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**BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH**

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In the Matter of the Application of Rocky Mountain Power for Authority to Increase its Retail Electric Utility Service Rates in Utah and for Approval of its Proposed Electric Service Schedules and Electric Service Regulations	<b>Docket No. 10-035-124</b>
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**PREFILED DIRECT TESTIMONY OF KEVIN C. HIGGINS**

**[REVENUE REQUIREMENT]**

**[Non-Confidential Version]**

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The UAE Intervention Group (UAE) hereby submits the Prefiled Direct Testimony of Kevin C. Higgins on revenue requirement issues.

DATED this 26<sup>th</sup> day of May, 2011.

/s/ \_\_\_\_\_  
Gary A. Dodge,  
Attorney for UAE

## CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served by email this 26<sup>th</sup> day of May, 2011, on the following:

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**BEFORE**  
**THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH**

Non-Confidential Version

**[Redacted confidential testimony highlighted]**

**Direct Testimony of Kevin C. Higgins**

**on behalf of**

**UAE**

**Docket No. 10-035-124**

**[Revenue Requirement]**

**May 26, 2011**

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**DIRECT TESTIMONY OF KEVIN C. HIGGINS**

**INTRODUCTION**

**Q. Please state your name and business address.**

A. My name is Kevin C. Higgins. My business address is 215 South State Street, Suite 200, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111.

**Q. By whom are you employed and in what capacity?**

A. I am a Principal in the firm of Energy Strategies, LLC. Energy Strategies is a private consulting firm specializing in economic and policy analysis applicable to energy production, transportation, and consumption.

**Q. On whose behalf are you testifying in this proceeding?**

A. My testimony is being sponsored by the Utah Association of Energy Users Intervention Group (“UAE”).

**Q. Are you the same Kevin C. Higgins who testified on behalf of UAE in the test period phase of this docket?**

A. Yes, I am.

**Q. Please describe your professional experience and qualifications.**

A. My academic background is in economics, and I have completed all coursework and field examinations toward a Ph.D. in Economics at the University of Utah. In addition, I have served on the adjunct faculties of both the University of Utah and Westminster College, where I taught undergraduate and graduate courses in economics. I joined Energy Strategies in 1995, where I assist private

23 and public sector clients in the areas of energy-related economic and policy  
24 analysis, including evaluation of electric and gas utility rate matters.

25 Prior to joining Energy Strategies, I held policy positions in state and local  
26 government. From 1983 to 1990, I was economist, then assistant director, for the  
27 Utah Energy Office, where I helped develop and implement state energy policy.  
28 From 1991 to 1994, I was chief of staff to the chairman of the Salt Lake County  
29 Commission, where I was responsible for development and implementation of a  
30 broad spectrum of public policy at the local government level.

31 **Q. Have you previously testified before this Commission?**

32 A. Yes. Since 1984, I have testified in twenty-six dockets before the Utah  
33 Public Service Commission on electricity and natural gas matters.

34 **Q. Have you testified previously before any other state utility regulatory  
35 commissions?**

36 A. Yes. I have testified in approximately 110 other proceedings on the  
37 subjects of utility rates and regulatory policy before state utility regulators in  
38 Alaska, Arkansas, Arizona, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas,  
39 Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, New  
40 York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia,  
41 Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. I have also filed affidavits in  
42 proceedings at the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.

43 A more detailed description of my qualifications is contained in  
44 Attachment A, attached to my prefiled direct test period testimony, filed  
45 previously in this docket.

46

47 **OVERVIEW AND CONCLUSIONS**

48 **Q. What is the purpose of your testimony in this proceeding?**

49 A. My testimony addresses certain revenue requirement issues in this general  
50 rate case. As part of my testimony, I make recommendations to adjust the  
51 revenue requirement proposed by Rocky Mountain Power (“RMP”).

52 **Q. What revenue increase is RMP recommending for the Utah jurisdiction?**

53 A. In its direct filing, RMP is proposing a revenue increase of \$232,416,309,  
54 or 13.7 percent on an annual basis. It should be noted, however, that RMP’s  
55 proposed revenue increase does not include the effects in current rates of  
56 Schedule 97 or Schedule 98, each of which is scheduled to expire at the start of,  
57 or close to the start of, the rate effective period.

58 Schedule 97 is a temporary percentage rider approved in Docket No. 10-  
59 035-89 that is recovering certain deferred costs associated with RMP’s first Major  
60 Plant Additions case. It is levied at an average rate of 1.56 percent for eight  
61 months; as such, it is scheduled to recover \$15.7 million and to terminate on  
62 August 31, 2011, shortly before the rate effective period in this case.

63 Schedule 98 is also a temporary percentage rider approved in Docket No.  
64 10-035-89 that is *crediting* customers for 2011 REC revenues in the amount of



65 approximately \$3.0 million per month (Utah). It is providing an average credit of  
66 2.39 percent and is scheduled to terminate at the start of the rate effective period  
67 in this case.

68 As neither of these riders is included in RMP's presentation of its revenue  
69 increase, the Commission should be aware that RMP's proposed rate increase, *as*  
70 *experienced by customers*, will include the net impact of the Schedule 97 charge  
71 and Schedule 98 credit terminating, which together represent an average rate  
72 increase to customers of 0.83 percent (relative to rates paid by customers over the  
73 first eight months of 2011). From a customer rate impact standpoint, this average  
74 increase of 0.83 percent is incremental to the 13.7 percent revenue requirement  
75 increase indicated by RMP.

76 **Q. Please summarize the revenue requirement adjustments you are**  
77 **recommending.**

78 A. My recommended revenue requirement adjustments total **\$95,021,912** for  
79 the test period ending June 2012, plus an additional **\$46,209,511** relating to  
80 deferrals from a prior period, for a total adjustment of **\$141,231,422** in the rate  
81 effective period. These adjustments are presented in Table KCH-1 below. My  
82 recommended adjustments are as follows:

83 (1) I recommend using the Rolled-in inter-jurisdictional allocation  
84 method, without a premium, to set rates in this case. This adjustment reduces the  
85 Utah revenue requirement by approximately **\$15,013,228** relative to RMP's filed

86 case. All subsequent adjustments presented in my testimony are estimated using  
87 the Rolled-in method.

88 (2) I recommend that the Commission deny RMP's proposal to adjust the  
89 depreciation rates for the Klamath Hydroelectric Project assets at this time, as  
90 such an adjustment is premature. This adjustment reduces RMP's Utah revenue  
91 requirement by approximately **\$1,713,249**.

92 (3) I recommend an adjustment to RMP's revenue requirement in this  
93 case to recognize a revenue credit attributable to the contributions from Oregon  
94 and California customers to fully fund RMP's maximum obligation for the cost of  
95 dam removal for the Klamath Hydroelectric Project. This adjustment exactly  
96 offsets the cost of removal allocated to Utah by RMP. This adjustment reduces  
97 RMP's Utah revenue requirement by approximately **\$7,449,210**.

98 (4) I recommend using a REC sales revenue projection of \$110.5 million  
99 for the test period. This adjustment reduces Utah's revenue requirement by  
100 approximately **\$33,029,029**.

101 (5) I recommend reversing a proposed RMP adjustment to ancillary  
102 revenue associated with an expiring contract. This adjustment reduces Utah's  
103 revenue requirement by approximately **\$1,063,097**.

104 (6) I recommend that a portion of RMP's environmental upgrade  
105 expenditures be determined to be imprudent because they are not cost effective, as  
106 explained by UAE witness Howard Gebhart. The Utah revenue requirement  
107 reduction, by facility, associated with this adjustment is as follows:

108	Hunter 1 Scrubber Upgrade	\$294,824
109	Hunter 2 Scrubber Upgrade	\$1,820,735
110	Huntington 1 Scrubber Upgrade	\$2,513,687
111	Dave Johnston 3 SO <sub>2</sub> Project	\$3,708,625
112	TOTAL	<b>\$8,337,870</b>

113 (7) I recommend that the Commission approve an overall wage and  
114 benefit expense equal to the Company's Calendar Year 2010 actual expense plus  
115 0.75 percent on an annualized basis, which is an increase of 1.13 percent  
116 applicable to the test period. Even though 2010 actual wage and benefit expense  
117 declined relative to 2009, on average, the year-over-year increase in RMP's wage  
118 and benefit expenses has been running about 0.75 percent between 2007 and  
119 2010. I recommend approval of wage and benefit expense in rates that is  
120 consistent with this three-year trend in RMP's wage and benefits costs. This  
121 adjustment reduces RMP's Utah revenue requirement by approximately  
122 **\$8,430,269.**

123 (8) I recommend adjusting RMP's non-labor O&M expense to remove its  
124 projected cost escalation increase for the test period. This adjustment reduces  
125 Utah revenue requirement by approximately **\$7,466,328.**

126 (9) Based on the analysis presented in the direct testimony of UAE  
127 witness Jeff J. Fishman, I am recommending that projected expenses stemming  
128 from RMP's gas swap transactions associated with a hedged position greater than  
129 75 percent of the Company's projected monthly gas requirement in the test period

130 be excluded from cost recovery. This adjustment reduces RMP's Utah revenue  
131 requirement by approximately **\$12,519,631**.

132 (10) One hundred percent of the REC revenues deferred since February  
133 22, 2010 should be credited to customers in this proceeding. For the deferral  
134 period running from February 22, 2010 through December 31, 2010, a sur-credit  
135 should be established at the start of the rate effective period in this case that will  
136 refund to customers Utah's share of the difference between actual REC revenues  
137 booked during the period and the REC revenues reflected in base rates approved  
138 by the Commission in its decision in Docket No. 09-035-23, plus interest. I  
139 recommend that this balance be credited back to customers over the one-year  
140 period September 21, 2011 through September 20, 2012. I estimate that the REC  
141 deferral for this period, inclusive of interest, is **\$46,209,511**.

