

BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH

)	
)	Docket No. 15-053-01
)	
In the Matter of Strata Inc.)	Surrebuttal Testimony
Application for an Increase in)	of David Brevitz, C.F.A.
Utah Universal Service Fund Support)	For the Office of
)	Consumer Services
)	

NONCONFIDENTIAL VERSION

November 17, 2015

1 Q. PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME, OCCUPATION AND BUSINESS ADDRESS.

2 A. My name is David Brevitz. My business address is Brevitz Consulting Services,
3 3623 SW Woodvalley Terrace, Topeka, KS, 66614.

4 Q. HAVE YOU PREVIOUSLY FILED DIRECT TESTIMONY AND REBUTTAL
5 TESTIMONY IN THIS MATTER ON BEHALF OF THE OFFICE OF
6 CONSUMER SERVICES ("OCS")?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THIS SURREBUTTAL TESTIMONY?

9 A. The purpose of this rebuttal is to respond to various positions taken in the
10 rebuttal testimony of Douglas Meredith on behalf of Strata regarding rate of
11 return, and to relate those positions to my direct testimony on those issues. I
12 have read Mr. Meredith's testimony and exhibits thoroughly and while it is
13 somewhat voluminous, the Commission should give it little weight for the
14 reasons described in this surrebuttal testimony. The material presented by Mr.
15 Meredith regarding the "small company premium" is the perhaps unintended
16 product of "data mining" permitted by advances in databases and computer
17 technologies, which mistakes correlation for causation, and overlooks the nature
18 of and problems with the data that is being mined. The "small company
19 premium" hinges on existence of market inefficiencies and is an alleged measure
20 of one market inefficiency. Since this conflicts with the established and widely

21 held view that financial markets are efficient, the proof that the Commission
22 should require to demonstrate the existence of the “small company premium” is
23 that there are actual investors identifying this market inefficiency and profiting
24 from it. Mr. Meredith provides no such evidence. I urge the Commission to
25 adopt the rate of return recommendations contained in my Direct Testimony.

26 **RATE OF RETURN ISSUES**

27 **Q. PLEASE IDENTIFY THE RATE OF RETURN ISSUES, AND DESCRIBE THE**
28 **OVERALL BALANCE OF MR. MEREDITH’S TESTIMONY ON THOSE**
29 **ISSUES IN THIS CASE.**

30 **A.** In my Direct Testimony, I addressed two important elements in the computation
31 of rate of return under the Commission’s rules in this matter – the appropriate
32 state rate of return on equity to be used, and the appropriate interstate overall
33 rate of return to be used. Mr. Meredith devotes the great majority of his
34 testimony and exhibits to only one of those elements – which certainly is
35 important on its own – the state rate of return on equity. Of the thirteen pages
36 that comprise Mr. Meredith’s rate of return testimony, only one question and
37 brief answer is provided for the appropriate interstate rate of return.

38 **Q. IS THE OFFICE TAKING POSITIONS “UNREASONABLY DESIGNED TO**
39 **SIMPLY PRODUCE A LOW RATE OF RETURN FOR STRATA” AS**

40 **ALLEGED BY MR. MEREDITH AT LINE 123 OF HIS REBUTTAL**
41 **TESTIMONY?**

42 A. Absolutely not. Each of the recommendations in my Direct and Rebuttal
43 testimonies on rate of return has firm foundation in the Commission's rules,
44 regulatory policy, financial management and modern portfolio theory.
45 Furthermore, Mr. Meredith's testimony quite clearly suffers from the very
46 weakness that he accuses (without support) my testimony of having. Mr.
47 Meredith appears to have taken many opportunities - which are not supported
48 by financial or regulatory practice or modern portfolio theory - in a scattershot
49 approach to create additive factors to increase his recommended return on
50 equity. Here I am referring to Mr. Meredith's rejection of the DCF methodology
51 and "various premia" he seeks to add to intrastate return on equity for liquidity,
52 small size, and leverage, as well as flawed calculation of "leveraged beta".

53 **Q. MR. MEREDITH'S TESTIMONY CONTAINS SPECULATION AND**
54 **CONJECTURE CLAIMING TO KNOW WHY THE FCC HAS NOT YET**
55 **ACTED ON THE FCC STAFF REPORT ON RATE OF RETURN. SHOULD**
56 **THE COMMISSION GIVE THIS SPECULATION AND CONJECTURE ANY**
57 **WEIGHT?**

58 A. No. Mr. Meredith makes the following statements in an attempt to rebut my
59 reference to the rate of return recommendation contained in the FCC Staff
60 Report:

- 61 • Line 217, “the rebuttals of the [FCC] staff report provided by NTCA and the
62 Rural Broadband Alliance leveled a broadside against the staff findings to the
63 extent that the FCC has let the issue remain dormant for two years and no
64 action has been taken.”
- 65 • Line 228, “from the FCC’s docket we have one staff report that was
66 thoroughly rebutted.”
- 67 • Line 231, “in light of the evidence, the FCC has let the issue remain idle”

