

BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE)	
APPLICATION OF ROCKY MOUNTAIN)	
POWER FOR AUTHORITY TO)	DPU EXHIBIT No. 9.0R
INCREASE ITS RETAIL ELECTRIC)	
UTILITY SERVICE RATES IN UTAH)	
AND FOR APPROVAL OF ITS)	DOCKET No. 08-035-38
PROPOSED ELECTRIC SERVICE)	
SCHEDULES AND ELECTRIC SERVICE)	
REGULATIONS)	

PRE-FILED REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF

DR. WILLIAM A. POWELL

ON BEHALF OF THE

UTAH DIVISION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES

March 9, 2009

1 P R E - F I L E D R E B U T T A L T E S T I M O N Y
2 D R . A R T I E P O W E L L
3 U T A H D I V I S I O N O F P U B L I C U T I L I T I E S

4 **Q: Would you please state your name, employer, and position?**

5 A: My name is Dr. William, or Artie, Powell. I am the manager of the energy section
6 within the Division of Public Utilities (“Division”).

7 **Q: Are you the same Dr. Powell who filed Direct Testimony in this case?**

8 A: Yes, I filed Direct Testimony, DPU Exhibit 9.0, dated February 12, 2009.

9 **Q: What is the purpose of your rebuttal testimony?**

10 A: I am offering rebuttal remarks concerning adjustments proposed by the Committee
11 of Consumer Service’s (CCS) witness, Mr. Randall J. Falkenberg. Specifically, I rebut
12 the Sacramento Municipal Utilities District (“SMUD”) imputation proposed by Mr.
13 Falkenberg. Mr. Falkenberg adds a levelized value of the up-front payment to the
14 SMUD “current” contract price to arrive at a total price for imputation. As I
15 explained in direct testimony, this approach violates the underlying theoretical
16 principles of levelization and, thus, is not valid. If, for imputation purposes, the up-
17 front payment is to be levelized, then the SMUD contract prices should be levelized
18 in a consistent manner. Additionally, I take exception to the discount rate Mr.
19 Falkenberg apparently uses to levelize the up-front payment.

20 **Q: Will you please briefly explain levelization?**

21 A: Yes. Essentially, levelization is replacing a nominal, or actual, stream of values with a
22 stream of constant values that yield the same present value. There are two steps to
23 levelization. First, we obtain the present value of the stream of original nominal or
24 actual values. Second, the constant levelized value is calculated as the present value
25 of the original stream multiplied by the Capital Recovery Factor ("CRF").¹

26 For example, suppose we have a stream of values, $\{A_T\} = A_1, A_2, \dots, A_T$. For
27 the first step, using a discount rate of "i," we can find the present value by the
28 formula,

$$PV_A = \sum_{t=1}^T \frac{A_t}{(1+i)^t} \quad (1)$$

29 In the second step, we find the levelized value, A, by multiplying the present value,
30 PV_A , by the CRF:

$$A = PV_A \left[\frac{i(1+i)^T}{(1+i)^T - 1} \right] \quad (2)$$

¹ The CRF is the ratio of the levelized or annuity value to the present value of receiving that annuity value for a given number of periods using a specified interest rate. See, for example, Eugen L. Grant, W. Grant Ireson, and Richard S. Leavenworth, *Principles of Engineering Economy*, 6th ed., [The Ronald Press Company: New York, New York], 1976.

31 The Division's recommendation, which I presented in Direct Testimony,
32 applies this levelization methodology to both the up-front payment and to the
33 SMUD contract prices.

34 **Q: Did Mr. Falkenberg apply this levelization methodology to both components of the**
35 **SMUD contract?**

36 A: No. Mr. Falkenberg only applies the levelization to the up-front payment. In his
37 Direct Testimony, Mr. Falkenberg states,

38 Based on Exhibit GND-3SS, a constant, per kWh charge,
39 recovery of the up front payment would require an additional
40 \$24.9/MWh be added to the contract revenue. Adding this
41 amount to the current contract price (\$22.0/MWh) would
42 produce an imputed price of \$46.9/MWh.²

43 **Q: What are your objections to Mr. Falkenberg's methodology?**

44 A: As I explained in Direct Testimony, adding the levelized value of the up-front
45 payment to the nominal, what Mr. Falkenberg calls the current, contract price is like
46 adding apples and oranges and, thus, is invalid. The concept behind levelization is to
47 place the two components of the SMUD contract on an equal footing in order to add
48 them together. For example, as one leading authority on Engineering Economy
49 states,

² "Direct Testimony of Randall J. Falkenberg: On Behalf of the Committee of Consumer Services," Docket No. 08-035-38, February 12, 2009, p. 25, lines 664-667.