142 (11) Utah customers should also be credited with a true-up to actual  
143 incremental REC revenue for the REC deferral period running from January 1,  
144 2011 through the start of the rate effective period (presumed to be September 21,  
145 2011). I recommend that this balance be credited back (or charged) to customers  
146 after the end of the one-year credit period described above. The amount of this  
147 sur-credit or surcharge for Utah customers is Utah's share of the difference  
148 between actual REC revenues booked during this period and the REC revenues  
149 reflected during this period in rates, including those assumed in base rates in the  
150 2009 general rate case and those collected through Schedule 98 and Schedule 40,

151 the latter of which incorporates incremental revenue associated with the Dunlap I  
 152 wind facility approved as part of the MPA II Docket, plus interest.

153 (11) Whether and how customers should be credited with REC revenues  
 154 booked by RMP prior to February 22, 2010, will presumably be addressed  
 155 following resolution of the Application filed by UIEC in Docket No. 11-035-46.  
 156 Accordingly, I do not specifically address that period in this testimony, other than  
 157 to address the circumstances and factors relevant to that time period and to note  
 158 the similarity of the same to the post-February 22, 2010 period.

**Table KCH-1**

**Summary of Revenue Requirement Impact of UAE Adjustments**

	<b>Adjustment</b>
<b>Adjustment to Reflect Rolled-In Allocation</b>	<b>(15,013,228)</b>
<b>Klamath Hydroelectric Depreciation</b>	<b>(1,713,249)</b>
<b>Klamath Surcharge Situs Adjustment</b>	<b>(7,449,210)</b>
<b>Test Period REC Revenue Adjustment</b>	<b>(33,029,029)</b>
<b>Ancillary Revenue Adjustment</b>	<b>(1,063,097)</b>
<b>Environmental Projects Disallowance</b>	
<b>Hunter Unit No. 1 Scrubber Upgrade</b>	<b>(294,824)</b>
<b>Hunter Unit No. 2 Scrubber Upgrade</b>	<b>(1,820,735)</b>
<b>Huntington Unit No. 1 Scrubber Upgrade</b>	<b>(2,513,687)</b>
<b>Dave Johnston Unit No. 3 SO<sub>2</sub> Project</b>	<b>(3,708,625)</b>
<b>Wage and Benefit Expense Adjustment</b>	<b>(8,430,269)</b>
<b>O&amp;M Escalation Adjustment</b>	<b>(7,466,328)</b>
<b>Natural Gas SWAP Disallowance</b>	<b>(12,519,631)</b>
<b>Sub-Total UAE Test Period Adjustments</b>	<b>(95,021,912)</b>
<b>2010 Deferred REC Revenue (Feb. 22, 2010 - Dec. 31, 2010)</b>	<b>(46,209,511)</b>
<b>Total UAE Rate Effective Period Adjustments</b>	<b>(\$141,231,422)</b>

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161

162 **INTER-JURISDICTIONAL COST ALLOCATION: MOVE TO ROLLED-IN**

163 **Q. What is the role of inter-jurisdictional cost allocation in an RMP general rate**  
164 **case?**

165 A. Because RMP is a multi-jurisdictional utility, it is necessary to allocate the  
166 Company's system costs among its various jurisdictions when conducting a  
167 general rate case. An inter-jurisdictional cost allocation methodology must be  
168 used for this purpose.

169 **Q. What inter-jurisdictional cost allocation methodologies have been utilized in**  
170 **Utah in recent rate cases?**

171 A. Rate cases filed since 2004 have shown inter-jurisdictional cost allocation  
172 results using both the Rolled-in method and the Revised Protocol method. Prior  
173 to that, Utah had used the Rolled-in method for several years. While there are  
174 several specific differences between these two methods, the most essential  
175 difference is that the Revised Protocol removes the benefits and costs of the west-  
176 side hydro system from the Utah revenue requirement, whereas the Rolled-in  
177 method allocates the benefits and costs of all system resources, including hydro,  
178 in a manner that is proportionate to jurisdictional load. Pursuant to a Stipulation  
179 that was conditionally approved by the Commission on December 14, 2004 in  
180 Docket No. 02-035-04, the revenue requirement for the Utah jurisdiction is  
181 determined by selecting the lesser of two revenue requirement calculations: one  
182 which uses the Revised Protocol method plus a premium (currently 0.25%,

183 applicable to the first nine months of the test period) or one using the Rolled-in  
184 method plus a premium (currently 1.0%).

185 **Q. Which inter-jurisdictional cost allocation method did RMP use in this**  
186 **proceeding?**

187 A. Consistent with each previous rate case filing in Utah made after 2004,  
188 RMP filed its case using the Revised Protocol method and the Rolled-in method.  
189 According to the Company's filing, Revised Protocol plus a premium of 0.25%  
190 applied to the first nine months of the test period produces a lower revenue  
191 requirement than Rolled-in plus a premium of 1.0%; consequently, RMP proposes  
192 to set Utah rates using the former. In addition, RMP's filing provides revenue  
193 requirement results using an alternative proposed allocation method, the "2010  
194 Protocol," which has been under discussion among RMP stakeholders as part of  
195 the Multi-State Process ("MSP"), and is the subject of a March 2011 filing by  
196 RMP in Docket No. 02-035-04. A number of Utah parties, including UAE, are  
197 engaged in discussions with RMP on this issue, but no agreement or Commission  
198 acceptance of this methodology has been reached.

199 **Q. What inter-jurisdictional cost allocation method should be used for setting**  
200 **rates in this case?**

201 A. I recommend using the Rolled-in method, without a premium, to set rates  
202 in this case.

203 **Q. Please explain your recommendation.**

204 A. In its Order in Docket No. 09-035-15, issued March 3, 2011, the  
205 Commission approved an Energy Balancing Account (“EBA”) for RMP. UAE  
206 has consistently maintained that if an EBA is adopted in Utah, as a condition of  
207 such adoption and for at least as long as an EBA remains in effect, inter-  
208 jurisdictional costs allocated to Utah should be set based on the Rolled-in  
209 allocation methodology. The reason for this linkage is that an EBA subjects Utah  
210 to hydro-related risk: a poor hydro year requires the procurement of replacement  
211 power, negatively impacting customers through the EBA. Yet a defining  
212 characteristic of the Revised Protocol method is that the benefits of west-side  
213 hydro resources are removed from the Utah revenue requirement.

214 In 2004, when the MSP Stipulation was filed and conditionally approved,  
215 there was no EBA in Utah. In my opinion, the adoption of an EBA subjecting  
216 Utah customers to hydro-related risk is a materially-changed circumstance, and I  
217 believe the continued use of the Revised Protocol to determine Utah’s allocated  
218 share of system revenue requirements in conjunction with an EBA would produce  
219 unjust and unreasonable results. In short, it would be fundamentally unreasonable  
220 for Utah customers to be fully subjected to hydro-related risk through the EBA  
221 while being denied a large proportion of system hydro benefits through the  
222 Revised Protocol allocation method.

223 In contrast, the Rolled-in method apportions to Utah a system hydro  
224 benefit that is proportionate to Utah’s load. By re-adopting the Rolled-in method,



225 without a premium, the system hydro benefits credited to Utah would be  
226 consistent with the system hydro risk allocated to Utah through the EBA.

227 **Q. How does your recommendation comport with the MSP?**

228 A. While adoption of my recommendation in this docket might appear to  
229 have implications for MSP discussions among representatives of PacifiCorp's  
230 jurisdictions, it is not intended to preclude or preempt a new, negotiated MSP  
231 resolution among those parties. Rather, my recommendation is tied to RMP's  
232 voluntary pursuit of an EBA; thus, my recommendation is more akin to the  
233 adoption of the MSP rate mitigation cap in the 2004 Stipulation, which governs  
234 inter-jurisdictional cost allocation to Utah, in co-existence with the MSP Revised  
235 Protocol among the signatory states.

236 **Q. As a party to the Utah MSP Stipulation dated June 28, 2004, in Docket 02-**  
237 **035-04 and as a party that supported ratification of the Revised Protocol in**  
238 **that docket, UAE agreed to work in good faith to address inter-jurisdictional**  
239 **issues being considered by the MSP Standing Committee. Has UAE done so?**

240 A. Yes. UAE, along with a number of other Utah participants, has actively  
241 monitored and participated in MSP Standing Committee activities over the past  
242 several years to address, among other things, concerns of Utah parties regarding  
243 continued application of Revised Protocol in Utah. In addition, UAE informed  
244 the MSP Standing Committee that adoption of an EBA in Utah would constitute a  
245 changed circumstance that would cause it to conclude in good faith that Revised  
246 Protocol would no longer produce just and reasonable results for Utah, and that

247 UAE intended to propose that adoption of any kind of an EBA should be  
248 conditioned upon simultaneous adoption of the Rolled-in allocation methodology  
249 for all inter-jurisdictional cost allocation ratemaking purposes in Utah.

250 **Q. What is the revenue requirement impact of your recommendation to re-**  
251 **adopt the Rolled-in inter-jurisdictional cost allocation methodology?**

252 A. Adoption of the Rolled-in inter-jurisdictional cost allocation methodology,  
253 without a premium, reduces the Utah revenue requirement by approximately  
254 **\$15,013,228** relative to RMP's filed case. This adjustment is presented in UAE  
255 Exhibit RR 1.1.

256 All subsequent adjustments presented in my testimony are estimated using  
257 the Rolled-in method.

258

259 **KLAMATH HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT**

260 **Q. Please explain your adjustments related to the Klamath Hydroelectric**  
261 **Project.**

262 A. RMP is proposing several adjustments pertaining to the Klamath  
263 Hydroelectric Project. The Company's rationale for these changes is tied to the  
264 Klamath Hydroelectric Settlement Agreement ("KHSA"). I recommend two  
265 adjustments relating to the Company's proposal: denial of RMP's proposal to  
266 change the depreciation rate for this project and recognition of revenues for the  
267 cost of dam removal that are being contributed by Oregon and California  
268 customers in support of their respective state policies regarding this project.

