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BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH

In the Matter of the Application of Rocky Mountain Power for Authority to Increase its Retail Electric Utility Service Rates in Utah and for Approval of Its Proposed Electric Service Schedules and Electric Service Regulations

Docket No. 09-035-23

PREFILED REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF ROGER J. SWENSON

[COST OF SERVICE, RATE SPREAD]

US Magnesium LLC (“US Mag”) hereby submits the Prefiled Rebuttal Testimony of Roger J. Swenson on cost of service and rate spread issues.

DATED this 12th day of November, 2009.

/s/ _____
Gary A. Dodge,
Attorneys for US Magnesium LLC

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

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BEFORE
THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH

Rebuttal Testimony of Roger J. Swenson

on behalf of

US Magnesium LLC

Docket No. 09-035-23

[Cost of Service, Rate Spread]

November 12, 2009

1 **REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF ROGER J. SWENSON**

2

3 **Introduction**

4 **Q. Please state your name and business address.**

5 A. My name is Roger J. Swenson. My business address is 1592 East 3350
6 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84106.

7 **Q. By whom are you employed and in what capacity?**

8 A. I am an independent energy consultant specializing in energy related
9 matters including regulatory proceedings and energy project development.

10 **Q. On whose behalf are you testifying in this proceeding?**

11 A. My testimony is being sponsored by the US Magnesium LLC (“US
12 Mag”), which has petitioned for intervention in this docket.

13 **Q. Please describe your professional experience and qualifications.**

14 A. I have a BS degree in Physics and a MS degree in Industrial Engineering
15 from the University of Utah. I have worked in the energy industry for over 25
16 years. Prior to working as a consultant I was the Vice President of Energy
17 Marketing for an oil and gas production company that was affiliated with a
18 cogeneration development company. Prior to that I worked for Questar
19 Corporation in various positions including rate making matters.

20

21 **OVERVIEW AND CONCLUSIONS**

22 **Q. What is the purpose of your testimony in this proceeding?**

23 A. My testimony responds to testimony filed by parties in regards to cost of
24 service (COS) and rate spread issues in the general rate case filed by Rocky
25 Mountain Power (“RMP,” “Company” or “PacifiCorp”).

26 **Q. Please summarize your primary conclusions and recommendations with
27 respect to rate spread as proposed by parties in this case.**

28 A. I recommend that the rate spread in this matter should be determined
29 based on the “revenue apportionment” method suggested by UAE witness
30 Higgins. This method provides reasonable movement towards the indicated
31 direction of the cost of service results presented in this case without unduly
32 penalizing any class. No solid evidence has been presented by any party that
33 could provide confidence to the Commission that it has a full and accurate picture
34 of class cost responsibility. Until a more accurate and complete picture can be
35 presented, caution should be the course of action to follow.

36 **Q. Please summarize your primary conclusions and recommendations with
37 respect to cost of service based on the testimony as filed in this proceeding.**

38 A. The cost of service evidence presented in this docket cannot reasonably
39 produce confidence in accurate cost of service results. The Commission should
40 require a systematic and comprehensive approach to reviewing and revising cost
41 of service. First, we need confidence that we have numbers that we can rely upon,
42 based on the best information available. Then, the multitude of subjective and

43 policy based determinations of how fixed and variable costs should be
44 apportioned among classes should be addressed. Cost redistributions should not
45 be based simply upon opinions. Any significant proposed changes to cost
46 allocations should be carefully vetted with facts, discussion and rational testimony
47 such that just and reasonable findings can be made.

48

49 **RATE SPREAD REBUTTAL DISCUSSION**

50 **Q. Do you have any comments on the rate spread proposal presented by OCS**
51 **witness Gimbal?**

52 A. Yes, I have. The most important factor informing the OCS position on
53 rate spread is called out on page 13 of Mr. Gimbal's testimony, in which he
54 indicates that he has relied on the COS results as presented by RMP. We know
55 from testimony presented from many other parties in this case that there are
56 significant flaws in the data used to derive the COS results; therefore any
57 conclusions based on the COS results as presented are suspect. Indeed, Mr.
58 Gimbal's base assertion that the residential customer class is a strong performer is
59 based on peak demand and energy determinates from load forecasts that are
60 brought into serious question by several witnesses in this case.

