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**BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH**

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In the Matter of the Application of Rocky Mountain Power for Authority to Increase its Retail Electric Utility Service Rates in Utah and for Approval of its Proposed Electric Service Schedules and Electric Service Regulations	<b>Docket No. 10-035-124</b>
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**PREFILED SURREBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF HOWARD GEBHART**

**[REVENUE REQUIREMENT]**

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The UAE Intervention Group (UAE) hereby submits the Prefiled Surrebuttal Testimony of Howard Gebhart on revenue requirement issues.

DATED this 19<sup>th</sup> day of July, 2011.

/s/ \_\_\_\_\_  
Gary A. Dodge,  
Attorney for UAE

## CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

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**BEFORE**  
**THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH**

**Surrebuttal Testimony of Howard Gebhart**  
**on behalf of**  
**UAE**

**Docket No. 10-035-124**

**[Revenue Requirement]**

**July 19, 2011**

1                   **SURREBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF HOWARD GEBHART**

2

3           **Introduction and Purpose**

4           **Q.     Please state your name and business affiliation.**

5           **R.**     I am Howard Gebhart and I am employed at Air Resource Specialists, Inc.  
6                   (ARS), located at 1901 Sharp Point Drive, Suite E, Fort Collins, CO 80525.  
7                   ARS is an environmental engineering and consulting firm. At ARS, I am the  
8                   Manager for the Environmental Compliance Section. My staff and I assist  
9                   regulated industries as well as government and commercial clients with  
10                  environmental permitting and compliance issues, primarily with respect to the  
11                  Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act.

12          **Q.     Did you also provide Direct and Rebuttal Testimony in this Docket?**

13          **R.**     Yes.

14          **Q.     What is the purpose of your surrebuttal testimony?**

15          **R.**     My surrebuttal testimony responds to rebuttal testimony filed by  
16                  Chad Teply, Cathy Woollums, Howard Ellis and Richard Sprott on behalf of  
17                  Rocky Mountain Power (RMP), as well as rebuttal testimony filed by  
18                  Matthew Croft on behalf of the Utah Division of Public Utilities (DPU).

19

20          **Summary**

21          **Q.     Please summarize your surrebuttal testimony:**

22          **R.**     A summary of my surrebuttal testimony is as follows:

- 23 1. RMP's rebuttal witnesses confuse and distort Regional Haze requirements  
24 as they apply to the challenged emission control projects. The four  
25 projects challenged in my direct testimony were clearly not cost-effective,  
26 did not produce any meaningful reduction in SO<sub>2</sub> emissions, and would  
27 never have been required under the Regional Haze regulations or other  
28 provisions of the Clean Air Act. My challenges are limited to those  
29 projects where the cost for pollution control significantly outweighs the  
30 environmental benefits achieved.
- 31 2. Mr. Sprott is dead wrong in suggesting that the Section 309 Regional Haze  
32 regulations require "better than BART" controls at each individual electric  
33 generating unit (EGU) that is "subject-to-BART". To the contrary, the  
34 primary and intended benefit of the Section 309 regulatory option was to  
35 permit utilities and regulators to target the most cost-effective  
36 environmental controls in order to achieve better "overall progress"  
37 towards meeting regional milestones than would be achieved through a  
38 unit-by-unit analysis.
- 39 3. The Section 309 states (which include Utah and Wyoming) have easily  
40 met the regional SO<sub>2</sub> emissions milestones contained in the Regional Haze  
41 SIP, with significant leeway, in part because of the scrubber project at the  
42 previously-unscrubbed Huntington 2 – an emissions control project that I  
43 have not challenged. The additional SO<sub>2</sub> removal accomplished by the  
44 very expensive projects at Hunter 1, Hunter 2 and Huntington 1 added

45 nothing of significance to regional haze reductions or compliance with  
46 Clean Air Act requirements. Those projects were optional and voluntary,  
47 not mandatory, when RMP committed to them.

48 4. RMP's witnesses repeatedly make the accurate but misleading claim that  
49 the applicable Utah and Wyoming State Implementation Plans (SIPs) and  
50 air permits require RMP to install the challenged pollution control  
51 upgrades. That argument ignores the fact that the current requirements  
52 were incorporated into the SIPs and air permits after and because of  
53 RMP's voluntary commitment in or before 2005 to install the upgrade  
54 projects in dispute. That claim begs the question whether the challenged  
55 upgrades would have been required had RMP looked out for the interests  
56 of its ratepayers by demonstrating to the respective air pollution control  
57 agencies that the challenged pollution control upgrades were not cost-  
58 effective, did not produce significant regional haze reductions, and were  
59 not necessary to achieve greater overall progress than BART towards  
60 meeting regional haze SO<sub>2</sub> emissions milestones.

61 5. Cost-effectiveness is always relevant in Regional Haze evaluations and  
62 requirements, regardless of whether the Section 308 or Section 309  
63 approach is used. Simply stated, Regional Haze regulations do not require  
64 investments in pollution control upgrades unless the controls are cost-  
65 effective.



- 66           6. RMP's witnesses quibble with my \$2,000 per ton cost-effectiveness  
67           threshold for SO<sub>2</sub>, but they generally offer no meaningful alternatives and  
68           no support for their claims. In contrast, I provided evidence of numerous  
69           SO<sub>2</sub> cost analyses at other BART-eligible facilities in support of my  
70           proposed cost threshold. The \$2,000 per ton figure is not absolute or cast  
71           in stone. However, all available evidence confirms that BART control  
72           projects at the majority of similar EGUs achieved emission reductions  
73           during the relevant time period at costs far below \$2,000 per ton of SO<sub>2</sub>  
74           removed. These costs are a reasonable upper limit for cost-effective  
75           BART SO<sub>2</sub> controls, absent unique circumstances that would make a  
76           higher cost reasonable. Abstract arguments that costs have increased since  
77           2009 or that some witnesses or regulators feel that higher costs may be  
78           reasonable are not applicable or relevant. Any cost-effectiveness  
79           evaluation done at any meaningful time in the process would have used  
80           the same data that I used and would have concluded that costs in excess of  
81           about \$2,000 per ton were not reasonable under BART.
- 82           7. RMP has never prepared a meaningful cost-effectiveness analysis of the  
83           scrubber projects at Hunter 1, Hunter 2 or Huntington 1. No such analysis  
84           was prepared in or before 2005 to support the Company's decision to  
85           proceed with the challenged Utah scrubber projects; nor has any such  
86           analysis been submitted by RMP's rebuttal witnesses in this docket. Mr.  
87           Sprott and Dr. Ellis purport to quarrel with certain aspects of my analyses,

88 but neither makes any effort to prepare his own quantitative analysis.  
89 RMP has attempted after-the-fact evaluations in response to DPU data  
90 requests and in Mr. Teply's rebuttal testimony, but these explanations do  
91 not use accepted or appropriate methodologies, they grossly distort  
92 claimed SO<sub>2</sub> emissions control benefits, and they do not provide  
93 meaningful results. When Mr. Teply's data are evaluated properly, his  
94 data actually confirms that the challenged projects were not cost-effective.

95 8. I would expect a utility concerned about ratepayer impacts to have  
96 performed, well in advance of a commitment to any of the challenged  
97 pollution control upgrades, a meaningful cost-benefit analysis and a robust  
98 evaluation of all other potential options. No such analyses have ever been  
99 produced by the Company with respect to the challenged Utah projects.  
100 While such an analysis was prepared by PacifiCorp's consultants in  
101 connection with the Dave Johnston 3 upgrades, PacifiCorp ignored the  
102 results of that analysis (including the recommendations of its own  
103 consultant performing the BART review) and chose an option that was not  
104 cost-effective on an incremental costs basis. RMP cannot properly rely  
105 upon after-the-fact rationalizations to defend its decision to move forward  
106 with uneconomical pollution controls at the four disputed EGUs.

107 9. RMP's witnesses purport to offer after-the-fact rationalizations for the  
108 company-wide decision made by PacifiCorp by 2005 to install or upgrade  
109 scrubbers and other pollution controls at all of its BART-eligible EGUs.

110           These arguments are unpersuasive. It is my understanding that the  
111           prudence of a utility's decision is evaluated based on facts that are known  
112           or should have been known at the time the decision was made, and not  
113           based on looking backwards or considering new data, as suggested by  
114           RMP's witnesses. In any event, none of the after-the-fact rationalizations  
115           support an argument that pollution control projects not meeting a  
116           reasonable cost-effectiveness test would have been required under any  
117           reasonable Clean Air Act regulatory program.