269 **Q. What is the KHSA?**

270 A. The KHSA is an agreement among PacifiCorp, the U.S. Government, the  
271 State of Oregon, the State of California and over two dozen other parties that was  
272 signed on February 28, 2010. The agreement resulted from PacifiCorp's efforts to  
273 relicense the Klamath Hydroelectric Project. The KHSA followed a non-binding  
274 Agreement in Principle signed in 2008 by PacifiCorp, the U.S. Secretary of the  
275 Interior, and the Governors of Oregon and California that established a framework  
276 for a final settlement agreement that would provide a presumptive path to dam  
277 removal no earlier than 2020. To the best of my knowledge, neither the State of  
278 Utah nor any representatives of Utah interests participated in the negotiation  
279 process or the agreements.

280 As described by RMP witness Dean S. Brockbank, the KHSA provides for  
281 the transfer of the Klamath Hydroelectric Project to a dam removal entity no  
282 earlier than 2020. The U.S. Secretary of the Interior is to conduct further studies  
283 and environmental review and must determine by March 2012 whether dam  
284 removal should proceed. Prior to this determination, federal legislation must be  
285 enacted to implement key provisions of the KHSA and to protect PacifiCorp and  
286 its customers from liabilities related to dam removal.

287 **Q. What special cost recovery is RMP seeking with respect to the KHSA and the**  
288 **Klamath Hydroelectric Project in this proceeding?**

289 A. There are several categories of costs that RMP seeks to recover in this  
290 case:

- 291           • The costs of relicensing and settlement, projected to be \$73.7 million system-  
292           wide, which RMP proposes to include in rate base and amortize over nine  
293           years. Utah's annual share of this cost is approximately \$7.8 million.<sup>1</sup> Note  
294           that pursuant to the Revised Protocol allocation method filed by RMP, much  
295           of this cost is removed through the Embedded Cost Differential, which  
296           removes west-side hydro benefits and costs from Utah. However, under the  
297           Rolled-in method, Utah retains this allocation of cost. The \$15 million  
298           revenue requirement reduction for Utah associated with the Rolled-in method,  
299           discussed above, already takes this cost into account. Although I have some  
300           concerns about PacifiCorp's request to begin collecting these costs in this rate  
301           case, I am not recommending any adjustments relative to these costs at this  
302           time.
- 303           • Cost of dam removal. Under the Revised Protocol, this cost is situs assigned  
304           to Oregon and California. Under the Rolled-in method, Utah retains this  
305           allocation of cost, which is already taken into account in the aforementioned  
306           \$15 million revenue requirement reduction for Utah associated with the  
307           Rolled-in method.
- 308           • Accelerated depreciation of the existing Klamath Hydroelectric Project assets  
309           and all new Project assets to coincide with the December 31, 2019 removal  
310           date anticipated in the KHSA.

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<sup>1</sup> Approximately \$3.55 million in depreciation expense plus \$4.25 million in return on rate base.

311 **Q. Do you have any comments with respect to the treatment of these costs in this**  
312 **rate proceeding?**

313 A. Yes. As noted above, the proposed removal of the Klamath Hydroelectric  
314 Project dams requires that certain milestones be met, including the passage of  
315 federal legislation. The federal legislation has yet to occur, and conceivably may  
316 not occur. In addition, significant funding will be required for removal to proceed  
317 per the terms of the KHSA. Whereas \$200 million of funding from PacifiCorp's  
318 Oregon and California ratepayers has either been approved or appears close to  
319 approval by those states' regulatory commissions, a second major funding source,  
320 up to \$250 million in bonds (or other financing) issued by the State of California,  
321 has yet to be enacted. In light of significant uncertainty as to whether or when  
322 dam removal will actually proceed, I believe it is premature to change the  
323 depreciation rates for the Klamath Hydroelectric Project assets at this time.  
324 Moreover, even if this adjustment were not premature, it is not clear that the cost  
325 of accelerated recovery of an asset that has not been providing full benefits to  
326 Utah ratepayers over its service life should be fully allocated to Utah.

327 **Q. What is your recommendation to the Commission with respect to RMP's**  
328 **proposed change in depreciation rates?**

329 A. I recommend that the Commission deny RMP's proposal to adjust the  
330 depreciation rates for the Klamath Hydroelectric Project assets at this time. The  
331 proposal is premature because the reality and timing of dam removal under the  
332 KHSA Agreement is speculative and uncertain.

333 **Q. What is the revenue impact of your recommendation to deny the proposed**  
334 **adjustment to the Klamath Hydroelectric Project depreciation rates?**

335 A. As shown in UAE Exhibit RR 1.2, this adjustment reduces RMP's Utah  
336 revenue requirement by **\$1,713,249**.

337 **Q. Do you have any other comments with respect to the treatment of Klamath-**  
338 **related costs in this rate proceeding?**

339 A. Yes. Just as it is premature to change the depreciation rates for the  
340 Klamath Hydroelectric Project assets at this time, it is also premature to charge  
341 Utah customers for cost of dam removal. However, it is important to note that  
342 Oregon and California customers, consistent with the support of their respective  
343 state governments, including utility regulators, for dam removal, have been (or are  
344 close to being) obligated to pay up to \$200 million to fully cover RMP's  
345 maximum exposure to the costs for this project. Yet, RMP's Rolled-in allocation  
346 to Utah does not recognize these revenues being contributed by Oregon and  
347 California customers to pay for dam removal. I do not believe this omission is  
348 reasonable. These special customer contributions are being made in furtherance  
349 of Oregon and California state policies to remove this RMP system resource.  
350 Therefore, it is appropriate for the revenues being recovered from these customers  
351 to be recognized as an offset to the cost of removal allocated to Utah.

352 Although it would be reasonable to deny recovery of Utah's share of the  
353 cost of removal at this time because it is premature, recognition of the revenues  
354 contributed by Oregon and California customers renders such an adjustment

355 moot. Therefore, I recommend that RMP's revenue requirement in this case be  
356 adjusted to recognize a revenue credit attributable to the contributions from  
357 Oregon and California customers to fully fund RMP's maximum obligation for  
358 the cost of removal. This adjustment exactly offsets the cost of removal allocated  
359 to Utah by RMP.

360 As shown in UAE Exhibit RR 1.3, this adjustment reduces RMP's Utah  
361 revenue requirement by **\$7,449,210**.

362

363 **RENEWABLE ENERGY CREDITS**

364 **Q. Generally, what role do renewable energy credits play in setting rates for**  
365 **RMP?**

366 A. RMP is able to sell the renewable energy "attributes" associated with the  
367 generation output of certain renewable generation facilities such as wind,  
368 geothermal, and small hydro plants. These attributes have value to other utilities  
369 and other RMP states that require specified amounts of renewable energy  
370 pursuant to state statutes and regulations. When these attributes are sold in the  
371 marketplace, the exchanged product has come to be known as Renewable Energy  
372 Credits ("RECs") or Green Tags. Because REC sales are made using assets that  
373 are paid for by customers, the revenues from REC sales are appropriately treated  
374 as a revenue credit against the revenue requirement recovered from customers.

375 **Q. What is the current level of REC revenues reflected in Utah rates?**

376 A. Base rates set in the last general rate case reflect REC revenue of \$18.6  
377 million per year on a Company-wide basis.<sup>2</sup> Utah's share of these revenues is  
378 approximately \$9.9 million. This level of REC revenues was approved by the  
379 Commission in Docket No. 09-035-23. In addition, as part of the stipulation  
380 approved by the Commission in Docket No. 10-035-89 ("MPA II"), a sur-credit  
381 that recognizes approximately \$3 million per month (Utah-allocated share) has  
382 been recognized in rates via Schedule 98 since January 1, 2011. In addition, this  
383 stipulation recognizes \$0.76 million of REC revenues from the Dunlap I wind  
384 facility in Utah rates effective January 1, 2011, implemented through Schedule  
385 40. Schedules 98 and 40 are intended to be in effect until the start of the rate-  
386 effective period in this case.

387 **Q. You have previously testified in the EBA case, Docket No. 09-035-15 and the**  
388 **last Major Plant Addition (MPA II) case, Docket No. 10-035-89, regarding**  
389 **the appropriate ratemaking treatment of REC revenues that are being**  
390 **deferred pursuant to Commission Order as a result of UAE's Application for**  
391 **deferred accounting of incremental REC revenue in Docket No. 10-035-14.**  
392 **How does that discussion relate to your testimony in this proceeding?**

393 A. I will address the appropriate ratemaking treatment of these deferred REC  
394 revenues below, in a separate section of my direct testimony in this case. This  
395 section of my testimony will address only the appropriate level of REC revenues

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<sup>2</sup> Unless explicitly stated otherwise, all references to REC sales values in my testimony will be on a total Company basis.



396 that should be projected for the test period in this case, from July 1, 2011 to June  
397 30, 2012.

398 **Q. Please proceed. What level of REC revenues has RMP projected for the test**  
399 **period?**

400 A. In its filing, RMP's projects \$55.7 million of REC revenues in the test  
401 period. This is significantly less than actual base period (ending June 2010) REC  
402 revenues of approximately \$98.5 million. It is also significantly less than actual  
403 calendar year 2010 REC revenues of \$101.1 million. In his direct testimony,  
404 RMP witness Stefan Bird attributes a large part of this differential to uncertainty  
405 in the California market associated with the pendency of a major ruling by the  
406 California Public Utilities Commission ("CPUC") concerning the eligibility of  
407 using out-of-state resources for compliance with California renewable energy  
408 requirements. According to Mr. Bird, prior to the issuance of CPUC Decision 11-  
409 01-025 (which was issued on January 14, 2011, shortly before RMP's filing), the  
410 California REC market had become "paralyzed." The subsequent issuance of  
411 CPUC Decision 11-01-025, which authorizes the use of tradable renewable  
412 energy credits ("TRECs") for compliance with a portion of California Renewables  
413 Portfolio Standard ("RPS") requirements, and lifts a stay on the use of TRECs  
414 imposed by a prior CPUC decision, has now alleviated a significant portion of the  
415 uncertainty concerning access to the California market referenced by Mr. Bird,  
416 and is allowing transactions to proceed.

