

1 **Q. Please state your name and business address.**

2 A. My name is Lowell E. Alt, Jr. My address is 4084 Emma Circle, Salt Lake City,
3 Utah, 84124

4 **Q. On whose behalf are you testifying?**

5 A. I am testifying on behalf of PacifiCorp.

6 **QUALIFICATIONS**

7 **Q. Briefly describe your educational and professional background.**

8 A. I received a Bachelor of Science degree in Electrical Engineering and a Master of
9 Business Administration degree from West Virginia University. I am a
10 Registered Professional Engineer licensed in Pennsylvania and Utah. I have
11 attended numerous conferences and seminars on various aspects of utility
12 regulation. I retired in December 2005 as Executive Staff Director of the Utah
13 Public Service Commission after a twenty-five year career in Utah utility
14 regulation. I served as Director of the Utah Division of Public Utilities from
15 March 2001 to August 2003, Manager of the Energy Section from October 1995
16 to March 2001, Chief Engineer from 1983 to 1995 and Rate Engineer from 1980
17 to 1983. I have testified before the Utah Public Service Commission in numerous
18 electric, natural gas and telecommunication cases on various topics including
19 customer charges, interim rates, rate case stipulations, rate design, cost-of-service,
20 mergers, service extensions and return on equity. I was the Division's witness on
21 class cost of service and rate design for every Utah Power rate case from 1983 to
22 1998. I have completed numerous cost-of-service studies of various utilities
23 including Utah Power, U.S. West Communications, several rural electric

24 cooperatives and two water companies. Earlier this year, I published a book,
25 *Energy Utility Rate Setting*. I previously worked for Pennsylvania Power and
26 Light Company from 1968 to 1980. My last positions there were Distribution
27 Senior Engineer-Substations and Senior Tariff Analyst.

28 **PURPOSE AND SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY**

29 **Q. What is the purpose of your testimony?**

30 A. The purpose of my testimony is to address issues raised in the direct testimony of
31 the following witnesses regarding the residential customer charge and minimum
32 bill:

- 33 1. Abdinasir M. Abdulle – Utah Division of Public Utilities
- 34 2. Ronald J. Binz – AARP
- 35 3. Anthony J. Yankel - Committee of Consumer Services
- 36 4. Elizabeth A. Wolf – The Ratepayers Alliance

37 **Q. Please provide a brief summary of your testimony.**

38 A. I describe the purpose and nature of customer charges and minimum bills. I
39 provide a brief history of PacifiCorp's residential customer charge in Utah and
40 discuss common rate design objectives and principles, including the importance
41 of cost-based rates. I discuss the areas of agreement and disagreement with the
42 positions taken by the witnesses I listed above. Finally, I explain why
43 PacifiCorp's residential customer charge proposal in this case is reasonable.

44 **DESCRIPTION OF CUSTOMER CHARGES AND MINIMUM BILL**

45 **Q. As your testimony addresses the residential customer charge and minimum**
46 **bill, can we start with your understanding of the purpose of each?**

47 A. Yes.

48 **Q. What is a customer charge?**

49 A. A common rate element for both electric and natural gas utilities is a monthly
50 customer charge, although this charge is sometimes called a basic charge, basic
51 service fee or other name. The idea here is that some costs vary directly by the
52 number of customers and should be recovered in a per customer charge in order to
53 track costs. These are costs that each and every customer causes to be incurred by
54 the utility. Some customers may not use any energy in a given month, so a
55 customer charge is a way to assure recovery of direct customer costs. Customer
56 investment costs include meters and service lines. Customer expense items
57 include depreciation of meters and service lines, meter reading, billing and
58 payment processing. The use of a customer charge helps maintain intra-class
59 equity. If customer costs are recovered through an energy rate, very low use
60 customers end up being subsidized by other customers. If a customer uses very
61 little energy each month, the energy charge likely will not recover all of the
62 energy costs plus the direct customer costs. This means high-energy use
63 customers would be making up the difference. Adding a separate customer
64 charge that covers all direct customer costs avoids this problem.