118           10. Despite claims by RMP witnesses, projections of increased coal sulfur at  
119           the Hunter plant do not support the challenged scrubber projects at these  
120           plants. First, the specific likelihood, magnitude or extent of potential  
121           increases in sulfur were not known in or before 2005 when the Company  
122           decided to proceed with the challenged pollution control projects. Second,  
123           I have seen no demonstration that the projected increase in sulfur would  
124           necessarily require the challenged scrubber projects in any event. Third,  
125           my rebuttal testimony demonstrates the weak correlation between coal  
126           sulfur and SO<sub>2</sub> emissions at Hunter 2, and shows that the Company's own  
127           data demonstrates better emissions control performance of the old  
128           scrubber units during periods of higher sulfur coal. Finally, I have not  
129           seen any convincing demonstration from the Company that coal blending  
130           or other options would not have addressed the implications of higher  
131           sulfur coal at lower costs than the challenged scrubber upgrades.

132 11. The challenged Utah scrubber projects were not required to satisfy the  
133 requirement for progress toward visibility improvement at Utah's Class I  
134 areas. Very significant SO<sub>2</sub> reductions (nearly 12,000 tons per year  
135 according to the Utah Regional Haze SIP) have been accomplished  
136 through controlling the previously unscrubbed Huntington 2 plant. I have  
137 not challenged the Huntington 2 pollution control costs in the Docket. In  
138 contrast, the additional SO<sub>2</sub> emission reductions projected for the three  
139 challenged projects at Hunter 1, Hunter 2, and Huntington 1 total only  
140 about 1,000 tons per year according to the Utah Regional Haze SIP.  
141 These additional emission reductions were not necessary in achieving  
142 required visibility improvements.

143

144 **Compliance with Regional Haze Regulations**

145 **Q. There are repeated claims throughout the RMP rebuttal testimony to the**  
146 **effect that State Implementation Plans (SIPs) and applicable air permits**  
147 **require RMP to install the challenged scrubber upgrades. Is that**  
148 **correct?**

149 **R.** Yes, those claims are accurate, but they are not relevant to the issue at hand,  
150 and in my view are intended to mislead the Commission. They ignore the fact  
151 that the current requirements were incorporated into the SIPs and air permits  
152 after and because of RMP's voluntary commitment in or before 2005 to install  
153 the challenged pollution control projects. Those claims beg the question

154 whether the challenged upgrades were in fact required by the Regional Haze  
155 Regulations and if they would have been required by air regulatory authorities  
156 had RMP properly done its job of looking out for the interests of its ratepayers  
157 by evaluating project costs and the related environmental benefits. If the  
158 proper analysis had been done at the time, RMP could have demonstrated  
159 then, as I have now, that the challenged pollution control projects were not  
160 cost-effective, did not produce significant reductions in emissions and/or  
161 improvements in regional haze, and were not necessary or essential to achieve  
162 the required regulatory standard, which is greater overall progress than BART  
163 towards meeting regional haze milestones.

164 **Q. What is your general response to the testimony of RMP rebuttal**  
165 **witnesses Sprott regarding the application of Regional Haze regulations**  
166 **and requirements to the four pollution control projects that you have**  
167 **challenged as not cost-effective?**

168 **R:** Mr. Sprott's discussion is confusing and misleading at best. He makes the  
169 remarkable assertion that RMP was essentially required by Utah's Section 309  
170 approach to install the challenged scrubber upgrades at the three Utah EGUs  
171 (Hunter 1, Hunter 2, and Huntington 1) regardless of cost or other factors.  
172 That suggestion is ludicrous and just flat wrong. Simply stated, there is no  
173 credible argument that non-cost-effective pollution control upgrades were  
174 mandated by the Section 309 Regional Haze regulations or other Clean Air  
175 Act requirements.

176                   Mr. Sprott’s testimony discusses at length the process followed by the  
177                   State of Utah (and to some extent Wyoming) in developing a Regional Haze  
178                   State Implementation Plan (SIP) under Section 309 of the Clean Air Act.  
179                   However, it fails to recognize the primary reason that some states selected the  
180                   Section 309 alternative. Section 309 differs from Section 308 in that it  
181                   provides states with an alternative means of implementing emissions  
182                   reductions to achieve the national goal of reducing or eliminating man-made  
183                   impairment to visibility in a manner designed to create overall emissions  
184                   reductions in a more cost-effective manner than would otherwise be achieved  
185                   using the source-by-source BART approach under Section 308. Within  
186                   Section 309, states are given significant flexibility, provided that the state  
187                   must demonstrate that its alternative Section 309 plan will achieve greater  
188                   overall emissions reductions and/or improvements in visibility at affected  
189                   Class I areas than would have otherwise been achieved following the source-  
190                   by-source BART approach under Section 308. Mr. Croft’s rebuttal  
191                   testimony also recognizes this basic premise of the Section 309 regulations.

192                   Mr. Sprott is correct that a source-by-source BART determination is not  
193                   required for BART-eligible sources located in Section 309 states. However,  
194                   he ignores the critical distinction between Section 308 and 309. Mr. Sprott’s  
195                   testimony would lead one to believe that, under Section 309, emissions  
196                   reductions and controls that are “better-than-BART” must be installed on each  
197                   and every BART-eligible source. Indeed, he states that “PacifiCorp had a

198 clear legal obligation to reduce SO<sub>2</sub> emissions” in order to meet the emission  
199 milestones from the Section 309 SIP (Page 7, Line 141), and suggests that this  
200 is true individually for each of the challenged EGUs. That is simply not the  
201 case, and Mr. Sprott provides no support for his misleading suggestion.

202 What Section 309 does require is that the regional emissions control plan  
203 as a whole must achieve “greater overall progress” in reducing SO<sub>2</sub> emissions  
204 than would a source-by-source BART approach. That differs significantly  
205 from suggesting that each and every source must individually achieve  
206 emission reductions or must add controls that are “better than BART”, as  
207 suggested by Mr. Sprott. Using the flexibility allowed by Section 309,  
208 individual states can adopt controls that exceed the minimum BART standards  
209 at some sources, while leaving other BART-eligible sources controlled at  
210 levels less than BART. It is this flexibility that can make Section 309 an  
211 attractive alternative, particularly in a State like Utah where all of the BART-  
212 eligible EGUs were owned by the same company.

213 The overall emission reduction level that would have been achieved by  
214 source-by-source BART reviews under Section 308 must be achieved under  
215 Section 309, and must be incorporated into the SO<sub>2</sub> emission milestones  
216 described in the SIP. In fact, the SO<sub>2</sub> emission milestones described in the  
217 SIP are intended to represent the regional emissions levels that would have  
218 otherwise been achieved by installing BART on all of the BART-eligible  
219 sources. However, it is wholly unnecessary for emissions control technology

220 to be required on each and every BART-eligible source to meet the milestone  
221 targets in the SIP. States and BART-eligible sources covered under the  
222 regional plan are free to choose the most cost-effective manner to add the  
223 needed controls in order to meet the overall regional emission milestone  
224 targets. Again, Mr. Croft agrees with this assessment in his rebuttal testimony.

225 To suggest, as Mr. Sprott does, that Section 309 somehow requires  
226 emission reductions across the board on each and every BART-eligible source  
227 would make Section 309 meaningless, as the requirement for source-by-  
228 source BART controls is imposed through Section 308. Section 309 was  
229 designed specifically to provide States with flexibility in addressing emissions  
230 reductions to improve visibility; duplicating the basic Section 308  
231 requirements in Section 309 as suggested by Mr. Sprott would be meaningless  
232 and contrary to the statutory goal.

233 In summary, Mr. Sprott's rebuttal testimony is wrong in suggesting that  
234 emission reductions were needed and/or required under Section 309 at each  
235 and every PacifiCorp BART-eligible unit. Mr. Sprott's interpretation of  
236 Section 309 renders its legal requirements as essentially equal to Section 308  
237 (source-by-source BART). This interpretation undermines the basic premise  
238 of Section 309, which is the ability to craft emission controls that as a whole  
239 are "better than BART", but come at a lower overall cost than the source-by-  
240 source BART approach in Section 308. Section 309 was actually designed to  
241 prevent what happened here -- the addition of very costly environmental



242 controls on individual emission sources that generate little or no  
243 environmental improvement, rather than achieving overall emissions  
244 reductions in the most cost-effective manner.