417 **Q. What further developments have occurred in the California market since the**  
 418 **filing of RMP’s direct testimony?**

419 A. On March 1, 2011, the three large California investor-owned utilities  
 420 (“IOUs”) submitted their RPS compliance reports as mandated by CPUC  
 421 Decision 05-07-039. Those compliance reports identify “historic performance in  
 422 the RPS program, current year targets and procurement data, and forecast targets  
 423 and procurement data for at least three years.”<sup>3</sup> Based on renewable procurement  
 424 data in these reports, the utilities expect to continue to utilize TRECs in their RPS  
 425 portfolios at higher levels than 2010, with steady growth through at least year  
 426 2014. Current and forecasted TREC procurement details for Southern California  
 427 Edison (SCE), Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E) and San Diego Gas and Electric  
 428 (SDG&E) are shown in Table KCH-2, below.

429 **Table KCH-2**

430 **California IOU TREC Forecast<sup>4</sup>**

<b>SCE Procurement Detail</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>
Existing TREC Contracts:	1,331,598	1,070,314	2,014,233	2,787,410	2,787,410
TREC Contracts Pending Approval:	0	194,840	835,374	1,046,347	892,288
<b>Total TREC Contracts:</b>	<b>1,331,598</b>	<b>1,265,154</b>	<b>2,849,607</b>	<b>3,833,757</b>	<b>3,679,698</b>

<b>PG&amp;E Procurement Detail</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>
Existing TREC Contracts:	1,489,954	2,718,594	2,152,411	2,385,230	2,671,550
TREC Contracts Pending Approval:	1,429,525	1,613,650	605,000	605,000	605,000
<b>Total TREC Contracts:</b>	<b>2,919,479</b>	<b>4,332,244</b>	<b>2,757,411</b>	<b>2,990,230</b>	<b>3,276,550</b>

<b>SDG&amp;E Procurement Detail</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>
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<sup>3</sup> Source: <http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUC/energy/Renewables/compliance.htm>

<sup>4</sup> Source: IOUs’ RPS Compliance Reports, March 1, 2011. Available at [www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUC/energy/Renewables/compliance.htm](http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUC/energy/Renewables/compliance.htm)

Existing TREC Contracts:	724,863	656,441	635,000	635,000	635,000
TREC Contracts Pending Approval:	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total TREC Contracts:</b>	<b>724,863</b>	<b>656,441</b>	<b>635,000</b>	<b>635,000</b>	<b>635,000</b>

<b>Total: SCE, PG&amp;E and SDG&amp;E Combined Procurement Detail</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>
Existing TREC Contracts:	3,546,415	4,445,349	4,801,644	5,807,640	6,093,960
TREC Contracts Pending Approval:	1,429,525	1,808,490	1,440,374	1,651,347	1,497,288
<b>Total TREC Contracts:</b>	<b>4,975,940</b>	<b>6,253,839</b>	<b>6,242,018</b>	<b>7,458,987</b>	<b>7,591,248</b>

431 **Q. What inferences can you draw regarding the continued demand in the**  
 432 **California market for TRECs during the test period in this case?**

433 A. As shown in Table KCH-2, the projected demand in California for TRECs  
 434 continues to be strong in 2011 and 2012, which overlaps the test period in this  
 435 case. The projected demand continues to be strong beyond the test period as well.

436 **Q. What conclusion do you draw based on this information?**

437 A. I conclude that it would not be reasonable to assume that regulatory  
 438 uncertainty in California will cause a fall-off in TREC sales to that state relative  
 439 to 2010. Indeed Southern California Edison, Pacific Gas and Electric, and San  
 440 Diego Gas and Electric have recently issued, in May 2011, a Request for Offers  
 441 for TRECs for the period of 2011 and beyond.

442 **Q. Have there been other developments with implications for REC sales in the**  
 443 **test period?**

444 A. Yes. As indicated in RMP's Confidential Response to DPU 10.52, the  
 445 Company has entered into a REC sales agreement with [REDACTED].

446 **Q. Has RMP updated its forecast of REC sales for the test period?**

447 A. Yes. As of the date of this testimony, RMP has updated its REC revenue  
448 projections twice. The first update occurred on March 17, 2011, when the  
449 Company increased its projection to \$76.3 million.<sup>5</sup> Then, on March 28, RMP  
450 further updated its test period forecast for REC sales to \$86.1 million.<sup>6</sup>

451 **Q. What is your assessment of RMP's updated forecast?**

452 A. In my opinion, the most recent updated forecast provided by RMP in the  
453 data response referenced still understates the likely value of REC revenues that  
454 will be received in the test period, just as its prior forecasts in this docket did. For  
455 ratemaking purposes, the REC revenue credit should be set substantially higher  
456 than any of RMP's projections.

457 **Q. Please explain the basis of your assessment.**

458 A. There are two main components of RMP's REC sales projection for the  
459 test period: (1) known transactions and (2) projected incremental transactions. As  
460 of March 28, 2011, the known REC transactions for the test period have a value  
461 of [REDACTED] million. RMP's projected incremental transactions amount to only [REDACTED]  
462 million.

463 RMP calculates the value of the projected incremental transactions by  
464 assuming that it can sell the RECs associated with 75 percent of the wind output  
465 that remains after the RECs needed to meet RMP's Oregon and California RPS's  
466 are subtracted from total wind output. Of this 75 percent target, a portion is used  
467 for the known transactions. RMP then values the remaining RECs (of the 75

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<sup>5</sup> Source: Confidential RMP Response to DPU 10.52. It is my understanding that the price and quantity of these projected sales are confidential, but that projected total revenue is not.

468 percent target) at a price of only \$7.00 per REC to estimate the value of the  
469 projected incremental transactions. RMP also projects approximately [REDACTED] million  
470 for sales of vintage RECs.

471 RMP's price estimate of \$7.00/REC for its projected incremental  
472 transactions is [REDACTED] than the average transaction price for known  
473 wind transactions in the test period of [REDACTED]/REC and dramatically lower than  
474 RMP's average REC sale price in 2010 or 2009 of [REDACTED]/REC and [REDACTED]/REC,  
475 respectively. RMP's assumed pricing of incremental sales at a [REDACTED] of average  
476 actual prices gives rise to the Company's unreasonably low estimate of test period  
477 REC revenues.

478 **Q. How accurate has RMP's approach to projecting REC revenues in general**  
479 **rate cases been in recent years?**

480 A. Not very accurate. RMP has significantly under-projected the REC  
481 revenues in its recent rate cases in Utah and Wyoming. In the 2009 Utah general  
482 rate case, RMP initially projected REC sales revenues of \$7.4 million for the test  
483 period ending June 2010. This estimate was subsequently revised to \$18.6  
484 million in RMP's rebuttal filing. Actual REC revenues for the test period turned  
485 out to be \$98.5 million. While certain extraordinary conditions occurred during  
486 the pendency of that rate case, which I will address later in my testimony, RMP  
487 also significantly underestimated REC revenues for Calendar Year 2010 in a  
488 subsequent Wyoming docket.

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<sup>6</sup> Source: Confidential RMP Response to DPU 10.52-2, 1<sup>st</sup> Supplemental.

489 **Q. How much did RMP's projections in Wyoming underestimate actual REC**  
490 **sales for Calendar Year 2010?**

491 A. In its October 2, 2009 filing in the 2009 Wyoming general rate case,  
492 Docket 20000-352-ER-09, RMP projected REC revenues of \$36.4 million for the  
493 test period ending December 2010. Based on discovery produced during the  
494 course of the case, parties to the case stipulated to a sales projection of \$84.4  
495 million, with a one-time true-up. Actual REC revenues in the test period turned  
496 out to be \$101.1 million.

497 **Q. Did you offer a REC sales projection in that Wyoming case?**

498 A. Yes.

499 **Q. What was it?**

500 A. I estimated REC sales of \$95.2 million – which was more accurate than  
501 RMP's projection, but which still understated actual results.

502 **Q. Does the use of a test period 17¼ months beyond the filing date have**  
503 **implications for the REC revenue projection in this case?**

504 A. Yes. Because RMP consistently uses a sales price for projected  
505 incremental sales that is dramatically lower than the price of known transactions,  
506 the Company's REC sales forecast turns out to be very sensitive to the length of  
507 the forecast horizon. The further out the test period extends from the forecast, the  
508 fewer the known transactions, and the more likely the Company's approach will  
509 lead to an understatement of REC revenues. This concern was one of the reasons  
510 I proposed a closer-in-time test period, and this is one of RMP's projections that

511 should be carefully scrutinized, as suggested in the Commission's test period  
512 order.

513 **Q. What projected level of REC sales revenue should be used in setting rates in**  
514 **this case?**

515 A. I recommend using a REC sales revenue projection of \$110.5 million for  
516 the test period.

517 **Q. How did you derive this value?**

518 A. I start with the most recent information provided by RMP regarding the  
519 value of known transactions. I then estimate that 50 percent of the still-available  
520 wind RECs will be sold at a price that is 90 percent of the average price of known  
521 transactions in the test period.

522 **Q. Why do you believe it is reasonable to estimate that wind RECs will be sold**  
523 **at a price that is 90 percent of the average price of known transactions in the**  
524 **test period?**

525 A. The best proxy price for incremental REC sales would be to use the  
526 average price of known transactions in the test period, which is █████/REC.  
527 However, I am only proposing to use 90 percent of this price (█████/REC) to be  
528 conservative. I note that this price is comparable to the average REC sales price  
529 registered by RMP in 2010 of █████/REC and is consistent with RMP's  
530 projection of wind REC price forecast provided in discovery of █████/REC for

531 2011 and █████/REC for 2012.<sup>7</sup> In contrast, RMP's assumption that incremental  
532 REC sales will occur at a price of only \$7.00/MWH is simply not credible in light  
533 of the price of known transactions, as well as RMP's own wind REC price  
534 forecast. Use of the \$7.00/MWH price to forecast the value of incremental REC  
535 sales is not reasonable as it is likely to significantly understate the value of the  
536 REC revenue credit to Utah customers, resulting in rates that are artificially high.