50 Engineering economy studies usually require some
51 conversion [e.g., levelization] as a basis for intelligent decision.
52 A comparison of total payments involved in alternative plans,
53 without the use of interest factors to convert the two series to
54 make them comparable, is nearly always misleading. ...

55 Equivalence calculations [e.g., levelization] are
56 necessary for a meaningful comparison of different money
57 time series.³

58 Similarly, economists acknowledge that a meaningful comparison of alternative
59 proposals requires a conversion based on the present values of the alternatives. For
60 example, Dr. William F. Shugart (et. al.) states,

61 In order to identify the investment opportunities that
62 comprise the set of acceptable capital projects, the manager
63 must gather and analyze information that is relevant for
64 evaluating various alternative uses of the firm's capital
65 resources. ...

66 [M]anagment must evaluate the competing
67 investment proposals in terms of their impacts on the
68 discounted present value of the firm ...⁴

69 While the two components of the SMUD contract are, strictly speaking, not
70 alternative investments or projects, the same principles apply: in order to compare
71 or, in this case, add the two components together, requires some conversion based

³ Eugen L. Grant, W. Grant Ireson, and Richard S. Leavenworth, *Principles of Engineering Economy*, 6th Ed., [The Ronald Press: New York, New York], 1976, pp. 31-32. (Material in square brackets added).

⁴ William F. Shugart II, William F. Chappell, and Rex L. Cottle, *Modern Managerial Economics: Economic Theory for Business Decisions*, [South-Western Publishing Company], 1994, p. 504.

72 on the present value of the components. If applied consistently to both components
73 of the contract, levelization meets this criterion.

74 **Q: What discount rate did Mr. Falkenberg use in levelizing the up-front payment?**

75 A: Mr. Falkenberg did not explicitly identify the discount rate he used, but it can be
76 determined from his testimony. To obtain a levelized value of \$24.90 per megawatt
77 hour, as identified in Mr. Falkenberg's testimony,⁵ one would need to use a discount
78 of approximately 8.28 percent (0.0828).

79 Note, from Equation 2, there are three inputs into the calculation of the
80 levelized value: the discount rate, the present value, and the number of years.
81 Given the up-front payment of \$94 million and the length of the contract, 28 years,
82 the derived discount rate would be 8.28 percent. A presentation of this calculation
83 is in Table 1 below.

84 **Q: If you were to apply the 8.28% discount rate to both components of the SMUD
85 contract, what per megawatt value would you get for the imputation?**

86 A: Applying the 8.28% discount rate to both the up-front payment and the SMUD
87 contract prices, would yield a levelized per megawatt hour value of \$37.88.

88 **Q: Do you believe the 8.28% discount rate is reasonable?**

⁵ Falkenberg, p. 25, line 666.

89 A: No. In Direct Testimony, I argued in favor of a discount rate equal to the Company's
90 weighted cost of capital. Since the Company finances generation through a
91 combination of equity and debt, using the weighted cost of capital is reasonable.
92 Also, given the Commission's emphasis in past orders on using information that was
93 contemporaneous to the execution of the SMUD contract, I chose a rate, 10.2%,
94 equal to that ordered by the Commission in the Company's general rate case, Docket
95 No. 89-035-10. This rate case was near in time with the execution of the SMUD
96 contract and just after the merger of PacifiCorp and Utah Power & Light.

97 While Mr. Falkenberg's discount rate of 8.28% is reflective of today's
98 weighted cost of capital, it is substantially below that of the late 1980s. Therefore, I
99 believe a discount rate of 10.2% more reasonably reflects the conditions existing at
100 the time of the SMUD contract execution.

101 **Q: Will you summarize the Division's recommendation?**

102 A: Using a discount rate of 10.2%, and levelizing both the up-front payment and the
103 SMUD contract prices, yields a value of \$41.56 per megawatt hour.

104 A summary of the levelizing of the up-front payment is in Table 1, which
105 shows a levelized value of \$29.29 per megawatt hour. Levelizing the contract prices

106 from 1987 to 2014 yields a value of \$12.27 per megawatt hour.⁶ Adding these two
107 values together yields the Division's recommendation of \$41.56 for the SMUD
108 imputation adjustment.

109 **Table 1: Levelizing the Up-Front Payment**

Number of Years	28		
Up Front Payment	\$94,000,000		
Annual Megawatt Hours	350,400		
Discount Rate	Capital Recovery Factor	Up-Front Levelized Value	Per Megawatt Hour Value
8.28%	9.28%	8,723,678	24.90
10.20%	10.92%	10,264,476	29.29

110

111 **Q: Does this conclude your Rebuttal Testimony?**

112 **A:** Yes, it does.

⁶ Details for these calculations are in Exhibits 9.1 and 9.2 attached to my Direct Testimony in this case, Docket No. 08-035-38.