In the Matter: Of the Formal Complaint and Request for Agency Action of Bear Hollow Restoration, LLC against Leon H. Saunders; Landmark Plaza Associates; Parley's Creek, Ltd.; Parley's Lane, Ltd.; Parley's Park; Stuart A. Knowles; Trilogy Limited, L.P.; Trilogy Asset Management, Inc.; Land and Water Resources, Inc.; Lawrence R. Knowles Irrevocable Trust; Leon H. Saunders, Stuart A. Knowles and Trilogy Limited, L.P. d/b/a SK Resources, a Utah General Partnership and/or Joint Venture; Summit Water Distribution Company, a Utah Corporation

) Transcript of) Hearing

) Docket No:
) 09-015-01

Tuesday, December 8, 2009 - 2:00 p.m.

Location: PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

160 East 300 South Fourth Floor, Room 451

Before: Ruben H. Arredondo

Administrative Law Judge

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	1	December 8, 2009 - 1:38 p.m.
13:28:15	2	PROCEEDINGS
13:38:33	3	JUDGE ARREDONDO: This is docket No. 09-015-01, Bear
13:54:49	4	Hollow Restoration vs. Leon Saunders and others. And this is
13:54:52	5	the time the commission has set for oral argument in this motion
13:54:56	6	to dismiss. And with that, let's take appearances, please,
13:55:00	7	beginning with Mr. Flitton.
13:55:01	8	MR. FLITTON: Yes. John Flitton, and Lara Swensen's
13:55:04	9	with me, on behalf of Summit Water Distribution Company.
13:55:09	10	JUDGE ARREDONDO: Okay.
13:55:11	11	MR. HATCH: Your Honor, Brent Hatch and Mitchell
13:55:13	12	Stephens on behalf of all the other individual defendants.
13:55:16	13	JUDGE ARREDONDO: Thank you. And on this side?
13:55:18	14	MR. SMITH: Craig Smith, Dan McDonald, and Kathryn
13:55:22	15	Steffey on behalf of Bear Hollow Restoration.
13:55:25	16	JUDGE ARREDONDO: Okay. Thank you. And who is
13:55:27	17	going to argue the motions on this? Mr. Flitton, are you going
13:55:33	18	to
13:55:33	19	MR. HATCH: Well, we have we have a motion to
13:55:35	20	dismiss, Your Honor. I think Summit Water has one as well. I
13:55:39	21	think
13:55:39	22	JUDGE ARREDONDO: I mean, I guess of the two
13:55:41	23	MR. FLITTON: Yes, I'll argue and Mr. Hatch will
13:55:44	24	argue.
13:55:44	25	JUDGE ARREDONDO: Okay. And then on this side?

MR. SMITH: I'm going to respond to the SWDC motion,
and Mr. McDonald is going to respond to the other respondents'
motion.

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JUDGE ARREDONDO: Okay. So I've already reviewed the moving and responding papers, and I know the commissioners have reviewed them as well. So if you'd like to quickly summarize and then hit your major points, that would be great. You can stay seated if you'd like, or if you'd like you can come to the podium here, whichever. Typically people stay seated. Just make sure your microphone is on.

Let's begin with Mr. Flitton then.

MR. FLITTON: Thank you, Your Honor. I'm assuming since we had some of the same discussions a few weeks ago, I won't go into too much detail on some of it. But I think it's important to sort of set the stage for the proceeding that's before the commission today.

This complaint which was brought by Bear Hollow is a complaint that is really focused on trying to get the PSC to assert jurisdiction over Summit Water Redistribution Company and several of its shareholders. And I think it's important to note that this — this complaint was filed after — after numerous investigations that Summit has been through with the Division of Public Utilities. And I spoke with Mr. Powlick last week on a related matter, and he indicated that the Division of Public Utilities was not taking a position at this point in time.

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And I think that that reflects the decisions that have come in the past, and particularly with respect to the admissions in those decisions that unless there's a change in circumstances, unless there are facts that give rise to the PSC reassessing its jurisdiction, that -- that really, you know, we keep being brought back in here over and over again. And -- and as we will show, there are -- there are no allegations in the complaint that really give rise to jurisdiction. And furthermore, they -- all of the issues that have been raised in the plaintiff's complaint have been addressed in detail by the Public Service Commission.

Let me just give you a little bit of background of Summit Water and -- and how it was started and how it operates as far as a corporate matter. Summit Water Distribution Company serves generally the unincorporated area of the Snyderville Basin, which is just the Salt Lake City side of Park City. And the company was founded in 1979. And at that time there were a number of property owners who had acquired properties throughout the Snyderville Basin, ranging from properties near Parley's Summit all the way -- including Jeremy Ranch, and all the way up to near the Park City limits. And those property owners that had purchased those properties had also acquired water rights that were appurtenant to the land that they had acquired. This area was settled back in the 1860s, and many of the water rights were still intact when -- when these property owners acquired

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And as they looked to be able to develop their land and to -- and to make use of the property that they owned, they realized in short fashion that there was not a culinary water system or -- or really adequate sources of culinary water supply. And after going to Summit County and requesting that the county take action to develop a public water system, it became clear that the county really didn't have the funds or the interest in developing such a water system.

So Summit Water Redistribution Company was born out of the cooperative efforts of many of these property owners to band together and to develop a culinary source of supply and a distribution system that would be able to deliver the water to the various properties that were spread out across the basin. So Summit Water Distribution Company was incorporated in March of 1979 as a nonprofit corporation, and it filed its corporate documents with -- with the state, and has operated as a nonprofit mutual water company since that time.

And the basic structure of the company is that the shareholders own all of the assets and they own all of the water rights. And like most mutual irrigation companies, the shares of stock in Summit Water Distribution Company are created when a water right owner conveys water rights into the company and -- and develops source capacity from which to be able to use those water rights through the distribution system.

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And there are two primary classes of stock in Summit Water; there's the Class A development stock and there is Class B use stock. Those shares and -- and the nature of Summit's corporate structure has not changed, and has been reviewed by the Public Service Commission and the Division of Public Utilities on numerous investigations and occasions.

One of the things that the company was founded to do was to -- was to set up a system where there was a reliable water supply. And the company, in its 30-year history, has -- has an unblemished history of delivering culinary water to its shareholders at the lowest prices in the Snyderville Basin, and frankly, low prices considered anywhere. And they have never failed to meet delivery obligations under their shares. There has never been an occasion when the company has not fully met all of the delivery obligations to its shareholders.

One of the issues that -- that is at the heart of Bear Hollow's complaint is the appurtenancy requirements that the company has on its shares of stock. And those appurtenancy requirements are contained in the bylaws and also in a development agreement that every new developer who seeks to join the Summit Water System and -- and developer-acquired shares is required to sign.

And the purpose for the appurtenancy requirement is to ensure that there is always water that is associated with the facilities that come to depend on that water supply. And so

under the corporate documents and under the bylaws, shares of stock in Summit Water become appurtenant to particular projects at the time that they are converted to Class B shares.

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There is also an appurtenancy requirement that goes along with developments at the time they enter in development agreements, and that's to make sure that Summit shareholders are -- are adequately protected, that -- that source of supply is not moved to a location where the company doesn't have the ability to deliver the water according to the shareholder agreement, or that water is moved away from people that are expecting to have water in their area.

So with that general background, let's -- I think that -- that reading through plaintiff's response to our motion to dismiss, I think that there is little disagreement about the basic statutory framework and legal framework governing the question of whether or not the PSC should assert jurisdiction.

And I think that the point of that agreement is that Garkane and Nelson and the cases that have been cited by the supreme court are controlling on the issue.

As -- as you're aware, the basis for Public Service Commission jurisdiction is predicated on a finding that an entity acts as a public utility. And the cases that have dealt with this question have -- have come down to the basic principle that in order to have jurisdiction over a -- over a public utility, the finding has to be made that that entity serves the

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public generally. And in Nelson, what the court found was that,

"If a business or concern is not public service, where the

public has not a legal right to the use of it, where the

business or operation is not open to an indefinite public, it is

not subject to the jurisdiction or regulation of the

commission."

Plaintiff's complaint does not raise any issues that would counter the holdings of the supreme court in the past or the recent holding of the Public Service Commission in the Deepwater case with respect to this -- this threshold issue of jurisdiction. And in fact, in Nelson the court went on to say, "It is only by the presence of such fact or element," which is public service, "that the commission has power or authority to regulate or control such business. Eliminating it, its power and jurisdiction are gone."

In Garkane the court held: So long as a cooperative serves only its owner-members and so long as it has the right to select those members, those who become members, ordinarily it matters not that five or 1,000 people are members or that few or all of the people in a given area are accorded membership.

And then in the PSC's recent decision in Deepwater, the commission held that, "Even before considering the factors stated by the Division and those in Rule 746-331-1.C, the Commission must determine whether the service being provided by the Company is being provided" by the -- "to the public."

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So the issue that is before the Public Service

Commission with respect to jurisdiction is whether or not Summit

Water Distribution Company acts as a nonprofit corporation and

delivers water only to its members, or whether it serves the

public generally.

Turning to the factual basis set forth in plaintiff's complaint and in the briefing accompanying this motion, there -- there are really three arguments that -- that Bear Hollow makes to try to overcome this legal standard that is -- that is clearly established by the Utah Supreme Court. The first of those is that the sale of homes, that the transfer of the shares and the appurtenancy requirement that goes along with the sale of homes somehow makes Summit Water Distribution Company subject to jurisdiction as serving the public generally. The second argument is that Summit Water Distribution Company markets its water to the public generally. And the third is that the public uses facilities in which water from -- from -delivered by Summit Water Distribution Company is used. And what I mean by that is used in public restrooms or public restaurants or in -- in private homes. Let me -- let me just address each of those issues individually and -- and dispel the notion that somehow those give rise to jurisdiction.

The first issue that was -- that was raised by Bear Hollow, the sale of homes. That -- that issue I think is one that in the briefing was frankly conceded by the plaintiffs.

Every -- every person that receives water delivery from Summit 14:06:51 14:06:56 Water Distribution Company is a shareholder in the corporation. Summit does not and never has served members of the public who 14:06:59 14:07:03 are not shareholders of Summit Water Distribution Company stock. In fact, the company only serves those who meet its membership 14:07:08 14:07:13 requirements. And -- and as I said before, those membership requirements require first either creating or acquiring a share 14:07:18 through the dedication of water rights, and those water rights 14:07:22 14:07:25 are represented by that share of stock. Secondly, the 14:07:31 10 corporation ensures that its membership requirements are complied with and has a process whereby membership and share 14:07:35 11 14:07:41 12 certificates are transferred and accepted by the board of 14:07:43 13 directors of the corporation. 14:07:45 14 The second argument that has been raised by plaintiffs in its complaint is that somehow Summit Water 14:07:48 15 14:07:51 16 Distribution Company actively markets shares of stock to the 14:07:55 17 corporation. And they gave -- they gave one example in which 14:07:58 18 they misquoted correspondence between Summit Water Distribution

14:08:03 19 Company and a potential shareholder regarding the requirements
14:08:07 20 that Summit Water Distribution Company would place on
14:08:10 21 acquisition of the shares and service to that project. That

14:08:13 22 certainly is not an effort by Summit Water Distribution Company

to market the shares.