245 **Q. Can the SIP's regional milestones be met without the challenged scrubber**  
246 **upgrades?**

247 **R.** Yes, clearly. The 2008 SO<sub>2</sub> Emissions Milestone Report (which evaluates  
248 compliance with the 2008 SIP Milestones, and was released in March 2010),  
249 shows that the regional SO<sub>2</sub> emissions for the four states participating in  
250 Section 309 at the time (Arizona, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming) was  
251 265,662 tons year, compared to the regional SO<sub>2</sub> emissions milestone of  
252 378,398 tons per year. In other words, the regional SO<sub>2</sub> emission reductions  
253 already achieved through 2008 provided surplus emissions reductions of  
254 112,736 tons per year compared to the required milestones, a 30% cushion.  
255 On this basis, Utah and the other participating states have clearly  
256 demonstrated that their Section 309 plan is achieving results that are "better  
257 than BART".

258 **Q. But don't those numbers include reductions from the challenged**  
259 **scrubber projects?**

260 **R.** No. As of 2008, none of the SO<sub>2</sub> emissions controls at the plants in dispute  
261 (Huntington #1, Hunter #1, Hunter #2 and Dave Johnston #3) were yet in  
262 service. Yet, even without those scrubber upgrades, the regional surplus in  
263 SO<sub>2</sub> emissions reductions already exceeded 100,000 tons per year. Any

264 suggestion by Mr. Sprott or other RMP witnesses that these added emissions  
265 controls were essential and necessary to meeting the emissions milestones in  
266 the SIPs is simply not supported by the available data. In fact, the 2008 actual  
267 SO<sub>2</sub> emissions are already almost as low as the required milestone for 2014.  
268 Moreover, even the final 2018 milestone (234,624 tons per year) will require  
269 only moderate additional (post-2008) emission reductions of about 31,000  
270 tons per year on a regional basis, representing an emissions decrease of only  
271 12 percent over the remaining 10 years in the SIP (or about 1% per year).  
272 These milestones should be easy to achieve and there is no credible argument  
273 that the modest emissions reductions from the challenged projects (only about  
274 1,000 tons per year at the three Utah EGUs combined) are critical or necessary  
275 to meet the milestones.

276 This is further confirmed by further analysis of the 2008 milestone  
277 report. Actual 2008 emissions reflected in that report represents the average  
278 SO<sub>2</sub> emissions over the period 2006 – 2008, and many of the PacifiCorp  
279 emission control improvements described in the Company's planning  
280 documents were not yet in place by this time. For example, the Huntington #2  
281 scrubber project, which provided SO<sub>2</sub> reductions of 11,960 tons per year  
282 according to the Utah SIP, was not in place until about mid-2007. As such,  
283 these emissions reductions are not yet fully recognized in the 2008 milestone  
284 report. When this is factored into the analysis, the SO<sub>2</sub> emission reductions  
285 required by "new" (post-2008) emissions control projects is significantly less.

286           In summary, Mr. Sprott's rebuttal testimony fails to recognize that the  
287 SO<sub>2</sub> emission reductions achieved at Huntington #1, Hunter #1, and Hunter  
288 #2 are inconsequential and have not been demonstrated to be necessary or  
289 essential to meet the current or future regional emissions SO<sub>2</sub> milestones  
290 contained in the Utah Regional Haze SIP.

291       **Q. Do you agree with the suggestions of RMP witnesses Sprott and Ellis that**  
292 **added controls at Huntington #1, Hunter #1, and Hunter #2 may be**  
293 **necessary to provide sufficient progress toward visibility improvement**  
294 **specifically at Utah's Class I areas?**

295       **R.** No. While it is true that regional emission reductions need to be somewhat  
296 geographically distributed in order to provide reasonable progress in reducing  
297 haze at individual Class I areas under Section 309 Regional Haze SIPs, Mr.  
298 Sprott and Dr. Ellis ignore that very substantial SO<sub>2</sub> reductions have already  
299 been achieved at Huntington #2, which was previously uncontrolled. The  
300 costs associated with emission controls at Huntington #2 are not being  
301 disputed by me in this Docket. According to the Utah Regional Haze SIP, the  
302 Huntington #2 emission controls reduce SO<sub>2</sub> emissions from the baseline by  
303 11,960 tons per year, which represents about 90% of the total emission  
304 reductions from all of PacifiCorp's BART-eligible EGUs in Utah.

305           In contrast, the three challenged Utah scrubber projects produce slightly  
306 more than 1,000 tons per year of SO<sub>2</sub> emission reductions combined. The  
307 Utah scrubber projects challenged in this docket contribute only a small

308 fraction of the total reductions from PacifiCorp's Utah EGU sources. The  
309 combined reductions of the three challenged projects are inconsequential in  
310 comparison to the reductions already achieved at Huntington #2.  
311 Furthermore, the Huntington #2 reductions occur in the same relative location  
312 as the other Utah scrubber projects and would therefore have similar effects  
313 on a per ton basis in meeting the SIP emissions milestones and reducing  
314 regional haze in Utah's Class I areas. The Huntington #2 reductions are more  
315 than sufficient to meet any requirement to demonstrate reasonable further  
316 progress toward improving visibility at Utah's nearby Class I areas (Arches,  
317 Canyonlands, and Capitol Reef National Parks).

318 Moreover, a portion of the Huntington #2 emission reductions are also  
319 "surplus" in that the current SO<sub>2</sub> emissions limit for that unit is 0.12  
320 lb/MMBtu, which is lower than the "presumptive BART" limit of 0.15  
321 lb/MMBtu described by Mr. Sprott. These surplus reductions create  
322 additional "room," confirming that the other Utah EGU's could have been left  
323 at or near their existing SO<sub>2</sub> emissions levels without jeopardizing the  
324 requirement that the overall SIP must create better overall progress than  
325 BART and meet the reasonable further progress requirements for Utah's Class  
326 I areas. Similarly, "better-than-BART" controls installed on several other  
327 EGUs in the planning region provided even more flexibility in meeting the  
328 Section 309 regulatory requirements, and created an opportunity for additional

329 flexibility at other EGUs where additional pollution controls were not cost-  
330 effective.

331 **Q. Ms. Woollums claims that your conclusions rest on the “faulty**  
332 **assumption” that RMP “could have relied exclusively on the SO<sub>2</sub>**  
333 **backstop trading program to achieve compliance with the Regional Haze**  
334 **Rule” (lines 342-344). Is she correct?**

335 **R.** No, she is incorrect. I made no such assumption. Indeed, I did not challenge  
336 the vast majority of Wyoming plant SO<sub>2</sub> upgrade projects even though the  
337 WDEQ itself said that PacifiCorp would not be required to install any  
338 particular SO<sub>2</sub> control equipment as BART in light of the backstop trading  
339 program.

340 My analysis does not rely at all on the backstop SO<sub>2</sub> trading program.  
341 Rather, I conclude that the SO<sub>2</sub> controls installed at the four EGUs in dispute  
342 were not cost-effective and were not necessary to meet the regional haze  
343 milestones. If there had been a showing that the inconsequential reductions in  
344 SO<sub>2</sub> emissions from these four contested projects were necessary to meet the  
345 regional emissions milestones, I would not have challenged the associated  
346 costs. However, as clearly demonstrated above in my discussion of the 2008  
347 Emissions Milestone Report, the projects in question are not essential in  
348 meeting the SIP emissions milestones. Also, if the milestones are achieved,  
349 and I have every reason to expect that they will be achieved going forward

350 even without the benefits achieved by the challenged emission control  
351 projects, the backstop SO<sub>2</sub> trading program will not be triggered.

352 **Q. Ms. Woollums and Mr. Croft both refer to an assumption that a 90%**  
353 **SO<sub>2</sub> removal level may be required by the EPA or UDEQ. Can you**  
354 **comment?**

355 **R.** There is no credible evidence that any regulatory agency ever required a 90%  
356 SO<sub>2</sub> removal level at any of the EGUs in dispute; all available evidence  
357 demonstrates to the contrary. Indeed, the air quality permits issued to  
358 PacifiCorp for its Utah facilities (Hunter 1, Hunter 2, and Huntington 1) still  
359 mandate only an 80% SO<sub>2</sub> control efficiency.

