

**BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH**

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<b>In the Matter of the Application of</b>	<b>)</b>	<b>Docket No. 13-035-02</b>
<b>Rocky Mountain Power for Authority</b>	<b>)</b>	<b>Direct Testimony of</b>
<b>to Change its Depreciation Rates</b>	<b>)</b>	<b>Jacob Pous</b>
<b>Effective January 1, 2014</b>	<b>)</b>	<b>For the Office of</b>
	<b>)</b>	<b>Consumer Services</b>

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**JUNE 21, 2013**

**DIRECT TESTIMONY OF  
JACOB POUS  
ON BEHALF OF THE OFFICE OF CONSUMER SERVICES**

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## DIRECT TESTIMONY AND EXHIBITS OF JACOB POUS

### ACRONYMS

**2011 DEPRECIATION STUDY** Depreciation Study based on plant ending December 31, 2011

#### **STUDY**

**AICPA** American Institute of Certified Public Accountants

**ALG** Average Life Group

**ASL** Average Service Life

**CCCT** Combined-Cycle Combustion Turbines

**CFR** Code of Federal Regulations

**CI** Conformance Index

**COMMISSION** Utah Public Service Commission

**COMMONWEALTH COMPANY** Commonwealth Edison Company

**COMPANY** Rocky Mountain Power Company

**or RMP**

**DUCI** Diversified Utility Consultants, Inc.

**FERC** Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

**IMPC** Indiana Michigan Power Company

**NARUC** National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners

**OCS** Office of Consumer Services

**OLT** Observed Life Table

**REI** Retirement Experience Index

**SPR** Simulated Plant Record Balance Method

**SSD** Sum of Squares Difference

1       **SECTION I:       INTRODUCTION**

2

3       **Q.       PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME AND BUSINESS ADDRESS.**

4       A.       My name is Jacob Pous and my business address is 1912 W. Anderson Lane,  
5       Suite 202, Austin, Texas 78757.

6

7       **Q.       WHAT IS YOUR OCCUPATION?**

8       A.       I am a principal in the firm of Diversified Utility Consultants, Inc. ("DUCI"). A copy  
9       of my qualifications appears as Appendix A.

10

11       **Q.       HAVE YOU PREVIOUSLY TESTIFIED IN PUBLIC UTILITY PROCEEDINGS?**

12       A.       Yes. Appendix A also includes a list of proceedings in which I have previously  
13       presented testimony. In addition, I have been involved in numerous utility rate  
14       proceedings that resulted in settlements before testimony was filed. In total, I  
15       have participated in well over 400 utility rate proceedings in the United States  
16       and Canada. In particular, I have submitted testimony on the topic of depreciation  
17       in over 200 cases, and I have analyzed Rocky Mountain Power Company's  
18       ("RMP" or the "Company") last three depreciation studies.

19

20       **Q.       WHAT IS YOUR PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND?**

21       A.       I am a registered professional engineer. I am registered to practice as a  
22       Professional Engineer in several states.

23

24       **Q.       ON WHOSE BEHALF ARE YOU PROVIDING THIS TESTIMONY?**

25       A.       My testimony and recommendations are sponsored on behalf of the Office of  
26       Consumer Services ("OCS").

27

28       **Q.       WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR TESTIMONY?**

29       A.       The purpose of my testimony is to address the reasonableness of RMP's request  
30       to increase its depreciation rates, as filed before the Utah Public Service  
31       Commission ("Commission") in Docket No. 13-035-02.

32       **SECTION II:     SUMMARY**

33

34       **Q.     PLEASE SUMMARIZE THE COMPANY'S DEPRECIATION PRESENTATION.**

35       A.     The Company developed a depreciation study based on plant as of December  
36             31, 2011 ("2011 Depreciation Study").<sup>1</sup> The 2011 Depreciation Study was  
37             developed by Gannett Fleming and sponsored by Mr. John Spanos. While the  
38             2011 Depreciation Study establishes the Company's proposed mortality  
39             characteristics (i.e., life and net salvage parameters for each of its various  
40             accounts), the Company takes the unusual action of estimating interim additions,  
41             interim retirements, and future corresponding net salvage aspects of its plant  
42             through December 31, 2013. The Company further adjusts the estimated  
43             remaining life for its investment based on the December 31, 2013 time frame  
44             compared to the December 31, 2011 time frame utilized in its 2011 Depreciation  
45             Study.

46

47             The Company's 2011 Depreciation Study establishes a total Company level of  
48             depreciation expense of \$622 million, or \$260.0 million when allocated to the  
49             Utah jurisdiction.<sup>2</sup> However, by taking the unusual step of changing the  
50             depreciation test period from historical calendar year 2011 to estimated calendar  
51             year 2013, the Company actually proposes higher depreciation rates that result  
52             in a \$743 million total Company level of depreciation expense, or \$310.9 million  
53             when allocated to the Utah jurisdiction.

54

55       **Q.     PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR TESTIMONY AND RECOMMENDATIONS.**

56       A.     I have reviewed and analyzed RMP's request and underlying support. Based on  
57             my analysis of RMP's 2011 Depreciation Study, direct testimony and exhibits,  
58             and responses to data requests, I recommend various adjustments to the  
59             proposed life and net salvage parameters. As shown in Exhibit OCS 2.1 (Direct)  
60             these recommendations result in an annual Utah jurisdictional level of  
61             depreciation expense of \$237.5 million based on depreciable plant as of

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<sup>1</sup> Exhibit 2011 Depreciation Study.

<sup>2</sup> Exhibit 2011 Depreciation Study at page III-19 and allocation factors from Exhibit RMP\_\_\_\_(HEL-1).

62 December 31, 2011, compared to the Company's request of \$310.9 million  
63 based on plant as of December 31, 2013, or a \$73.6 million reduction to the  
64 Company's proposed \$70.5 increase on a Utah jurisdictional basis.<sup>3</sup> Thus, my  
65 overall recommendation is a \$3.1 million decrease to existing depreciation  
66 expense on a Utah jurisdictional basis.

67  
68 The following is a brief synopsis of each adjustment that I recommend. The  
69 adjustments are provided at both 2011 and 2013 values, depending on whether  
70 or not the Commission allows the Company's proposal to include interim  
71 additions through year-end 2013 in establishing new depreciation rates.

72  
73 • **Depreciation Rate Time Frame Interim Additions** – As noted above, the  
74 Company takes the unusual position of estimating interim additions<sup>4</sup> as  
75 well as other components of net plant, life, and net salvage aspects of its  
76 investment two years beyond the actual test year period utilized for its  
77 depreciation study. In other words, the Company performs life and net  
78 salvage analyses on actual plant as of December 31, 2011, but then takes  
79 the atypical action of modifying those rates to reflect its estimate of  
80 additional changes in plant, depreciation reserve, and remaining lives for  
81 an additional two-year period ending as of December 31, 2013. In  
82 particular, due to the unusual proposed cost levels associated with its  
83 Carbon production plant and the very short remaining life that results from  
84 such action, the Company's overall depreciation request and rates  
85 increase significantly due to the application of this non-standard approach.  
86 Proper depreciation and ratemaking recognizes and reflects reliance on  
87 depreciation rates established in a depreciation study applied to actual  
88 plant balances allowed for ratemaking purposes when the Company files  
89 an actual rate case. Changes in mortality characteristics and thus  
90 depreciation rates are normally limited to depreciation studies based on  
91 analyses of actual historical plant data, not future manipulated data  
92 estimates. I recommend continuation of the standard industry practice  
93 performed by the vast majority of the industry, and as previously practiced  
94 by the Company, which requires reliance on depreciation rates based on

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<sup>3</sup> The Company operates in several jurisdictions. Its investment in production, transmission, general and mining plant is allocated to each jurisdiction using various system allocation factors. The allocation factors to Utah are listed on Exhibit RMP\_\_\_(HEL-1) are approximately 42%.

<sup>4</sup> National Association of Regulatory Commissioners' publication "Public Utility Depreciation Practices", 1996 edition at page 321, defines interim additions as "used in life span analysis, additions made subsequent to the year in which the unit was placed in service. Interim additions are not considered in the depreciation computation until they occur."

95 plant as of December 31, 2011.<sup>5</sup> The impact of my recommendation  
96 results in a reduction in Utah jurisdictional depreciation expense of \$22.4  
97 million.  
98

- 99
- 100 • **Production Plant Life Spans** – The Company’s proposal of a 40-year life  
101 span for combined-cycle combustion turbines (“CCCT”) is too short.  
102 CCCTs represent some of the most efficient generating facilities available  
103 to the Company. Economic theory mandates maximization of capital  
104 intensive assets, especially those associated with efficient operation of the  
105 system. I recommend correction of the Company’s historic practice of  
106 understating life spans for new types of generation. I recommend a five-  
107 year increase in life span for CCCT units, or 45 years. The impact of my  
108 recommendation is a reduction in Utah jurisdictional depreciation expense  
109 of approximately \$2.4 million and \$2.7 million based on plant as of  
110 December 2011 and 2013, respectively.
  - 111 • **Production Plant Interim Retirements** – The Company requests  
112 recognition of the impact of interim retirements in the calculation of  
113 production plant depreciation rates. While such practice is not  
114 unreasonable, the Company proposes a new method that inappropriately  
115 magnifies the impact of interim retirements in the depreciation calculation.  
116 Retention of the interim retirement approach previously employed by the  
117 Company along with reliance on Company specific data is more  
118 appropriate for the establishment of the intended fine tuning impact of  
119 interim retirements. My recommended adjustments result in a \$11.7  
120 million and \$16.1 million reduction in Utah jurisdictional annual  
121 depreciation expense based on plant as of December 31, 2011 and 2013,  
122 respectively.  
123
  - 124 • **Production Plant Net Salvage** – The Company’s proposed terminal net  
125 salvage values are based on various erroneous studies or unsubstantiated  
126 estimations. In particular, the Company proposes a \$330 per kW terminal  
127 net salvage for its Carbon generating plant. This particular component of  
128 the Company’s request represents a significant portion of the Company’s  
129 overall depreciation requested increase. As discussed later in my direct  
130 testimony, the Company’s request for the Carbon plant is based on  
131 studies that are either inaccurate, unsubstantiated, or unrealistic. In  
132 addition, the Company’s request to continue the use of a \$40 per kW  
133 estimate for the remainder of its coal-fired generating facilities is  
134 excessive. Finally, the Company’s estimates for terminal net salvage  
135 associated with its gas and wind Other Production generating facilities are  
136 unsubstantiated and excessive. I recommend reliance on a \$30 per kW,  
137 an \$8 per kW, and a \$5 per kW terminal net salvage estimate for steam-

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<sup>5</sup> While the existing rates include the recognition of two months of estimated data, those rates are based on a settlement in Docket No. 07-035-13. The settlement further notes that no party acknowledges the validity of any principle or practice.

138 fired, Other Production – gas-fired, and Other Production – wind  
139 generating facilities, respectively. My recommendations result in a \$16.3  
140 million and \$21.0 million reduction in Utah jurisdictional annual  
141 depreciation expense based on plant as of December 31, 2011 and 2013,  
142 respectively.

- 143
- 144 • **Mass Property Life Analysis** – The Company proposes estimated life  
145 parameters for its various mass property accounts. Mass property  
146 accounts include transmission, distribution, and general plant. The  
147 Company relies on actuarial or semi-actuarial analyses as part of the  
148 basis for its proposed life parameters. Based on a review of the available  
149 information, longer average service lives (“ASL”) are warranted for at least  
150 five accounts impacting the Utah jurisdiction. The impact of my  
151 recommendations for these five accounts results in a Utah jurisdictional  
152 reduction in depreciation expense of \$3.9 million and \$5.4 million based  
153 on plant as of December 31, 2011 and 2013, respectively.
  - 154
  - 155 • **Combined Impact** – As shown on Exhibit OCS 2.1 (Direct), the combined  
156 impact of the various recommendations is not the summation of the  
157 individual components. The life span, net salvage, and interim retirement  
158 adjustments for production plant interact with one another and the  
159 retention of 2011 rather than 2013 values further impacts the results.  
160 Therefore the combined impact of my recommendations results in a \$73.5  
161 million reduction to requested depreciation expense on a Utah  
162 jurisdictional basis.
- 163

164 The following series of tables summarize the depreciation expense adjustments  
165 on a Utah jurisdictional basis. The first table presents all OCS recommendations  
166 compared to RMP’s request, including the reversal of the Company’s proposed  
167 2013 based depreciation rates. The second table presents all OCS  
168 recommendations without the interim additions adjustment compared to RMP’s  
169 request based on 2013 values. The third table presents all OCS  
170 recommendations compared to RMP’s 2011 depreciation study rates, which the  
171 Company did not propose as it is requesting 2013 based depreciation rates.

