

1 **Q. Please state your name, business address and present position with**  
2 **PacifiCorp (the Company).**

3 A. My name is Mark T. Widmer, my business address is 825 N.E. Multnomah, Suite  
4 800, Portland, Oregon 97232, and my present title is Director, Net Power Costs.

5 **Qualifications**

6 **Q. Briefly describe your education and business experience.**

7 A. I received an undergraduate degree in Business Administration from Oregon State  
8 University. I have worked for PacifiCorp since 1980 and have held various  
9 positions in the power supply and regulatory areas. I was promoted to my present  
10 position in September 2004.

11 **Q. Please describe your current duties.**

12 A. I am responsible for the coordination and preparation of net power cost and  
13 related analyses used in retail price filings, the Integrated Resource Plan (IRP)  
14 process and the Multi-State Process (MSP). In addition, I represent the Company  
15 on power resource and other various issues with intervener and regulatory groups  
16 associated with the six state regulatory commissions which have jurisdiction over  
17 the Company.

18 **Summary of Testimony**

19 **Q. Will you please summarize your testimony?**

20 A. I provide quantitative analysis of the Company's historical net power cost  
21 exposure and how that relationship has changed to the point that the Company's  
22 risk has become very asymmetrical. I present the Company's proposed Power

23 Cost Adjustment Mechanism (PCAM), which if adopted, would better balance net  
24 power cost exposure between the Company and customers.

25 **Asymmetric Risk**

26 **Q. Why is the Company requesting a PCAM?**

27 A. The Company's net power cost exposure to losses is asymmetric. Market prices  
28 can only fall to zero while market price increases are, theoretically, unlimited.  
29 Even though it is unlikely that market prices will fall to zero or increase infinitely,  
30 the limitations are relevant. For example, as explained below, since 1989 the  
31 largest decrease in net power costs is dwarfed by the largest increase in net power  
32 costs above authorized levels. This is causing the Company to bear a  
33 disproportionate share of net power costs incurred to serve retail customers. As a  
34 consequence, our opportunity to earn our authorized rate of return over the long  
35 run will be greatly diminished if not eliminated, because net power costs are such  
36 a large component of revenue requirement.

37 **Q. Please define net power cost exposure.**

38 A. In this context I have defined net power cost exposure as the variance between  
39 actual and authorized net power costs.

40 **Q. Please explain the information shown on Exhibit UP&L\_\_\_ (MTW-1).**

41 A. Exhibit UP&L\_\_\_ (MTW-1) shows the historical net power cost exposure  
42 experienced from 1990 through 2004. These figures exclude the \$146 million  
43 recovered from Utah customers for the energy crisis. As shown, the net power  
44 cost exposure varied between a \$32 million gain and a \$738.5 million loss on a  
45 total Company basis, excluding recovery for the energy crisis. In aggregate and

46 including recovery for the energy crisis, losses exceeded gains by \$1.1 billion total  
47 Company based on Utah authorized net power costs.

48 **Q. Has the Company's net power cost exposure been constant over that period?**

49 A. No. Beginning in 2000, with the start of the Western energy crisis, the exposure  
50 has become very asymmetric. From 1990 through 1999, the Company's net  
51 power cost exposure averaged \$7.1 million total Company and from 2000-2004 it  
52 averaged approximately \$223 million in excess costs. In percentage terms, the  
53 exposure for the 2000-2004 period increased by over 3,100 percent compared to  
54 the 1990-1999 period average.

55 **Q. Are the factors which contribute to the net power cost exposure asymmetry**  
56 **controllable by the Company?**

57 A. No. Deviations from net power costs in rates are primarily related to factors not  
58 controllable by the Company. For example, hydro conditions, weather conditions,  
59 retail loads, wholesale market prices for natural gas and electricity and the timing  
60 of forced outages are not controllable. While these potential causes have always  
61 been present, the cost of addressing these factors has increased dramatically over  
62 the past 5 years. The overwhelming cause of the cost increase is due to an  
63 increase in wholesale market prices and price volatility. For example, actual  
64 hydro generation for fiscal 2004 was 1.5 million MWh below normal due to  
65 continued drought conditions. At market prices prevalent from 1990 through  
66 1999, replacement power would have cost \$25 million on average. At recent  
67 market prices, replacement power would have cost approximately \$120 million.  
68 Historical market prices are shown in Exhibit UP&L\_\_\_ (MTW-2). More

69 recently we have seen natural gas prices approximately double over the last year  
70 alone. Unless changes are made to the Company's Utah net power cost recovery  
71 regulatory model, this asymmetry will continue to increase as wholesale market  
72 prices and price volatility increase.

73 **Q. What is the expected trend for the wholesale market price of electricity?**

74 A. While the expected trend is down from the current high levels over the next  
75 several years, the prices are expected to stay high by historical standards and there  
76 will be some level of year-to-year volatility in wholesale market prices. Exhibit  
77 UP&L\_\_\_ (MTW-3) is the Company's most recent Official Price Projection of  
78 future market prices.