360 When RMP was asked for support for the 90% level, it pointed to the  
361 EPA's Proposed Guidelines for BART Determinations published in the  
362 Federal Register on July 20, 2001, which was attached to Mr. Croft's rebuttal  
363 testimony as DPU Exhibit 7.9R-RR. Those guidelines make no suggestion  
364 whatsoever that a 90% removal requirement should be imposed on currently  
365 controlled units, or that cost-effectiveness is not relevant in selecting the  
366 appropriate control level under BART. The proposed guidelines referenced  
367 an October 2000 report to the effect that scrubbers installed in the 1990s  
368 typically removed more than 90% (pg. 38110), they mention 1980 BART  
369 guidelines that included an analysis of 90% controls (pg. 38110), and they  
370 discussed and proposed a presumption that 90-95% SO<sub>2</sub> control could be  
371 achieved cost-effectively for previously uncontrolled units (at 38130). No

372 presumption was suggested for units that were already 80-85% controlled, as  
373 were the Hunter 1 and 2 and Huntington 1 units.

374 In reality, the proposed guidelines were explicit in confirming that cost-  
375 effectiveness remains a critical component of a BART analysis and should not  
376 be ignored, as reflected in the following quotations from those 2001  
377 guidelines:

- 378 • “[T]he state’s determination of BART for regional haze involves some  
379 State discretion in considering a number of factors ..., including the  
380 costs of compliance.” (pg. 38111);
- 381 • “States are required by Section 169A(g) of the [Clean Air Act] to  
382 consider: - The costs of compliance, .... (pg. 38115);
- 383 • “[If states adopt] alternative measures, such as an emissions trading  
384 program, ..., [they must] provide a demonstration that any such  
385 alternative will achieve greater ‘reasonable progress’ [based on  
386 considerations including] the costs of compliance ....” (pg. 38115);
- 387 • “[The engineering analysis step] requires ... analysis of the cost of  
388 compliance.... (pg. 38116).
- 389 • “Step 4: For a Bart Engineering Analysis, What Impacts Must I  
390 Calculate and Report” .... After you identify and rank the available and  
391 technically feasible control options, you must then conduct three types  
392 of impacts analyses when you make a BART determination: Impact  
393 analysis part 1: Costs of compliance ....” (pg. 38125).

- 394           •     “c. *What do we mean by cost effectiveness?* .... [providing discussion  
395                     of cost-effectiveness calculations] (pg. 38126-38127).

396           These guidelines were unambiguous in their requirement that cost-  
397           effectiveness must be taken into account in selecting BART. There is simply  
398           no credible argument that the EPA ever considered imposing a 90% SO<sub>2</sub>  
399           control requirement regardless of cost.

400                     Similarly, there is no credible evidence that the UDEQ ever considered  
401           imposing a 90% requirement regardless of cost on its BART-eligible Utah  
402           plants. The WRAP Annex clearly demonstrates that its participants, which  
403           included the UDEQ, contemplated that uncontrolled units such as Huntington  
404           2 would add at least 85% efficient controls, but that units already controlled to  
405           about 80%, as were Huntington 1 and Hunter 1 and 2, would not be further  
406           controlled. In addition, as noted above, the air permits for the Hunter 1 and 2  
407           and Huntington 1 units still, to this day, require only 80% SO<sub>2</sub> removal.  
408           While the lb/MMBtu SO<sub>2</sub> emissions requirements were made much more  
409           stringent at PacifiCorp’s request, the percentage removal requirements were  
410           not changed from the 80% value mandated by earlier permits. Finally, based  
411           on my inspection of the UDEQ file on the Hunter 2 air permitting process, I  
412           did not discover a single document that supports any claim that UDEQ ever  
413           proposed that PacifiCorp’s Utah EGUs should be required to remove at a 90%  
414           SO<sub>2</sub> removal rate. I cannot speak to whether various parties may have  
415           engaged in speculation about such a requirement, but I can say confidently



416 that no such requirement was ever adopted or proposed for adoption for the  
417 challenged Utah EGUs.

418

419 **Cost-Effectiveness Calculations**

420 **Q. How do you respond to the various challenges by RMP rebuttal witnesses**  
421 **to your SO<sub>2</sub> cost-effectiveness calculations?**

422 **R.** My first general response is that, despite various unfounded criticisms of my  
423 calculations, the RMP witnesses have not offered any cost-effectiveness  
424 analyses of their own (other than a misleading attempt by Mr. Tepy to  
425 calculate cost-effectiveness, which I discuss below). Even more incriminating  
426 is that RMP has never produced any kind of meaningful evaluation of  
427 available options to the selected pollution control projects or the cost-  
428 effectiveness of the challenged Utah scrubber projects prior to the time that  
429 PacifiCorp committed to proceed with them. I cannot see how a utility that  
430 purports to be looking out for the best interests of its ratepayers can avoid  
431 preparing rigorous analyses of cost-effectiveness of the proposed projects and  
432 all reasonable alternatives. Yet, that is how this utility elected to proceed.

433 An analysis of costs and options was prepared by PacifiCorp's  
434 consultants with respect to Dave Johnston 3. Unfortunately, those results  
435 were then ignored and the Company elected to proceed with an option that  
436 was not recommended by its own consultant on the basis that the controls  
437 were not cost-effective on an incremental-cost basis.

438 I note that, in his rebuttal testimony, Mr. Croft remains somewhat  
439 confused as to the WDEQ's cost-effectiveness conclusions regarding Dave  
440 Johnston 3. As I explained in my rebuttal testimony, the control costs  
441 evaluated by WDEQ were clearly for the full-scale baghouse option that was  
442 eventually selected by the Company. WDEQ's BART analysis mis-labeled  
443 controls, but it clearly concluded that the incremental cost-effectiveness of  
444 that option was not reasonable, even while it "accepted" the option as (more  
445 than) satisfying BART. Later, the Wyoming SIP accepted the overall cost  
446 effectiveness of that option as reasonable, but I have challenged only the  
447 incremental costs of this option over another available and cost-effective  
448 option. On an incremental cost basis, the WDEQ unambiguously found  
449 PacifiCorp's selected control option not to be cost-effective.

450 Mr. Sprott and Dr. Ellis quibble with various aspects of my analyses, but  
451 neither of them makes any effort to prepare a competing quantitative analysis.  
452 It is not particularly helpful to take unsupported pot-shots at an analysis  
453 without offering a competing analysis.

454 **Q. In his rebuttal testimony, Mr. Sprott claims that the cost data you used in**  
455 **calculating cost-effectiveness are invalid. How do you respond?**

456 **R.** First, I note that Mr. Sprott makes this claim without stating what he thinks  
457 are the accurate cost values for the emission control projects in dispute.  
458 Second, the capital cost data used in my direct testimony come directly from  
459 the cost data provided by PacifiCorp in response to various data requests in

460 this Docket. I then annualized the capital costs using the same assumptions  
461 used elsewhere by PacifiCorp in its five-factor BART analyses for Wyoming.  
462 I also added realistic incremental operating costs to the totals. So, in fact, my  
463 costs were derived directly from PacifiCorp's own data. Mr. Sprott's  
464 unsupported suggestion that the costs described in my direct testimony include  
465 errors is ludicrous and not based on any scientific evaluation or checking of  
466 the relevant supporting data, which was fully documented in my direct  
467 testimony.

468 Also, if one actually compares the cost data developed in my direct  
469 testimony with the cost information provided by Mr. Teply in his rebuttal  
470 testimony (which I discuss below), one will find that my cost values are  
471 actually slightly less than the costs developed in the Teply rebuttal testimony.  
472 For example, Teply Table 1 (page 38) lists annualized cost for emissions  
473 control at Hunter #1 and Hunter #2 at \$9.885 million and \$8.982 million  
474 respectively. The annualized costs in my direct testimony for Hunter #1 and  
475 Hunter #2 are less, about \$8.2 million and \$7.4 million respectively. This  
476 comparison also occurs in Mr. Croft's rebuttal testimony. So, in comparison,  
477 my costs are actually underestimated by approximately \$1.5 million per year  
478 at each of these units. Mr. Sprott should verify his facts before making claims  
479 about the accuracy of another witness's data and calculations.

