

**Docket No. 11-035-200**

**Utah Office of Consumer Services Witness**

**Daniel J. Lawton**

**Exhibits OCS 1.1D through 1.10D**

**May 31, 2012**

**BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH**

**In the Matter of Application of Rocky  
Mountain Power for Authority to Increase  
its Retail Electric Utility Service Rates in  
Utah and for Approval of its Proposed  
Electric Service Schedules and Electric  
Service Regulations**

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**Docket No. 11-035-200**  
**Direct Rate of Return Testimony  
of Daniel J. Lawton**  
**For the Utah Office of Consumer  
Services**

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**MAY 31, 2012**

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION I:	INTRODUCTION/BACKGROUND/SUMMARY .....	1
SECTION II:	OVERVIEW OF COMPANY'S REQUEST .....	3
SECTION III:	RECENT TRENDS FOR PACIFICORP ROE.....	5
SECTION IV:	REGULATORY ISSUES AND COST OF CAPITAL .....	6
SECTION V:	CURRENT CAPITAL MARKET CONDITIONS.....	10
SECTION VI:	COST OF EQUITY CAPITAL DCF ANALYSIS.....	15
SECTION VII:	RISK PREMIUM/CAPM COST OF EQUITY ESTIMATE .....	28
SECTION VIII:	CAPITAL STRUCTURE .....	33
SECTION IX:	FINANCIAL INTEGRITY.....	36
SECTION X:	ISSUES RAISED IN DR. HADAWAY'S DIRECT TESTIMONY	38
SECTION XI:	CONCLUSION ON COST OF EQUITY.....	42

Exhibit OCS 1.1D	Resume Background	
Exhibit OCS 1.2D	Historical Interest Rates	
Exhibit OCS 1.3D	Comparable Group Company Historical and Forecasted Data	
Exhibit OCS 1.4D	Comparable Group Price Data	
Exhibit OCS 1.5D	Comparable Group Growth Rate Data	
Exhibit OCS 1.6D	Comparable Group Constant Growth DCF Estimates	
Exhibit OCS 1.7D	Comparable Group Two Stage DCF	
Exhibit OCS 1.8D	Risk Premium Estimate	
Exhibit OCS 1.9D	Financial Integrity Metrics	
Exhibit OCS 1.10D	Dow Jones Industrial / Dow Jones Utility Graphic History 5 years and 80 years	

**DIRECT TESTIMONY OF  
DANIEL J. LAWTON**

1     **SECTION I: INTRODUCTION/BACKGROUND/SUMMARY**

2     **Q.     PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME AND BUSINESS ADDRESS.**

3     A.     My name is Daniel J. Lawton. My business address is 701 Brazos, Suite 500, Austin,  
4            Texas 78701.

5     **Q.     PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND AND WORK  
6            EXPERIENCE.**

7     A.     I have been working in the utility consulting business as an economist since 1983.  
8            Consulting engagements have included electric utility load and revenue forecasting, cost  
9            of capital analyses, financial analyses, revenue requirements/cost of service reviews, and  
10           rate design analyses in litigated rate proceedings before federal, state and local  
11           regulatory authorities, and in court proceedings. I have worked with municipal utilities  
12           developing electric rate cost of service studies for reviewing and setting rates. In  
13           addition, I have a law practice based in Austin, Texas. My main areas of legal practice  
14           include administrative law representing municipalities in electric and gas rate  
15           proceedings and other litigation and contract matters. I have included a brief description  
16           of my relevant educational background and professional work experience in my Exhibit  
17           OCS 1.1D.

18    **Q.     HAVE YOU PREVIOUSLY FILED TESTIMONY IN RATE PROCEEDINGS?**

19    A.     Yes. A list of cases where I have previously filed testimony is included in my Exhibit  
20            OCS 1.1D.

21

22 **Q. ON WHOSE BEHALF ARE YOU FILING TESTIMONY IN THIS**  
23 **PROCEEDING?**

24 A. I have been retained to review Rocky Mountain Power Company's ("Company" or  
25 "RMP") cost of capital request, financial integrity metrics and related financial issues,  
26 on behalf of the Utah Office of Consumer Services ("OCS").

27 **Q. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR TESTIMONY IN THIS PROCEEDING?**

28 A. The purpose of my testimony in this proceeding is to address the Company's requested  
29 overall cost of capital. I will address the Company's requested rate of return, capital  
30 structure, and cost rates for equity, capital, preferred stock, and long-term debt, which is  
31 presented in the direct testimony of cost of capital witnesses, Bruce Williams and Dr.  
32 Samuel Hadaway. In addition, I am addressing financial integrity and cash flow issues  
33 related to return of and on invested capital.

34 **Q. WHAT MATERIALS DID YOU REVIEW AND RELY ON FOR THIS**  
35 **TESTIMONY?**

36 A. I have reviewed the Company's current direct and previous testimony, Company  
37 responses to interrogatories, Value Line Investment Survey ("Value Line"), financial  
38 reports of the Company, along with other utility companies of comparable risk and  
39 various other financial information available in the public domain. When relying on  
40 various sources, I have referenced such sources in my testimony and/or attached  
41 Exhibits and included copies or summaries in my Exhibits or workpapers.

42 **Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS IN THIS**  
43 **CASE.**

44 A. My analysis of the Company's required cost of capital results in a recommendation of a  
45 9.4% return on equity for shareholders combined with the RMP proposed capital  
46 structure and cost rates for debt and preferred securities and an overall return to be  
47 earned on rate base investment of 7.49%. As discussed below, in my opinion, these  
48 recommended return levels are consistent with current market capital costs and  
49 consistent with reasonable rates for consumers. My analyses of the Company's  
50 requested 7.91% overall cost of capital and 10.2% return on equity indicate that the

51 Company request is overstated and is not consistent with just and reasonable rates for  
52 consumers given current market costs of capital.

53 Based on my analyses (which are fully explained in the following pages), I make the  
54 following conclusions and recommendations:

55 (i) A return of 9.4% on shareholder equity is more than adequate for the Company  
56 to maintain its financial integrity;

57 (ii) The Company's cash flows and liquidity at a rate of return on investment of  
58 7.49% are more than adequate to meet cash operating and construction requirements.

59 (iii) The Company's overall cost of capital, employing the Company's proposed  
60 capital structure and cost rates for debt and preferred capital and my recommended  
61 9.4% equity return, to be earned on rate base investment should be set at 7.49% for  
62 setting just and reasonable rates for customers in this proceeding;

63 (iv) The Company's proposed 10.20% return for equity shareholders is an  
64 overstatement of the required return on equity to hold and attract equity capital; and

65 (v) The Company's proposed 7.91% overall return on investment is overstated and  
66 should not be adopted as representative of the Company's cost of capital requirements.

67 **SECTION II: OVERVIEW OF COMPANY'S REQUEST**

68

69 **Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE REQUESTED RATE INCREASE.**

70 A. A review of the testimony of Mr. Walje at 2:31 and rate filing at Exhibit RMP\_(SRM-3)  
71 at 1.0, shows the Company is requesting a \$172,267,339 annual revenue increase. This  
72 represents about a 9.7 percent increase to the current General Business revenue levels of  
73 \$1,772,847,495.

74 **Q. WHAT FACTORS ARE DRIVING THE SIZE OF THE RATE INCREASE?**

75 A. Based on the testimony of RMP's President, Richard Walje, there appear to be five main  
76 cost drivers underlying the Company's \$172.3 million annual revenue increase request.  
77 First, Mr. Walje asserts that \$37 million of the \$172.3 million annual increase is

78 associated with the return and carrying charge requirements associated with new or  
79 additional rate base investment. At page 3, lines 54 to 57 of his direct testimony, Mr.  
80 Walje claims that much of the added capital is for environmental mandates, transmission  
81 reliability, relocations and mobile radio replacements. The ultimate decision by this  
82 Commission with regard to rate of return will impact the size of this capital additions  
83 cost driver.

84 A second cost driver listed at page 3, line 62 of Mr. Walje's testimony is a \$30 million  
85 increase in the Company's operating and maintenance budget. A third claimed cost  
86 driver outlined at page 4, lines 72 to 76 is the claimed \$16 million increase in net power  
87 costs. The fourth claimed cost driver is the approximate \$26 million decline in  
88 renewable energy credit revenues which will not be available to offset cost of service.  
89 This issue or cost driver is discussed at page 4, lines 81-90 of Mr. Walje's testimony.  
90 The fifth claimed cost driver outlined at pages 4 and 5, lines 93 to 102 of Mr. Walje's  
91 testimony is associated with declining, or lower than expected, load growth. Because  
92 fixed costs are spread over fewer billing determinants with lower present rate revenue  
93 than projected, about \$47 million of the increase has been attributed to lower load  
94 growth.

95 Lastly, the Company, at page 5, lines 107 to 112 of Mr. Walje's testimony points out  
96 that the requested 10.2 percent equity return request (up 20 basis points from the 10.0  
97 percent authorized in the last RMP case) amounts to a \$9.7 million impact of the overall  
98 \$172.3 million annual rate request.

99 **Q. DO YOU HAVE ANY GENERAL COMMENTS ON THE EQUITY RETURN**  
100 **IMPACT ON THE COMPANY'S RATE INCREASE REQUEST?**

101 A. Yes. I am recommending a 9.4% equity return in this case – given the Company's rate  
102 base investment level, such a change in return would reduce revenue requirements by  
103 about \$37 million. Thus, the ultimate decision on return will have a significant impact  
104 on the ultimate rate increase and rates paid by Utah customers.

105 **SECTION III: RECENT TRENDS FOR PACIFICORP ROE**

106 **Q. WHAT ARE THE ISSUES BEING ADDRESSED WITH REGARD TO EQUITY,**  
107 **RETURN, AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE?**

108 A. The overall issue is what level of profits for shareholders or equity return should be  
109 allowed through rates. The Company has requested a 10.2% or about \$305.7 million per  
110 year of shareholders after tax profits. Setting return at a more reasonable 9.4% level,  
111 when combined with a 52.1% equity ratio, results in reducing the after tax shareholder  
112 profit by about \$24 million. When the impact of federal income taxes is factored into  
113 the revenue requirement analysis, the resulting revenue requirement reductions are about  
114 \$37 million annually.

115 The Company's requested shareholder profit and return on investment is overstated in  
116 light of declining and lower market capital costs. The Company's failure to recognize  
117 these lower capital costs overstates the need for a rate increase in this case.

