest, it is remarkable that the FERC/NERC report does not 149 specifically additional recommend building storage. Instead. recommendations encompass these six areas:³ 150
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- 1. Implementation of uniform winterization standards for gas production facilities
- 2. Exemption of critical natural gas facilities from rolling electrical blackouts
- 3. Development of voluntary curtailment plans that can reduce demand quickly and efficiently
- 4. Development of plans as to whether residential gas or electrical generation customers should receive priority during an emergency
 - 5. Determination of how local distribution systems can be improved to increase flows to handle periods of historically high demand

 ² FERC/NERC Staff Report on the 2011 Southwest Cold Weather Event, pages 212 – 213.
 Report can be found: https://www.ferc.gov/legal/staff-reports/08-16-11-report.pdf
 ³ Ibid, pages 214 - 217.

162 163 Determination of how local distribution systems can be improved to implement curtailments that speed up system recovery after an outage or emergency

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166Q.IF THE FERC/NERC REPORT DID NOT SPECIFICALLY RECOMMEND167GAS STORAGE, WHY DID THE ARIZONA CORPORATION

- 168 COMMISSION APPROVE THE CONSTRUCTION OF AN LNG PLANT?
- 169 Α. A review of the documents associated with the cold weather event, including 170 hearings held by the Arizona Corporation Commission, indicates that 171 officials noted numerous times that Arizona did not have access to any in-172 state storage facilities prior to the cold weather event. The documents also 173 indicate that discussions in Arizona soon after the event originally centered 174 around the creation of a salt cavern storage facility. A salt cavern storage 175 facility in Arizona was not pursued at the time due to public and legislative 176 opposition, uncertainties regarding brine disposal and difficulties 177 demonstrating cost-effectiveness⁴. However, when Southwest Gas came 178 before the Arizona Commission in October 2016 asking to increase the cost 179 of its new LNG plant by 60%, from \$50 million to \$80 million, Arizona 180 Commission Staff, recommended that Southwest Gas pause the LNG 181 project and investigate two developing underground storage facilities in 182 Arizona instead, because these storage facilities would be cheaper and 183 provide better deliverability than the proposed LNG facility.⁵

 ⁴ Arizona Corporation Commission, Docket No. G-01551A-14-0024, December 23, 2014 Order, pages 2 – 3. See: <u>http://images.edocket.azcc.gov/docketpdf/0000159385.pdf</u>.
 ⁵ Arizona Corporation Commission, Docket No. G-01551A-14-0024, January 3, 2017 Order. See: http://docket.images.azcc.gov/0000176126.pdf.

184	Q.	DOES	DEU	CURRENTLY	HAVE	ACCESS	то	ANY	LOCAL	GAS
185		STORA	GE F	ACILITIES?						

- A. Yes, as discussed above DEU reports they currently have contracted
 access and use of five different storage facilities, with three of these facilities
 located in Utah (OCS 2.12).⁶
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190 The proposed LNG facility would not have prevented past outages on DEU's

- 191 <u>system</u>
- 192 Q. IN ITS TESTIMONY, THE COMPANY SPECIFICALLY DISCUSSES THE
- 193 PROBLEMS THAT OCCURRED WITH THE RECENT JANUARY 2017
- 194 OUTAGE IN COALVILLE.⁷ WOULD THE COMPANY'S PROPOSED LNG
- 195 FACILITY HAVE PREVENTED THE COALVILLE OUTAGE?
- 196 A. No. The proposed LNG plant would be located in the Salt Lake Valley and
- 197 not have any direct means to flow gas to the city of Coalville.

198 Q. IN THE PAST 20 YEARS, HAS THE COMPANY REPORTED ANY OTHER

- 199 OUTAGES SIMILAR TO THE COALVILLE INCIDENT?
- 200 A. In response to DPU 1.12⁸, the Company stated that in the last 20 years,
- 201 there were four outages in addition to Coalville:

Date	Location
1/6/2017	Coalville
10/31/2013	Monticello
~8/8/2011	Glendale
~12/15/2010	Saratoga
2008	Ogden Valley

⁶ A copy of DEU response to OCS discovery request 2.12 can be found in Vastag Exhibit 1.1

⁷ Direct Testimony of Michael L. Platt, page 9.

