## BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH

\_\_\_\_\_

In the Matter of Qwest Corporation's

Land Development Agreements (LDA) : Docket No. 03-049-62

Tariff Provisions :

\_\_\_\_\_

## SUPPLEMENTAL SURREBUTTAL TESTIMONY

**OF** 

LAURA L. SCHOLL

**FOR** 

**QWEST CORPORATION** 

**APRIL 5, 2005** 

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

	P	AGE
I.	INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE	1
II.	STIPULATION WITH HBA	1
III.	CLARIFICATION OF IMPACT OF RECENT LEGISLATION	3
IV.	RESPONSES TO OPTION 2 CONTACTORS	4
$\mathbf{V}$	SUMMARY	10

1		I. INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE
2	Q.	PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME, TITLE AND ADDRESS.
3	A.	My name is Laura L. Scholl. I am employed by Qwest Services Corporation as
4		the Utah Director of Regulatory Affairs for Qwest Corporation (Qwest).
5	Q.	ARE YOU THE SAME LAURA SCHOLL WHO PREVIOUSLY FILED
6		DIRECT, REBUTTAL AND SURREBUTTAL TESTIMONY IN THIS
7		DOCKET?
8	A.	Yes, I am.
9	Q.	WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR SUPPLEMENTAL SURREBUTTAL
10		TESTIMONY?
11	A.	I respond briefly to certain elements of the surrebuttal testimony filed by Mr.
12		Allen on behalf of Clear Wave and Mr. Bodine on behalf of SBS. However,
13		most importantly, I want to alert the Public Service Commission (Commission)
14		that Qwest has successfully negotiated a stipulation with The Salt Lake Home
15		Builders Association (HBA). I also clarify statements made in my surrebuttal
16		testimony about the impact of 1st Substitute SB 108 on this proceeding.
17		II. STIPULATION WITH HBA
18	Q.	PLEASE DECRIBE THE STIPULATION REACHED BETWEEN QWEST
19		AND THE HBA.
20	A.	The stipulation states that the HBA has no objection to the discontinuation of
21		Option 2 of the LDA. It outlines the modifications Owest is making to its facility

22 placement processes and ensures the opportunity for continued input by HBA 23 members into Qwest's processes. A copy of the stipulation is attached to this 24 testimony as exhibit LLS –SSR1. It was also separately filed with the 25 Commission on March 30, 2005. WHY DID OWEST PURSUE AN AGREEMENT WITH THE HBA? 26 Q. 27 A. Owest believes the HBA is an actual party in interest to the LDA process, unlike 28 the Option 2 contractors. The HBA represents approximately 170 builders and 29 developers, in one of the critical geographic areas of single-family development in 30 the State. Satisfying the needs of such developers is key to Owest's success in the 31 marketplace. Qwest believes the most effective approach is direct communication 32 with the HBA, not a process convoluted by a third party with adverse interests, 33 such as the Option 2 contractors. 34 Additionally, after reviewing proposals made by the Division of Public Utilities 35 (DPU), Qwest sought to reach an agreement with the HBA that made sense to the 36 HBA and to Qwest in terms of timeliness, effectiveness and cost. 37 Qwest's choice of approach has since been reinforced by the actions of SBS in response to the HBA entering into the stipulation. As I discuss below, rather than 38 39 working fairly to forward the interests of developers, SBS has unfairly portrayed 40 the stipulation in a seemingly desperate attempt to preserve Option 2 at all costs. 41 Qwest should simply not have to rely on entities who can be so antagonistic for 42 the placement of its facilities.

43 Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE PROCESS 44 A. Representatives of Qwest met formally with the executive committee of the HBA 45 board on two occasions. There were also numerous informal conversations and 46 discussions to fine tune the provisions of the stipulation. It is my understanding 47 that the executive committee sought and received approval from the full board of 48 the HBA and also sent a copy of the stipulation to all of its members for comment 49 before the president signed it. 50 Q. WHAT DO YOU CONCLUDE? 51 I conclude that a key real party in interest to this proceeding has been satisfied A. 52 and that the Option 2 contractors do not represent the interests of the 53 homebuilders and developers as they claimed. III. CLARIFICATION OF IMPACT OF RECENT 54 **LEGISLATION** 55 56 Q. WHAT CLARIFICATION DID YOU WANT TO MAKE REGARDING THE IMPACT OF 1<sup>ST</sup> SUBSTITUTE SB108? 57 58 A. In my surrebuttal testimony, I stated that as a result of the legislation, "the issues 59 in this case may be essentially moot.". Having now read the pre-hearing brief 60 submitted by Qwest, I believe that a more correct characterization would be that 61 the legislative policy statements update the framework under which Qwest is 62 regulated in Utah. Under that updated regime, Owest is allowed to make changes 63 to its offerings on five days notice with any challenge coming after the fact. 64 Qwest believes that once the legislation becomes effective on May 2, 2005,

Consistent with legislative intent, Qwest will have the ability to modify the LDA Option 2 without prior Commission approval. I would like to note, however, that given the protracted history of this dispute, Qwest believes it is prudent to continue with this process to allow for a full hearing and PSC determination on the issues and Qwest's right to control the placement of its own network.