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And in fact, that is an issue that was dealt with by the supreme court in Garkane and in San Miguel. In those cases

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the court held that -- that serving the members of a community and enlarging the number of shareholders that are served by the corporation does not confer jurisdiction and does not change the nature of the corporation, and that the corporation still remains a member-owned, member-served entity. And I think that that's the case here.

The other issue on that point is that the plaintiffs attached a screen shot in their complaint of a Web site that really is unrelated to Summit Water Distribution Company.

That -- that screen shot is from a Web site that is summitcountywater.com, and does nothing more than give contact information for a Trilogy Asset Management, which is -- which is a shareholder in Summit Water Distribution Company. But there is no relationship between this Web site and Summit Water Distribution Company's Web site. And in any event, there's nothing on the Web site that indicates that -- the shares of stock or that Summit Water is marketing its water generally to the public.

And finally, the third issue is one in which they claim the public use of shareholder facilities constitutes a service to the public generally. I'm not sure that that is all that different than -- than the arguments that were raised in Garkane and some of these other cases. And I'm thinking in particular of the arguments that were made in Garkane that somehow public -- there was a public nature to the service

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because Garkane used right of ways for erecting some of its facilities. Summit Water Distribution Company still delivers water to its shareholders. The contractual obligations run between the shareholder and the company, and they do not run to any individual that may be using those facilities or that — that may be drinking water from someone's home.

There are another subset of factual allegations that are -- that are contained in the complaint, and I'd just like to briefly address those as well. And these issues primarily go to the point that there are no new facts here, that all of the -- all of the issues that the Division of Public Utilities and the Public Service Commission reviewed in prior investigations are -- are still the same. The company still operates in exactly the same way, and that there is no change in corporate structure. Summit Water has not amended its articles and bylaws. It has not changed the manner in which it conducts business since -- since any of the prior investigations.

Just running through the gamut of issues, the first -- the first issue is whether or not there has been a change in the corporate structure. In 19 -- in 2002, when the Division of Public Utilities conducted its last investigation, it went to great lengths to scrutinize the operation of the company. I was involved in that investigation. And the Division of Public Utilities' staff attended shareholder meetings, they looked through the corporate documents in detail,

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they looked through the shareholder records in detail. They -they really scrutinized how the company operates. And the
conclusion that -- that the division made in his recommendation
to the Public Service Commission was that there was no basis for
asserting jurisdiction. And as we sit here today, that -- that
story still holds true. The company has operated for over 30
years, and there has never been an occasion which -- in which it
has failed in its responsibilities to its shareholders.

There is no allegation that -- that Summit Water Distribution Company charges extraordinary amounts for its service. Summit Water Distribution Company's rates are the lowest of any of the major water providers in the Snyderville Basin, and on a statewide basis they're -- they're competitive or lower than -- than any other water provider. And in fact, Summit Water Distribution Company has not had any complaints before the Public Service Commission or the DPU that its rates are unreasonable.

There -- Summit has a history of safe and adequate water -- culinary water supply, and there is no allegation to the contrary that is contained in the complaint.

The one issue that -- that seems to be important to plaintiffs is that they focus on a change in voting rights. And the basis for that change is a trans -- or an issuance of additional shares that were made around the time that -- just shortly after DPU made its recommendation and prior to the time

that the Public Service Commission reviewed that recommendation and decided not to -- to move further.

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But one of the things that the Division of Public

Utilities has always been concerned with in investigating Summit

Water in the past is -- is looking at how the corporate

structure is maintained. And one of the recognitions that has

been present in each of the investigations is the shares of

stock in the company change hands on a regular basis. And over

the years, from its inception with very few shareholders to the

state of the company today, which there are many diversified

shareholders, those changes in shares of stock occur frequently,

and in fact on a monthly basis there -- there are numerous

shares that change hands because of change of ownerships or

individuals that transfer their shares to others.

And if you -- if you were to look at the snapshot that is presented by plaintiffs in the complaint, you know, that -- that only represents one short window of time in view of this company. Fortunately, the Division of Public Utilities has had a much longer view of how this company operates in investigations that date back to 1989 and continued through 2003. And in -- over that period of time, the shareholder structure of Summit Water Distribution Company has not changed. And as the company exists today, there is no material change in shareholder distribution or the number of shares. There's been significant share transfers that have occurred between the

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period of 2002 and present, and yet those shareholder transfers are in the ordinary course of business and consistent with the corporate structure that has been approved by the Public Service Commission through the DPU investigations.

Summit Water Distribution Company has a requirement to issue shares, and -- and yet within that requirement the shareholder must meet certain criteria. And as we discussed before, they have to -- they have to convey into the company water rights and they have to develop source capacity and they have to develop distribution capacity. And over the period of Summit Water's history there's been a number of entities that have done that. And just to name a few, there's Knight Brothers, the LDS Church, the Canyons Ski Resort and its parent company, Lynn Nielsen, White Pine Ranches, Jeremy Ranch Development and Double M. And in fact, when Bear Hollow acquired shares of stock, a portion of that acquisition was through the transfer of decreed water rights that were appurtenant to the property upon which the Bear Hollow development sits.

Just in conclusion, Summit Water Distribution

Company has an unblemished record and has a corporate structure that protects the interests of all of its shareholders. And primary in its mission is to deliver water at competitive, affordable rates, and at the high -- and water that is of the highest quality to its shareholders. And there is no allegation

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The complaint also does not raise any jurisdictional issues with respect to the company. There are no allegations other than -- than the three allegations that I addressed earlier and that are easily dismissed, that Summit serves the public generally. Summit delivers -- every drop of water that Summit delivers is delivered under shares of stock in the corporation and in accordance with the corporate documents of the corporation, meaning the rules and regulations, bylaws and articles of the corporation.

And the company -- one of the issues that they raise is ownership of the facilities. The company owns all of the water rights and the company owns all of the facilities that are used to deliver water to the shareholders. There is no individual ownership. And Mr. Hatch will address some of these issues, I'm sure. But there is no individual shareholder ownership of any of the facilities. Everybody who is a member of Summit Water and has shares of stock is governed and regulated by the corporate documents of Summit Water

Distribution Company. And as such, there is -- there is no jurisdiction based on the legal standards that have been set forth in Garkane, Nelson, and others.

One last point is that this is a -- this is a time-consuming and costly process for Summit Water Distribution Company, and there -- there are significant concerns. And these

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are concerns that -- that have been expressed previously by

Judge Pratt in his dissenting opinion in Mulcahy vs. Public

Service Commission. Because each time that Summit Water

Distribution Company is required to appear before the commission and present the information with respect to how it operates its company, the odds are that, over time, you know, there's a war of attrition, and -- and Summit has been through this process many times.

And let me just quote what Mr. Pratt said in his opinion. He said: "Of what use to a protestant is a rehearing, or a favorable decision on appeal, if the applicant may file a new application covering the same set of circumstances and obtain what the commission originally denied him? How many times may the applicant force the protestant through useless red tape? Common sense tells us that the decisions of the Commission, once they become final, should not be changed but upon a showing of a change of circumstances."

There is no change of circumstance here. The company is operating exactly the same way that it did when it was founded in 1979. And this complaint is really just an attempt by these shareholders to get relief that -- that they otherwise would be denied, and that is that the ultimate goal of the plaintiffs in this case is to force regulation by Summit Water Distribution Company and change the nature and the structure of the corporation, to remove the appurtenancy

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requirements that are so important to the shareholders, and is
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           nothing more. And for these reasons, Summit prays that the
           commission deny -- dismiss the motion of the complainant in this
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           case.
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                       JUDGE ARREDONDO: Thank you, Mr. Flitton.
           Mr. Smith?
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                       MR. SMITH: Thank you. If it's okay, I'd like to
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           stand up.
                       JUDGE ARREDONDO: That's fine.
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                       MR. SMITH: Do you want me to move my microphone up
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14:20:29 11 here or just speak loud or --
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                       JUDGE ARREDONDO: As long as the reporter can hear
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           you.
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                       MR. SMITH: I doubt that will be a problem.
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                       Providing water is a lot like providing natural gas
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           or electricity. Those are probably the more garden variety
           things the commission regulates. We know that when utilities
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           are created they tend to create a monopoly, and water is no
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           different. In fact, water, I would argue to this commission, is
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           even more important than electricity or natural gas; you can't
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           live without water.
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                       And the commission -- why do we have a commission?
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           The commission exists to regulate monopoly utilities like
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           Questar and Rocky Mountain Power. As pointed out in the Garkane
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           decision -- and we'll talk a lot about the Garkane decision --
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the differing interests of the provider and the customer, that a customer who does not own and operate the utility can create rates that are either too low or too high. And in Garkane they found either one was -- was bad.

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Like Questar and Rocky Mountain Power, Summit Water Distribution Company is a for-profit utility, operated by two individuals who make their money selling its shares. But we don't have to decide that today. I don't have to prove that today. Today all we need to think about and all we need to look at today is the complaint and the allegations made there. Now, that's been recognized I think by everybody; there's no question about that.

In fact, let me read from SWDC's memo at Roman numeral five, before they get to the number of pages:

Accordingly, the PSC must determine whether there is jurisdiction based on Bear Hollow's complaint and request for agency action alone, accepting the factual allegations therein as true.

Now, they understand that's the standard, we understand the standard. We're happy to stand on what is alleged in our complaint and our -- that we have filed with the commission. However, although the -- although Summit Water recognizes the standard, we spend most of the time hearing their arguments of different facts that aren't in the complaint, they claim are facts. They're allegations that have no basis other

than their counsel happens to either write them down or say them
to you, and that's what we spend all of our time listening to.
Those are completely irrelevant, and I would ask the commission
to disregard all of those comments about what they are, who they
are, how they serve. We have to look at the complaint and the
things that are in the complaint.

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Now, without the commission, Bear Hollow, as a minority shareholder, we're powerless. We can't even get a list of the other shareholders. So when they start talking about this shareholder and that shareholder, that's news to us. We don't even know who the shareholders are. We have asked them for a list of shareholders. They have refused to provide it to us. There's no question who's controlling Summit Water and why they're controlling it. We can't even find out that much, and that's why we need to do discovery in this case.

Now, despite what you've read in the respondent's memos and what you've heard today, this is really the very first time that SWDC and its insiders have been before the commission in a hearing matter.

