

BEFORE THE UTAH PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF ROCKY)
MOUNTAIN POWER FOR AUTHORITY TO INCREASE ITS)
RETAIL ELECTRIC UTILITY SERVICE RATES IN UTAH AND)
FOR APPROVAL OF ITS PROPOSED ELECTRIC SERVICE)
SCHEDULES AND ELECTRIC SERVICE REGULATIONS)

DPU EXHIBIT 9.0R-RR
DOCKET No. 10-035-124

Pre-filed Rebuttal Testimony

Of

Joni S. Zenger, PhD

On Behalf of

Utah Division of Public Utilities

June 30, 2011

Revenue Requirement

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Introduction

Q. Please state your name, business address, and occupation for the record.

A. My name is Joni S. Zenger. My business address is Heber Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84114. I am employed by the Utah Division of Public Utilities (Division) of the Utah Department of Commerce as a Technical Consultant.

Q. On whose behalf are you testifying?

A. The Division.

Q. Are you the same Joni S. Zenger who previously filed testimony in this proceeding?

A. Yes, I am. I filed DPU Exhibit 1.0, addressing test year issues, on March 9, 2011 in this proceeding and DPU Exhibit 9.0, addressing revenue requirement issues, on May 26, 2011.

Q. What is the purpose of your rebuttal testimony that you are now filing?

A. The purpose of my testimony is to rebut the direct testimony of Dr. Dennis E. Peseau, filed on behalf of the Utah Industrial Energy Consumers (UIEC), pertaining to cost recovery and cost allocation of the Populus to Terminal transmission line (Line) in this case. However, I do not comment on all of the ideas and statements made by Dr.

25 Peseau. Silence on a given subject does not imply that the Division necessarily agrees
26 with him on that subject.

27

28 **Q. Please summarize your rebuttal testimony and recommendations put forth to the**
29 **Commission.**

30 A. As I will discuss below, the Division believes that the Line is used and useful and all of
31 the prudently incurred Populus to Terminal project investment costs should be included
32 in the Company's rate base in this case in the traditional ratemaking method.

33

34 **Q. Would you please outline what you believe are the principal points in Dr. Peseau's**
35 **testimony that you will be rebutting?**

36 A. Yes. As I see it, the principal purpose of Dr. Peseau's testimony is to propose a new cost
37 allocation scheme that should be adopted by the Commission in this case and for all
38 future Energy Gateway transmission projects (that are not even a part of this case).¹ In
39 addition, Dr. Peseau recommends that only 50 percent of the Company's revenue
40 requirements associated with the investment in the Line be allocated to Utah retail
41 ratepayers in this case, thus reducing the Company's Utah revenue requirement by one
42 half of the requested \$46.9 million amount, or by \$23.45 million.

43

44 **Q. What specific points do you disagree with?**

¹ Direct Revenue Requirement Testimony of Dennis E. Peseau, p. 5, line 17 and pp. 13-24.

45 A. First, I disagree with Dr. Peseau’s position that only 50 percent of the investment costs
46 of the Line should be included in the Company’s rate base to be paid by retail
47 customers. Rather, the full costs of the Line should be included in the Company’s rate
48 base as is typically done when the Company invests in new capital additions in
49 generation and transmission plant. Second, I disagree with Dr. Peseau’s claim that the
50 Line is not fully used and useful at the present time. Third, although I agree that cost
51 allocation between retail and wholesale customers is a salient issue, I disagree with his
52 claim that this Commission in this case must make a change to the traditional cost
53 allocation method that has been in place for years.²

54
55 The Company first announced its Energy Gateway Project in 2007 and has invested in
56 the first portion of this project (Gateway Central) in good faith under the existing
57 regulatory mechanisms. Changing the allocation scheme three years later and after the
58 Company has constructed and fully energized the first planned phase of this project is
59 patently unfair to the Company. If the Commission is concerned about the allocation of
60 transmission costs, it has various tools to address the problem, including a rulemaking
61 proceeding, a work group, etc. to provide guidance for future decision making.