480 **Q. Mr. Sprott makes similar claims about the accuracy of the pollution**  
481 **control benefits for the challenged Utah scrubber projects. What is your**  
482 **response?**

483 **R.** As seems to be his style, without offering any quantitative data or analysis of  
484 his own, Mr. Sprott makes the unsupported claim that the emission reductions  
485 assumed in my direct testimony are “drastically low” (Lines 432-433) and that  
486 the true reductions should be “several fold greater” (Line 442). Mr. Sprott  
487 again ignores the underlying data in making these erroneous claims.

488 The proper and accepted method for calculating the level of emissions  
489 control is to calculate the difference in pre-control emissions with the post-  
490 control emissions. This basis for calculating the emission control reductions is  
491 also acknowledged by Mr. Croft’s rebuttal testimony. As explained in my  
492 rebuttal testimony, the standard regulatory practice is to use past actual  
493 emissions for the pre-control level and future allowable emissions for the  
494 post-control emissions. Mr. Sprott’s claim that “actual tons reduced” must be  
495 used (Lines 441-442) is contrary to standard regulatory practice and, in fact, is  
496 not possible, given that the “actual” emissions levels for future years are  
497 unknown. Any attempt to define future year “actual” emissions would be  
498 entirely speculative. For this reason, standard regulatory practice defines  
499 future year emissions based on the allowable permit levels, because the source  
500 is legally allowed to operate up to that emissions level at any point in the

501 future. Standard regulatory practice does not allow sources to take credit for  
502 emission reductions that are not legally enforceable.

503 Mr. Croft cites some examples where the baseline emission calculations  
504 used the allowable permit emissions, and he describes such an approach as  
505 “conservative”. I generally agree with Mr. Croft’s assessment. However,  
506 when the baseline emissions are based on the allowable permit values, this  
507 approach will overestimate the actual emission reductions and the resulting  
508 cost-effectiveness value will be underestimated. It is from this perspective  
509 that the approach described by Mr. Croft is “conservative”. The regulatory  
510 agency is generally concerned in selecting BART that the costs being  
511 evaluated are not overstated so as to erroneously exclude a BART option  
512 based on costs. The situation in this Docket is actually the reverse of the  
513 standard situation that the BART guidelines try to address.

514 The use of a standardized regulatory practice in calculating emission  
515 reductions from a pollution control project is essential for any type of  
516 meaningful comparisons between costs and associated cost-effectiveness of  
517 different controls and different projects. If everyone used a unique approach  
518 in calculating costs and the associated pollution control benefits, there would  
519 be no basis for comparing costs or determining reasonable levels for cost-  
520 effectiveness between different EGUs and/or control options. My calculations  
521 follow the standard regulatory approach and provide a meaningful comparison

522 of the true costs and benefits of the emission control options selected by  
523 PacifiCorp.

524 **Q. You mentioned RMP's after-the-fact attempts at calculating cost-**  
525 **effectiveness. What do you make of those analyses?**

526 **R.** RMP's first such attempt was done in response to DPU data requests and I  
527 responded to those analyses in my rebuttal testimony. I showed that the  
528 analyses did not use accepted or appropriate methodologies and that they  
529 overstated claimed SO<sub>2</sub> savings. More important, however, I showed that,  
530 even using the distorted numbers from those analyses, the SO<sub>2</sub> reductions are  
531 still not cost effective at any of the challenged pollution control projects.

532 Apparently troubled by the cost-effectiveness numbers reflected in  
533 RMP's own data response, Mr. Teply's rebuttal testimony purports to include  
534 a brand new approach to cost-effectiveness. I will say that, unlike Mr. Sprott  
535 or Dr. Ellis, Mr. Tetley at least made an attempt at a quantitative assessment  
536 of the potential costs and benefits of the Hunter scrubber projects. However,  
537 his analysis is even more distorted than the DPU data response analyses,  
538 provides little meaningful or useful information, and does not represent a  
539 regulatory acceptable method of addressing project costs under BART.

540 Based on his Table 1 (page 38), Mr. Teply's rebuttal testimony claims  
541 that the scrubber projects at Hunter #1 and Hunter #2 provide a net benefit of  
542 over 9,000 tons per year in SO<sub>2</sub> reduction at each plant. This claim is  
543 internally inconsistent because it comes from an emissions baseline of only

544 about 3,000 tons per year. One cannot start with 3,000 tons of emissions and  
545 produce 9,000 tons of emission reductions no matter how hard you try; yet  
546 that is what Mr. Teply's table purports to show. For his values to be accurate,  
547 one would have to accept that the degree of controls added exceeds the  
548 original emissions level. In other words, Teply attempts to claims credit for  
549 controlling emission levels that were never released at either of the plants in  
550 question.

551 For this reason and others, Mr. Teply's calculations do not conform to  
552 any standard regulatory analysis. They are meaningless in terms of assessing  
553 the cost-effectiveness of the challenged scrubber projects or comparing cost-  
554 effectiveness calculations from other projects.

555 One significant error in Teply's table is the assumption of 0.16  
556 lb/MMBtu in calculating baseline emissions at Hunter Unit #1 and Unit #2.  
557 Based on PacifiCorp's own data provided in response to data request DPU  
558 36.10, the historical "actual emissions" at Hunter Unit #2 ranged between  
559 about 0.11 and 0.17 lb/MMBtu over the period of record (13 years). In fact,  
560 in 9 of the 13 years for emissions data provided by PacifiCorp, the actual  
561 Hunter #2 SO<sub>2</sub> emissions were less than 0.16 lb/MMBtu. Therefore, the value  
562 used by Teply in his table is at or near the top of the range in terms of baseline  
563 SO<sub>2</sub> emissions. On average, PacifiCorp's own data demonstrate that the  
564 baseline emissions at Hunter Unit #2 were much lower than the value used by  
565 Teply in his rebuttal testimony. The result is that the historical SO<sub>2</sub> removal

566 rates stated by Teply are also at the lower end of the historical range, which  
567 results in exaggerating the benefits of any added pollution controls. Mr.  
568 Teply's assumptions regarding baseline emissions completely distort his  
569 calculated cost-effectiveness for emission controls.

570 A more significant error in Teply's data is in his estimate of the  
571 pollution control benefits of the Hunter #1 and Hunter #2 scrubber upgrades.  
572 As described previously, he claims an emissions reduction credit of about  
573 9,000 tons per year, about threefold more than his reported baseline emissions  
574 of about 3,000 tons per year. The practical implication of Teply's claim is  
575 that the pollution control projects at Hunter Unit #1 and #2 will result in the  
576 power plant becoming an SO<sub>2</sub> "sink" that will suck ambient SO<sub>2</sub> out of the  
577 atmosphere! Teply's claim for the environmental value of the Hunter  
578 pollution control project is totally unreasonable, unrealistic, and provides no  
579 meaningful basis for estimating or comparing the cost effectiveness of the  
580 Hunter pollution control projects.

581 Among other concerns, it appears that Teply is attempting to claim  
582 credit for presumed emissions control benefits of projected increases in coal  
583 sulfur at the Hunter plant. In a similar vein, Mr. Croft seems to accept the  
584 possibility that increased coal sulfur might be "another factor" that could be  
585 considered in a cost-effectiveness evaluation, assuming it was known by  
586 PacifiCorp at the time it made its decision to proceed with the Hunter projects.



587           There are several problems with any attempt to quantify or claim  
588 unknown and unknowable emissions reductions from projected increases in  
589 coal sulfur content at the Hunter plants. First, no credible evidence has been  
590 offered that PacifiCorp knew of the likelihood or extent of projected increases  
591 in sulfur content at the Hunter plant before 2006, or that it considered or  
592 evaluated those factors in deciding to install the scrubber upgrades at Hunter.  
593 PacifiCorp proposed the Hunter scrubber projects as early as 2003, when it  
594 requested an air permit for a proposed Hunter 4 unit. Hunter 4 was never  
595 constructed. Although the permitting efforts for Hunter 4 were never  
596 completed, the scrubber control projects at issue in this Docket originated with  
597 the Hunter 4 permit application. PacifiCorp re-committed to these Hunter  
598 scrubber projects in 2005 in connection with the proposed acquisition by its  
599 current owner. It is beyond reasonable dispute that PacifiCorp had committed  
600 to the Hunter scrubber projects long before the nature or extent of any  
601 projected increases in coal sulfur for the Hunter plant were known or  
602 evaluated. PacifiCorp has produced no analysis documenting the likelihood,  
603 extent or potential impacts of higher sulfur coal at any time before it  
604 committed to these projects. Therefore, even accepting Mr. Croft's  
605 suggestion that this factor could be an "additional factor" in assessing costs, it  
606 was not timely considered or evaluated by PacifiCorp before it had committed  
607 to the Hunter pollution control projects.