61 **Q. What about the rate spread proposal presented by DPU witness Brill in his**
62 **original testimony and his supplemental testimony?**

63 A. Mr. Brill's initial proposal is to collect the entire revenue shortfall
64 suggested by the DPU's direct testimony from schedule 9 and 10 customers. This

65 suggestion is hard to understand given other DPU testimony filed in this case and,
66 indeed, Mr. Brill's own direct testimony (pg 15 lines 292-293). Mr. Brill's
67 supplemental testimony suggests that only the Residential customers should
68 receive the rate decrease based on the DPU's revised position. Unfortunately, the
69 DPU has elected not to share its spread recommendations at any revenue
70 requirement outcome other than those two distinct numbers. That makes it very
71 difficult for any other party to respond to or critique the DPU's spread
72 recommendations.

73 **Q. Why do you suggest that Mr. Brill's direct testimony is inconsistent with his**
74 **initial spread recommendation?**

75 A. Mr. Brill confirms that he does not trust the COS results because of load
76 forecasting concerns and errors identified by his consultant. He affirmatively
77 alleges that the COS results are flawed, but nevertheless proposes to push the
78 entire proposed cost increase to two singled-out customer classes based on those
79 flawed COS results.

80 **Q. Doesn't Mr. Brill also point to the fact that schedule 9 has been under paying**
81 **for several rate cases?**

82 A. Yes, but the same COS methodology has been utilized for those same
83 cases. That methodology has now been shown to have bad data that go to the
84 very heart of cost allocation. Indeed, information provided by UEA and UIEC
85 witnesses demonstrate that systemic errors have been allowed to creep into the

86 billing determinates. Those forecasting errors have been used in the rate cases on
87 which Mr. Brill relies. Moreover, it appears that those errors are getting larger.

88 **Q. Please explain the forecast errors identified by DPU witness Nuns.**

89 A. Mr. Nuns' direct testimony states ;

90 " the Company's methodology with respect to its industrial class is
91 problematic in certain respects and has resulted in an overstatement of that portion
92 of the sales forecast."

93 **Q. Wouldn't this seem to suggest that the results of the COS for industrial
94 classes are suspect?**

95 A. Yes. The DPU consultant has waived a red flag associated with the inputs
96 to the COS model, but that information is ignored in Mr. Brill's spread
97 recommendations. No mention is made that any portion of the apparent under
98 recovery by these classes may be caused by the systemic load forecast and
99 measurement errors introduced into the model.

100 **Q. What does this suggest in terms of any proposal to dump all or the bulk of
101 any rate increase stemming from this case onto the backs of Schedule 9
102 customers?**

103 A. There is no good basis to accept any such rate spread proposal. The
104 evidence in this case demonstrates that the COS results cannot be trusted and any
105 spread recommendations which rely upon those results to direct all or any
106 significant portion of a rate increase to Schedule 9 should be rejected.

107 **CLASS COST OF SERVICE REBUTTAL**

108 **Q. Do you have any general comments on the class cost-of-service results**
109 **presented in the direct testimony filed in this case?**

110 A. Yes. It is clear from the testimony in this case that we first need reliable,
111 fully vetted data before we begin COS allocations. If we do not have good
112 information to begin with, we cannot trust the output of the model. Once we have
113 good information, then we can begin the difficult process of determining the most
114 fair and reasonable means of assigning costs.

115 **Q. Why is the process of assigning costs difficult?**

116 A. The assignment of costs is determined largely by subjective
117 determinations. What we know with some certainty is that some fixed costs do not
118 vary with consumption, some variable costs do vary with consumption and some
119 costs relate to serving a customer directly. Beyond that, the means of determining
120 how much cost responsibility each customer class should bear for specific fixed,
121 variable and customer costs is a matter of policy and judgment.

122 **Q. What is your reaction to the testimony presented in this case with respect to**
123 **the appropriate assignment of costs to customer classes?**

124 A. The testimony reminds me why there is a tendency to shy away from
125 COS. Many people don't like the subjective nature of the COS process. Also, it
126 involves a very complicated model with many moving pieces.

