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**BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH**

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<b>In the Matter of the Application of Rocky Mountain Power for Authority to Increase its Retail Electric Utility Service Rates in Utah and for Approval of Its Proposed Electric Service Schedules and Electric Service Regulations</b>	<b>Docket No. 09-035-23</b>
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**PREFILED REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF NEAL TOWNSEND**

**[RATE DESIGN]**

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The UAE Intervention Group (UAE) hereby submits the Prefiled Rebuttal Testimony of Neal Townsend on rate design issues.

DATED this 23<sup>rd</sup> day of March, 2010.

/s/ \_\_\_\_\_  
Gary A. Dodge,  
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## CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served by email

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**BEFORE**  
**THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH**

**Rebuttal Testimony of Neal Townsend**

**On behalf of**

**UAE**

**[Rate Design]**

**March 23, 2010**



1 decouple rates on a pilot basis to collect fixed distribution costs for the residential  
2 rate class.

3 **Q. What is UAE's interest in this residential rate issue?**

4 A. UAE members take electric service under non-residential rate schedules,  
5 which are not directly affected by the various rate design and decoupling  
6 proposals in this proceeding. However, UAE members are concerned about  
7 sound ratemaking principles and the possible precedential value of issues in this  
8 proceeding.

9 **Q. What conclusions and recommendations do you offer on the various  
10 residential rate design and decoupling proposals in this proceeding?**

11 A. I offer the following conclusions and recommendations:

12 (1) If the Commission approves any of the inverted residential rate design  
13 proposals offered by DPU, SWEEP/UCE or WRA, I encourage the Commission  
14 to understand and find that the rationale underlying any such rate design does not  
15 extend to commercial and industrial rates.

16 (2) If the Commission approves the DPU's pilot decoupling proposal, I  
17 recommend that the Commission expressly limit its applicability to residential  
18 schedule and find that the rationale underlying the proposal does not extend to  
19 commercial and industrial rates.

20

21

1 **Rate Design - Schedule 1 Inverted Block Rate Design**

2 **Q. Can you please briefly summarize the proposals of the DPU, SWEEP/UCE,**  
3 **and WRA for inverted residential rate design?**

4 A. Yes. If the Commission approves the DPU's proposed three-year pilot  
5 decoupling mechanism (which I discuss later), DPU recommends, along with  
6 maintaining a \$3.00 customer charge, a 1% percent increase in the summer first,  
7 summer second and winter block rates, and an 11% increase in the summer third  
8 block rate to send a stronger price signal to customers with usage levels higher  
9 than 1,000 kWh. Alternatively, if the Commission does not adopt the DPU's  
10 decoupling proposal, the DPU proposes to increase the customer charge to \$3.40  
11 and increase the third block rate by 8.5%.

12 SWEEP/UCE recommends a four-tiered summer rate/two-tiered winter  
13 rate for Schedule 1 that contains a more accentuated inverted structure than exists  
14 in the current rate design. Similar to the DPU's proposal, this recommended rate  
15 design is intended to send a strong price signal to large residential customers with  
16 the hope of eliciting a demand response.

17 WRA recommends the imposition of a High Usage Surcharge to recover  
18 the revenue increase for residential rate schedules. No surcharge would be  
19 imposed for monthly usage below 1,000 kWhs, but a surcharge would be imposed  
20 above 1,000 kWh. The amount of the surcharge would increase with increasing  
21 usage.

22 **Q. Do you have any comments on the various proposals of the DPU,**  
23 **SWEEP/UCE, and WRA for Schedule 1 rate design?**

1 A. As UAE's members do not take service on Schedule 1, UAE is not taking  
2 any specific position on rate design for Schedule 1 rates. However, I am  
3 commenting on the various rate design proposals in order to explain why any such  
4 proposals for inverted block rates would be inappropriate for non-residential  
5 customers.

6 **Q. To your knowledge, has any party to this proceeding proposed inverted**  
7 **block rates for non-residential customers?**

8 A. No. However, I am aware that such proposals have been made in other  
9 jurisdictions.

10 **Q. In your opinion, would it be appropriate for an inverted block rate design to**  
11 **be implemented for commercial and industrial rate schedules?**

12 A. No. Any proposal for inverted block rates for commercial and industrial  
13 customers would be a misguided notion and entirely inappropriate.

14 **Q. Please explain.**

15 A. The premise behind inverted block rates is that it is important to send a  
16 price signal to customers that increasing energy usage is costly to the utility  
17 system. This concept is typically paired with the notion that there is a critical  
18 minimum amount of electric power that is necessary to meet basic needs. The  
19 rate design that results from combining these ideas is often one in which the initial  
20 pricing block (corresponding to the first energy used in the billing period) is  
21 priced at a relatively low rate, whereas energy consumption above this amount is  
22 priced at higher rates.