65 **Q. What is a minimum bill?**

66 A. A minimum bill or minimum charge is normally intended to represent the amount
67 of the direct customer charges discussed above. If a customer's bill calculated
68 from the other rate elements (such as energy charges) is less than the minimum
69 bill amount, then the customer's bill is the minimum bill amount. The purpose of
70 this charge is to help assure that all customers pay for their direct customer costs.
71 Yet when a customer is billed such a minimum charge, any energy consumed is
72 basically free since only the direct customer costs are recovered. The only time
73 such a minimum bill recovers the right amount of costs is when the kWh
74 consumption is zero. Having a customer charge based on the full direct customer
75 costs is therefore superior to having a minimum charge since in all cases the direct
76 customer costs as well as other costs are recovered. Also, minimum bills only
77 impacts less than 3 percent of PacifiCorp's Utah customers, while customer
78 charges are paid by all customers. The reason for a minimum charge is when the
79 customer charge is less than the full amount of the direct customer costs. If the
80 customer charge covers all direct customer costs, then a separate minimum charge
81 would not be necessary.

82 **COMMENTS ON ABDINASIR M. ABDULLE’S TESTIMONY**

83 **Q. Dr. Abdulle lists the Division’s rate design objectives as stable, simple,**
84 **understandable and acceptable to the public, economically efficient, to**
85 **promote fair cost apportionment of costs among individual customers within**
86 **each customer class with no undue discrimination. Do you support these**
87 **objectives?**

88 A. Yes. I believe rate design, like other facets of the rate-setting process, should be
89 guided by a number of objectives. I support the following objectives: recovery of
90 the class revenue requirement; simple, understandable and acceptable to
91 customers; rate stability; revenue stability; correct price signal; fair cost
92 apportionment among customers within the class; ease of administration;
93 economic efficiency; nondiscriminatory; and conservation of resources. James C.
94 Bonbright indicates in his 1961 book, *Principles of Public Utility Rates*, that he
95 derived such a list of rate-making objectives from a variety of sources including
96 technical literature, reported opinions by courts and commissions and summary
97 lists by a number of writers.

98 Class and total revenue requirement recovery is essential in rate design
99 since the main purpose of rates is to price utility service such that the utility
100 recovers its prudently incurred costs of providing that service.

101 Rates that are simple, understandable and acceptable to customers
102 generate less confusion, questions and complaints and are more likely to achieve
103 the desired customer response. I consider a correct price signal one that is cost-
104 based. Bonbright states on page 294 of his aforementioned book, “Without doubt

105 the most widely accepted measure of reasonable public utility rates and rate
106 structures is cost of service.” Theoretically customers react to price signals. If
107 the price signal (rate design) is complicated and difficult to understand, it is
108 unlikely customers will react in the desired way. Therefore a complicated and
109 confusing rate design is unlikely to provide a correct price signal even if the
110 calculation is done right. If a rate design sends the correct price signal to
111 customers, the customers can make their own economic decisions about how they
112 consume utility services.

113 Rate stability means prices do not change frequently or by large amounts.
114 Customers desire rate stability. Stable rates make budgeting easier for families
115 and businesses. Customers have a difficult time understanding large rate
116 increases that are not comparable percentage-wise to the changes in their own
117 income or even with consumer price index changes. Rate design changes alone
118 can result in significant rate increases for individual customers even if the class
119 revenue requirement is unchanged. The principle of gradualism is often used to
120 implement rate design changes in order to limit rate impacts. Utilities like
121 revenue stability in the sense they want the revenue from customers to track the
122 cost of providing service. A utility’s fixed costs do not vary with unit energy
123 sales, although revenues will vary if only a unit energy price rate design is used.

124 Fair cost apportionment among customers within a rate schedule is not
125 always easy to achieve. A cost of service study is usually employed to determine
126 the fair cost apportionment between rate schedules. Within a rate schedule, it is
127 the rate design that determines how costs are apportioned among individual

128 customers. Theoretically, fair cost apportionment within a rate schedule requires
129 a number of cost-based rate elements sufficient enough to accurately match each
130 customer's cost of service with their bill. Since some utility costs vary during the
131 day and over a year, time-of-day and seasonal pricing might be needed. Non-
132 discriminatory rates are those that charge all customers with the same service
133 characteristics the same price. These include service characteristics such as
134 delivery voltage, maximum demand and total energy usage.