68 The Commission should not accept Mr. Meredith’s speculation and conjecture
69 regarding what is on the minds of the FCC commissioners regarding this report,
70 or why the FCC has not yet acted on the Staff Report. Mr. Meredith has not
71 provided any basis to support that he knows why the FCC is doing what it is
72 doing regarding the Staff Report. As this Commission no doubt can well
73 appreciate given its own responsibility to manage its own docket schedule, the
74 FCC sets its own schedule of when it takes matters up and when it doesn’t. It is
75 my experience that commissions do not allow parties to make any conclusions
76 on facts or policy from circumstances and timing of when a commission does or
77 doesn’t take a matter up for consideration. The Commission should give no

78 weight to Mr. Meredith's speculation and conjecture that because time has
79 elapsed since the FCC Staff Report was filed, and rural local exchange company
80 groups filed comments opposing the conclusions contained in the Report, that in
81 fact the FCC has rejected the Report and its conclusions. In fact, as described
82 below, the American Cable Association filed a Request for Reconsideration on
83 use of the FCC staff return in the cost modeling to determine Connect America
84 Fund Phase II support levels, stating that the FCC staff return was "too high".
85 The FCC denied this reconsideration request and found that the FCC staff return
86 was in fact reasonable.¹ Mr. Meredith's speculation and conjecture would be
87 equally applicable to infer that because the FCC has not yet acted, the FCC
88 agrees with those commenters that the FCC Staff Report provides a rate of return
89 that is too high.

90 The Commission should also note that one of the "rebuttals" to the FCC Staff
91 Report that Mr. Meredith states "levels a broadside" against that Report is the
92 Exhibit 4 authored by Mr. Vincent Wiemer who, as explained below, the Kansas
93 Corporation Commission found not to be a credible witness on rate of return
94 issues. This should cause the Commission to carefully scrutinize the merit of Mr.
95 Meredith's Exhibit 4.

¹ Memorandum Opinion and Order; In the Matter of Connect America Fund and High Cost Universal Service Support; WC Docket Nos. 10-90 and 05-337; FCC 14-180; Released November 12, 2014. This Order is attached as Exhibit OCS 3S-1.

96 Q. AT LINE 216 MR. MEREDITH STATES "WHAT SHOULD INFORM THE
97 COMMISSION IN THIS PROCEEDING IS THE FACT THAT THE FCC DID
98 NOT ACCEPT THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE STAFF REPORT" (EMPHASIS
99 IN ORIGINAL). IS THIS ACCURATE?

100 A. No. While the FCC has not yet acted on the FCC staff Report on Rate of Return
101 for reasons known only to the FCC itself, the FCC has directly employed the FCC
102 staff recommended rate of return to determine support amounts for Phase II of
103 the Connect America Fund or "CAF II" funding. Specifically in the cost model
104 used to determine CAF II support amounts, the FCC staff used an 8.5% rate of
105 return as a model input, based on the mid-point of the rate of return range
106 contained in the FCC Staff Report on Rate of Return: 7.84% to 9.20%. The FCC
107 addressed the application for review of this model input by the American Cable
108 Association and specifically upheld the 8.5% rate of return from the FCC Staff
109 report stating: "we are not persuaded by ACA's argument that the cost of
110 money selected by the Bureau is unreasonably high"; and, "we find the Bureau's
111 selection of the input values for the cost of money and the subscription rate to be
112 reasonable, clearly reflecting the Bureau's consideration of the record before it,
113 its own analysis, and its predictive judgment of future conditions."² The
114 midpoint of the rate of return range established by the FCC Staff Report on Rate

² Id, at page 3.

115 of Return – 8.5% -- is in use today to determine CAF II support amounts from the
116 federal Universal Service Fund.

117 **RATE OF RETURN FOR INTERSTATE SERVICES**

118 **Q. DOES MR. MEREDITH DIRECTLY ADDRESS THE RECOMMENDATION**
119 **IN YOUR DIRECT TESTIMONY THAT THE COMMISSION USE THE 9.40%**
120 **OVERALL RATE OF RETURN FROM THE FCC FORM 492 REPORT?**

121 A. No. Mr. Meredith’s testimony on the interstate rate of return to be used is
122 provided at lines 436 – 441. There he advocates for use of a more recent (2015)
123 Form 492 and states “this is not the 2014 version proposed by Messrs. Brevitz
124 and Coleman.” Mr. Meredith is completely incorrect to state that I proposed use
125 of this Form 492 from 2014 – the Company proposed it via Mr. Searle’s Direct
126 Testimony, as I made clear in my Direct Testimony at footnote 2.³ I accepted use
127 of the Company – proposed Form 492 from 2014 but made clear that Mr. Searle
128 had selected the wrong return on the form to use – 11.45% versus 9.40% -- which
129 I explained was the correct interstate rate of return to use. I have thoroughly
130 explained why the 9.40% rate of return is the correct return to use in this case in
131 my Direct Testimony at lines 171 – 239. The Commission should find that 9.40%

³ Mr. Meredith also completely glosses over the fact that he has changed more than just which year of the Form 492 to use. In this case Mr. Meredith changes from Mr. Searle’s recommended use of the Common Line pool return of 11.45% to the total interstate rate of return for all services of 9.51%. Mr. Meredith makes this change in the company position without any explanation whatsoever.