First of all, we've got to -- I think we've got to segregate, which seems to be -- there seems to be a lot of confusion about the Division of Public Utilities and Public Service Commission. I'm sure it's not in the commission's mind. I'm sure you are well aware the Division of Public Utilities' recommendation, like the one in 2002 and the other three that

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they talk about, are not commission orders. They don't carry
the weight of a commission order. Even though Summit Water says
the Public Service Commission has examined Summit Water's status
as an exempt, nonprofit mutual water company four times.

Now, we try to find every record of every kind of examination, so-called examination, of all these times that they've been through this, and what do we find? Really nothing. There's nothing from the 1989 proceeding. All we know is that's when they were given an exemption. The commission has done nothing since, not order -- not entered an order since. And I would dare say that this is the first time there's ever been a hearing even discussing this issue before the commission.

Again, we can't rely on -- if you want to rely on DPU's recommendations, there would be no reason for the commission to even act, because the recommendation would be -- would be the law. That's just not the case.

So even if there had been this -- you know, these four previous proceedings as SWDC argues -- and again, we can't even find the letter in 1989, that was 20 years ago, in the commission files that even says they were given an exemption; if they weren't, how they came about that. But let's assume -- just for a few minutes let's assume that there had been these four determinations. Can -- can the commission look at this now and should it look at this now. That's a -- that's the question that's been raised. And they, relying on one minor quote from

Rule 746-331-1(c), talk about the issuance of the findings shall 14:25:12 14:25:12 not preclude another commission inquiry at a later time --REPORTER: Could you slow that down just a little? 14:25:19 14:25:19 MR. SMITH: I'm sorry. I tend to always talk fast. 5 If changed circumstances or later discovered facts 14:25:21 warrant another inquiry. Now, they want you to disregard the 14:25:24 rest of this rule, because they say this rule doesn't apply 14:25:28 because they -- and we'll talk about this in a few minutes. 14:25:31 This rule -- the rest of this rule, where it talks about 14:25:34 14:25:37 10 commonality of interest, where it talks about having sufficient assets to provide for the -- those things, they don't count, but 14:25:40 11 14:25:43 12 this thing does. 14:25:44 13 Well, let's look at some of the other governing law. 14:25:46 14 First of all, I don't think we've heard anything about Utah Code Annotated 54-7-14.5(1). And let me read that to the commission, 14:25:54 15 14:25:54 16 one of the key statutes governing the commission's activities. 14:25:57 17 It says, "The commission may, at any time after providing an 14:26:02 18 affected utility notice and an opportunity to be heard, rescind, 14:26:08 19 alter, or amend any order or decision made by the commission." 14:26:08 20 At any time. 14:26:10 21 Let's look at the case that was quoted for, the 14:26:13 22 dissent from Justice Pratt, the Mulcahy case. Let's take a look 14:26:17 23 at that case, what does that case say. Well, what that case 14:26:22 24 says, in that case it says any decision -- and in that case it was a denial or a certificate of -- a certificate of convenience 14:26:25 25

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and necessity, which is not an exercise of their judicial function, or one that does not purport to settle and conclude a legal controversy, is not res judicata of the rights and issues therein involved or thereby decided. That's a supreme court case, you can look at that. No question that you could look at this again. And there have been plenty of changed circumstances that we'll talk about, since 1989, which was the last time this was really looked at.

And let's talk about a few of those changed circumstances. Nothing in the prior proceedings show that Summit Water is owned and operated by two individuals who have made millions of dollars through their control. Millions of dollars, I might add.

Now, when we -- we hear about rates, we have to remember something about rates when we hear about rates. I think we heard it three or four times: Summit Water has the lowest rates. Well, it's going to take a long time, even at double or triple their rates, to make up for the 20,000 bucks that everybody that bought into Summit Water was forced to pay. They're making their money at the front end, at the buy end. That's why they wanted -- that's why they issued more shares to themselves, that's why they wanted to control the shares, because that's where the money is being made by the insiders. And like I say, whether your rate's 30 or 60 bucks a month, it's going to take a long time to make a difference between 20,000

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and, you know, a couple of thousand to hook up your -- hook up
to that system. And that is borne by the ratepayers. Because
if I buy a house there, if I buy a house in Jeremy Ranch, that
cost has to be built into my -- into my home. And so this idea
about the lowest rates -- which they may even be too low, and
that could be a problem -- that's really a red herring and
should not be part of the consideration. Not even a fact before
the commission, but it shouldn't even be a consideration of
this.

Okay, let's -- let's talk about a couple of other things. Never before, I don't think in any other proceeding, there was the -- you know, it was shortly after the last recommendation by the Division of Public Utilities that we had the issuance of a whole bunch of new shares. Yeah, Mr. Saunders and Mr. Knowles were getting worried they couldn't control the company. Well, they were making lots of money, but that's not good enough; they wanted to also keep their control. They issued themselves a whole bunch of new shares. No information about that has ever been looked at by the commission, or even by the Division of Public Utilities.

I would like to provide more current information than the information we've provided with the complaint, but, again, we've been stonewalled. We can't even get a list of the shareholders, let alone the information of how this company runs. That's why we need discovery. We could control a lot

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more facts of how Summit -- what Summit's done, and the
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           insiders, how they've done it, if we could have this discovery.
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           And that's what this is all about.
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                        These other cases that we've talked about, the
           Garkane case and other cases, they came after a full commission
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           hearing on the merits, not at a motion to dismiss stage.
                       Okay. Now, let's -- we talked about some of the
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           change of circumstances and some of the new facts. Let's -- let
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           me -- and we continue to find new facts today. If I could
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           approach, I'd like to give the commission a copy of an affidavit
           by Mr. Saunders and talk a little bit about what's in that
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           affidavit.
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                       MR. FLITTON: Your Honor, as this is a -- this is
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           not an evidentiary hearing, I'd object to the use of an
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           affidavit.
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                       JUDGE ARREDONDO: Was this included with you -- with
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           your response?
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                       MR. SMITH: No, we didn't have it, Your Honor, we
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           didn't have it then. We just recently got this. Let me just
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           point out two things on the affidavit --
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                       JUDGE ARREDONDO: Well --
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                       MR. SMITH: -- and I think I have a right to argue
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           those. I'm not asking for any admission of the affidavit, I'm
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           just submitting the affidavit. And...
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                       MR. FLITTON: Your Honor, this is a -- this is a
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motion to dismiss. And as Mr. Smith correctly notes, it is 14:29:53 based on the allegations contained in the complaint. 14:29:56 MR. SMITH: Well, we tried --14:29:59 14:30:02 MR. FLITTON: -- this affidavit is --5 JUDGE ARREDONDO: I'm going to sustain the 14:30:02 14:30:05 objection. I'm not going to allow the affidavit. And I will say that I understand that the -- Mr. Flitton submitted a lot of 14:30:08 facts that probably aren't in evidence. And just so you know, 14:30:13 14:30:16 the commission is going to rely on what's in the pleadings and the attachments to make their decision. 14:30:20 10 MR. SMITH: Okay. I'll just read -- I'll just tell 14:30:22 11 you what's in the affidavit. I think I have the right to do 14:30:24 12 14:30:26 13 that as part of my argument. 14:30:28 14 JUDGE ARREDONDO: No. 14:30:35 15 MR. SMITH: Okay. Also, which is a part of what we've submitted, is the ongoing antitrust lawsuit. It's 14:30:40 16 interesting how different Summit Water is charactering the 14:30:44 17 antitrust lawsuit than it is there. In that lawsuit in the 14:30:47 18 14:30:51 19 Third District Court, just like in this affidavit that I can't 14:30:54 20 read from, they've characterized themselves as a very different 14:30:57 21 entity than what they're characterizing themselves today. 14:30:59 22 They're characterizing themselves as a competitor, a water 14:31:03 23 marketer. They're in the business to do this. They're suing 14:31:05 24 because they can't -- the markets -- they think the market's 14:31:08 25 been improperly taken away from them by Mountain Regional in

Summit County. They're a marketer and a competitor in that. 14:31:08 They're not talking about serving their -- just their 14:31:12 shareholders. 14:31:15 14:31:17 Finally, we've never been party to any prior proceeding. Nothing -- we have never been -- no order has 14:31:19 governed us as far as Bear Hollow Restoration. This is our 14:31:24 first complaint. This -- we believe we have a right to have our 14:31:27 complaint heard, and heard in full. 14:31:31

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Now, let's talk a little bit -- let's shift over and talk about the Garkane case a little bit. Okay, we go to the 1940 Garkane decision, and that's -- that's the last time I would argue to this commission that the supreme court has carefully looked at the definition of a public utility. Talked about it a little bit toward 1925, but that's really the case that I think everybody's keying on.

Now, let me read you what the holding -- you read something that said it was the holding of the Garkane case. I would have to respectfully tell this commission that that is not the holding of the Garkane case. The Garkane case contains a holding. And the holding in Garkane -- and I will read it -- it's exactly -- wasn't what you were told. The holding states, says, Garkane, and I'll just -- I'll quote, "as a nonprofit electrical cooperative which serves only its members and is completely consumer-owned, with each consumer limited to one membership, is not a public utility within the purview of the

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Now, let's compare Garkane to Summit Water. And I would submit to the commission that Summit Water is not even within shouting distance of this holding. Okay, Summit Water, is it completely consumer-owned? No, what from what we have. It's controlled by two majority shareholders who are not consumers; they are owner-operators of it. One is the president of the company, the other one's on the board, and one's been the president since the company started. They have enough shares to outvote every other stockholder that gets service from the company. So is that completely -- is that completely consumer-owned? I -- I would say clearly not completely consumer-owned.

Now, is each consumer limited to one share or one membership? No. Again, Summit Water is not like Garkane. We can have as many shares as we've bought -- that's shown that you have, and if you have a majority you can run the company even though you don't get any service from the company. Okay. And so is each consumer limited to one membership? No. That's completely different from the Garkane holding.

I would submit to the commission that Garkane is completely different than what we have here, and that the Garkane decision actually supports what we're doing here today and is not the case that has been argued to you, because Summit Water cannot meet those conditions of Garkane. And that is the holding. That is the most important part of the case. And the

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court says this is our holding -- that's at the very end of the opinion, this is the holding that we made, and they spell that out very clearly. That's why we have Rule 746-331-1, was to try to put those into -- into a rule. That's talking about complete commonality of interest. And again, there's no commonality of interest because we have two individuals that can run and control the company, and they have been doing that. We'll know a lot more of how they do that when we can actually get looking at the records and finding out what's happened, which have been denied to us; as a shareholder we have no right to get those things, according to Summit Water.

They are -- they have an interest that's different from the homeowner in Jeremy Ranch who gets water from Summit Water. Their interest is different in the fact that they want to see the price of water go as high as possible so the shares that they sell become as valuable as possible.

