

BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH

In the Matter of the Application of)	
Rocky Mountain Power for)	Docket No. 10-035-124
Authority to Increase Its Retail)	Direct Testimony
Electric Utility Service Rates in Utah)	Lori Smith Schell
And for Approval of Its Proposed)	For the Office of
Electric Service Schedules and)	Consumer Services
Electric Service Regulations)	

May 26, 2011

Direct Testimony on Issues Relating to Hedging
In Connection with Rocky Mountain Power’s General Rate Case

REDACTED

1 **Q. WHAT IS YOUR NAME, OCCUPATION AND BUSINESS ADDRESS?**

2 A. My name is Lori Smith Schell. I am the founder and President of
3 Empowered Energy, which has its business address at 174 North Elk Run,
4 Durango, Colorado, 81303.

5

6 **Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE EMPOWERED ENERGY.**

7 A. Empowered Energy is a Colorado-based independent consulting firm that
8 provides market and regulatory analysis of natural gas, power, and
9 emissions markets. Empowered Energy provides industry expertise and
10 quantitative skills to analyze these markets. Empowered Energy also
11 works with end-users and energy providers to evaluate how the costs and
12 benefits of emerging technologies are impacted by changes in natural gas,
13 power, and emissions markets.

14

15 **Q. HAVE YOU PREPARED A SUMMARY YOUR QUALIFICATIONS AND**
16 **EXPERIENCE?**

17 A. Yes. I have attached Appendix 1, which is a summary of my relevant
18 experience and qualifications.

19

20 **Q. ON WHOSE BEHALF ARE YOU APPEARING?**

21 A. Empowered Energy is a subcontractor to GDS Associates, Inc. ("GDS")
22 for work done in this proceeding. GDS was retained by the Utah Office of
23 Consumer Services ("OCS") to review Rocky Mountain Power's natural

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24 gas risk management policies and procedures. Accordingly, I am
25 appearing on behalf of the OCS.

26

27 **Q. HAVE YOU PREVIOUSLY TESTIFIED BEFORE THIS COMMISSION?**

28 A. Yes. I provided direct testimony in Phase I of Docket No. 09-035-15 on
29 November 16, 2009, that discussed the stated goals of PacifiCorp
30 Energy's Risk Management Policy and showed that, with respect to
31 natural gas, PacifiCorp Energy was generally in compliance with its then-
32 current volume-based hedge targets. (The Risk Management Policy
33 applies to hedging of both natural gas and electricity, and to each of
34 PacifiCorp's three main divisions: PacifiCorp Energy, Pacific Power, and
35 Rocky Mountain Power.) I also provided direct testimony in Phase II, Part
36 1 of that same docket on June 16, 2010, that recommended that
37 PacifiCorp Energy reduce its Year 1 maximum natural gas hedge target to
38 no more than 85 percent of PacifiCorp's "Total MWh Requirements" to
39 account for system balancing requirements. I provided surrebuttal
40 testimony in Phase II, Part 1 of that same docket on August 10, 2010, that
41 recommended that the acceptable range of the To-Expiry Value-at-Risk
42 ("TEVaR") metric being substituted for the former hedge targets should be
43 re-examined in light of my prior recommendations to reduce the overall
44 level of PacifiCorp's natural gas hedge target.

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46 **Q. HAVE YOU PREPARED ANY EXHIBITS IN SUPPORT OF YOUR**
47 **TESTIMONY?**

48 A. Yes. I have prepared Exhibit OCS-5.1, Exhibit OCS-5.2, and Exhibit
49 OCS-5.3,¹ which are attached to this testimony. Exhibit OCS-5.1 contains
50 one page of summary data that differentiates PacifiCorp's Test Period
51 hedging gains and losses by time period, the totals of which are reported
52 in the Net Power Costs ("NPC") study filed in this proceeding. Exhibit
53 OCS-5.2 contains two graphs related to OCS-5.1. Exhibit OCS-5.3
54 contains one page of data showing the net volumes underlying the natural
55 gas and electric swaps reported in the NPC study in order to determine an
56 alternative hedging strategy using options instead of swaps.