62
63 **The Populus to Terminal Transmission Line**

64 **Q. Are you aware that Dr. Peseau filed testimony with respect to the Line in the Idaho**
65 **and Wyoming general rate cases?**

² Id. at p. 5, line 17.

66 A. Yes. Dr. Peseau references data requests and information from the Wyoming and Idaho
67 rate cases in his testimony and in UIEC data requests in this case. He makes similar
68 arguments against cost recovery of the Line in those dockets, but in Utah he does not go
69 so far as recommending that Utah opt out of the multi-state process (MSP) as he did in
70 the Idaho general rate case.³

71

72 **Q. Does Dr. Peseau dispute the prudence of the Line in this proceeding?**

73 A. No. Dr. Peseau states the following: “I am not proposing that the Commission
74 determine that any portion of the Populus to Terminal line is imprudent.”⁴

75

76 **Q. In Utah, have there been other opportunities (in addition to this proceeding) for**
77 **intervenors to object to the need, size, costs, and other issues with respect to the**
78 **Line?**

79 A. Yes. First, in Docket No. 08-035-42, the Commission determined that the Line was
80 needed, and the Commission granted the Company a Certificate of Public Convenience
81 and Necessity (CPCN) to build the 135-mile, 1,400 MW line. In the CPCN proceeding,
82 evidence was presented showing that many of the 138-kV transmission lines running
83 from the Salt Lake City area northward into southeast Idaho were constructed prior to
84 World War I, i.e., before the 1920s, and the transmission infrastructure was in need of

³ Direct Testimony of Dennis E. Peseau on behalf of Monsanto Company, October 14, 2010, Docket No. ID PAC-E-10-0, p. 20, lines 7-12.

⁴ Direct Revenue Requirement Testimony of Dennis E. Peseau, p. 26, lines 1-2.

85 upgrades.⁵ The Commission concluded that the “public convenience and
86 necessity does or will require the construction” of the 1,400 MW Line, and no evidence
87 has been presented to contradict the testimony of the Company (underline added).⁶ I
88 interpret this to suggest that the Line is needed to serve the public for not just the
89 present time (the public convenience and necessity does require the construction), but
90 at some future time (the public convenience and necessity will require the
91 construction). The only way that the Line could fulfill both aspects of the public
92 convenience and necessity requirement for the CPCN is if the Line was designed and
93 sized sufficiently to meet current and future use. Further, the Federal Energy
94 Regulatory Commission (FERC) has indicated that transmission investments must be
95 designed for more than just immediate needs, as evidenced in its statement that
96 follows:

97 The electricity industry, above all, is one in which making
98 provision for future expansion is customary and prudent.⁷
99

100 **Q. Has the Line also gone through other regulatory approval proceedings before this**
101 **Commission?**

102 A. The short answer is yes. Utah has passed a statute allowing alternative cost recovery for
103 major plant additions. (Neither Wyoming nor Idaho have a similar statute.) The Utah
104 Legislature passed Senate Bill 75,⁸ which enacted Utah Code Ann. UCA § 54-7-13.4. This

⁵ Docket No. 08-035-42, Company’s Response to DPU Data Request 1.14, June 4, 2008.

⁶ Docket No. 08-035-42, Report and Order, September 4, 2008, p. 5.

⁷ Pacific Power & Light Co., 27 FPC 623 (1962).

⁸ <http://le.utah.gov/Documents/bills.htm>.

105 statute provides an alternative cost recovery mechanism for major plant additions of a
106 gas or electrical corporation under certain conditions. Therefore, pursuant to Utah
107 Code Ann. § 54-7-13.3, the Company requested alternative cost recovery of the first
108 segment of the Populus to Terminal line on February 1, 2010—the Ben Lomond to
109 Terminal transmission line.⁹ In that proceeding, the Division testified that the costs for
110 construction of the project were generally reasonable, and the costs should be allowed
111 in the Company’s rate base.¹⁰ The Commission approved a Stipulation for cost recovery
112 of the Ben Lomond to Terminal portion of the Line.¹¹ This was the first major plant
113 addition (MPA I) case in Utah, as a result of the passage of Senate Bill 75 and the newly
114 enacted Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-13.4.

