

BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH

In The Matter Of The Petition Of US)
Magnesium LLC For Determination)
of Long-Term Economic) Docket No. 03-035-19
Development Rates and Conditions)
of Interruptible Service)

REBUTTAL TESTIMONY

OF

BRUCE W. GRISWOLD

NOVEMBER 5, 2004

1 **Q. Are you the same Bruce W. Griswold that filed direct and supplemental**
2 **testimony in this case?**

3 A. Yes I am.

4 **Purpose of Testimony**

5 **Q. What is the purpose of your testimony?**

6 A. I will address the base energy level and contract term recommendations made by the
7 Division of Public Utilities (“DPU”) and Committee of Consumer Services (“CCS”) in their direct testimony. I will also address issues raised by US Magnesium (“US
8 Mag) in its supplemental testimony, including interruption and cost issues. Finally, I
9 will summarize the key points of PacifiCorp’s proposed power supply agreement
10 (“PSA”) and operating reserve agreement and show the resulting net effective cost to
11 US Mag.
12

13 **Q. Please describe the base energy level and contract term recommendations of the**
14 **DPU and CCS and provide the Company’s position on those recommendations.**

15 A. In my supplemental testimony, I used a base energy level of 533,000 MWh and a
16 contract term of 10 years. In their direct testimony, the DPU and CCS recommended
17 a base energy level of 615,000 MWh and a contract term of 5 years. The Company is
18 willing to adopt both recommendations.
19

20 **Q. What is the affect of those recommendations?**

21 A. There were three price components proposed in my supplemental testimony. The
22 first is the cost of service price provided by Mr. Taylor of \$25.94 per MWh. That
23 number remains the same for the starting cost of service price in 2005 regardless of

1 base energy usage or term. The second price component was the credit of \$0.16 per
2 MWh for physical interruption in July and August when temperatures are equal to or
3 greater than 100F. Adjusting this to a base of 615,000 MWh and five years results in
4 a revised credit of \$0.14 per MWh. The third price component is the operating reserve
5 of \$1.38 per kW-month. This is also impacted by both energy usage level and term.
6 This results in a revised operating reserve payment of \$1.59 per kW-month over the
7 term of 5 years or an energy credit of \$2.64 per MWh based on 85 MW of operating
8 reserves. In addition, the Company proposes a system integrity credit of \$0.18 per
9 kW-month for the term. This equals a \$0.10 per MWh credit based on the 615,000
10 MWhs. This credit to US Mag allows the Company to physically interrupt US Mag in
11 the event of an electrical system emergency. US Mag's current contract has this
12 provision and we would bring that provision forward to the new agreement. When
13 these changes and additions are combined together the revised net price proposed for
14 US Mag is \$23.06 per MWh, as shown in Exhibit UP&L_(BWG – 1R) tab "Price
15 Calculation".

16 **Q. If the Commission approved the Company's proposal, what would the price**
17 **changes be over the contract term and what would the net effective price be?**

18 A. I have summarized our estimates of the price changes and the effective price over the
19 contract term in Exhibit UP&L_(BWG – 1R) on the tab "Net Effective Price Chart".
20 These are estimates and obviously are dependent upon a number of factors, including
21 the final adjustment to Schedule 9 in PacifiCorp's rate cases, the changes in market
22 prices when US Mag buys through curtailment, and US Magnesium's projected usage
23 over the term. The following are the adjustment components:

- 1 • Cost of Service of \$25.94 per MWh is tied to changes in Schedule 9 price
2 changes – For this analysis the average increases from the past 5 years for
3 PacifiCorp’s industrial customer class (Schedule 6 and 9 combined) were
4 projected forward which resulted in an average price increase of 2.1
5 percent per year effective for years 2006 through 2009.
- 6 • Replacement power price is based on Palo Verde market prices –
7 PacifiCorp’s market price forecast dated September 28, 2004 for the Palo
8 Verde market on-peak firm was used. The percent change in monthly
9 price from the previous year was applied to the buy through cost for the
10 current year for years 2006 through 2009. Exhibit UP&L_(BWG – 1R)
11 tab “Market Price Forecast” contains the monthly price forecasts and
12 percent changes.
- 13 • US Magnesium’s usage level will affect their effective price because
14 changes in capacity or energy will change the dollars resulting from the
15 kW-month credit for reserves as well as the volume associated with the
16 PSA. – For this analysis I assumed that the US Mag load would increase
17 10 percent per year starting in 2005 through 2007. The impact of the
18 volume changes was applied to the prices in the following year.

19 My approach for evaluating price changes since 2002 was to utilize actual bills
20 and usage for the current contract starting price of \$21 per MWh in 2002, to
21 include the replacement power to get to an effective per MWh cost for US Mag,
22 and then to adjust the base to 615,000 MWh. I then started in 2005 with the
23 proposed pricing I have described in my testimony above and made a series of

1 projections on the various prices to reflect changes over the term. I have not
2 included the impact of the current or proposed QF contract on either volume or
3 payment to US Mag in this analysis (the volumes will be impacted because US
4 Mag will be selling a higher volume to PacifiCorp and conversely that
5 incremental volume will be added back into their loads as it applies to the PSA.)
6 Rather I have started from the 615,000 MWh base and applied the estimated
7 increases to US Mag usage levels. The results show that the net effective price
8 (PSA price minus credits plus replacement power) to US Mag increases at an
9 average rate of 2.5% per year over the term of the proposed agreement. This is
10 much less than Mr. Brown points to in his testimony. In fact, the increase to US
11 Mag during the proposed agreement closely reflects the changes in Schedule 9
12 prices and therefore supports the proposal to adjust US Mag's prices based on
13 Schedule 9 price changes.