57

58 **Q. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR TESTIMONY?**

59 A. The purpose of my testimony is to examine both the volumes and hedging
60 gains and losses associated with the natural gas and power swaps
61 included in the Test Period NPC study. I first allocate the trading gains
62 and losses into "buckets" based on how far in advance of the first
63 settlement month the underlying swaps were executed. I will show that
64 the natural gas trading losses increase significantly the further in advance
65 of the first settlement month that the underlying swaps were entered into.
66 Conversely, the power trading gains generally decrease the further in

¹ Exhibits OCS 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 are confidential.

67 advance the underlying swaps were entered into. I then examine the net
68 volumes associated with the Test Period natural gas and electric swaps in
69 order to estimate how many financial options would have to have been
70 purchased to cap the price on those same volumes. Based on a range of
71 option premiums, I then estimate the costs associated with a hedging
72 strategy using options purchases rather than swaps.

73

74 **Q. CAN YOU BRIEFLY DESCRIBE HOW THE TEVaR IS USED TO**
75 **DETERMINE THE HEDGE TARGETS IN PACIFICORP ENERGY'S**
76 **FRONT OFFICE PROCEDURES?**

77 A. The TEVaR measures the potential losses that PacifiCorp's combined
78 natural gas and power swap positions could incur if those positions were
79 held through their future settlement dates. Thus, the TEVaR measures
80 potential increases in the NPC at any given time, based on expected
81 market conditions and on PacifiCorp's natural gas and power swap
82 positions at that time. The TEVaR is used by the Company to direct its
83 hedging activities so as to limit the potential percentage change in the
84 NPC; its use supplanted the former volumetric hedging targets as of May
85 17, 2010 (Front Office Procedures, Exhibit 10). Like the volumetric
86 hedging targets that preceded it, the TEVaR [REDACTED]

87 [REDACTED]

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101 **Q. HAVE YOU EXAMINED THE TEST PERIOD NET HEDGING GAINS**
102 **AND LOSSES IN LIGHT OF THE TEVaR'S FORWARD TIME PERIOD**
103 **BUCKETS?**

104 A. Yes. Exhibit OCS-5.1 is based on mark-to-market values for power and
105 natural gas swaps with settlement months in the Test Period, as provided
106 by the Company in Confidential Filing Requirement R746-700-23-C.8.
107 Exhibit OCS-5.1 provides a summary table that identifies for both power
108 and natural gas the Test Period hedging gains and losses, categorized
109 based on how far forward the swaps were entered into. In effect, the
110 hedging gains and losses were "bucketed" by determining for each swap

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111 transaction affecting the Test Period the number of months between the
112 date the swap was executed and the swap's first settlement month.

113

114 **Q. HAVE YOU CALCULATED THE VOLUMETRIC HEDGE**
115 **PERCENTAGES ASSOCIATED WITH THE "BUCKETED" TEST**
116 **PERIOD NET HEDGING GAINS AND LOSSES?**

117 A. No. The former volumetric hedge percentages were calculated separately
118 for natural gas and power, and are not identifiable from the TEVaR values.
119 The Company no longer calculates the volumetric hedge percentages.
120 However, in response to UIEC Data Request 27.13, the Company
121 indicates that 64% (= 42.6/67.0 million MMBtu) of its total natural gas burn
122 was hedged using gas swaps in the calendar year 2008 Test Period filed
123 in Docket No. 07-035-93. Similarly, in response to UIEC Data Request
124 27.14, the Company indicates that 80% (= 54.7/68.4 million MMBtu) of its
125 total natural gas burn was hedged using gas swaps in the calendar year
126 2009 Test Period filed in Docket No. 08-035-38.

127

128 **Q. WHAT ARE THE RESULTS OF "BUCKETING" THE TEST PERIOD**
129 **NET HEDGING GAINS AND LOSSES BY FORWARD TIME PERIOD?**

130 A. The total natural gas [REDACTED]
131 [REDACTED] Exhibit OCS-5.1 and the related graphs in Exhibit
132 OCS-5.2 clearly show that [REDACTED] of this net natural gas hedging
133 [REDACTED], results from swaps that were entered into [REDACTED]

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
134 [REDACTED] prior to their first settlement date. Power hedging [REDACTED],
135 conversely, tend to get smaller the further in advance of the first
136 settlement date that the power swaps were entered into. The combined
137 impact of these two effects is that [REDACTED]
138 [REDACTED] is associated with swaps
139 entered into more than [REDACTED] ahead of the first settlement date of
140 those swaps.

