

1 **Q. Please state your name, business address, and position with the Company.**

2 A. My name is David J. Godfrey. My business address is 1407 West North Temple,
3 Suite 320, Salt Lake City, Utah. My position is currently the Director of Asset
4 Management and Compliance for PacifiCorp Energy.

5 **Qualifications**

6 **Q. Please describe your education and business experience.**

7 A. I have a Bachelor of Science degree in Mechanical Engineering from Brigham
8 Young University. I have worked in the electric industry for almost 26 years. I
9 have spent the bulk of my career in various engineering and management
10 positions. I started out with the Company performing design studies and small
11 project management for power plant improvement projects. I then filled many
12 positions with increasing responsibility in the generation organization. In 2001, I
13 became the Director of Asset Management for generation with responsibilities for
14 the development of strategic asset plans and risk management plans for the
15 generation fleet. I also oversee the management of the Company's Availability
16 Information System and PacifiCorp Energy's compliance with the North
17 American Electric Reliability Corporation Reliability Standards.

18 **Summary of Testimony**

19 **Q. Please summarize your rebuttal testimony.**

20 A. My rebuttal testimony responds to certain issues raised by Utah Division of Public
21 Utilities (DPU) witness Mr. George W. Evans regarding the Company's forced
22 outage rates and his proposal to use a single average North American Electric
23 Reliability Corporation/Generating Availability Data System (NERC/GADS)

24 statistic to adjust the Company's Net Power Costs (NPC).

25 **Q. Please describe Mr. Evans' proposed adjustment related to the Company's**
26 **forced outage rates.**

27 A. Mr. Evans recommends that the Commission reject the Commission's long-time
28 practice of calculating forced outages using actual historical data for each unit
29 based upon a rolling four-year average. Instead, Mr. Evans proposes a benchmark
30 that replaces the actual data used to calculate the NPC with a national average
31 outage rate for units of a comparable size. Mr. Evans proposes using statistics
32 from NERC/GADS to calculate his average national forced outage rate. The
33 NERC data consists of utilities' self-reported Equivalent Forced Outage Rates
34 (EFOR)—a different calculation than the Company's forced outage rate used in
35 its power cost model. Mr. Evans justifies his adjustment after comparing the
36 Company's forced outage rate to the NERC/GADS EFOR and concluding that the
37 Company's units experience a higher than average outage rate.

38 **Q. Why does the Company disagree with Mr. Evans' use of the NERC/GADS**
39 **data to adjust the NPC?**

40 A. The Company has four main objections to using the NERC data as proposed by
41 Mr. Evans:

- 42 • First, his proposal is a significant departure from Commission precedent and
43 nothing in the record suggests that his proposal will increase the accuracy of
44 forecast outage rates;
- 45 • Second, it compares two different calculations—the NERC/GADS EFOR and
46 the Company's forced outage rate—and then replaces one with the other

- 47 without accounting for the differences;
- 48 • Third, it focuses on a single statistic while ignoring overall fleet performance;
- 49 and
- 50 • Fourth, it is a benchmarking mechanism that improperly compares the
- 51 operations of a single unit to a potentially non-comparable NERC/GADS peer
- 52 group average.

53 **Commission Precedent**

54 **Q. Does Mr. Evans' proposal represent a departure from Commission**

55 **precedent?**

56 A. Yes. The Company uses each unit's actual, historical data to calculate the forced

57 outage rate by use of a four-year rolling average. The Commission has

58 consistently endorsed this method. For instance, in Docket No. 01-035-01 the

59 Commission retained the use of the four-year average because it found that it

60 provided a better approximation of forecast outages than the six-year average

61 proposed by others in that proceeding. Mr. Evans' proposal, on the other hand,

62 eliminates the historical average and substitutes a national industry average

63 instead. This is a significant departure from past Commission practice.

64 **Q. Why is this departure so significant?**

65 A. Mr. Evans' proposal undercuts the purpose of the forced outage rate calculation.

66 The underlying purpose of this calculation is to forecast the expected outage rate

67 for each unit during the test period. This value is then used in the Company's

68 GRID model to forecast NPC for the test period. A unit's past performance is the

69 most accurate predictor of future outages.

70 **Q. Did Mr. Evans address how his method affects the accuracy of the forecast?**

71 A. No. Nothing in his proposal suggests that his method will improve forecast
72 accuracy. His testimony fails to identify any substantive basis for his new method
73 because he fails to show causation.