118 **Q. HAVE THE COMPANY'S COST OF CAPITAL REQUESTS IN UTAH BEEN**  
119 **TRENDING DOWNWARD?**

120 A. In general the answer is yes, but there seems to be a lag in the Company's recognition of  
121 these declining costs. For example, in the Company's last case Dr. Hadaway was  
122 supporting a 10.5% equity return. The 10.5% recommendation in the last case was  
123 down from Dr. Hadaway's 11.0% equity return recommendation in prior proceedings.  
124 Now, Dr. Hadaway is recommending a 10.2% equity return. Clearly the cost of equity  
125 is declining as is evidenced by the Company's own filings. The problem with the  
126 Company's analyses is the failure to recognize the true measure of capital cost decline.  
127 At least in the Utah jurisdiction the Company seems to see a 10% equity return as a  
128 floor. But, in reality the Company's cost of equity is below 10% and failure to  
129 recognize that reality will subject Utah customers to excessive rates.

130 **Q. SINCE THE COMPANY'S LAST CASE WHERE EQUITY COST WAS SET AT**  
131 **10%, HAVE CAPITAL COSTS DECLINED?**

132 A. Yes. For example, RMP witness Bruce Williams describes how in January 2012 the  
133 Company completed a \$650 million bond issue at interest rates "...among the lowest



134 ever achieved by borrowers.”<sup>1</sup> Mr. Williams goes on to point out that the capital cost for  
135 this \$650 million debt issue was “...tied for the lowest utility rate on record...”<sup>2</sup> While  
136 the 30 year bonds at a rate of 4.10% is the “...third lowest coupon achieved by any  
137 issuer in any industry and credit rating.”<sup>3</sup> The Company’s cost of capital is lower in  
138 2012 than when the 10% cost of equity was set in the last case.

139 **Q. HAVE OTHER PACIFICORP JURISDICTIONS RECEIVED EQUITY**  
140 **RETURNS BELOW 10 PERCENT?**

141 Yes. The Washington jurisdiction of PacifiCorp received a 9.8% authorized equity  
142 return in the Company’s 2010 rate case, Docket UE-100749. The Company maintained  
143 the 9.8% equity return when it filed Docket UE-111190 with the Washington Utilities  
144 and Transportation Commission on or about July 1, 2011 wherein Mr. Williams  
145 testified:

146 I am aware that Dr. Hadaway’s recommendations in recent general rate  
147 cases continue to support a return on equity in excess of the 9.8 percent  
148 authorized by the Commission in the 2010 Rate Case.<sup>4</sup>

149 Apparently in the Washington jurisdiction the Company is willing to set rates below  
150 their own witness Hadaway’s recommendations and even below 10% return on equity.

151 **SECTION IV: REGULATORY ISSUES AND COST OF CAPITAL**

152 **Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE COST OF CAPITAL CONCEPT AS IT RELATES TO**  
153 **THE REGULATORY PROCESS.**

154 **A.** The overall rate of return to be earned on rate base investment is an essential element in  
155 the regulatory and rate setting process and is typically a major part of overall revenue  
156 requirements. For example, in this case the Company’s requested overall return is  
157 7.91%. As is discussed below, a small change in rate of return can have a large impact  
158 on revenue requirements.

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<sup>1</sup> Direct Testimony Bruce Williams at 7:137-141

<sup>2</sup> *Id* 7:141-143

<sup>3</sup> *Id* 7:143-145

<sup>4</sup> Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission Docket No. UE:111190, Pacific Power & Light Co. Testimony of Bruce Williams at 3:17-19

159 **Q. WHAT IS THE BREAKDOWN OF RETURN ON CAPITAL AND PROFIT**  
 160 **BEING REQUESTED IN THIS CASE?**

161 A. The overall return on rate base investment being requested in this case is shown in the  
 162 following table.

TABLE 1 <sup>5</sup>				
RMP REQUESTED CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND RETURN				
DESCRIPTION	RATIO	COST RATE	WEIGHTED COST	REQUESTED RETURN <sup>6</sup>
Long-Term Debt	47.60%	5.41%	2.5752%	\$148,145,573
Preferred Stock	0.30%	5.43%	0.0163%	\$937,142
Common Equity	52.10%	10.20%	5.3142%	\$305,718,947
Total	<u>100.00%</u>		<u>7.9057%</u>	<u>\$454,801,662</u>
Rate Base	\$5,752,868,671			

163

164 As can be seen from the above table, the Company is requesting that rates be set to allow  
 165 the Company to earn a 7.91% overall return on a claimed test year investment level of  
 166 \$5,752,868,671, which translates into about \$454.8 million of total return dollars. The  
 167 total return dollars can be broken down to \$148.1 million of interest return to cover  
 168 claimed debt costs, \$937,142 of preferred dividends, and a Company request of  
 169 \$305,718,947 of profit for shareholders.

170 It is important to note that the shareholder profit being requested is an after tax request.  
 171 In other words, customers also must pay through rates return and income  
 172 (state/federal/revenue related) taxes such that the \$305.7 million profit request is  
 173 available after all taxes are paid. Federal income taxes alone, at a 35% rate, adds about  
 174 \$165.1 million to customer rates.<sup>7</sup>

175

<sup>5</sup> See Exhibit OCS 1.9D

<sup>6</sup> *Id* and weighted cost times rate base requested

<sup>7</sup> Tax Factor equal 1/(1-tax rate), which is 1/(1-.35) which equals 1.53846154. This tax factor of 1.53846154 times the requested shareholder profit level requested equals taxes and profits.

176 **Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN HOW THE VARIOUS COMPONENTS OF COST OF**  
177 **CAPITAL ARE DETERMINED.**

178 A. The overall rate of return in the regulatory process is best explained in two parts. First,  
179 return to senior securities, such as debt and preferred stock, both of which are included  
180 in the capital structure, are contractually set at issuance. The reasonableness of the cost  
181 of this contractual obligation between the utility and its investors is examined by  
182 regulatory agencies as part of the utility's overall cost of service.

183 The second part of a Company's overall return requirement is the appropriate cost rate to  
184 assign the equity portion of capital costs. The return to equity should be established at a  
185 level that will permit the firm an opportunity to earn a fair rate of return. By fair rate of  
186 return, I mean a return to equity holders, which is sufficient to hold and attract capital,  
187 sufficient to maintain financial integrity, and a return to equity comparable to other  
188 investments of similar risks.

189 Two U.S. Supreme Court decisions are often cited as the legal standards for rate of  
190 return determination. The first is Bluefield Water Works and Improvement Company v.  
191 Public Service Commission of West Virginia, 262 U.S. 679 (1923). The Bluefield case  
192 established the following general standards for a rate of return: The return should be  
193 sufficient for maintaining financial integrity and capital attraction and a public utility is  
194 entitled to a return equal to that of investments of comparable risks.

195 The second U.S. Supreme Court decision is the Federal Power Commission v. Hope  
196 Natural Gas Company, 320 U.S. 591 (1942). In the Hope decision, the Court affirmed  
197 its earlier Bluefield standards and found that methods for determining return are not the  
198 test of reasonableness rather the result and impact of the result are controlling.

199 The cost of capital is defined as the annual percentage that a utility must receive to  
200 maintain its financial integrity, to pay a return to security owners and to insure the  
201 continued attraction of capital at a reasonable cost and in an amount adequate to meet  
202 future needs. Mathematically, the cost of capital is the composite of the cost of several  
203 classes of capital used by the utility – debt, preferred stock, and common stock,  
204 weighted on the basis of an appropriate capital structure.

205 The ratemaking process requires the regulator to determine the utility's cost of capital  
206 for debt, preferred stock and equity costs. These calculations of cost rates, when  
207 combined with the proportions of each type of capital in the capital structure, result in a  
208 percentage figure that is then multiplied by the value of assets (investment) used and  
209 useful in the production of the utility service to ultimately arrive at a rate charged to  
210 customers. Rates should not be excessive (exceed actual costs) or burdensome to the  
211 customer and at the same time should be just and reasonable to the utility.

212 **Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE COST OF EQUITY CONCEPT.**

213 A. The cost of equity, or return on equity capital, is the return expected by investors over  
214 some prospective time period. The cost of equity one seeks to estimate in this  
215 proceeding is the return investors expect prospectively when the rates from this case will  
216 be in effect.

217 The cost of common equity is not set by contract, and there are no hard and fast  
218 mathematical formulae with which to measure investor expectations with regard to  
219 equity requirements and perceptions of risk. As a result, any valid cost of equity  
220 recommendation must reflect investors' expectations of the risks facing a utility.

221 **Q. WHAT PRINCIPAL METHODOLOGY DO YOU EMPLOY IN YOUR COST OF**  
222 **EQUITY CAPITAL ANALYSES?**

223 A. I employ the Discounted Cash Flow ("DCF") methodology for estimating the cost of  
224 equity, keeping in mind the general premise that any utility's cost of equity capital is the  
225 risk free return plus the premium required by investors for accepting the risk of investing  
226 in an equity instrument. It is my opinion that the best analytical technique for measuring  
227 a utility's cost of common equity is the DCF methodology. Other return on equity  
228 modeling techniques such as the Capital Asset Pricing Model ("CAPM") or risk  
229 premium are often used to check the reasonableness of the DCF results. I have employed  
230 all these modeling methods to arrive at my recommendations in this case.

231 **Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE RISKS YOU REFER TO ABOVE.**

232 A. As I stated earlier in this testimony, equity investors require compensation above and  
233 beyond the risk free return because of the increased risk factors investors face in the

234 equity markets. Thus, investors require the risk free return plus some risk premium  
235 above the risk free return. The basic risks faced by investors that make up the equity  
236 risk premium include business risks, financial risks, regulatory risks, and liquidity risks.

237 **SECTION V: CURRENT CAPITAL MARKET CONDITIONS**

238 **Q. DO CURRENT ECONOMIC CONDITIONS WARRANT HIGHER RETURNS**  
239 **FOR UTILITY COMPANIES?**

240 A. In my opinion, no. As discussed earlier and acknowledged by Company witness  
241 Williams, the Company's capital costs – borrowing costs – have declined to record lows.  
242 While the financial markets, and the economy in general, has experienced periods of  
243 uncertainty and turmoil since September 2008, government intervention has had an  
244 impact on financial markets. Moreover, recent January 2012 Federal Reserve monetary  
245 policy announcements have signaled a longer term period for low interest rates and  
246 yields. The end result is that cost of capital today is not higher as a result of the  
247 economic turmoil that impacted the global markets in the autumn of 2008. Moreover,  
248 the cost of capital continues to decline as evidenced by a review of historical bond  
249 yields, and demonstrated by RMP's own borrowing costs, and authorized equity returns  
250 set by regulatory authorities around the country.