141

142 **Q. HOW ARE THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR HEDGING AFFECTED BY THE**
143 **TIME BETWEEN THE DATE THE SWAP IS EXECUTED AND THE**
144 **SETTLEMENT DATES OF THE SWAP?**

145 A. Market liquidity becomes limited the further out the settlement date. This
146 lack of liquidity in the natural gas futures market is illustrated in the graph
147 below for 48 forward settlement months as of the (randomly selected) May
148 11, 2011, trade date. For ease of comparison, the 48 forward settlement
149 months have been divided into 12-month time periods. The rapid decline
150 in market liquidity is evident as one moves through each successive 12-
151 month time period and the graph clearly illustrates the very limited trading
152 activity 37-48 months forward.

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155 There are many fewer counterparties entering into swap transactions the
 156 further out the settlement date and this lack of liquidity tends to be
 157 reflected in wider bid-offer spreads, i.e., in greater differences between
 158 what sellers are willing to sell for and what buyers are willing to pay.

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160 **Q. WHAT IS THE BASIS OF THE COMPANY’S HEDGING HORIZON?**


161 A. In response to UIEC DR 9.7, the Company states that “[t]he hedging
 162 period was 24 months for the period for 2001 through mid-2006, and 48
 163 months for the period mid-2006 through 2010.” The Company explains in
 164 response to UIEC DR 9.8 that “[t]he hedging period was changed in
 165 response to the generally increased market liquidity.”

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167 **Q. HAVE YOU COMPARED THE CURRENT MARKET LIQUIDITY IN**
168 **NATURAL GAS FUTURES TO THAT OF ANY PRIOR TIME PERIOD?**

169 A. Yes. The graph below illustrates in the same format as above the market
170 liquidity in the natural gas futures market three years ago, as of the May
171 13, 2008, trade date. A comparison of the two graphs shows that market
172 liquidity has been compressed into the earlier time periods over the past
173 three years in terms of both the daily volume traded and the total number
174 of unsettled futures contracts (known as the “open interest”). However,
175 even three years ago, market liquidity in the natural gas futures market
176 beyond the first 36 months was very limited.



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181 **Q. WHAT DO YOU CONCLUDE REGARDING THE COMPANY'S**
182 **HEDGING HORIZON?**

183 A. I conclude that the Company's trading activities beyond 36 months
184 forward are not justified based on the limited market liquidity in the natural
185 gas futures market beyond that point.

186

187 **Q. DID YOU ALSO EXAMINE THE VOLUMES ASSOCIATED WITH THE**
188 **COMPANY'S NATURAL GAS AND POWER HEDGES?**

189 A. Yes. Exhibit OCS-5.3 shows the monthly natural gas and power volumes
190 underlying the Company's Test Period swap positions, both by Test
191 Period month and "bucketed" in the same manner as hedging losses and
192 gains by determining for each swap transaction affecting the Test Period
193 the number of months between the date the swap was executed and the
194 swap's first settlement month. Exhibit OCS-5.3 is based on the net
195 hedged volume of power and natural gas with settlement months in the
196 Test Period, as provided by the Company in Confidential Filing
197 Requirement R746-700-23-C.8.

198

199 **Q. WHAT IS GAINED BY KNOWING THE VOLUMES ASSOCIATED WITH**
200 **THE COMPANY'S NATURAL GAS AND POWER HEDGES?**

201 A. Knowing the actual volumes that the Company has hedged for the Test
202 Period allows one to examine alternative hedging strategies. In addition to
203 showing the natural gas and power volumes underlying the Company's

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204 Test Period swap positions, Exhibit OCS-5.3 also shows how many
205 natural gas options would have to be purchased to cap the price exposure
206 for the same volumes for each 12-month forward “bucket.” Whereas a
207 swap locks in a specific price, purchasing call options establishes a price
208 cap for buyers of a commodity and purchasing put options establishes a
209 price floor for sellers of a commodity. The use of options thereby allows
210 the purchaser to take advantage of favorable price movements (which is
211 desired from a ratepayer perspective), as opposed to the use of swaps
212 (which lock in specific prices regardless of future price movements).