115
116 Next, on August 3, 2010, the Company requested approval, pursuant to Utah Code § 54-
117 7-13.4, for alternative cost recovery (MPA II) of the remaining segment of the Line--the
118 Populus to Ben Lomond segment.¹² This case was resolved through a settlement
119 stipulation that was approved by the Commission, whereby the Company was allowed
120 to recover its costs for the remaining segment of the Line.¹³

121

⁹ Docket No. 10-035-13. (The Company also requested recovery for costs associated with the Dave Johnson Unit 3 emissions controls as part of MPA I.)

¹⁰ Docket No. 10-035-89, Direct Testimony of Charles E. Peterson, April 10, 2010, p. 6, lines 109-112.

¹¹ Docket No. 10-035-89, Report and Order, June 15, 2010.

¹² Docket No. 10-035-89, Application for Alternative Cost Recovery, August 3, 2010. (The Company also requested cost recovery for the Dunlap 1 wind project as part of MPA II.)

¹³ Order Approving Settlement Stipulation, Docket No. 10-035-13, Docket No. 10-035-14, Docket No. 10-035-89, December 21, 2010.

122 **Q. What point does the Division wish to make regarding these proceedings?**

123 A. The Division points out that this general rate case proceeding represents the fourth time
124 that the Populus to Terminal transmission line has been brought before this Commission
125 in one form or another in formal regulatory proceedings. Contrary to Dr. Peseau's
126 position that half of the Line's costs should be disallowed (regardless of the reasoning),
127 the need for the 1,400 MW Line has been previously demonstrated and the construction
128 costs for both segments of the Line have been scrutinized and approved by this
129 Commission. The Line was fully energized and placed into service on November 19,
130 2010, and the associated revenue requirement is already being collected from
131 ratepayers as of January 1, 2011 through a surcharge in Schedule 40. Now it is time, in
132 this proceeding, for this Commission to place those prudently incurred costs of the Line
133 into base rates and eliminate Schedule 40.

134

135 **Q. Is this congruent with Dr. Peseau's recommendation?**

136 A. No. As I previously mentioned, Dr. Peseau recommends that only 50 percent of the
137 revenue requirement associated with the investment in the Line be allocated to retail
138 customers at this time, rather than the full 100 percent of the costs that have been
139 found to be prudent (as described above). Dr. Peseau claims that "RMP has made an
140 investment in a transmission line that will be able to operate for the benefit of retail
141 customers at only 50% of ultimate capacity and that the portion of the investment that

142 is not for the benefit of retail customers during the test period should not be included in
143 the Company's rate base."¹⁴

144

145 **Q. Please explain why Dr. Peseau's logic is faulty.**

146 A. First, Dr. Peseau is concerned that the full capacity rating of the Line will reach 1,400
147 MW only when Gateway South and Gateway West are completed. As I previously
148 mentioned, the Line was fully energized and placed into service on November 19, 2010,
149 and on that date was fully used and useful. In other words, the Line was open and ready
150 for use. On that date capacity from the Line was being used to serve customers, and
151 energy flowed into the interconnected transmission network. Since the elements of the
152 existing transmission network are integrated and mutually dependent upon each other,
153 the new line carries its full share of the energy being transmitted by the system at any
154 given instant in time. Dr. Peseau's logic is faulty in that there is not a one-to-one
155 correlation between capacity and costs. As I describe later in my testimony, building the
156 line at one-half the capacity (700 MW) does not result in a 50 percent decrease in costs.

157

158 Under the Western Electric Coordinating Council (WECC) path rating process, the line
159 rating of 1,400 MW is determined by the incremental value that it adds to the system as
160 it exists at the time of the rating.¹⁵ The 1,400 MW path rating refers to the system
161 transfer capacity rating, not a self-rating of the line itself. In other words, when the Line

¹⁴ Direct Revenue Requirement Testimony of Dennis E. Peseau, p. 11, lines 12-16.