And now let's talk about -- a little bit about the Deepwater case that the commission recently issued an order. We have obviously looked at that decision with very -- very hard, because obviously that's a decision of the commission, and as reluctant as I am to try to argue about what the commission meant by something, I just have to tell what I think it meant by this -- by the decision, and pointed out that in Deepwater, the three individuals who were on the board were also consumers.

There may be in the future sometime when the stock is issued to

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other people that aren't consumers, but that wasn't the case right now. And that's what the commission looked at, is saying that it was only serving -- and there was no allegation it was serving the public, there was no allegations about anything else, it was just saying that the commission was -- that the Division was telling the commission, we're concerned, because in the future there might be problems. And the commission looked at it and said we don't think there's -- there's -- there -- you know, that's -- looking at the future, that's not enough to give jurisdiction and revoke the exemption.

I can tell you that in 27 years I've been practicing water law in this state, there is nothing else like Summit Water out there. They are a unique animal all unto themselves.

They -- they've stepped in a role that no other -- there's no other company, private, public, other water supplier out there that has been able to manipulate the system to make as much money as Summit Water insiders have. And that's a whole different animal. It's completely different than anything else that I have ever seen, and I've seen plenty in 27 years.

Okay, let's talk about serving the general public.

Summit claims we've conceded that point, which we clearly haven't. We believe there's many facts that show they do serve the general public. Okay. First of all, they have an exclusive territory. They talked about their territory. If you live in Jeremy Ranch, that's the only water source that you have access

to, is Summit Water. If you buy a house, that's -- that's water 14:36:14 for your house. However you do it, there's nothing that 14:36:14 14:36:14 prevents you -- or they have no -- unlike Garkane, where they 14:36:14 could pick who could be the members, there's no -- no choice about that, you just become a member of Summit Water if you fill 14:36:27 14:36:29 out the same thing that Park City or Salt Lake City would have you fill, which is just a service agreement, just like Questar 14:36:32 and everybody else has, those sorts of things. You fill 14:36:37 14:36:37 those -- that out, you pay your bill, you do that. 14:36:39 10 Okay. It also serves public buildings and renters. 14:36:42 11 Now, let's talk about renters for a second, because I think that's something that Summit would like to have us all gloss 14:36:46 12 14:36:49 13 over. There are a number of apartment complexes and rent --14:36:50 14 other rental properties within the Summit Water service area. 14:36:53 15 In fact, in their bylaws, and I'd like to read from their 14:36:56 16 bylaws, they even in their bylaws provide for providing --14:37:00 17 serving renters. Now, these renters aren't shareholders. Now, 14:37:04 18 a minute ago you were told they only serve their shareholders. 14:37:07 19 The renters aren't shareholders. In fact, this is what their 14:37:10 20 bylaws say. It's on page 17, No. 10 of their bylaws, and those 14:37:12 21 are attached to some of the pleadings here. It says: Landlords 14:37:14 22 or lessors -- this is the heading of Section 10. Landlords or 14:37:18 23 lessors shall be held primarily liable for all assessments.

served by SWDC shall appear as the record owner of the share of

Then it says: The legal owner of any rented property being

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stock representing the water connection within SWDC and shall be held primarily responsible to SWDC for the payment of the annual stock assessment.

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Okay, now we know what it said. Now, what doesn't it say? Well, it doesn't say they pay the monthly charge, because they don't pay the monthly charge; that's paid for, obviously, by the renter. We're talking about the annual assessment. There's lots of other charges here. This — there's a monthly fee for the service of water, which is what we're concerned about. What we're told is so low, that's paid for by the renter, not by the — by the shareholder. That renter is not a shareholder. That renter is paying the bill.

Now, if we look at the statute and we look carefully at what the statute says, let's read that, let's read -- they talk about who the contract is with, is it between the shareholder and the company. That's not what the statute requires. Let's look at the statute for jurisdiction. And if we look at -- it's in 54 -- let me turn to this here really quickly, so I want to read this so I get it completely correct. Okay, let's see. Okay, it's in 54-2-1(16). This is the definition of a public utility. And I'll read this so I get it right: A public utility includes every railroad corporation, gas corporation, electrical corporation, distribution electrical cooperative, wholesale electrical cooperative, telephone corporation, telegraph corporation, water corporation is where

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we are here, water corporation, sewerage corporation, heat corporation, and independent energy provider not described in section (16)(d) where the service -- now, this is the key language -- where the service is performed for or the commodity delivered to the public generally. It's where the commodity, the water is delivered to, is what determines whether it's a public utility or not. It's not who is the contract with. contract could be with somebody else, but it's deliver -- when it's delivered to the public generally, that's the key part of this. And it's delivered to these renters who aren't shareholders. And that's the delivery of a commodity. It doesn't matter even who pays the bill, but even that their own bylaws anticipate that the renter pays the bill. And so this is service to the general public because these people aren't shareholders. It's not serving only its shareholders like they want to tell you. It's just -- it's serving all of these other folks.

Okay, then the -- also we have the fire plugs, things like that, fire hydrants, get that service and that sort of thing. And so we have this delivery of this commodity. And under -- under Summit Water's view of the world, I could form a water company, I could have one share that's mine that's the only voting share, then I could give shares to everybody else that I serve water to that has no vote at all, and because they're my shareholders I -- I wouldn't -- I wouldn't be

14:40:28 1 regulated even though I have full say and control of the company completely.

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You have to remember something that was said in the Garkane case, and this will be the last quote that I'll read. But in the Garkane case, this is a quote from a case that you haven't heard anything about. Let me read this to you, because I think this is important. And again, I want to get it exactly correct: The courts will always scrutinize closely to determine whether or not a certain organization or method of conduct has for its purpose evasion of the law, and where it finds that such evasion will declare — finds such evasion, will declare such organization to be truly what it is. Truly what it is.

What is -- what is Summit Water truly? We don't know for sure yet. We've made the allegation that it's a public utility seeking to evade and -- and evading regulation by this commission. Now, we don't have the facts today to prove that, but we don't need those facts today.

As was pointed out, I couldn't even submit that affidavit from Mr. Saunders where -- where he makes his characterizations of the company. There's a lot of facts out there that we have a right to look at and we have a right to bring before this commission so this commission can make a fully informed decision about what Summit Water really is and whether or not it should be regulated. Thank you.

JUDGE ARREDONDO: Thank you. Mr. Flitton, any

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reply? 14:41:46 1 MR. FLITTON: Yeah. Thank you, Your Honor. 14:41:47 14:41:47 JUDGE ARREDONDO: Brief reply. 14:41:50 MR. FLITTON: What's that? Brief --14:41:51 JUDGE ARREDONDO: Brief reply. 14:41:52 MR. FLITTON: Yes, I'll be brief. 7 Let's let me begin with the question that Mr. Smith 14:41:54 asked at the end of his argument, and that is that -- what is 14:41:58 14:42:01 Summit Water Distribution Company. And Mr. Smith has put a lot 14:42:05 10 of personal statements in here and has -- has been pretty fast and loose with some of the factual allegations that he's made in 14:42:09 11 14:42:14 12 his arguments. What Summit Water Distribution Company is today 14:42:17 13 is a shareholder-owned corporation that is operated with its own 14:42:22 14 governing system. And -- and unlike the example that he gave, 14:42:27 15 the Class A and Class B shareholders of the company all have a 14:42:41 16 voting right within that company. 14:42:41 17 One of the things that distinguishes a water 14:42:41 18 corporation in this context is -- and addressing the arguments 14:42:41 19 relating to the Garkane holding, and I would point out that, you 14:42:44 20 know, if you read that carefully, it is the -- the court is 14:42:47 21 dealing with the facts that were specifically before it, which 14:42:51 22 were appropriate. It was looking at the structure of Garkane, 14:42:54 23 and its holding was specific. But its analysis certainly does 14:42:58 24 not require that there's only one membership accorded or that

that's the structure. And with respect to that point, a water

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corporation has to reflect the interest of those shareholders.

And the rights that were conveyed into the company are represented by those shares of stock. And those interests are -- are held. And frankly, that's an issue that the Division of Public Utilities has given a lot of concentration on in its past investigations. That was one of the major issues that was before the Division of Public Utilities in 2002.

And I would also like to just clarify that when Summit Water Distribution Company has gone through the Division of Public Utilities' scrutiny, it has been at the direction of the Public Service Commission. There is no misunderstanding on the part of Summit Water Distribution Company as to the procedures that apply here. And if Mr. Smith would look at the files, he would see that the Public Service Commission directed the DPU to conduct an investigation, and to in fact make a recommendation back to its body as to whether or not Summit Water Distribution Company merited an exemption and was without the jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission.

Furthermore, if you were to take Mr. Smith's arguments with respect to the Garkane holding, the Garkane holding also makes clear that it applies to electrical corporations. That could be read one of two ways. One is that you could only get -- that exemption or that holding only applies to electrical corporations, which we know it does not, because San Miguel and Holmgren and Medicall and the cases that

14:44:41 1 follow it all pick up on the same language of the Garkane
14:44:44 2 analysis.

Let me just turn in my remaining time briefly back 14:44:47 to the issue that Mr. Smith seemed to spend a lot of time on. 14:44:50 And I think that the reason that it -- that that was such the 14:44:54 focus of the argument is because it's really the seminal 14:44:56 question that's before the Public Service Commission in this 14:44:59 case, and that is -- is whether or not the element -- the 14:45:05 14:45:06 required threshold element of serving the public generally is 14:45:11 10 present. And Mr. Smith's arguments really focus on -- on this 14:45:14 11 idea of renters and whether or not the renters would require 14:45:19 12 Summit Water Distribution Company to be regulated. As Mr. Smith 14:45:23 13 correctly read from -- from Summit's corporate documents, it is 14:45:28 14 the property owner, it is the shareholder that is primarily 14:45:31 15 responsible. And the distinction that I think is important 14:45:33 16 here, and it's been glossed over, is that the water that is 14:45:37 17 delivered by Summit Water Distribution Company is delivered 14:45:41 18 under the shares. It is not out delivering water to individuals 14:45:46 19 that don't have a tie to a shareholder interest. And in fact, 14:45:49 20 as he correctly pointed out, it is the shareholder who is 14:45:52 21 ultimately responsible to Summit Water Distribution Company for 14:45:55 22 the assessments, which are quarterly and -- and actually 14:45:58 23 annually, and not monthly. So in that respect there is nothing 14:46:03 24 about having a renter occupy a home that defeats the nature of 14:46:08 25 Summit Water Distribution Company as a cooperative, nonprofit

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corporation. That same argument is akin to arguing that if you have guests come over to your home and you serve them a glass of water or they use your restroom facilities, that somehow you are serving them and serving the public generally, when in fact the water is being delivered to the shareholder, to the property owned by that shareholder. A renter is simply occupying a piece of property that is owned by the shareholder, and the water is delivered under the contractual requirements of that share and the corporate documents.