127 I believe COS needs to be approached on a systematic basis. The problem
128 needs to be broken down into parts that can be focused on, reviewed and resolved

129 in the normal course of rate proceedings. The COS testimony in this case looks
130 like it was largely geared towards picking and choosing a few important pieces of
131 the puzzle, but not addressing the puzzle as a whole.

132 **Q. What do you suggest as the steps to break the problem down?**

133 A. Rather than just dealing with a few discrete COS items as most of the
134 testimony seems to do in this case, I suggest that a multitude of important COS
135 issues should be dealt with on a systematic basis. First, accurate billing
136 determinants must be determined. Next, allocation issues relevant to one full
137 section of the COS (such as Generation) should be addressed. Then, allocation
138 issues relevant to other elements (Transmission, Distribution, etc.) should be
139 systematically reviewed. This type of process should produce meaningful results
140 that the Commission could properly rely upon in future rate cases.

141

142 **Rebuttal of Specific COS testimony**

143 **Q. Do you wish to share any specific concerns as to the COS testimony of OCS**
144 **witness Chernick?**

145 A. Yes, particularly Mr. Chernick's suggestion that the Commission should
146 move to an allocation of generation plant that would spread more fixed costs that
147 do not vary with usage based on the energy consumed by customer classes. He
148 suggests shifting the existing 25% / 75% weighting of the F10 allocation factor to
149 a 50% / 50% weighted factor.

150 **Q. What is the basis for this proposal?**

151 A. His primary basis seems to be that the 25% / 75% factor was arbitrarily
152 selected. Interestingly, he then proposes an arbitrary factor to replace the arbitrary
153 factor that he dislikes. While Mr. Chernick attempts to support his proposal by
154 pointing to other factors, they do not support his argument and his proposed
155 allocation factor is every bit as arbitrary as the factor he wishes to replace.

156 **Q. What does Mr. Chernick purport to rely upon in support of his proposal?**

157 Mr. Chernick points to the cost of peaking resources -- costs that vary
158 from \$65 to \$122 per kw/yr. However, he fails to take into account the fuel cost
159 of those peaking resources and the question of how much gas would be consumed
160 by a peaking resource to be able to catch each coincident peak. Any such proposal
161 should consider all relevant costs and we should understand the specifics of such
162 a determination. There is clearly not enough information to understand the
163 specifics of his proposal.

164 **Q. What does Mr. Chernick propose in regards to power purchases?**

165 A. Mr. Chernick also discusses the nature of energy costs associated with
166 firm electric purchases and attempts to compare them to fuel costs. The full thrust
167 of his argument (on pages 22-23) is unclear, but he appears to be suggesting that
168 firm contracts should be allocated on energy. His argument seems to be that fuel
169 is related only to energy so firm electric purchases also relate only to energy.

170 **Q. Do you agree with the suggestion that contract purchases should be based on**
171 **energy alone?**

172 No, I disagree based partially on two important factors. First, it ignores
173 which customer classes are causing these costs to be incurred. If purchased power
174 costs were to be assigned based on energy, they should also be assigned to those
175 customers or time periods for which they were contracted and a true value
176 attributed for the power delivered in higher value periods. Second, if purchased
177 power costs are to be allocated based on energy and directed to specific periods,
178 fuel costs should also be allocated to those periods in which the plant for which it
179 was purchased was in operation and assigned based on energy usage by class
180 during those same periods.

181 **Q. Wouldn't this be difficult?**

182 A. Not necessarily. I believe the grid model should be capable of extracting
183 out exactly when the plants are running and using fuel. I also believe that firm
184 contracts can be shown to be used during specific hours. Once we identify the
185 specific operational parameter of plants or contract takes we can also identify
186 energy usage per class during those same periods and thereby properly allocate
187 cost responsibility in a more granular fashion.