¹⁵ UIEC Attachment 7.1.

162 was interconnected to the WECC system, according to WECC’s current path rating
163 process, the New Path C (NPC) including Path C and new Populus-to-Terminal upgrade
164 allowed the path to be scheduled up to 1,250 MW in the northbound direction during
165 light Utah load conditions and 1,600 MW southbound during heavy Utah load. These
166 ratings allow an increase of 780 MW for southbound flows and 350 MW for northbound
167 flows beyond the original Path C rating.¹⁶ Inasmuch as the Company prudently planned
168 and designed the Line by obtaining a future rating of 1,400 MW, the Company captured
169 the total planned capacity for the future use of its customers.

170
171 The path limits currently assigned to the Line will increase when other segments of the
172 Gateway project are completed or other non-Gateway additions are made to the
173 western interconnected system, either increasing or decreasing depending on the
174 transmission additions that other transmission providers make. In the next Energy
175 Gateway phase—the Mona to Oquirrh line—the Company is currently in the process of
176 obtaining permits and rights-of-ways. The Company has been holding public meetings
177 with stakeholders and landowners who might be impacted and concerned with the
178 siting of the line. The Commission has already issued a CPCN to construct the line. The
179 Company’s 2011 Integrated Resource Plan (IRP) states that “proceeding with the full
180 Gateway expansion scenario is the most prudent strategy given regulatory uncertainty,

¹⁶ Populus to Terminal Project, Phase 2 Study Report. October 6, 2008.

181 benefits from resource diversity, and the long lead time for adding new transmission
182 facilities.”¹⁷

183

184 **Q. Couldn't the Company have built Gateway Central, Gateway West, and Gateway South**
185 **at the same time?**

186 A. No. Even if it were physically possible, the build-out would create a gigantic rate shock,
187 rather than the desired outcome of gradualism in rates. Even though Dr. Peseau
188 advocates that Gateway West and Gateway South both need to be built in order for the
189 Line to fully benefit ratepayers, it would be difficult to imagine building the entire
190 Energy Gateway project at once in order that the full design capacity of the project
191 could be turned on with a flip of the switch. In reality it would be practically impossible
192 to build the entire \$6 billion Gateway project instantaneously. As evidenced by the
193 difficulty and public backlash from landowners when the Company was attempting to
194 obtain permitting, rights-of-way, and the siting just to build this first segment of the
195 Gateway Project, it would be impracticable to obtain all of the corridors and permits at
196 once. There would also be major reliability concerns, as the Company would still be
197 required to serve loads while construction takes place. This was in fact an issue in the
198 construction of the Line, as certain portions of the line had to be re-rerouted and
199 energized in segments in order to still reliably serve customers and without incurring

¹⁷ PacifiCorp's 2011 IRP, March 31, 2011, p. 82.

200 North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) compliance fines.¹⁸ It would be
201 difficult to achieve the maximum design rating of all segments at once and imprudent to
202 build the other segments before they are needed for load and reliability purposes. The
203 Company's design strategy in building the project in segments is a prudent strategy.

204

205 **Q. Dr. Peseau also claims that the Line is overbuilt or has excess capacity. Do you agree?**

206 A. No. In reality transmission is lumpy. It takes on the order of five to seven years to
207 design, permit, and build transmission facilities. Since transmission has a long-life, it is
208 designed by definition to meet future load. If the Line was built to meet only current
209 load, then the Company would be acting imprudently. A capacity expansion project for
210 any given transmission path may take place only once in 20 or 30 years. There has not
211 been a major transmission line built in Utah since the 1980s.¹⁹ Therefore, the Path C
212 upgrade was planned and designed to have the ability to meet a range of future
213 conditions, making the best use of scarce transmission corridors. The Company agreed
214 to the Path C upgrade, primarily to meet load and enhance reliability, as well as to
215 facilitate the receipt of renewable resources, increase transfer capability between the
216 east and west control areas, and enable further system optimization.²⁰

217

218 **Q. What if the Company had just built a 700 MW line just for now?**

¹⁸ Docket No. 10-035-89, Direct Testimony of Kenneth J. Slater, October 26, 2010.