172

173

174

175

176



177

178

Table 1

**UTAH JURISDICTIONAL ONLY IMPACT  
OCS Recommended 2011 to RMP Proposed 2013  
(\$ Millions)**

	<b>2013 Existing RMP</b>	<b>2013 RMP Proposed</b>	<b>Existing to RMP Proposed</b>	<b>2011 OCS Recommended</b>	<b>OCS 2011 to RMP 2013</b>
Electric Plant w/o Carbon	\$ 239.0	\$ 277.1	\$ 38.1	\$ 229.8	\$ (47.3)
Carbon Plant	\$ 1.5	\$ 33.9	\$ 32.4	\$ 7.6	\$ (26.3)
Electric Plant	\$ 240.4	\$ 310.9	\$ 70.5	\$ 237.5	\$ (73.6)

Table 2

**UTAH JURISDICTIONAL ONLY IMPACT  
2013 Comparison Only  
(\$ Millions)**

	<b>2013 Existing RMP</b>	<b>2013 RMP Proposed</b>	<b>Existing to RMP Proposed</b>	<b>2013 OCS Presented</b>	<b>OCS 2013 to RMP 2013</b>
Electric Plant w/o Carbon	\$ 239.0	\$ 277.1	\$ 38.1	\$ 255.1	\$ (22.0)
Carbon Plant	\$ 1.5	\$ 33.9	\$ 32.4	\$ 31.5	\$ (2.4)
Electric Plant	\$ 240.4	\$ 310.9	\$ 70.5	\$ 286.6	\$ (24.4)

Table 3

**UTAH JURISDICTIONAL ONLY IMPACT  
2011 Comparison Only  
(\$ Millions)**

	<b>2011 Existing RMP</b>	<b>2011 RMP Presented</b>	<b>Existing to RMP Presented</b>	<b>2011 OCS Recommended</b>	<b>OCS 2011 to RMP 2011</b>
Electric Plant w/o Carbon	\$ 153.2	\$ 246.4	\$ 93.2	\$ 229.8	\$ (16.6)
Carbon Plant	\$ 1.6	\$ 14.3	\$ 12.7	\$ 7.6	\$ (6.7)
Electric Plant	\$ 154.8	\$ 260.7	\$ 105.9	\$ 237.5	\$ (23.3)

179       **SECTION III:   DEPRECIATION – GENERAL**

180

181   **Q.    WHAT IS DEPRECIATION?**

182   A.    There are two commonly cited definitions of depreciation. The first comes from  
183   the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”):<sup>6</sup>

184           ‘Depreciation,’ as applied to depreciable plant, means the loss in  
185           service value not restored by current maintenance, incurred in  
186           connection with the consumption or prospective retirement of  
187           electric plant in the course of service from causes which are known  
188           to be in current operation and against which the utility is not  
189           protected by insurance. Among the causes to be given  
190           consideration are wear and tear, decay, action of the elements,  
191           inadequacy, obsolescence, changes in the art, changes in demand  
192           and requirements of public authorities.

193

194           The second definition, from the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants  
195           (“AICPA”), is similar:

196           Depreciation accounting is a system of accounting which aims to  
197           distribute the cost or other basic value of tangible capital assets,  
198           less salvage (if any) over the estimated useful life of the unit (which  
199           may be a group of assets) in a systematic and rational manner. It  
200           is a process of allocation, not of valuation. Depreciation for the  
201           year is a portion of the total charge under such a system that is  
202           allocated to the year. Although the allocation may properly take  
203           into account occurrences during the year, it is not intended to be a  
204           measurement of the effect of all such occurrences.

205

206   **Q.    WHAT ARE THE TWO GENERAL FORMULAS USED IN DETERMINING**  
207   **DEPRECIATION RATES?**

208   A.    The whole life and the remaining life technique are the most commonly used  
209   formulas. The whole life technique is as follows:<sup>7</sup>

---

<sup>6</sup> Title 18 of the Code of Federal Regulations (“CFR”) Part 101, Definition 12.

210

211

$$\text{Depreciation Rate (\%)} = \left[ \frac{\frac{(\text{Original Cost} - \text{Net Salvage})}{\text{Average Service Life}}}{\text{Original Cost}} \right]$$

212

213 The remaining life technique is as follows:

214

215 Depreciation Rate (%)

216

$$= \left[ \frac{\frac{\text{Original Cost} - \text{Accumulated Provision For Depreciation} - \text{Net Salvage}}{\text{Remaining Life}}}{\text{Original Cost}} \right]$$

217 The two formulas should equal each other when the difference between the  
 218 theoretical reserve and the actual accumulated provision for depreciation is  
 219 recovered over the remaining life of the investment under the whole life  
 220 technique.

221

222 **Q. ARE THERE ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS IN DEPRECIATION BEYOND**  
 223 **THE DEFINITIONS?**

224 A. Yes. The definitions provide only a general outline of the overall utility  
 225 depreciation concept. In order to arrive at a depreciation-related revenue  
 226 requirement in a rate proceeding, a depreciation system must be established.

227

228 **Q. WHAT IS A DEPRECIATION SYSTEM?**

229 A. A depreciation system constitutes the method, procedure, and technique  
 230 employed in the development of depreciation rates.

231

---

<sup>7</sup> A theoretical depreciation reserve calculation is developed and compared to the actual accumulated provision for depreciation in conjunction with the whole life technique. If the differential is significant, an amortization of the differential over some period of time may be recommended.

232 **Q. BRIEFLY DESCRIBE WHAT IS MEANT BY “METHOD.”**

233 A. “Method” identifies whether a straight-line, liberalized, compound interest, or  
234 other type of calculation is being performed. The straight-line method is normally  
235 employed for utility depreciation proceedings.

236

237 **Q. BRIEFLY DESCRIBE WHAT IS MEANT BY “PROCEDURE.”**

238 A. “Procedure” identifies a calculation approach or grouping. For example,  
239 procedures can reflect the grouping of only a single item, items by vintage (year  
240 of addition), items by broad group or total grouping, or equal life groupings. The  
241 average life group (“ALG”) procedure is used by the vast majority of utilities.

242

243 **Q. BRIEFLY DESCRIBE WHAT IS MEANT BY “TECHNIQUE.”**

244 A. There are two main categories of techniques with various sub-groupings: the  
245 whole life technique and the remaining life technique. The whole life technique  
246 simply reflects calculation of a depreciation rate based on the whole life (e.g., a  
247 10-year life would imply a 10% depreciation rate over the life of the plant). The  
248 remaining life technique recognizes that depreciation is a forecast or estimation  
249 process that is never precisely accurate and that requires true-ups in order to  
250 recover exactly 100% of what a utility is entitled to over the entire life of the  
251 investment. Therefore, as time passes, the remaining life technique attempts to  
252 recover the remaining unrecovered balance over the remaining life or other  
253 period of time. Most utilities rely on a remaining life technique in utility rate  
254 matters.

255

256 **Q. DO THE METHODS, PROCEDURES, AND TECHNIQUES INTERACT WITH  
257 ONE OTHER?**

258 A. Yes. Different depreciation rates will result depending on what combination of  
259 method, procedure, and technique is employed. Differences will occur even when  
260 beginning with the same ASL and net salvage values.

261

262 **Q. WHAT IS NET SALVAGE?**

263 A. Net salvage is the value obtained from retired property (the gross salvage) less  
264 the cost of removal. Net salvage can be either positive, in cases where gross  
265 salvage exceeds cost of removal, or negative, in cases where cost of removal is  
266 greater than gross salvage.

267

268 **Q. HOW DOES NET SALVAGE IMPACT THE CALCULATION OF**  
269 **DEPRECIATION?**

270 A. The intent of the depreciation process is to allow the Company to recover 100%  
271 of investment less net salvage. Therefore, if net salvage is a positive 10%, then  
272 the utility should recover only 90% of its investment through annual depreciation  
273 charges, under the theory that it will recover the remaining 10% through net  
274 salvage at the time the asset retires ( $90\% + 10\% = 100\%$ ). Alternatively, if net  
275 salvage is a negative 10%, then the utility should be allowed to recover 110% of  
276 its investment through annual depreciation charges so that the negative 10% net  
277 salvage that is expected to occur at the end of the property's life will still leave  
278 the utility whole ( $110\% - 10\% = 100\%$ ).

279

280

281 **SECTION IV: DEPRECIATION RATE TIME PERIOD – INTERIM ADDITIONS**

282

283 **Q. WHAT DO YOU ADDRESS IN THIS PORTION OF YOUR TESTIMONY?**

284 A. I address the Company's inappropriate attempt to include interim additions in its  
285 calculation of depreciation rates. The Company is attempting to estimate  
286 additions and retirements two years beyond the actual plant analyzed in its  
287 depreciation study, which ended December 31, 2011. The Company's actions  
288 also result in estimated changes to remaining lives, which significantly attempts  
289 to accelerate capital recovery but without the benefit of any changes in mortality  
290 characteristics (life and net salvage parameters) during the same period.

291

292

293 **Q. WHAT ARE INTERIM ADDITIONS?**

294 A. Interim additions are theoretical or estimated future dollars of capital for either  
295 replacing existing facilities or adding new facilities. Such additions are referred to  
296 as interim since they do not reflect the dollars of investment in service as of the  
297 end of the depreciation test year.

298

299 **Q. ARE INTERIM ADDITIONS APPROPRIATE FOR DEPRECIATION**  
300 **PURPOSES?**

301 A. No. Interim additions are inappropriate since they reflect the estimation of  
302 potential additions to plant-in-service that currently do not exist and are not used  
303 and useful in providing service. Interim additions may never actually occur or  
304 may occur at a much different date or amount than initially assumed.

305

306 **Q. CAN YOU IDENTIFY AN AUTHORITATIVE SOURCE SUPPORTING YOUR**  
307 **POSITION THAT ESTIMATED INTERIM ADDITIONS SHOULD NOT BE**  
308 **REFLECTED IN THE CALCULATION OF DEPRECIATION RATES?**

309 A. Yes. The National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners' ("NARUC")  
310 1968 publication entitled Public Utility Depreciation Practices describes, on  
311 pages 133 and 134, how interim additions are treated. It states the following.

312

*Appropriate computations must be made for such interim retirements, but interim additions are not considered in the depreciation computation until they are actually made.*

316

*It is possible to estimate the probable future retirements and additions to a particular piece of property and thus arrive at a single depreciation rate applicable over the entire life of the property. This is unsatisfactory practice inasmuch as considerable speculations would be required to make such an estimate on future additions... In any event, this is not necessary inasmuch as the depreciation accrual can be adjusted in future years as additions are made. (Emphasis added).*

324

325

326 The 1996 edition of the NARUC depreciation publication reaffirms this concept.<sup>8</sup>  
327

328 **Q. HAS THE FERC RENDERED A DECISION ON THE ISSUE OF INTERIM**  
329 **ADDITIONS?**

330 A. Yes. In 1983, the FERC reviewed and ruled on this issue in its Opinion No. 165,  
331 a Commonwealth Edison Company (“Commonwealth”) case.<sup>9</sup> In that case,  
332 Commonwealth had proposed taking into account budgeted future interim  
333 additions and stated that without the inclusion of the budget interim additions,  
334 there would be a violation of the matching principle (i.e., revenues collected  
335 corresponding to the expense incurred). In Opinion No. 165, the FERC clearly  
336 opposed the recognition of interim additions:

337  
338 *... we reject its [Edison’s] claim that this will leave some costs*  
339 *unrecovered after the plant is retired. Such a result might occur if*  
340 *Commonwealth would fail to adjust its depreciation rates from time*  
341 *to time, taking into account up-to-date information on changes in*  
342 *plant balances, estimated remaining life, salvage and removal cost*  
343 *experience, and accumulated provision for depreciation to date.*  
344 *However, Commonwealth not only is free to make such*  
345 *adjustments to its depreciation rates, but is obligated to do so to*  
346 *assure that as near as possible the service value of electric plant is*  
347 *fully recovered during its useful life. For all these reasons, we find*  
348 *no basis to approve Commonwealth’s depreciation methodology.*<sup>10</sup>  
349

350 **Q. DO THE COMPANY’S EXISTING DEPRECIATION RATES REFLECT INTERIM**  
351 **ADDITIONS?**

352 A. Yes, but such rates only include two months of estimations and only occurred as  
353 part of an overall settlement in Docket No. 07-035-13. As previously noted, no  
354 party to the settlement acknowledged any principle or practice contained therein.  
355 In other words, there is no precedence for the inclusion of interim additions in the  
356 calculation of depreciation rates.

---

<sup>8</sup> Page 142 states “... interim additions are not considered in the depreciation base or rate until they occur.”

<sup>9</sup> 23 FERC at paragraph 61,219 (1983).

<sup>10</sup> 23 FERC at paragraph 61,489.

357

358 **Q. HAS THE COMPANY INCLUDED INTERIM ADDITIONS IN ITS**  
359 **DEPRECIATION STUDIES DURING THE PAST 20 YEARS?**

360 A. No, not prior to its proposal to include them in Docket No. 07-035-13.<sup>11</sup>

361

362 **Q. IS IT COMMON PRACTICE FOR UTILITIES TO PROPOSE INTERIM**  
363 **ADDITIONS IN THE MANNER THE COMPANY HAS PROPOSED IN THIS**  
364 **PROCEEDING?**

365 A. No. I have been involved in hundreds of depreciation proceedings throughout the  
366 United States and Canada. While it is hard to recall any instances of an  
367 equivalent request by other United States utilities, this practice has occurred in at  
368 least one Canadian jurisdiction, that being Alberta. It should be noted that  
369 Gannett Fleming is the depreciation consultant that proposes such practices in  
370 Canada.

371

372 **Q. DOES GANNETT FLEMING PROPOSE SUCH A PRACTICE IN THE UNITED**  
373 **STATES?**

374 A. I am currently involved in the depreciation analysis for Pacific Gas & Electric  
375 ("PG&E") Company in California. That depreciation study was also prepared by  
376 Gannett Fleming, but in that specific case PG&E did not attempt to violate the  
377 prohibition against interim additions. For whatever reason, the Company has  
378 apparently directed Gannett Fleming to include interim additions here in Utah.

379

380 **Q. WHY ARE INTERIM ADDITIONS IMPORTANT IN THIS CASE?**

381 A. The Company's request represents a significant change in policy in an attempt to  
382 obtain a much greater increase in depreciation expense than otherwise would be  
383 the case. In particular, the Company's attempt to estimate interim additions and  
384 reduce the remaining life by two additional years through 2013 has a dramatic  
385 impact on depreciation for the Carbon plant. The Company's analysis identifies a  
386 \$34 million total Company annual depreciation requirement for the Carbon plant

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<sup>11</sup> Response to CCS 8.2 (g) in Docket No. 07-035-13.



387 based on data as of the end of 2011, but increases that amount to \$82 million  
388 annually under its proposed interim addition approach.