Mr. Smith makes a point also to focus on the rules of the -- of the Public Service Commission and this issue of new facts. And I think a lot of effort is made to try to give the appearance that there are facts that change circumstances. And I think that a review of the record, and it is the -- as the judge has correctly noted, that, you know, it's really based on what is in the allegations of complaint. I don't think that there's anything in the complaint.

But I just wanted to point out also that the rule that was quoted and the citation to Mulcahy that was referenced by Mr. Smith, it talked about an affected utility. I think that that's important, because the issue that is before the commission is whether or not Summit Water is a public utility, and that question has to be answered as to whether or not Summit serves the public generally. And I have seen no facts either in the complaint or in the argument today that would suggest that

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Summit Water Distribution Company is nothing but a shareholder
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           entity that delivers water to its shareholders exclusively.
                        Just one last thing. I've got a -- I reference
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           these in the argument, and if it's okay with the Court, I'd like
           to just present these handouts that just kind of summarize the
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           cases and the arguments we've made.
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                        JUDGE ARREDONDO: If you'd like to provide a list of
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           the citations, that's fine.
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                       MR. FLITTON: Okay. Do you want me to do that
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           instead?
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                       JUDGE ARREDONDO: Uh-huh.
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                       MR. FLITTON: All right. Thank you.
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                       JUDGE ARREDONDO: You can provide those to the court
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           reporter.
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                       MR. FLITTON: Okay.
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                       JUDGE ARREDONDO: All right. Thank you. Mr. Hatch?
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                       MR. HATCH: Thank you, your Honor.
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                       JUDGE ARREDONDO: Thank you. Does anybody need a
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           break?
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                       MR. FLITTON: Yeah, I could use a drink of water.
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                        JUDGE ARREDONDO: Okay. Let's take a break till
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           11:00, five till.
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                        (A recess was taken, 2:48 p.m. to 2:55 p.m.)
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                       JUDGE ARREDONDO: Back on the record. Mr. Hatch,
14:55:08 25 | please.
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14:55:09 1 MR. HATCH: Thank you, Your Honor.

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I think it's obvious to the Court that there is a slight bit of overlap between our two motions, in part because, obviously, the commission is -- does not have the jurisdiction to regulate Summit Water. The individual shareholders are once removed from that and wouldn't be -- there would be no jurisdiction over them either.

But without repeating what Mr. Flitton has said to you, there are a few thing that Mr. Smith says, well, that I found a little surprising, one of which is the nature of this proceeding. He indicated that he thought this was really the first opportunity that -- the commission and administrative law judge has had the opportunity to have a real hearing and address these kind of issues. And I found that somewhat amazing, because that argument was based without any real citation to record, without any facts of any kind, essentially says that the four times in the past the commission has addressed this issue, that they've essentially done it in an arbitrary, capricious manner without any real facts, evidence, or in a knee-jerk fashion. And I -- you know, I just don't think that that's the way the commission views its own rulings or its own responsibility in granting those exemptions, the most recent of which was in 2002.

And if I can -- if I might, can I -- I have a couple demonstratives that I would give Mr. -- you're arguing, right?

Judge, I'm just going to object to 14:56:55 MR. McDONALD: this exhibit. It's almost as if it's a demonstrative exhibit. 14:57:00 There's no foundation. This is not an evidentiary hearing. 14:57:06 14:57:10 None of this -- unless they can show me where in the complaint and what paragraph these facts are contained, I think this 14:57:13 exceeds the scope of this hearing. 14:57:18 7 MR. HATCH: Your Honor, this is absolutely not 14:57:20 evidence. This is dealing with the commission's own rulings, 14:57:22 14:57:25 which are a matter of record, a matter of judicial notice, and 14:57:29 10 it is not entering into any type of factual analysis. As a 14:57:35 11 matter of fact, it's dealing with the judicial -- essentially the judicial rulings of the past. That's like saying you can't 14:57:36 12 14:57:41 13 cite a case. And this -- this goes to the precedent that 14:57:45 14 affects this matter, and that -- I don't -- I don't think that's 14:57:47 15 with any basis at all, the objection he just made. JUDGE ARREDONDO: What I'll do is we can refer to it 14:57:50 16 14:57:53 17 here in the hearing if you like. To me it seems -- I mean, 14:57:57 18 these are things that were brought up in the motions, the 14:58:00 19 pleadings, but --14:58:01 20 MR. HATCH: This was, Your Honor. Because 14:58:03 21 essentially what the argument is, is they have to show something 14:58:06 22 new since the last exemption was granted. And it's very clear 14:58:10 23 from the previous proceedings that if you compare it to the 14:58:14 24 complaint -- and that's what we're supposed to look at here. 14:58:17 25 They don't want you to look at the complaint now, because it

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alleges no new facts, no changed circumstances, and that's what they're required to do under the law. And so of course I can argue this. Because it was their -- Summit Water users or shareholders, there's no new facts here, there's no material change since the prior commission ruling. The corporate structure has not changed. They haven't alleged that, there are no facts that would support that, there's no material change.

That they're paying reasonable rates, they can't -they didn't even argue today that the rates aren't reasonable.

In fact, you know, the evidence would be, of course -- and they
could not contradict that -- that the rates are the most
reasonable in that valley. And that -- but that was issued back
then, and there's no material change since then. And that goes
to each of these, including voting rights. So they -- they have
not met the legal standard.

Now, what's really telling about the complaint, and this is particularly telling about the individuals, Your Honor, is that Mr. Smith got up, and he put it that way, he said look at what these insiders -- he calls them insiders, which is a pejorative way of referring to the defendant individual shareholders here. He says, look what they've done to us.

Well, let's look at what he alleges. Because what he's alleging is not something that is a matter of PSC jurisdiction, but it would be the matter of a lawsuit, a corporate or contractual lawsuit in a civil court if it were true. They haven't alleged

something that goes to rate making or something that would be under the regulatory authority of this commission.

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In their introduction in their brief, and I'll read from that, they said they exercise manipulation and control of the company behind the scenes. Now, this kind of pejorative language I guess gives it flavor, but there's no factual allegation of that. Behind the scenes in a manner that allows them to exploit the company's limited resources for their personal gain. Well, that's a breach of fiduciary duty, that's potentially a breach of contract claim, potentially maybe a tort claim, I don't know, but that's not a -- that's not a PSC matter.

And they make that even more clear as they go on in their -- they had two sections in their brief. The first section talked about the commission has jurisdiction over the individual respondents because they're controlling Summit Water, a -- Summit Water, a water system. Well, then they -- then they -- then they say that -- the individual response is page 2 of their brief -- are subject to the commission's jurisdiction because they operate and control Summit Water. Well, that's -- that's saying they control a corporation. That goes back to Mr. Smith's allegations and the allegations that are in the introduction to this brief that somehow there are individuals who are breaching their duty of good faith and fair dealing with the corporation. That isn't a matter that the PSC -- that's,

again, some civil lawsuit, if they can make that out, which I don't believe they can.

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And -- and more importantly, it talks about -- when we're talking today about whether or not these individual shareholders are controlling a water system, well, water system, we all know from the statute, it's very clear what that is. A water system is defined as all reservoirs, tunnels, shafts, dams, dikes, head gates, and similar properties when used in the public distribution of water. Well, even Mr. Smith, in the briefs that they filed in response to our motion, made it very clear they never once said the individual respondents control any of those things. They say they are -- through their -their status as shareholders that they somehow control Summit Water. Well, that's controlling a corporation. And as we made clear in our brief, that's something very different, because that is -- that is a new legal argument. That is an argument that goes well beyond the Nelson/Garkane progeny of cases. And those cases, as Your Honor well knows, goes way back, and it goes back to the 1940s, and they've never been overruled.

And they make it very clear that the commission at one point, and others, tried to get the commission to exercise jurisdiction over essentially private water -- private utility companies, and was made very clear by the supreme court that the statute does not allow that, and that -- and that companies that are like Summit Water today, and Mr. Smith in their brief has

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not made a single distinguishing factor from those cases, that those cases, those entities, the court -- this commission does not have jurisdiction over. And so as the court brings us closer to what I think the commission has well accepted is the extent of its jurisdiction. And the Deepwater case that Mr. Flitton cited came out just eight days ago, accepted the Nelson/Garkane/San Miguel line of cases.

Mr. Smith and Bear Hollow now wants to go the other direction and not only go back and just obliterate the Nelson/Garkane line of cases, but to go one step further and reach back to the shareholders of those entities, where all they alleged -- and all we have to do is look at the complaint for that and things I just read you -- is that somehow they're breaching their corporate fiduciary obligations to the shareholders.

Now, they go on one -- they have one more section in their brief, the second section, and it says the commission has jurisdiction over the individual respondents because they are controlling Summit Water for the public generally. It's the same thing. And they say that through control or management of Summit Water. And they completely ignore any obligation to show that the individual respondents, let alone -- that the individual respondents are control -- are operating a water system under the definition of the statutes and under the jurisdiction of this commission. And so they want to ignore the

15:04:29 1 niceties.

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Mr. -- Mr. Smith at one point said -- and I've always been interested in the years that I've practiced law that when you don't have facts, you always say in the 27 years I've practiced law I've never seen anything like this. Well, that's not what's required in a court of law, it's -- like how many years you've been practicing law, it's to actually to present some cognizable fact or legal argument that would cause your clients to win. And that doesn't do it.

And so we look at -- if we look at all of these things put together, Summit Water is claiming -- for instance, here he's said in his argument we can't even get a list of shareholders. I practice corporate law. We get those kind of lawsuits all the time, and there are means of doing that in civil court. That's not something that causes a commission to say that we're going to regulate individuals who control a corporation, allegedly, through their shareholder status as though they're a public utility providing water to people. So he's going -- while the court has brought us over here with the Nelson/Garkane cases, he wants to go -- he wants to go pre-1940 and start going the other direction and ignore what the supreme court did. And I suggest to the Court that that would be an improper course of action to go forward that way.

And I would point out, I think he said that the Garkane case was the last time the supreme court even looked at

the issue. I think the San Miguel case is at least 16 years after that. And so I think the cases past Garkane have come closer to where we're at.

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Now, a couple of things that they have to show, as I've stated, is that the statute requires control of the water system, not a company. Now, that sometimes sounds -- may sound to some as though that's a technical distinction, but it's very important, because without that distinction, the shareholders and others in a corporation would always be subject to the commission's control. And that would mean every board member of Questar, PacifiCorp, every major shareholder -- and we said in our brief, for instance, Warren Buffet even would be -- would be regulated by this commission as though they were a public utility. And I don't think Bear Hollow can cite to a single precedent, legal or otherwise, that would cause even a policy reason for why that should happen, and yet that's what they're asking for here.