74 Moreover, Mr. Evans' proposal is a benchmark—it compares the
75 Company's performance to that of the industry and disallows certain costs if the
76 Company fails to meet the established benchmark. Benchmarking, however, is not
77 a forecasting tool. The Company, therefore, does not support the use of
78 benchmarking to single out specific units against an industry-wide benchmark to
79 establish NPC or expectations for future performance.

80 The Company is also concerned that his proposal unfairly singles out one
81 component of the test period NPC calculation and instead of using forecasting
82 based upon historic data, it replaces the forecast with an industry average.
83 Singling out specific components and replacing them with generic industry data is
84 poor regulatory policy and undermines the whole purpose of a test period—using
85 historic data to predict future NPC.

86 **NERC/GADS EFOR Versus The Company's GRID Forced Outage Rate**

87 **Q. What is the Company's second concern with Mr. Evans' proposal?**

88 A. As I describe in more detail below, Mr. Evans' analysis fails to correct for the fact
89 that the Company's forced outage rate used in its NPC takes into account more
90 outages than the outage rate reflected in the NERC/GADS data. A direct
91 comparison of the Company's forced outage rate to the NERC/GADS EFOR is
92 therefore inherently flawed. This flaw is further compounded when it is used to

93 justify the replacement of the Company's data with the NERC/GADS data
94 without accounting for the outages excluded from the EFOR calculation. This
95 results in certain outages being excluded from the power cost model altogether.

96 **Q. By way of background, can you please describe the different types of plant**
97 **outages?**

98 A. There are four main categories of outages used to describe a plant or unit when it is
99 off-line:

- 100 • Planned outages;
- 101 • Unplanned outages;
- 102 • Deratings; or
- 103 • Reserve shutdowns

104 **Q. Please describe a planned outage.**

105 A. NERC/GADS defines a planned outage as "an outage that is scheduled well in
106 advance and is of a predetermined duration, lasts for several weeks, and occurs
107 only once or twice a year. Turbine and boiler overhauls or inspections, testing,
108 and nuclear refueling are typical Planned Outages."

109 **Q. Please describe an unplanned outage.**

110 A. NERC/GADS defines an unplanned outage or derate as either maintenance or
111 forced.

112 A maintenance outage is an outage that can be deferred beyond the end of
113 the next weekend (Sunday at 24:00 hours), but requires that the unit be removed
114 from service, another outage state, or reserve shutdown state before the next
115 planned outage. Characteristically, a maintenance outage can occur any time

116 during the year, has a flexible start date, may or may not have a predetermined
117 duration, and is usually much shorter than a planned outage.

118 A forced outage is an outage that requires immediate removal of a unit
119 from service, another outage state, or a reserve shutdown state. This type of
120 outage usually results from immediate mechanical, electrical, or hydraulic control
121 systems trips or operator-initiated trips in response to unit alarms.

122 **Q. Please describe a derating.**

123 A. A derating occurs whenever a unit is limited to some power level less than the
124 unit's Net Maximum Capacity. A derating starts when the unit is not capable of
125 reaching 100 percent capacity. The available capacity is based on the output of the
126 unit and not on dispatch requirements. The derating ends when the equipment that
127 caused the derating is returned to service, whether the operators use it at that time
128 or not.

129 As with outages described above, a derating can be planned, maintenance,
130 or forced.

131 **Q. Please describe a reserve shutdown.**

132 A. A reserve shutdown occurs whenever a unit is available for load but is not
133 synchronized due to lack of demand. This type of event is sometimes referred to
134 as an economy outage or economy shutdown.

135 **Q. How does the Company model unavailability in its GRID model?**

136 A. The Company combines all of the above-described unplanned outage and derate
137 hours in the following formula to develop a rate that can be applied to all hours
138 that the unit is scheduled to run:

139
$$\text{Forced outage rate} = \frac{FOH + EFDH + MOH + EMDH + EPDH}{FOH + MOH + SH} \times 100$$

140 Where:
141 SH = Service hours
142 FOH = Forced outage hours
143 EFDH = Equivalent forced derated hours
144 MOH = Maintenance outage hours
145 EMDH = Equivalent maintenance derated hours
146 EPDH = Equivalent planned derated hours

147 This calculation results in a forced outage rate that is a ratio of the hours a unit is
148 unavailable to the hours the unit is scheduled to run. For instance, a forced outage
149 rate of 10 percent means that the particular unit is unavailable 10 percent of the
150 time the unit is scheduled to run. This calculation takes into account all outages a
151 unit may experience.