389

390 **Q. IS THERE A NEED TO SPECULATE ON THE COMPANY'S FUTURE INTERIM**  
391 **ADDITIONS AT THIS TIME?**

392 A. No. The Company will have the opportunity to recover actual additions to plant  
393 from customers once they occur.

394

395 **Q. DOES YOUR RECOMMENDATION TO DENY THE COMPANY'S ATTEMPT**  
396 **TO INCLUDE INTERIM ADDITIONS IN THE CALCULATION OF**  
397 **DEPRECIATION RATES DEPRIVE THE COMPANY IN ANY MANNER OF THE**  
398 **RECOVERY OF ITS CAPITAL?**

399 A. No. As is the case elsewhere across the United States, depreciation rates are set  
400 based on the results of a depreciation study. Those rates are then applied in the  
401 future in the test year used in a rate case. In other words, if the Company files a  
402 general rate case in 2014, it can include all plant actually placed into service or  
403 allowed by the Commission into plant in service. The rates established in this  
404 proceeding would then be applied to the plant balances used in the rate case.  
405 The difference between the two approaches is that the Company attempts to  
406 estimate future additions in an historical depreciation analysis, and then apply the  
407 higher depreciation rates in a rate proceeding which also includes new plant  
408 additions, but potentially different additions. This approach fails to address  
409 changes in mortality characteristics that may occur by the end of 2013, as the  
410 Company's analysis of mortality characteristics is based on data only through  
411 2011. Alternatively the standard approach is to rely on depreciation rates based  
412 on analysis of historical data and facts known at the time of the depreciation  
413 study and apply those rates to whatever plant in service values are adopted by  
414 the Commission during a future rate proceeding. The Company's approach  
415 inappropriately attempts to add an additional layer of uncertainty and  
416 assumptions to an already complex area.

417

418 **Q. WHAT IS THE IMPACT OF REMOVING INTERIM ADDITIONS FROM THE**  
419 **COMPANY'S REQUEST AND BASING DEPRECIATION RATE ON PLANT AS**  
420 **OF DECEMBER 31, 2011?**

421 A. The standalone impact of relying on the Company's depreciation rates based on  
422 plant as of December 31, 2011 rather than 2013 is a reduction to Utah  
423 jurisdictional depreciation expense of \$22.4 million.

424

425

426 **SECTION V: PRODUCTION PLANT LIFE SPANS**

427

428 **Q. WHAT ISSUE DO YOU ADDRESS IN THIS PORTION OF YOUR TESTIMONY?**

429 A. I will address the Company's proposal for a 40-year life span associated with its  
430 CCCT. CCCTs are generation resources that fall in the category of "Other  
431 Production" power plants in the current depreciation study.

432

433 **Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN WHAT A LIFE SPAN REPRESENTS.**

434 A. A life span represents a time between when a utility places a generating facility  
435 into service through the date it is ultimately retired by that utility. In other words, if  
436 a utility places a power plant in service in 1970 and it had a 50-year life span, it  
437 would be expected to be retired in 2020, or 50 years later.

438

439 **Q. WHAT LIFE SPANS DOES THE COMPANY PROPOSE FOR ITS VARIOUS**  
440 **GENERATING FACILITIES?**

441 A. The Company proposes various life spans for different types of generation. For  
442 the most part, the Company proposes life spans between 55 years and 68 years  
443 for its coal-fired steam generating units, life spans ranging from 41 years to 143  
444 years for its various hydroelectric generating facilities, life spans of 40 years for  
445 CCCT Other Production generation, 30-year life spans for Other Production –  
446 combustion turbines, and 30-year life spans for Other Production – wind  
447 generation.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> 2011 Depreciation Study at pages II-30 and 31.

448 **Q. DO YOU AGREE WITH THE COMPANY'S PROPOSED LIFE SPANS?**

449 A. No. While I believe there are several instances where the Company has  
450 understated realistic life spans for generating facilities, I am only addressing the  
451 CCCT life spans in this testimony. . In my testimony, I recommend increasing the  
452 Company's proposed 40-year life span for CCCT units to 45 years.

453

454 **Q. WHAT IS THE COMPANY'S BASIS FOR ITS PROPOSED 40-YEAR LIFE**  
455 **SPAN FOR ITS CCCT UNITS?**

456 A. The Company simply states that a "life span of 40 years was estimated for the  
457 majority of the combustion turbines and combined cycle units."<sup>13</sup> (Emphasis  
458 added). The depreciation study also notes that life span estimates "are the result  
459 of considering experienced life spans of similar generating units, the age of  
460 surviving units, general operating characteristics of the units, major refurbishing,  
461 currently approved life spans for each facility, and discussions with management  
462 personnel concerning the long-term outlook for the units."<sup>14</sup> However, the  
463 Company could not identify any specific aspect of any of its considerations with  
464 the exception of the fact that the existing life span for CCCT generating units is  
465 40 years. It must be noted that the existing life span for CCCT units has never  
466 been adjudicated and is a result of a prior settlement.

467

468 **Q. WHAT IS THE BASIS FOR YOUR RECOMMENDATION?**

469 A. CCCT generation has the most efficient heat rates of any of the Company's fossil  
470 fuel-based generating units. CCCT generation also represents the most flexible  
471 resources on the Company's system and can be operated in an intermediate or a  
472 base load capacity depending on changing load requirements. Moreover, from a  
473 carbon emissions standpoint, CCCT generation produce fewer environmental  
474 problems than do coal-fired generating facilities. CCCT generating units are  
475 currently one of the preferred choices for new generation. Therefore, from an

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<sup>13</sup> 2011 Depreciation Study at page II-29.

<sup>14</sup> *Id.*

476 economic standpoint, life maximization of capital intensive investments should be  
477 the guiding factor for the establishment of useful life.

478  
479 While the Company has not provided any basis for limiting the life span for CCCT  
480 generating facilities to only 40 years, there are factors that would indicate longer  
481 life expectation is warranted. First, it must be recognized that CCCT generating  
482 facilities generally combine gas turbine technology with a steam source. Many of  
483 the Company's existing steam generators have lasted well beyond 40 years,  
484 even though initially estimated to have design lives or life spans shorter than 40  
485 years. In addition, many combustion turbine generators have been in operation  
486 for more than 40 years for other utility systems. Thus, when each separate  
487 component of the CCCT generating plant is considered from the standpoint of  
488 historical operation, there is nothing that limits the life expectation to a period of  
489 only 40 years. Indeed, the real life span will be determined by economic  
490 considerations in the future, as has been the case associated with the  
491 Company's coal-fired and other generating facilities.

492  
493 While not identical technology, there are numerous instances of combined cycle  
494 generating facilities that have already been in service for more than 40 years.  
495 Indeed, the United States Energy Information Administration identifies over 70  
496 combined cycle generating facilities that have been in operation for over 40  
497 years.<sup>15</sup> While most of the combined cycle generating facilities identified are not  
498 the same as the Company's more modern CCCT units, there are many combined  
499 cycle generating facilities based on combustion turbine technology in the list of  
500 facilities that are more than 40 years old. Again, when a capital intensive  
501 resource is efficient, owners tend to find ways in order to maximize life  
502 expectancy even beyond initial design life expectations.

503

504

---

<sup>15</sup> 2011 form EIA-860 Data-Schedule 3, Schedule "Generator Data".

505 **Q. HAS THE COMPANY AND THE INDUSTRY SHOWN A PROPENSITY FOR**  
506 **UNDERSTATING THE INITIAL LIFE SPANS FOR NEW GENERATING UNITS?**

507 A. Yes, Historically, both the Company and the industry have underestimated the  
508 life expectation for each new type of generating facilities placed into service. For  
509 example, high temperature and pressure coal-fired generating facilities were  
510 assumed to operate for 30 to 35 years when first placed into service. As time  
511 passed, it became obvious that the initial life span estimates were extremely  
512 conservative, even though they were often predicated on design life  
513 expectations. As empirical data clearly proved the initial life expectancies  
514 artificially short, the industry generally moved in 5- to 10-year increments as time  
515 passed. As is the case for the Company, it now proposes life spans for coal-fired  
516 units generally in the 60-year range, or approximately double the initial life  
517 expectations for coal-fired generating facilities. This same situation occurred for  
518 nuclear generation. While initial life estimates were between 25 and 35 years, the  
519 Nuclear Regulatory Commission began issuing licenses for a 40-year period. In  
520 the 1990s, as utilities realized they would be able to operate nuclear generating  
521 facilities for a period greater than 40 years, they petitioned and received license  
522 extensions from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to operate for 60 years.  
523 Now, utilities are beginning to seek consideration of extending the 60-year  
524 licenses to possibly 80 years. The situation is no different for hydroelectric  
525 facilities. Indeed, the Company has already sought new licenses for many of its  
526 hydroelectric facilities and undoubtedly will continue to do so in the future. In  
527 other words, it has been a continuous practice by the Company as well as the  
528 industry to artificially underestimate life spans for new generating facilities. Such  
529 practice is unreasonable, as it pertains to CCCT generating facilities, given there  
530 is empirical evidence that such technology has and can last for periods greater  
531 than 40 years.

532

533 **Q. IS THERE ANOTHER BASIS FOR YOUR RECOMMENDATION?**

534 A. Yes. Another consideration for longer life spans for CCCT generating facilities is  
535 the fact that the Company has not extended its life expectation for coal-fired

536 generating facilities in this case even though it has expended hundreds of  
537 millions of dollars over the last several years at such generating facilities. To the  
538 extent no additional life expectation is being assumed for coal-fired generating  
539 facilities, then another source of power must be in place to meet the demands  
540 that coal-fired generating facilities may no longer meet in the future. Based on  
541 the low heat rates for these CCCT generating facilities, it is reasonable to expect  
542 that the Company will continue to maintain and operate such facilities as it retires  
543 its fleet of coal-fired generating facilities.

544  
545 In summary, while the Company provides no basis for its limitation of life  
546 expectancy to 40 years, there are several factors that warrant a longer life span  
547 for CCCT units. Indeed, both economic theory and actual physical operation by  
548 other owners of CCCT generation support a longer life span. In addition, given  
549 the Company's propensity to understate the initial life expectancy for its new  
550 generating facilities, it is reasonable and appropriate to take an initial step to  
551 extend the life expectation for CCCT by five years in this proceeding.

552

553 **Q. WHAT IS THE IMPACT OF YOUR RECOMMENDATION?**

554 A. My recommendation results in a \$5.8 million and \$6.3 million reduction in annual  
555 depreciation expense based on plant as of December 31, 2011 and 2013,  
556 respectively, on a total Company basis. The Utah jurisdictional reductions are  
557 \$2.4 million and \$2.7 million, respectively.

558

559

560 **SECTION VI: INTERIM RETIREMENTS**

561

562 **Q. WHAT ISSUE DO YOU ADDRESS IN THIS PORTION OF YOUR TESTIMONY?**

563 A. The issue in this portion of my testimony addresses the Company's new  
564 approach for estimation of interim retirements and the ultimate interim retirement  
565 life-curve combinations proposed for production plant accounts.

566

567 **Q. WHAT ARE INTERIM RETIREMENTS?**

568 A. Interim retirements have been characterized as a fine tuning adjustment to the  
569 life span analysis. The life span method is used in estimating the retirement date  
570 for any large unit of property such as an entire generating unit. The theory  
571 behind interim retirement rates is that even though a large unit of property such  
572 as a generating unit might retire in 60 years, in the interim period many  
573 components have to be replaced in order to maintain the overall generating  
574 facility in operating condition. An analogy to this would be a car which might be  
575 anticipated to have a service life of 10 years. During the 10-year life of the car,  
576 the owner might have to replace the battery, tires, alternator and other  
577 components in order to maintain the automobile in a safe and operable condition.  
578 Therefore, even though the automobile may have an overall 10-year life span, its  
579 dollar weighted adjusted life span may be 9.8 years due to the averaging of the  
580 automobile's overall life span with the average of the individual replaced  
581 components. In other words, the interim retirement rate would be a fine tuning  
582 factor used to reduce the service life from 10 years to 9.8 years.

583

584 **Q. HOW DOES THE COMPANY INCORPORATE THE IMPACT OF INTERIM**  
585 **RETIREMENTS IN ITS DEPRECIATION ANALYSIS?**

586 A. The Company proposes to implement a new calculation procedure for interim  
587 retirements based on an "estimated" interim retirement survivor curve.<sup>16</sup> In other  
588 words, the Company performed an actuarial analysis for each production plant  
589 account, performed a visual curve-fitting process with standard Iowa survivor  
590 curves, and then selected its interpretation of a possible Iowa Survivor curve fit.

591

592 **Q. IS THE COMPANY'S PROPOSED APPROACH IN THIS CASE CONSISTENT**  
593 **WITH ITS PRIOR APPROACH?**

594 A. No. The Company's proposed approach in this case is noticeably different from  
595 its prior approach.

596

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<sup>16</sup> 2011 Depreciation Study at page I-3.

597 **Q. DOES THE COMPANY'S NEW APPROACH RESULT IN HIGHER**  
598 **DEPRECIATION RATES?**

599 A. Yes. The Company's new approach of selecting an Iowa Survivor curve and an  
600 assumed ASL, and then truncating the assumed pattern corresponding to the  
601 estimated retirement date for each generating facility results in a higher rate of  
602 assumed interim retirements, which results in higher depreciation rates.

603

604 **Q. DO YOU AGREE WITH THE COMPANY'S POSITION?**

605 A. While I agree with the Company that interim retirements should be included in  
606 the calculation of production plant depreciation rates, I do not agree with the  
607 Company's proposed process or results. I find the Company's new proposal  
608 inappropriate and cumbersome for application in this proceeding.