79 **Q. Have prudent steps been taken to insulate customers and shareholders from  
80 net power cost exposure?**

81 A. Yes. The Company engages in the IRP process. Through the IRP process the  
82 Company identifies resource requirements which have resulted in the Company  
83 filing request for proposals ("RFPs") for resources to meet load requirements on a  
84 least-cost, risk-adjusted basis. This process provides further assurances to the  
85 Commission and customers as to the prudent nature of our net power costs  
86 involving power purchases and/or the construction of generation facilities. The  
87 Company has also increased its emphasis on transactions that would reduce risk.  
88 These efforts were undertaken to further align the interests of shareholders and  
89 customers. Finally, under the proposed PCAM described below, the sharing bands  
90 would result in the Company shouldering a significant portion of the volatility

91 between rate cases, thereby reinforcing the Company's incentive to manage its  
92 system and associated risks prudently.

93 **Q. Has net power cost exposure been recognized and addressed by other**  
94 **Commissions that regulate utilities located in the WECC?**

95 A. Yes. As described in a recent Standard and Poor's research article titled "Fuel and  
96 Power Adjusters Underpin Post-Crisis Credit Quality of Western Utilities",  
97 Exhibit UP&L\_\_\_ (MTW-4), most of the investor owned electric utilities located  
98 in the WECC currently have some form of power cost recovery mechanism, with  
99 the exception of a few utilities including PacifiCorp and Portland General Electric  
100 (PGE), and Public Service of New Mexico and Tucson which are resource long.  
101 An important factor that should be considered in the Commission's evaluation of  
102 our request is the fact that the Company has more exposure than many of the other  
103 utilities located throughout the WECC due to variability of hydro resources in our  
104 portfolio.

105 **Q. How does the Company propose to rebalance the asymmetric net power cost**  
106 **exposure that the Company has been shouldering?**

107 A. The Commission should adopt the Company's proposed PCAM to rebalance net  
108 power cost exposure between customers and the Company so they are closer to  
109 historic levels. Failure to do so would likely result in a systemic under recovery  
110 of net power costs that are prudently incurred to serve customers and would not  
111 consistently provide our customers proper price signals for energy consumption  
112 decisions.

113 **Proposed PCAM**

114 **Q. Please explain how net power costs will be recovered in Utah under the**  
115 **Company's proposed PCAM.**

116 A. The PCAM is an incentive-based mechanism that would share variations in  
117 adjusted actual net power costs from the authorized baseline net power costs with  
118 one exception. The one exception is that 100 percent of cost increases or  
119 decreases related to Qualifying Facility (QF) contracts should be recovered from  
120 customers since the purchases are required by PURPA. In addition, the 2005  
121 Energy Policy Act (EPAAct) requires that electric utilities recover all prudently  
122 incurred costs. Section 210 (m) (7) states:

123 The Commission shall issue and enforce such regulations as are necessary  
124 to ensure that an electric utility that purchases electric energy or capacity  
125 from a qualifying cogeneration facility or qualifying small power  
126 production facility in accordance with any legally enforceable obligation  
127 entered into or imposed under this section recovers all prudently incurred  
128 costs associated with the purchase.  
129

130 All other costs would be subject to asymmetrical sharing bands that allocate 90  
131 percent of cost increases to customers and 100 percent of cost decreases to  
132 customers.

133 **Q. Please explain how the proposed PCAM will operate.**

134 A. In the ongoing operation of the PCAM, base net power costs in rates will be  
135 established in general rate cases. Deferred Net Power Costs will be calculated  
136 monthly and are equal to the Utah allocated share of the difference between total  
137 Company Base Net Power Costs and total Company Adjusted Actual Net Power  
138 Costs plus a Utah retail load adjustment. If the Deferred Net Power Costs is

139 positive, the Company has collected more from customers than the costs incurred  
140 and 100 percent of the net excess will be returned to customers over a 12 month  
141 period. If the Deferred Net Power Cost is negative, the Company has collected  
142 less from customers than the costs incurred and only 90 percent will be recovered  
143 from customers over a 12 month period. In other words, if the Company recovers  
144 less than the Adjusted Actual Net Power Cost, the Company will absorb 10  
145 percent of the cost increase as risk sharing. This asymmetric risk sharing  
146 mechanism will provide the Company a significant incentive to keep total net  
147 power costs as low as possible while providing safe, adequate and reliable service.  
148 Mr. Taylor describes the steps necessary to allocate the deferrals to Utah pursuant  
149 to Revised Protocol.

150 **Q. Please explain the Utah retail load adjustment.**

151 A. The adjustment captures the monthly retail revenue impact of changes in Utah  
152 load from the level included in retail rates. Through this adjustment, increased  
153 retail revenue related to load increases is netted against increased net power costs  
154 and conversely, revenue decreases related to declines in retail loads is netted  
155 against decreased net power costs. The revenue adjustment would be calculated  
156 by multiplying the portion of the retail rate related to net power costs by the  
157 change in load from the in rates level.