132 is the correct interstate rate of return for use in this case under the Commission's
133 rule. However, in the alternative, I do not object to use of the more recent return
134 of 9.47%/9.51% which is the more recent total interstate return.

135 **"COMPARABLE OR PEER COMPANIES"**

136 **Q. MR. MEREDITH DISCUSSES THE "PEER GROUP" OF COMPANIES**
137 **SELECTED BY MR. COLEMAN AT LINES 281 - 315 OF HIS TESTIMONY,**
138 **AND IDENTIFIES A SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT "PEER GROUP".**
139 **SHOULD THE COMMISSION ACCEPT HIS PEER GROUP?**

140 **A.** No. Selection of "comparable companies" for rate of return analysis is necessary
141 and required. The rate of return analyst must rely on public information
142 associated with publicly traded companies in order to perform calculations
143 necessary to determine the cost of capital elements of capital structure and return
144 on equity. There is no public market data for Utah telecommunications
145 companies since these companies are not publicly held with stocks and bonds
146 that trade in public financial markets. If there were publicly traded
147 telecommunications companies in Utah, those companies could be considered for
148 reasonableness for inclusion as "comparable companies" for rate of return
149 analysis purposes. Since there are no such companies, other telecommunications
150 companies which are publicly traded must be reviewed for inclusion in the pool
151 of "comparable companies" for this analysis - recognizing that it is not possible

152 to assemble a pool of companies that are direct analogs to Strata.⁴ Mr. Meredith
153 takes issue with the comparable companies Mr. Coleman used, and accepts my
154 testimony in other cases to exclude HickoryTech, Alteva, Atlantic Tele Network,
155 Earthlink, and IDT. However, Mr. Meredith does not exclude Cincinnati Bell or
156 FairPoint, and in fact includes them in his “levered beta” table. I am very
157 familiar with FairPoint Communications (FRP) from many years of working in
158 other states on various FairPoint cases and dockets, including the acquisition
159 case in which FairPoint acquired Verizon’s Northern New England operations,
160 and the subsequent bankruptcy case less than two years later. FairPoint does not
161 pay a dividend and is owned by a variety of entities that acquired ownership as a
162 result of the bankruptcy proceeding, and subsequent “distressed capital” (or
163 “vulture fund”) investors. FairPoint has yet to earn a profit on a full-year basis.
164 For these reasons I would not include FairPoint as a comparable company.

165 Oddly, Mr. Meredith states at line 310 “as noted by Dr. Billingsley, some of these
166 companies are distressed or are in bankruptcy, thereby affecting their beta value”
167 and refers to “FTR”, which is Frontier Communications. Frontier is not
168 distressed or in bankruptcy and in fact has recently concluded over \$10 billion in
169 financing to fund its acquisition of Verizon landline operations in California,

⁴ Mr. Meredith notes that “there are only 14 publicly traded ILEC peers in the nation” within “1,101 small company study areas in the nation”. Meredith Rebuttal, at line 349.

170 Florida and Texas. This erroneous statement carries through to Mr. Meredith's
171 "levered beta" table at line 378. Mr. Meredith also puts in AT&T and Verizon as
172 "peers" to Strata without any substantive explanation. This is illogical and
173 inconsistent with his claim elsewhere that a "small company premium" is
174 necessary. It makes no sense to include the two companies which are most
175 demonstrably not comparable to Strata in the peer group. Mr. Coleman and I
176 appropriately did not include AT&T and Verizon.

177 It is reasonable for the Commission to rely on the comparable companies selected
178 by Mr. Coleman and me, as adjusted above.