135 Economic efficiency refers to the efficient allocation of society's
136 resources. Efficient resource allocation is achieved by basing rates on costs.
137 Patrick Mann, while professor of economics at West Virginia University, stated in
138 a 1977 article in *Public Utilities Fortnightly*, "Rate structures based on actual cost
139 differentials tend to generate more allocative efficiency than rate structures based
140 on noncost criteria." Economic theory states that marginal cost pricing is needed
141 for economic efficiency. There are problems with using marginal costs for rate
142 design. If marginal costs exceed average embedded costs, the utility could
143 recover more than the revenue requirement. If marginal costs are less than
144 embedded costs, the utility would be at risk of under-recovery of its revenue
145 requirement. Therefore use of marginal costs in rate design must be balanced
146 against the need to recover an embedded revenue requirement.

147 Energy conservation is achieved by correctly pricing incremental usage so
148 as not to encourage wasteful use. Setting prices based on the underlying cost
149 allows consumers to make their own decisions regarding energy consumption and
150 conservation. Rates that accurately track costs often are complicated. Rates that

151 are easy to administer and are simple, understandable and acceptable to customers
152 often do not accurately track costs. Rate design then must try to find the optimal
153 balance of competing objectives

154 **Q. Dr. Abdulle cites six guiding principles for rate design you developed while**
155 **working for the Division and included in your testimony in Utah Power rate**
156 **case 97-035-01. What is your current opinion of these guiding principles?**

157 A. I originally developed these guiding principles as a way to help achieve the proper
158 balance of the competing rate design objectives discussed above. My guiding
159 principles he cited are: simple, correct price signal, multi-part rates, gradualism,
160 marginal and embedded costs, and customer charges. I still believe these guiding
161 principles are important and I fully support them.

162 Two very important guiding principles relevant for the customer charge
163 are the correct price signal and customer charges. The correct price signal means
164 if rates are correctly based on costs, customers can make the right decision about
165 energy use including energy conservation decisions. In my testimony in case 97-
166 035-01 cited by Dr. Abdulle, I also describe on page 8 the very important cost of
167 service principle of cost causation. Cost causation is the principle that costs
168 should be borne by those who cause them to be incurred. This is done not just
169 because it is perceived to be fair, but to send a correct price signal to the
170 consumer.

171 Customer charges should include costs that vary directly with the number
172 of customers and are caused by each and every customer. Costs that generally
173 increase with the number of customers, but are not caused by each customer

174 should be excluded from the customer charge and instead be included within the
175 commodity portion of rates. This customer charge position was stated by the PSC
176 in its Order in Mountain Fuel Case No. 82-057-15.

177 **COMMENTS ON RONALD J. BINZ'S TESTIMONY**

178 **Q. Do you believe Mr. Binz's testimony indicates support for cost-based rates?**

179 A. Yes. On page 9 of his direct testimony, he states, "...there are many
180 considerations that go into rate making, only one of which is precise cost recovery
181 on an element-by-element basis. Rate making must serve many purposes, some
182 of which can be in conflict. In general, though, I agree that rates should be set to
183 recover the underlying costs."

184 **Q. Do you believe Mr. Binz's testimony supports the inclusion of the cost**
185 **components PacifiCorp used in its calculation of the residential customer**
186 **charge?**

187 A. Yes. On page 10 of his direct testimony, he states, "I think the Company has
188 appropriately limited its derivation of the customer charge to those costs that vary
189 directly with the number of customers."

190 **Q. Do you agree with Mr. Binz that the appropriate cost components were used**
191 **by PacifiCorp in its calculation of the residential customer charge?**

192 A. Yes.

193 **Q. What is the basis for your agreement?**

194 A. Since I began employment with the Division of Public Utilities in June 1980 and
195 was directly involved with all Utah Power rate cases from 1983 through 2003, I
196 would like to provide a history of the residential customer charge. I was the

197 Division witness that first recommended the \$1.00 residential customer charge
198 that the Commission adopted, and over time I, together with Margo Hovingh of
199 the Committee, helped refine the approved list of included direct customer cost
200 components in the calculation of the customer charge.

201 **HISTORY OF THE RESIDENTIAL CUSTOMER CHARGE**

202 **Q. What was the rate design for Residential Rate 1 when you moved to Utah in**
203 **1980?**

204 A. Utah Power Tariff 26, effective April 29, 1980, had Residential Rate 1 charges of
205 10.2029 cents per kWh for the first 60 kWh, 8.1654 cents per kWh for the next
206 140 kWh and 6.0201 cents per kWh for all additional kWh. There was also a
207 minimum bill of \$2.44 for single-phase service.