213

214 **Q. CAN YOU BRIEFLY EXPLAIN HOW NATURAL GAS OPTIONS WORK?**

215 A. Yes. Natural gas options are based on natural gas futures contracts in
216 units of 10,000 MMBtu per month. Natural gas options premiums are
217 quoted in \$/MMBtu, so purchasing one natural gas option at a
218 \$1.00/MMBtu option premium would cost \$10,000. A natural gas option
219 includes a strike price expressed in \$/MMBtu. Buying a call option gives
220 the buyer the right (but not the obligation) to buy 10,000 MMBtu of natural
221 gas at the strike price in a specified future settlement month. Buying a put
222 option gives the buyer the right (but not the obligation) to sell 10,000
223 MMBtu of natural gas at the strike price in a specified future settlement
224 month. The call option (put option) buyer may let the option expire
225 unused, i.e., may choose not to buy (sell) natural gas at the strike price
226 because the market price on the settlement date is below (above) the

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
227 strike price. In this case, the cost of the option premium can be
228 considered an insurance premium that is added to (subtracted from) the
229 natural gas cost (revenue) for the settlement month.

230

231 **Q. CAN YOU PROVIDE AN EXAMPLE SHOWING HOW OPTIONS**
232 **PREMIUMS ARE RELATED TO FUTURES PRICES?**

233 A. Yes. The graph below shows the call option premium required for a strike
234 price similar to the natural gas futures settlement price for the April 9,
235 2010 trade date. Two items are of particular note. First, call option strike
236 prices are discontinuous, meaning that they are available only in certain
237 increments as determined by market demand. Second, for any given
238 strike price, the option premium is higher the further out the settlement
239 month. This can be seen by comparing the option premium for each of
240 the three settlement months highlighted in the graph below. Each of the
241 three settlement months highlighted has an option strike price of
242 \$5.45/MMBtu. The option premium is \$0.672/MMBtu for the January 2011
243 settlement month, \$0.680/MMBtu for the February 2011 settlement month,
244 and \$0.720/MMBtu for the April 2012 settlement month.

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247 **Q. ARE THE OPTIONS PREMIUMS SHOWN IN THE GRAPH ABOVE THE**
 248 **ONLY OPTIONS PREMIUMS AVAILABLE ON THAT DATE?**

249 **A.** No. The \$0.20-0.90/MMBtu range of options premiums shown above are
 250 for options strike prices at or near the underlying futures contract price,
 251 referred to as “at the money.” There are a range of options premiums and
 252 associated strike prices available for any given forward settlement month,
 253 with options premiums generally increasing over time and increasing
 254 (decreasing) for call (put) options for lower (higher) strike prices. On the
 255 trading date illustrated above, natural gas options for settlement in May
 256 2011 near the \$5.132/MMBtu futures contract settlement price ranged
 257 from a \$0.738/MMBtu premium for a \$4.90/MMBtu strike price to a
 258 \$0.647/MMBtu premium for a \$5.10/MMBtu strike price. Buying a swap

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259 on that day at \$5.132/MMBtu would have locked the Company into that
260 price for May 2011. However, if the Company had bought an option at the
261 \$5.10/MMBtu strike price by paying the \$0.647/MMBtu premium, it would
262 have capped its natural gas price exposure at \$5.10/MMBtu and not
263 limited its ability to benefit from downward price movement. As it turns
264 out, the May 2011 natural gas futures contract settled at \$4.377/MMBtu,
265 which means that the Company could have purchased natural gas in the
266 spot market at or near that price and let the \$5.10/MMBtu option expire
267 unused. Adding the \$0.647/MMBtu option premium to the Company's
268 May 2011 \$4.377/MMBtu natural gas cost would have resulted in a total
269 natural gas cost of \$5.024/MMBtu, \$0.108/MMBtu less than the alternative
270 cost of a concurrently executed swap at \$5.132/MMBtu.

271

272 **Q. HOW MANY NATURAL GAS OPTIONS WOULD BE REQUIRED TO**
273 **PLACE THE COMPANY IN AN EQUIVALENT VOLUMETRIC HEDGED**
274 **POSITION TO THE VOLUMETRIC HEDGED POSITION REFLECTED IN**
275 **THE NPC STUDY?**

276 A. Exhibit OCS-5.3 calculates that the Company would need to purchase
277 [REDACTED] call options and [REDACTED] put options to achieve an equivalent
278 volumetric hedged position to that reflected in the NPC study. Exhibit
279 OCS-5.3 also shows the breakout of the total number of call options and
280 put options that would be required by each of the [REDACTED] 12-month forward
281 time periods, based on the "bucketing" of swap volumes described above.