#### IV. RESPONSES TO OPTION 2 CONTACTORS

IN REGARDS TO THE SURREBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM

72 BODINE AND STEPHEN ALLEN, HAVE EITHER ONE OF THEM 73 PROVIDED ANY COMPELLING PUBLIC POLICY REASONS WHY 74 **OPTION 2 SHOULD REMAIN?** 75 No. Their arguments are based primarily upon self interest. They claim to also A. 76 speak in the interest of developers (and even Qwest). However, as demonstrated 77 in my surrebuttal testimony, what once appeared to be a large number of 78 developer interveners continue to evaporate. No developer has had any 79 meaningful participation in this docket to support the Option 2 contractors' 80 position, and the HBA has entered into a stipulation with Qwest. Finally, the 81 Option 2 contractors certainly do not speak in the best interests of Qwest. 82 All Qwest seeks in this proceeding is to regain the ability to handle the placement 83 of its own facilities by itself or through its own contractors. Despite the claims of 84 Mr. Allen (e.g., pages 4-5) and Mr. Bodine (e.g., page 15) that hardly seems 85 "arrogant" or seeking to act in "total disregard" for Commission authority,

65

66

67

68

69

70

71

Q.

especially when it is something that all of Owest's competitors enjoy. Indeed, there ought to be an extreme countervailing public interest in order for the Commission to prevent Qwest from managing its own facility placement. They also add a new twist that Qwest hadn't previously addressed, and that is extremely troubling. Both Clear Wave and SBS say Qwest should appreciate the marketing services Option 2 contractors provide, and cite the example of the Traverse Ridge development for their hard work attempting to win placement opportunities for Owest. Owest has serious concerns with having its marketing carried out by parties who, in their surrebuttal testimony, variously refer to Qwest or its representatives as being "false and misleading," of committing "failings and abuses," of not being "sincere" (Bodine pages 20-21), of having a reputation of "delaying projects and being uncooperative," of having "arrogance and pride," and of not being "trustworthy" (Allen pages 2-4, 6). It is easy to imagine conversations with developers where these Option 2 contractors sell their services without necessarily speaking of Qwest in glowing terms. Indeed, Qwest doesn't need to rely on informed judgment to see how Option 2 contractors interface with developers. In response to the stipulation with the HBA, SBS sent an email communication to members of the HBA characterizing the HBA's action as a selling "down the river" "for a handful of beads," strongly implying that Owest's promises regarding its future dealings with developers are essentially worthless. A copy of the email is attached as exhibit LLS-SSR2. Essentially calling Qwest's proposals empty promises is both unfair and inaccurate, and is destructive of

86

87

88

89

90

91

92

93

94

95

96

97

98

99

100

101

102

103

104

105

106

107

Qwest's relationship with developers. Qwest can do without such "marketing."
To me it seems patently unfair to require Qwest to have its facilities placement
handled by parties as antagonistic as some Option 2 contractors can be.
ON PAGE 19 OF HIS TESTIMONY, MR. BODINE CLAIMS THAT SBS
HAS PROVIDED TAX RETURNS THAT PROVE SBS MAKES LITTLE
MONEY. HAS QWEST RECEIVED SUCH DOCUMENTS?
No. SBS initially offered to supply tax returns rather than directly answer
questions regarding SBS's profits and the financial benefits it provides to its
principals. Qwest agreed (subject to requesting further information if the tax
returns did not provide adequate information). However, the tax returns have
never been supplied. This may simply have been a logistical issue on getting the
returns to Qwest, but whatever the case Qwest has not seen the returns. Further,
SBS has flatly refused to answer Qwest's data requests seeking information about
things such as SBS's labor costs (which would be important information about a
company like SBS, where the principals apparently also provide the labor and
where profits could therefore be characterized as expenses). If the tax returns that
SBS was planning to supply would accurately demonstrate SBS's true financial
condition, Qwest wonders why SBS would refuse to provide information on labor
costs. In sum, to date SBS has provided no meaningful information about its
financial condition.

128	Ų.	SURREBUTTAL TESTIMONY?
130	A.	Just one. Mr. Bodine makes statements in his testimony to the effect that if things
131		were as bad as Qwest states under Option 2, Qwest would have the proof in the
132		form of legal judgments (e.g., pages 4, 20). The argument goes something like, if
133		Option 2 contractors are as bad as Qwest asserts (I note in this regard, Qwest has
134		been careful not to paint all Option 2 contractors—including Clear Wave—as
135		being as uncooperative as SBS) why doesn't Qwest just sue for violation of the
136		LDA contract? Putting aside the fact that Qwest has no contractual relationship
137		with Option 2 contractors (a fundamental flaw in Option 2), I found it very telling
138		that SBS's recommendation to Qwest for handling Option 2 problems is to sue. I
139		thought these statements by Mr. Bodine offered a nice snap shot of much of the
140		problem with Option 2.
141		The proposals Mr. Pappas identified in earlier testimony to shorten the tariff time
142		intervals, allow developers to pay for conduit placement if they require expedited
143		treatment, and require Qwest to pay for conduit placement if it fails to meet the
144		tariff timelines, provide ample protection for developers' interests. Qwest's
145		proposals, in addition to held-order rules and the pressures of the competitive
146		market, provide ample protection for Qwest's customers. There is simply no
147		public interest in requiring Qwest to maintain Option 2.