208 **Q. With no customer charge, how were direct customer costs recovered?**

209 A. Direct customer costs likely were recovered in the first kWh block and possibly in
210 the second kWh block. The first kWh block was priced more than two cents per
211 kWh higher than the second kWh block and more than four cents per kWh higher
212 than the tail block.

213 **Q. What conclusions do you draw from this rate design about customer costs?**

214 A. With customer costs being recovered in the first and possibly the second kWh
215 blocks, small-use customers using 100 to 300 kWh would probably have paid all
216 direct customer costs.

217 **Q. What was the impact on recovery of customer costs when the declining block**
218 **rate design for Residential Rate 1 was replaced with a flat kWh rate in 1982?**

219 A. Small-use customers no longer paid all direct customer costs since direct

220 customer costs were spread over all kWh. The use of a minimum bill would
221 allow some cost recovery of direct customer costs, but not all.

222 **Q. When was a customer charge added to the Residential Rate 1?**

223 A. A \$1.00 customer charge was added to Residential Rate 1 on July 1, 1985 by the
224 Commission's order in Utah Power rate case 84-035-01. The Commission's order
225 stated:

226 Both Division witness Alt and Utah Power & Light witness Faigle
227 testified that a customer charge furthers the objectives of revenue
228 stability, equity and cost-based rates. Ms. Faigle and Mr. Alt also
229 testified that the proposed customer charges included only those
230 costs caused by the customer and that the Commission approved a
231 customer charge for Mountain Fuel Supply Company, which
232 included the same type of costs.

233
234 The Commission further stated, "No party to this case opposed the
235 implementation of cost-based customer charges for the remaining schedules."

236 **Q. Did the \$1.00 residential customer charge represent the full direct customer
237 costs?**

238 A. No.

239 **Q. Why then was only \$1.00 implemented?**

240 A. I testified in support of the reduced amount to alleviate rate impact. Following
241 are statements from my direct testimony in that case:

242 We recommend that customer charges be implemented for all rate
243 schedules but at reduced rate where required to alleviate the
244 adverse impact on small use customers. We believe, where
245 necessary to soften the impact, the customer charge should be
246 phased-in over a few years. This phase-in allows us to achieve a
247 balance between the sometimes conflicting objectives of rate
248 stability, revenue stability, equity and cost-based rates.

249

250 I recommend that Residential Rates 1, 5 and 5A include a monthly
251 customer charge of \$1.00. This customer charge will result in
252 more equity within the schedules while not imposing a significant
253 adverse impact on small use customers.
254

255 The Commission in its July 1, 1985 order also stated:

256 The Commission has previously made the finding (Mountain Fuel
257 Supply Company Case No. 82-057-15) that a customer charge
258 results in the payment by each customer of those costs that he
259 imposes upon the system, which are independent of actual energy
260 consumption during a given month. A customer of UP&L, who
261 uses no electricity in a given month, must nonetheless have his
262 meter read, be issued a billing statement and have his meter
263 maintained in good operating condition. Those activities represent
264 costs to UP&L. We find that a customer charge, as opposed to a
265 minimum billing, allows such costs to be recovered reasonably and
266 properly. The maximum increase any customer on Schedule No. 1
267 could experience would be 89 cents to 94 cents a month.
268 Similarly, a \$1.00 customer charge would reduce the energy rate
269 for Schedules Nos. 1 and 5 only 0.17 cents to 0.058 cents. We
270 conclude that a \$1.00 customer charge is appropriate and should be
271 imposed.
272

273 **Q. What components were included in the calculation of customer charges in**
274 **that case (84-035-01)?**

275 A. The original customer charge components were first presented by Company
276 witness, Shelley Faigle, in her rebuttal Exhibit No. SRF-2.2 in that case. The
277 components included:

- 278 1. Account 903 - customer records/collections expense
- 279 2. Account 902 - meter reading expense
- 280 3. Account 586 - meter operating expense
- 281 4. Account 597 - meter maintenance expense
- 282 5. Meter depreciation expense

- 283 **6.** Service drop depreciation expense
- 284 **7.** Account 370 - meter plant
- 285 **8.** Account 369 - service drop plant
- 286 **9.** Meter accumulated depreciation
- 287 **10.** Service drop accumulated depreciation
- 288 **11.** Return on rate base

289 Similar customer charge components were used by PacifiCorp in this case with a
290 few differences. The current cost components exclude operation and maintenance
291 costs for meters and some customer collection costs and include a credit for
292 billing service revenue.