179 **STATE RETURN ON EQUITY**

180 **Q. AT LINES 87 - 95 MR. MEREDITH DISCOUNTS THE EXTENSIVE CASE**
181 **CITATIONS IN YOUR DIRECT TESTIMONY TO RURAL LOCAL**
182 **EXCHANGE COMPANY RATE OF RETURN DETERMINATIONS BY THE**
183 **KANSAS CORPORATION COMMISSION (KCC) STATING "WE SIMPLY**
184 **DON'T HAVE ANY INFORMATION THAT THE RATE USED FOR RETURN**
185 **ON EQUITY WAS FULLY EXAMINED IN THE CITED KANSAS CASES". IS**
186 **THIS CRITICISM WARRANTED OR REASONABLE?**

187 **A.** No. Every document in every case cited is publicly available on the KCC's
188 website. Each company filing, company witness testimony, staff witness
189 testimony, pleading, stipulation, and final Commission order is available on the

190 website for each case. Only limited information is deemed confidential and not
191 publicly available. In footnotes 10 and 11 of my direct testimony I included the
192 link to the KCC website and stated that “each of these testimonies is public
193 record” and “each of the Commission decisions is public record” on the KCC
194 website. The cost basis for individual rural local exchange company KUSF
195 funding has been reviewed by the KCC on a rotating basis since 1997. So at this
196 point there is an established base of precedent from cases that have gone to
197 hearing, and now in most cases stipulations are reached to generally accept the
198 KCC staff-recommended revenue requirement based on KCC staff-
199 recommended ROR as illustrated by the table at line 252 of my Direct Testimony.
200 I cannot explain why Mr. Meredith did not use the link provided in my Direct
201 Testimony to review these stipulations and orders himself to seek to verify that
202 in fact rate of return was fully examined by the parties and the Commission in
203 each case. The only appropriate criticism here is that Mr. Meredith failed to
204 review these public documents as he easily could have done before writing the
205 testimony he wrote.

206 **Q. MR. MEREDITH’S REBUTTAL STATED “ESPECIALLY ABSENT IS ANY**
207 **REFERENCE OR CITATION FROM THE COMMISSION ABOUT ITS**
208 **EVALUATION AND DETERMINATION OF THE RATE OF EQUITY [SIC]**
209 **IN THE LAHARPE CASE.” IS THIS CRITICISM WARRANTED?**

210 A. No. As noted above, this decision by the KCC is publicly available on its website
211 and is attached as Exhibit OCS 3S-1. Review of this KCC Order makes clear that
212 the Commission did thoroughly review rate of return determination, and the
213 Commission's analysis of the rate of return position expressed by the Company's
214 consultant is scathing:

215 22. As part of the Commission's analysis of the extensive evidentiary
216 record, the Commission also assesses witness credibility. In this proceeding, the
217 Commission finds a substantial credibility gap between the two ROR witnesses.
218 Staff's witness, Mr. Gatewood, incorporated his own comprehensive updated
219 cost of equity analysis and consistently recommended this analysis as a
220 reasonable and appropriate approach.

221 23. LaHarpe's witness, Mr. Wiemer, incorporated another witness's
222 testimony in his pre-filed direct testimony to recommend a 12.5% ROE. Then, in
223 his supplemental rebuttal testimony, Mr. Wiemer, abandoned his initial
224 recommendation. Instead, he opted to use Mr. Gatewood's analysis and add
225 premia in an apparent effort to reach the highest possible ROE figure. There was
226 no mention of his previous recommendation, and the Commission was left to
227 ponder its application. Mr. Wiemer was certainly free to adjust his testimony as
228 the proceeding progressed; however, wholesale abandonment of one position
229 without reasonable explanation does have an effect on witness credibility.⁵

230 As noted in my Direct Testimony at line 497, the Commission adopted the 10%
231 return on equity recommended by KCC staff's "comprehensive updated cost of
232 equity analysis".⁶ The KCC clearly fully and carefully vetted the rate of return

⁵ Order; State Corporation Commission of the State of Kansas; *In the Matter of Staff's Motion Requesting The Commission Order LaHarpe Telephone Company, Inc. to Submit to an Audit for Purposes of Determining its Cost-Based Kansas Universal Service Fund Support, Pursuant to K.S.A. 66-2008*; Docket No. 12-LHPT-875-AUD; June 26, 2013, at page 7 - 8. [Exhibit OCS 3S-1; or the "LaHarpe Order"]

⁶ *Id.*, at page 7.

233 analysis before it. This KCC Order was (and is) publicly available on the website
234 cited in my testimony for Mr. Meredith's review.

235 **Q. IS THE COMPANY WITNESS IN THE LAHARPE PROCEEDING ABOVE**
236 **THE SAME MR. WIEMER THAT IS INDICATED TO HAVE AUTHORED**
237 **THE DOCUMENT MR. MEREDITH ATTACHES AS HIS EXHIBIT 4?**

238 A. Yes. Vincent H. Wiemer, CPA, Alexicon Consulting is indicated on the cover
239 page of Meredith Exhibit 4 to be the author of those comments to the FCC on the
240 FCC Staff Rate of Return report. The KCC's finding of Mr. Wiemer's lack of
241 credibility on rate of return issues should cause this Commission to carefully
242 scrutinize the merit of this Exhibit and Mr. Meredith's related testimony.