608           Second, as demonstrated by the data in my rebuttal testimony, coal  
609 sulfur content by itself is poorly correlated with actual SO<sub>2</sub> emissions, and  
610 actual plant data show that scrubber performance at Hunter Unit #2 improves  
611 as coal sulfur increases. So, a basic premise of the calculations and  
612 assumptions made by Mr. Teply and several other RMP rebuttal witnesses  
613 (i.e., that SO<sub>2</sub> emissions increase proportionally to coal sulfur content) is itself  
614 unproven and not documented by PacifiCorp's own plant data. Simply stated,  
615 PacifiCorp has not demonstrated that the projected increases in sulfur at coal  
616 to be burned at the Hunter plant could not have been handled adequately by  
617 the existing scrubber and/or through alternative means. No such analyses  
618 have been offered.

619           Notwithstanding all of the above, the biggest problem with Mr. Teply's  
620 Table 1 calculations is that the effect of the higher coal sulfur is included on  
621 only one side of the comparison. The baseline emissions are based on a coal  
622 sulfur of 0.5% while the future year emissions are based on a coal sulfur  
623 content assumed to be 0.767%. This skews the calculation and suggests larger  
624 emission control benefits than would be achieved in reality, if one were to  
625 correctly perform the calculations even accounting for higher sulfur coal. In  
626 effect, Teply's Table 1 compares apples to oranges in terms of tons of SO<sub>2</sub>  
627 removed. It does not provide any meaningful or accurate assessment of the  
628 cost effectiveness of the Hunter scrubber upgrade projects.

629       **Q. Can any meaningful data be gleaned from Mr. Teply's Table 1?**

630 **R.** Yes, it is possible to perform a proper calculation of cost-effectiveness that  
631 conforms to standard regulatory practice based on data in Teply's Table 1.  
632 Table 1 claims environmental benefits based on the difference between future  
633 emissions and the past baseline emissions. This claimed value is 751 tons per  
634 year for each unit. Using Teply's annualized cost data (\$9,885,000 for Hunter  
635 Unit #1 and \$9,982,000 for Hunter Unit #2), the calculated cost effectiveness  
636 is about \$13,292 per ton at Hunter Unit #1 and \$11,960 per ton at Hunter Unit  
637 #2. These values are in the same general range of cost effectiveness as  
638 calculated in my direct testimony and are well above the cost effectiveness  
639 values promoted by any other witness. Mr. Teply's own data thus confirms  
640 my analysis.

641 **Q. How do you respond to Mr. Croft's question about whether it is**  
642 **appropriate to rely upon SO<sub>2</sub> removal data from the Utah SIP?**

643 **R.** Mr. Croft's rebuttal testimony states that a UDEQ employee told him that the  
644 Utah SIP SO<sub>2</sub> reduction values were "never intended for the purpose of a cost  
645 effective analysis" (lines 121-123). Whether or not this statement is true, I do  
646 not believe it is troubling. In performing a BART analysis, one needs to  
647 project SO<sub>2</sub> removal under each of the options under consideration. Neither  
648 the UDEQ nor PacifiCorp ever performed a BART analysis for the Utah units,  
649 so no such data was prepared specifically for a BART cost-effectiveness test.  
650 The reported SIP emissions control numbers are simply the difference  
651 between the "baseline" emissions described in the SIP and the future plant

652 emissions based on the allowable permit level. As such, the SIP calculations  
653 conform with the standard regulatory practice, making the numbers generated  
654 comparable to BART data for other plants. Whether or not the participants in  
655 developing the SIP “intended” that the SO<sub>2</sub> reduction numbers be used for  
656 other purposes, those participants had every incentive and obligation to reach  
657 their best estimates based upon all available information. In fact, statements  
658 that these particular control benefits calculations were not developed for the  
659 purpose of conducting a cost-effectiveness analysis actually gives me higher  
660 confidence that these values are accurate and not biased by the desire to  
661 engineer a particular cost effectiveness outcome. It is thus the best and most  
662 accurate information available that I or the Commission can look to in  
663 describing the pollution control benefits of the Utah scrubber projects and, as  
664 such, it provides the best estimates for making cost-effectiveness calculations.

665

666 **Cost-Effectiveness Threshold**

667 **Q. How do you respond to claims made by RMP rebuttal witnesses Sprott,**  
668 **Ellis, Teply and Woollums that your \$2,000 per ton cost-effectiveness**  
669 **“threshold” is too low?**

670 **R.** In my direct testimony, I offered my expert opinion that \$2,000 per ton of SO<sub>2</sub>  
671 removed is a reasonable threshold for defining the upper limit for “cost-  
672 effective” SO<sub>2</sub> emissions controls under BART. I based my opinion on my  
673 professional experience and also on my evaluation of numerous SO<sub>2</sub> BART

674 determinations performed by air regulators in several states on their BART-  
675 eligible sources. My opinion has been challenged by RMP's rebuttal  
676 witnesses, although none of them offers any meaningful support for a higher  
677 number.

678 Ms. Woollums suggests that a value of \$5,000 per ton SO<sub>2</sub> removed is a  
679 reasonable value for defining "cost-effective" SO<sub>2</sub> controls. However, Ms.  
680 Woollums offers no calculations, technical analysis or regulatory evaluation in  
681 support of her claim. She offers only unsupported claims of "recent  
682 discussions" with unnamed air regulators that \$5,000 is a reasonable "rule of  
683 thumb." As a professional scientist, I have a very hard time relying upon  
684 unsupported hearsay for setting a reasonable cost-effectiveness threshold,  
685 particularly given that extensive data from actual BART evaluations at similar  
686 EGUs consistently confirm that \$2,000 per ton is a reasonable upper limit,  
687 absent compelling evidence of other factors that warrant a higher cost value.  
688 Ms. Woollums references her "review" of BART determinations around the  
689 country, but fails to cite even one of them that reached a conclusion that more  
690 than \$2,000 per ton for SO<sub>2</sub> removal is a reasonable general standard under  
691 BART.

692 Mr. Teply suggests that costs of up to \$7,500 per ton SO<sub>2</sub> removed may  
693 represent a reasonable "cost-effectiveness" level. The only thing offered in  
694 support of this claim is a recent BART decision for the Four Corners  
695 Generating Station in New Mexico. However, that decision involved nitrogen

696 oxide (NO<sub>x</sub>) emissions, not SO<sub>2</sub>. The Four Corners BART analysis is wholly  
697 irrelevant to SO<sub>2</sub> and cannot be used to defend higher costs for controlling  
698 SO<sub>2</sub> emissions at PacifiCorp's EGUs. Mr. Croft also reaches the same  
699 conclusion in his rebuttal testimony.

700 Mr. Sprott and Dr. Ellis both criticize my \$2,000 figure, but neither  
701 offers a competing figure or any basis for calculating a different number. As  
702 stated elsewhere, my number is based upon an analysis of numerous actual  
703 BART determinations for EGUs operating under comparable circumstances.  
704 If either Mr. Sprott or Dr. Ellis had any basis for supporting a higher number,  
705 I would have expected them to produce and support competing calculations.  
706 Having failed to do so, their criticisms ring hollow.

707 In considering the challenges of the RMP rebuttal witnesses to my  
708 \$2,000 per ton threshold, it should also be remembered that the margin by  
709 which PacifiCorp's costs exceed this threshold is very large. As documented  
710 in my direct testimony, the true costs for PacifiCorp's controls at the Utah  
711 EGUs (Huntington #1, Hunter #1, and Hunter #2), are between \$11,929 per  
712 ton and \$30,943 per ton. These costs are well above even the inflated cost-  
713 effectiveness thresholds of \$5,000 or \$7,500 per ton offered by PacifiCorp's  
714 witnesses. The arguments presented against my \$2,000 per ton threshold are  
715 smokescreens designed to divert attention away from the facts of this case,  
716 i.e., that the actual cost of the disputed pollution control projects cannot be  
717 justified under any reasonable BART threshold.