14 **Q. Please comment on Mr. Swenson's proposal to only allow curtailment in the**
15 **June through September months when the temperature in Salt Lake City is**
16 **greater than the historic monthly mean.**

17 A. The difficulty in applying this logic is that the curtailment proposed for this
18 agreement is designed to remove US Magnesium's load from system coincident peak
19 and not Utah coincident peak. We have already reduced the current six (6) hour block
20 to a four (4) hour block during the four summer months in going from the current
21 contract to this proposed structure. Adding this component in as a curtailment trigger
22 basically cuts the number of hours available in half for each month. This increases
23 the probability that there will be a month when US Mag will not be available for

1 curtailment because of this trigger and their load will be included in the system
2 coincidental peak. In that case, US Mag receives the full value of missing the system
3 coincident peak when it in fact did not. On a simple level, the cost of US Mag
4 missing the system coincident peak is approximately \$800,000 per month. It is
5 interesting that Mr. Swenson makes no mention of US Mag being assessed the cost
6 for missing a curtailment during the hour of system coincident peak while seeking to
7 reduce the hours of available curtailment to reduce his risk. We believe our proposal
8 is much more reasonable in that it only forces physical curtailment during days
9 forecast at or over 100F, which on average total five (5) days per year. This is a
10 physical exposure of 20 hours per year concentrated in the two months of July and
11 August.

12

13 **Q. What about this type of temperature trigger in the two winter months?**

14 A. In the winter months of December and January, it would be even more difficult to use
15 this type of trigger to miss the system coincident peak for two reasons. First, the
16 winter peak is normally driven by PacifiCorp's western system loads. There could be
17 days when it is mild in Utah and colder in Oregon and other states served by
18 PacifiCorp. Second, the curtailment hours have been split into two (2) hour blocks
19 during the morning and evening. Reducing those by half, coupled with the first
20 concern, would increase the probability that US Mag would not be available for
21 curtailment during a winter system coincident peak.

22 **Q. Please comment on the physical interruption exposure to US Mag.**

1 A. The 100F temperature trigger in the PSA shows an average of five days per year of
2 temperatures over 100F, therefore the physical exposure during those days is 20 hours
3 of interruption to their business, normally concentrated in two months of July and
4 August. US Mag has an existing 36 MW generating facility that it can use choose to
5 serve its own load. Therefore its current exposure is 85 MW minus the 36MW or
6 49MW on average. However, Mr. Swenson has indicated that US Mag can physically
7 cycle their magnesium cells. As a result, one-half of its load could be off at any time
8 and through cycling the actual net physical exposure is 85 MW divided by 2, or 42.5
9 MW minus the 36 MW supplied by the generating facility, far closer to a net physical
10 exposure of 7.5 MW. As sophisticated as US Mag is in their energy management
11 practices, I believe they can find DSM opportunities in their plant to reduce the
12 physical exposure to zero. In fact, Mr. Swenson has mentioned in technical
13 conferences that they are considering the option of acquiring additional generators for
14 the single purpose of hedging any physical curtailment by running them during the
15 limited hours of physical interruption.

16

17 **Q. Are there comments you wish to make regarding curtailment provisions?**

18 A. Yes, in previous testimony both Mr. Taylor and I have described the mechanism for
19 physical curtailment versus buy-through. We have previously testified that the buy-
20 through provision requires the Company to continue to plan to serve the US Mag load
21 and therefore it is included in the Company's firm load requirements and service
22 obligations. This includes the cost of holding reserves for US Mag's load during the
23 "curtailment period". US Mag, the DPU and the CCS in testimony and during

1 technical conferences have stated that the Company should not be planning for the
2 load during curtailment hours even in buy-through conditions. The Company
3 consents to that position and therefore will not be planning for serving US Mag's load
4 during those hours of curtailment. Thus, during a curtailment hour when US Mag has
5 chosen to buy-through and there are no resources, or a constraint occurs where the
6 Company cannot import power to the Wasatch front, US Mag will not be served.

7

8 **Conclusion**

9 **Q. Based on the work that has been completed to date, what price do you support**
10 **for US Magnesium?**

11 A. The proposed five (5) year power supply agreement would include a curtailment
12 option with buy-through on certain curtailment hours. This results in a cost of service
13 based price of \$25.94 per MWh. The Company then applies a credit of \$0.14 per
14 MWh for the temperature-triggered physical curtailment provision in July and August
15 and a \$0.10 per MWh credit for system integrity. This results in a net price of \$25.70
16 per MWh. The separate operating reserve agreement with a five (5) year term pays
17 US Mag \$1.59 per kW-month or \$2.64 per MWh based on the test year usage of
18 615,000 MWhs.

19 The net price of the two agreements would be \$23.06 per MWh.

20 **Does this conclude your testimony?**

21 A. Yes it does.