251 **Q. ARE ECONOMIC CONDITIONS EXPECTED TO CONTINUE TO IMPROVE**  
252 **IN 2012?**

253 A. Yes, but slowly. Forecasts are for continued, but slowed economic improvement.  
254 Economic conditions in 2011 and early 2012, when compared to the end of 2008, are  
255 much improved. The Federal Reserve has lowered economic growth estimates to reflect  
256 the slower growth in GDP.

257 GDP forecasts were all lowered to about 2.7% for 2011 and 3.2% for 2012.  
258 Unemployment levels were in the 9.1% range for 2011 and projected at 8.25% by the  
259 end of 2012. The economy while improving from the levels experienced in the depths  
260 of the 2008 financial/liquidity crisis is recovering at a much slower pace than past  
261 predictions and expectations would indicate.

262 **Q. DOES THE FEDERAL RESERVE CONTINUE TO TARGET A LOW FEDERAL**  
263 **FUNDS RATE AS PART OF MONETARY POLICY?**

264 A. Yes. Since December 2008, the federal funds targeted rate, by the Federal Open Market  
265 Committee of the Federal Reserve, has been between 0 and .25 percent – essentially  
266 zero. Thus, for the past three years the Federal Reserve policy has been to maintain low  
267 short-term interest rates as part of the monetary policy.

268 **Q. HAS THE FEDERAL RESERVE RECENTLY CHANGED ITS PUBLIC**  
269 **REPORTING POLICY OF THESE CLOSELY WATCHED INTEREST RATES?**

270 A. Yes. At the December 2011 meeting of the Federal Reserve, it was decided to start  
271 communicating to the public, four times per year, how long the Federal Reserve will  
272 maintain short-term interest rates at current levels.<sup>8</sup> In other words, projections of target  
273 federal reserves combined with the Summary of Economic Projections (which are  
274 released four times per year and include projections of economic growth,  
275 unemployment, and inflation) would help the public and markets better understand  
276 monetary policy.

277 The first forecast of interest rates was published following the January 24-25, 2012  
278 Federal Reserve meeting. Some of the goals of this new projected information are to  
279 provide the public increased transparency of monetary policy, and assure the public that  
280 interest rates will not rise before a specific time, which is expected to lower longer term  
281 yields further and provide some economic stimulus.

282 Following the January 2012 Federal Open Market Committee meetings, the Federal  
283 Reserve stated: "...the Committee decided today to keep the target range for the federal  
284 funds rate at 0 to ¼ percent and currently anticipates that economic conditions –  
285 including low rates of resource utilization and a subdued outlook for inflation over the  
286 medium run – are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate at  
287 least through late 2014."

288 Thus, the Federal Reserve has made a new commitment extending these 0% to ¼%  
289 federal funds rates from the mid-2013 period at least through late 2014. Certainly, the

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<sup>8</sup> [www.federalreserve.gov](http://www.federalreserve.gov), see minutes of Federal Open Market Committee, December 13, 2011 at 9-10.

290 Federal Reserve’s assurance that these key interest rates will remain at or near zero for  
 291 an additional 18 months beyond the previous mid-2013 projection points to continued  
 292 sluggish economic conditions and lower near term expectations.

293 **Q. HAS THE FEDERAL RESERVE ISSUED A MORE RECENT ECONOMIC**  
 294 **ASSESSMENT?**

295 A. Yes, an April 25, 2012 press release from the Federal Reserve indicates low federal  
 296 funds rates through late 2014. The press release notes that while unemployment has  
 297 declined it remains elevated, housing remains depressed and longer term inflation  
 298 expectations remain stable. The following table summarizes the Federal Reserve current  
 299 projections compared to the January 2012 projections for real GDP, unemployment, and  
 300 inflations. Slight changes are expected in the 2012 – 2014 period, but longer run  
 301 projections remain constant.

302 Table 2

Variable	Central tendency <sup>1</sup>				Range <sup>2</sup>			
	2012	2013	2014	Longer run	2012	2013	2014	Longer run
Change in real GDP.....	2.4 to 2.9	2.7 to 3.1	3.1 to 3.6	2.3 to 2.6	2.1 to 3.0	2.4 to 3.8	2.9 to 4.3	2.2 to 3.0
January projection.....	2.2 to 2.7	2.8 to 3.2	3.3 to 4.0	2.3 to 2.6	2.1 to 3.0	2.4 to 3.8	2.8 to 4.3	2.2 to 3.0
Unemployment rate.....	7.8 to 8.0	7.3 to 7.7	6.7 to 7.4	5.2 to 6.0	7.8 to 8.2	7.0 to 8.1	6.3 to 7.7	4.9 to 6.0
January projection.....	8.2 to 8.5	7.4 to 8.1	6.7 to 7.6	5.2 to 6.0	7.8 to 8.6	7.0 to 8.2	6.3 to 7.7	5.0 to 6.0
PCE inflation.....	1.9 to 2.0	1.6 to 2.0	1.7 to 2.0	2.0	1.8 to 2.3	1.5 to 2.1	1.5 to 2.2	2.0
January projection....	1.4 to 1.8	1.4 to 2.0	1.6 to 2.0	2.0	1.3 to 2.5	1.4 to 2.3	1.5 to 2.1	2.0
Core PCE inflation <sup>3</sup> .....	1.8 to 2.0	1.7 to 2.0	1.8 to 2.0		1.7 to 2.0	1.6 to 2.1	1.7 to 2.2	
January projection....	1.5 to 1.8	1.5 to 2.0	1.6 to 2.0		1.3 to 2.0	1.4 to 2.0	1.4 to 2.0	

NOTE: Projections of change in real gross domestic product (GDP) and projections for both measures of inflation are from the fourth quarter of the previous year to the fourth quarter of the year indicated. PCE inflation and core PCE inflation are the percentage rates of change in, respectively, the price index for personal consumption expenditures (PCE) and the price index for PCE excluding food and energy. Projections for the unemployment rate are for the average civilian unemployment rate in the fourth quarter of the year indicated. Each participant's projections are based on his or her assessment of appropriate monetary policy. Longer-run projections represent each participant's assessment of the rate to which each variable would be expected to converge under appropriate monetary policy and in the absence of further shocks to the economy. The January projections were made in conjunction with the meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee on January 24–25, 2012.

1. The central tendency includes the three highest and three lowest projections for each variable in each year.
2. The range for a variable in a given year includes all participants' projections, from lowest to highest, for that variable in that year.
3. Longer-run projections for core PCE inflation are not collected.

303

304 **Q. WHAT ARE CURRENT TRENDS PERTAINING TO LONGER TERM**  
 305 **INTEREST YIELDS?**

306 A. Longer term interest yields are best described as low and lower relative to longer-term  
 307 historical averages. I have included in my Exhibit OCS 1.2D historical bond monthly  
 308 bond yields for longer term government and corporate bonds. For example, current 30

309 year; 20 year and 10 year U.S. Treasury Bond yields are essentially at or below 3  
310 percent. All three government bonds are near six year lows in terms of yields. As  
311 explained above, current efforts by the Federal Reserve are to maintain and/or lower  
312 these longer term yields. The same is true for long term Aaa and Baa corporate bond  
313 yields, which are near their respective six year lows and generally declining.

314 **Q. DO THE FEDERAL RESERVE POLICY ACTIONS PROVIDE YOU ANY**  
315 **INSIGHT AS TO THE DIRECTION AND LEVEL OF LONGER-TERM**  
316 **INTEREST RATES?**

317 A. Current monetary policy objectives of the Federal Reserve are designed to stimulate  
318 economic growth and employment. The Federal Reserve has stated that short-term rates  
319 will remain at or near zero at least until late 2014 in an effort to provide further  
320 economic stimulus and employment growth.

321 The market evidence shown in Exhibit OCS 1.2D, shows longer term interest rates  
322 generally declining. Thus, the Federal Reserve stated policy of continued lower interest  
323 rates is reflected in market results. The Federal Reserve actions continue efforts to  
324 maintain lower interest rates. The evidence of declining and lower rates in the market  
325 place all indicate it is reasonable to expect continued low yields for the foreseeable near  
326 term future.

327 **Q. WHAT LEVEL OF INTEREST RATES AND EXPECTATIONS DO YOU**  
328 **EMPLOY FOR YOUR COST OF CAPITAL ANALYSIS?**

329 A. I employ the most current three month average as the best approximation of interest rate  
330 levels. In my opinion, the most recent three months or quarter of activity adequately  
331 captures the levels and trends of interest rates – while avoiding any limited influences  
332 that monthly or shorter durations may have on interest rates.

333 **Q. S&P RECENTLY LOWERED U.S. DEBT RATINGS, HAS ANY OTHER**  
334 **RATING AGENCY DOWNGRADED U.S. DEBT?**

335 A. No. Both Fitch and Moody's have affirmed their AAA rating for U.S. debt. It does not  
336 appear that U.S. capital markets have over-reacted to S&P's unilateral downgrade of  
337 U.S. debt.



338 **Q. WHAT DOES THE FEDERAL RESERVE'S MOST RECENT ECONOMIC**  
339 **ASSESSMENT INDICATE?**

340 A. I discussed earlier the revised and lowered economic estimates of the Federal Reserve  
341 Open Market Committee that reflect lower or slower growth. Basically, economic  
342 growth is substantially slower than expected. Unemployment at high levels continues.  
343 The Federal Reserve response is to maintain the federal funds rate at or near zero  
344 through late-2014.

345 Economic projections from the Federal Reserve meeting in April 2012 indicate longer  
346 term range (beyond 2014) GDP growth in the 2.2% to 3.0% range, unemployment in the  
347 4.9% to 6.0% range and inflation at 2.0%. The shorter range up to 2014 has a GDP  
348 growth range at 2.9% to 4.3%, unemployment at 6.3% to 7.7% and inflation at 1.5% to  
349 2.2%.

350 Generally, the recent Federal Reserve actions reflect a view of weaker economic  
351 conditions than was previously projected. The current policy of extending low interest  
352 rates through the end of 2014 is viewed as an attempt to further increase economic  
353 growth to address higher levels of unemployment.

354 **Q. WHAT CONCLUSIONS DO YOU DRAW FROM CURRENT ECONOMIC**  
355 **CONDITIONS IN PROVIDING GUIDANCE IN SETTING EQUITY CAPITAL**  
356 **COSTS IN THIS PROCEEDING?**

357 A. As a general matter capital costs remain low in comparison to historical levels. While  
358 the bottom tier of investment grade corporate bond rates (BBB) increased substantially  
359 during the liquidity crisis such increases do not appear to be a trend, but rather the direct  
360 impact of an atypical event in the capital markets. Current BBB bond rates are at the  
361 5.2% level. Single A borrowing costs as discussed earlier and in the testimony of Mr.  
362 Williams are at historical lows. The economic slowdown or recession, and modest  
363 growth in recovery, will cause general investor expectations of growth to decline. The  
364 bottom line is that the general economic data does not support increasing capital costs.