Summit Water is its own unique entity. It has its own liabilities, duties, debts, assets and other things. And the board members -- even board members are limited in their corporate duty and their duty to act in good faith and their fiduciary duty to the corporation. They can't just, as alleged in the brief, just do anything they want to do; they're limited. It isn't -- they can't act in their personal interests; they act in their -- in their position as fiduciaries to the corporation.

15:07:38 1 And as such, there is no -- there's not the type of distinction 15:07:40 2 that's being made here.

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Now, the second point that we've made is that the commission lacks jurisdiction of Summit Water, but certainly the independent shareholders if they do not serve the public generally. Now, it was very interesting to me because the Nelson/Garkane line of cases make it very clear that as long as you are -- you have to be a member to be served, that that's enough. And they said in numerous instances it doesn't matter if there are five or a thousand members, that's immaterial. They don't -- whether there's a number -- the number of people in an area that subscribe to the service, that's immaterial.

15:08:24 13 I think Mr. Smith argued that, well, we serve 15:08:27 14 everybody -- he said everybody at Jeremy Ranch. Well, whether 15:08:31 15 that's true or not is not a matter of evidence here today. 15:08:36 16 let's assume that that were true. It's very clear if you look 15:08:40 17 at... let's see. Hold on. Here we go, I got it. Yeah, that's 15:08:57 18 true, he was citing the Garkane case when he was talking about 15:09:00 19 that. And I found that kind of interesting because he said, 15:09:02 20 well, that means you're serving the public generally because you 15:09:06 21 serve every member in Jeremy Ranch. Well, that's not what 15:09:11 22 Garkane says. How could he cite Garkane for that? Garkane 15:09:14 23 said, "So long as a cooperative serves only its owner-members 15:09:19 24 and so long as it has the right to select those who become 15:09:24 25 members, ordinarily it matters not that 5 or 1000 people are

members or" -- and this is the part that wasn't read to you -"that a few or all of the people in a given area are accorded
membership..." And so the Garkane case, the supreme court is
pretty clear on this point.

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And the arguments that have been made here are really starting to kind of border on the frivolous. Mr. Smith stood up and he basically said, well -- and I think he used it as kind of an ad hominem attack on our clients. He said, well, they -- you know, they got to pay \$20,000 to get in and, yeah, their rates may be low, but it takes a long time to pay back that \$20,000. Well, what was one of the requirements by the supreme court is the fact that someone had to pay -- one of them, in Garkane I believe it was, it made it -- they were trying to argue that it was too low by being \$5 in Garkane. now they're arguing, oh, this is really unfair because you got to pay to be a member. Well, what they essentially did by representing that to Your Honor is they made it very clear that, yes, you've got to be a member. That goes directly to the fact that they're not serving members of the public, because you got to pay \$20,000 to be a member. And so he -- Mr. Smith proved our point by making that. He's trying to use it to try and kind of smear Summit Water, and I guess through Summit Water, the individual respondents by saying it's expensive to be a member, even though they have the lowest rates in the valley. But what he essentially proved is exactly what the supreme court says:

They're not serving the public generally. And that's why, you know, I say their briefs start to border on the frivolous.

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And so they can't dispute, and they haven't disputed, and they can't allege in their complaint that approval was required before you can become a shareholder, that the service is limited to members just as required in the Garkane cases. And that's the whole reason Bear Hollow purchased these in the first place, is so that they could become a member and they could receive water. And so they then fall back into what I call really quite disingenuous arguments, because they -- they are trying to find some way to say that we are serving the general public.

And some of these they said in brief in opposition to my motion to dismiss, some in response to Summit Water's motion to dismiss, but they made arguments like if you use the facilities at the post office, since the post office is open to the general public, then therefore you're -- you're providing water to the public in general. I don't see any authority in the law for that. And it really is quite a specious argument that just because you use a public toilet, that somehow we're providing -- that we, particularly the individual respondents -- are providing a public water system and public utilities.

I assume that they would put in their brief some of their strongest evidence, and they -- so they attach as Exhibit Q -- and I know Your Honor has this, but if you could just -- so

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we could have it easily, this is Exhibit Q to their brief.
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           you do have it.
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                       MR. McDONALD: Your Honor, this is not Exhibit Q to
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           our brief.
                        JUDGE ARREDONDO: That's Exhibit Q here.
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                       MR. McDONALD: Well, this was provided in their
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           brief. It was --
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                       MR. HATCH: Your Honor, I misspoke, I misspoke, it's
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           Exhibit Q to their complaint.
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                       JUDGE ARREDONDO: Okay.
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                       MR. HATCH: Did you submit it to them or not?
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                       MR. SMITH: What is that?
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                       MR. HATCH: That makes it even more relevant,
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           because it's part of the complaint, Your Honor. They -- they
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           represented this to you as showing that the -- that the --
           either Summit Water -- particularly -- particularly the
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           individuals, because they attribute this to Mr. Knowles, one of
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           the individual respondents, he's -- he's offering water to the
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           public. And this is it. It says, "Trilogy Asset Management,
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           Inc. Welcome to the home page for Trilogy Asset Management, Inc.
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           For further information, please go to About Us. For complete
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           contact information, go to Contact Us." That's all they give.
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           That's the -- that's the only thing that's in the complaint;
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           that's what we consider.
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                        The next page gives -- is the Contact Us you can go
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to. And it says, "For general inquiries, e-mail:

15:14:00 2 Info@trilogyasset.com." And it gives Stuart A. Knowles and

15:14:04 3 Marianne Cleveland, their addresses, telephone, fax numbers, and

15:14:08 4 their e-mails.

And this is why, you know, I say that, you know,

15:14:14 6 trying to bring individuals in here, there isn't even a good

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trying to bring individuals in here, there isn't even a good faith basis for it. There's not a mention of water there, let alone water for sale. There's nothing there. And this is — this is evidence that they put not only in their complaint, but again in their briefs, they argue that that is offering water to the public generally. It just doesn't — it just doesn't pan out.

So if we look -- if we look at the standards, the only other -- the only other point I would mention is that I am involved in the antitrust lawsuit, Your Honor, and talked -- several cites were made to the antitrust lawsuit. But what isn't talked about there is an antitrust lawsuit is a very different animal, and there you're suing for -- to be able to get recompense for damaged property rights and economic rights. And so those types of -- even though those -- the allegations in the complaint go clear back and they're -- they involve other individuals. So they're taken out of context to the extent that they're taken -- they're not put in the full context of that antitrust lawsuit and the types of allegations, the laws that are being applied, the damages that are being sought.

So, Your Honor, I would put to you that not only 15:15:39 should Summit Water be dismissed, but certainly in any instance 15:15:43 the individuals should be dismissed, as not a water corporation 15:15:48 15:15:54 or an individual or entity that is controlling and operating a water system for public service. Thank you. 15:15:59 15:16:01 JUDGE ARREDONDO: Thank you, Mr. Hatch. 15:16:03 7 Mr. McDonald, please. MR. McDONALD: Thank you, Judge Arredondo. I want 15:16:05 15:16:07 to start out by reminding everybody in this room as to the basis 15:16:15 10 for why we're here. We're here on a Rule 12(b)(1) and a Rule 12(b)(2), motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over the 15:16:20 11 15:16:25 12 person and over the subject matter. That's it. We're not here 15:16:29 13 for a trial, we're not here for an evidentiary hearing, we're here on a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. 15:16:34 14 15:16:37 15 Consequently, as all the lawyers in this room have agreed and 15:16:41 16 conceded, the proper standard for the commission to review is to 15:16:46 17 assume that every single allegation in the complaint is true, 15:16:57 18 irrefutable, factual, and established for purposes of this 15:16:57 19 motion. And we've spent a lot of time today on sideshows and 15:17:02 20 personal attacks and things that aren't in the complaint. And I 15:17:08 21 would urge Judge Arredondo and the commission to carefully 15:17:12 22 review the allegations of the complaint. 15:17:14 23 The motion that I'm addressing makes two points. page 4 of the individual non-consumer majority shareholders' 15:17:19 24 15:17:25 25 opening brief they state, "There are no allegations nor is there 15:17:29

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any support for the proposition that the individual shareholders own or control a water system." On page 6 of their opening brief they said, "Even if each of the individual shareholders did independently own and operate a water system, there is absolutely no allegation or support for the proposition that the individual shareholders do so for the public generally."

So really the two issues framed in the briefs is, number one, are there any allegations in the complaint that support the idea that the non-consumer majority shareholders own or control a water system. And second, even if they did, do they do so for the public generally. Those are the two issues I'd like to address today.

To do that, I want to highlight some allegations of the complaint. I don't know how counsel gets around these, but let me just highlight a few of these for the record. Paragraph 16 of the complaint: Respondents each independently and collectively constitute a public utility and/or a water corporation as those terms are defined in Utah Annotated Section 54-2-1(16)(a), 29. Paragraph 18: Jurisdiction over this action is properly held by the Public Service Commission. Paragraph 21: Since its inception, SWDC has provided or attempted to provide and fulfill the essential public use and purpose of providing water and water service for culinary, domestic, residential, commercial, and recreational uses in western Summit County, Utah. The culinary water distribution system owned and

operated by SWDC and controlled by the respondents is a "water 15:19:15 system" as defined in Utah Code Section 54-2-1(30)(a). 15:19:20 Paragraph 22, "SWDC and respondents are operating a public 15:19:28 utility as defined in Utah Code Section 54-2-1(16)(a) and are 15:19:33 engaged in the development, establishment, operation, and 15:19:39 maintenance of public water service facilities in western Summit 15:19:42 County, Utah, including water rights, source, storage, treatment 15:19:47 and distribution systems, facilities, and equipment." That's 15:19:51 15:19:55 just a few of the allegations that you have to assume are true 15:19:59 10 and established for purposes of this motion. I don't know how counsel can say that there are no allegations in the complaint 15:20:04 11 15:20:07 12 that support jurisdiction. 15:20:10 13 However, I don't want the commission to just view 15:20:13 14 those allegations in isolation, I want the commission to also 15:20:17 15 view the other allegations of the complaint. I would call your 15:20:22 16 attention particularly to paragraph 39, paragraph 40, paragraph 41, which address Exhibit Q that we've just talked about. 15:20:30 17 15:20:34 18 don't hang our hats on that exhibit. If that's all that we had, 15:20:38 19 yeah, we'd be in trouble. That's just one of many examples. 15:20:43 20 It's not the linchpin, it's not the litmus test for our case. 15:20:48 21 We have a very detailed complaint with paragraph after paragraph

Paragraph 44, last sentence, last phrase, "Saunders and Knowles and/or the Saunders and Knowles entities manipulate and dominate SWDC." Essentially what we're saying there is that

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of allegations.

they're an alter ego; they manipulate, dominate, and control the company to the extent that there's no distinction between the non-consumer majority shareholders and the company itself.