537 **Q. Why do you believe it is reasonable to estimate that 50 percent of still-**  
538 **available wind RECs will be sold?**

539 A. This conservative projection is informed by several factors. For example,  
540 in 2010, RMP's actual REC sales were █████ percent of the RECs predicted by  
541 RMP to be available for that year. My estimate is equivalent to RMP selling █████  
542 percent of the RECs predicted by the Company to be available for the test period  
543 – less than last year's actual performance on a percentage basis.

544 Further, as shown in Confidential UAE Exhibit RR 1.4, page 6, my REC  
545 sales volume estimate for the test period represents projected growth over 2010  
546 volumes of █████ percent, whereas RMP's estimate of RECs available for sale is  
547 projected to grow by █████ percent. Meanwhile, as shown in Table KCH-2, above,  
548 the important California TREC market is projected to grow by 25.7 percent  
549 between 2010 and 2011, with 2012 TREC purchases holding fairly steady relative  
550 to 2011.

551 **Q. How does your REC sales volume estimate compare with that of RMP?**

---

<sup>7</sup> RMP Response to UAE 5.4, Confidential Attachment UAE 5.4.



552 A. The two estimates are very close. As shown in Confidential UAE Exhibit  
553 RR 1.4, page 6, my estimate exceeds RMP's by less than 0.2 percent.

554 **Q. What is the revenue requirement impact of your test period REC revenue**  
555 **adjustment?**

556 A. My recommended adjustment is presented in Confidential UAE Exhibit  
557 RR 1.4. This adjustment reduces Utah's revenue requirement by approximately  
558 **\$33,029,029.**

559

#### 560 **ANCILLARY REVENUE**

561 **Q. Please explain your adjustment to ancillary revenue.**

562 A. In its filed case, RMP removed approximately \$2.5 million in ancillary  
563 revenue from its total Company revenue requirement to reflect the termination of  
564 an ancillary services contract on December 31, 2011. Because the contract  
565 terminates midway through RMP's test period, the Company made an adjustment  
566 that removes 50 percent of the annual revenue derived from this contract.<sup>8</sup>

567 The contract in question is long-term in nature. RMP has stated in  
568 discovery that "the Company is in discussion over terms and conditions for a new  
569 contract but nothing is final at this time."<sup>9</sup> The counterparty is a public entity that  
570 has entered into an agreement to purchase from a third party the energy and  
571 environmental attributes of a wind generating facility. The counterparty has  
572 stated in public documents that it is "critical" that it acquire, prior to 2012,

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<sup>8</sup> Exhibit RMP\_\_(SRM-3), p. 3.6.'

<sup>9</sup> RMP Response to UAE 8.1(d).

573 transmission and/or integration and exchange services from RMP for the last ten  
574 years of its wind purchase agreement. A copy of this public document is included  
575 in Confidential UAE Exhibit RR 1.5.<sup>10</sup> Given the apparent dependence of the  
576 counterparty on RMP for provision of some type of service going forward, RMP's  
577 assumption that zero revenue will be recovered from this ancillary services  
578 agreement after December 31, 2011 seems highly implausible. Although the  
579 revenue may wind up increasing or decreasing, the best assumption for  
580 ratemaking purposes is to retain the revenues in the revenue requirement at the  
581 status quo. Consequently, I have made an adjustment that reverses RMP's  
582 adjustment and restores the full annual revenue as a credit in rates.

583 **Q. What is the revenue requirement impact of your adjustment?**

584 A. This adjustment is presented in UAE Exhibit RR 1.6. This adjustment  
585 reduces Utah's revenue requirement by approximately **\$1,063,097**.

586

587 **IMPRUDENCE OF CERTAIN ENVIRONMENTAL UPGRADE**

588 **EXPENDITURES**

589 **Q. What recommendation are you making with respect to RMP's**  
590 **environmental expenditures?**

591 A. I am recommending that a portion of RMP's environmental upgrade  
592 expenditures be determined to be imprudent because they are not cost effective, as

---

<sup>10</sup> Although this document is public and came into my possession over the internet, RMP has treated the identity of the counterparty and the details surrounding this contract as confidential. Consequently, I am presenting it in a confidential exhibit.

593 explained by UAE witness Howard Gebhart. The imprudent expenditures pertain  
594 to the Company's share of costs for scrubbers/SO<sub>2</sub> reduction projects at the  
595 following plants:

596 **Huntington Unit No. 1**

597 Total Disallowed Expenditure: \$52.5 million

598 RMP share: 100%

599 In service dates: Nov. 2010, Dec. 2010, Mar. 2011

600

601 **Hunter Unit No. 1**

602 Total Disallowed Expenditure: \$19.8 million

603 RMP Share: 93.75%

604 In service date: Mar. 2012

605

606 **Hunter Unit No. 2**

607 Total Disallowed Expenditure: \$70.2 million

608 RMP Share: 60.31%

609 In service dates: May 2011, Mar. 2012

610

611 **Dave Johnston Unit No. 3**

612 Total Disallowed Expenditure: \$78 million<sup>11</sup>

613 RMP Share: 100% In service date: May 2010

614

615 **Q. Why should Mr. Gebhart's findings that these investments are not cost**  
616 **effective be the grounds for a finding of imprudence and disallowance of cost**  
617 **recovery by this Commission?**

618 A. Only those costs that are reasonably incurred to provide service to  
619 customers should be recovered in rates. Mr. Gebhart has demonstrated that these

---

In a very recent data response, RMP suggested that this cost figure is too high, despite the fact that it is the same number reported by RMP to the Wyoming Department of Environmental Quality (WDEQ) and relied on by the WDEQ in preparing its BART analysis. UAE has not yet had adequate time to explore RMP's recent claims, but will do so prior to the next round of testimony. I note that, even at the lower incremental cost now claimed by RMP, the upgrade option selected by RMP is not cost-effective according to an analysis provided by RMP's consultants. If RMP's revised numbers are accurate, it will reduce my proposed disallowance for this facility, but will not eliminate it.

620 expenditures were voluntary, in that RMP was not required by existing or  
621 reasonably anticipated environmental regulatory requirements or authorities to  
622 make these investments. Nor can the investments reasonably be construed to be  
623 cost effective in contributing to meaningful environmental improvements.  
624 Customers should not be expected to pay for utility investments that are neither  
625 necessary nor cost effective.

626 **Q. Is your recommendation for disallowance indicative of an unwillingness of**  
627 **UAE members to pay for environmental improvement costs?**

628 A. No, not at all. Mr. Gebhart carefully considered each environmental  
629 upgrade investment that is proposed in this case for inclusion in rate base and  
630 evaluated each on its merit. In many instances, Mr. Gebhart identified  
631 investments that were not required by regulators, but nonetheless proved to be  
632 cost effective in terms of achieving environmental improvement. UAE is not  
633 recommending disallowance of such costs. Rather, UAE's recommendation for  
634 disallowance is limited to the most egregious examples of unnecessary  
635 expenditures.

636 **Q. What is the revenue requirement impact of UAE's recommendation for**  
637 **disallowance?**

638 A. The revenue requirement impact of the disallowance is presented in UAE  
639 Exhibit RR 1.7. The Utah revenue requirement reduction, by facility, is as  
640 follows:

641	Hunter 1 Scrubber Upgrade	\$294,824
642	Hunter 2 Scrubber Upgrade	\$1,820,735
643	Huntington 1 Scrubber Upgrade	\$2,513,687
644	Dave Johnston 3 SO <sub>2</sub> Project	\$3,708,625
645	TOTAL	<b>\$8,337,870</b>

646 **Q: You include a disallowance for Dave Johnston Unit #3. Are the impacts of**  
647 **the SO<sub>2</sub> upgrade costs for that unit being included in Utah rates for the first**  
648 **time in this docket?**

649 A: No, they were first brought into Utah rates as a result of a stipulation in the  
650 first Major Plant Additions case (“MPA I”) on July 1, 2010.

651 **Q: If you did not challenge the inclusion of these costs in rates at that time, why**  
652 **are you challenging them now?**

653 A: The MPA statute is designed to permit RMP to recover the annual revenue  
654 requirement impact of a major plant addition as soon as it goes into service. The  
655 MPA I stipulation was intended to resolve this immediate revenue requirement  
656 impact of the facilities addressed in that case, which it did. My testimony here  
657 does not address the annual revenue requirement allowed into rates under the  
658 MPA I Stipulation. That stipulation has no further relevance when the facilities  
659 are rolled into base rates in this general rate case. This is the first time that the  
660 prudence of the Dave Johnston Unit #3 scrubber upgrade facilities has been  
661 challenged before this Commission.

662 **WAGE AND BENEFITS EXPENSE**

663 **Q. What is RMP proposing for its wage and benefit expense?**

664 A. RMP is proposing an increase of \$34.9 million (total Company), or 7.2%,  
665 over the wage and benefit expense for the historical period ending June 2010. A  
666 summary of the Company's wage and benefit expense history since 2007 is  
667 presented in UAE Exhibit RR 1.8, page 3. This exhibit also presents RMP's  
668 proposed wage and benefit expense for the test period ending June 2012.

669 **Q. What are your observations concerning RMP's proposed wage and benefit**  
670 **expense?**

671 A. RMP's actual annual wage and benefit expense (which excludes  
672 capitalized labor) for the period 2007 through 2010 ranged between \$483 million  
673 and \$502 million. The maximum expense occurred in 2009. In 2010, wage and  
674 benefit expense fell to \$494 million, and for the period ending June 2010 (filed in  
675 this case), it was \$485 million.

676 The wage and benefit expense that RMP is proposing to be included in  
677 rates is materially greater than the Company's experience over the past four years:  
678 it is 5.2% greater than actual 2010 expense and, as noted above, 7.2% greater than  
679 the actual expense for the 12 months ending June 2010. The trend line for the  
680 four calendar years plus RMP's proposal for 2011 is shown in Figure KCH-1  
681 below.