365

366 **Q. HAVE REGULATORY AUTHORITIES AROUND THE COUNTRY**  
 367 **RECOGNIZED THE DECLINING COST OF EQUITY AND DEBT CAPITAL IN**  
 368 **SETTING RATES?**

369 A. Absolutely. Many regulatory authorities have established equity returns at or below  
 370 10%. The Company has agreed in a stipulation to a 9.8 percent equity return in  
 371 Washington. Further, the Company recently filed another proceeding in Washington  
 372 requesting a 9.8 percent equity return.

373 **SECTION VI: COST OF EQUITY CAPITAL DCF ANALYSIS**

374 **Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE COMPANY.**

375 A. Rocky Mountain Power (“RMP” or “Company”) is one of three primary subsidiaries of  
 376 PacifiCorp. Since about 2006 PacifiCorp has been a wholly owned subsidiary of  
 377 MidAmerican Energy Holdings Company which is an affiliate of Berkshire Hathaway.  
 378 RMP also serves customers in Wyoming and Idaho, while another PacifiCorp  
 379 subsidiary, Pacific Power, serves customers in Oregon, California and Washington.

380 Of the six different state jurisdictions served by RMP and Pacific Power, the Utah  
 381 jurisdiction is the largest in terms of energy sold to retail customers. The 2011  
 382 PacifiCorp Form 10K shows the following retail sales by state jurisdiction over the 2009  
 383 through 2011 period:

State	Gwh 2011	%	Gwh 2010	%	Gwh 2009	%
*Utah	23,245	43%	22,477	42%	22,098	42%
Oregon	13,014	24%	12,717	24%	13,422	25%
*Wyoming	9,793	18%	9,680	18%	9,202	17%
Washington	4,006	7%	3,985	8%	4,184	8%
*Idaho	3,440	6%	3,326	6%	2,956	6%
California	809	2%	831	2%	848	2%
Total	54,307	100%	53,016	100%	52,710	100%

\*Part of Rocky Mountain Power

384 The RMP operations represent about two-thirds of total Gwh sales.

385

386 **Q. WHAT IS THE COMPANY’S REQUEST IN THIS CASE?**

387 A. The Company is requesting an annual rate increase of \$172.3 million or about a 9.7%  
388 increase in rates.<sup>9</sup> The Company asserts there are five cost drivers for this increase.<sup>10</sup> Part  
389 of the claimed cost increase is the Company’s request to increase the equity return from  
390 10% to 10.2% amounting to about \$9.7 million of the \$172.3 million rate request.<sup>11</sup> As I  
391 will discuss later in this testimony, capital costs in general are declining and the  
392 Company’s request to boost the equity return is not supported by capital market  
393 evidence.

394 **Q. WHAT IS THE TEST YEAR IN THIS CASE?**

395 A. The test year is a forecasted test period consisting of the twelve months ending May  
396 2013. Employing a forecasted test year is advantageous for the utility as future test year  
397 expenditures can be captured in the prospective rate setting process reducing regulatory  
398 lag impacts.

399 **Q. DOES THE REGULATORY PROCESS IN UTAH AFFORD UTILITY**  
400 **COMPANIES RISK REDUCING OPPORTUNITIES?**

401 A. Yes. For example, single capital investments that exceed 1% of rate base investment  
402 qualify for interim recovery without a full rate case proceeding. This large investment  
403 recovery mechanism “Major Plant Addition” (“MPA”) provides an opportunity to  
404 reduce regulatory lag and reduce risk of revenue erosion. In addition, the Utah  
405 Commission recently approved a net power cost adjustment mechanism or Energy  
406 Balancing Account (“EBA”) which serves to limit the utility exposure or risk to fuel and  
407 purchase power price volatility. Rating agencies such as Standard & Poor’s view the  
408 EBA as a “...step forward for credit quality because it mitigates key business risk for  
409 electric utilities...”<sup>12</sup>

410

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<sup>9</sup> Direct Testimony Richard Walje at 2:31

<sup>10</sup> *Id* at 2:37-46

<sup>11</sup> *Id* at 5:105-6:116

<sup>12</sup> See Direct Testimony Bruce Williams, Exhibit 2, Standard & Poor’s, Global Credit Portal, PacifiCorp. October 3, 2011.

411 **Q. YOU MENTIONED REGULATORY LAG PLEASE EXPLAIN THE TERM AND**  
412 **HOW IT IMPACTS RATE SETTING AND REGULATORY RISK.**

413 A. Regulatory lag is the period of time it takes to adjust tariffs in a rate case proceeding.  
414 Generally, it is the time between the request or realization of a needed rate adjustment  
415 and the ultimate authorization of a rate change. For example, a utility requesting a rate  
416 increase of \$1 million based on an historical test year may claim earnings erosion due to  
417 the regulatory lag during the pendency of the rate process until the authorized increase is  
418 implemented. Also, a utility that receives a rate adjustment may assert regulatory lag if  
419 it finds its unit costs are higher than the cost levels upon which the rate adjustment was  
420 based.

421 The counter argument to these claims of regulatory lag and risks is that the utility  
422 controls the timing of its rate requests. Also, regulatory lag is built into the regulatory  
423 process to encourage the utility to control and monitor costs as a means of bolstering  
424 profits. Regulatory lag can work both ways – sometimes there is earnings erosion while  
425 other times there can be excess earnings.

426 Other contributions to regulatory lag are rising costs, inflation, increasing capital  
427 investments and lower growth and sales. I have discussed three mechanisms in Utah  
428 that address these regulatory lag issues: (i) forecasted test year, (ii) MPA, and (iii) EBA.  
429 For example, the forecasted test year (in this case the 12 months ended May 30, 2013)  
430 affords Utah utilities the opportunity to capture expected cost and sales changes in the  
431 rate proceeding. Second, the large investment mechanism allows for stream-lined or  
432 more rapid rate charges to capture cost changes associated with increased investment.  
433 Third, the aforementioned EBA limits the Company's risk to fuel and purchase power  
434 price volatility. The regulatory process in Utah provides the Company ample  
435 opportunity to earn its authorized return by reducing significant regulatory lag in the rate  
436 process.

437 Nationally regulatory lag for 2011 averaged about 9.6 months.<sup>13</sup> This is a decline from  
438 the historical 10 month average for regulatory lag.<sup>14</sup> Rate mechanisms such as interim

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<sup>13</sup> Edison Electric Institute, Financial Update, Rate Case Summary Q4 2011 at 2.

<sup>14</sup> *Id*

439 increases, cost trackers, and forecasted test years have all contributed to the decline in  
440 regulatory lag and regulatory risks.

441 **Q. HAVE UTILITY COMMISSIONS ADJUSTED UTILITY EQUITY RETURNS**  
442 **TO LOWER LEVELS DUE TO IMPLEMENTATION OF RISK SHIFTING**  
443 **RATE MECHANISMS?**

444 A. Yes. A review of rate decisions does indicate that regulatory authorities have ordered  
445 lower returns due to cost trackers and other rate mechanisms.<sup>15</sup> For example, Hawaii  
446 Electric's equity return was set at 10% because various rate mechanisms reduced the  
447 Company's risk.<sup>16</sup> The impact of rate mechanisms to reduce and/or shift risk on equity  
448 return decisions were also seen in Indiana and Massachusetts.<sup>17</sup>

449 To the extent the regulatory scheme is changed to ameliorate regulatory lag and the risk  
450 is shifted to consumers an adjustment to equity return can be made to reflect lower risks  
451 or taken into consideration in the Commission's return on equity award.

452 **Q. IS THERE A TREND IN TERMS OF DECLINING EQUITY COSTS**  
453 **APPROVED BY REGULATORY AUTHORITIES?**

454 A. Yes. In 2011 the average ROE allowed by regulatory authorities was about 10.25%.  
455 This level of ROE award reflects declining market capital costs along with the impacts  
456 of various risk moderating rate mechanisms discussed earlier. The evidence of the  
457 market place and recent decisions of regulatory authorities is that capital costs in general  
458 are lower and ROE's required by utility companies are lower.

459 **Q. HAVE RATING AGENCIES WEIGHED IN WITH REGARD TO THE RISKS**  
460 **AND EXPECTATIONS OF THE COMPANY AND ITS PARENT PACIFICORP?**

461 A. Yes. Standard & Poor's<sup>18</sup> which rate PacifiCorp's corporate credit rating at A- lists the  
462 following strengths:

463 

- Market and regulatory diversity;

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<sup>15</sup> *Id* at 9

<sup>16</sup> *Id*

<sup>17</sup> *Id*

<sup>18</sup> Standard & Poor's, Ratings Direct PacifiCorp, October 2, 2011 at 2.

- 464
- Favorable electric rates relative to other suppliers;
- 465
- The recent approval of a fuel and purchased power adjuster in Utah is a positive
- 466
- development because the state is the company's largest market and will limit the
- 467
- amount the utility will have to absorb if purchased fuel and power costs exceed
- 468
- levels authorized in electric rates;
- 469
- Dependence on purchased power has decreased.

470 As weaknesses Standard & Poor's lists:

- 471
- Regulatory lag;
- 472
- Continued large capital investments and weak economic conditions;
- 473
- Slow sales growth

474 In terms of weaknesses, regulatory lag should not be an issue given the rate adjustment

475 mechanism for major plant additions and slowed or reduced capital expenditures.

476 Slower sales growth can benefit the Company in assessing costs and future expansion.

477 **Q. DOES THE COMPANY FACE ANY UNUSUAL BUSINESS OR FINANCIAL**

478 **RISK?**

479 A. No.

480 **Q. YOU STATED ABOVE THAT YOU RELIED ON A DCF ANALYSIS. PLEASE**

481 **DESCRIBE HOW YOU CONDUCTED YOUR DCF ANALYSIS.**

482 A. For my DCF analyses I employ a 21 company comparable risk group of companies to

483 evaluate cost of capital. The comparable risk group of companies, for which there is

484 market data available, serves as a reasonable proxy for the Company.

485 **Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN HOW YOU DEVELOPED YOUR COMPARABLE GROUP**

486 **OF COMPANIES.**

487 A. The starting point is the group of regulated electric utilities that are followed by and

488 contained in the Value Line Investment Survey ("Value Line"). Value Line is an

489 important source for market information and it is a widely followed source for investors.

490 This group was further screened for the following criteria:

- 491 (i) Investment grade bond rating of BBB or Baa by Standard & Poor's (S&P) and  
492 Moody's;
- 493 (ii) Sales revenues of at least 70% from utility operations, and at least 50% electric  
494 revenues;
- 495 (iii) Currently paying dividends; and
- 496 (iv) No current major merger or asset sale activities that could impact share prices  
497 and earnings estimates.