That's basic corporate law, and that's a theory that's never been alleged, I don't think, in this forum. That is an allegation that gives plenty of basis for conducting as least an investigation, at least allowing us to have some discovery.

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I realize they don't like the allegations, I realize that they're offensive to them. However, the law is the law; they have to be accepted as true. And if they want to dispute them, let's have discovery, let's have an evidentiary hearing, let's have a summary judgment hearing, but let's not get into a shouting match here in this proceeding about what is true and what isn't.

Seventy-six, paragraph 76 of the complaint: Class A development shares are issued to developers upon conveyance to SWDC of sufficient water rights and source site. Upon the sale of a lot from a developer to a customer, a Class A development share is convertible to a Class B use share appurtenant to and inseparable from the lot. That's critical to understand. These shares are supposedly appurtenant to and inseparable to the lot. What that means is that they don't get to choose who the members are of SWDC. They have no more control over who's going to move into Jeremy Ranch than Questar or PacifiCorp does. They can't control that. And later on I'll show you where they admit in

1 | the antitrust litigation that very thing.

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I call the Court's attention to paragraphs 78, 79, 81, 82, 83, 86, 87, and 88, which I won't address here. Those address the domination and control and the manipulation of the company by the non-consumer shareholders. And I keep saying non-consumer majority shareholders because that's an important concept to understand. Non-majority -- excuse me, non-consumer majority shareholders control and dominate this company.

Paragraph 93: Because of their minority shareholder status, Class B use shareholders which are SWDC's rate-paying consumer members do not have it in their power to elect other directors, which are elected by a simple majority vote, and demand necessary changes or control in the rate-making process. Paragraph 99: It cannot be said of SWDC that the owner is both the seller and buyer, because Class A development shareholders, although owners, do not and cannot buy or receive water service. Paragraphs 100, 103, 104 all go to the elements of Garkane and all go to the elements of jurisdiction. Paragraph 105: The conflict of interest between owner-vendor and consumer-vendee inherit in public utility companies is not lacking in SWDC, nor are their consumer and producer interests one and the same.

Now, the relief that we request against the individual non-consumer majority shareholders is spelled out in paragraph 134. This is -- this is what we're asking: Bear Hollow respectfully requests that the commission commence a

commission inquiry as to whether all of the other respondents, including but not limited to Saunders, Knowles, the Saunders and Knowles entities, and SK Resources should be regulated as a public utility or qualify for exemption. We ask the same thing in paragraph 135.

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No one has told you today -- and this is because it's true -- that the non-consumer majority shareholders have ever been investigated by the DPU or by the commission. They never have. To my knowledge, no one has ever filed a complaint against the individual non-consumer majority shareholders.

We're not plowing old ground, we're plowing new ground.

Let me just refer to the antitrust complaint which I think we've taken judicial notice of. It's a public record, and I don't think there's any dispute that it's been filed. And let me put that in context of the broad definitions of the statute, because the statute enacted by the Utah legislature is really what controls here. Garkane controlled, but Garkane was partly overruled by some legislative action subsequent to its holding.

The critical issue I think that you need to understand is what is the definition of a water system. Counsel has suggested that a water system is the distribution mechanism, the dams, the canals, the ditches, the pipes, the diversion works. That's true. That's part of it. But the definition that the legislature imposes upon us is much, much broader than that. Referring to Utah Code Annotated Section 54-2-1(30), and

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I'm going to quote the pertinent parts: Water system includes all other real estate, fixtures, and personal property owned, controlled, operated, or managed in connection with or to facilitate the development of water. All you have to do is own, control, or manipulate personal property in connection with or to -- even just to facilitate the development of water. There's no requirement in the statute that you actually have to be titled owner to a dam or a ditch or a pipe or a diversion facility. That's -- that's superimposing upon the statute requirements that just aren't there that the legislature never intended.

Let me give you some examples though of how these statutory definitions are satisfied and established in the antitrust case. Let's take the issue of providing water to the public generally. That's been a big issue, that is a big issue, that's an important issue. Paragraph 38 of the antitrust complaint states with regard to Class B shares, "The water rights represented by the Class B share become part of the real property owned by the homeowner and are transferred with the land upon subsequent sale of the home." So if I buy a home in Jeremy Ranch, I have no choice but to get my water from Summit, and they have no choice but to deliver it to me because it runs with the land. That's their own words: It runs with the land. So they have no more authority, no more knowledge of who's going to be the next owner or the next member than Questar does or

PacifiCorp does. It runs with the land.

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In our antitrust complaint they say they compete with other people. Paragraph 53, they say: As of January 2000 there were 11 water companies serving the Snyderville Basin, comprised of a mix of mutual water companies such as Summit Water, private water companies subject to regulation by the Public Service Commission and special service districts established by Summit County. So who do they compete with? Well, they compete with public water providers like Summit 15:28:38 10 County and private water companies regulated by the PSC. How can the respondents complete with public water providers and 15:28:43 11 15:28:47 12 PSC-regulated entities if they don't provide water to the public 15:28:52 13 generally? That doesn't make sense to me. That's like Utah 15:28:56 14 saying it competes with BYU every November at Rice-Eccles or 15:28:56 15 Lavell Edwards Stadium, but then claiming, no, we're not playing 15:28:56 16 football. That's like them wearing red helmets, shoulder pads and chin straps and admitting there's 11 of us out there on the 15:29:10 17 15:29:12 18 field, we block and we tackle our competitors, but no, we're not 15:29:16 19 playing football. That's as preposterous as the respondents 15:29:20 20 saying they compete with public water providers and PCS-15:29:25 21 regulated water companies, but they don't intend to provide 15:29:26 22 water to the public generally. 15:29:28 23

As a matter of fact, with -- with regard to whether they control a water system, they explain how they control a water system in their antitrust complaint. In paragraph 34 they

talk about the Class A shareholders who are non-users, non-15:29:38 15:29:42 consumers, but voting members. What they do is "contribute 15:29:48 capital, infrastructure and/or source water in exchange for 15:29:51 shares." Paragraph 37 of the antitrust complaint, they say, "The right to wet water that these shares represent may be sold 15:29:55 to new or existing Class A shareholders. This is the means by 15:29:59 7 which the investor shareholders recover their costs and a 15:30:04 reasonable return on their investment in obtaining and 15:30:06 15:30:10 developing the water rights and water sources and providing the 15:30:13 10 capital to construct" -- now they're talking about the Class A shareholders here, the non-member Class A shareholders that are 15:30:18 11 parties to the antitrust litigation as we've named in this 15:30:20 12 15:30:20 13 complaint -- "to construct the storage, distribution, and 15:30:24 14 delivery systems they have contributed at no cost to Summit Water." It's the Class A shareholders that are constructing the 15:30:29 15 15:30:33 16 delivery systems. They then contribute them to Summit Water. 15:30:36 17 So I ask you, how can you contribute a distribution and delivery 15:30:40 18 system if you don't operate it or control it to begin with? Of 15:30:45 19 course, the non-consumer majority shareholders own and operate and control the water system. You cannot contribute a water 15:30:48 20 15:30:51 21 distribution and delivery system on the one hand, and then claim 15:30:55 22 that you don't own or operate or control a water system on the 15:30:57 23 other. 15:30:58 24 We've talked about the \$20,000 per share that the 15:31:01 25 Class A non-user majority shareholders charge. Those wholesale

rates they charge consumers are completely controlled and dominated by them because they're the only ones that have fungible shares. We allege that in the complaint, we discuss that.

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Again, a water system under 54-2-1(30) includes all other real estate, fixtures and personal property owned, controlled, operated or managed in connection with or to facilitate the development of water. That's what they do.

That's what they do. They dominate, control, and manipulate

Summit Water to the extent that they're one and the same; we allege that, and that's one theory. That's the only theory that they've addressed in their motion. But in the complaint we also explain these other -- these other -- how they operate, the factor. And they're really two sides of the same coin, because if they're one and the same, they're developing and distributing the water.

So how could Summit Water function without the foundational contribution of a distribution and delivery system they admit the non-consumer majority shareholders provide? How could the company function without the contribution of their water system? Do they just get Class A shares because the board of directors is nice and likes them? No. They admit they contribute a water system. They should be regulated.

Let me just quickly address the Warren Buffet and the Walt Disney analogy, because I think these are -- are

interesting examples. Cinderella's castle, I like that example 15:32:42 15:32:42 because it persuasively demonstrates my point. Do you really think that if Walt Disney himself were alive he couldn't storm 15:32:45 15:32:50 Cinderella's castle? Do we really think that Walt Disney himself, as a majority shareholder in the Disney Corp., couldn't 15:32:54 arbitrarily raise the price of admission or arbitrarily exclude 15:32:58 anybody he wanted from Cinderella's castle? Is it realistic to 15:33:02 think that an officer and employee of Disneyland would say to 15:33:06 15:33:10 Mr. Disney, "I'm sorry, sir, you're just a majority 15:33:14 10 shareholder?" No, that's not going to happen. And as fun as Disneyland obviously is, there's obviously a different value 15:33:18 11 15:33:22 12 that society places on tickets to Disneyland and Cinderella's 15:33:26 13 castle and water. 15:33:27 14 It's been proven that human beings can live without 15:33:30 15 gas and, although my teenage kids would disagree, humans can also live without electricity. Humans can actually live without 15:33:33 16 15:33:38 17 public transportation. But doggone it, they can't live without 15:33:42 18 water. So why wouldn't the Public Service Commission take a 15:33:46 19 very good look at this, an entity that claims they're the 15:33:50 20 largest and most efficient and powerful water-distribution 15:33:54 21 company in all of Snyderville Basin? If they screw up, we're 15:33:57 22 talking about a commodity essential to human life, not tickets 15:34:00 23 to Disneyland. 15:34:01 24 Warren Buffet, first problem with their Warren

Buffet analogy is that PacifiCorp is in fact a regulated entity.

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And if Summit Water was in fact a regulated entity, maybe there would be less need to regulate its non-consumer majority shareholders. Unlike the non-consumer majority shareholders in this case, Warren Buffet himself's not out there personally bringing antitrust lawsuits in his own name against PacifiCorp's public utility competitors. Unlike the non-consumer majority shareholders in this case, Warren Buffet isn't out there personally building pipelines, creating distribution or delivery mechanisms to sell to consumers on the wholesale market or donate to PacifiCorp. Whenever this position is taken to its logical extreme, the Warren Buffet analogy means that no majority shareholders can ever be regulated regardless of how much they manipulate, dominate, or control the company and its assets and no matter what is actually going on in the company.

And that's what Garkane says that you ought to look at. Don't -- don't put form over substance. Just because their articles of organization or their bylaws say something, don't assume that that's exactly what reality is. If that was the case, you could evade jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission just through carefully crafted bylaws. You have to look at what's actually going on. That analogy ignores the facts of this case.