609

610 **Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE PROBLEMS WITH THE COMPANY'S PROPOSED**  
611 **METHOD.**

612 A. The Company's approach relies on an actuarial analysis of the historical data to  
613 estimate an interim retirement life-curve combination. Actuarial analyses are  
614 normally performed on more homogeneous types of investments that are not  
615 generally dependent on one another, such as poles or wires. In particular, the  
616 varying types of investments within each of the major production plant accounts  
617 do not appropriately lend themselves to actuarial analyses. In other words, the  
618 retirement forces experienced by electric motors or pumps booked in Account  
619 312 are noticeably different than the retirement forces on smoke stacks, also  
620 booked in Account 312. However, the Company's actuarial approach treats all  
621 items in the same account as one homogeneous type of asset for life estimation  
622 purposes. Therefore, when the dispersion and life expectation between  
623 appreciably different assets within an account exists, the credibility of actuarial  
624 results declines noticeably. While there are also differences in the type of assets  
625 within mass property accounts, the differences are not as appreciable as they are  
626 for production plant accounts.

627



628 By analogy, actuarial analyses are utilized by the insurance industry to set risks  
629 in order to establish premium payments. In order to establish reasonable risk  
630 estimates, the more homogeneous the population studied, the less risk exists of  
631 inaccurately measuring life expectancy. Simply put, life insurance companies  
632 would not perform actuarial analyses on people in Swaziland which has a life  
633 expectancy of only 32.23 years with people in Andorra who have an average life  
634 expectancy of 83.52 years, and reasonably expect to rely on such results for  
635 establishing risk for determining premiums.<sup>17</sup> Yet the Company's use of actuarial  
636 analyses for production plant does not even rise to the equivalent level of the risk  
637 in establishing insurance for people of different countries. The Company's  
638 approach is more akin to combining life expectation data for people and horses  
639 and expecting to establish a credible and usable result. While a result can be  
640 obtained, the value of such result is more than questionable.

641  
642 Another problem is that, the results of the Company's actuarial analysis in  
643 general do not provide reasonable matches between the Observed Life Table  
644 ("OLT") (actual historical data pattern) and the assumed Iowa Survivor curve the  
645 Company proposes as its best match of the OLT. For example, the Company's  
646 assumed "60L1" life-curve combination for Account 312 is *not* a particularly good  
647 fit of the data.<sup>18</sup> As can be seen in the depreciation study, the Company's  
648 proposal, developed through its actuarial approach, clearly begins to deviate  
649 from the OLT after 37 years of age and continues that deviation through the  
650 remainder of the data. However, use of a 60L1 life-curve combination results in a  
651 27.2-year adjusted remaining life for the Colstrip coal plant even through the  
652 projected remaining life in 35 years (2046-2011).<sup>19</sup> The Company's new actuarial  
653 approach results in a 22%  $((35-27.2) / 35)$  "fine-tuning" adjustment to the overall  
654 life span. This new interim retirement impact is approximately double the 11%  
655 impact proposed by the Company in its last study.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> 2008 life expectancies by country from [www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0934746.html](http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0934746.html).

<sup>18</sup> *Id.* at page III-27.

<sup>19</sup> *Id.* at page III-4.

<sup>20</sup> 2006 Depreciation Study interim retirement workpaper for Colstrip Account 312.

656 **Q. IS THERE ANOTHER ASPECT TO THE COMPANY'S INTERIM RETIREMENT**  
657 **PROPOSAL THAT RAISES CONCERN WITH THE RESULTS PROPOSED BY**  
658 **THE COMPANY?**

659 A. Yes. In this case the Company proposes two types of net salvage for production  
660 plant: interim retirement net salvage; and terminal net salvage. The interim  
661 retirement net salvage is associated only with the retirements that are  
662 "estimated" by employing the Company's proposed interim retirement life-curve  
663 combination approach. Given that the Company's new interim retirement  
664 approach results in higher interim retirements and the fact that the Company  
665 proposes more negative interim net salvage than terminal net salvage, the  
666 Company's new approach further unreasonably escalates depreciation rates.  
667 The significance of this is that the Company's proposed interim retirement  
668 approach, which relies on truncated Iowa Survivor Curves, projected that \$1.4  
669 billion of steam production plant would retire between January 1, 2012 and the  
670 projected retirement dates for its various steam-fired generating units. By  
671 changing to a new approach of calculating interim retirements that yields a  
672 greater level of interim retirements and predicting higher interim net salvage rates  
673 than terminal net salvage rates results in higher depreciation rates.

674  
675 **Q. CAN YOU PLACE THE \$1.4 BILLION OF PROJECTED STEAM PRODUCTION**  
676 **PLANT INTERIM RETIREMENT ACTIVITY INTO PROPER PERSPECTIVE?**

677 A. Yes. The Company has provided the annual historical steam plant retirement  
678 activity for the period 1910 through 2011. This time frame represents  
679 approximately a 100-year period or approximately five times the time frame the  
680 Company projects for the remaining life of the existing steam production plant.<sup>21</sup>  
681 During the historical 100-year period the Company reports normal retirements of  
682 approximately half the level it assumes will occur during the approximate 19-year  
683 average remaining life for steam units.<sup>22</sup> In other words, on an annual basis the  
684 Company's projected interim retirement values are approximately 11 times the

---

<sup>21</sup> 101-year historical period divided by an approximate 19-year proposed average weighted remaining life for steam production plant.

<sup>22</sup> 2011 Depreciation Study at pages III-23 through III-44.

685 historical annual retirement levels experienced by the Company.<sup>23</sup> There is no  
686 evidence that demonstrates that such a proposed expansion of interim  
687 retirements is reasonable or realistic.

688

689 **Q. DOES INDUSTRY DATA CONFIRM THE REASONABLENESS OF THE**  
690 **COMPANY'S PROPOSAL?**

691 A. No. A review of the electric industry data provided by the Company's  
692 depreciation consultant often identifies significantly longer lives than the  
693 proposals in this case. For example, Gannett Fleming's industry interim  
694 retirement values range from a low of 40 years to a high of 90 years for Account  
695 312 – Boiler Plant Equipment.<sup>24</sup> This range represents an unrealistic result for  
696 the same type of investment. Indeed, due to interpretations of actuarial results  
697 based on non-homogenous investment, Gannett Fleming has estimated a high  
698 end value 2.25 times the low end value. In this case, Gannett Fleming's proposal  
699 is 30 years lower than the upper end of its own range.

700

701 The degree of variance between the upper and lower end of the range for this  
702 account, proposed for other utilities, is undoubtedly a function of both the method  
703 employed by Gannett Fleming as well as the individual transactions that have  
704 occurred for each utility. Those utilities that have incurred unusual or one-time  
705 events may have resulted in the lower end of the reported range of values. By  
706 relying on unusual events that may not reoccur in the remaining life expectations  
707 for any given utility significantly overstates that impact of estimated interim  
708 retirements, especially using the Company's proposed new approach.

709

710 **Q. ARE YOU PROPOSING ANY ADJUSTMENTS TO THE LEVEL OF INTERIM**  
711 **RETIREMENTS REQUESTED BY THE COMPANY?**

712 A. Yes. Given the excessive level of interim retirements that are produced by the  
713 Company's new approach, and the level of variance between what the Company

---

<sup>23</sup> \$1.4 billion/19 years versus \$700 million/101 years.

<sup>24</sup> Response to OCS 1.3 Attachment.

714 proposes compared to what the Company's consultants have proposed in other  
715 proceeding for the same accounts, I recommend an alternative approach.

716

717 **Q. WHAT DO YOU RECOMMEND?**

718 A. I propose an interim retirement approach that is not based on truncated Iowa  
719 Survivor Curves. In other words, I have replaced the actuarial component of the  
720 Company's new analysis, given that the plant analyzed is neither reasonably  
721 homogeneous nor independent from the life of the overall generating unit. The  
722 method I rely upon is one recognized by the NARUC in its publication entitled  
723 "Public Utility Depreciation Practices." Indeed, my recommended approach is a  
724 method that the Company supported in previous cases. Thus, the method I  
725 recommend has been employed historically and is still currently used by utilities  
726 and regulators.

727

728 Next, I developed interim retirement ratios for each of the plant accounts based  
729 on actual Company specific information. In other words, the interim retirement  
730 ratios utilized in my approach were developed from the historical reported levels  
731 of retirement activity by account for each of the steam, hydro and other  
732 production accounts. Due to the significant differences between wind and gas-  
733 fired other production plant, separate values are recommended. As can be seen  
734 in the table below, my recommended interim retirement ratios are similar, if not  
735 identical in many cases, to what the Company proposed in its last depreciation  
736 study. The only significant difference is that associated with wind generation. In  
737 the last study, the Company applied the overall Other Production ratios that were  
738 developed primarily for gas-fired resources to its limited wind generation at one  
739 plant. There currently is more data available for wind generation, which permits  
740 development of different ratios between gas and wind facilities. The resulting  
741 interim retirement ratios I recommend and the ratios proposed by the Company  
742 in its prior depreciation study are set forth below.

743

744

FUNCTION	ACCOUNT	RMP PRIOR RATIO	OCS RATIO
<b>STEAM PRODUCTION</b>			
	311	.0020	.0020
	312	.0050	.0045
	314	.0080	.0060
	315	.0015	.0015
	316	.0150	.0160
<b>HYDRO</b>			
	331	.0015	.0020
	332	.0012	.0015
	333	.0020	.0045
	334	.0050	.0050
	335	.0050	.0070
	336	.0015	.0020
<b>OTHER PRODUCTION – GAS</b>			
	341	.0001	.0000
	342	.0020	.0020
	343	.0020	.0060
	344	.0100	.0015
	345	.0100	.0000
	346	.0100	.0000
<b>OTHER PRODUCTION – WIND</b>			
	341	N/A	.0015
	342	N/A	.0000
	343	.0020	.0000
	344	.0100	.0000
	345	.0100	.0005
	346	N/A	.0000

745

746

747 **Q. WHAT IS THE IMPACT OF YOUR RECOMMENDATION?**

748 A. The adoption of my recommended interim retirement ratios on a standalone  
749 basis result in a \$27.9 million and \$38.2 million reduction to depreciation expense  
750 on a total Company basis for plant as of December 31, 2011 and 2013,  
751 respectively. The corresponding Utah jurisdictional values are \$11.7 million and  
752 \$16.1 million, respectively.

753

754

755       **SECTION VII: NET SALVAGE**

756

757       **A. Production Plant**

758

759       **Q. WHAT DO YOU ADDRESS IN THIS PORTION OF YOUR TESTIMONY?**

760       A. This portion of my testimony addresses the Company's request for negative net  
761 salvage associated with the assumed retirement cost of its various steam and  
762 other production generating facilities.

763

764       **Q. WHAT DOES THE COMPANY PROPOSE FOR ITS VARIOUS STEAM AND  
765 OTHER PRODUCTION GENERATING FACILITIES?**

766       A. The Company proposes a bifurcated calculation for production plant net salvage.  
767 The first component of the Company's request reflects terminal net salvage.  
768 Terminal net salvage is the Company's assumed method of retirement for its  
769 steam and other production generating facilities, and is based on full demolition  
770 and site restoration. In addition to terminal net salvage, the Company also  
771 requests interim net salvage for its generating units. Interim net salvage  
772 corresponds to individual assets that are projected to retire before the termination  
773 of a power plant that must be replaced in order to keep the generating facility  
774 operational.

775

776       **Q. DOES THE COMPANY PROPOSE DIFFERENT NET SALVAGE AMOUNTS  
777 FOR DIFFERENT GENERATING FACILITIES?**

778       A. Yes. For terminal net salvage purposes, the Company proposes a \$40 per kW  
779 amount for steam production plant with the exception of the Carbon and James  
780 River plants.<sup>25</sup> For the Carbon plant, the Company proposes a \$330.23 per kW  
781 terminal net salvage value.<sup>26</sup> For its limited investment in the James River plant,  
782 the Company proposes a \$13 per kW terminal net salvage value. In addition, the  
783 Company proposes a \$20 per kW terminal net salvage value for its gas-fired

---

<sup>25</sup> 2011 Depreciation Study at page III-582 through 583.

<sup>26</sup> *Id.*

784 other production generating facilities and a \$9 per kW cost of removal for its wind  
 785 generating facilities.<sup>27</sup> The Company does not propose any cost of removal  
 786 associated with its very limited investment in solar generating facilities.<sup>28</sup>

787  
 788 **Q. BASED ON THE COMPANY'S DECEMBER 31, 2011 DEPRECIATION TEST**  
 789 **YEAR, WHAT DOLLAR AMOUNT OF TERMINAL NET SALVAGE DOES THE**  
 790 **COMPANY REQUEST?**

791 A. As set forth below, the Company's \$40, \$20, and \$9 per kW terminal net salvage  
 792 proposal for its coal-fired production (other than for the Carbon plant), other  
 793 production-gas and wind other production generating units, respectively, result in  
 794 a total terminal net salvage request of \$354,274,000.<sup>29</sup>

795

Generation Type	\$ per kW	Total
Coal	\$40	\$249,702,000
Carbon Plant	\$330.23	\$56,800,000
Other Production – Gas	\$20	\$37,260,000
Other Production – Wind	\$9	\$10,512,000

796

797 **B. Steam Production Plant**

798

799 **Q. WHAT IS THE COMPANY'S BASIS FOR ITS PROPOSED DEMOLITION**  
 800 **COSTS FOR ITS COAL-FIRED GENERATING FACILITIES OTHER THAN FOR**  
 801 **THE CARBON PLANT?**

802 A. The Company states that it

803

804 proposes to continue to use current decommissioning costs of \$40  
 805 per kW, with the exception of the Carbon plant. This rate is based  
 806 on the cost of decommissioning the Company's Hale Plant in the  
 807 1993 to 1995 time period. Based on recent studies, the current  
 808 estimate of the complete decommissioning cost for the Carbon  
 809 plant is \$56.8 million, or \$330 per kW. This includes demolition, ash

<sup>27</sup> 2011 Depreciation Study at page III-586.

<sup>28</sup> 2011 Depreciation Study at page III-587.