498 Applying these criteria employing data from Value Line and the AUS Utility Reports  
499 ("AUS") for May 2012, I was able to construct a comparable group consisting of 21  
500 electric and combination electric and gas companies. The list of companies in the  
501 comparable group is included in my Exhibit OCS 1.3D.

502 **Q. ARE THE COMPANIES IN YOUR COMPARABLE GROUP SIMILAR TO**  
503 **THOSE USED BY COMPANY WITNESS HADAWAY IN THIS CASE?**

504 A. Yes. Dr. Hadaway's comparable group consists of 14 electric utilities and 11 of his  
505 comparable companies are included in my group as well. My screening criteria  
506 regarding S&P and Moody's bond rating was not quite as narrow (requiring a senior  
507 secured rating of at least "A- " by S&P or A3 by Moody's) as Dr. Hadaway imposed for  
508 group selection.<sup>19</sup> My screening also includes lower rated BBB utilities. I would note  
509 that Dr. Hadaway's Exhibit RMP\_(SCH-1) shows five of his comparable group  
510 companies have split ratings of BBB to A. Thus, inclusion of BBB investment grade  
511 rating is not inconsistent with his analysis. Further, the inclusion of more rather than  
512 fewer companies dampens any unusual influence one company may have on the proxy  
513 group sample and final results.

514 **Q. THERE ARE THREE COMPANIES IN DR. HADAWAY'S SAMPLE THAT**  
515 **YOU DID NOT USE IN YOUR ANALYSIS, PLEASE EXPLAIN WHY.**

516 A. Black Hills Corp was excluded because less than 50 percent of its revenues came from  
517 the regulated electric business. Sempra Energy and Vectren Corp were excluded  
518 because, like Black Hills, less than 50 percent of their regulated revenues came from the

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<sup>19</sup> See Hadaway Direct Testimony at 2:42-45.

519 electric business. In the case of Sempra and Vectren regulated electric revenues  
520 represented about 28 percent of total revenues.

521 **Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR COMPARABLE GROUP SELECTION AS**  
522 **COMPARED TO COMPANY WITNESS HADAWAY'S COMPARABLE**  
523 **GROUP FOR THIS CASE.**

524 A. As explained earlier, my comparable group is larger and not subject to unusual and  
525 isolated influences of one company. Second, this larger group, unlike Dr. Hadaway's  
526 proxy group, has eliminated companies that are primarily gas utility operations. In my  
527 opinion, the larger 21 company sample is a better proxy for RMP in this case.

528 **Q. ARE THERE OTHER REASONS EXPLAINING WHY YOU EXAMINED**  
529 **COMPARABLE ELECTRIC COMPANIES?**

530 A. There are several reasons why the estimate of a cost of capital requires an analysis of a  
531 group of comparable risk companies rather than the single firm subject of the analysis:

532 (1) A comparable risk group analysis is consistent with the requirements of a fair  
533 and reasonable return addressed in the *Hope* and *Bluefield* cases. The return on  
534 investment should be commensurate with returns earned by firms with  
535 comparable risk. Thus, there is a need to examine firms of comparable risk to  
536 identify the fair and reasonable comparable returns being earned. In addition, the  
537 equity returns of comparable firms are viewed as opportunity costs of forgone  
538 investments in the market which, like other investment opportunities, will  
539 directly impact the cost of equity of the Company.

540 (2) The reliability of the cost of equity estimate is enhanced when the calculation is  
541 based on equity capital estimates from a variety of risk equivalent companies. A  
542 group of comparable companies can be employed as a check on a single  
543 company analysis. Further, the comparable group analysis, whether employed as  
544 a check or the primary analysis, mitigates any distortions resulting from  
545 measurement errors in dividend yield and expected growth measures and  
546 estimates. For example, the average growth rate estimate based on forecasts of  
547 several comparable firms is less likely to deviate from investor expectations of  
548 growth than an estimate for a single firm. Moreover, the general assumptions



549 underlying the DCF model are more likely to be met for a group of companies  
550 than for a single firm.

551 (3) An analysis of a comparable group also avoids circularity problems. In the  
552 analysis of investor-owned utilities, the stock price (that is, the cost of capital) is  
553 a direct function of an investor's growth rate expectations, which is also a  
554 function of an investor's perception of the regulatory environment. The bottom  
555 line is that the cost of equity depends in part on the anticipated regulatory  
556 environment and actions. Thus, both the components of the DCF model –  
557 dividend yield and growth expectations – are influenced by the regulatory  
558 process.

559 (4) Extending the sample size of comparable companies beyond a single regulatory  
560 influence will mitigate the regulatory circularity problem. Specific conditions  
561 concerning a subject utility often requires that a comparable company analysis be  
562 employed. One of the most common conditions is the lack of market data  
563 necessary to perform a DCF analysis. In times of utility consolidation and  
564 merger, many utilities are owned and controlled by a single parent holding  
565 company.

566 **Q. HAVE YOU PROVIDED A LIST OF THE COMPANIES IN YOUR**  
567 **COMPARABLE GROUP?**

568 A. Yes. Contained in my Exhibit OCS 1.3D is a list of the companies in the comparable  
569 group, along with additional data of company Beta values, historical and projected  
570 equity ratio for 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2015-2017, bond rating by Standard &  
571 Poor's along with Moody's, and the percentages of regulated revenues.

572 **Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE CONSTANT GROWTH DCF METHODOLOGY YOU**  
573 **HAVE EMPLOYED IN YOUR ANALYSIS.**

574 A. The foundation of the DCF model is in the theory of security valuation. The price that  
575 an investor is willing to pay for a share of common stock today is determined by what  
576 income stream the investor expects to receive from the investment. The return the  
577 investor expects to receive over the investment time horizon is composed of: (i)  
578 dividend payments, and (ii) the appreciated sale value of the investment. A proper

579 analysis adds dividends to the gain on the final sale value, and discounts these expected  
580 future earnings to a present value.

581 To determine or estimate investor requirements using the DCF model, one computes a  
582 cost of capital requirement, or discount rate from the current market data and the  
583 expected dividend stream. The DCF model stated as a formula is as follows:

$$584 \quad K = D/P + G$$

585 where:

586 K = required return on equity,

587 D = dividend rate,

588 P = stock price,

589 D/P = dividend yield, and

590 G = growth in dividends.

591 **Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN HOW YOU CALCULATED THE DIVIDEND YIELD FOR**  
592 **THE COMPARABLE COMPANIES.**

593 A. The dividend yield is the ratio of the dividend rate to the stock price. When calculating  
594 the dividend yield, one must be cautious and not rely on spot stock prices. One must be  
595 equally cautious not to rely on long periods of time as the data becomes unrepresentative  
596 of market conditions. The objective is to use a period of time such that the resulting  
597 dividend yield is representative of the prospective period when rates will be in effect.

598 While there is no fixed period for selecting the denominator of the dividend yield (i.e.,  
599 stock price), the key guideline is that the yield not be distorted due to fluctuations in  
600 stock market prices. On the other hand, dividends, the numerator of the yield  
601 calculation, are relatively stable, as opposed to the stock prices, which are subject to  
602 daily and cyclical market fluctuations. The selection of a representative time period will  
603 dampen the effect of stock market changes.

604 The price and dividend data used for each of the companies in the comparable group is  
605 contained in my Exhibit OCS 1.4D.

606 I have examined weekly closing stock prices for the period February 2012 through April  
607 2012 for 4 week, 6 week, along with 52 week, and spot intervals to calculate a

608 representative price for the dividend yield calculation. For this analysis, I have employed  
609 the six week average price in calculating the dividend yield.

610 To calculate dividends, I employed the current annualized dividend increased for ½ the  
611 expected growth rate. The resulting base dividend yield is shown on my Exhibit OCS  
612 1.6D for the comparable group companies.

613 **Q. HOW DOES YOUR RECOMMENDED DIVIDEND YIELD COMPARE TO THE**  
614 **DIVIDEND YIELD ESTIMATE OF DR. HADAWAY?**

615 A. Dr. Hadaway's dividend yield average and median estimate for the electric utility  
616 comparable group companies ranges from 4.3% to 4.4%.<sup>20</sup> The dividend yields I have  
617 computed based on more recent data for the comparable group are about 4.4% and 4.5%,  
618 and are in the same range or slightly higher than the levels estimated by Dr. Hadaway.

619 **Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN HOW YOU HAVE CALCULATED THE EXPECTED**  
620 **GROWTH RATE IN YOUR CONSTANT GROWTH DCF ANALYSIS FOR THE**  
621 **COMPANIES IN THE COMPARABLE GROUP.**

622 A. Like dividend yields, there exists no single or simple method to calculate growth rates.  
623 The calculation of investor growth expectations is the most difficult part of the DCF  
624 analysis. To estimate investor expectations of growth, I have examined historical  
625 growth and forecasted growth rates, and other financial data for each of the companies in  
626 the comparable group.

627 Implementation of the DCF model requires the exercise of considerable judgment with  
628 regards to estimating investor expectations of growth and it is a difficult task, but such  
629 difficulties are not insurmountable. Many economic factors affect capital markets in  
630 general and individual stocks specifically. Such economic variables entail the current  
631 state of the economy, the trade deficit, federal budget uncertainty, fiscal policy, inflation  
632 and Federal Reserve Board policies on interest rates.

633 Investors generally have good information on the economic and financial variables  
634 outlined above. All of this information is available quickly, especially in recent decades  
635 with easy access to the worldwide web. This information influences return expectations

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<sup>20</sup> Direct Testimony of Dr. Hadaway Exhibit SCH-5, pp. 2 and 3.

636 and, as a result, the maximum price an investor will pay for various securities.

637 Like the information available on the general economy, investors also have access to a  
638 wealth of information about particular types of securities, industries and specific  
639 company investments. This information is also factored into investor expectations and  
640 therefore the stock price individuals are willing to pay.

641 Common earnings growth rate forecasts and historical growth rate data may be found in  
642 the Value Line Investment Survey (“Value Line”) publication. These Value Line  
643 earnings estimates are five year projections in annual earnings. Again, Value Line is  
644 widely available to the public, and is a good source of earnings projections. Other  
645 earnings estimates are forecasted by Zacks as well as First Call projections, which are  
646 widely available on the internet at Zacks.com and Yahoo Finance respectively. Those  
647 earnings projections along with other stock specific financial data provide a range of  
648 estimates of earnings and are readily available at no cost.