152 **Q. How does that differ from the EFOR number that Mr. Evans used?**

153 A. Mr. Evans proposed replacing the above number with the EFOR number that
154 comes from the NERC/GADS data. This number is based on the following
155 formula:

156
$$EFOR = \frac{FOH + EFDH}{FOH + SH} \times 100$$

157 Where:
158 SH = Service hours
159 FOH = Forced outage hours
160 EFDH = Equivalent forced derated hours

161 Clearly, the two formulas differ because the EFOR does not account for any
162 maintenance outages or the planned or maintenance derates. The Company's
163 forced outage rate, therefore, includes outages that are not included in the
164 NERC/GADS EFOR data. In this case, Mr. Evans is comparing apples and
165 oranges.

166 **Q. Did Mr. Evans account for these different formulas in his testimony?**

167 A. No.

168 **Q. How do these different formulas affect Mr. Evans' recommendation?**

169 A. First, Mr. Evans based his recommended adjustment on his conclusion that the
170 Company's forced outage rates are generally greater than the forced outage rates
171 reflected in the NERC/GADS data. This result, however, is not surprising because
172 the Company's forced outage rate includes types of outages that are not included
173 in the NERC/GADS data. Mr. Evans failed to account for this important
174 distinction and therefore failed to show that an adjustment is necessary.

175 Second, Mr. Evans' proposed adjustment replaced the actual historical
176 data with the average EFOR without accounting for the fact that the EFOR does
177 not include all the outages it is replacing. This means that those outages included
178 in the Company's forced outage rate are effectively excluded from the power cost
179 model. Mr. Evans provided no support for excluding these outages.

180 For these reasons alone the Commission should reject Mr. Evans'
181 proposed adjustment.

182 **Single Statistic Versus Overall Performance**

183 **Q. Are there any other problems with Mr. Evans' proposed adjustment?**

184 A. Yes. Mr. Evans focused exclusively on the Company's forced outage rate and
185 failed to consider how that single statistic fit into the overall performance of the
186 Company's generating fleet—a fleet that consistently performs better than a
187 comparable NERC/GADS peer group.

188 **Q. What are the dangers of looking at just a single statistic?**

189 A. There are several reasons why this is not a good practice. First, it can give
190 misleading results. Second, it does not reflect the overall value being delivered by
191 the generating fleet to the Company's customers.

192 **Q. Please explain how it can give misleading results.**

193 A. Focusing on one, single statistical measure can create misleading results when
194 that single measure is used to compare the performance of two units without
195 reference to other relevant factors. For example, Unit A could have annual
196 overhauls which make it unavailable for 10 percent of the year and an unplanned
197 outage rate of five percent. If there are no reserve shutdown hours this would
198 provide an 85 percent availability rate for dispatch.

199 Unit B could be on a four-year overhaul cycle which makes it unavailable
200 for three percent annually and have a 10 percent unplanned outage rate. If there
201 are no reserve shutdown hours this would provide an 87 percent availability rate
202 for dispatch.


203 If one looked only at the unplanned outage rate, one could draw the wrong
204 conclusion that Unit B performs worse than Unit A. Even though Unit B has a
205 greater overall availability rate, in isolation its unplanned outage rate appears
206 excessive.

207 To fully understand how a utility is performing it is important to view a
208 variety of factors. In particular, when analyzing the Company's forced outage
209 rates, it is important to analyze the outage rates in the context of three other
210 performance factors: equivalent availability, capacity factor, and planned outage

211 hours.

212 **Q. Why is equivalent availability an important statistic when comparing plant**
213 **performance?**

214 A. Equivalent availability is a measure of the optimal energy that could have been
215 generated during a given report period. This eliminates the bias of market
216 conditions. As the graph below illustrates, the Company fleet consistently has a
217 greater equivalent availability factor than its NERC/GADS peer group.



218 Equivalent availability also takes into account all the reasons a plant could
219 be off-line, including planned outages, planned derates, forced outages,
220 maintenance outages, equivalent forced derates, and equivalent maintenance
221 derates. This means that the equivalent availability data removes the bias that can
222 appear if a Company outage is placed in a different category than a comparable

223 outage from the NERC/GADS peer group. For example, it does not matter if an
224 outage is classified as maintenance or forced; they are all treated equally in
225 equivalent availability.

226 The above graph also shows that the Company fleet is improving its
227 performance against the NERC/GADS peer group over the last four years.


228 **Q. How is it possible that a Company outage could be placed in a different**
229 **category than a comparable outage from the NERC/GADS peer group?**

230 A. Each utility that reports data to NERC/GADS does so in a manner that they
231 believe meets the NERC/GADS reporting criteria. However, the data is not
232 audited, and therefore there is no way to ensure that there is consistency in
233 reporting.