<sup>29</sup> *Id.* at pages III-4 through 15.

810 pile, and ash pond abatement, asbestos, and other hazardous  
811 material abatement and final site cleanup and mitigation.<sup>30</sup>  
812

813 **Q. DID THE COMPANY PROVIDE THE UNDERLYING ANALYSIS ASSOCIATED**  
814 **WITH THE RETIREMENT OF THE HALE PLANT APPROXIMATELY TWO**  
815 **DECADES AGO?**

816 A. No.<sup>31</sup>

817

818 **Q. DID THE COMPANY PROVIDE ANY INFORMATION ASSOCIATED WITH THE**  
819 **RETIREMENT OF THE HALE GENERATING PLANT?**

820 A. Yes. While the Company claimed a \$20 per kW net demolition cost for the Hale  
821 plant, it also notes that it received \$3.2 million as part of the retirement process.<sup>32</sup>  
822 The Company actually received a positive, not negative, net salvage for the  
823 retirement of the Hale plant.<sup>33</sup> In fact, the Company identified a positive 18% net  
824 proceeds which corresponded to a \$33 per kW positive net salvage.<sup>34</sup>

825

826 **Q. DOES THE COMPANY CLAIM THAT IT DEMOLISHED THE HALE PLANT?**

827 A. Yes.<sup>35</sup>

828

829

830

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<sup>30</sup> Direct Testimony of K. Ian Andrews at pages 12 and 13.

<sup>31</sup> Response to DPU 2.38(a).

<sup>32</sup> Response to DPU 7-6 Attachment 2 (\$1,197,280 cost of removal divided by 59 MW).

<sup>33</sup> Response to DPU 2.38(b) Attachment. While the Company incurred cost of removal to improve the site, land, it booked the sale of land to an account not associated with the depreciation reserve. If cost of removal for depreciable plant is incurred to increase the sale value of the land, then sale proceeds should be considered as an offset to demolition costs.

<sup>34</sup> \$3,170,769 of proceeds less \$1,197,280 of removal cost divided by 59,000 kW. The positive net salvage of \$1,973,489 divided by \$11,155,753 of original cost equals 18%.

<sup>35</sup> *Id.*



835 **Q. NOTWITHSTANDING THE REPORTED POSITIVE LEVEL OF NET**  
836 **PROCEEDS FOR THE HALE PLANT, WOULD THERE BE SIGNIFICANT**  
837 **CONCERNS ASSOCIATED WITH A CLAIMED NEGATIVE \$40 PER KW COST**  
838 **OF REMOVAL IF THE \$20 PER KW VALUE WAS AN ACCURATE**  
839 **REPRESENTATION OF WHAT TRANSPIRED?**

840 A. Yes. Even assuming the \$20 per kW cost for full dismantlement and site  
841 restoration was accurate, much has changed in the electric industry since the  
842 early to mid-1990s in terms of plant retirement approaches and costs.  
843

844 **Q. HOW DOES THE HALE PLANT COMPARE TO THE COMPANY'S**  
845 **REMAINING COAL-FIRED GENERATING FACILITIES?**

846 A. For the most part, there is very limited comparison between the Hale plant and  
847 the balance of the Company's generating facilities. The Hale plant consisted of  
848 two generating units, one 15 MW and another 44 MW, for a total of 59 MW.<sup>36</sup>  
849 These units were built in 1936 and 1950, respectively.<sup>37</sup> The Company's current  
850 fleet of coal-fired generating facilities are much larger and thus would benefit  
851 from economies of scale if a full demolition approach were reflected. In other  
852 words, all permitting, mobilization, infrastructure, and other similar type of costs  
853 would be spread over a much larger number of MW, thereby reducing the per  
854 unit value based on a dollar per kW basis.  
855

856 For example, if the mobilization and other fixed costs for demolition of a coal-fired  
857 plant were assumed to be \$200,000, that would result in a \$3.39 per kW  
858 demolition cost for that component of the total demolition process for a station  
859 the size of the Hale plant (\$200,000 / 59,000). Alternatively, the same \$200,000  
860 cost for the 1,411 MW Jim Bridger generating station would translate into a \$0.14  
861 per kW demolition cost component of overall demolition activities. Thus, the Hale  
862 plant does not represent an appropriate proxy for estimating demolition costs for  
863 larger coal-fired units when relying on a dollar per kW approach.

---

<sup>36</sup> Response to DPU 2.38(b) Attachment.

<sup>37</sup> *Id.*

864 **Q. WHAT OTHER CONCERNS ARE THERE ASSOCIATED WITH RELIANCE ON**  
865 **OLDER DEMOLITION PROJECTS?**

866 A. As is the case for many other activities, the process of demolition of power plants  
867 now takes advantage of different approaches and newer equipment. Changes in  
868 approaches and technology improve productivity and lower cost. For example, to  
869 the extent the Hale plant was demolished in a reverse engineering or stick-by-  
870 stick removal approach, it would greatly overstate the estimated cost of current  
871 demolition to the extent explosive techniques coupled with controlled toppling  
872 were employed. Therefore, the efficiency and cost savings associated with newer  
873 and better demolition techniques can greatly reduce the cost of future demolition  
874 projects.

875

876 In addition, newer equipment with greater capabilities now also exist. For  
877 example, there are booms that can rise over 300 feet in height and utilize power  
878 shears in order to cut steel structural members rather than having workers  
879 manually scale to the top of a plant and attempt manual cutting of steel  
880 members. These and other types of advancements render demolition cost  
881 estimates of two decades ago as inappropriate proxies for current expectations  
882 to the extent full demolition of a power plant is the assumed approach.

883

884 **Q. IS IT APPROPRIATE TO ASSUME THE RETIREMENT COST ASSOCIATED**  
885 **WITH CURRENT POWER PLANTS MUST RESULT IN FULL DEMOLITION**  
886 **AND SITE RESTORATION WITH ATTENDANT COSTS?**

887 A. No. While the Company's proposal is predicated on this worst case scenario, that  
888 is but one of the alternatives available to the Company in the future. The  
889 retirement of a power plant can take on a wide range of alternatives. While the  
890 Company assumes only the worst case scenario of total dismantlement and full  
891 site restoration, there are lower cost alternatives. In fact, certain alternatives can  
892 result in positive net salvage for the retirement of a generating facility.

893

894 **Q. IS IT APPROPRIATE FOR RATEMAKING PURPOSES TO ONLY ASSUME**  
895 **THE WORST CASE SCENARIO WITHOUT CONSIDERATION OF OTHER**  
896 **ALTERNATIVES?**

897 A. No. The concept of ratemaking has always been to establish fair and reasonable  
898 expectations that give weight to various alternatives to the extent such  
899 alternatives may be available.

900  
901 **Q. IS IT POSSIBLE THAT THE COMPANY COULD SELL PORTIONS OF ITS**  
902 **GENERATING FACILITIES WITHOUT HAVING TO DEMOLISH ANY OR ALL**  
903 **COMPONENTS?**

904 A. Yes. At the time of retirement, there will undoubtedly be many relatively new  
905 items of equipment in service due to interim retirements. Those new items, as  
906 well as some older assets, may actually produce noticeable levels of positive net  
907 salvage rather than being considered scrap. The sale of relatively new and  
908 usable equipment (e.g., motors, pumps, etc.) will result in significantly greater  
909 gross salvage than simply assuming the items have only scrap value.

910  
911 **Q. IS THERE ANY CERTAINTY AS TO WHETHER THE COMPANY MUST**  
912 **DEMOLISH THE ENTIRE PLANT AND RESTORE THE SITE TO ITS**  
913 **ORIGINAL CONDITION?**

914 A. Yes. In fact, the only retirement of a major generating facility by the Company  
915 resulted in a positive net salvage. That situation was the sale of the Centralia  
916 plant in 2001. The Company obtained approximately \$114 million of proceeds  
917 associated with that retirement.<sup>38</sup> Clearly, the only empirical data associated with  
918 the retirement of a major generating station by the Company has been one  
919 reflecting the sale of the facilities without demolition rather than the worst case  
920 scenario proposed by the Company of total demolition and total site restoration.

921

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<sup>38</sup> Response to DPU 2.38(b) Attachment.

922 **Q. DID THE COMPANY GIVE ANY CONSIDERATION TO PARTIAL**  
923 **DISMANTLEMENT OR THE SALE OF ANY OF ITS GENERATING**  
924 **FACILITIES?**

925 A. No. Again, the Company's proposal is a worst case scenario and should not be  
926 relied upon for ratemaking purposes.

927

928 **Q. IS THE SALE OF GENERATING UNITS BY UTILITIES COMMON?**

929 A. Yes. Since the late 1990s, well over 1,000 generating units have been sold  
930 across North America. In all instances, the sale of such facilities resulted in  
931 positive net salvage and eliminated the need for the demolition and site  
932 restoration associated with such power plants by the selling utility. Therefore, the  
933 sale of the Centralia station is not unusual or atypical for the industry.  
934 Unfortunately, it has not been given any consideration in the Company's request  
935 in this proceeding. This is a fatal flaw in the Company's presentation.

936

937 **Q. IN YOUR OPINION, WHAT IS A MORE REALISTIC DOLLAR PER KW LEVEL**  
938 **ASSOCIATED WITH RETIREMENT COSTS APPLICABLE TO GENERATING**  
939 **UNITS, EVEN ASSUMING A HIGH PROBABILITY OF DEMOLITION AND THE**  
940 **COMPANY'S ASSUMED \$40 PER KW ESTIMATE?**

941 A. Under the rather restrictive assumptions that there is a high probability of the  
942 demolition of a power plant and that the \$40 per kW estimate proposed by the  
943 Company is reasonable, which I do not believe it is, then a more appropriate  
944 blending of retirement alternatives for ratemaking purposes is still required. If one  
945 were to assume only a 1% probability of a sale similar to the situation of  
946 Centralia, a 10% probability associated with the retirement similar to the positive  
947 18% net salvage for the Hale plant retirement, and the 89% balance associated  
948 with the Company's \$40 per kW estimate for demolition, then the resulting  
949 blended retirement cost level would be approximately \$30 per kW.<sup>39</sup> While I  
950 believe such approach still results in an excessive level of negative net salvage  
951 for the assumed retirement of the Company's large coal-fired generating

---

<sup>39</sup>  $(\$40 \text{ per kW} \times .89) - (\$113.9 \text{ million} / 693.49 \text{ MW} \times .01) - (\$2 \text{ million} / 59 \text{ MW} \times .1) = \$30.57 \text{ per kW}.$

952 facilities, it is a more realistic and appropriate value than the Company's worst  
953 case scenario proposal of \$40 per kW level.

954

955 **Q. HAS THERE BEEN A RETIREMENT AND DEMOLITION OF A MAJOR COAL-**  
956 **FIRE GENERATING FACILITY SINCE THE RETIREMENT OF THE**  
957 **COMPANY'S HALE PLANT?**

958 A. Yes. The Breed generating station owned by Indiana Michigan Power Company  
959 ("IMPC") was retired in 1994. The Breed station was a 495.6 MW coal-fired unit  
960 built in 1960. The demolition of the Breed generation station was completed in  
961 2006, 12 years after the unit was retired in 1994. While IMPC's demolition cost  
962 estimate by an outside construction firm was \$28.7 million, the actual net salvage  
963 experienced for the generating plant was a negative \$10.8 million. This  
964 retirement cost results in a \$21.79 per kW cost of removal associated with the  
965 retirement of a major coal-fired generating facility.<sup>40</sup> The actual demolition of the  
966 Breed plant relied in part on explosive techniques rather than the reverse  
967 engineering approach reflected in many prior decommissioning cost estimates,  
968 including those relied upon by the Company in Docket No. 07-035-13 and by  
969 IMPC for its cost estimate.

970

971 **Q. ARE THERE OTHER RECENT INSTANCES OF MUCH LOWER ACTUAL**  
972 **DEMOLITION COSTS FOR POWER PLANTS THAN THE COMPANY'S**  
973 **UNSUBSTANTIATED \$40 PER KW COST ESTIMATE?**

974 A. Yes. For example, the King power plant in Florida, a smaller gas-fired plant with  
975 asbestos, was demolished in 2010 in a situation where the contractor actually  
976 paid the utility \$1 million for the right to demolish the power plant and retain all  
977 rights to scrap material and usable equipment.<sup>41</sup> In other words, a positive net  
978 salvage was obtained rather than a negative net salvage, even in association  
979 with full demolition of a power plant. There are also other examples of less costly

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<sup>40</sup> Response by Public Service Company of Oklahoma to AG7-45, in Oklahoma Corporation Commission cause No. 200800144.

<sup>41</sup> Several conversations with John Tompeck, Capital Projects Engineer for the King generation plant demolition plant for the Fort Pierce Utility Commission, Fort Pierce, Florida.

980 demolition projects than the unsubstantiated \$40 per kW cost proposed by the  
981 Company.

982

983 **Q. WHAT IS THE IMPACT OF RELYING ON A \$30 PER KW ESTIMATE FOR**  
984 **THE COMPANY'S COAL-FIRED GENERATING FACILITIES?**

985 A. Relying on a \$30 per kW value as a more realistic value for ratemaking purposes  
986 than the Company's proposals results in a \$38.8 million and \$50.0 million  
987 reduction in total Company annual depreciation expense for steam plant based  
988 on plant in service as of December 31, 2011 and 2013, respectively. The  
989 corresponding Utah jurisdictional amounts are \$16.3 million and \$21.0 million,  
990 respectively.

991

992 **C. Carbon Plant**

993

994 **Q. WHAT IS THE COMPANY'S BASIS FOR ITS PROPOSED \$330 PER KW**  
995 **COST FOR THE PROPOSED DEMOLITION OF THE CARBON PLANT?**

996 A. The Company relies on a 2004 demolition cost estimate by Black & Veatch,  
997 inflated to more current periods, and has added other estimates for in-house  
998 oversight, asbestos, removal and pond remediation or abatements. The net  
999 estimate cost for Carbon is \$56.8 million.