158 **Q. Should the accrued balances accrue interest?**

159 A. Yes. Both customers and the Company should be compensated for the time value  
160 of money for accrued balances, whether positive or negative. The interest rate  
161 used should be the Company's authorized rate of return.

162 **Q. Please define and describe the terms that the Company proposes for the**  
163 **management of the PCAM.**

164 A. **Base Net Power Costs** are the authorized net power costs in rates. The  
165 measurement period should be tied to the balancing account trigger, which is  
166 discussed below. Base Net Power Costs will be in effect until the Company's  
167 rates are adjusted through a general rate case.

168 **Adjusted Actual Net Power Costs** is the sum of the total Company amounts  
169 recorded in FERC Accounts: 501, 503 and 547 (Steam Production Fuel Expense)  
170 for coal, steam and natural gas purchased and or sold, 555 (Purchased Power), 565  
171 (Wheeling), 447 (Sales for Resale). These actual amounts would be further  
172 adjusted to; 1) remove actual costs consistent with the rate setting process so  
173 comparable costs are being used in the accrual calculation, 2) remove prior period  
174 accounting entries recorded during the accrual period that are not applicable to the  
175 current period, and 3) to include Commission-adopted disallowance adjustments  
176 from the most recent Utah rate case so comparable costs are being used in the  
177 accrual calculation. An example of an item 1 adjustment would be the removal of  
178 Bonneville Regional Credit costs because they are not applicable to Utah. An  
179 example of an item 2 adjustment would be the removal of fuel costs booked to the  
180 current period that are related to a historical period outside the measurement  
181 period. An example of an item 3 item adjustment would be the Commission  
182 adopted Sacramento Municipal Utility District (SMUD) wholesale sales revenue  
183 imputation adjustment.



184            **Trigger** is the \$20 million Deferred Net Power Cost threshold balance at which  
185            the Company may return or recover balances accrued from customers.

186    **Q.    Is the Company proposing to establish a fixed schedule for requesting**  
187            **recovery of or return to customers of accrued balances?**

188    A.    No. Rather than establishing a fixed schedule for such filings, the Company  
189            proposes that a plus or minus \$20 million accrued balance on a Utah basis be  
190            established as a trigger. Once the trigger is reached, the Company can return or  
191            collect balances from customers. This approach is more beneficial than setting a  
192            fixed schedule because it should reduce the number of rate changes during periods  
193            of lower net power cost volatility, reduce rate shock during periods of higher  
194            volatility when balances could be much higher, and provide more current price  
195            signals during periods of higher volatility.

196    **Q.    How does the Company propose to allocate the sur-charges and sur-credits to**  
197            **customers?**

198    A.    Both will be spread to customers on a uniform cents-per-kwh basis to all customer  
199            classes in order to reflect changes in costs per MWh incurred by the Company to  
200            serve customers. Because differences in delivery voltage result in different line  
201            losses and power requirements, the Company proposes to vary the sur-charge and  
202            sur-credit amounts by delivery voltage. The loss factors in effect at the time  
203            of the accrual would be used for this determination.

204 **Q. Is the PCAM designed to take into account all net power cost components?**

205 A. Yes. The mechanism is designed to include the impact of cost changes for fuel,  
206 wheeling and purchase power expenses and wholesale electricity and natural gas  
207 sales modeled in the Company's production dispatch model.

208 **Q. Please explain Exhibit UP&L\_\_ (MTW-5).**

209 A. Exhibit UP&L\_\_ (MTW-5) is an illustration of how the Company's proposed  
210 PCAM would have operated during calendar year 2004. As shown, the total  
211 Company net power cost variance from Utah authorized results was \$233.6  
212 million. After exclusion of the Company's \$22.2 million share, \$3.3 million was  
213 related to east hydro, \$.4 million was related to Mid Columbia hydro. \$5.5 million  
214 was related to existing QF contracts, .8 million was related to new QFs and  
215 \$\$62.5 million was related to all other, which includes fuel prices, market prices,  
216 contract changes etc. Utah's allocated share of these costs would have been  
217 \$\$72.4 million. The revenue impact of the load changes was \$(40.9) million,  
218 leaving a net Utah impact of \$31.5 million.

219 **Q. Is the proposed PCAM similar to currently effective commodity balancing**  
220 **account mechanism used by Questar?**

221 A. Yes, the function of the proposed PCAM is similar to Questar's natural gas  
222 commodity balancing account. The major difference is that the Questar  
223 mechanism provides 100% recovery of cost increases and the Company's  
224 proposed mechanism provides recovery of 90 percent of cost increases between  
225 rate effective periods.

226 **Q. Should accrued costs be subject to a prudence review?**

227 A. Yes. However, costs and revenues related to existing contracts and resources that  
228 have previously been included in rates should be exempt from a prudence review  
229 on a cost basis. Of course, the manner in which in which generation facilities  
230 were operated and contracts dispatched during the accrual period should be  
231 subject to review along with other new contracts. This review is also intended to  
232 cover whatever accounting issues may arise and ensure that Commissions  
233 disallowances are accounted for properly.

234 **Q. Does this conclude your direct testimony?**

235 A. Yes.