243 **Q. MR. MEREDITH STATES AT LINE 413 THAT YOU "FAIL TO INDICATE**
244 **THE METHOD USED TO CALCULATE THE PROPOSED STAFF RETURNS**
245 **ON EQUITY IN KANSAS". IS THIS CRITICISM WARRANTED OR**
246 **REASONABLE?**

247 A. No. At line 500 of my Direct Testimony I indicate that the DCF and CAPM
248 methods are used. Also as indicated above, all the filings, pleadings, testimonies,
249 stipulations and orders are publicly available on the KCC website. Review of
250 each publicly available KCC staff testimony on rate of return will show that each

251 case contains a “comprehensive updated cost of equity analysis”⁷ and that the
252 comprehensive analysis performed includes both Discounted Cash Flow (DCF)
253 and Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) estimations which are used to create a
254 holistic return on equity recommendation to the Commission.

255 **Q. MR. MEREDITH APPEARS TO IGNORE USE OF THE DISCOUNTED CASH**
256 **FLOW METHOD OF DETERMINING RETURN ON EQUITY, AND**
257 **FOCUSES ONLY ON THE CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL (CAPM). IS**
258 **THIS A SIGNIFICANT SHORTCOMING IN HIS TESTIMONY AND**
259 **PRESENTATION?**

260 A. Yes. Mr. Meredith’s testimony contains no discounted cash flow analysis for
261 determining return on equity, or reference to such analysis. Further, there is no
262 explanation of why Mr. Meredith has excluded the DCF methodology from his
263 testimony. My experience is that return on equity analysis before state utility
264 commissions will include estimations using both the DCF and CAPM
265 methodologies. This is done for purposes of producing a robust analysis, which
266 has an inherent cross-check between the methods to ensure reasonableness.
267 Notably, the return on equity estimations contained in the table in my Direct
268 Testimony at line 488 are derived from averages of the estimations from
269 application of both the DCF and CAPM methodologies. There is thus an

⁷ Exhibit OCS 3S-1; LaHarpe Order; at page 7.

270 inherent cross check for reasonableness in my recommendation that is lacking in
271 Mr. Meredith's testimony.

272 **Q. AT LINE 120 MR. MEREDITH STATES "A SMALL COMPANY**
273 **ADJUSTMENT OR MORE SPECIFICALLY A SIZE ADJUSTMENT IS A**
274 **COMMON ADJUSTMENT THAT IS USED WHEN EXAMINING SMALL**
275 **COMPANIES". HAS MR. MEREDITH PROVIDED ANY CITATIONS**
276 **WHERE THIS ADJUSTMENT WHICH HE CLAIMS IS "COMMON" HAS**
277 **BEEN ACCEPTED BY A STATE COMMISSION?**

278 **A.** No. Mr. Meredith provides no evidence of the acceptance of a small company
279 adjustment in any state USF funding proceeding, or in any other proceeding
280 where determination of rate of return is required. I am not aware of any case
281 where a state commission has accepted and used a "small company adjustment"
282 in its rate of return findings for state USF funding. In fact, this Commission has
283 rejected the request for a small company size adjustment of return on equity in
284 the Questar Gas Company rate case in Docket No. 13-057-05.⁸ Also, the
285 Minnesota Public Utilities Commission has recently rejected the application of a

⁸ Report and Order, In the Matter of the Application of Questar Gas Company to Increase Distribution Rates and Charges and Make Tariff Modification; Docket No. 13-057-05; Issued by the Public Service Commission of Utah, February 21, 2014, at pages 20, 32-33.

286 small size adjustment of return on equity. The pages from the MPUC's Order
287 relevant to cost of equity are attached as Exhibit OCS 3S-2.

288 Mr. Meredith's testimony contains generalizations and assertions on the subject
289 of the "small size" adjustment, but no real specifics on how "size" is measured,
290 or where are the breakpoints between "small size" and larger size. Perhaps it
291 may be presumed that size is measured by the firm's level of capitalization. In
292 any event, the proffered small size adjustment is completely contrary to rate of
293 return estimation concepts in public utility proceedings before state utility
294 commissions. Furthermore, the bare existence of a "small company premium" is
295 disputed in the finance field, and there is strong evidence that such a premium
296 does not in fact exist. My Direct Testimony explains this at lines 305 - 431.

297 **Q. AT LINE 98 MR. MEREDITH DEFINES "A SMALL COMPANY PREMIUM**
298 **[AS] AN ADJUSTMENT TO THE CALCULATED RATE OF EQUITY [SIC]**
299 **AND IS DESIGNED TO ACCOUNT FOR THE FACT THAT ACCESS TO**
300 **EQUITY IS MORE CONSTRAINED AS COMPANIES GET SMALLER.**
301 **THUS, DUE TO VARIOUS FACTORS, ACCESS TO CAPITAL REQUIRES A**
302 **PREMIUM OVER A RETURN ON EQUITY FOR MUCH LARGER**
303 **COMPANIES." PLEASE RESPOND.**

304 **A.** Mr. Meredith provides no evidence whatsoever that Strata's access to capital is at
305 all constrained. In fact, Strata's Annual Report data shows its equity has grown

306 substantially enough to permit rapid accumulation of profits and capital credits,
 307 all while it is financing a substantial construction program for Fiber to the Home,
 308 and buying various buildings and other assets.