293 **Q. Why the differences?**

294 A. As mentioned earlier, the list of direct customer cost components included in a
295 customer charge was refined through the efforts of the Division and Committee
296 after July 1985. This is covered later in the discussion of the Commission's April
297 10, 1992 Order.

298 **Q. What happened to the residential customer charge after the July 1985 order?**

299 A. There were no litigated Utah Power rate cases until the Commission initiated a
300 new case in June 1989. There had been an earlier case that was withdrawn due to
301 the merger of Utah Power and Pacific Power. The residential customer charge
302 had been reduced from \$1.00 to 94 cents by a uniform percentage rate reduction
303 of all rate elements as a result of a merger credit. The \$1.00 residential customer
304 charge was reestablished by the February 9, 1990 Commission order in Case No.
305 89-035-10.

306 **Q. What did the Commission next decide regarding residential customer**
307 **charges?**

308 A. In its April 10, 1992 order in Utah Power Case No. 90-035-06, the Commission
309 stated, “The Division and the Committee presented unrebutted evidence and the
310 Commission finds that residential customer-related costs are \$2.15 per customer
311 per month.” In this case the Division and Committee agreed on the direct
312 residential customer costs, excluding from the original list operation and
313 maintenance of meters, some collection costs and added revenue credit from
314 billing services. The Commission approval of the \$2.15 direct customer costs was
315 based on these adjustments.

316 The Commission left the customer charge at \$1.00 stating, “The
317 Commission attaches greater weight to other rate design objectives including an
318 equal sharing of the schedule revenue reduction by all customers than to the
319 recovery of all customer-related costs in a customer charge.”

320 **Q. What has happened since the 90-035-06 case?**

321 A. The Commission made no changes to the residential customer charge in Utah
322 Power Case No. 97-035-01, although the cost components for customer charges
323 established in the previous case were reaffirmed. The Commission also made no
324 changes to the residential customer charge in Utah Power Case No. 99-035-10.
325 The next three Utah Power rate cases (01-035-01, 03-2035-02 and 04-035-42)
326 were settled without any changes to the residential customer charge. The
327 Commission in Case No. 01-035-01 approved a rate design stipulation that
328 introduced a two-block inverted summer residential energy rate effective

329 November 2, 2001. The residential rate design had been a flat energy rate since
330 1982. The Commission in Case No. 03-2035-02 approved a stipulation that added
331 a third inverted block to the residential summer energy rate for usage over 1000
332 kWh effective April 1, 2004. In Case No. 04-035-42, the Commission approved a
333 stipulation that increased all residential summer energy block rates effective
334 March 1, 2005.

335 **Q. Please summarize what happened to the residential customer charge over the**
336 **past 21 plus years.**

337 A. On July 1, 1985 the Commission ordered a \$1.00 residential customer charge,
338 although full cost-based customer charges were approved for non-residential
339 rates. On April 10, 1992 the Commission approved the customer direct costs
340 calculation for all rate schedules, but left the residential customer charge at \$1.00
341 (less than full direct customer costs). The March 4, 1999 Commission Order
342 makes no changes to customer charges. The May 24, 2000 Commission Order
343 makes no changes to the residential customer charge. The November 2, 2001,
344 January 30, 2004 and February 25, 2005 Commission Orders approved stipulated
345 settlements of Utah Power rate cases that included rate design and left the
346 residential customer charge unchanged.

347 **Q. What conclusions do you draw regarding the recovery of residential direct**
348 **customer costs?**

349 A. The residential declining block rate design prior to 1982 allowed recovery of
350 direct customer costs from most customers. The change to a flat energy rate and
351 no customer charge spread direct customer costs over all kWh and no longer

352 allowed recovery of all direct customer costs from most customers. The change
353 in 2001 to an inverted two-block summer energy rate and the addition in 2004 of
354 a third inverted block to the energy rate accentuated this problem. If the customer
355 charge had been increased to include the full direct customer costs, these costs
356 would be recovered from all customers.

