

BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH

In the Matter of the Application of Rocky Mountain Power For Authority to Increase Its Retail Electric Utility Service Rates in Utah and for Approval of Its Proposed Electric Service Schedules and Electric Service Regulations.)	
)	DOCKET NO. 10-035-124
)	DPU EXHIBIT 12.0 SR-RR
)	

PRE-FILED SURREBUTTAL TESTIMONY

GEORGE W. EVANS

ON BEHALF OF THE

UTAH DIVISION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES

July 19, 2011

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4

5 **INTRODUCTION**

6

7 **Q. Please state your name, business address, employer, and current position or**
8 **title for the record.**

9 A. My name is George W. Evans, and my business address is 358 Cross Creek Trail,
10 Robbinsville, North Carolina 28771. I am a Vice President with Slater
11 Consulting.

12 **Q. For whom are you providing testimony in this case?**

13 A. I am providing testimony on behalf of the Utah Division of Public Utilities (DPU
14 or Division).

15 **Q. Are you the same George W. Evans that presented direct testimony in this**
16 **docket?**

17 A. Yes I am.

18 **PURPOSE OF TESTIMONY**

19 **Q. What is the purpose of your surrebuttal testimony in this proceeding?**

20 A. The purpose of my surrebuttal testimony is to respond to the rebuttal testimony of
21 Company witness Mr. Gregory N. Duvall concerning the Company net power
22 costs (NPC) adjustments I recommended in my direct testimony, and to respond
23 to other issues raised by Mr. Duvall.

24 **Q. What recommendations did you make in your direct testimony?**

25 A. I recommended eleven adjustments to the Company's filed NPC, as shown in
26 Table 1 below, and also included one additional adjustment (the twelfth
27 adjustment in Table 1) that is supported by other DPU witnesses.

Table 1

	<u>System</u>	<u>Utah</u>
Filed Net Power Costs	\$1,521.0	\$649.1
Proposed Adjustments:		
Utah QF Contracts:		
1 Extend Utah QF Contracts at Current Rates	\$0.3	\$0.1
Wind Integration Costs:		
2 Correct Gadsby CT Usage	-\$3.8	-\$1.6
3 Remove Double-Count of Wind Contingency Reserves	-\$2.0	-\$0.9
4 Correct Spinning Reserve Increase	-\$13.6	-\$5.8
5 Credit for Wind Integration Costs of Non-Owned Wind Producers	-\$4.1	-\$1.7
Contracts and Market Sales and Purchases:		
6 Market Cap Adjustments	-\$5.3	-\$2.2
7 California ISO Fees	-\$4.3	-\$1.8
8 Morgan Stanley Call Options	-\$2.1	-\$0.9
9 Arbitrage & Trading Margins	-\$3.0	-\$1.3
Fossil Generation Issues:		
10 Heat Rate Deration Issue	-\$4.1	-\$1.7
11 Chehalis Reserve Contribution	-\$3.4	-\$1.4
Gas and Electric Swaps		
12 Gas and Electric Swaps	-\$99.0	-\$42.3
Total Adjustment	-\$144.4	-\$61.6
Adjusted Net Power Costs	\$1,376.6	\$587.5

29 **GENERAL NPC ISSUES**

30 **Q. What general issues did Mr. Duvall raise in his rebuttal testimony?**

31 A. Mr. Duvall claims that NPC in rates have been consistently below actual NPC in
32 recent years¹, and thus the NPC modeling adjustments proposed by other parties
33 in this case serve to further reduce the overall accuracy of the NPC forecast².

34 **Q. How do you respond to these claims?**

35 A. If in fact, as Mr. Duvall asserts, NPC in rates have been consistently below actual
36 NPC, then the Company should consider benchmarking the GRID model, rather
37 than simply criticizing the concerns of the parties in this case. Total proposed
38 adjustments in this case would reduce NPC by some 12%. Assuming the
39 Commission only approves approximately half of the proposed adjustments, NPC
40 would be reduced by only 6%. Surely there are factors beyond the recommended
41 adjustments that are contributing to the underestimation of NPC. There is no
42 question that the Company has improved GRID over the years, but to my
43 knowledge, there has been no serious effort to benchmark the model, that is,
44 compare GRID results to actual NPC over a historical period in a controlled, open
45 and unbiased manner.