718 **Q. Dr. Ellis and Mr. Sprott point out that the cost-effectiveness values**  
719 **referenced in the EPA's Appendix Y of \$400 - \$2,000 per ton are based on**  
720 **previously uncontrolled EGUs. Mr. Croft made a similar observation.**  
721 **Does that affect the validity of your threshold or calculations?**

722 **R.** No. My calculations are not based on cost data from uncontrolled plants. I  
723 cited the information from Appendix Y regarding previously uncontrolled  
724 EGUs because it is consistent with actual BART decisions on previously  
725 controlled EGUs reached by a variety of air regulators. However, it was  
726 clearly not the primary basis for my conclusion. As explained in my direct  
727 testimony, I reviewed all of the data contained in the Western Regional Air  
728 Partnership (WRAP) BART Clearinghouse, which were compiled by WRAP  
729 up until late 2009. Further updates to the Clearinghouse were not made by  
730 WRAP after December 2009 as many of the WRAP states had already  
731 completed their BART decision-making by that time. Further updates of  
732 BART costs were simply no longer valuable to WRAP, so the efforts were  
733 discontinued.

734 Within the WRAP Clearinghouse, I compiled the relevant cost data for  
735 the subset of coal-fired EGUs where a scrubber upgrade was being considered  
736 as BART. This is the most relevant data for comparisons to the challenged  
737 Utah EGUs (Huntington #1, Hunter #1, and Hunter #2), as those plants were  
738 also upgrading their scrubbers under the BART technology proposed by  
739 PacifiCorp. Excluded from my comparison table were costs compiled by

740 WRAP where the EGU previously operated without SO<sub>2</sub> controls or the EGU  
741 was fired on fuels other than coal. The relevant cost-effectiveness data for  
742 scrubber upgrades from the WRAP BART Clearinghouse are summarized  
743 below:

744 **BART Cost Information – SO<sub>2</sub> Scrubber Upgrades**  
745 **(from December 10, 2009 WRAP BART Clearinghouse,**  
746 **www.wrapair.org)**  
747

<i>EGU &amp; Location</i>	<i>Estimated SO<sub>2</sub> BART Costs (\$ per ton)</i>
Jim Bridger (WY)	\$620 to \$729 per ton
Coal Creek (ND)	\$555 per ton
King (MN)	\$49 per ton
Laramie River (WY)	\$1,564 to \$1,571 per ton
MR Young (ND)	\$247 to \$565 per ton
Naughton Unit #3 (WY)	\$290 per ton
Sherburne County (MN)	\$236 to \$238 per ton
Wyodak (WY)	\$1,428

748  
749 Based on the above table, costs determined to represent BART for  
750 scrubber upgrades at other coal-fired EGUs ranged from a low of \$49/ton at  
751 the King Plant in Minnesota to a high of \$1,571/ton at Wyoming's Laramie  
752 River Station. The WRAP data cover units at eight different coal-fired  
753 facilities and even a larger number of individual EGUs. As such, these data  
754 represent a robust cross-section of coal-fired EGUs where scrubber upgrades  
755 were being installed to provide incremental control of SO<sub>2</sub> emissions.



756 Mr. Sprott's rebuttal testimony accepts that the WRAP Clearinghouse  
757 cost data were accurate as of 2009 (Lines 445-446), but then implies that the  
758 Clearinghouse data may not be current today, and should thus not be relied  
759 upon. PacifiCorp filed its applications for revised air permits to install the  
760 challenged scrubbers at the Huntington and Hunter units in 2003 - 2006, and  
761 the permits that authorized these projects were issued in 2008. This is the  
762 relevant time period to be considered in performing cost-effectiveness  
763 calculations, as it is the time period when PacifiCorp made the financial and  
764 other commitments to proceed with the disputed emissions control upgrades,  
765 and when it should have performed cost-effectiveness calculations. The data  
766 in the BART Clearinghouse are generally concurrent with the time period  
767 during which PacifiCorp make the commitments to move forward with its  
768 emissions control projects and, as such, form a valid basis for relative  
769 comparison of PacifiCorp costs to BART costs at other similar EGUs.

770 The costs incurred to install SO<sub>2</sub> emission controls at other  
771 BART-eligible EGUs provide reasonable benchmarks for judging whether  
772 proposed control strategies at other similar facilities are cost-effective under  
773 BART, particularly where the costs reported at other similar facilities fall  
774 within a fairly narrow range. Costs significantly outside the range of costs  
775 incurred at other BART-eligible facilities are simply not cost-effective. Since  
776 BART costs at other similar BART-eligible EGUs are all under \$2,000 per ton  
777 SO<sub>2</sub> removed, the threshold I selected for this evaluation represents a

778 reasonable cost-effectiveness threshold to judge PacifiCorp's control projects.  
779 Because the comparable costs for the challenged emissions controls are  
780 significantly above \$2,000 per ton (and even above all other potential cost  
781 thresholds referenced by PacifiCorp's own witnesses), they are not reasonable  
782 from a cost perspective. As such, these pollution control project are not  
783 required to meet any Clean Air Act requirement.

784 In reaching my expert conclusions, I also researched other information  
785 to help confirm that a \$2,000 per ton threshold for cost-effectiveness is  
786 reasonable. As part of the WRAP process that Mr. Sprott speaks of in his  
787 rebuttal testimony, expected cost information for potential future SO<sub>2</sub> controls  
788 were also compiled. These costs are identified in the preamble to EPA's 2001  
789 proposed regional haze rules (Federal Register, Volume 66, July 20, 2001,  
790 Page 38130-31). In the Annex to the Report of the Grand Canyon Visibility  
791 Transport Commission, Section 6A, WRAP describes "low cost" controls  
792 with an average cost-effectiveness below \$500 per ton, "moderate" costs are  
793 described as having an average cost-effectiveness in the range of \$500 to  
794 \$3,000 per ton, and "high" costs are described as controls having an average  
795 cost effectiveness of over \$3,000 per ton. Again, these costs were compiled as  
796 part of the very process described by Mr. Sprott's testimony and provide  
797 independent cost information consistent with my premise that \$2,000 per ton  
798 is a reasonable threshold for identifying whether or not SO<sub>2</sub> BART controls

799 are cost-effective. Even accepting the “high” cost assumption of \$3,000 per  
800 ton, none of the challenged scrubber projects is even close to cost-effective.

801 **Q. Do you have any other comments on the challenges to your \$2,000 per ton**  
802 **threshold?**

803 R. Yes. RMP’s rebuttal witnesses attempt to characterize my cost-effectiveness  
804 threshold of \$2,000 as a “bright line.” That is a misrepresentation of my  
805 testimony. An appropriate BART evaluation looks at the “five factors”  
806 described in my direct testimony. One of these factors is cost or cost-  
807 effectiveness. Although cost is an important factor, I have never claimed that  
808 the cost of emissions control trumps all other factors in selecting BART.  
809 Clearly, the regulatory requirement for BART considers all five factors  
810 described in 40 CFR 51 Appendix Y. However, to impose costs significantly  
811 above a reasonable threshold, other factors allowed under BART need to  
812 support that result. PacifiCorp or its witnesses in this case have not made any  
813 showing that any of the other regulatory factors were drivers in the emission  
814 control projects or would have supported a higher cost.

815 The RMP witnesses, particularly Mr. Sprott, attempt to downplay the  
816 role that costs should play in the BART process. This leads to the ludicrous  
817 suggestion by Mr. Sprott that PacifiCorp would have been forced to install  
818 controls at each of its Utah EGUs that exceed the “presumptive BART” limit  
819 of 0.15 lb/MMBtu regardless of cost. This is a gross misrepresentation of the  
820 applicable legal requirements. Cost is and always has been a very important

821 factor in the selection of BART technologies, whether under a Section 308 or  
822 Section 309 SIP. Indeed, I suspect most of PacifiCorp’s utility counterparts  
823 would be astonished to hear a utility claim otherwise. Emission control  
824 projects that are not cost-effective cannot be defended as BART under any  
825 regulatory scenario, Section 308 or Section 309. All available evidence and  
826 data in this Docket demonstrate that the emission control projects disputed in  
827 my testimony do not meet any reasonable definition for cost-effective  
828 controls, and in fact exceed this threshold by a very large margin.