1           The notion of a critical minimum or a “baseline” amount of electric power  
2 (that is priced at a lower rate) is grounded in a value judgment about what portion  
3 of electric power consumption for a residential customer is for “necessities” (e.g.,  
4 lighting) and what portion constitutes discretionary or even luxury usage (e.g.,  
5 heating a hot tub). As varied as households may be, they are significantly more  
6 homogeneous than businesses. In light of this homogeneity, it may be reasonable  
7 to establish prices for residential customers that distinguish between necessary  
8 “baseline” power consumption and discretionary or luxury usage. Consequently,  
9 inverted block rates may be appropriate for residential customers.

10           However, the notion of “baseline” rates does not translate in any  
11 meaningful way to commercial and industrial customers. The relative differences  
12 in electricity usage among commercial and industrial customers are driven largely  
13 by the differing requirements of their respective businesses, as opposed to  
14 individual consumption preferences. For example, a grocery store that is pursuing  
15 vigorous energy efficiency measures may still be consuming ten times the electric  
16 power of a gas station, due to the nature of the business. It is not reasonable to  
17 artificially reduce the energy rates paid by the gas station below the average cost  
18 to serve it, and then transfer the burden of meeting the revenue shortfall to the  
19 energy rate paid by the grocery store in order to send a stronger conservation price  
20 signal to the grocer. Any such pricing scheme merely creates new subsidies in  
21 which the larger customers on the rate schedule pay for the energy costs of the  
22 smaller customers, without regard to the energy efficiency practices of either.

23 **Q. What is your recommendation to the Commission on this issue?**

1 A. If the PSC approves any of the proposals of the DPU, SWEEP/UCE,  
2 WRA, or any similar inverted residential rate design proposals, I urge the  
3 Commission to recognize and expressly find that the rationale underlying any  
4 such rate design does not extend to commercial and industrial rates. Inverted  
5 block rates for commercial and industrial customers are entirely inappropriate and  
6 should not be considered.

7

8 **Rate Design – Schedule 1 Distribution Decoupling**

9 **Q. Can you please briefly summarize the DPU’s proposal to decouple rates to**  
10 **collect fixed distribution costs for the Schedule 1 residential rate class?**

11 A. Yes. The DPU is proposing a decoupling mechanism on a pilot basis  
12 designed to collect the Company's fixed distribution costs for residential  
13 customers. Decoupling severs the relationship between the revenues collected by  
14 the utility and the sales volumes, in kilowatt hours, used by customers. The DPU  
15 apparently believes that decoupling will allow flexibility in designing rates to  
16 promote energy efficiency while mitigating the risk of cost recovery from  
17 reductions in energy consumption and other factors such as weather.

18 **Q. Do you have any comments on the DPU’s proposed decoupling mechanism?**

19 A. Yes. Again, UAE’s members do not take service on residential schedules  
20 and would not be directly affected by this proposal. However, I am generally  
21 opposed to the adoption of decoupling mechanisms because they are typically  
22 unwarranted applications of single-issue ratemaking. Further, because decoupling

1 results in a material reduction in utility risk, it should not be adopted without  
2 explicit recognition in the utility's allowed return on equity.

3 **Q. How would DPU's decoupling proposal reduce RMP's risk?**

4 A. Various factors affect customers' usage – price being but one factor. For  
5 example, the weather may be cooler in the summer or warmer in the winter  
6 relative to normal conditions. Currently, Utah rates are set to recover RMP's  
7 revenue requirement using normal weather. The risk of deviations in usage from  
8 abnormal weather, both high and low, is borne by RMP. RMP is compensated for  
9 taking this risk in the determination of its allowed ROE. By its very design, the  
10 DPU's proposal is intended to reduce RMP's risk from weather and other factors.

11 **Q. Do you have any additional comments on decoupling at this time?**

12 A. Yes. I note that decoupling implementation proposals in Utah have been  
13 designed based on deviations in average usage per customer. This is the case for  
14 the existing QGC decoupling mechanism, as well as the DPU proposal in this  
15 proceeding. I concur that, if decoupling is to be adopted, such a design may make  
16 the most sense. However, the usefulness of this design concept is limited to  
17 customers that are relatively homogenous in character. A decoupling mechanism  
18 based on deviations in average usage per customer would be entirely without  
19 merit if applied to industrial customers. For industrial customers, changes in  
20 usage per customer are far more likely to be driven by changes in the *composition*  
21 of the customers and changes in the *economy* than by changes attributable to  
22 utility-sponsored conservation programs. For this reason, if decoupling is to be

1 further considered in Utah, I strongly recommend that it not be considered for  
2 non-residential customers.

3 **Q. Please summarize your recommendation to the Commission on this issue.**

4 A. I am generally opposed to the adoption of decoupling mechanisms because  
5 they represent problematic applications of single-issue ratemaking. Further,  
6 because decoupling leads to a material reduction in utility risk, I caution against  
7 the adoption of any decoupling mechanism absent a corresponding reduction in  
8 the utility's allowed return on equity. If the Commission approves the DPU's  
9 decoupling proposal, I recommend that the Commission expressly limit its use to  
10 residential schedules and find that the rationale underlying such a proposal does  
11 not extend to commercial and industrial rates.

12 **Q. Does this conclude your direct testimony?**

13 A. Yes, it does.