46 **Q. What do you recommend?**

47 A. I recommend that the Commission appoint a collaborative group to benchmark
48 the GRID model against actual NPC to ascertain whether the model includes any

¹ Page 10, lines 205-207 of Mr. Duvall's rebuttal testimony.

² Page 12, lines 256-258 of Mr. Duvall's rebuttal testimony.

49 inherent biases that impact forecasted NPC. The group should include
50 representatives of the parties to this case and should be an open and informal
51 forum, with the purpose of benchmarking the GRID model. The parties should
52 have access to GRID and the data used for benchmarking.

53 **Q. Is this the sort of benchmark described by Mr. Duvall in his rebuttal**
54 **testimony?**

55 A. No, it is not. Mr. Duvall compares the results of two NPC forecasts in his rebuttal
56 testimony, and refers to the comparison as a benchmark³. Comparing two GRID
57 results does not constitute a benchmark nor does it serve to support the
58 Company's claimed NPC in this case.

59 **Q. What sort of benchmark are you recommending?**

60 A. To ascertain whether GRID is producing accurate NPC, one must select a
61 historical period, and compare actual NPC for that historical period to GRID NPC
62 for the same period. In addition, the GRID input modeling data must be set as
63 closely as possible to actual data. For example, GRID fuel costs would be set to
64 actual fuel costs, and the load forecast in GRID would be the actual experienced
65 load from the historical period. In my experience, this is the only way to properly
66 benchmark a model such as GRID.

67 **Q. Does Mr. Duvall address any other general issues in his rebuttal?**

³ Page 12, lines 259-267 and page 13, lines 268-272 of Mr. Duvall's rebuttal testimony.

68 A. Yes, he does. As in previous cases, Mr. Duvall is recommending in his rebuttal a
69 series of “updates” to the previously filed NPC⁴.

70 **Q. What do you recommend concerning these updates to NPC?**

71 A. I recommend the Commission reject these updates. At this point in the case, to
72 fully evaluate these updates and their impacts on NPC would require a re-
73 examination of nearly all the NPC issues. To allow parties the opportunity to
74 serve discovery, evaluate discovery, and to examine in detail the revised GRID
75 results, there must be a frozen set of assumptions that allow the completion of the
76 process. The updated official price curve (OFPC), included as one of Mr. Duvall’s
77 updates, will change the operation of all PacifiCorp generating units in GRID. It
78 is simply unrealistic at this point to ask all parties to completely re-do their
79 examination of NPC.

80 **UTAH QF CONTRACTS**

81 **Q. What is Mr. Duvall’s position on your recommended change concerning the**
82 **Utah QF contracts (adjustment 1 in Table 1)?**

83 A. Mr. Duvall has accepted our recommendation concerning these contracts⁵.

84 **WIND INTEGRATION COSTS**

85 **Q. What is Mr. Duvall’s rebuttal position concerning your wind integration cost**
86 **adjustments (adjustments 2 through 5 in Table 1)?**

⁴ Page 4, lines 71-77 of Mr. Duvall’s rebuttal testimony.

⁵ Page 9, lines 195-196 of Mr. Duvall’s rebuttal testimony.

87 A. Mr. Duvall rejects all of these adjustments.

88 **Q. What is your position on these adjustments?**

89 A. I'm in agreement with Mr. Duvall's rebuttal testimony concerning my proposed
90 adjustment 5 in Table 1 – Credit for Wind Integration Costs of Non-Owned Wind
91 Producers. However, on the other proposed wind integration adjustments, I
92 disagree with Mr. Duvall's rebuttal testimony.

93 **Q. Is there an area of disagreement that applies to all of the proposed wind
94 integration adjustments?**

95 A. Yes, there is. The Company relies on its 2010 Wind Integration Study (the Wind
96 Study) for the GRID modeling of wind integration costs. Mr. Duval refers to the
97 Wind Study many times in his rebuttal testimony. However, it is clear that the
98 Wind Study suffers from errors that belie the Company's dependence on the
99 study.