682

**Figure KCH-1**


683

**RMP Wage and Employee Benefits**

684

**2007-2012**

685



686

687

688 **Q. What are the main drivers behind RMP’s proposed increase in wages and**  
689 **benefits?**

690 A. As shown in UAE Exhibit RR 1.8, page 3, two significant components of  
691 the increase are pension expense (an increase of \$10.3 million relative to 2010)  
692 and medical benefits (\$5.8 million increase). RMP is also proposing an increase  
693 of \$7.1 million in its annual incentive program, while regular wage expense  
694 (“regular ordinary time”) is proposed to increase by \$16.4 million.

695 **Q. Has any other utility commission recently ruled on RMP’s proposed wage**  
696 **and benefit expense in a general rate case?**

697 A. Yes. On February 28, 2011, the Idaho Public Utilities Commission issued  
698 its Order in RMP's general rate proceeding, Case No. PAC-E-10-07. On the  
699 subject of wages, the Idaho Commission Staff cited to the difficult economic  
700 conditions prevalent in the Company's Idaho service territory and proposed that  
701 all wage increases awarded by the Company to its employees during 2009 and  
702 2010 be disallowed in rates. The Idaho Commission concurred, ruling that:  
703 The Commission finds that in challenging economic times the local economy in  
704 the Company's service area is a greater indicator as to the appropriateness of a  
705 wage increase than market data and industry averages. We find no demonstration  
706 by the Company that the union and non-union wage increases were required for  
707 the Company to be a competitive employer able to retain or attract employees.  
708 We find no evidence that without the union and non-union wage increase the  
709 service provided by the Company would be degraded and safety compromised.  
710 We find that as a certificated provider of service RMP has elected to be a member  
711 of the communities it serves. We find Staff's proposed wage adjustment to be  
712 reasonable. The Company may choose to implement its wage increases, but we  
713 will not allow recovery of that expense from its Idaho customers. [Order 32196 at  
714 18-19]  
715

716 **Q. What is your recommendation for addressing RMP's proposed increase in**  
717 **wage and benefit expense?**

718 A. I agree with the Idaho Commission that it is important to be sensitive to  
719 the economic conditions faced by customers when determining the amount of  
720 increased wage and benefit expense that will be passed on to those customers in  
721 rates. Utilities should not be exempt from the belt-tightening that its customers  
722 must endure during challenging economic circumstances. I find it especially  
723 troubling that RMP is proposing to recover an additional 26.7% (\$7.1 million) for



724 its incentive pay plan at a time when the Company is proposing to increase Utah  
725 rates by a very substantial 13.7 percent.<sup>12</sup>

726 As shown in UAE Exhibit RR 1.8, RMP's *actual* wage and benefit  
727 expense has been relatively contained within the past four years: indeed the  
728 Company's wage and benefit expense was only 2.24 percent higher in 2010 than  
729 it was in 2007. It is only when we come to the projected test period used for  
730 setting rates that a projected large year-over-year jump occurs.

731 From a regulatory standpoint, it is not necessary to adjust each line item of  
732 the Company's wage and benefit expense, particularly when using a future test  
733 period. My recommendation is that the Commission set an overall level of wage  
734 and benefit expense that is acceptable in rates, recognizing that it is RMP's choice  
735 to pursue a test period that extends significantly into the future and the  
736 Commission must use its best judgment to ascertain the level of projected wage  
737 and benefit expense that ratepayers should bear. For the purposes of this case, I  
738 recommend that the Commission approve an overall wage and benefit expense  
739 equal to the Company's Calendar Year 2010 actual expense plus 0.75 percent on  
740 an annualized basis, which is an increase of 1.13 percent for the test period  
741 relative to 2010. This approach results in a wage and benefit expense for  
742 ratemaking purposes of \$499.7 million (total Company).

743 **Q. Why do you propose allowing a 0.75 percent annualized increase over the**  
744 **level experienced in the year ending December 2010?**

---

<sup>12</sup> When the termination of Schedules 97 and 98 is taken into account, the increase is closer to 14.5 percent.

745 A. Such an increase is consistent with the Company's experience over the  
746 past several years. Even though 2010 actual wage and benefit expense declined  
747 relative to 2009, on average, the year-over-year increase in RMP's wage and  
748 benefit expenses has been running about 0.75 percent since 2007. I recommend  
749 approval of wage and benefit expense in rates that is consistent with this three-  
750 year trend in RMP's wage and benefits costs.

751 **Q. What is the revenue requirement impact of your recommendation?**

752 A. As shown in Table KCH-1, my recommendation reduces RMP's Utah  
753 revenue requirement by **\$8,430,269**. The impact of this adjustment on net  
754 operating income is shown in UAE Exhibit RR 1.8.

755

## 756 **O&M COST ESCALATION**

757 **Q. What adjustment are you proposing with respect to non-labor O&M**  
758 **expense?**

759 A. I am proposing an adjustment to remove the inflation escalator applied by  
760 RMP to its test period non-labor O&M expense.

761 **Q. Please explain the basis for your adjustment.**

762 A. The non-labor O&M expense projected by RMP for the test period  
763 contains a cost escalation component to reflect projected inflation for the period  
764 extending from July 2010 through June 2012.

765 To apply this cost escalator, RMP starts with its actual non-labor O&M  
766 expense for the base period, July 2009 to June 2010. RMP then applies a series of

767 escalation factors to the base-period cost of its materials and services using  
768 indices for electric utility costs produced by Global Insight.

769 From a ratemaking perspective, I have two serious concerns with this  
770 approach.

771 First, at a broad policy level, I have concerns as an economist about  
772 regulatory pricing formulations that reinforce inflation. This occurs when  
773 *projections* of inflation are built into formulas that are used to set  
774 administratively-determined prices, such as utility rates. Such pricing  
775 mechanisms help to make inflation a self-fulfilling prophesy. As a matter of  
776 public policy, this is a serious concern. It is one thing to adjust for inflation after  
777 the fact; it is another to help guarantee it. For this reason, I believe that regulators  
778 should use extreme caution before approving prices that guarantee inflation before  
779 it occurs.

780 **Q. What is your second major concern?**

781 A. A related, but distinct, concern involves the building of this “cost cushion”  
782 into the Company’s test period costs. Allowing this type of systemic uplift in  
783 rates goes well beyond the basic rationale advanced by advocates for using a  
784 projected test period, which is to ameliorate the effect of regulatory lag on the  
785 recovery of investment in new plant. The best evidence of what it costs RMP for  
786 non-labor O&M is the Company’s actual costs recorded in the base period. The  
787 cost increases represented by the escalation factors may or may not come to  
788 fruition. In any case, RMP should be expected to strive to improve its O&M

789 efficiency on a continuous basis, and thereby lessen the net impact of inflation on  
790 its O&M costs. It is not reasonable to simply gross up the Company's actual base  
791 period costs by an index factor and pass these costs on to customers.

792 **Q. Are there ever situations in which inflation should be considered in this**  
793 **context?**

794 A. Yes. The United States experienced major inflation during the late 1970s.  
795 In that type of severe increasing-cost environment, some consideration for O&M  
796 inflation in a projected test period would probably be necessary. However, we are  
797 very far from such a cost environment. Inflation in the United States has been at  
798 very low levels for several years. While world events have caused recent spikes  
799 in some energy and food prices, the prospects for core inflation, which excludes  
800 these two relatively volatile pricing components, remain subdued.

801 **Q. Can you cite to any independent sources to support your contention that the**  
802 **prospects for core inflation remain subdued?**

803 A. Yes. I have reviewed the published Minutes of the Federal Reserve Open  
804 Market Committee since the beginning of the year. The Minutes of the April 26-  
805 27, 2011 meeting indicate that the Fed's central tendency forecast for core  
806 inflation is in the range of 1.3% to 1.6% for 2011, and 1.3% to 1.8% for 2012.

807 **Q. What alternative for establishing non-labor O&M expense for the projected**  
808 **test year do you recommend?**

809 A. I recommend adjusting RMP's non-labor O&M expense to remove its  
810 projected cost escalation increase for the test period. The impact of this  
811 adjustment is shown in UAE Exhibit RR 1.9.

812 **Q. What is the impact of your recommended adjustment on Utah revenue**  
813 **requirement?**

814 A. This adjustment reduces Utah revenue requirement by **\$7,466,328**.

815 **Q. Does removing the cost escalation from non-labor O&M prevent RMP from**  
816 **recovering increased O&M costs associated with new facilities?**

817 A. No. Incremental O&M cost for new facilities is presented in a separate  
818 adjustment by RMP and is not affected by this adjustment.

819 **Q. Does removing the cost escalation from non-labor O&M eliminate the effects**  
820 **of all input-related price changes from the general rate case?**

821 A. No. As I discussed above, I am recommending a modest increase in rates  
822 to account for higher wage and benefit costs, which includes labor input prices.  
823 Even more significantly, the revenue requirement for net power costs incorporates  
824 projected prices for inputs related to power production.

825

## 826 **GAS SWAPS**

827 **Q. What is the impact of gas swaps on RMP's revenue requirement in this case?**

828 A. Gas swaps are a component of RMP's net power cost. The gas swap cost  
829 represents the difference between the cost of RMP's gas hedges and the projected  
830 market cost of the natural gas in the test period. If the cost of the hedges is less

831 than the projected market cost, then gas swaps provide a credit against net power  
832 cost. Conversely, if the cost of the hedges is greater than the projected market  
833 price, then gas swaps represent a cost.

834 In RMP's filed case, gas swaps represent a projected system cost of  
835 \$160.7 million.

836 **Q. Is this swap cost unusual?**

837 A. The fact that the gas swap is a cost and not a credit is not unusual: RMP's  
838 gas hedges have consistently added materially to net power cost for several rate  
839 cases. However, the magnitude of the swap cost in this case is worth noting.  
840 Utah's share of the \$160.7 million gas swap cost is about \$68.4 million,  
841 representing nearly 30 percent of the Company's proposed increase in this case.