357 **CONTINUATION OF COMMENTS ON RONALD J. BINZ'S TESTIMONY**

358 **Q. Mr. Binz on pages 14-15 of his direct testimony recommends the residential**
359 **customer charge be increased to \$2.50 instead of the \$3.40 proposed by the**
360 **Company so that the impact on commodity rates will be more gradual. Do**
361 **you agree with his concern about the impact on the commodity rates?**

362 A. No. His concern seems to be that the kWh block rates will not be raised high
363 enough since his recommended rates for those blocks are higher than that
364 proposed by PacifiCorp. Even his contingent rates are higher than PacifiCorp for
365 the second and third block rates. In my experience the gradualism principle is
366 normally employed to mitigate the impact of rate increases to customers. His
367 graph of impacts on page 14 of his testimony seems to imply that perhaps his real
368 concern is for customers using less than about 500 kWh per month since his
369 proposal would result in lower percentage impacts than PacifiCorp's proposal.
370 However, higher percentage impacts for small use customers may be small in
371 terms of dollars and cents.

372 **COMMENTS ON ANTHONY J. YANKEL'S TESTIMONY**

373 **Q. Mr. Yankel on page 2 of his direct testimony states, "Rate Design should not**
374 **be done without a sound knowledge of the cost causation principles, as well**
375 **as a good understanding of other regulatory principles that come into play."**

376 **Do you agree with this statement?**

377 A. Yes.

378 **Q. Mr. Yankel on page 7 of his direct testimony lists six regulatory principles to**
379 **be used in rate design. Do you agree with his list of regulatory principles?**

380 A. Not entirely. His list includes many of the objectives I listed earlier and those
381 listed by Dr. Abdulle for the Division. His list does not include revenue stability
382 or nondiscriminatory objectives. His first principle, "Promote economic and
383 efficient use of electricity, while protecting the long-range interest of the
384 consumers to obtain adequate levels of service at the lowest cost practical"
385 appears to have added a new objective with the second part of the phrase. I would
386 agree with the part, "Promote economic and efficient use of electricity" and
387 believe it is included in my list of objectives. The remaining part, "while
388 protecting the long-range interest of the consumers to obtain adequate levels of
389 service at the lowest cost practical" is not quite so clear as to what is intended. If
390 this objective's intent is simply to try to use incremental or marginal costs in the
391 rate design to help send a better price signal, then I would support it. If it has
392 been added to support the Committee's position that direct customer-related costs
393 should be added to energy and demand costs for recovery in a commodity rate to
394 discourage increased energy use, then I would not support it. To me pricing rate

395 elements at cost is what is needed to promote economic and efficient use of
396 electricity. This sends the correct price signal to consumers for any energy
397 consumption. It tells the consumer what the cost of energy consumption is and
398 lets the consumer make his or her own decisions. To add direct customer costs on
399 top of the demand and energy costs is a distortion of the price signal and tells the
400 consumer that increased energy use costs more than it really does. To do this in
401 order to meet an objective of lower long-range costs to all consumers is akin to
402 making decisions for the consumer instead of pricing the commodity correctly
403 and letting the consumer make his or her own choices. This is not following the
404 cost-causation principle that says costs should be borne by those who cause them
405 to be incurred. It is more like saying that those who cause the costs should pay
406 those costs plus some extra costs (caused by others).

407 **Q. Mr. Yankel on page 17 of his direct testimony describes the disadvantages of**
408 **a customer charge. Do you agree with his description?**

409 A. No. He states, “The disadvantage of a Customer charge over the Minimum
410 charge is that the more that is collected in the Customer charge from all
411 customers, the less of the total class revenue requirement will be collected in the
412 energy rates.” He goes on to say that if the \$3.40 customer charge is imposed,
413 \$25 million annually would be removed from the energy charges, resulting in the
414 Commission directionally moving away from addressing a growing peak demand
415 problem. Reducing the amount collected in the energy charge does not
416 necessarily correlate to the peak demand issue. He implies that the more costs
417 that are loaded into the energy charge, the better, without regard to any cost basis

418 for doing so. His testimony does not present evidence that the \$25 million
419 properly belongs in the energy charge on a cost basis or that the energy impacted
420 is energy at the time of peak. PacifiCorp has presented evidence to support a
421 cost-based customer charge. A growing peak demand causes demand-related
422 costs. Mr. Yankel has not identified how much these demand costs are. On page
423 2 of his direct testimony in discussing regulatory principles, he mentions “the
424 importance of cost causation” yet here he seems to stray from that principle. He
425 does not claim that PacifiCorp’s calculated \$3.40 of direct customer costs is
426 incorrect, yet he says collecting those costs in a customer charge is a
427 disadvantage. I believe having cost-based rate elements in a rate design is an
428 important rate design objective and not a disadvantage when implemented. To do
429 otherwise sends a distorted price signal to customers about their energy
430 consumption. A distorted price signal, lacking a cost basis, does not promote
431 economic and efficient use of electricity.