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282

283 **Q. WHY DO YOU EXPRESS THE VOLUMETRIC HEDGED POSITION FOR**
284 **POWER IN TERMS OF MMBTU OF NATURAL GAS?**

285 A. Converting the volumetric hedged position for power into MMBtu of natural
286 gas allows for a more straight forward combination of results in Exhibit
287 OCS-5.3. The net MWh of hedged power is converted to natural gas
288 assuming a relatively high heat rate of 10,000 Btu/kWh. Choosing a lower
289 heat rate for the conversion would reduce the required number of
290 equivalent natural gas options and the resultant total cost of this hedging
291 alternative.

292

293 **Q. WHAT IS THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE OPTIONS PRICING RESULTS**
294 **PRESENTED IN EXHIBIT OCS-5.3?**

295 A. The options pricing results presented in Exhibit OCS-5.3 are intended to
296 illustrate the potential costs to ratepayers of PacifiCorp's hedging
297 practices. Exhibit OCS-5.3 does this by using options premiums as a
298 measure of the cost of hedging the Test Period hedged volumes of natural
299 gas and power. The three different levels of options premiums assumed
300 in Exhibit OCS-5.3 reflect a range of options premiums that could be
301 available to purchase at any given point in time, and the potential cost of
302 using options is calculated at options premium levels of \$0.50/MMBtu,
303 \$0.75/MMBtu, and \$1.00/MMBtu. This can be seen at the bottom of
304 Exhibit OCS-5.3, where the total potential cost of hedging the Test Period

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305 volumes at the three levels of option premiums illustrated would be [REDACTED]
306 [REDACTED], [REDACTED], and [REDACTED], respectively. These potential
307 costs using financial options are presented in contrast to the net hedging
308 [REDACTED] that are included in the Test Period NPC study
309 based on the use of financial swaps for hedging. The cost of hedging
310 using options with a \$1.00/MMBtu options premium [REDACTED]
311 [REDACTED] included in the Test Period.

312

313 **Q. WHAT ARE THE ADVANTAGES OF USING FINANCIAL OPTIONS**
314 **RATHER THAN FINANCIAL SWAPS FOR HEDGING?**

315 A. The use of options limits exposure to adverse price movements but allows
316 the buyer to benefit from favorable price movements. For someone who
317 needs to buy a commodity, purchasing a call option protects the buyer
318 when market prices rise above the option strike price but allows the buyer
319 to benefit if market prices fall below the strike price. For someone who is
320 selling a commodity, buying a put option protects the buyer from price
321 movement below the strike price and allows the buyer to benefit if prices
322 move above the strike price.

323

324 **Q. WHY HAS THE COMPANY CHOSEN TO USE SWAPS RATHER THAN**
325 **OPTIONS FOR HEDGING NATURAL GAS AND POWER?**

326 A. One reason may be that the Company is concerned that the cost paid for
327 options that are not exercised will be disallowed. Buying an option is like

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328 buying an insurance policy and like an insurance policy, one hopes never
329 to have to use it, i.e., to exercise the option. Like an insurance policy, the
330 option provides protection against a significant adverse event. Assuring
331 recovery of reasonable options premium costs as an alternative to locking
332 in commodity prices through the use of swaps should be considered by
333 the Commission as a means to increase the hedging alternatives available
334 to the Company.

335

336 **Q. WHAT DO YOU CONCLUDE?**

337 A. I conclude that the Company's policy of hedging its natural gas and
338 electric price exposure up to ■ months in advance is not justified due to
339 limited market liquidity for future settlement months. I also conclude that
340 the Company should investigate alternatives to its ongoing trading
341 practices, including the use of financial options as a hedging tool to allow
342 ratepayers to benefit from favorable market price movements. Ratepayers
343 should have input into the Company's investigation to the extent that the
344 financial risk of the Company's trading practices are included in rates.

345

346 **Q. DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR TESTIMONY?**

347 A. Yes.

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Confidential Material Redacted

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Confidential Material Redacted

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Confidential Material Redacted

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Appendix 1

Lori Smith Schell, Ph.D.