188 **Q. Would this be a more appropriate method of allocating fuel or contract costs**
189 **than the use of an annual energy factor?**

190 A. Yes. It would provide a fairer allocation of costs directed to the customer
191 classes that caused those costs.

192 **Q. Can you provide an example of why this would be fairer?**

193 A. Yes. For instance, let us assume one customer class that uses no energy
194 during on peak periods but only during off peak periods. Also assume that firm
195 contract purchases occur only during on peak periods. If we allocate those costs
196 solely on an annual energy allocation factor, the off peak customer class would be
197 allocated costs that it did not cause.

198 **Q. What else could be done to allocate contract costs on a more rational basis?**

199 A. We know from other proceedings involving avoided cost calculations that
200 power costs should be shaped by hourly scalars to give better cost/price signals.
201 This has been used in both the US Mag QF contract pricing and as a basis to shift
202 the cost of wind projects in regards to the proxy plant. Energy usage should be
203 gathered for super peak 8 hour periods and shoulder hour periods. The power
204 contract pricing used to meet load requirements can then be adjusted with the
205 scalars within the relevant periods. That way, customers that cause more contract
206 demand and have more usage in the more expensive super peak periods will bear
207 more of those costs, providing a more correct pricing signal through rates.

208 **Q. Should this concept be used for allocating fuel costs as well?**

209 A. Yes. Natural gas costs have become a very large component of the
210 Company's cost structure. These costs should be allocated directly to the
211 customer classes that are taking energy during those periods when natural gas is
212 being used and not to customer classes that are not causing the costs to be
213 incurred.

214 **Q. What else could be done to allocate gas cost on a more rational basis than the**
215 **use of an annual energy factor?**

216 A. Mr. Brubaker suggests that it does not appear to make very much
217 difference as to the allocation of costs in regards to seasonal factors. My sense is
218 that PacifiCorp's contracting practices for both physical volume and financial
219 hedging are smoothing these costs out over the course of the test year. This does
220 not send correct price signals. We should find a methodology that provides better
221 price signals. Longer term flat pricing could easily be converted into monthly
222 pricing based on when contracted power is used.

223 **Q. Do you take issue with what Mr. Chernick says in regards to line losses and**
224 **high demand periods?**

225 A. I only take issue with the fact that we are not taking this very important
226 fact into account in determining the billing determinants used in the COS. Mr.
227 Chernick is right that line losses increase with high loads. Peak period line losses
228 will be more than double the average line losses. We need to take this factor into
229 account in terms of specific monthly peaks at input determination as well as the
230 energy usage during peak periods. This factor may also explain some of the
231 variance in the load input data described by parties in this case in regards to the
232 jurisdictional allocation and the COS quantities.

233 **Q. Can you explain this in more detail?**

234 A. Let me start by providing some relevant definitions from the BPA tariff:

235 **losses** - The general term applied to energy (kilowatthours) and power (kilowatts)
236 lost when operating an electric system, occurring mainly as energy turns to waste
237 heat in electrical conductors and apparatus.

238

239 **energy loss** - The difference between power supplied and power received, due to
240 dissipation by the transmission line or other facility.

241

242 **line loss** - The electric energy lost (dissipated) in transmission and distribution
243 lines. Varies with the current (amperes) of the line. If the current doubles, the
244 losses will increase by a factor of four.

245

246 **system loss** - The difference between the system net energy (or power) input and
247 output, resulting from losses and unaccounted energy between the sources of
248 supply and the metering points of delivery on a system.

249

250 The significant implication for cost allocation purposes is that if electric

251

current doubles in a system, line losses go up by a factor of 4. Line losses are a

252

function of the current squared. It is not a linear relationship. This can introduce

253

significant errors in two important and distinctive ways.

254 **Q. May this help explain issues raised in this case associated with measurement?**

255 A.

Yes. As the loads of a customer class grow, more current will flow to the

256

appliances and equipment being used. This increase in current is recognized as

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increased demand on an instantaneous basis and an increase in energy usage as

258

appliances and equipment operate over time. Mr. Higgins' testimony in Table

259

KCH-6 shows how energy usage has increased over time. If this increased usage

260

is proportional to the current flowing, then the increases in usage will drive line

261

losses up in proportion to the square of the increase.