1000

1001 **Q. HAS THE COMPANY DEMONSTRATED THE VALIDITY OF ANY OF ITS**  
1002 **PROPOSED COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH ITS PROPOSED \$56.8 MILLION**  
1003 **REQUEST FOR THE DECOMMISSIONING OF THE CARBON PLANT?**

1004 A. No. While the Company previously presented its Black & Veatch study, such  
1005 estimates by Black & Veatch have, on an empirical basis, been shown to be  
1006 dramatically inaccurate. In addition, the Company presents no supporting  
1007 analysis for the Thermal West, Inc. "conceptual" estimate for asbestos removal  
1008 cost. The lack of any analytical support for estimated asbestos removal cost is  
1009 significant as it is many times the cost estimated by Black & Veatch for the same  
1010 activity in its study. The Company also presents unsubstantiated and

1011 unsupported assumptions associated with estimated cost for in-house oversight  
1012 of the demolition project. Finally, the Company's Black & Veatch demolition cost  
1013 estimate already includes costs associated with total site restoration. Therefore,  
1014 the Company's attempt to include additional cost elements for site restoration  
1015 represents a double counting of estimated costs in the depreciation analyses.  
1016

1017 **Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN YOUR STATEMENT THAT THE BLACK & VEATCH**  
1018 **STUDY HAS SHOWN TO BE DRAMATICALLY IN ERROR.**

1019 A. At approximately the same time Black & Veatch developed its cost estimate for  
1020 the Carbon plant for the Company, it also produced a comparable estimate for  
1021 Nevada Power Company's various generating facilities. In spite of significant  
1022 concerns regarding the excessive nature of the Black & Veatch study in Nevada,  
1023 the staff and the commission in Nevada adopted Black & Veatch's analyses as a  
1024 reasonable proxy with minor adjustments.<sup>42</sup>  
1025

1026 **Q. IF THE NEVADA STAFF AND COMMISSION ADOPTED BLACK & VEATCH'S**  
1027 **EQUIVALENT STUDY AS BEING REASONABLE, WHY DO YOU NOW CLAIM**  
1028 **IT IS DRAMATICALLY IN ERROR?**

1029 A. Black & Veatch's Nevada cost estimate was soon put to the real test: the actual  
1030 demolition of generating units. Shortly after Black & Veatch's study, Nevada  
1031 Power Company issued a request for bids to demolish certain generating units.  
1032 The responsive bids for actual demolition of what Black & Veatch estimated were  
1033 dramatically lower than what Black & Veatch had presented. In fact, in a  
1034 subsequent rate proceeding before the Nevada commission, the staff and the  
1035 Nevada commission began recognizing the excessive nature of the previously  
1036 adopted Black & Veatch estimate and reduced such estimates by 60%. In other  
1037 words, for every dollar Black & Veatch had estimated for the demolition of the  
1038 generating units, the bids being received and the ultimate adoption of

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<sup>42</sup> Nevada Public Service Commission Docket No. 05-100004 Final Order at pages 80-81, paragraphs 256-260.

1039 decommissioning cost estimates for ratemaking purposes declined to \$0.40 on  
1040 the dollar for each dollar Black & Veatch initially estimated.

1041 **Q. DID THE ACTUAL FINAL DEMOLITION COSTS FOR THE NEVADA POWER**  
1042 **COMPANY'S GENERATING UNITS COME IN EVEN LOWER THAN THE**  
1043 **BIDS?**

1044 A. Yes. The final demolition cost for the Nevada Power Company generating units  
1045 came in at \$0.28 on the dollar compared to Black & Veatch's initial estimate. In  
1046 the most current Nevada rate proceeding, even Nevada Power Company filed its  
1047 decommissioning cost request based on the \$0.28 per dollar level of the initial  
1048 Black & Veatch demolition cost estimates.

1049  
1050 **Q. WHAT WERE SOME OF THE MAJOR REASONS FOR THE DRAMATIC**  
1051 **DIFFERENCE IN ESTIMATED VERSUS ACTUAL DEMOLITION COSTS IN**  
1052 **THE NEVADA POWER CASE?**

1053 A. Black and Veatch used much lower scrap metal prices and an out-dated  
1054 demolition approach in making its removal cost estimates in the Nevada Power  
1055 case.

1056  
1057 **Q. HOW HAVE SCRAP METAL PRICES CHANGED?**

1058 A. While Black & Veatch estimated a \$0.40 per pound scrap metal price for copper,  
1059 actual scrap metal prices increased by over a factor of 10. Such increase  
1060 coincided with the economic expansions by China and India demanding  
1061 tremendous amounts of the world's raw materials. While the change in scrap  
1062 copper prices is the most dramatic, increases in steel prices and other  
1063 commodities have also far exceeded the impact of only inflation.

1064  
1065 **Q. ARE YOU AWARE OF OTHER SITUATIONS WHERE CHANGES IN SCRAP**  
1066 **METAL PRICES SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECTED POWER PLANT DEMOLITION**  
1067 **COSTS?**

1068 A. Yes, as previously noted, a Florida utility demolished one of its generating  
1069 stations and actually received \$1 million in net proceeds from the demolition



1070 contractor. In that instance, he demolition contractor paid \$1 million to remove  
1071 the plant and retain the salvage rights to the material and equipment.<sup>43</sup>

1072  
1073 In addition, other demolition cost estimators now rely on much higher levels for  
1074 scrap metal prices in more recent studies, which have significantly lowered  
1075 demolition cost estimates. The decrease in demolition cost estimates occur  
1076 because power plants contain significant quantities of steel, copper, aluminum,  
1077 inconel, brass, and other valuable scrap metals.

1078  
1079 **Q. PLEASE DISCUSS THE SECOND SIGNIFICANT AREA THAT CAUSED THE**  
1080 **BLACK & VEATCH INITIAL ESTIMATE IN NEVADA TO BE SIGNIFICANTLY**  
1081 **EXCESSIVE.**

1082 A. The second major problem with the Black & Veatch study was its assumed  
1083 demolition approach. Black & Veatch's cost estimate in Nevada, as well as for  
1084 the Company in this case, relies on a reverse engineering or stick-by-stick  
1085 removal approach. This means the worst case scenario for retirement of a power  
1086 plant (i.e., total demolition and site restoration) is further magnified by selection of  
1087 the worst case demolition approach (i.e., reverse engineering). Black & Veatch's  
1088 approach is time consuming and labor intensive, both of which combine to  
1089 produce a very costly demolition approach.

1090  
1091 **Q. WHAT APPROACH DID THE ACTUAL DEMOLITION CONTRACTOR**  
1092 **EMPLOY IN NEVADA?**

1093 A. The actual demolition process employed in Nevada was a combination of  
1094 explosive techniques in conjunction with controlled toppling. The contractor  
1095 recognized that it was not only safe but cost effective to implode the structural  
1096 supports of the generating station and topple it to the ground where it is easier,  
1097 faster, and cheaper to dismantle and haul away. Reliance on a reverse  
1098 engineering approach as employed by Black & Veatch normally results in an  
1099 excessively high demolition cost estimate.

---

<sup>43</sup> King power plant Fort Pierce, Florida.

1100 **Q. ARE THERE OTHER CONCERNS WITH THE COMPANY'S RELIANCE ON**  
1101 **ITS BLACK & VEATCH ANALYSIS?**

1102 A. Yes. While the \$0.28 on the dollar factor currently recognized in Nevada  
1103 applicable to Black & Veatch's analyses attempts to address scrap metal prices  
1104 and the demolition approach, it does not specifically address an additional  
1105 significant factor associated with the Company's analyses. That additional factor  
1106 is labor costs. Black & Veatch's estimate for the construction labors in 2004  
1107 dollars was a \$36.81 per hour labor rate prior to fringe benefits.<sup>44</sup> That 2004  
1108 amount was increased to \$49.69 per hour for crew members, other than those  
1109 associated with asbestos related removal, when overhead burdens were  
1110 added.<sup>45</sup>

1111  
1112 **Q. WERE THE LABOR RATES ASSUMED BY BLACK & VEATCH IN 2004**  
1113 **EXCESSIVE?**

1114 A. Yes. They assumed labor rates represent union-based labor rather than  
1115 prevailing average labor rates in Utah. Based on information obtained from the  
1116 United States Bureau of Labor Statistics for the state of Utah, it is clear that the  
1117 assumed labor rates by Black & Veatch were excessive when compared to mean  
1118 labor rates available in Utah even today. Given that a total site demolition  
1119 process is labor intensive, but does not require an excessive level of highly  
1120 skilled laborers other than to operate equipment and perform supervisory  
1121 activities, a much lower overall hourly labor rate is appropriate.

1122  
1123 **Q. CAN YOU PLACE BLACK & VEATCH'S PROPOSED LABOR RATE FOR THE**  
1124 **COMPANY IN PROPER CONTEXT?**

1125 A. Yes. The \$36.81 per hour base wage rate without overhead burdens translates  
1126 into an employee being paid \$76,565 annually. Given that a significant amount of  
1127 the work associated with demolition is associated with low skilled common

---

<sup>44</sup> Response to DPU 2.23 Attachment 1 Carbon Plant Removal Estimate.

<sup>45</sup> *Id.*

1128 laborers removing debris, a \$77,000 per year annual salary is on its face  
1129 unreasonable and excessive.

1130

1131 **Q. BASED ON YOUR ANALYSIS, WHAT IS A MORE REALISTIC LABOR RATE**  
1132 **FOR THE AVERAGE HOURLY DEMOLITION EMPLOYEE?**

1133 A. Based on crew mixes identified in a national publication for demolition activity,  
1134 which includes supervisors, machine operators, machine oilers, truck drivers, and  
1135 common laborers, a more realistic average labor rate before addition of overhead  
1136 burdens is \$18.18.<sup>46</sup>

1137

1138 In addition, the Company includes a limited level of labor activity associated with  
1139 asbestos and lead paint removal. Black & Veatch estimated a 2004 based level  
1140 of \$46.81 per hour base labor rate prior to overhead burdens. The U.S. Bureau of  
1141 Labor Statistics for Utah currently identifies a mean average salary for asbestos  
1142 removal workers in Utah at \$20.03 per hour.

1143

1144 **Q. WHAT IS THE IMPACT ON THE COMPANY'S BLACK & VEATCH STUDY**  
1145 **EMPLOYING THE LOWER HOURLY LABOR RATES THAT YOU HAVE**  
1146 **IDENTIFIED?**

1147 A. Beginning with the lower hourly labor rates identified above but including the  
1148 same percent increase for overhead burdens to such labor rates results in an  
1149 approximate \$9 million standalone reduction to Black & Veatch's demolition cost  
1150 estimate. This change alone presents a 32% reduction in the demolition cost  
1151 estimate for the Carbon plant compared to Black & Veatch's initial cost estimate.  
1152 Again, this level of reduction is above and beyond any impacts associated with  
1153 the corrections identified in Nevada associated with other problems with the  
1154 Black & Veatch analyses.

1155

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<sup>46</sup> RS Means Building Construction Costs dated 2011 Edition and U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics for the construction industry in Utah.

1156 **Q. DOES THE COMPANY'S CURRENT REQUEST FOR CARBON PLANT**  
1157 **DECOMMISSIONING ALSO REFLECT A SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN THE**  
1158 **EXPECTED COST OF REMOVAL OF ASBESTOS?**

1159 A. Yes. The Company claims that the Black & Veatch cost estimate included  
1160 approximately \$2.8 million relating to asbestos removal.<sup>47</sup> However, as part of its  
1161 current cost estimate, the Company retained Thermal West Industrial, Inc. to  
1162 develop a pre-demolition asbestos and lead abatement cost estimate for the  
1163 Carbon plant. That "conceptual" estimate of \$12.6 million included over \$2 million  
1164 of contingencies.<sup>48</sup>

1165  
1166 **Q. IS THE THERMAL WEST ESTIMATE A DETAILED AND WELL-SUPPORTED**  
1167 **ESTIMATE?**

1168 A. No. The Company did not provide a single workpaper in association with what  
1169 has been identified as a "conceptual" estimate. Indeed, Thermal West even  
1170 requested, as part of its asbestos conceptual estimate, that it be allowed to  
1171 perform a detailed plant-wide asbestos survey. Unfortunately, the Company has  
1172 not authorized such survey.<sup>49</sup>

1173  
1174 **Q. ARE THERE OTHER PROBLEMS WITH THE RELIANCE ON THE**  
1175 **CONCEPTUAL ESTIMATE PRESENTED BY THERMAL WEST?**

1176 A. Yes. Thermal West's estimate does not take into account the Company has  
1177 actually incurred over \$2 million of asbestos removal costs at the Carbon plant  
1178 through the end of 2011.<sup>50</sup> Therefore, the depreciation study already reflects the  
1179 impact of actual asbestos and lead removal activity, and Thermal West's  
1180 conceptual estimate double counts some of these costs.

1181  
1182

---

<sup>47</sup> Response to DPU 2.23.

<sup>48</sup> Response to DPU 2.23, Attachment 3.

<sup>49</sup> Response to OCS 3.16.

<sup>50</sup> Response to DPU 3.13 Attachment.

1183 **Q. DO YOU BELIEVE THERE ARE OTHER PROBLEMS WITH THE THERMAL**  
1184 **WEST STUDY?**

1185 A. Yes. The Company presents nothing more than an undefended and  
1186 unsubstantiated high-level conceptual estimate with a 20% contingency in an  
1187 attempt to establish an excessively high demolition cost estimate for ratemaking  
1188 purposes. At least with the Black & Veatch estimates, certain information was  
1189 provided so that some test of reasonableness of the overall estimate could be  
1190 performed. In the case of the Thermal West conceptual estimate, even basic  
1191 supporting information is not provided.