309 [BEGIN CONFIDENTIAL]

[REDACTED]

310

311 [END CONFIDENTIAL]

312 This is not the profile of an entity that is “capital constrained”. The purported
 313 need for a “premium” would be pure profit subsidy from ratepayers statewide to
 314 Strata’s members.

315 **Q. AT LINE 347, MR. MEREDITH STATES “STRATA IS CHALLENGED IN**
 316 **THE NATIONAL EQUITY MARKETS”. DOES MR. MEREDITH PROVIDE**
 317 **ANY SUPPORT FOR THIS CONTENTION?**

318 **A.** Mr. Meredith provides no evidence whatsoever that Strata is challenged in the
 319 equity markets. Further undermining Mr. Meredith’s claims is the fact that
 320 Strata does not participate in public equity markets. It therefore is unclear what

321 “equity market” Mr. Meredith is referring to. The nature of the “challenge” is
322 not described by Mr. Meredith and the nature of any such “challenge” is very
323 difficult to perceive when Strata has accumulated substantial capital credit
324 balances, all while funding substantial construction and asset acquisition. It begs
325 the question of how much more equity does Strata need when it has substantial
326 member-provided equity, and is funding a substantial Fiber to the Home
327 construction program and asset acquisition while continuing to accumulate
328 substantial capital credits (equity) for its members.

329 **Q. AT LINE 228 MR. MEREDITH REFERENCES A RURAL BROADBAND**
330 **ALLIANCE ESTIMATE OF 6 PERCENT FOR A “SMALL COMPANY**
331 **ADJUSTMENT”. IS SUCH AN ADJUSTMENT WARRANTED OR**
332 **SUPPORTABLE?**

333 **A.** No. This “estimate” is drawn from Mr. Meredith’s Exhibit 4, which the cover
334 page indicates are comments before the FCC authored by Mr. Vincent Wiemer.
335 This is the same Mr. Wiemer that the Kansas Corporation Commission found
336 had no credibility as a rate of return expert in the LaHarpe case. Also, the very
337 size of the suggested “premium” indicates its inappropriateness. It is egregious
338 to recommend that 6% be added on top of any return on equity determined by
339 DCF or CAPM using market data which by definition includes a market assessed
340 risk/return relationship.

341 Q. AT LINE 361 MR. MEREDITH INDICATES "ADJUSTING THE BETA" FOR
342 LEVERAGE IS "ANOTHER STANDARD TOOL". IS THIS IN FACT
343 "STANDARD" IN DETERMINATION OF RETURN ON EQUITY BEFORE
344 STATE UTILITY COMMISSIONS?

345 A. This is an unsupported assertion by Mr. Meredith, which the Commission
346 should not accept. He offers no citation to state commission decisions that have
347 adopted this "standard" adjustment, including to decisions of the Utah PSC. I
348 am unaware of any Commission decision in any jurisdiction where this
349 "standard" adjustment is applied in determination of return on equity.

350 Q. BEGINNING AT LINE 368 OF HIS TESTIMONY MR. MEREDITH
351 PROPOSES THE USE OF A "LEVERED BETA" TO CALCULATE REQUIRED
352 RETURN ON EQUITY. DOES MR. MEREDITH PROVIDE ANY SUPPORT
353 FOR THE USE OF "LEVERED BETA" IN CALCULATING RETURN ON
354 EQUITY IN A REGULATORY PROCEEDING?

355 A. No. Mr. Meredith provides no citation to any regulatory proceeding where a
356 commission has used "levered beta" as he presents it to calculate a required or
357 allowed return on equity. I am not aware of any instance where a state utility
358 commission has accepted or used "levered beta" as presented by Mr. Meredith in
359 its determinations on rate of return, despite his unsupported claim at line 362
360 that it "is another standard tool when using CAPM". I have reviewed the

361 various finance and investment texts in my possession⁹ and while there are
362 extensive chapters on CAPM, beta, and related concepts and practices, there is no
363 mention whatsoever of “levered beta” or any equivalent. The standard usage of
364 “levered beta” I believe is for capital budgeting decisions – i.e., whether to
365 undertake a specific capital project, or not – not for valuation estimations such as
366 rate of return. Use of levered beta in state regulatory ROE determinations
367 appears to be uncommon at best.