100 **Q. What errors have you identified in the Wind Study?**

101 A. Based on the Wind Study, the Company forces the Gadsby combustion turbines
102 (Gadsby units 4, 5 and 6) to operate in GRID in all hours in which the units are
103 available. My direct testimony establishes that, in reality, the Gadsby combustion
104 turbines do not operate in this manner⁶. Also based on the Wind Study, the
105 Company increased the required regulating margin in GRID. However, my direct
106 testimony establishes that the spinning reserves (one part of regulating margin)

⁶ Page 10, lines 136-146 and page 11, line 147 of Mr. Evans' direct testimony.

107 within the Company's GRID results greatly exceed actual spinning reserves⁷.
108 Finally, the Wind Study makes the faulty assumption that additional reserves to
109 cover the variability of wind will be required in all hours, even hours in which
110 excess reserves sufficient to cover the wind variability exist prior to consideration
111 of the variability of wind.

112 **Q. Does Mr. Duvall address these issues in his rebuttal testimony?**

113 A. No, he does not. Essentially the Wind Study fails to consider actual PacifiCorp
114 operations. Given that nearly all anticipated wind generation was in place in 2010,
115 recent actual operations should confirm the results of the Wind Study. Instead,
116 recent actual operations confirm that the Wind Study is fatally flawed and cannot
117 be relied upon. As a result, the wind integration costs from the Company's GRID
118 runs are also fatally flawed.

119 **GADSBY CT MUST-RUN**

120 **Q. What is Mr. Duvall's rebuttal position concerning the operation of the**
121 **Gadsby combustion turbines?**

122 A. Although Mr. Duvall does not address my direct testimony concerning the
123 operation of the Gadsby combustion turbines, he does continue to claim that the
124 Company's GRID analysis properly models the operation of these generating

⁷ Page 11, lines 148-157 and page 12, line 158 of Mr. Evans' direct testimony.

125 units. The basis for his assertion is that the average historical capacity factors
126 compare well to the GRID capacity factors for these generating units⁸.

127 **Q. Is Mr. Duvall's assertion correct?**

128 A. It is correct that the GRID capacity factors for Gadsby units 4-6 match well with
129 historical capacity factors. The problem is that capacity factors are only one piece
130 of the picture. In the Company's GRID modeling, the units operate in all hours. In
131 reality, the units operated only 65% of the hours in the twelve months from July
132 2009 through June 2010.

133 **Q. How then is it possible that the Company's GRID capacity factors match**
134 **actual capacity factors?**

135 A. Within the Company's GRID run, the Gadsby units 4-6 typically operate at very
136 low levels. In reality, the units operate at much higher levels. This explains the
137 apparent discrepancy, and also points out an additional problem – the hourly
138 dispatch of these generating units is incorrect in the Company GRID results.
139 Rather than supporting the Company's results, the capacity factor match reveals
140 an additional error in the Company's GRID results.

141 **WIND REGULATING RESERVES**

142 **Q. What are the parties' positions concerning the level of regulating reserves**
143 **required to cover the intermittent nature of wind generation?**

⁸ Page 40, lines 867-873 and page 41, lines 874-881 of Mr. Duvall's rebuttal testimony

144 A. The Company contends that the intermittent nature of wind requires regulating
145 reserves (or regulating margin) of 533 mega-watts. Mr. Falkenburg, for the Office
146 of Consumer Services, contends that only 430 mega-watts are required. My direct
147 testimony proposes an adjustment that reduces regulating reserves to 433 mega-
148 watts (adjustment 4 in Table 1).

149 **Q. How did the parties arrive at these levels of required regulating reserves?**

150 A. The Company bases its 533 mega-watts on the Wind Study. Mr. Falkenburg bases
151 his 430 mega-watts on adjustments and corrections to the Wind Study. My 433
152 mega-watt level is based on an analysis of actual spinning reserves carried by the
153 Company in the years 2007 through 2010.

154 **Q. Is it simply coincidence that your number is so close to Mr. Falkenburg's**
155 **number?**

156 A. No, it is not simply coincidence. Although Mr. Falkenburg and I addressed the
157 issue in completely different ways, the fact that we have confirmed each other's
158 result is additional evidence that the Wind Study is fatally flawed, and the
159 Company's level for regulating reserves in GRID is excessive.