262 **Q. Can you estimate the line loss increase attributable to the class increases?**

263 A. Yes. Based on the increases shown in Mr. Higgins' Table KCH-6, and the
264 assumption that electric current increase is directly proportional to increased
265 electricity use, the following will result from the indicated line loss increases:

	Residential	Commercial	Industrial
266 TY MWH	6,616,982	7,491,492	7,314,906
267 1997 MWH	4,279,332	4,840,806	6,809,086
268 TY / 1997 MWH	1.5463	1.5476	1.0743
269 Increase squared	2.391	2.395	1.154

270
271 In other words, the projected line losses attributable to just the increase in
272 Residential and Commercial customer load growth since 1997 have increased by
273 more than 139%, more than doubling in this period, while the line losses for
274 industrial customer have gone up by only about 15%.

275 **Q. What would you expect to see in the data as a result of this if the losses are**
276 **not being counted or assigned correctly?**

277 A. I would expect that over time if we don't take this change into account we
278 would see that the difference between the forecasted loads using old factors and
279 the JAM loads as measured increase. That is exactly what Mr. Brubaker and Mr.
280 Higgins have shown. The difference between the JAM and forecasted loads has
281 increased significantly.

282 **Q. What else would you expect to see as these line losses grow?**

283 A. I would expect to see the greatest difference between what is being forecasted and
284 actual JAM quantities in the highest usage months (the highest current draw

285 months), as that is when the Residential and Commercial classes, with their lower
286 load factors, have much higher usage. Again, that is exactly what the data
287 provided by Mr. Brubaker shows. The summer month differences between the
288 forecast and JAM are becoming more pronounced in summer high demand
289 months. This suggests that the shortfalls are likely coming largely from line losses
290 that are not being captured.

291 **Q. What other important factor comes into play with how the COS and line**
292 **losses interact?**

293 A. The COS uses a simple linear factor to adjust from sales to input in both
294 the demand and energy factors for all months regardless of quantity of sales or the
295 peak level. This assumption introduces additional error into the numbers because
296 a month with 50% of the average usage will in reality have only 25% of the line
297 losses. This becomes especially important if we begin to use more focused CP
298 methodologies or if we drive the COS to better accuracy with more detail granular
299 monthly pricing for contract energy and fuel purchases.

300 **Q. How do you respond to Mr. Chernick's testimony in regards to the use of the**
301 **COS results in this case?**

302 A. Mr. Chernick recommends that we make improvements to the COS and
303 suggests that the COS output should be disregarded for one class because of
304 questionable data. I suggest that the questionable data means that the entire COS
305 should be disregarded in this case.

306 **Q. Have you reviewed Mr. Mancinelli's testimony for the DPU in this case in**
307 **regards to consistency with JAM allocations as a basis for intra-state**
308 **allocations?**

309 A. I have and I have to admit to being somewhat confused by his testimony in
310 this regard.

311 **Q. Why is that?**

312 A. He seems to suggest that the COS should follow JAM allocations except
313 where he wants to deviate from it. For the most part, he suggests consistency with
314 JAM allocations. Inconsistently, he then suggests deviating from the JAM for
315 allocation of wind costs. It seems to me that the logic of his testimony should be
316 that we should use the best allocation basis available for each and every cost
317 input, rather than following JAM allocations which may have been the result of
318 various compromises.

319 **Q. Do you take issue with that logic?**

320 A. No, I agree that cost allocation decisions should be based on good rational
321 thinking. My previous example of a customer class that used energy only in the
322 middle of the night is an example. Just because JAM allocations may be flawed
323 should not require us to use absurd cost allocation factors in Utah.

324 **Q. What else can you say about Mr. Mancinelli's argument for pushing all wind**
325 **costs to an energy allocation basis?**

326 A. I think we should not base allocation decisions on any one argument or
327 viewpoint, even if it may have some surface logic. For example, one could just as

328 easily argue that the peaking plants and all the fuel that they use should be
329 allocated on only a demand allocator. That is just as valid as Mr. Mancinelli's
330 suggestion for wind. We need to have a good and consistent basis for allocating
331 all costs, and we need to take into account why various resources were installed
332 and who will benefit from them.