1192  
1193 **Q. DOES THE COMPANY'S CARBON PLANT DEMOLITION COST ESTIMATE**  
1194 **ALSO INCLUDE THE ESTIMATED COST OF IN-HOUSE LABOR?**

1195 A. Yes.<sup>51</sup> As part of the Company's current proposed demolition cost estimate, it  
1196 now is requesting \$6.7 million of estimated costs associated with in-house  
1197 personnel, studies and travel costs.<sup>52</sup>

1198  
1199 **Q. WHAT ARE THE UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE**  
1200 **COMPANY'S REQUEST FOR \$6.7 MILLION OF IN-HOUSE COST?**

1201 A. The Company assumes a \$160 per hour labor cost rate for its in-house  
1202 personnel and has assumed 28,746 hours of effort by in-house personnel.<sup>53</sup>

1203  
1204 **Q. HAS THE COMPANY SUBSTANTIATED ITS ASSUMPTIONS RELATED TO**  
1205 **ESTIMATES OF IN-HOUSE COSTS?**

1206 A. No. When specifically requested to provide the support for its \$160 per hour  
1207 estimate, the Company did not even attempt to answer the request for support  
1208 and justification. It simply restated that the \$160 amount was an estimate of fully  
1209 loaded labor activity and claimed that when actual demolition work is performed,  
1210 the actual rate specific to the employee involved will be utilized.<sup>54</sup> Thus, the

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<sup>51</sup> Response to DPU 2.23-Attachment 2.

<sup>52</sup> *Id.*

<sup>53</sup> *Id.*

<sup>54</sup> Response to OCS 3.14.

1211 Company has failed to support or justify its assumed \$160 per hour fully loaded  
1212 labor rate.

1213

1214 **Q. WHY IS THIS LACK OF SUPPORT A SIGNIFICANT CONCERN?**

1215 A. The fully loaded labor rate used by the Company translates to an annual cost to  
1216 ratepayers per employee of \$332,800. Unless vice presidents of the Company  
1217 are performing that activity, which I do not believe is the case, such an estimate  
1218 is excessive from a wage and benefits standpoint. The same concern may also  
1219 be true for the number of hours assumed by the Company. Again, the  
1220 Company's request demonstrates what appears to be a clear focus on obtaining  
1221 an excessively high demolition cost estimate for ratemaking purposes.

1222

1223 **Q. HAS THE COMPANY ALSO INCLUDED IN THIS PROCEEDING A REQUEST**  
1224 **FOR EXPECTED LANDFILL CLOSURES AND REMEDIATION, COAL PILE**  
1225 **CLOSURE AND REMEDIATION, AND BALANCE OF PLANT SITE**  
1226 **REMEDICATION?**

1227 A. Yes. The Company's current estimate now includes its claim for approximately  
1228 \$20 million of costs for closure of landfills, coal piles, and remediation of the  
1229 balance of the plant site.<sup>55</sup>

1230

1231 **Q. DID THE COMPANY INCLUDE IN ITS OVERALL REQUEST THE LOWEST**  
1232 **COST AND HIGHEST RANKED ALTERNATIVES FOR THESE TYPES OF**  
1233 **ACTIVITIES?**

1234 A. No. While the Company did have an evaluation performed for various closure  
1235 options for the ash landfill at the Carbon plant, it ignored the lowest cost option,  
1236 which also happened to be the highest ranked option from a "risk/design  
1237 consideration" standpoint.<sup>56</sup>

1238

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<sup>55</sup> Response to DPU 2.23-Attachment 2.

<sup>56</sup> *Id.* at Tables ES1 and ES2, and Response to DPU 2.24.

1239 **Q. HAS THE COMPANY DEMONSTRATED THAT SUCH COSTS ARE NOT**  
1240 **ALREADY ADEQUATELY REFLECTED IN THE BLACK & VEATCH**  
1241 **ANALYSIS?**

1242 A. No. The Company's request again appears to be an attempt to establish an  
1243 excessively high demolition cost estimate for ratemaking purposes. In fact, it  
1244 must be noted that the Company's updated request for these limited activities  
1245 now approximately equals the total cost estimated by Black & Veatch prior to  
1246 contingencies and indirect costs. Moreover, the Black & Veatch study contains  
1247 over \$7 million of costs, after contingencies and contractor profit but before  
1248 inflation, for excavating, trenching, backfill of ponds and contaminated areas.<sup>57</sup>  
1249

1250 **Q. DO YOU BELIEVE THE COMPANY HAS PRESENTED A CREDIBLE**  
1251 **REQUEST FOR DEMOLITION COSTS OF ITS CARBON PLANT?**

1252 A. No. Even if one assumes full demolition and site restoration with no sale of  
1253 usable equipment other than as scrap, the Company's estimate lacks credibility  
1254 and should be rejected. The Company's request for \$56.8 million, which results  
1255 in a \$330 per kW demolition cost estimate, is in excess of eight times the level it  
1256 believes is reasonable for the balance of its coal-fired generating facilities (\$330 /  
1257 \$40).<sup>58</sup>  
1258

1259 **Q. GIVEN THE PROBLEMS WITH THE COMPANY'S CARBON PLANT**  
1260 **REQUEST, WHAT DO YOU RECOMMEND?**

1261 A. I recommend the same \$30 per kW level estimate previously discussed as a very  
1262 conservative estimate to be applied to the Carbon plant decommissioning  
1263 process.  
1264

1265 **Q. WHY DO YOU BELIEVE SUCH ESTIMATE IS REASONABLE?**

1266 A. Beginning with Black & Veatch's excessive estimate and adjusting for problems  
1267 due to the decommissioning approach and current scrap metal prices reduces

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<sup>57</sup> Black & Veatch 2004 Study at "Yard Area – Excavation/Backfill" section.

<sup>58</sup>(\$330 / \$40 = 8.3).

1268 the Black & Veatch cost estimate by 72% as determined by the Nevada  
1269 commission. In addition, the Black & Veatch estimate for the Company relies on  
1270 excessively high labor cost rates. By relying instead on mean labor rates as  
1271 established by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics for the state of Utah, Black &  
1272 Veatch's estimate is reduced by approximately 32%.<sup>59</sup> The net result of these  
1273 adjustments on a dollar per kW basis for the Carbon plant is approximately  
1274 \$32.<sup>60</sup> Therefore, reliance on the \$30 value noted for all other coal-fired units is  
1275 consistent with an approach that corrects the Black & Veatch cost estimate,  
1276 which in part forms the basis of the Company's estimate for this request in this  
1277 case, and reflects actual project results. The dollar impact of a \$30 per kW  
1278 demolition cost value for the Carbon plant is already reflected in the amount  
1279 noted in the prior Steam Production Plant section.

1280

1281 **D. Other Production**

1282

1283 **Q. WHAT DOES THE COMPANY PROPOSE FOR TERMINAL NET SALVAGE**  
1284 **FOR ITS VARIOUS OTHER PRODUCTION GENERATING FACILITIES?**

1285 A. The Company proposes a \$20 per kW net salvage for gas-fired other production  
1286 generating facilities, a \$9 per kW net salvage level for wind generation other  
1287 production facilities, and a zero (0) level of net salvage for its investment in solar  
1288 generations.<sup>61</sup> In addition, the Company seeks limited levels of interim net  
1289 salvage ranging from zero (0) to a -5% for various other production generating  
1290 accounts.<sup>62</sup>

1291

1292

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<sup>59</sup> Substituting an \$18.18 and \$20.03 labor rate before employee burden into Black & Veatch's Carbon cost estimate reduces the total estimated cost from \$28.3 million to \$19.2 million or a 32% reduction.

<sup>60</sup> The \$47.30 per kW average coal demolition cost adopted in Nevada adjusted for the 32% Utah labor rate reduction ( $\$47.30 \times .68$ ) = \$32.17.

<sup>61</sup> 2011 Depreciation Study at pages III-586 through 587.

<sup>62</sup> *Id.*



1293 **Q. WHAT IS THE TOTAL LEVEL OF NET SALVAGE THE COMPANY SEEKS**  
1294 **THROUGH ITS VARIOUS PROPOSALS FOR ITS OTHER PRODUCTION**  
1295 **UNITS?**

1296 A. In total, the Company seeks \$73,573,000 of negative net salvage for both interim  
1297 and terminal net salvage associated with its other production generating facilities.  
1298 The majority, or \$47.8 million of the total, is attributable to its requested levels of  
1299 terminal net salvage.

1300

1301 **Q. WHAT IS THE COMPANY'S BASIS FOR ITS VARIOUS TERMINAL NET**  
1302 **SALVAGE PROPOSALS?**

1303 A. The Company does not have any verifiable basis for its proposals. It has  
1304 performed no studies, analyses, or other verifiable means of determining the  
1305 reasonableness of its proposals.

1306

1307 **Q. DO YOU AGREE WITH THE COMPANY'S PROPOSAL?**

1308 A. No. I recommend an \$8 per kW terminal net salvage for gas-fired other  
1309 production generating facilities and a \$5 per kW level for wind other production  
1310 generation.

1311

1312 **Q. WHAT IS THE BASIS FOR YOUR RECOMMENDATION?**

1313 A. For gas-fired other production generating facilities, I have relied on the results of  
1314 corrected analyses of Black & Veatch decommissioning studies on behalf of  
1315 Nevada Power Company. Those studies were corrected to reflect the relationship  
1316 between what Black & Veatch had estimated in its cost studies for Nevada Power  
1317 Company and what actual demolition contractors were able to demolish a steam-  
1318 fired generating facility. In addition, new CCCT generating facilities are more  
1319 modular in nature compared to coal-fired generating facilities. The removal of  
1320 components should be less costly on a per-unit basis than the cost for  
1321 demolishing coal-fired generating facilities. As previously noted, I have  
1322 recommended a \$30 per kW terminal net salvage for coal-fired generating  
1323 facilities.

1324

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1334 **Q. WHAT IS THE IMPACT OF YOUR RECOMMENDATION?**

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1341 **SECTION VIII: MASS PROPERTY – LIFE**

1342

1343 **A. General**

1344

1345 **Q. WHAT ISSUE DO YOU ADDRESS IN THIS PORTION OF YOUR TESTIMONY?**

1346

1347

1348

1349

1350 **Q. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THE LIFE PORTION OF A DEPRECIATION**  
1351 **ANALYSIS?**

1352

1353

1354

As it pertains to wind, there is no identifiable empirical data available for removing wind resources. However, the retirement of wind generating facilities could also result in a positive net salvage given the limited physical presence of such assets. Moreover, a substantial portion of the wind investment from a physical standpoint is associated with concrete foundations, at least a certain portion of which should be able to be abandoned in place. Therefore, while a small positive or zero terminal net salvage value may be more appropriate for wind resources, I have conservatively estimated \$5 per kW.

A. My recommendation results in an \$868,000 and \$967,000 reduction in depreciation expense on a total Company basis for plant as of December 31, 2011, and 2013, respectively. The corresponding Utah jurisdictional impacts are a reduction of \$365,000 and \$406,000, respectively.

A. This portion of my testimony addresses the Company's proposals for artificially short ASLs relating to certain transmission and distribution accounts within the area of mass property.

A. The purpose of a life analysis is to determine the ASL, the dispersion pattern, and remaining life for each account or subaccount. This information is necessary in order to properly perform the depreciation calculation previously noted. A

1355 longer ASL normally results in a longer remaining life and a lower annual  
1356 depreciation expense. Alternatively, a shorter ASL will normally reduce the  
1357 remaining life and increase annual depreciation expense. The dispersion pattern,  
1358 as established by an Iowa Survivor curve, is also important in the overall process  
1359 of selecting the best fitting results. The same ASL with different Iowa Survivor  
1360 curves also results in different remaining lives.

1361

1362 **Q. WHAT ARE THE MAIN TOOLS UTILIZED IN PERFORMING LIFE**  
1363 **ANALYSES?**

1364 A. Life analyses are normally performed either through the use of actuarial or semi-  
1365 actuarial analyses. Actuarial analyses rely on aged data. In other words, when an  
1366 item of property is retired the age at retirement is known. This is identical to the  
1367 type of analysis performed by insurance companies in obtaining life tables in  
1368 order to measure risk and establish premiums. Semi-actuarial analyses are  
1369 performed in instances when the age of plant retired is unknown.

1370 **Q. WHAT METHOD DID THE COMPANY USE?**

1371 A. The Company employed both methods. The Company used actuarial analyses  
1372 for all Transmission accounts and Distribution Account 362 – Station Equipment.  
1373 The Company used semi-actuarial analyses for the balance of the Utah  
1374 Distribution accounts. The semi-actuarial analysis the Company relied upon is  
1375 the Simulated Plant Record Balance method (“SPR”). This approach relies on  
1376 simulation of generic Iowa Survivor curves with a corresponding ASL. The  
1377 simulation matches the interrelationship of additions, retirements and balances  
1378 on an annual basis. The lowest sum of least squared differences between actual  
1379 balances and simulated balances, based on an assumed curve and life  
1380 combination, produces a potential range of results from which to estimate the  
1381 future pattern of retirements for the current investment.

1382

1383

1384 **Q. BASED ON YOUR REVIEW OF THE COMPANY'S LIFE ANALYSES, ARE**  
 1385 **YOU RECOMMENDING ADJUSTMENTS?**

1386 A. Yes. I am recommending adjustments for five accounts. My recommendations  
 1387 and the Company's proposals for each of the accounts where a change is  
 1388 recommended are summarized in the table below. The Utah jurisdictional impact  
 1389 is a reduction of \$3.9 million and \$5.3 million based on plant as of December 31,  
 1390 2011 and 2013, respectively.