160 **Q. What is Mr. Duvall's response to your claim that the Company's claimed**
161 **level of regulating reserves is excessive?**

162 A. Mr. Duvall begins by discussing the chart that I presented on page 12 of my direct
163 testimony. This chart compares the actual historical average spinning reserves for
164 the years 2007 through 2010 to the average spinning reserves in the Company's
165 GRID analysis used to develop NPC.

166 **Q. You were discussing regulating reserves, but the chart shows spinning**
167 **reserves. What is the relationship between spinning reserves and regulating**
168 **reserves?**

169 A. Spinning reserves are one part of the regulating reserves (or regulating margin).
170 Spinning reserves must be available within ten minutes and generally are
171 provided by generating units that are operating (or spinning).

172 **Q. What does the chart in your direct testimony show?**

173 A. The chart shows that the average spinning reserves in the Company's GRID
174 analysis is 789 mega-watts, while the actual average spinning reserves carried by
175 the Company have never exceeded 653 mega-watts. That is, the spinning reserves
176 assumed by the Company in its development of NPC exceed actual recorded
177 spinning reserves by 136 mega-watts.

178 **Q. What is Mr. Duvall's concern regarding this chart?**

179 A. Mr. Duvall criticizes my chart in that it shows only spinning reserves and not the
180 total regulating reserves⁹.

181 **Q. Does Mr. Duvall dispute the numbers used to generate your chart?**

182 A. No, he does not. Mr. Duvall does not discuss or dispute the levels of spinning
183 reserves shown in my chart.

184 **Q. Why did you choose to display only spinning reserves in your direct**
185 **testimony?**

⁹ Page 38, lines 806-817 of Mr. Duvall's rebuttal testimony.

186 A. Attached as Exhibit 12.1 SR-RR is the Company's response to DPU Data Request
187 10.38. The question requests actual regulating reserves and actual operating
188 reserves. However, the Company responded by providing only spinning reserves
189 and non-spinning contingency reserves. The Company did not provide total
190 regulating reserves.

191 **Q. Why did the Company fail to provide regulating reserves?**

192 A. As discussed in Mr. Duvall's rebuttal testimony, the Company does not record
193 actual regulating reserves¹⁰. Mr. Duvall instead must "estimate" historical
194 regulating reserves from available data.

195 **Q. What is the result of Mr. Duvall's estimate of historical regulating reserves?**

196 A. Mr. Duvall estimates that actual regulating reserves held in calendar year 2010
197 averaged 629 mega-watts, and thus concludes that the Company's 533 mega-watt
198 regulating reserve criteria in GRID is justified.

199 **Q. Do you agree?**

200 A. No, I do not. First, Mr. Duvall does not perform similar computations for his
201 GRID results, and thus never establishes that GRID carries similar regulating
202 reserves. In addition, he never addresses the problem shown in my comparison of
203 actual spinning reserves to the spinning reserves carried by GRID in the
204 Company's NPC computation. The GRID model is holding excessive spinning

¹⁰ Page 35, lines 743-747 of Mr. Duvall's rebuttal testimony.

205 reserves. Mr. Duvall does not dispute this fact, and fails to address it in any direct
206 way.

207 **Q. Does the fact that your chart shows only spinning reserves explain the**
208 **discrepancy, as Mr. Duvall contends?**

209 A. No, it does not. The data is consistent for the historical values and the GRID
210 result. The Company's GRID model carries excess spinning reserves, and thus
211 must also carry excess regulating reserves.

212 **WIND INTEGRATION CONTINGENCY RESERVES**

213 **Q. What is the issue with wind integration charges and the wind contingency**
214 **reserves?**

215 A. The Company must carry contingency reserves equal to five percent of load
216 served by wind resources. In the Wind Study, the Company produced a level of
217 regulating reserves that the Company claims are needed to maintain reliability in
218 the face of the intermittent nature of wind generation. Mr. Duvall claims that the
219 two reserve amounts for wind are additive, that is, the Company must maintain
220 reserves for wind equal to the sum of the five percent contingency and the
221 claimed regulating reserves from the Wind Study

222 **Q. Do you agree?**

223 A. No, I do not agree. Contingency reserves are held to cover the possibility that a
224 wind generator will fail to serve load. Regulating reserves for wind are held to
225 cover, for one thing, a sudden reduction in wind generation. So the two types of

226 reserve for wind are covering the same events. Summing the two reserve
227 requirements is like buying two insurance policies for the same house.