234 **Q. Why should capacity factor be considered?**

235 A. Capacity factor is the measure of actual output compared to the possible output.
236 Therefore, the higher the capacity factor the more the plant has operated at or near
237 its maximum capacity. Because this is the most efficient operating level, it means
238 that power is produced at its lowest cost. It also means that the Company's fleet is
239 able to generate more power thus offsetting the need for the Company to purchase
240 power on the wholesale market. The Company fleet's capacity factor is
241 consistently greater than the NERC/GADS peer group as illustrated in the graph
242 below.

PacifiCorp vs- NERC
Operating Statistics
Capacity Factor



243 By operating the fleet at these high capacity factors the Company is able
244 to provide greater benefit to its customers by supplying a low cost source of
245 energy. Looking at the four-year average ending December 31, 2008, the
246 Company fleet had a capacity factor of 77.4 percent versus the NERC/GADS peer
247 group's capacity factor of 65.8 percent. The difference in capacity factor
248 represents approximately 937 MW of capacity for the Company's fleet (using the
249 average fleet capacity of 8,077 MW). This represents a substantial benefit to the
250 Company's customers because it represents power the Company did not have to
251 purchase on the more expensive wholesale market.


252 Q. **The Company's capacity factor for the four-year period ending December**
253 **31, 2008, is 11.6 percent greater than the NERC/GADS peer group average.**
254 **What is the approximate value associated with the Company's above average**
255 **capacity during this period?**

256 A. The value of the power associated with the Company's fleet running above the
257 NERC/GADS peer group capacity factor for the four-year period ending
258 December 31, 2008, is in the range of \$250 million to \$325 million. These
259 savings have helped the Company maintain relatively low net power costs
260 compared to other utilities.

261 Q. **Explain the significance of the planned outage factor.**

262 A. The planned outage factor simply divides the amount of planned outage hours by
263 the total period hours. This is a measure of the percentage of time the plant was
264 off-line for a scheduled maintenance outage. The Company fleet has less planned
265 outage hours than its NERC/GADS peer group as illustrated by the graph below.

PacifiCorp vs- NERC
 Operating Statistics
 Planned Outage Factor



266 Looking at the four-year average ending December 31, 2008, the
 267 Company fleet had a planned outage factor of 3.19 percent as compared to a
 268 planned outage factor of 6.66 percent for the NERC/GADS peer group. This
 269 difference equates to a difference of 7.6 TWh of generation (using the average
 270 fleet capacity of 8,077 MW and the fleet capacity factor of 77.4 percent) over the
 271 four-year period.

272 **Q. What conclusions can be drawn after comparing the generating fleet's**
 273 **overall performance to that of the NERC/GADS peer group?**

274 **A.** When measuring the overall performance, the Company's fleet outperforms the
 275 NERC/GADS peer group. The Company operates its fleet to maximize the
 276 benefits to customers by reducing total net power costs. It does not operate its
 277 fleet to minimize forced outages at the expense of overall performance. Thus

278 disallowing a significant portion of the Company's NPC simply because one
279 statistic appears excessive is poor policy. If the Commission adopts Mr. Evans'
280 proposal, it would create a strong incentive for the Company to focus its attention
281 on one single measure of fleet performance and that may very well result in
282 higher NPC to Rocky Mountain Power's Utah customers.

283 The comparisons are also important because Mr. Evans' based his
284 adjustment solely on his conclusion that the fleet performs poorly with respect to
285 one statistical measure. If overall the fleet performs well then there is no basis for
286 his adjustment.

287 **Benchmarking Mechanism Applied To Single Units**

288 **Q. What is the Company's final criticism of Mr. Evans' proposal?**

289 A. Mr. Evans' proposed benchmark is problematic because it compares individual
290 units to industry averages without accounting for the different characteristics of
291 each unit.

292 **Q. What are the Company's concerns about comparing single units to**
293 **NERC/GADS average statistics?**

294 A. This concern is similar to that discussed above regarding using a single, isolated
295 statistic to measure fleet performance. Again, the Company operates its fleet to
296 maximize the benefits to its customers. That means that overall as a fleet the
297 Company compares well with NERC/GADS data or other industry indices.
298 Comparing each individual unit to an industry average, without the context of its
299 operation within the total fleet, can be misleading.