432 **Q. Mr. Yankel on page 17 of his direct testimony says there is no need for both a**
433 **customer charge and a minimum charge. Do you agree?**

434 A. If the customer charge is based on the full direct customer costs as I described
435 earlier, then I agree there is no need for a separate minimum charge. If however,
436 the customer charge recovers less than the direct customer costs (as it currently
437 does at 98 cents), then I believe there should also be a separate minimum charge.
438 A separate minimum charge allows for more of the direct customer costs to be
439 recovered from those that cause them to be incurred. With the current customer
440 charge and no minimum charge, customers using little or no energy would be

441 subsidized more by the other customers than they would with a minimum charge.
442 The use of the minimum charge and a customer charge less than full direct
443 customer costs allows customers using little or no energy to pay less than the cost
444 to serve them. Other customers pick up the shortfall. This subsidization of small
445 use customers will continue until the customer charge includes all the direct
446 customer costs.

447 **Q. Mr. Yankel on 17 of his direct testimony says residential customers have no**
448 **control over the monthly customer charge. Do you agree?**

449 A. No. Each residential customer made the choice to get electricity from the utility.
450 Once that choice was made, the utility started incurring customer-related costs for
451 that customer. The utility then has very little control over those customer costs, as
452 it is required to provide service and maintain an account and read meters and bill
453 for service. These customer costs do not vary with a customer's energy use but
454 continue as long as the customer chooses to continue service.

455 **Q. Mr. Yankel on page 18 of his direct testimony proposes "that there be no**
456 **increase in the Customer Charge (consistent with its 20 year history) so that**
457 **as much emphasis can be placed on the energy rate structure (and preferably**
458 **the tailblock) as possible." Do you agree?**

459 A. No. He is proposing to place as much emphasis, as possible, on the energy rate
460 without any evidence of a cost basis. He is even proposing to keep most direct
461 customer costs in the energy rate, which if it were cost-based would not include
462 any direct customer costs.

463

464 **Q. Mr. Yankel on page 19 of his direct testimony says “The average of what**
465 **other utilities charge should not serve as a basis for increasing the**
466 **Residential Customer charge in this case”. Do you agree?**

467 A. Yes. I think customer charges should be cost-based. Each utility has its own
468 costs. PacifiCorp’s current residential customer charge in Utah is less than the
469 direct customer costs and should be increased on that basis alone. The fact that
470 other utilities in Utah have customer charges shows that customer charges are
471 common and customers by now should be more used to them. Questar Gas has
472 had a \$5.00 monthly customer charge for many years and it serves most of
473 PacifiCorp’s Utah customers.

474 **Q. Mr. Yankel on page 31 of his direct testimony says “the present rates are not**
475 **sending a strong enough signal” and uses this as a reason to either not**
476 **change or to decrease the residential customer charge. Do you agree?**

477 A. No. He says the present rates are not sending a strong enough signal, but offers
478 no evidence to support such a claim. In my opinion the proper signal is a cost-
479 based price signal and not one with an artificial increase based on an unproven
480 assumption that the signal is not high enough. He does not say how high the
481 signal should be and does not offer cost data to support such a price. He simply
482 says to keep direct customer costs in the energy rate to keep it as high as possible.
483 He speaks of the importance of cost-causation regulatory principles in rate design,
484 but seems to abandon them with his recommendations.

485 **COMMENTS ON ELIZABETH A. WOLF'S TESTIMONY**

486 **Q. Ms. Wolf on page 4 of her direct testimony says PacifiCorp's customer**
487 **charge proposal is unsound ratemaking because more revenue is guaranteed.**
488 **Do you agree?**

489 A. No. Common ratemaking objectives include revenue stability as well as intraclass
490 equity. Both of these objectives support a cost-based customer charge.