⁸ A copy of DEU response to DPU discovery request 1.12 can be found in Vastag Exhibit 1.1

202Q.WOULD THE OUTAGES THAT OCCURRED IN MONTICELLO,203GLENDALE, SARATOGA OR OGDEN VALLEY HAVE BEEN204PREVENTED BY THE COMPANY'S PROPOSED LNG FACILITY?

- A. No, in response to OCS 2.17⁹, the Company states: "The proposed LNG
 plant in Magna would not have prevented these outages, many of which
 were on small isolated systems." Also, the response indicates that none of
 these outages were caused by a supply shortfall. As Mr. Mierzwa explains
 in his testimony, the system feeding gas to DEU's Wasatch Front demand
 area is not a "small isolated system" but a large, resilient system capable of
 responding to disruptions.
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213 Supply shortfalls have not caused any outages on DEU's system

214 Q. ON SLIDE 11 OF THE JUNE 19, 2018 TECHNICAL CONFERENCE, THE

215 COMPANY PLOTTED THE SUPPLY CUTS THAT HAVE OCCURRED

216 DURING THE LAST 7 HEATING SEASONS. ARE THESE SUPPLY CUTS

217 EVIDENCE THAT AN LNG PLANT IS NEEDED?

A. No. In response to DPU 4.01¹⁰, the Company stated that none of these
supply cuts resulted in outages. Below is a copy of the chart from Slide 11.
As one can see, supply cuts are fairly common both in cold and warm
weather. In its response to DPU 4.01, the Company also stated that it
primarily relied on its storage services to resolve these supply cuts.

⁹ A copy of DEU response to OCS discovery request 2.17 can be found in Vastag Exhibit 1.1.

¹⁰ A copy of DEU response to DPU discovery request 4.01 can be found in Vastag Exhibit 1.1.

However, the Company claims that if supply cuts occurred on a Design Day,

its storage facilities would not be available to cover them.

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227 Q. HOW DOES THE OFFICE RESPOND TO THE COMPANY'S CONCERN 228 ABOUT SUPPLY CUTS OCCURRING ON A DESIGN DAY?

A. As Mr. Mierzwa explains in his testimony, the last time the Company's
Wasatch Front system experienced Design Day conditions was in 1963.
The chart above shows supply cuts occurring in both warm and cold
conditions. The chart actually appears to indicate that the chance of a very
large cut occurring on a Design Day is very small; and therefore, the chart
does not provide evidence that the Company needs an LNG plant.

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236 <u>The proposed LNG facility is not a risk-free solution to potential supply</u> 237 <u>reliability problems</u>

238 Q. DOES THE COMPANY DEMONSTRATE THAT THE LNG FACILITY 239 WOULD BE A ROBUST SOLUTION TO SUPPLY RELIABILITY RISKS?

A. In her direct testimony, Tina Faust lists these risks to supply reliability: cold
weather related well freeze offs and processing plant interruptions,
instances of pipeline repair and maintenance, landslides, earthquakes, and
other unanticipated events.¹¹ The majority of these factors would still pose
a risk to an LNG plant located in the SL Valley. Earthquakes, pipeline
damage, repair and maintenance issues and "other unanticipated events"
are still a risk.

247 In addition, if supply disruptions were to occur, it is unknown if the 248 LNG plant's proposed output, 150,000 Dth/day for 8 days, will be sufficient. 249 The Company claims in response to OCS 2.24¹² that a capacity of 150,000 250 Dth/day for the LNG plant was chosen because it "is representative of the 251 shortfalls the Company has seen on the system over the past few years." 252 Again, the Company refers to Slide 11 of the LNG Technical Conference 253 which is not compelling evidence to demonstrate what kind of future supply 254 disruptions might be experienced nor to support that a capacity of 150,000 255 Dth/day would be an appropriate remedy. At the time of a crises the need 256 could be greater than 150,000 Dth/day or may be caused by a disruption 257 that is not able to be resolved by an LNG plant at all.

258 Q. ARE THERE ANY ADDITIONAL "OTHER UNANTICIPATED EVENT"

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TYPE RISKS TO THE COMPANY'S PROPOSED LNG PLANT?

¹¹ Docket 18-057-03, Direct Testimony of Tina M. Faust for DEU, 4-30-18, p.2-3.

¹² A copy of DEU response to OCS discovery request 2.24 can be found in Vastag Exhibit 1.1.