300 Moreover, this comparison ignores the fact that each individual unit has its

301 own unique operating characteristics. Units with different capacities and different
302 operating characteristics have different challenges and opportunities. Looking at
303 the average NERC/GADS data for coal-fueled plants of a similar size and making
304 inferences about how a specific plant should run is like comparing repair costs for
305 your car to the average cost of repairs for all cars of similar make and model.
306 Some cars are driven once a week while others are commercial vehicles. Ignoring
307 these significant differences makes the comparison largely meaningless. If one is
308 trying to compare the value of their vehicle, it is best to compare it to vehicles
309 similar in size and similar in use.

310 When comparing a single unit, it is extremely critical to understand the
311 peer group used to establish the comparison. It is imperative that the comparison
312 include the right conversion technology, unit size and composition, operating
313 regime, and age. If not fully understood and adjusted for, all of these factors can
314 skew the results and give false expectations.

315 **Q. Has NERC provided any guidance for selecting a peer group for the**
316 **comparison of an individual unit?**

317 A. Yes. The following quote is from the NERC website, under the benchmarking tab
318 and describes the standards for selecting a peer group for individual unit
319 benchmarking:

320 “Whenever we benchmark a generating plant’s performance, it is
321 vital that we start by selecting a peer group that have as close a
322 similarity in design and operating characteristics as possible.
323 Certainly, we would never compare a fossil steam unit against a
324 group that included nuclear, hydro or combined cycle units.
325 However, many benchmarking programs have assumed that for
326 fossil steam units, fuel type and size ranges are the proper select
327 criteria. We have found from our extensive benchmarking studies

328 that fuel types and especially the arbitrary size ranges (100-
329 199MW, 200-299MW, etc.) are relatively much less statistically
330 significant than other design and operational characteristics such as
331 criticality, duty cycle, vintage, pressurized/balanced draft, etc.
332 Because each individual unit is unique, our process ensures that the
333 optimal peer group is selected; balancing the need for similarity in
334 design and operations with the need for a large enough sample size
335 for statistical validity. Without this objective analysis to find the
336 optimal peer select criteria any conclusions drawn from the
337 comparisons could very well be invalid and misleading.”

338 Thus, even NERC warns that when benchmarking a single unit it is vital to
339 use a truly comparable peer group or the results of the comparison may be
340 invalid and misleading.

341 **Q. Does the Company support comparing its fleet performance to NERC/GADS**
342 **data for other purposes?**

343 A. The Company supports the use of NERC/GADS data to benchmark or trend the
344 fleet performance against a peer group. This type of comparison can help indicate
345 long-term trends and identify potential areas for improvement. Importantly,
346 however, the Company only supports benchmarks for these purposes and not for
347 forecasting. The Company also uses benchmarking to compare its *entire fleet* to
348 an industry average, not individual units.

349 **Q. How does the Company develop its peer groups for comparison?**

350 A. When the Company compares its entire fleet performance against the
351 NERC/GADS data it creates a peer group by simulating a fleet of similarly sized
352 units. This is accomplished by creating an equivalently configured system from
353 the NERC/GADS database so that the number of units and the type of units within
354 a given fuel category and size are the same as the Company fleet. Therefore, the
355 makeup of our fleet from year-to-year is duplicated by using an equivalent system

356 configuration, using the NERC/GADS database. For example, the Company fleet
357 has one coal-fired unit in the 1-99 MW range, four coal-fired units in the 100-199
358 MW range, two coal-fired units in the 200-299 MW range, eight LM 6000 gas
359 units, one geothermal unit, etc. The NERC/GADS capacity range averages are
360 then weighted to simulate the Company fleet.

361 **Q. Does Mr. Evans' proposed benchmark take into consideration these issues?**

362 A. No. Mr. Evans' benchmark is based solely on comparing each The Company unit
363 to all units of a comparable size in the NERC/GADS database. His proposal fails
364 to consider each unit's operating characteristics and design and is therefore likely
365 to result in invalid and misleading comparisons.

366 **Q. Please summarize your rebuttal testimony.**

367 A. The Commission should reject Mr. Evans' proposal and re-affirm its long-
368 standing policy in favor of forecasting forced outage rates using each unit's actual
369 historical data. Mr. Evans' entire proposal is based on his erroneous conclusion
370 that the forced outage rate used in GRID is the same as the NERC/GADS EFOR.
371 Because these calculations are different, a direct comparison will be flawed and
372 replacing one value with the other will ignore and exclude certain outages.
373 Moreover, Mr. Evans' analysis fails to consider the overall performance of the
374 Company's fleet when he focused on one single statistical measure in isolation.
375 Finally, his benchmark proposal improperly compares individual units to industry
376 averages.

377 **Q. Does this conclude your rebuttal testimony?**

378 A. Yes.