Empowered Energy, 174 N. Elk Run, Durango, Colorado 81303

EDUCATION: Pennsylvania State University, 1988
Ph.D., Operations Research and Mineral Economics

University of Washington, 1979
B.A., Economics (Honors); Mortar Board and Phi Beta Kappa

RELEVANT EXPERIENCE:

EMPOWERED ENERGY

2002-Present

President and founder of this Colorado-based independent energy consulting firm specializing in power, natural gas, emissions and renewable energy markets.

- Testified on behalf of Utah Office of Consumer services on hedging-related issues with respect to implementation of an energy cost adjustment mechanism.
- Expert witness in multi-state Appalachian natural gas royalty litigation, including issues of prudence of long-term natural gas hedges, affiliate sales, spin-down of gathering and transportation facilities, post-production deductions and underlying cost-of-service, and natural gas liquids valuation and make-up volumes.
- Provided analytical support in Staff prudency review of natural gas and purchased power procurement practices of two western U.S. electric utilities.
- Direct fuels procurement and negotiate fuels supply and transportation contracts for a large state university in Colorado; similar work done for university in eastern U.S.
- Expert witness in Alberta electric rate case dealing with cost allocation between regulated and retail rates; instrumental in \$14.8 million rate reduction. Participated in two subsequent, related rate cases that were ultimately settled.

TRIGEN ENERGY CORPORATION

1999-2002

A New York-based combined heat & power company with 37 operating units specializing in energy efficiency, on-site cogeneration, trigeneration, and district energy systems.

***Director, Energy Risk Management, Project Advisory Group* 2000-2002**

***Director, Fuels Management, Division of Operating Assets* 1999-2000**

- As head of Risk Management Committee, developed and implemented corporate-wide risk management policy for electricity, fuels, and emissions allowances; responsible for related hedging and controls, mark-to-market determinations, and FAS 133 effectiveness tests.
- Directed commodity market analyses and issued electricity and primary energy forecasts for budgeting and hedging; electricity focus on NYISO, PJM, and Cinergy/Entergy.

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- Supported business development and existing operating assets with commodity and basis market analyses, forecasts, and in-depth natural gas pipeline and LDC tariff rate assessment.
- Provided contractual support and oversight for electricity and primary energy purchases and sales for all Trigen operating units.

AIR PRODUCTS AND CHEMICALS, INC.

1993-1999

A Pennsylvania-based Fortune 300 producer of industrial gases and chemicals, with production costs dominated by volatile electricity and natural gas prices.

Manager, Regulatory Affairs & Market Analysis, Corporate Energy

1995-1999

Senior Principal Energy Analyst, Corporate Energy

1993-1994

- Assessed potential benefits of renegotiating long-term natural gas supply agreement for a 120-MW Florida QF cogen facility; managed facility's daily natural gas supply and transportation (including capacity release) with the goal of optimizing commodity and regulatory costs.
- Responsible for intervening, testifying, and being cross-examined at the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) in proceedings directly impacting natural gas pipeline transportation costs to flagship Air Products facilities. Major cases addressed (i) market power and market-based rates, and (ii) appropriate pricing of pipeline expansions.
- Demonstrated cost-shifting impact of zone-gate rates and the inappropriateness of such rates on Koch Gateway's network pipeline system for a nine-member industrial coalition. Maintained coalition's direction and consensus while negotiating a 20 percent discount to settle the case.
- Underwent oral cross-examination to defend several rounds of written testimony analyzing and critiquing the market power analysis of Koch Gateway in the first major market power case brought before the FERC. Administrative Law Judge's initial decision in favor of opposing intervenors was ultimately upheld by the D.C. Circuit Court.
- Advocated interruptible transportation rate design changes applicable to Tennessee Gas Pipeline through written testimony at the FERC.
- Opposed incremental AFUDC calculations for expansion capacity by Florida Gas Transmission through written testimony at the FERC.
- Directed FERC interventions in four natural gas pipeline restructuring proceedings.

BENJAMIN SCHLESINGER AND ASSOCIATES, INC.

1988-1993

Boutique natural gas consulting firm providing project and market analysis from exploration and production downstream to the burnertip.

Project Manager/Senior Economist

1988-1993

- Provided contractual, regulatory, and deliverability risk evaluation (wellhead-to-burnertip) for a dozen project-financed natural gas-fired QF cogeneration units developed under PURPA.

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- Performed market valuation to support buy-out of a major international gas supply contract.
- Multi-client research relating existing natural gas spot markets to (developing) futures market.

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