¹⁹ PacifiCorp's 2011 Integrated Resource Plan, March 31, 2011, p. 57.

²⁰ Docket No. 08-035-42, RMP Application for CPCN for the Line, paragraphs 5-6. (Also see Docket No. 05-035-43 Merger Commitment #34.)

219 A. First of all, as I just described, transmission has a long life and is designed and planned
220 for the long term. Therefore, it would have been imprudent planning on the Company's
221 part to have built a single circuit 345 kV line. Second, building a 700 MW would not only
222 be cost ineffective, but would end up costing ratepayers more than the 1,400 MW Line
223 itself. The Company states that it would cost almost 50 percent more than the currently
224 designed Line costs (\$819 million) to build the single circuit 345 kV line and then remove
225 and replace it with double circuit 345 kV lines later (\$1.24 billion).²¹ The single circuit
226 line would not have adequate transfer capacity to integrate the Company's generating
227 resources—especially renewable wind resources coming from Wyoming.²² When
228 future load growth requires more transmission, the Company would not be able to build
229 it instantaneously, but would have to purchase it on the wholesale market, most likely
230 at a higher price.

231
232 In fact, the Division asked the Company to provide the incremental costs for poles,
233 substations, wire, tower configurations, etc. for the project designed as follows: with
234 double circuit towers, footings, etc., but with only a single circuit conductor and fewer
235 substation line terminals. The Company's response shows that the costs of the first
236 phase (phase I) of the project would be reduced by \$72 million dollars if designed and
237 constructed in this manner.²³ However, under this hypothetical scenario, to come back
238 and convert the conductors to a double circuit line in the future (phase 2) would cost

²¹ Company Response to DPU 47.13 and Attachment 47.13, June 27, 2011.

²² http://www.gatewaywestproject.com/documents/GeneralProject_fs.pdf.

²³ Id.

239 ratepayers more than the actual installed project cost of the full currently designed and
240 constructed Line.²⁴ Additionally, the Division notes that the Company has an obligation
241 to make sure that any blackouts and outages are minimized during any construction.
242 The Company's analysis of any reconstruction of the line did not even take into account
243 the costs of continuing to meet the Company's network load obligation and reliability
244 needs while the re-construction was taking place. Therefore, the Division considers the
245 estimated reconstruction costs to be conservative.

246

247 **Q. Will you please describe the benefits that Utah retail ratepayers are receiving as a**
248 **result of the construction of the Line?**

249 A. Certainly. The need for the line and resultant benefits of the line have been previously
250 demonstrated in the CPCN proceeding (Docket No. 08-035-42).²⁵ However, the Line also
251 provides ancillary benefits such as increased transfer capability, congestion relief, and
252 assisting the Company to meet its current and future network load obligation. The Line
253 improves system reliability and reduces the Path C constraints that have been
254 problematic for many years.²⁶

255

256 The benefits of the Line also spread much further than the immediate load that it
257 serves. Inasmuch as PacifiCorp is a multi-jurisdictional company that provides retail

²⁴ Company's response to DPU #47.14, June 17, 2011.

²⁵ Docket No. 08-035-42, Company's Response to DPU #1.14, June 4, 2008 and DPI 1st Supplemental 1.14, June 25, 2008.

²⁶ Docket No. 08-035-42, Company's Confidential Attachment 5.1 (1). WECC Abbreviated System Disturbance Report.

258 customer service in six states, the Company can transport energy from its generation
259 resources and those of others across its system. PacifiCorp operates its bulk electric
260 generation and transmission as if all of the generation and transmission facilities that
261 exist on the six-state system are capable of serving load anywhere on the system.
262 Hence, the Company can transport energy from its generation resources and those of
263 others across its system. The diversity of resources that exist on the system and the
264 interconnected transmission system ensures that power is delivered reliably anywhere
265 on the system, when it is needed, and the least cost resources are dispatched first,
266 optimizing the economic dispatch of its system—an economic benefit to ratepayers. A
267 robust transmission system also provides more flexibility for the Company to acquire
268 the least cost/least risk generating resources to serve its loads. These types of benefits
269 that retail ratepayers receive would be difficult to quantify. However, what we do know
270 is that Utah has some of the lowest electricity prices in the country. According to the
271 Energy Information Administration, Utah’s retail electric prices, ranked from low to high,
272 come in as the fourth lowest among the fifty states.²⁷