491 **Q. Ms. Wolf on page 5 of her direct testimony says any increase in the customer**
492 **charge should be made more gradually. Do you have any comments?**

493 A. She does not challenge the \$3.40 residential customer charge calculation, but
494 simply says any increase should be gradual. In 1985 when I first recommended
495 the \$1.00 residential customer charge, I fully intended that it be increased in steps
496 of about a \$1.00 until all direct customer costs were included. I intended this
497 would happen in just a few years depending on the calculated direct customer
498 costs. That did not happen for various reasons. There was a gap of a few years
499 before there was another Utah Power rate case, then the merger case arrived
500 followed by a period of rate reductions. The Commission in its orders decided
501 not to increase the customer charge in a period of rate reductions. Later several
502 rate cases were presented to the Commission as stipulated settlements with no
503 change in the residential customer charge. It has been 21 plus years since the first
504 \$1.00 customer charge was implemented. At that time the Commission found that
505 a \$1.00 increase was an acceptable impact on customers. Today after 21 plus
506 years of inflation, an increase of \$1.89 per month to the customer charge would
507 have the same impact as the \$1.00 increase had in 1985. Also, the movement of

508 direct customer costs from the energy rate to the customer charge would further
509 reduce the impact on small energy users by allowing a lower energy rate than
510 otherwise. So, an increase in the monthly residential customer charge from \$0.98
511 to \$3.40 would have an impact not significantly more than when the customer
512 charge was first implemented in 1985.

513 **Q. Ms. Wolf on pages 6-7 of her direct testimony says increasing the customer**
514 **charge rather than putting the increased charges in the energy portion of the**
515 **bill hides the real cost of energy and that this sends the wrong price signal**
516 **and impedes conservation. Do you agree?**

517 A. No. I believe the appropriate regulatory policy in rate design is to send correct
518 price signals based on cost. I believe in multi-part rates with each rate element
519 based on cost. Having a customer charge that is based on direct customer costs is
520 the correct price signal and improves intraclass equity. She does not challenge the
521 accuracy of the \$3.40 direct customer costs. Putting those direct customer costs
522 in an energy rate is hiding the customer costs in the energy rate. The real cost of
523 energy is being distorted by adding in direct customer costs that are not impacted
524 by energy usage. She does not offer evidence as to what the real cost of energy is
525 and therefore what the correct price signal should be. With respect to energy
526 conservation, I believe the best policy is to send a correct price signal by basing
527 rates on costs and letting consumers make their own choices about energy
528 consumption. Even the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978
529 (“PURPA”), enacted in response to a national energy crisis, imposed rate making
530 standards that sought cost-based rates. I was the witness for the Division in 1981

531 and supported adoption of the PURPA Declining Block Rate Standard, which
532 basically said any declining block energy rate had to be cost-based. The
533 Commission adopted this rate making standard. It seems reasonable to me that an
534 inverted block energy rate also ought to be cost-based.

535 **SUMMARY**

536 **Q. Please summarize your conclusions and recommendations regarding the**
537 **residential customer charge.**

538 A. I believe it is reasonable for the Commission to implement the \$3.40 residential
539 customer charge for the following reasons:

- 540 1. The \$3.40 residential customer charge is based on the direct customer costs
541 that the Commission has previously approved for inclusion in a customer
542 charge. These are the costs that vary directly with the number of customers.
- 543 2. The same direct customer cost components have been used to calculate
544 customer charges for the non-residential rate schedules for many years and no
545 party opposes them.
- 546 3. No party opposes the calculation of the \$3.40 residential direct customer
547 costs.
- 548 4. The implementation of a \$3.40 residential customer charge will allow
549 elimination of the minimum charge since all direct customer costs will be
550 recovered from all customers. This will simplify the rate design.
- 551 5. Impeding conservation is not a valid argument as a cost-based rate sends the
552 correct price signal and allows customers to make their own decisions
553 regarding energy consumption. Even PURPA sought cost-based rates. Even

- 554 with a cost-based customer charge, the energy rates will still be increased.
- 555 6. Changing of the residential rate design from a declining block energy rate to a
556 flat energy rate without a cost-based customer charge allowed many
557 customers to escape paying all direct customer costs. The introduction of
558 inverted two and three block energy rates accentuated the problem.
- 559 7. A gradual movement to cost for the residential customer charge never
560 happened over the 21 plus years since the \$1.00 customer charge was
561 implemented for various reasons explained earlier. The current customer
562 charge of 98 cents is actually 2 cents lower than it was in 1985
- 563 8. The rate impact in dollars of implementing the \$3.40 residential customer
564 charge is not significantly higher than the impact of the implementation of the
565 first \$1.00 customer charge due to 21 plus years of inflation. Further gradual
566 movements to cost are not necessary.

567 **Q. Does this conclude your direct testimony?**

568 A. Yes.