368 **Q. PLEASE ADDRESS MR. MEREDITH’S TABLE 2 (AT LINE 374), WHICH**
369 **PRESENTS “LEVERED BETA” AND “ADJUSTED CAPM”.**

370 **A.** The levered beta/adjusted CAPM table appears flawed for a number of reasons.
371 Mr. Meredith provides no source or calculation documentation. It can perhaps
372 be assumed from prior statement that the “October 27th Spot Beta” is from Yahoo
373 Finance, but that and other data in the table is unattributed and unsourced. Mr.
374 Meredith states he “gathered the data to produce a levered beta” but provides no
375 more insight into the data sources and calculations for “CAPM unadjusted” or
376 the tax or debt%/equity% figures. Critically, Mr. Meredith’s “Spot beta” point of
377 beginning – if it is from Yahoo Finance, or potentially other sources – would
378 already include leverage and tax considerations. The same as other betas, the

⁹ These include: Managerial Finance, J. Fred Weston and Eugene F. Brigham; Financial Management and Policy, James C. Van Horne; Investments, Frank K. Reilly; Managing Investment Portfolios: A Dynamic Process, John L. Maginn and Donald L. Tuttle, eds.

379 Yahoo Finance beta is based on stock trading prices for the individual stock
380 relative to the S&P 500 stock index. The stocks trade based on earnings, which
381 includes leverage and tax effects. Mr. Meredith's levered beta/ Adjusted CAPM
382 Table 2 is unsupported, potentially incorrect on its face, and unusable by the
383 Commission. Importantly, the "levered beta" presentation assumes the return
384 on equity from CAPM requires adjustment - which it does not for reasons
385 described in my testimony. The Commission should disregard Mr. Meredith's
386 "levered beta" discussion and calculations for these reasons.

387 **Q. AT LINE 422 MR. MEREDITH REFERS TO A NEW NTCA-SPONSORED**
388 **RATE OF RETURN METHOD. SHOULD THE COMMISSION GIVE ANY**
389 **WEIGHT TO THIS TESTIMONY?**

390 **A.** No. Mr. Meredith does not provide any citation to where this new methodology
391 has been used and vetted. Furthermore, the new method requires a substantial
392 new variable - "value" - which by its nature is bound to be controversial. There
393 will be competing estimations of "value" and it does not simplify or streamline
394 the rate of return determination process to add a controversial new variable that
395 must be calculated.

396 **Q. AT LINE 387 OF MR. MEREDITH'S TESTIMONY A GRAPH IS PRESENTED**
397 **DRAWN FROM AN ARTICLE IN THE INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT**
398 **REVIEW, WITH THE CLAIM THAT THE GRAPH "SHOWS THE VARIOUS**

399 **PREMIA REQUIRED TO CALCULATE RETURNS ACROSS FINANCIAL**
400 **INSTRUMENTS”. DOES MR. MEREDITH PROVIDE SUCH A**
401 **CALCULATION OR INDICATE WHERE STATE UTILITY COMMISSIONS**
402 **ARE USING SUCH A CALCULATION TO DETERMINE RETURN ON**
403 **EQUITY?**

404 A. No. Mr. Meredith presents this graph but never provides any proposed data or
405 calculations, or more importantly never provides any data sources from which
406 the calculation could be made. Full assessment of this graph is impeded since
407 the title of the graph is not provided, nor is the article from which it is drawn
408 attached as an exhibit. Mr. Meredith is not consistent in that he states that “they
409 [the various premia] are required to calculate a rate of return” but he does not
410 provide a rate of return estimation which estimates and sums each of these
411 “various premia”. The Commission should give no weight to this graph because
412 it is not tied to a real calculation of required return on equity and is otherwise
413 inconsistent with other parts of Mr. Meredith’s testimony. Immediately
414 following this graph which shows “various premia”, Mr. Meredith finds
415 another even more important premium which is not contained on the graph. “It
416 is claimed that ‘the liquidity premium is perhaps as important as any of the risk
417 premiums’”. Yet this most important premium is not included in the various
418 premia listed immediately before, from the same author. The Commission
419 should rely upon required return on equity estimations that are clearly based

420 upon the standard formulation of the real risk free rate of return plus expected
421 inflation plus the risk premium – DCF and CAPM, rather than the scattershot,
422 inconsistent and unapplied citations from Mr. Meredith.

423 **Q. MR. MEREDITH INDICATES MR. COLEMAN’S CAPM MUST BE**
424 **ADJUSTED IN “RECOGNITION OF A LIQUIDITY PREMIUM” (LINE 355)**
425 **AND STATES “THE LIQUIDITY PREMIUM IS PERHAPS AS IMPORTANT**
426 **AS ANY OF THE RISK PREMIUMS” (LINE 392). PLEASE RESPOND.**

427 A. “Liquidity” is defined as “the ability to buy or sell an asset quickly with
428 reasonably small price changes assuming no new information has entered the
429 market”.¹⁰ Liquidity is irrelevant to the Commission’s determinations in this
430 case regarding Strata. Strata is a cooperative. There is no indication whatsoever
431 that the cooperative is going to be sold. From a member perspective, under
432 Strata’s bylaws membership interests in Strata are non-transferrable, so by
433 definition liquidity is not relevant. The Commission should not accept Mr.
434 Meredith’s proposal to recognize and include a “liquidity premium” among the
435 various premia which he seeks to have added to the computation of return on
436 equity. Mr. Meredith admits at lines 408 – 410 that he is not able to calculate
437 such a “liquidity premium” in the first place.