273
274 In addition, because PacifiCorp’s system is interconnected to other utilities and
275 independent generation owners, particularly at trading hubs, such as Palo Verde, Four
276 Corners, and others, the Company can take advantage of liquid markets when it has
277 excess power to sell or when it needs to purchase power to serve retail loads. The

²⁷ Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, Form EIA-826, "Monthly Electric Sales and Revenue Report with State Distributions Report."

278 diversity of interconnections on the system also benefits ratepayers as it helps ensure
279 the lowest available market price for purchases and the highest available market price
280 for wholesale sales. (The revenues from wholesale sales are credited back to retail
281 customers.)

282

283 **Q. Will you please discuss the reliability benefits that accrue to retail, as well as**
284 **wholesale customers in Utah?**

285 A. Ratepayers benefit from having a robust transmission system that allows the Company
286 to minimize costs that it must incur for operating reserves under requirements set out
287 by the WECC and the NERC. The Line will assist in balancing loads and operating
288 resources, which are required to be balanced at all times throughout the western
289 interconnect in order to avoid having an N-1 contingency (the failure of a single, large
290 generating resource). The Company must insure that all mandatory NERC reliability
291 standards and WECC criteria are met. Otherwise, hefty fines will (and have been)
292 imposed.²⁸ The Company's investment in the Line, its transmission and distribution
293 infrastructure, and the Energy Gateway project help to ensure that the Company's
294 transmission infrastructure can meet the mandatory requirements and does not pay
295 fines that consumers would have to bear.²⁹ PacifiCorp has already had to make penalty
296 payments and to date is in negotiations with the NERC in attempts to settle the
297 reliability violations. Many of the violations can be assessed at \$1 million per day per

²⁸ For example, Florida Power and Light was assessed a civil penalty of \$25 million for not being in compliance. (See Docket No. IN-08-5-000, http://www.nerc.com/files/Order_FPL_Settlement_10082009.pdf.)

²⁹ Company's Response to 37.9 Attachment, as an example.

298 violation.³⁰ Thus, avoiding the penalty payments by having a reliable transmission
299 network is another retail ratepayer benefit.

300

301 **Q. What are the consequences of denying the Company full cost recovery of the Line?**

302 A. Denying recovery under these circumstances could provide a disincentive to the
303 Company to make needed investments transmission infrastructure in the future.³¹ If
304 the Company does not invest in its transmission infrastructure as planned, it might have
305 to build new generating resources closer to load, (even though those resources may be
306 more expensive than other renewable resources,) that could have been brought into the
307 system at a lower cost (such as Wyoming wind) to ratepayers. In the Company's 2011
308 IRP, resource diversity is one of the performance characteristics used in the Company's
309 IRP modeling used to arrive at the preferred portfolio.³² Investment in state and
310 regional transmission infrastructure is necessary In order to obtain the benefits of
311 resource diversity—a goal of state and national policies that seek energy
312 independence.³³ Disallowing recovery of prudent transmission investment is

³⁰ http://www.nerc.com/docs/standards/sar/FERC_Order_on_VSLs_2008June19.pdf.

³¹ On August 22, 2003, the Rocky Mountain Area Transmission Study (RMATS) was commissioned because the electric power industry has been reluctant to invest in new transmission infrastructure due to protracted regulatory uncertainties. The RMATS states that: "Investment in new transmission infrastructure in the West has lagged the growth in both demand and new generation. There has been very few new bulk power transmission infrastructure additions in the western interconnection in over a decade." RMATS Report, September 2004, Chapter 4, pp. 1-2.

³² PacifiCorp's 2011 IRP, March 31, 2011, pp. 219-220.