260 Α. Yes, building such a facility in a highly populated and growing valley 261 appears to present other types of risks. For example, it is conceivable that 262 a not-in-my-backyard (nimby) movement could prevent the construction or 263 operation of the plant. DEU has not provided evidence that it has done 264 adequate work with local residents or officials to have confidence that this 265 project will move forward without opposition. Ratepayers should not be 266 forced to pay anything toward the development of a plant which may face a 267 significant risk of not becoming operational.

Nimby issues could become even more problematic, if a failure at the plant occurred. A release of liquid and/or vaporized gas, possibly causing an explosion, would cause public outcry and possibly cause the plant to have to be shut down. Similar LNG facilities have experienced failures that caused an explosion, such as the Williams Northwest LNG facility near Plymouth, WA in March 2014.¹³

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275 Other potential reasons for DEU to pursue the LNG facility

276 Q. ARE THERE OTHER FACTORS PRESSURING DEU TO CONSTRUCT A

277 LARGE FACILITY SUCH AS AN LNG PLANT?

A. Yes. DEU's parent company, Dominion Energy, which is comprised of 90%
regulated operations is promising its investors that it will generate 6-8%
annual growth in earnings and 6-10% annual growth in dividends. Dominion

¹³ See: <u>https://www.tri-cityherald.com/news/local/article75681512.html</u> and <u>https://www.utc.wa.gov/publicSafety/Documents/Presentation%20from%20Northwest%20Pipelin</u> <u>e%20-%203-31-14%20LNG%20Incident.pdf</u>

Energy's June 2018 presentation to investors explained that these increases were underpinned by a 6-7% per year growth in rate base.¹⁴ This presentation lists the DEU LNG plant as one of the projects generating its future growth.

285 Q. COULD THE GOALS OF DEU'S CORPORATE PARENT AFFECT HOW

286THE COMPANY DEVELOPS A SOLUTION TO THE NEWLY STATED287NEED TO ADDRESS SYSTEM RELIABILITY, I.E. POTENTIAL SUPPLY

288 SHORTFALLS?

A. Yes. The corporate goals appear to favor a solution that involves the
Company building and owning a large expensive LNG facility rather than
contracting with a third party to provide system reliability solutions.

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293 Conclusions and Recommendations

294 Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE THE OFFICE'S RECOMMENDATIONS
 295 REGARDING DEU'S REQUEST FOR APPROVAL TO CONSTRUCT AN
 296 LNG FACILITY.

A. The Office recommends that the Commission deny DEU's request for approval of an LNG facility. The Office believes that the Company has not conducted sufficient due diligence concerning the newly identified system reliability problem. DEU also failed to present sufficient evidence to meet

¹⁴ See: <u>http://investors.dominionenergy.com/static-files/e59c2e0a-6f33-42ff-b7a4-3c11fbddac33</u>. A copy of the presentation is also included in Vastag Exhibit 1.1. 301 its burden of proof that an LNG facility is needed. The Company's request302 is inadequate for the following reasons:

- Lack of evidence in its application and in DEU's regulatory history
 that a supply reliability problem exists on the DEU system and if
 needed, that an LNG plant is the optimal solution.
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 2. Failure to adequately investigate all potential supply reliability
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 2. Failure to adequately investigate all potential supply reliability
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 3. Lack of evidence that LNG plants are typically used by the natural
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 4. Failure to demonstrate that 150,000 Dth/day is an appropriately
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 sized plant to remedy its alleged supply reliability problem.
- 5. Failure to consider the risks of siting an LNG plant in the highlypopulated Salt Lake Valley.
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The Office agrees that the avoidance of natural gas outages during cold winter weather is extremely important. However, the construction of an LNG facility is not a time-limited solution. The Commission should require more from the Company than the insufficient analysis provided in this 324 docket which is based on a continually shifting statement of problems used 325 to justify an LNG facility. The Commission should require the Company to 326 fully document the alleged supply reliability problem and fully explore and 327 completely evaluate all potential supply reliability services. Only then can 328 regulators and stakeholders properly assess what solution would be the 329 most effective for DEU's ratepayers.

Finally, if the Commission decides to approve the Company's request, then the Office asserts that DEU's firm transportation customers should share in the cost of an LNG facility because they would also benefit from its service.

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335 Q. DOES THAT CONCLUDE YOUR TESTIMONY?

336 A. Yes it does.