228 **Q. What do you conclude?**

229 A. The Company should reduce the required regulating reserves by the wind
230 contingency amount, or alternatively, remove the five percent wind contingency.
231 In either case, adjustment 3 in Table 1 is the impact on NPC.

232 **MARKET CAPS**

233 **Q. What is the issue concerning market caps in GRID?**

234 A. The Company utilizes GRID market caps, or hourly limitations on the size of
235 transactions, for all hours and all markets.

236 **Q. What is the Company's basis for using these market caps?**

237 A. The Company states that "Due to load requirements and transmission constraints
238 in the region and static assumptions about market prices in GRID, among other
239 things, the Company may not be able to sell all its economic generation to the
240 markets." ¹¹

241 **Q. Is this a reasonable argument?**

242 A. No, it is not. The Company has not performed any analysis or study that would
243 support the new market caps, but is simply concerned that it "may not be able" to
244 sell all economic generation to the markets.

¹¹ Page 11, lines 234-237 of Mr. Duvall's direct testimony.

245 **Q. Does the Company make any other argument concerning the market caps?**

246 A. Yes, Mr. Duvall argues that, were it not for the regulating margin increases for
247 wind generators, GRID coal generation would exceed historical average
248 generation.

249 **Q. Do you agree?**

250 A. While it is true that if the Company were to remove the increased regulating
251 margin for wind, GRID coal generation would exceed the historical average, it is
252 also true that the market caps are restricting economic coal generation. Unless Mr.
253 Duvall is proposing to remove the increased regulating margin for wind, his
254 argument has no relevance.

255 **CAL ISO CHARGES**

256 **Q. What is the issue concerning California ISO fees?**

257 A. The Company has included in NPC fees paid to the California ISO to allow
258 transactions with the California ISO, but does not model the connection between
259 the Company and the California ISO in GRID.

260 **Q. Doe Mr. Duvall contend otherwise?**

261 A. No, he does not. The Commission should not allow these fees in NPC.

262 **MORGAN STANLEY CALL OPTIONS**

263 **Q. What is the issue concerning the Morgan Stanley call options?**

264 A. The Company claims that the fixed costs for these call options should remain a
265 part of NPC, even though the options are not utilized in the test year.

266 **Q. When did the Company purchase these options?**

267 A. The Company purchased these options in November 2005 for delivery in the
268 summer of 2011.

269 **Q. Is this reasonable?**

270 A. No, it is not reasonable to purchase a fixed price option in 2005 for delivery in
271 2011. One advantage of purchased power over owned generation is that purchased
272 power provides flexibility. These contracts have high fixed costs and high strike
273 prices and provide no flexibility. In all likelihood, the contracts will never provide
274 benefits to Utah ratepayers.

275 **ARBITRAGE AND TRADING MARGINS**

276 **Q. Please describe the issue with arbitrage and trading margins.**

277 A. Mr. Duvall claims that I have argued that GRID does not account for margins
278 earned on arbitrage and trading transactions¹².

279 **Q. Is Mr. Duvall correct?**

280 A. No, he is not. Instead, I argue that the margins derived from trading and arbitrage
281 in NPC are far below the historical averages of actual margins from these
282 activities¹³.

¹² Page 46, lines 1000-1004 of Mr. Duvall's rebuttal testimony.

283 **Q. Has your position changed in any way?**

284 A. No, it has not.

285 **HEAT RATE DERATION**

286 **Q. Please describe the heat rate deration issue.**

287 A. The heat rate deration issue arises because of the fact that the Company reduces
288 the maximum capability of each generating unit to reflect unforeseen outages. The
289 idea of this reduction is to cause GRID to produce generation levels that account
290 for the unforeseen outages. However, because the Company does not modify the
291 heat rate curves for the generating units, the heat rates will be unrealistically high
292 because GRID will assign a higher heat rate based on the deration.

293 **Q. How have you corrected the problem?**

294 A. My adjustment for the problem modifies the heat rate curve for each coal and
295 combined cycle generating unit so that the heat rates will more accurately reflect
296 real-life operations. I first develop a forced outage rate for each coal and
297 combined cycle unit, using only full forced outages (ignoring partial outages).
298 Then I modify the complete heat rate curve for each of the units so that the heat
299 rate at the maximum capability reduced by the forced outage rate is equal to the
300 heat rate at maximum capability. This is because, if the unit has forced outages
301 equivalent to 10% of the time, then 90% of the time, the unit is operating at a heat

¹³ Page 17, lines 251-255 of Mr. Evans' direct testimony.