842 **Q. Has the Commission commented recently on gas swaps?**

843 A. Yes. In its March 3, 2011 Order issued in the EBA Docket, the  
844 Commission stated that swap transactions should be excluded from the calculation  
845 of both base and actual net power cost. [Order at 72] However, in its Order on  
846 Petition for Clarification and Reconsideration or Rehearing, issued May 9, 2011,  
847 the Commission agreed to examine this question further.

848 In its March 3, 2011 EBA Order, the Commission also concluded that  
849 swap transactions "must be reviewed and approved in each general rate case,  
850 which is an appropriate proceeding for determining the prudence of Company  
851 decisions." [Order at 72]

852 **Q. In light of this latter directive, have you prepared any adjustments to RMP's**  
853 **gas swap expenses?**

854 A. Yes. Based on the analysis presented in the direct testimony of UAE Jeff  
855 J. Fishman, I am recommending that RMP's gas swaps associated with a hedged  
856 position greater than 75 percent of the Company's projected monthly gas  
857 requirement in the test period be excluded from cost recovery.

858 **Q. What is the basis of your recommendation?**

859 A. A hedged fuel supply should be part of a utility's portfolio, and to the  
860 extent that reasonably-transacted hedges cause an increase in net power costs,  
861 then it is reasonable for customers to bear this cost. The issue here is one of  
862 extent. RMP's hedging practices have been the subject of extensive inquiry by  
863 this Commission in recent years and it is now well understood that the  
864 aggressiveness (i.e., extensiveness) of the Company's gas hedges cause RMP to  
865 be an outlier in this respect relative to other utilities.

866 Based on Mr. Fishman's analysis, I have concluded that a reasonable  
867 *upper boundary* for utility hedged gas supply is 75 percent. In contrast, RMP  
868 actually forecasts three instances in which its gas hedge position for a given test  
869 period month exceeds [REDACTED]. After observing RMP's hedging practices  
870 over several proceedings, I have concluded that the Company appears to be  
871 motivated more by a corporate preference to [REDACTED] its future gas supply  
872 costs than to create a strategically diversified portfolio of gas supply pricing.  
873 While it is reasonable for customers to bear the hedging costs of achieving a

874 diversified fuel supply portfolio, it is not reasonable for customers to bear the  
875 incremental cost of what appears to be an idiosyncratic corporate predilection.  
876 Consequently, I am recommending that RMP's gas swaps associated with a  
877 hedged position greater than 75 percent of the Company's projected monthly gas  
878 requirement in the test period be excluded from cost recovery.

879 **Q. What is the revenue requirement impact of your recommendation?**

880 A. This adjustment is shown in Confidential UAE Exhibit RR 1.10. This  
881 adjustment reduces RMP's Utah revenue requirement by approximately  
882 **\$12,519,631.**

883

884 **SALE OF ASSETS**

885 **Q. Has RMP proposed to sell any assets, the sale of which is not included in the**  
886 **Company's revenue requirement in this case?**

887 A. Yes. I am aware of two proposed sales. On April 20, 2011, RMP filed an  
888 application with the Wyoming Public Service Commission for authority to sell its  
889 interest in the Snake Creek Hydroelectric Generating Plant in Utah. The  
890 approximate sales price reported in the application is \$1.2 million. If the sale  
891 goes forward, then the plant should be removed from rate base and any gain on  
892 the sale should be credited to customers in this rate case. The gain on the sale  
893 would be the difference between the sales price and the net book value of the  
894 facility. The application for the sale filed by RMP in Wyoming does not indicate



895 how much of the sales price represents a gain, but that is the subject of a pending  
896 data response.

897 In addition, in Wyoming PSC Docket No. 20000-382-EA-10, RMP received  
898 authority to sell its interest in the Windstar Substation and Dave Johnston  
899 Substations to Black Hills Power Corporation. As this sale is either imminent or  
900 completed, this plant should be removed from rate base and any gain on the sale  
901 should be credited to customers in this rate case. The details on this sale are also  
902 the subject of a pending data response. I intend to supplement my testimony with  
903 the amount of the appropriate adjustments following receipt of this information.  
904

905 **RENEWABLE ENERGY CREDITS – RECOGNITION OF DEFERRED**  
906 **REVENUES IN RATES**

907 **Q. What is the purpose of this section of your testimony?**

908 A. In this section of my testimony, I address the issue of RECs that have been  
909 deferred from prior periods. I recommend establishment of a credit to customers  
910 in this docket that would be reflected in rates at the start of the rate effective  
911 period in this case and would be returned to customers over two years using two  
912 consecutive one-year recovery periods, as described below.

913 **Q. Please identify the deferral time periods to which your discussion pertains.**

914 A. My discussion applies to two time periods:

915 (1) February 22, 2010 through December 31, 2010. This period starts on  
916 the date of UAE's application filed in Docket No. 10-035-14 for a deferred

917 accounting order applicable to incremental REC revenues. It runs until the  
918 initiation of Schedule 98, which was approved in the MPA II Docket. Schedule  
919 98 provides a sur-credit to Utah customers of approximately \$3 million per month  
920 for 2011 REC revenues. The appropriate revenue credit to customers for this  
921 period (2/22/10-12/31/10) is Utah's share of the difference between actual REC  
922 revenues booked during the period and the REC revenues reflected in base rates  
923 approved by the Commission in its decision in Docket No. 09-035-23, plus  
924 interest. I recommend that this balance be credited back to customers over the  
925 one-year period September 21, 2011 through September 20, 2012.

926 (2) January 1, 2011 through September 20, 2011. This period runs from  
927 the initiation of Schedule 98 through the start of the rate effective period in this  
928 case. The appropriate revenue credit (or debit) to customers for this period is  
929 Utah's share of the difference between actual REC revenues booked during this  
930 period and the combined REC revenues reflected during this period in base rates,  
931 Schedule 98, and Schedule 40, the latter of which incorporates incremental  
932 revenue associated with the Dunlap I wind facility approved as part of the MPA II  
933 Docket, plus interest. I recommend that this balance be credited back to  
934 customers over the one-year period September 21, 2012 through September 20,  
935 2013. Thus, the crediting back to customers for this period would immediately  
936 follow upon the conclusion of the crediting period for the deferrals recorded from  
937 February 22, 2010 through December 31, 2010 deferrals.

938 **Q. Have you reviewed the application for deferred accounting filed by UIEC in**  
939 **Docket No. 11-035-46?**

940 A. Yes, I have.

941 **Q. How does the time period implicated by that application relate to your**  
942 **testimony in this proceeding?**

943 A. UIEC's application is addressed to the time period prior to February 22,  
944 2010. The Commission has set a separate schedule for UIEC's application and it  
945 is UAE's assumption that the issue of incremental REC revenue recovery for the  
946 time period prior to February 22, 2010 will be determined in connection with or  
947 following resolution of UIEC's application in that docket. I note, however, that  
948 many of the facts and circumstances described below are equally applicable to  
949 periods covered by the UIEC Application.

950 **Q. What is the basis of your recommendation that a credit to customers for**  
951 **REC deferrals for the period beginning February 22, 2010 should be**  
952 **reflected in rates in this case?**

953 A. My recommendation in this proceeding is an extension of prior  
954 recommendations I have presented to the Commission in both the EBA Docket  
955 and the MPA II Docket. These recommendations have their origins in the  
956 contentions made by UAE in its application for a deferred accounting order for  
957 incremental REC revenue filed in Docket 10-035-14, as well as in Docket No. 11-  
958 035-46.

959 UAE's application in Docket No. 10-035-14, dated February 22, 2010,  
960 was filed four days following the Commission's general rate case order issued in  
961 Docket No. 09-035-23, in which the Commission approved a revenue requirement  
962 increase for RMP of \$32.4 million. As explained in that application, the market  
963 value available to RMP in selling RECs had recently increased in a manner that  
964 was dramatic, unprecedented, unforeseeable, and extraordinary. Moreover, RMP  
965 did not incorporate into its rate case projections or disclose to the Commission in  
966 the recently-concluded general rate case the extraordinary increase in the value of  
967 RECs that it was receiving and projecting. As a result, RMP received significant  
968 incremental revenue from selling RECs over and above the value reflected in  
969 Utah rates. Based on these facts and the legal principles discussed in UAE's  
970 application, UAE argued that a deferred accounting order should be issued to  
971 require RMP to defer for future ratemaking treatment all incremental REC  
972 revenue from the date of UAE's application to the effective date of new rates in a  
973 future RMP proceeding.

974 Pursuant to a stipulation entered among parties to Docket No. 10-035-14,  
975 the Commission approved UAE's deferred accounting request for incremental  
976 REC revenues in its order issued July 14, 2010. However, the appropriate  
977 ratemaking treatment of the deferred REC revenue was left for future  
978 determination by the Commission.

979 **Q. Do you have a recommendation regarding the appropriate ratemaking**  
980 **treatment of the REC revenues deferred as a result of UAE's application?**

981 A. Yes. One hundred percent of the deferred REC revenues should be  
982 credited to customers. A sur-credit should be established at the start of the rate  
983 effective period in this case that will refund to customers over a period of two  
984 years the deferred balance (including interest) accrued through the start of the rate  
985 effective period (presumed to be September 21, 2011), as described in my  
986 testimony. These steps are the most reasonable actions that can be taken in  
987 response to the extraordinary and unforeseeable orders-of-magnitude increase in  
988 REC revenues that RMP experienced at the time the last general rate case, Docket  
989 No. 09-035-23, was being concluded.

990 **Q. Please explain why the increase in REC revenue realized by RMP over and**  
991 **above what is recognized in Utah rates was unforeseeable and extraordinary.**

992 A. Towards the latter part of 2009, REC values soared to unprecedented  
993 levels. As I will discuss in more detail below, in a matter of weeks, between the  
994 time of the Company's rebuttal filing and the issuance of a final order in Docket  
995 No. 09-035-23, RMP's own projections for annual REC revenues increased by  
996 more than fourfold. This orders-of-magnitude of change is clearly extraordinary  
997 by any reasonable standard. Moreover, the scale of dollars involved is  
998 substantial. RMP's booked REC revenues for the test period used in the prior rate  
999 case turned out to be \$98.5 million<sup>13</sup> – more than five times the level included in

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<sup>13</sup> There appears to be some discrepancy between the REC revenues reported in RMP's filing of its base year REC revenues in this docket (\$98.5 million) and the REC revenues reported by RMP for the same period in discovery of \$97.3 million. This apparent discrepancy is the subject of a pending data response.