649 Another growth estimate is referred to as the sustainable growth or retention ratio  
650 growth estimate. To project future growth in earnings under the sustainable growth  
651 method, one multiplies the fraction of a firm’s earnings expected to be retained (not paid  
652 out as dividends) by the expected return on book equity. As a formula:

653 
$$(\text{growth} = b \times r)$$

654 Where:

655  $b = 1 - (\text{dividends per share} / \text{earnings per share})$

656  $r = \text{earnings per share} / \text{net book value share}$

657 All the data necessary to calculate the elements of the sustainable growth method are  
658 available on a forecasted basis in Value Line.

659 **Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN YOUR GROWTH RATE ANALYSIS.**

660 A. I have included in my Exhibit OCS 1.5D, a two page schedule, showing the growth rates  
661 I have reviewed in my analysis. The first set of growth rates examined is the five year  
662 and ten year historical growth rates in earnings per share, dividends per share, and book  
663 value per share as reported by Value Line. The second set of growth rates is the Value  
664 Line forecasted growth rates in dividends, book value and earnings per share for each

665 company in the comparable group. The third set of growth rates examined is the Zacks  
666 forecasted growth rates in earnings. The fourth growth estimate considered is the First  
667 Call growth rates which are readily available to investors at Yahoo Finance.

668 In addition, I have examined the growth rates based on the forecasted retention ratio  
669 growth estimate discussed above. These calculations are included in my Exhibit OCS  
670 1.5D at page 2.

671 The growth rates described above provide a range of estimates for each of the  
672 comparable companies. The resulting range of average forecasted growth rates for the  
673 electric utility comparable group is from 4.0% to 5.5%. Relying on the forecasted  
674 earnings per share estimates and internal growth rate estimates, the growth rate average  
675 range can be narrowed to 4.1% to 5.2% as shown in Exhibit OCS 1.5D, page 1, average  
676 and median at columns M and N.

677 **Q. HOW DO YOUR COMPARABLE GROUP GROWTH ESTIMATES COMPARE**  
678 **TO DR. HADAWAY'S GROWTH ESTIMATES FOR THE CONSTANT**  
679 **GROWTH DCF ANALYSIS?**

680 A. Dr. Hadaway's average growth estimate for the electric utilities in the comparable group  
681 ranges 5.11% to 5.8%,<sup>21</sup> and this range generally exceeds the very upper end of my  
682 estimates.

683 My growth rate analyses are more current (as we both relied on Value Line and Zacks  
684 EPS forecast estimates) and my analysis looks to other earnings estimates along with a  
685 sustainable growth calculation. Therefore, in my opinion, my analysis covers a wider  
686 array of growth estimates and is not as limited as Dr. Hadaway's proposal. Also, my  
687 analysis does not ignore the low end of the growth results. Dr. Hadaway's DCF analysis  
688 totally ignores the lower end of growth ranges. This is especially unusual given the  
689 slower rate of economic growth in general. I will discuss specific problems in Dr.  
690 Hadaway's analysis later in my testimony.

691 **Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR CONSTANT GROWTH DCF ANALYSIS.**

692 A. For the 21 company electric utility comparable group, based on an average yield and a

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<sup>21</sup> See Direct Testimony Dr. Hadaway, Exhibit SCH-5, p.2

693 low and high range growth rate, the ROE estimate is 9.0% to 9.8%. These results are  
694 presented in my Exhibit OCS 1.6D.

695 **Q. HAVE YOU CALCULATED ADDITIONAL DCF ANALYSES FOR THE**  
696 **COMPARABLE GROUP COMPANIES?**

697 A. Yes. I have calculated a two stage non-constant growth DCF analysis for the companies  
698 in the comparable groups.

699 **Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR TWO-STAGE NON-CONSTANT GROWTH DCF.**

700 This analysis calculates equity cost using a non-constant growth two stage DCF Model.  
701 The constant growth DCF model is often adjusted to reflect multiple growth  
702 assumptions because the constant growth rate assumption is often not consistent with  
703 investor expectations. As an example, it is often the case where short-term growth  
704 estimates are not consistent with long-term sustainable growth projections. In those  
705 instances, where more than one growth rate estimate is appropriate, a multi-stage non-  
706 constant growth model can be employed to derive a cost of capital estimate. In other  
707 words, the constant growth model is adjusted to incorporate multiple growth rate  
708 periods, assuring a constant growth (long-term) rate is estimated for a longer period.

709 For the electric utility comparable group, the first growth stage (years 1-4) of the model,  
710 the Value Line growth in dividends is employed and an annual dividend is calculated.  
711 The second stage (years 5 and beyond)<sup>22</sup> employs an earnings growth estimate based on  
712 the comparable group forecast EPS average estimate of 5.2%. The 5.2% growth  
713 estimate is the average of these EPS growth estimates and represents the higher end of  
714 my range.

715 In the two-stage model the dividend cash flows are discounted equal to the price<sup>23</sup> paid  
716 for the stock. The calculated discount rate or internal rate of return is the cost of equity  
717 capital estimate.

718

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<sup>22</sup> The model is ended at year 150.

<sup>23</sup> Price is based on the 6 week average discussed earlier.

719 **Q. WHAT ARE THE RESULTS OF THE TWO-STAGE NON-CONSTANT**  
720 **GROWTH DCF ANALYSIS?**

721 A. The results of the two-stage non-constant growth DCF analysis are shown in Exhibit  
722 OCS 1.7D. The 21 company comparable group average indicates a cost of equity range  
723 of 9.5% to 9.6%.

724 **Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR DCF ESTIMATES.**

725 A. The table below is a summary of the DCF results:

**TABLE 3**  
**SUMMARY OF COMPARABLE GROUP**  
**DCF ANALYSES**

DESCRIPTION	COMPARABLE GROUP ELECTRIC UTILITIES
Constant Growth DCF	9.0% - 9.8%
Non-Constant Growth Two Stage DCF	9.5% - 9.6%
DCF Range	9.0% - 9.8%

726 This range of estimates of 9.0% % to 9.8% % indicates an average cost of equity of about  
727 9.4% based on the DCF analysis.

728 **SECTION VII: RISK PREMIUM/CAPM COST OF EQUITY ESTIMATE**

729 **Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE RISK PREMIUM ANALYSIS.**

730 A. Debt instruments such as bonds (long-term debt) are less risky than common equity  
731 when both classes of capital are issued by the same entity. Bondholders have a prior  
732 contractual claim to the earnings of the corporation and returns on bonds are less  
733 variable and more predictable than stocks. The bottom line is that debt is less risky than  
734 equity. There are numerous return studies of capital market investments, all of which  
735 show lower returns with lower risks and higher returns with higher risk investments.  
736 These financial truisms provide a sound theoretical basis and foundation for the risk  
737 premium method for estimating equity costs. The risk premium approach is useful in  
738 that the analysis is based on current market interest rates, that is, the current observable

739 cost of debt capital. But, the risk premium approach is not without its problems and  
740 drawbacks. In practice, there is considerable debate as to the time period to analyze in  
741 the determination of the bond/equity return risk spread. Historical debt/equity risk  
742 spreads measured over many decades may not be relevant to current capital market  
743 requirements. Others argue that a long-term analysis is necessary, since the goal is to  
744 measure investors' long-term expectations.

745 Another version of the risk premium method is the capital asset pricing model  
746 ("CAPM"). Generally, the CAPM begins with a theoretically risk-free interest rate such  
747 as a three-month Treasury bill rate. The risk premium, or equity spread above and  
748 beyond the risk free rate is adjusted by the stock beta.<sup>24</sup> The risk free return measure is  
749 combined with the equity risk premium adjusted for the measure of beta to arrive at a  
750 CAPM result.

751 Like the risk premium discussed above, the CAPM is subject to measurement  
752 uncertainties. First, the general problem of how to measure the equity risk premium and  
753 the time period for which the premium is analyzed is subject to considerable debate.  
754 This problem and associated criticisms is generic to all variants of the risk premium  
755 model. Second, measures of beta are often unstable from period to period and may not  
756 reflect the equity risk spread measure.

757 For all of the above reasons, risk premium methods should be viewed with considerable  
758 caution. The risk premium analysis and CAPM described below consists of analyses of  
759 shorter time horizons and are employed as a check on the DCF results described earlier.

760 **Q. DESCRIBE YOUR RISK PREMIUM ANALYSIS?**

761 A. I examined two analyses comparing the authorized electric utility return on equity  
762 relative to the Moody's Average Public Utility Bond Yield for the period 1980 - 2011.  
763 This analysis is set forth in my Exhibit OCS 1.8D. In this analysis I estimate equity risk  
764 premiums by comparing authorized electric utility returns with Moody's average public  
765 utility bond yields employing a current single "A" bond yield and a forecasted single

---

<sup>24</sup> Beta is a measure of the volatility of the specific stock movement relative to that of a market measure such as the S&P 500. A beta below 1.0 means that a specific stock is less volatile than the market measure, while a beta above 1.0 indicates a specific stock is more volatile than the market measure.



766 “A” bond yield. The resulting risk premium is combined with the current single “A”  
767 corporate bond yield of 4.51% and the projected estimate of a single “A” utility bond  
768 yield of 4.32% to arrive at a cost of equity estimate. The current 4.51% single “A” bond  
769 yield is computed consistent with Dr. Hadaway’s approach of adding 132 basis points to  
770 the long-term U.S. Treasury yield of 3.19%, or about 4.51%. The projected single “A”  
771 yield of 4.32% is based on the Company’s pro forma debt cost at 3/15/13 of 4.32%.

772 The resulting risk premium range of results is 9.52% to 9.63% with a 9.58% midpoint  
773 estimate.

774 **CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL ANALYSIS**

775 **Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN HOW YOU CALCULATED THE EQUITY RETURN**  
776 **ESTIMATE EMPLOYING THE CAPM.**

777 A. Employing the basic CAPM formula denoted as follows:

778 
$$ROE = R_f + \beta(R_m - R_f)$$

779 Where:

780  $R_f$ = risk free rate;

781  $\beta$ =Beta;

782  $R_m$ = market return; and

783  $R_m - R_f$ = market risk premium or MRP

784 This is the typical model structure employed by most financial analysts in estimating  
785 equity returns.

786

787 **Q. WHAT RISK FREE ( $R_f$ ) VALUE DID YOU EMPLOY IN YOUR CAPM**  
 788 **ESTIMATE?**

789 A. I employed the most recent three month average of the 30 Year U.S. Treasury Bond  
 790 rates. This three month average is:

February 2012	3.11%
March 2012	3.28%
April 2012	3.18%
<u>3 Month Average</u>	<u>3.19%</u>

791 **Q. WHAT VALUE DID YOU EMPLOY FOR BETA IN YOUR CAPM ANALYSIS?**

792 A. I employed a beta estimate of .72, which is the average beta for the comparable group as  
 793 shown in my Exhibit OCS 1.3D.