333 **Q. U.S. Mag is an industrial customer with a very high load factor. Will it**
334 **benefit from wind resources in rate base?**

335 A. Not very much. Those who will benefit from wind resources are customers
336 decades in the future. I expect that if you asked most industrial entities that are
337 struggling to get by in today's economy if they would like these facilities in place
338 now with their higher costs to protect against the potential for higher costs in the
339 future, they would say no. They simply cannot afford to do that and survive. What
340 Mr. Mancinelli is proposing will thrust a very large portion of those cost onto
341 today's high load factor customers.

342 **Q. Mr. Mancinelli shows many COS output variations based on various**
343 **scenarios. Do you accept his output as correct?**

344 A. No. The key is that the basis for these scenarios and the starting input values for
345 the class data is suspect. We need to start with revised accurate information
346 before we start to make wholesale changes to the COS methodology

347 **Q. What other issues concerning wind power resources do you wish to comment**
348 **on?**

349 A. DPU witness Zenger describes some shortcomings of the wind resources
350 being brought on by PacifiCorp to serve native load. She explicitly talks about the
351 PacifiCorp proposition that the basis for building these intermittent resources is
352 the IRP and how these resources will reduce the risk of fuel price volatility in the
353 future. She emphasizes that the IRP has not been approved by the Utah PSC.

354 **Q. Do you agree that wind is an important resource that will benefit future rate**
355 **payers?**

356 A. I agree that it is a resource that someday in the future will likely be of
357 considerable value. However, I am afraid that the combination of building these
358 high capital cost plants and the transmission resources required to deliver the
359 power they produce on a firm basis are extraordinarily expensive for today's
360 customers, especially as these high cost/low load factor resources and low load
361 factor transmission upgrades get put into rate base.

362 **Q. Would you suggest that we should not be developing these resources?**

363 A. No. I would actually suggest that we develop more wind resources and get
364 them put on line quickly to fill what will essentially be empty transmission paths.
365 I suggest that all the power from these resources should be put on line as quickly
366 as possible and sold to markets at Mona in Utah or Mid Point in Idaho. At those
367 points, the value for the wind power is likely to be much higher than the value to
368 the PacifiCorp system. One only has to look at the California Market Price
369 Referent at over \$110/MWH to know that is where the wind power should be
370 directed for now. If we contract wind resources out now for 10, 15 or even 20

371 year contracts for delivery at Mona or Mid-point, the resources can be directed to
372 benefit Utah ratepayers when the contracts terminate in the future.

373 **Q. How would the utility make such a program work?**

374 A. PacifiCorp could do a reverse RFP as it does often, but for 1500 MWs of
375 wind or whatever network resource rights it will have in the upgraded Gateway
376 transmission line. It could ask for proposals for various contract lengths. It could
377 at the same time issue a request for resources to fill its needs for these contracts as
378 it has done with its recent RFP's for wind resources.

379 **Q. What would this do for Utah ratepayers?**

380 A. It would maximize the value over time to Utah ratepayers by getting value
381 from the transmission line immediately and getting other entities to pay for
382 resources that we will need in the future. It would ensure that the Gateway
383 transmission line is used and useful to the customers that will pay for it in
384 whatever cost allocation scheme is adopted.

385 **Q. Is this an out of the ordinary approach to utility resource development?**

386 A. No. Large power plant projects that involve transmission lines have
387 multiple off taker arrangements for specific terms for the very reason that most
388 utilities cannot use the output all at once. The only difference here is that we
389 would have a large diverse mix of projects, not only with multiple shafts but
390 multiple generation sites.

391 **Q. Some parties in this case have suggested a task force be instituted to deal**
392 **with some of the COS issues brought up. Would you participate in a task**

393 **force to work on cost of service issues and do you think it would be a good**
394 **use of time?**

395 A. We know that for US Mag we must participate and we would do so, but I
396 would also want to push the Commission to require the systematic approach
397 discussed above to the improvement of the COS model and its implementation
398 and development in ongoing proceedings. I have spent many hours in task forces
399 that did not bring much in the way of closure to issues. I would hope that there
400 could be very specifically defined objectives and goals in terms of identifying
401 what the task force would be working on.

402 **Q. Does this conclude your rebuttal testimony?**

403 A. Yes, it does.