In conclusion, the motions to dismiss should be denied because the allegations of the complaint, when viewed in a light most favorable to Bear Hollow, with all reasonable

inferences being drawn in Bear Hollow's favor, that establishes 15:35:31 that the respondents own, control, and operate a public utility, 15:35:34 they control -- control a water system. We've alleged that 15:35:39 they're a public utility. That ends the inquiry for now. If 15:35:43 they want to dispute that, fine; we'll have discovery, we'll 15:35:48 have an evidentiary hearing. Quite frankly, given the confusion 15:35:51 and the finger pointing and everything else that's going on 15:35:55 today, I think we need to have an evidentiary hearing. If our 15:35:58 claims are truly "frivolous," "disingenuous," "specious," "with 15:36:03 15:36:08 10 no good-faith basis," then let's have it, let's find out. 15:36:14 11 we can't find out based on allegations made by a consumer that has been stonewalled and doesn't even have a current shareholder 15:36:19 12 15:36:23 13 list because they refuse to give it to us. 15:36:28 14 Let this proceed to where it ought to proceed and 15:36:30 15 let's do the right thing and look at this carefully and not just dismiss this complaint out of hand. 15:36:33 16 15:36:35 17 Thank you. 15:36:35 18 JUDGE ARREDONDO: Thank you, Mr. McDonald. 15:36:39 19 Mr. Hatch, a brief reply? 15:36:41 20 MR. HATCH: Sure. Thank you, Your Honor. 15:36:43 21 A lot of things were alleged there, but I think 15:36:45 22 Mr. McDonald was right in the sense that, you know, what we're 15:36:48 23 looking at is this complaint. And I'm happy to address anything 15:36:52 24 in the antitrust complaint, because I think they've taken it out 15:36:55 25 of context. I do think that's not alleged. None of the

antitrust complaint issues are alleged in their complaint, and it's truly outside of the scope of this proceeding. I didn't object because I'm happy to answer any of those because I think they're totally irrelevant.

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But the point -- Mr. McDonald went through several sections in the complaint, and, you know, that's fine, but what the problem is, is the standard is even if we accept these things as true, are they still legally sufficient to proceed on. And Mr. McDonald's taken the position that just because they say something, we have to ignore the law, we have to ignore all reality, and -- and the issue is over, and we go to an evidentiary hearing.

If that were truly the case, Your Honor, there would never be a motion to dismiss in federal court, state court, or before this commission. Because every -- every case that I think any lawyer's ever been involved with where a motion to dismiss has been brought, it's been brought largely because, given the allegations that are made, there isn't a legal basis to move forward.

Now, let me point out a few -- I'll just -- I don't have time to go through every one of those. I will if Your Honor wants to give me the time. But he cited, for instance, that you have to take as true and move forward Section 8 -- Section 8, paragraph 18 of the complaint. Well, here's what that says. It says: Jurisdiction over this action is properly

held before the Public Service Commission pursuant to, and then
he cites code cites. Well, that's not -- by saying you have to
accept the allegations are true, he's essentially saying, well,
since we say you have jurisdiction, you cannot determine
jurisdiction for yourself. That's certainly not the case. And
there's certainly no authority for any such of a wild assertion
as that.

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And that's why you have a motion to dismiss, because you look at these things and you determine is there really jurisdiction, are there grounds for it, not just did they allege it in their complaint. We're not just trying to determine whether the form is proper, but whether the substance that's contained in this document is proper.

So we go through it. And if you go through it, they make a lot of allegations. In 22, with -- one of the very next sections, he -- paragraphs that he cited to, he says Summit Water and respondents -- he throws those in, my clients -- are operating a public utility as defined in Utah Code. Well, that's a conclusory statement. Just them saying that doesn't mean that they're -- they're -- that they've made the allegations necessary and that this commission doesn't look to see whether or not there are allegations in this complaint that meet the standard that would grant jurisdiction over my clients and over Mr. Flitton's clients to proceed further.

And virtually all of these, if you look at the

sections he talks about, he's talking about things that are totally unrelated or conclusory statements, things that in our briefs and the -- and the arguments that I made earlier, we addressed every one of the points and showed how they are legally insufficient.

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A perfect example is paragraph 40. He says, for example: On information and belief, Trilogy Asset Management, Inc., a for-profit corporation here owns the domain name summitcountywater.com and appears to be advertising water for sale over the Internet; see Exhibit Q. Well, they attached Exhibit Q. They made a big issue that I misspoke and said it was in the briefs, attached here as -- to Plaintiff's Exhibit Q. And we've gone through that, Your Honor. And, you know, when I've talked about things having really no good-faith basis, I mean, that has to fit every one of the words I ever used, because if you look at it yourself, they're sitting here saying that it is an advertisement for water over the Internet, and the word "water" isn't even used, nothing's being offered for sale. And they want you to -- they say that, well, you have to accept our view of that as true because we said it. Well, that's not the standard, it's never been the legal standard. They have to allege facts that provide a legally sufficient basis, and they haven't done it. And they've proved it because you're allowed to consider the exhibit to their -- to their complaint.

So you go through, and I listened very carefully,

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and they do not provide any facts to show that the respondents themselves are providing water to the public. The only allegations in here are that Summit Water does that. And they try to bootstrap, essentially, the individual respondents by the fact that they own shares. Now, you know, obviously -- and one of the things we haven't talked about that's really interesting here too is they're a Class A shareholder, Your Honor. They come under the same status as my clients. And yet they've never sat here and said that they themselves ought to be regulated. Because they don't want to be regulated.

I mean, they're here trying to pursue a corporate lawsuit that, if it has any merit or any basis whatsoever, it ought to be pursued in civil court. But I -- you know, and I can only -- I can only guess as to their motivations for trying to do that here, but what I do know is they haven't alleged a legal basis to be here and have you do that for them. They've never alleged that my clients run a water system, that they own any of the things that are required in the statute, and we went through that. Again, they've only alleged that Summit Water owns those things, and that somehow because we're a shareholder we ought to be there. But every time that -- they try to jump that chasm, that legal chasm.

And that's why we talk about are their allegations legally sufficient. They have to ignore Garkane, they have to ignore San Miguel, they have to ignore Nelson, and they have to

try to limit those cases, and they have to take us back to prior to the 1940s and ignore everything the supreme court has said to jump from my client, past Summit Water, and say we're the ones that are running the water, when we're not.

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They never have alleged that -- they've never -they've never contradicted, and in their complaint they don't,
that the only right to the water is through share ownership. As
a matter of fact, they've been here complaining that it's
expensive to -- you have to own a piece of property and you have
to pay money to become a member; if you don't do that, they
don't let you become a member. And -- and so they've exactly -they've absolutely argued the opposite of what they would need
to show to get outside of Garkane and outside of San Miguel and
outside of Nelson. What they've argued is -- is exactly what
those cases require, is if you're only a member, it's not being
offered to the public.

And their bigger complaint is essentially that we're a member. We don't like being a member, I guess. But they've -- every allegation is that we're a member and we wouldn't have any right to water otherwise. That falls directly inside the supreme court's test. And they have never disputed, in a complaint or otherwise, that approval is required. As a matter of fact, you heard their arguments today that they complained about approval being required.

And so we hear, you know, kind of these broad,

general arguments as we go through the complaint that somehow some conclusory statements that largely go to what -- the provision of water by Summit Water, which isn't even -- their allegations aren't even legally sufficient to provide jurisdiction over Summit Water, that somehow you can jump the chasm and get to us. And to do that we would have to ignore years and years of supreme court precedent.

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Mr. McDonald said, you know, we're plowing new ground here, and I would agree that they are asking you to plow new ground here. They're asking you to plow new ground that has no basis of being plowed.

They say that the reason -- well, Warren Buffet's never been -- that you ought to investigate my clients because we've never been investigated. Well, neither has Warren Buffet. I mean, are they saying that you -- you and the Public Service Commission should be personally investigating every member, every shareholder, every board member of every -- every corporation that has anything to do with water? If we take their arguments, you know, you'd have to be checking out the guys at Smith's Food Store because they've got a public water fountain. And in the examples they gave you, that's the provision of water to the public. So we ought to call in the board members of Smith's. I mean, that's the kind of reductio ad absurdum arguments that are being kind of crafted, and talk with each other to try to -- try to come up with a case out of

whole cloth that just doesn't exist.

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The last point I -- and I'm happy to answer any questions Your Honor has, too -- is the -- their argument from -- I think it was paragraph 53. I was writing these down as fast as I could. He talked about, you know, that -- that Summit Water is competing, you know, with public -- this is where he cites the antitrust case and thinks -- and apparently finds somewhat persuasive the fact that because Summit Water -and I'll note that this argument goes to Summit Water, not really my clients -- but he notes -- he notes that in the antitrust complaint it's alleged that Summit Water is competing with public water providers, and that somehow -- and to be true to the statement in the antitrust case, it says competes with public and private water suppliers. But I guess -- I gather the argument they're trying to make now is because we compete in some instances with public water suppliers, that therefore we're a public water supplier. And there's really something missing from the logic of that if you graph that out. And we could do that logically to show it doesn't make any sense whatsoever.

But I think as far as we need to go is the fact that that's exactly the facts of the San Miguel case, you know, because they were -- they also in that instance indicated that one of the people they competed with was public systems. But the court didn't look to that. It's not a factor, it's immaterial, it's irrelevant. The important factors are -- are

do you require membership, and do you -- do you -- and are you 15:47:28 15:47:34 not holding yourself out to the public, you have to only be a shareholder or a member to receive water. That's the test 15:47:37 15:47:41 that's been established. And certainly my client -- Summit Water requires that, and certainly my clients don't even provide 15:47:45 15:47:49 water. 7 And so I would ask Your Honor to dismiss this matter 15:47:49 15:47:54 as being legally insufficient to be able to bring against 15:47:59 individuals such as my client, and if they have real, honest-15:48:10 10 to-goodness disputes, to go air them in the proper jurisdiction, 15:48:10 11 which, if they have claims, would not be here. 15:48:11 12 Thank you, Your Honor. 15:48:12 13 JUDGE ARREDONDO: Thank you. Thank you, all of you. 15:48:14 14 And we'll go ahead and take this matter under advisement and 15:48:18 15 make a recommendation to the commissioners. Thank you. 16 17 (Proceedings concluded, 3:48 p.m.) 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

1	CERTIFICATE
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3	I, Lisa Collman, Certified Shorthand Reporter within and
4	for the State of Utah, do hereby certify:
5	
6	That the foregoing proceedings were taken before me at
7	the time and place herein set forth, and were taken down by me
8	in shorthand and thereafter transcribed into typewriting under
9	my direction and supervision.
10	
11	That the foregoing 74 pages contain a true and correct
12	transcription of my shorthand notes so taken.
13	
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16	In witness thereof, I have hereunto transcribed my name
17	this 30th day of December, 2009.
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21	Utah License No. 10783607801
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