794 **Q. WHAT VALUE HAVE YOU EMPLOYED FOR THE MARKET RISK**  
 795 **PREMIUM (“MRP”)?**

796 A. I have employed a MRP of 4.9% based on the following calculation:

<u>DESCRIPTION<sup>25</sup></u>	<u>GEOMETRIC AVG</u>	<u>ARITHMETIC AVG</u>
Large Company Stock Returns (1/1/26 - 12/31/10)	9.8%	11.8%
Long Term Government Bonds	5.7%	6.1%
Risk Premium	4.1%	5.7%
Midpoint		4.9%

797 **Q. WHAT IS THE RESULT OF YOUR CAPM ANALYSIS?**

798 A. Employing a beta value of .72, a risk free rate of 3.19%, and a MRP of 4.9% results in a  
 799 CAPM estimate of:

800 
$$K = 3.19\% + .72(4.9\%)$$

<sup>25</sup> Stocks, Bonds, Bills and Inflation Market Report, December 2011 at 12 on Table 7.

801  $K = 3.19\% + 3.53\%$

802  $K = 6.72\%$

803 **Q. IN YOUR ANALYSES, HAVE YOU INCLUDED A CALCULATION OF THE**  
 804 **ECAPM RETURN ESTIMATE FOR THIS CASE?**

805 A. Yes. Like the CAPM analysis discussed above, the ECAPM estimate of equity return  
 806 relies on basic financial theory in order to correct for biased beta estimates, an  
 807 adjustment is made so as not to understate the cost of equity.

808 ECAPM<sup>26</sup>

809  $K = R_f + 0.25(R_m - R_f) + 0.75\beta(R_m - R_f)$

810  $K = 3.19\% + 0.25(4.9\%) + 0.75 \times .72(4.9\%)$

811  $K = 3.19 + 1.225\% + 2.646\%$

812  $K = 7.061\%$

813 **Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR COST OF EQUITY CAPITAL RESULTS FOR**  
 814 **THIS CASE.**

815 A. The DCF results both constant and two-stage DCF for both comparable groups, updated  
 816 CAPM and ECAPM, along with the updated risk premium and alternative risk premium  
 817 analysis are summarized in the following table:

Table 4 Summary of Cost of Equity Modeling		
Description	Range	
DCF Constant Growth Electric Utility Group	9.0%	9.8%
DCF Two-Stage Electric Utility Group	9.5%	9.6%
CAPM	6.7%	
ECAPM	7.1%	
Historical Risk Premium Authorized Electric Utility Returns	9.5%	9.6%

<sup>26</sup> *Id*

818 The constant growth DCF range is 9.0% to 9.8% with a 9.4% midpoint. The two-stage  
 819 DCF results fall slightly above the 9.4% midpoint at 9.55%. The risk premium results  
 820 also fall slightly above the midpoint at 9.55%. Given that the two-stage DCF results are  
 821 driven by a higher 5.2% growth rate, the 9.4% constant growth DCF midpoint is the  
 822 more balanced final estimate. The risk premium results fall within the DCF range and  
 823 on average fall closer to the midpoint of 9.4% than either end of the overall 9.0% to  
 824 9.8% range. For these reasons I am recommending a 9.4% equity return in this case.<sup>27</sup>

825 The 9.4% equity return midpoint is further supported by the addition of Utah regulatory  
 826 mechanisms such as the MPA and EBA which improve credit quality and mitigate  
 827 business risk for RMP.

828 **SECTION VIII: CAPITAL STRUCTURE**

829 **Q. WHAT CAPITAL STRUCTURE IS THE COMPANY PROPOSING IN THIS**  
 830 **PROCEEDING?**

831 **A.** Based on the direct testimony of Company witness Bruce Williams, the Company is  
 832 proposing the following capital structure, cost rates and overall cost of capital to be  
 833 earned on rate base investment as follows:

834 **TABLE 5<sup>28</sup>**  
 835 **ROCKY MOUNTAIN POWER**  
 836 **DOCKET NO. 11-035-200 TEST YEAR ENDED MAY 31, 2013**  
 837 **OVERALL REQUESTED COST OF CAPITAL**

838

<u>Line No</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Cost Rate</u>	<u>Weighted Cost</u>
1	Long-Term Debt	47.60%	5.41%	2.5752%
2	Preferred Stock	0.30%	5.43%	0.0163%
3	Common Equity	52.10%	10.20%	5.3142%
4	Total	<u>100.00%</u>	---	<u>7.9057%</u>

<sup>27</sup> The CAPM results well below 8% were omitted as outliers.

<sup>28</sup> Company filed (Certification) Schedule F, p. 1 of 2.

839 Thus, the Company requests an overall cost of capital to be earned on rate base  
840 investment of 7.91% in this case.

841 **Q. WHAT IS THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE?**

842 A. The overall cost of capital is the sum of the weighted average cost rates of various  
843 sources of capital. The quantity or portion of each type of capital, combined with the  
844 cost rate of capital determines the overall rate of return that the Company should be  
845 allowed to earn in this proceeding. The most significant relationship in any capital  
846 structure is the debt to equity ratio.

847 **Q. DOES THERE EXIST SOME SET RELATIONSHIP OR IDEAL MIX OF DEBT  
848 AND EQUITY CAPITAL?**

849 A. There exists no set debt/equity relationship for all firms or all industries in terms of  
850 leveraging. However, the ideal capital structure is one that minimizes the overall cost of  
851 capital to the firm, while still maintaining financial integrity so as to maintain the ability  
852 to attract capital at reasonable costs to meet future needs. Because the cost of debt is  
853 generally lower than the cost of equity, and also because the cost of debt represents a tax  
854 deductible expense, any increase in the quantity of debt capital tends to decrease the  
855 overall cost of capital relative to equity financing. One must keep in mind that increases  
856 in the quantity of debt financing can cause the financial risk of the Company to increase.  
857 In other words, there is a cost for the savings associated with increased debt leveraging.  
858 That cost is increased financial risk to the firm.

859 In summary, it is not possible to determine with precision the exact proportion of debt  
860 and equity that minimizes the overall cost of capital without imposing undue financial  
861 risk upon the Company. There does exist some range of capital structure that generally  
862 meets the goal of minimizing the overall cost of capital while maintaining the firm's  
863 financial integrity.

864 **Q. WHAT CRITERIA SHOULD REGULATORS EMPLOY IN DETERMINING  
865 THE APPROPRIATE CAPITAL STRUCTURE TO BE USED FOR  
866 RATEMAKING?**

867 A. In my opinion, rate regulation should focus on two criteria to determine the appropriate

868 capital structure. Those factors as outlined below should be economy and safety.

869 The advantage of debt in the capital structure is that debt costs less than equity.  
870 Moreover, interest charges are deductible for income tax purposes and act to reduce  
871 taxes. Thus, the more debt in the capital structure the lower the cost of capital will be.  
872 The question of economy is addressed by examining whether increases in the debt ratio  
873 act to increase the cost rates of both debt and equity so as to over balance the benefits of  
874 the larger proportion of debt.

875 In addition, there is always the overriding question of safety. In other words, financial  
876 risk is increased if the proportion of debt is increased by such a magnitude that interest  
877 obligations cannot be covered during periods of depressed earnings.

878 **Q. HAVE YOU MADE ANY CHANGES TO THE PROPOSED CAPITAL**  
879 **STRUCTURE AND COST RATES?**

880 A. Other than reducing the cost of equity to 9.4%, I am not at this time proposing any other  
881 capital structure or cost rate changes. However, in data request 10.13 the Division  
882 asked:

883 **Cost of Capital/Capital Structure** PacifiCorp reported issuing \$100 million in first  
884 mortgage bonds in March 2012; the proceeds, in part, are to be used to redeem  
885 approximately \$84 million in pollution control revenue bonds. Does Mr. Williams  
886 plan to revise his testimony to reflect this event that was not included in his direct  
887 testimony? If so, when does he expect to file his revised testimony?

888 **The Company responded:** Yes, Mr. Williams plans to revise his testimony  
889 concerning the cost of debt during rebuttal testimony.

890 I will review his rebuttal testimony and make any necessary adjustments at that time.

891 **Q. WHAT CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND COST RATES ARE YOU**  
892 **RECOMMENDING THAT THE COMMISSION ADOPT IN THIS CASE?**

893 A. Based on the analyses and results discussed above, I am recommending the following  
894 capital structure, cost rates and overall cost of capital for this case:

895  
896  
897  
898

**TABLE 6**

**ROCKY MOUNTAIN POWER COMPANY  
RECOMMENDED ALTERNATIVE COST OF CAPITAL**

<u>Description</u>	<u>Ratio</u>	<u>Cost</u>	<u>Weighted Cost</u>
Long-term Debt	47.60%	5.41%	2.5752%
Preferred Stock	0.30%	5.43%	0.0163%
Common Equity	52.10%	9.40%	4.8974%
Total	<u>100.00%</u>	---	<u>7.4889%</u>

899  
900  
901

As can be seen from the above table when the long-term debt cost rates and common equity cost rates reflect current market conditions, the Company's overall cost of capital is 7.49%.

902

**SECTION IX: FINANCIAL INTEGRITY**

903  
904

**Q. WHAT IS THE IMPACT OF YOUR RECOMMENDED 7.49% COST OF CAPITAL ON THE COMPANY'S CLAIMED LEVEL OF RATE INCREASE?**

905  
906  
907  
908  
909  
910  
911  
912

A. Employing the \$5,752,868,671 rate base from the Company's filing schedule and my recommended 7.49% return grossed-up for federal income taxes to a level of 10.13% results in a revenue requirement of \$583,035,008 (See Exhibit OCS 1.9D). The Company's requested return and tax level of 10.7759% applied to the \$5,752,868,671 rate base results in a revenue requirement of \$619,924,172 (See Exhibit OCS 1.9D). Thus, the impact on revenue requirements of employing a 9.4% rather than a 10.2% return on equity in this case is a \$36,889,164 reduction to the Company's requested \$172.3 million annual rate increase.

913

914 **Q. HAVE YOU REVIEWED CREDIT RESEARCH REPORTS FOR THE**  
915 **COMPANY REGARDING CREDIT QUALITY AND CORPORATE**  
916 **FINANCIAL METRICS?**

917 A. Yes. The Company's credit quality is not threatened or under significant pressure of  
918 downgrade. Current bonus depreciation impacts on cash flow will cause rating agencies  
919 to focus more on earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization; or  
920 EBITDA metrics as pure cash flow measures are temporarily influenced by current tax  
921 law impacts.