¹⁰ Investments, Frank K. Reilly, The Dryden Press, 1982, at page 673.

438 Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE HOW AND WHY MR. MEREDITH'S TESTIMONY
439 CONTRADICTS WELL ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES OF FINANCE AND
440 THEREFORE YIELDS RATE OF RETURN ESTIMATIONS WHICH ARE
441 ESSENTIALLY MEANINGLESS AND WITHOUT PROPER FOUNDATION.

442 A. Mr. Meredith's testimony obfuscates basic principles of finance and rate of return
443 determination in regulatory cases, and is otherwise internally inconsistent. The
444 Commission should find that a return on equity and overall rate of return of the
445 magnitude sought by Strata is unwarranted and unnecessary in today's capital
446 markets, and is imbalanced against the wireline and wireless services consumers
447 that pay into the UUSF to provide funds for individual local exchange companies
448 like Strata. Strata's original requested intrastate rate of return on equity is
449 approximately 14.00%, and the requested overall rate of return is 9.50%. Mr.
450 Meredith offers a variety of recommendations and observations, including that
451 "there is more than enough data to support the 9.50 percent rate of return" (line
452 204); "the median value [for the NECA calculated rate of return] was at least
453 11.75 percent" (line 427); the levered beta/adjusted CAPM "results in an
454 intrastate cost of equity of 16.76 percent" using "a very conservative value of 3
455 percent for the small company premium" (line 369). Mr. Meredith's potpourri is
456 disconnected from the methods of rate of return analysis regularly used by state
457 utility commissions - Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) and Capital Asset Pricing
458 Model (CAPM) - and violates fundamental principles in finance by which risk

459 and return are related, and under which investors are compensated only for
460 systematic risk as calculated in the “beta” associated with each security. Mr.
461 Meredith’s testimony begs the question of what does he believe specifically is an
462 appropriate rate of return, and lends itself to an interpretation such “specific”
463 rate of return would simply be the highest return the Commission can be
464 persuaded to accept.

465 Mr. Meredith’s disconnection from methods of rate of return analysis regularly
466 used by state utility commissions is illustrated by his testimony which:

- 467 • Without serious explanation or consideration discards use of DCF, which
468 is the fundamental method for asset valuation;
- 469 • Provides no evidence whatsoever that the company’s access to equity or
470 capital is at all constrained;
- 471 • Advocates calculation and use of “levered beta”, which is not used or
472 recognized for rate of return analysis by state utility commissions, and is
473 instead oriented toward internal capital budgeting decisions of firms;
- 474 • Advocates use of “various premia” layered on top of determined rate of
475 returns, which premia are not used or recognized for rate of return analysis
476 by state utility commissions;
- 477 • Advocates use of “various premia”, the very existence of which is
478 inconsistent with efficient markets principles of finance and capital markets,

- 479 and whose existence would necessarily imply profitable exploitable
480 investment strategies – using which professional investors have “yet to make
481 a nickel”;
- 482 • Advocates use of “various premia” as an additive to reflect purported
483 additional risks, without consideration of substantial offsetting additional
484 benefits which pertain to incumbent local exchange companies;
 - 485 • Advocates use of “various premia”, which researchers have found may very
486 well not exist, whose apparent existence may be the result of “data mining”,
487 which may be indicative of correlation but not causation, and may ultimately
488 stem from “survivor” bias in the small company database as well as being
489 driven by a very small fraction of outliers in the data;
 - 490 • Advocates use of “various premia”, which is entirely inconsistent with
491 modern portfolio theory under which investors are compensated only
492 for systematic risk (expressed via the “beta”) within an efficient portfolio, but
493 not for unsystematic risk; and,
 - 494 • Contains inappropriate and unfounded speculation and conjecture regarding
495 why the FCC may or may not have acted on its staff report.

496 The Commission should adopt the overall rate of return of 7.50% based on a 10%
497 intrastate return on equity which is recommended in my Direct Testimony. This
498 recommendation has a demonstrable, solid foundation in regulatory practices for
499 rate of return determination, and finance theory and practices. This

500 recommendation reflects a proper balance for those Utah statewide consumers
501 that pay monthly charges through their wireless and wireline services provider
502 bills to fund the UUSF, and those individual incumbent companies that seek to
503 draw from the UUSF. Finally, this recommendation is very consistent with rates
504 of return on equity recently granted by the Commission.

505 **Q. DOES THIS COMPLETE YOUR PREFILED SURREBUTTAL TESTIMONY?**

506 **A. Yes.**