302 rate as if it were fully available and 10% of the time, the unit does not operate at
303 all.

304 **Q. Does your adjustment improve the accuracy of the unit heat rates?**

305 A. Yes it does. The table below shows that for Company coal units and combined
306 cycle units, the GRID average heat rates are closer to average historical heat rates
307 under my adjustment. The average historical heat rates were taken from FERC
308 Form 1 Reports for 2007 through 2010.

	Coal	Combined Cycle
Actual Average Heat Rate	10.727	7.332
GRID Average Heat Rate - Company NPC	10.751	7.394
Percent Variance	0.22%	0.84%
GRID Average Heat Rate - Heat Rate Adjustment	10.719	7.345
Percent Variance	-0.08%	0.18%

309

310 **CHEHALIS RESERVE CONTRIBUTION**

311 **Q. What is the concern with the Chehalis reserve contribution?**

312 A. The Company claims that Chehalis can no longer provide operating reserves, load
313 following reserves or AGC to the PacifiCorp system. The basic problem is that
314 the Chehalis plant is located in BPA's control area and BPA no longer allows the
315 plant to operate in a manner that allows PacifiCorp to carry reserves at the plant.

316 **Q. What is the issue that must be decided?**

317 A. The bottom line question is whether rate-payers must pay the additional costs
318 caused by this change at Chehalis. There is no dispute over whether the Company
319 originally claimed Chehalis would provide operating reserves.

320 **Q. Should the Company bear these costs?**

321 A. Yes, the Company should be held responsible for the added costs caused by the
322 loss of Chehalis' ability to provide reserves. The Company claimed in Docket No.
323 08-035-35 that ownership of Chehalis would allow the Company full discretion in
324 the dispatch of the plant, including operating reserves, load following reserves
325 and AGC. The Company should have been aware at that time that the physical
326 location of the plant within another utility's control area was a risk that could
327 potentially limit the control of the plant by PacifiCorp. In fact, the Company
328 should have negotiated a long-term agreement with BPA concerning the
329 utilization of Chehalis at the time of purchase. Ratepayers should not be held
330 accountable for this failure by the Company.

331 **GAS AND ELECTRIC SWAPS**

332 **Q. What is the DPU's current position on the gas and electric swaps in NPC?**

333 A. The DPU is recommending a reduction of \$57.4 million to the system NPC, or a
334 \$24.5 million reduction to the Utah NPC for gas and electric swaps.

335 **SUMMARY**

336 **Q. Can you summarize the DPU's current positions on NPC adjustments?**

337 A. Yes, I can. The following Table 2 shows our current positions on NPC
338 adjustments.

339

Table 2

	<u>System</u>	<u>Utah</u>
Filed Net Power Costs	\$1,521.0	\$649.1
Proposed Adjustments:		
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1 Extend Utah QF Contracts at Current Rates	\$0.03	\$0.01
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3 Remove Double-Count of Wind Contingency Reserves	-\$2.0	-\$0.9
4 Correct Spinning Reserve Increase	-\$13.6	-\$5.8
5 Credit for Wind Integration Charges to Non-Owned Wind Producers	\$0.0	\$0.0
Contracts and Market Sales and Purchases:		
6 Market Cap Adjustments	-\$5.3	-\$2.2
7 California ISO Fees	-\$4.3	-\$1.8
8 Morgan Stanley Call Options	-\$2.1	-\$0.9
9 Arbitrage Margins	-\$3.0	-\$1.3
Fossil Generation Issues:		
10 Heat Rate Deration Issue	-\$4.1	-\$1.7
11 Chehalis Reserve Contribution	-\$3.4	-\$1.4
Gas and Electric Swaps		
12 Gas and Electric Swaps	-\$57.4	-\$24.5
Total Adjustment	-\$98.9	-\$42.2
Adjusted Net Power Costs	\$1,422.1	\$606.9

340 **Q. Does this complete your testimony?**

341 A. Yes it does.