922 **Q. WILL YOUR RECOMMENDED RETURN PROVIDE THE COMPANY**  
923 **SUFFICIENT CASH FLOW AND FINANCIAL METRICS TO MAINTAIN ITS**  
924 **FINANCIAL INTEGRITY?**

925 A. Yes. Based on the capital structure above, my recommended overall cost of capital  
926 (which is based on a 9.4% equity return) provides sufficient financial metrics for the  
927 Company.

928 **Q. WHAT FINANCIAL RATIOS OR FINANCIAL METRICS SHOULD THE**  
929 **COMMISSION CONSIDER WHEN EVALUATING COST OF EQUITY?**

930 A. In my opinion, the Commission should consider the financial metrics that bond rating  
931 agencies consider in evaluating credit risk to a Company. Three key financial metrics  
932 involve cash flow coverage of interest, cash flow as a percentage of debt, and debt  
933 leverage ratio.

934 **Q. HOW ARE THESE FINANCIAL RATIOS CONSIDERED AND CALCULATED?**

935 A. Ratings agencies such as Moody's and Standard & Poor's develop rating guidelines that  
936 make explicit general ratings outcomes that are typical or expected given various  
937 financial and business risk combinations. A rating matrix or guideline is just that, a  
938 guideline, not a rule written in stone that guarantees a particular rating for a particular  
939 achieved financial metric level.

940 Funds from a company's operations, in other words cash flow, are very critical to any  
941 rating/risk consideration. Interest and principal obligations of a company cannot be paid



942 out of earnings if earnings are not cash. Thus, analyses of cash flow reveal debt  
943 servicing ability.

944 Debt and capital structure considerations are indicative of leverage and flexibility to  
945 address financial changes. The liquidity crisis that hit all markets and industries is an  
946 example of the importance of financial flexibility. Stable and continuous cash flows  
947 provide financial flexibility.

948 Each of these financial ratios is calculated in my Exhibit OCS 1.9D employing my  
949 recommendations in this proceeding. The results of my analyses indicate strong  
950 financial metrics, supporting the current B bond rating.

951 The resulting financial metrics at a 9.4% equity return are consistent with the current  
952 single A bond rating.

953 **SECTION X: ISSUES RAISED IN DR. HADAWAY'S DIRECT TESTIMONY**

954 **Q. DO YOU HAVE ANY COMMENTS REGARDING DR. HADAWAY'S**  
955 **TESTIMONY?**

956 A. Yes, I have a number of comments. First, Dr. Hadaway's DCF analysis results in a  
957 range of results of 9.6 percent to 10.2 percent.<sup>29</sup> Further, Dr. Hadaway's risk premium  
958 results indicate a range of 9.55 percent to 9.70 percent which is consistent with the lower  
959 end of his DCF model results.<sup>30</sup> Rather than embracing the consistency of his modeling  
960 results, Dr. Hadaway discounts the current equity risk premium 9.55 percent to 9.70  
961 percent range "...because they are unduly affected by the artificially low interest rates  
962 caused by the federal governments expansionary monetary policy."<sup>31</sup>

963 His risk premium results are very consistent with his DCF results, albeit at the lower end  
964 of the range. Dr. Hadaway does assert the lower end of his DCF results at the 9.6  
965 percent level have been unduly affected by unusual market factors.<sup>32</sup> I find Dr.  
966 Hadaway's abandonment of his lower end DCF results and risk premium analysis  
967 unsupported.

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<sup>29</sup> Direct Testimony Samuel C. Hadaway at 1:20-22.

<sup>30</sup> *Id* at 1:22,23 – 2:24

<sup>31</sup> *Id* at 2:24027

<sup>32</sup> *Id* at 31:633-636

968 **Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN WHY YOU FIND DR. HADAWAY’S ABANDONMENT OF**  
969 **HIS LOWER DCF RESULTS AND ALL HIS RISK PREMIUM ANALYSES TO**  
970 **BE UNSUPPORTED.**

971 A. Dr. Hadaway has undertaken no analysis to support this conclusion he merely states:

972 “[r]ecent market turmoil and the continuing effects on capital markets make it  
973 difficult to strictly interpret quantitative model estimates for the cost of  
974 equity....equity market volatility remains high. Under these conditions, use of a  
975 lower DCF range or equity risk premium estimates...will understate the market  
976 cost of equity. Based on all these factors, an ROE of 10.2 percent is a reasonable  
977 rate.”<sup>33</sup>

978 While Dr. Hadaway may call his selection of 10.2% “judgment”, in reality it is nothing  
979 more than a flat out guess. His judgment could have been 9.6% as well as 10.2%, there  
980 is no way to duplicate that result. In other jurisdictions such as Washington, PacifiCorp  
981 apparently sees no problem with “market turmoil”, “equity market volatility” or an  
982 equity return below 10 percent.

983 **Q. IN YOUR OPINION, IS THE MARKET CURRENTLY IN TURMOIL BECAUSE**  
984 **OF EQUITY MARKET VOLATILITY?**

985 A. Markets are functioning and operating in the way they always do. Certainly, the market  
986 turmoil from late 2008 and in 2009 is not present in today’s markets.

987 While there is some debate as to how volatile markets are today relative to the past, one  
988 must recognize markets have always been subject to volatility.

989 Today substantial market volumes are subject to computer trades where high-frequency  
990 traders rely on algorithms to capitalize on quick market movements. How, or if this type  
991 of market change creates more volatility is not clear.

992 Factors such as European economic issues, or double dip recession fears or concerns of  
993 margin call impacts are frequently issues looming over the market. Historically such  
994 events may have been the first bail out of Chrysler, or the New York City financial

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<sup>33</sup> *Id* at 31:629-637

995 crisis, or inflation in the late 1970's and early 1980's – markets have frequently been  
996 subjected to crisis and events. But, whether you look at the Dow Industrials and Dow  
997 Utility index over the past five or 80 years, (See Exhibit OCS 1.10D) there is no  
998 evidence to conclude current market volatility is any reason to discard current market  
999 cost of capital results.

1000 **Q. DO YOU HAVE ANY COMMENTS ON DR. HADAWAY'S COMPARABLE**  
1001 **RISK OR PROXY GROUP IN THIS CASE?**

1002 A. I pointed out earlier in this testimony that a larger company sample (my 21 company  
1003 group versus Dr. Hadaway's smaller 14 company group) avoids the problem of being  
1004 unduly influenced by large variations by one or more of the companies. I also pointed  
1005 out that some of the companies in Dr. Hadaway's sample are better suited for a gas case  
1006 rather than an electric case. Lastly, Dr. Hadaway's restriction or requirement for a  
1007 single A bond rating unnecessarily limits the proxy group.

1008 Given all of the above, my comparable group may be a better risk proxy in this case.  
1009 Whether my proxy group or Dr. Hadaway's group or both groups are employed, the  
1010 final equity return number will not be markedly different.

1011 **Q. DO YOU HAVE ANY COMMENTS ON DR. HADAWAY'S CONSTANT**  
1012 **GROWTH DCF ANALYSIS?**

1013 A. In my opinion, the growth rate range is limited resulting in an overstatement of the  
1014 equity return recommendation. As I noted in the growth rate section of this testimony,  
1015 an estimate and inclusion of the internal "b" times "r" growth rate provides a more  
1016 balanced and complete estimate for the DCF analysis. Dr. Hadaway's constant growth  
1017 analysis is limited and lacks a balanced range of growth.

1018 **Q. DO YOU HAVE ANY COMMENTS ON DR. HADAWAY'S CONSTANT**  
1019 **GROWTH DCF EMPLOYING THE LONG-TERM GDP GROWTH METRIC?**

1020 A. In my opinion, the 5.8 percent GDP growth estimate is not supported or consistent with  
1021 current investor or market growth expectations. Growth measured by this GDP measure  
1022 of 5.8% is overstated by at least 50 basis points. There are no current market forecasts  
1023 that currently estimate a 5.8 percent GDP growth estimate. While Dr. Hadaway may in

1024 fact believe in this 5.8% growth estimate, the market and most importantly investors are  
1025 not forming investment decisions on GDP forecasts of 5.8%. A search of recent and  
1026 current market forecasts of GDP suggests only Dr. Hadaway has such a bold high  
1027 growth projection of GDP. For these reasons a 5.8% GDP growth projection is not  
1028 supported by market evidence or helpful in determining the RMP cost of equity in this  
1029 case.

1030 **Q. DO YOU HAVE ANY COMMENTS ON THE PROPOSED TWO-STAGE DCF**  
1031 **FORMULA?**

1032 A. Yes, again the Company proposes to employ a 5.8% long-term growth rate based on Dr.  
1033 Hadaway's estimate of GDP growth. The first four years of the two-stage DCF model  
1034 are based on short-term Value Line estimates for dividends, but the remaining 146 years  
1035 of the calculation are based on the 5.8% GDP growth estimate. Given the primary  
1036 reliance on the 5.8% GDP growth metric, the two-stage DCF model will be overstated.

1037 **Q. BASED ON YOUR ANALYSIS OF DR. HADAWAY'S GROWTH ANALYSIS, IS**  
1038 **THE 9.6% TO 10.2% DCF RANGE REASONABLE?**

1039 A. In my opinion, Dr. Hadaway's DCF range is somewhat overstated as such range is  
1040 driven to some extent by the 5.8% growth in GDP. But, if one looks at only the constant  
1041 growth DCF employing analysts' growth estimates, the DCF range is 9.6% - 10.0% as  
1042 discussed at line 567 of Dr. Hadaway's direct testimony. Only by employing a 5.8%  
1043 GDP growth rate does Dr. Hadaway get the DCF estimates above 10% in this case.

1044 **Q. WHAT ARE THE RESULTS OF DR. HADAWAY'S RISK PREMIUM**  
1045 **ANALYSES?**

1046 A. As discussed at line 579 of his direct testimony, Dr. Hadaway discusses a risk premium  
1047 range of 9.55% to 9.70%. Dr. Hadaway goes on to state that these results are discounted  
1048 because of the claimed impact of monetary policy on interest rates. These risk premium  
1049 results generally support my recommendation in this case. His risk premium results  
1050 certainly support an equity return below 10%.

1051

1052 **SECTION XI: CONCLUSION ON COST OF EQUITY**

1053

1054 **Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR OVERALL COST OF CAPITAL**  
1055 **RECOMMENDATION IN THIS CASE.**

1056 A. The Company's requested 10.2% return on equity is overstated. A more reasoned cost  
1057 of equity analysis results in a required return on shareholder equity of 9.4%. These  
1058 recommended adjustments results in an overall cost of capital of 7.49% in this case.

1059 **Q. DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR TESTIMONY?**

1060 A. Yes.