1000 rates. Proper recognition of these revenues in Utah rates would have made the  
1001 rate increase adopted by the Commission on February 18, 2010 entirely  
1002 unnecessary. The scale of the dollars involved reinforces the extraordinary nature  
1003 of the change in REC revenue received by RMP.

1004 Further, as also discussed in more detail below, given the timing of the  
1005 information released by the Company, the extraordinary change in revenue was  
1006 not foreseeable to parties who were not directly involved in the negotiations that  
1007 led to the tremendous run-up in the price of the RECs that RMP sold to others.

1008 **Q. Please describe the timing and magnitude of the changes in projected REC**  
1009 **revenues issued by RMP.**

1010 A. In the Company's filing in Docket No. 09-035-23, submitted in June 2009,  
1011 RMP projected \$7.4 million in REC revenues for the test period ending June  
1012 2010. RMP's rebuttal testimony in that same docket, filed November 12, 2009,  
1013 stated that for purposes of the rate case, \$18.6 million represented a reasonable  
1014 estimate of its system-wide REC revenues for that test period.<sup>14</sup> The  
1015 Commission's Report and Order in that docket, dated February 18, 2010, utilized  
1016 that value in setting Utah rates.

1017 A timeline of RMP REC revenue projections based on RMP confidential  
1018 data responses is presented in Confidential UAE Exhibit RR 1.11. By early  
1019 October 2009, RMP was already internally projecting REC sales for Calendar  
1020 Year 2009 in excess of \$40 million.<sup>15</sup> Indeed, REC revenues for October 2009

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<sup>14</sup> Rebuttal testimony of Steven R. McDougal, pp. 5-6.

<sup>15</sup> See Confidential UAE Exhibit RR 1.11.

1021 alone spiked to █████ million.<sup>16</sup> Actual monthly REC booked revenue from  
1022 January 2009 through December 2010 is presented in Confidential UAE Exhibit  
1023 RR 1.12, page 3. As shown in that exhibit, the Company's booked REC revenue  
1024 in the fourth quarter of 2009 alone exceeded █████ million – which is more than  
1025 █████ the amount of REC revenues the Company had indicated on November 12  
1026 was reasonable for the *entire test period*. This was followed by another █████  
1027 million of REC revenues booked for January 2010. Thus, in the four months  
1028 preceding the Commission's February 18 Order in the rate case, RMP booked  
1029 over █████ million in REC revenues, while rates set in that order assumed just \$18.6  
1030 million for the entire test period.

1031 By January 2010, just two months after filing its rebuttal testimony in  
1032 Utah, and prior to the issuance of the final order in Docket No. 09-035-23, RMP  
1033 projected REC sales of \$84.4 million for Calendar Year 2010 – more than four  
1034 times the value of the RECs used in setting rates in Utah one month later.<sup>17</sup>

1035 In a matter of weeks, RMP's own projections for REC sales had grown by  
1036 orders of magnitude prior to the conclusion of the Utah rate case. Yet this  
1037 information was not disclosed by RMP to the parties in the Utah rate case. Nor  
1038 was it disclosed, to my knowledge, to the Utah Commission.

---

<sup>16</sup> Source: RMP Response to DPU 7.62(c). Also shown in Confidential UAE Exhibit RR 1.12, page 3.

<sup>17</sup> The \$84.4 million value appeared in a confidential data response provided to parties in a general rate case in Wyoming, and thus was not publicly disseminated until March 18, 2011 when RMP stipulated in Wyoming to system-wide REC sales of \$84.4 million for Calendar Year 2010 (with a provision for a true-up).

1039                   The hearings in the revenue requirement phase of the rate case took place  
1040 from December 2, 2009 to December 8, 2009. Given the speed at which REC  
1041 values changed, and the timing of the information made available to the parties in  
1042 the proceeding, the extraordinary and rapid increase in projected REC revenues  
1043 was not reasonably foreseeable to the parties in the Utah case within the  
1044 framework of the procedural schedule – at least not for those parties without  
1045 firsthand knowledge of the transactions that were unfolding.

1046                   With this surge in REC revenue, it seems RMP was in a position prior to  
1047 the issuance of the Commission’s Order to inform the parties and Commission  
1048 that the Company’s actual and projected REC revenues were growing in a  
1049 dramatic and unprecedented fashion, with serious implications for the pending  
1050 rate case decision. Yet the Company apparently chose not to disclose this  
1051 information in the Utah docket. In any case, whether or not RMP should have  
1052 disclosed these facts at the time, they clearly represent events that were  
1053 extraordinary in relation to past REC values and sales and that were unforeseeable  
1054 to the Commission or the other parties to the 2009 general rate case.

1055 **Q.    What amount of REC sales revenue did RMP book between October 2009**  
1056 **and February 22, 2010, the date of UAE’s application for deferred**  
1057 **accounting?**

1058 A.               I estimate that RMP booked approximately █████ million in REC revenues  
1059 during that time. This level of bookings was clearly extraordinary and not  
1060 foreseeable when then-current rates were set. As noted above, because these



1061 revenues were booked prior to February 22, 2010, UAE will address the issue of  
1062 the potential crediting to customers of the incremental portion of these revenues in  
1063 or after resolution of Docket No. 11-035-46, as I indicated above.

1064 **Q. What amount of REC revenues was ultimately recorded by RMP for the test**  
1065 **period used in the previous rate case?**

1066 A. According to the Company's base year filing in this case, the REC  
1067 revenues actually recorded by the Company during the July 2009 to June 2010  
1068 test period totaled \$98.5 million – approximately \$80 million more than the REC  
1069 revenues recognized in Utah rates for that test period. The difference in REC  
1070 values actually received by RMP for the test period ending June 2010 and the  
1071 REC values included in Utah rates translates into a Utah revenue requirement  
1072 differential of approximately \$46.2 million. Put another way, proper recognition  
1073 of the surge in REC revenues in Utah rates would have wiped out the entire \$32.4  
1074 million rate increase that was approved on February 18, 2010 in Docket No. 09-  
1075 035-23 – and then some.

1076 **Q. By not disclosing the updated information on REC sales, was RMP simply**  
1077 **maintaining consistency with a policy of not providing new revenue**  
1078 **requirement adjustments in rebuttal testimony?**

1079 A. No. In that same docket RMP did provide a new revenue requirement  
1080 adjustment in its rebuttal filing seeking a system net power cost increase of \$7.9  
1081 million associated with a BPA peaking contract. This adjustment corrected an  
1082 oversight in the Company's direct case – and was approved by the Commission.

1083 Thus, RMP was clearly willing to bring new revenue requirement information to  
1084 the Commission in its rebuttal case.

1085 **Q. Why should the deferred REC revenues be credited 100 percent to**  
1086 **customers?**

1087 A. As stated above, REC sales are made using assets that are paid for entirely  
1088 by customers; consequently, 100 percent of the revenues from REC sales are  
1089 appropriately treated as a revenue credit against the revenue requirement  
1090 recovered from customers in a rate case. This treatment is especially appropriate  
1091 in light of the increasing cost burden borne by Utah customers to pay for RMP's  
1092 aggressive expansion of its fleet of wind resources used for making REC sales;  
1093 over the past several Utah rate proceedings the Company has added over \$1.8  
1094 billion in wind-related plant in service (total Company). Utah's allocated share of  
1095 these recent additions to wind plant in service is approximately \$800 million. In  
1096 addition, the Company's claims for wind integration costs have increased  
1097 dramatically over the years. RMP's proposed cost recovery for wind integration  
1098 now exceeds ■■■ million per year.<sup>18</sup> Finally, the circumstances under which the  
1099 deferral was created – deriving from a surge in REC revenues during the  
1100 pendency of a general rate case which, if recognized, would have obviated the  
1101 need for a rate increase at all – strongly weigh in favor of 100 percent crediting to  
1102 customers as soon as practicable.

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<sup>18</sup> Source: Confidential RMP Response to DPU 10.37.

1103 **Q. What is the amount of the REC deferral for the period February 22, 2010**  
1104 **through December 31, 2010?**

1105 A. I estimate that the REC deferral for this period is **\$46,209,511**. This  
1106 calculation is presented in Confidential UAE Exhibit RR 1.12. This calculation  
1107 was performed by taking the difference between the REC revenues booked each  
1108 month as reported by RMP and the level of RECs in current rates. This  
1109 calculation includes the accrual of interest at a rate of 5.98%, consistent with the  
1110 rate approved by the Commission for this purpose in its Order issued July 14,  
1111 2010 in Docket Nos. 09-035-15 and 10-035-14.

1112 **Q. How did you measure the level of RECs in current rates?**

1113 A. I distributed Utah's share of REC revenues in rates across the months on  
1114 the basis of monthly retail sales. For the month of February 2010, I assigned one-  
1115 fourth of the retail load for the month to correspond to the February 22 starting  
1116 date of the deferral period. I treated the REC revenues booked in that month in  
1117 the same way.

1118 **Q. What is your recommended course of action with respect to the deferral**  
1119 **period from January 1, 2011 through September 20, 2011?**

1120 A. This period has yet to run its course. As stated above, the appropriate  
1121 revenue credit (or debit) to customers for this period is Utah's share of the  
1122 difference between actual REC revenues booked during this period and the REC  
1123 revenues reflected during this period in base rates, Schedule 98, and Schedule 40,  
1124 the latter of which incorporates incremental revenue associated with the Dunlap I

1125 wind facility approved as part of the MPA II Docket, plus interest. I recommend  
1126 that this balance be credited (or charged) back to customers over the one-year  
1127 period September 21, 2012 through September 20, 2013.

1128 **Q. Does this conclude your direct testimony?**

1129 A. Yes, it does.