829 The central role played by cost considerations is emphasized in a quote  
830 offered by Ms. Woollums in the context of her discussion of the uncertainty  
831 that has prevailed in the air regulatory environment. The March 16, 2011  
832 quote from Ms. Jackson of the EPA includes the following sentence: “And to  
833 ensure cost-effectiveness, we have proposed flexibility in meeting the  
834 standards.” (Lines 448-449; emphasis added). Cost-effectiveness and  
835 flexibility are critical components of any meaningful air regulatory analysis.  
836 Unfortunately, PacifiCorp failed to consider those critical components in  
837 making its “one size fits all” decision to install similar scrubber upgrades at all  
838 of its BART-eligible EGUs without even considering the costs, environmental  
839 impacts, or the financial impacts on its ratepayers. It is for that reason that  
840 RMP should be required to shoulder a significant part of the financial burden  
841 of its decisions with respect to the non-cost-effective projects.

842       **Q.    Mr. Croft’s rebuttal testimony abandons his previous assumption that**  
843       **SO<sub>2</sub> removal costs as high as \$7500 per ton may be reasonable. Do you**  
844       **wish to comment?**

845       **R.**    Yes. As I pointed out in my rebuttal testimony, Mr. Croft previously relied  
846       upon a clearly misleading claim in an RMP data request to that effect. By the  
847       time he filed his rebuttal testimony, Mr. Croft agreed with my assessment and  
848       had abandoned the notion that the referenced NO<sub>x</sub> BART case at the Four  
849       Corners Plant provided any support for cost-effectiveness for SO<sub>2</sub> removal.  
850       Mr. Croft then searches for other meaningful data that can be used to target a  
851       reasonable upper-end of cost effectiveness for SO<sub>2</sub> equipment. The  
852       appropriate place to find such data is in SO<sub>2</sub> cost-effectiveness calculations  
853       done by air regulators around the country on similar plants that were already  
854       largely controlled. That data, reproduced above, clearly demonstrates that the  
855       level at which air regulators have found SO<sub>2</sub> controls to be cost-effective  
856       BART at previously controlled plants is in the range of \$49 - \$1,571 per ton.  
857       Anything significantly above the upper end of this range should be rejected,  
858       based on all available data, as being not cost-effective.

859               Mr. Croft points out that the Wyoming DEQ found costs of around  
860       \$9,500 per ton to not be cost effective in the case of the Basin Electric  
861       Laramie River Station. Mr. Croft correctly notes that this conclusion by itself  
862       does not establish \$9,500 per ton as a proper cost-effective threshold. Despite  
863       Mr. Croft’s best efforts to research this question, my professional opinion as a

864 practicing air quality professional is that one should place more reliance on  
865 costs determined to be cost effective as opposed to trying to establish the  
866 appropriate cost threshold based on options that were determined not to be  
867 cost-effective. My direct testimony relies on data where emission control  
868 upgrades were determined to be cost effective.

869 **Q. Various RMP rebuttal witnesses seem to imply that the challenged**  
870 **scrubber upgrades may be necessary to meet Mercury or other HAPs**  
871 **MACT requirements. Can you respond?**

872 **R.** Yes. It is clearly implied in RMP's rebuttal testimony that scrubber upgrades  
873 will "support" mercury removal and satisfaction of proposed HAPs MACT  
874 requirements. Baghouses and chemical additions in connection with  
875 particulate removal can significantly enhance removal of mercury and perhaps  
876 other hazardous air pollutants, but it is my understanding that scrubbers do not  
877 contribute significantly to control of mercury emissions. Scrubbers are aimed  
878 primarily at SO<sub>2</sub> removal. I think the vague references to HAPs removal in  
879 the context of scrubber upgrades is misleading at best. The HAPs emission  
880 control benefits of the Utah scrubber upgrades in particular are non-existent or  
881 minimal at best.

882

883 **Conclusion**

884 **Q. What is your ultimate conclusion in this case?**

885 **R.** The pollution control projects at issue here, specifically the scrubber upgrades  
886 and Hunter Units 1 & 2, and Huntington Unit 1, and the baghouse addition for  
887 Dave Johnston Unit 3, are not cost-effective and were not required by BART  
888 or any other Clean Air Act regulatory requirements. I have challenged only  
889 four specific pollution control projects that do not meet any reasonable cost-  
890 effectiveness test, although other projects could reasonably be challenged as  
891 inadequately supported or marginally beneficial. I have conservatively  
892 challenged only those projects that were clearly not cost-effective, and to  
893 which PacifiCorp should never have committed on a voluntary basis. Instead,  
894 PacifiCorp should have fought for the interests of its ratepayers by performing  
895 and defending reasonable cost-effectiveness calculations, similar to what I  
896 have done. I have no doubt but that such an approach would have resulted in  
897 decisions that the four challenged projects were not required. The significant  
898 sums committed to these marginal projects could have been much more  
899 meaningfully deployed for other generation, transmission or pollution control  
900 projects that were legitimately needed.

901 With respect to Dave Johnston Unit #3, the Wyoming DEQ reached a  
902 similar conclusion as to the incremental cost-effectiveness of the pollution  
903 control option selected by PacifiCorp. Although the Wyoming DEQ accepted  
904 the voluntary PacifiCorp commitment as (more than) meeting BART, the

905 WDEQ BART records clearly reflect that the agency determined that the  
906 selected option did not meet reasonable incremental cost-effectiveness criteria  
907 under BART, and would not have otherwise been required by any regulatory  
908 standard of the Clean Air Act.

909 At the three Utah facilities, no such analyses were ever performed, either  
910 by the Company in developing its emissions control plan or by the Utah DEQ.  
911 While regional haze regulations do not require a formal five-factor BART  
912 analysis in Section 309 states, a meaningful advance assessment of the  
913 underlying options and costs is indispensable to any prudent utility decision to  
914 spend hundreds of millions of dollars that ratepayers will be expected to pay.  
915 There is no other means of assuring that the selected emission controls will  
916 achieve a reasonable cost-benefit standard. No such analysis was ever even  
917 attempted by PacifiCorp until I challenged the costs in this Docket. My  
918 calculations, based on the standard and accepted regulatory approach for a  
919 five-factor BART analysis, demonstrate that the projected environmental  
920 benefits of the disputed Utah scrubber controls are small and that they do not  
921 pass any reasonable cost-effectiveness standard. Furthermore, there are no  
922 non-regional haze emission control benefits from the projects in question that  
923 would warrant a higher cost-effectiveness standard. The Utah scrubber  
924 projects were simply not necessary under regulatory standards, BART or  
925 otherwise.



926           The small environmental benefits achieved by the disputed Utah projects  
927           are also unnecessary given the large margin of safety under the regional SO<sub>2</sub>  
928           emissions milestones reflected in the Utah SIP. Also, these controls were not  
929           needed for Utah to demonstrate reasonable further progress in meeting  
930           visibility goals at its Class I areas, primarily because those benefits are  
931           dwarfed by benefits achieved through controlling SO<sub>2</sub> emissions at  
932           Huntington Unit 2.

933           Recent projections of increased coal sulfur content are, at best, attempts  
934           at “after-the-fact” justifications. There is no evidence that the likelihood,  
935           magnitude or extent of such sulfur increases were known or considered when  
936           PacifiCorp committed to its emissions reduction plan. Moreover, there has  
937           been no showing that projected increases in sulfur content could not have been  
938           adequately dealt with by the old scrubbers or other alternatives.

939           While existing Regional Haze SIPs and air permits now require  
940           installation of the disputed pollution control upgrades, those requirements  
941           were imposed only after and because of PacifiCorp’s voluntary commitment  
942           to proceed with the projects. The bottom line is that the Company failed to  
943           discharge its responsibility to ratepayers to carefully evaluate the proposed  
944           projects in advance, and to undertake only those projects required by existing  
945           or reasonably foreseeable regulations, and only then at the lowest reasonable  
946           cost. As in the Deseret Arbitration, the inescapable conclusion is that  
947           PacifiCorp voluntarily embarked on an unneeded and expensive emissions

948 control program where, as to the four challenged projects, costs far exceeded  
949 benefits. As suggested by the arbitrator, PacifiCorp may have had internal  
950 corporate or other reasons for spending money on uneconomical projects. In  
951 that case, however, its shareholders, and not its ratepayers, should be expected  
952 to shoulder all or a significant portion of the unnecessary expenses of the four  
953 challenged projects.

954 **Q. Does this conclude your surrebuttal testimony?**

955 **R. Yes.**