³³ Title 63M of Utah Code Ann. states, "Utah will promote the development of resources and infrastructure sufficient to meet the state's growing demand, while contributing to the regional and national energy supply, thus reducing dependence on international energy sources."

313 inconsistent with Governor Herbert’s 10-Year Strategic Energy Plan that seeks fuel
314 diversification in order to broaden Utah’s supply of base load electricity.³⁴

315
316 The Division is aware that overbuilding transmission capacity could be a concern for
317 ratepayers in the future, but believes that regulatory tools exist to evaluate future
318 transmission projects, especially prior to construction, to ensure abuses do not occur.

319 The Division notes that putting a large amount of capital in transmission projects could
320 present a danger in the future, and the Commission may want to take a role in forming
321 future policies in this regard.

322

323 **Q. Does the Division have other concerns regarding the consequences of denying the**
324 **Company recovery of the fully approved prudent costs of the Line?**

325 A. Yes. In the long run the Division has concerns that ratepayers will be harmed by
326 disallowance in this case. If the plant that is disallowed becomes nonutility property,
327 and in the future when we need more transmission capacity, the Company might have
328 to resort to purchasing it on the market at a higher cost—definitely hurting ratepayers
329 in the pocketbook. Again, transmission is lumpy and it would likely take another five to
330 seven years for the Company to construct additional capacity. The Company cannot just
331 build new transmission instantaneously on an as needed basis. The opportunity cost of

³⁴ Energy Initiatives & Imperatives, Utah’s 10-Year Strategic Energy Plan, March 2, 2011, pp. 8-9.

332 not building the transmission infrastructure would be to build another generating
333 resource located near load.

334

335 **Q. Do you have any further rebuttal to Dr. Peseau's testimony?**

336 A. One last point. Dr. Peseau states that retail/wholesale cost allocation for not just the
337 Line, but the entire Energy Gateway Project must be decided in this case.³⁵ The Division
338 believes that the allocation of costs between wholesale and retail customers is a
339 complex and salient issue. However, there are a number of other ways or processes to
340 address Dr. Peseau's concerns that do not require immediate decisions in this case. For
341 instance, regional and/or sub regional planning groups are working on transmission
342 planning and cost allocation issues that may alleviate his concerns. In addition, some of
343 the proposals in response to the FERC rulemaking concerning Transmission Planning and
344 Cost Allocation may emerge as state solutions. In other words, resolution of cost
345 allocation issues for the entire Energy Gateway Project in this proceeding is not
346 necessarily imperative, as Dr. Peseau implies.

347

348 **Conclusion and Recommendations**

349 **Q. What does the Division conclude with respect to the Company's request for recovery**
350 **of the fully approved costs of the Line?**

³⁵ Direct Revenue Requirement Testimony of Dennis E. Peseau, p. 5, lines 12-17.

351 A. The Division concludes that this Commission has previously found that the Line is
352 needed to serve the present and future public convenience and necessity, and the costs
353 for construction of the Line have been scrutinized and also approved. The Division
354 disagrees with Dr. Peseau and maintains that the Line is fully used and useful at the time
355 it was energized, and the Line is currently benefitting Utah retail ratepayers.

356

357 Further, the Division asserts that, after three prior regulatory proceedings for this Line,
358 (this proceeding being the fourth), it seems unfair to the Company to, in hindsight,
359 change the traditional regulatory treatment of the Line (as Dr. Peseau proposes)
360 especially after the Company has financed and constructed the Line in good faith and in
361 hope of recouping its capital investments in rates (which costs have been deemed
362 prudent). The consequences of disallowing cost recovery would result in disincentives
363 to invest in future transmission, which would not be in the public interest and could cost
364 retail ratepayers more in the long-run.

365

366 **Q. What does the Division recommend with respect to the Company's request for cost**
367 **recovery of the Line?**

368 A. The Division recommends that the Commission grant recovery of the prudently incurred
369 costs of the Line, and Schedule 40 should then be eliminated.

370

371 **Q. Does that conclude your rebuttal testimony?**

372 A. Yes, it does.