148	Q.	MR. ALLEN DISCUSSES THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCE OF
149		HAVING AN OPTION 2 LDA. DOES HE IDENTIFY THE REAL ISSUE?
150	A.	No. Mr. Allen misstates Qwest's reference to "unintended consequences." He
151		alleges that the unintended consequence was merely that developers began to use
152		Option 2, which is false. The problem was with the option being interpreted as
153		providing an excessive, flat-rate, per-lot price (at 125% of the distribution portion
154		of Qwest's average loop investment) that sent perverse economic signals both to
155		developers and to the Option 2 contractors seeking to use the tariff for profit (in
156		the case of Clear Wave, eventually charging \$255 per lot for labor). Under this
157		interpretation, the people choosing to use Option 2 (the developers) had no
158		incentive to control costs, while the people with the incentive to control costs
159		(Qwest) had no control over or relationship with the contractors placing the
160		facilities. When combined with the other problems attendant to a situation where
161		the contractors do not work for Qwest (e.g., failing to observe tariff timelines), the
162		result has been an "unintended" mess.
163	Q.	MR. ALLEN TALKS ABOUT THE BENEFITS THAT OPTION 2
164	Ą.	CONTRACTORS PROVIDE TO THE DEVELOPER, THE END USER
165		AND QWEST. PLEASE COMMENT ON THESE STATEMENTS.
166	A.	As Mr. Pappas has testified, the end user enters the game so late in the
	Α.	
167		construction cycle of the development itself that they have no idea who placed the
168		facilities. Unless there are disputes that prevent Qwest from assuming ownership

169		of facilities under Option 2, the end-user is essentially never impacted by the
170		decision to use one option or the other.
171		Mr. Allen also misstates the position when he claims that "Qwest also benefits by
172		acquiring customers purchasing at least 56% of the new homes without having to
173		market their services." (Page 8.) The statement shows a lack of understanding
174		about how many CLECs operate using Qwest's facilities. Facilities placement
175		does not guaranty that Qwest will obtain customers.
176		As for a "marketing" benefit to Qwest, as stated above marketing should be left to
177		those Qwest employees responsible for building and advancing relationships with
178		developers and end-users. In light of their different interests and apparently
179		negative view of Qwest, entities such as SBS or Clear Wave should not do
180		Qwest's marketing. Yet that is an almost inescapable by-product of Option 2, as
181		the Option 2 contractors market their own services. This is a compelling reason
182		not to force Qwest to maintain Option 2.
183	Q.	DO YOU HAVE ANY FINAL OBSERVATIONS ABOUT MR. ALLEN'S
184		SURREBUTTAL TESTIMONY?
185	A.	Yes. Mr. Allen dismisses the proposal Qwest made to the HBA (which has since
186		become an executed stipulation, filed with the Commission) that if successful in
187		eliminating Option 2 Qwest will do certain things to ensure that it is responsive to
188		developers' needs. Mr. Allen implies that such a proposal would require
189		developers to blindly trust Qwest to meet their needs. Mr. Allen is wrong for

Page 10

several reasons. First, if Qwest fails to meet its tariff intervals developers can have conduit placed (paid for by Qwest)—they do not need to "trust" that Qwest will meet the schedule. Second, clarifying and shortening the timelines in the tariff does not leave developers to simply trust Qwest—Qwest is legally bound by the terms of its offering documents (e.g., tariffs and price lists) and is subject to Commission jurisdiction. Finally, Qwest has agreed to meet with developers in the future to determine how a revised LDA tariff is working, and cooperate in reaching any needed changes.

Despite Mr. Allen's skepticism, the HBA has entered the stipulation with Qwest whereby the HBA does not oppose the elimination of Option 2. This

whereby the HBA does not oppose the elimination of Option 2. This demonstrates the ability of Qwest and developers to work together to meet their mutual needs without Option 2. It is now crystal clear that Option 2 contractors do not really speak for developers in this proceeding—they speak only for their own interests in maintaining a lucrative tariff provision. As the stipulation further attests, Qwest has every incentive to work with developers and to ensure a good relationship with them in a competitive marketplace.

#### V. SUMMARY

### Q. DO YOU HAVE ANY CLOSING THOUGHTS?

208 A. Qwest believes the stipulated agreement with the HBA and the revised tariff
209 proposals made in earlier testimony address the key objectives set forth by the
210 DPU in its testimony as well as being responsive to the needs of the real parties in

211		interest, the home builders. Given the stipulation, in addition to the evidence
212		already offered by Qwest in multiple rounds of testimony, Qwest asks that the
213		Commission allow Qwest to remove Option 2 as an offering, consistent with its
214		revised tariff and the conditions in the stipulation, and finally and completely
215		resolve the issues disputed in this docket.
216	Q.	DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR SUPPLEMENTAL SURREBUTTAL
217		TESTIMONY?
218	A.	Yes, it does.