1391

1392

**Mass Property Life**

<u>Account</u>	<u>Company Proposed</u>	<u>OCS Recommended</u>
354 – Transmission Towers and Fixtures	68R4	75R3
355 – Transmission Poles, Towers, and Fixtures	60R2	64R1.5
356 – Transmission Overhead Conductors and Devices	60R3	64R1.5
367 – Distribution Underground Conductors and Devices	50R2	55R3
368 – Distribution Line Transformers	45R0.5	50R0.5

1393

1394 **B. Actuarial Analyses**

1395

1396 **Q. DOES GANNETT FLEMING RELY ON ACTUARIAL ANALYSIS IN**  
 1397 **DEVELOPING ITS PROPOSED LIFE-CURVE COMBINATIONS?**

1398 A. Yes. Gannett Fleming relies heavily on its interpretation of the results of actuarial  
 1399 analyses. Gannett Fleming states that “generally, the information external to the  
 1400 statistics led to no significant departure from the indicated survivor curve.”<sup>63</sup>

1401

1402 **Q. HOW DID GANNETT FLEMING DEVELOP ITS PROPOSED LIFE-CURVE**  
 1403 **COMBINATIONS BASED ON AN ACTUARIAL PROCESS?**

1404 A. Gannett Fleming performed actuarial analyses on a full or all-inclusive placement  
 1405 and experience band combination as well as shorter 1982-2011 and 1992-2011

<sup>63</sup> 2011 Depreciation Study at page II-25.

1406 experience bands.<sup>64</sup> Placement bands refer to the years in which plant was  
1407 installed and establishes the years of data reflected in the database analyzed.  
1408 For example, a 1924-2011 placement band captures all annual additions from  
1409 1924 through 2011 used to perform actuarial life analyses. Therefore, if a 1982-  
1410 2011 experience band is combined with a 1924-2011 placement band, the  
1411 actuarial results would yield the surviving plant pattern for plant added since  
1412 1924 taking into account only the retirements that occurred to those additions  
1413 since 1982.

1414

1415 **Q. WHAT RESULT IS OBTAINED FROM ACTUARIAL ANALYSIS?**

1416 A. The results produced by actuarial analyses are identified as an OLT, and are  
1417 presented in both numerical and graphical form. An OLT simply represents the  
1418 annual pattern of retirement activity, and thus survivors, by individual age groups.  
1419 At the beginning of the zero (0) age interval, 100% of the investment survives,  
1420 and as additional ages are examined and retirements occur, the OLT declines  
1421 from 100% surviving towards zero (0)% surviving. If the OLT fully declines to  
1422 zero (0)% surviving, it is called a complete survivor curve. OLTs that do not  
1423 decline to zero (0)% surviving are identified as stub curves. If a stub curve is too  
1424 short (i.e., it does not decline very far from 100% surviving), then limited useful  
1425 information can be garnered from such analyses. The limited information is  
1426 normally that a long ASL is indicated if a significant level of years has transpired  
1427 without significant decline in the OLT.

1428

1429 **Q. ONCE AN OLT IS OBTAINED, HOW IS IT UTILIZED TO DEVELOP A  
1430 REPRESENTATIVE LIFE-CURVE COMBINATION?**

1431 A. Both Gannett Fleming and I employed visual curve-fitting of the OLTs with  
1432 standardized Iowa Survivor curves. Use of standardized Iowa Survivor curves  
1433 provides smooth, complete survivor curves so that various calculations  
1434 necessary to establish a remaining life and depreciation rate can be obtained. In

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<sup>64</sup> Response to OCS 1.14 Attachment.

1435 particular, the area under a survivor curve yields the ASL of the assets being  
1436 analyzed. Therefore, as an OLT rises or elevates so does the ASL, all else equal.

1437

1438 **Q. IN THE PROCESS OF MATCHING AN OLT WITH A SMOOTH IOWA**  
1439 **SURVIVOR CURVE, ARE THERE DIFFERENT AREAS OF THE PROCESS**  
1440 **THAT ARE SIGNIFICANT?**

1441 A. Yes. It is more important to match a standard Iowa Survivor curve with the middle  
1442 and upper portions of an OLT than the tail portion (end of the curve), depending  
1443 on the dollar levels of exposures at issue. Both Gannett Fleming and I generally  
1444 rely on the portion of the OLT up to the point at which the dollar level of  
1445 exposures declines to approximately 1% of the initial dollar level of exposures in  
1446 the curve-fitting process.<sup>65</sup> The dollar level of exposures represents the plant that  
1447 is subject to retirement forces during that age interval. If the lower portions of an  
1448 OLT are matched with an Iowa Survivor curve in the visual curve-fitting process  
1449 while sacrificing the middle or the upper portions of the OLT, then it is highly  
1450 probable that an inappropriate result will be obtained. Therefore, part of the  
1451 judgmental process employed by a depreciation analyst is to determine what  
1452 ASL and corresponding Iowa Survivor curve constitutes the “best” fit of the OLT.  
1453 It is important to realize that in the visual curve-fitting process that life-curve  
1454 combinations with noticeably different ASL may provide a good fit. Therefore,  
1455 additional information is often helpful in the selection process. It is also important  
1456 to note that mathematical matching of curves (i.e., sum of squared differences)  
1457 are not normally relied upon for selection purposes unless a numerical weighting  
1458 is assigned to each point in the OLT.

1459

1460 **Q. WHY IS IT IMPORTANT TO SPECIFICALLY REVIEW THE DOLLAR LEVELS**  
1461 **OF EXPOSURES AT DIFFERENT AGE INTERVALS IN THE CURVE-FITTING**  
1462 **PROCESS?**

1463 A. The movement in the OLT from one age to the next is affected both by the dollar  
1464 level of exposures in that age interval as well as the corresponding dollar level of

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<sup>65</sup> Response to OCS 1.14 Attachment.

1465 retirement activity that has transpired during the same age interval. As time  
1466 passes between depreciation studies, and as both existing investment and new  
1467 investment age, the pattern of the OLT will often change. In other words, if plant  
1468 is continuously added and there are no retirements during a five-year period,  
1469 then the OLT will elevate (i.e., the curve will be higher) from the position it  
1470 previously exhibited in a prior study. A higher or elevated OLT normally  
1471 translates into a longer ASL.

1472  
1473 In addition, even if no new additions were to occur during the five years between  
1474 depreciation studies, but the existing plant aged for five additional years with no  
1475 additional retirements, then the mid portion and tail portion of the OLT would also  
1476 be expected to elevate, thus resulting in a longer ASL. Indeed, the lower portions  
1477 of the OLT may elevate significantly under these circumstances since they are  
1478 based on limited levels of exposures. Finally, if retirement activity occurs, but to a  
1479 lesser degree than is reflected historically in the various age brackets, then the  
1480 OLT again is expected to elevate and results in a longer ASL. Simply put, the tail  
1481 end or lower mid sections of an OLT that is based on limited levels of exposures  
1482 can move dramatically between one depreciation study and the next. Normally,  
1483 the head or top portions of the OLT remains relatively stable between  
1484 depreciation studies, as do the upper portions of the mid range of the OLT if they  
1485 are based on significant dollar levels of plant exposures.

1486

1487 **Q. SHOULD THE INTERPRETATION OF ACTUARIAL RESULTS BE THE**  
1488 **EXCLUSIVE BASIS FOR LIFE EXPECTATIONS?**

1489 A. No, not generally. Actuarial analysis represents a review of historical patterns.  
1490 Historical patterns should be tested to determine their reasonable predictive  
1491 capability for future expectations. For example, if there have been significant  
1492 technological improvements in underground conductors that have resulted in a  
1493 longer life expectancy for newer investment compared to the life characteristics  
1494 of older plant reflected in actuarial results, then such information must be taken

1495 into account in conjunction with the interpretations of the historical actuarial or  
1496 semi-actuarial results.

1497

1498 **Q. WHEN PERFORMING A GRAPHICAL COMPARISON OF CURVE FITS IS IT**  
1499 **NECESSARY TO SET FORTH THE FULL 0% TO 100% SURVIVOR**  
1500 **PRESENTATIONS?**

1501 A. No. Such a presentation often compresses the graphical values such that it  
1502 becomes difficult to identify variances between the OLT and the proposed Iowa  
1503 Survivor curve. The graphical presentations included in my direct testimony  
1504 attempt to magnify the variances between proposals so that the differences can  
1505 be more readily seen.

1506

1507 **Q. DOES YOUR ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION TRUNCATE MEANINGFUL**  
1508 **OR SIGNIFICANT DATA?**

1509 A. No. As I previously indicated, the tail end of an OLT often reflects insignificant  
1510 levels of activity and should be given limited or no weight in the curve-fitting  
1511 process. The magnification of the graphical presentation does not truncate or  
1512 eliminate useful information. The magnification simply permits a better visual  
1513 representation for the Commission to consider. In all instances I have reviewed  
1514 the entire smoothed Iowa Survivor curves.

1515

1516 **Q. DID THE COMPANY PROVIDE A DETAILED EXPLANATION OF ITS CURVE**  
1517 **SELECTION FOR EACH INSTANCE WHERE IT EMPLOYED ACTUARIAL**  
1518 **ANALYSIS?**

1519 A. No. Gannett Fleming chose to provide a single illustrative example which it  
1520 implies is applicable to all accounts. For actuarial analysis, Gannett Fleming used  
1521 Account 356 for its illustrative example.<sup>66</sup> There Gannett Fleming states that it  
1522 performed two separate actuarial band analysis. Then from its interpretation of  
1523 the statistical results, it identified a 60R3 life-curve combination as a “reasonable”  
1524 fit of the original survivor curve. Gannett Fleming then notes that its proposal is at

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<sup>66</sup> 2011 Depreciation Study at page II-28.



1525 the upper end of the typical service life for investment in this account, but that the  
1526 60-year ASL reflects “the Company’s plan to replace conductor as consistently in  
1527 the future as has been retired historically, which has been based on load  
1528 demands and failure.”<sup>67</sup> Thus, the Company relied on Gannett Fleming’s  
1529 interpretation of actuarial results, comparison with industry data, and unidentified  
1530 and unsubstantiated input from Company personnel.

1531  
1532 **Q. GIVEN THE LIMITED INFORMATION BOTH IN QUANTITY AND QUALITY AS**  
1533 **IT APPLIES TO VARIOUS ACCOUNTS WHERE THE COMPANY RELIED ON**  
1534 **THE ACTUARIAL ANALYSIS, DID YOU SEEK FURTHER CLARIFICATION**  
1535 **AND SUPPORT FOR THE COMPANY’S SELECTIONS, ESPECIALLY AS IT**  
1536 **PERTAINS TO THE JUDGMENTAL ASPECT OF THE SELECTION**  
1537 **PROCESS?**

1538 A. Yes. I specifically requested that the Company provide information in sufficient  
1539 detail so as to clearly identify the role judgment played in establishing the final  
1540 values for each account, along with all underlying documentation and support  
1541 that verifies the reasonableness of the claimed role of judgment and experience,  
1542 and a detailed narrative identifying and explaining each item of judgment and  
1543 experience relied upon, by account, in establishing life parameters.<sup>68</sup>

1544  
1545 **Q. DID THE COMPANY PROVIDE THE REQUESTED INFORMATION?**

1546 A. No. The Company stated that providing a detailed narrative for each account was  
1547 unduly burdensome. It referred back to its general illustrative presentation set  
1548 forth at page II-25 of the 2011 Depreciation Study that provided a limited  
1549 narrative for one transmission account as it applies to actuarial analysis for mass  
1550 property. However, the Company still did not provide any documentation or  
1551 support for claimed input from Company personnel or how such input impacted  
1552 decision-making processes for all other accounts. The Company’s claim that  
1553 providing information for each account is burdensome represents a clear failure

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<sup>67</sup> *Id.*

<sup>68</sup> OCS 1.14.

1554 to support its request associated with accounts other than Account 353 as it  
1555 applies to life selection based on actuarial analyses.

1556

1557 **Q. WAS THE COMPANY ALSO ASKED TO PROVIDE ALL ADDITIONAL BASES,**  
1558 **EVIDENCE, OPINIONS, ASSUMPTIONS, DOCUMENTS, ANALYSIS, ETC.**  
1559 **THAT EITHER DESCRIBES, EXPLAINS, SUPPORTS, AND/OR JUSTIFIES**  
1560 **THE SPECIFIC LIFE PARAMETERS PROPOSED FOR EACH SEPARATE**  
1561 **ACCOUNT OR SUBACCOUNT NOT ALREADY PROVIDED?**

1562 A. Yes. However, the Company responded that there are no additional bases,  
1563 evidence, opinions, assumptions, documents, analysis, etc. that either describes,  
1564 explains, supports, and/or justifies the specific life parameters proposed for each  
1565 separate account or subaccount.<sup>69</sup> In other words, given a second opportunity to  
1566 provide additional support and justification for its various proposals, the Company  
1567 again declined to do so. The only conclusion that can be drawn from this lack of  
1568 response is that the Company has no valid support for its various proposals. By  
1569 contrast, my recommendations and proposed adjustments to specific  
1570 transmission and distribution accounts are better supported by analysis and  
1571 industry comparisons.

1572

1573 **C. Simulated Plant Records Analyses**

1574

1575 **Q. IN PERFORMING SPR ANALYSES, ARE THERE VARIOUS ALTERNATIVES**  
1576 **AVAILABLE?**

1577 A. Yes. Some of the key alternatives or assumptions are the number of experience  
1578 bands or which bands to rely upon, the length of experience bands to rely upon,  
1579 as well as what criteria should be employed to rank and determine the best fitting  
1580 results of each SPR analysis.

1581

1582

1583

---

<sup>69</sup> Response to OCS 1.16.

1584 **Q. WHAT ARE EXPERIENCE BANDS?**

1585 A. Experience bands are simply the time period for which historical retirement  
1586 activity is reviewed. For example, plant placed in service from 1898 through 2011  
1587 would form a placement band (i.e., the historical database). A full experience  
1588 band would simulate the retirement activity over the full time frame 1898 through  
1589 2011. Alternatively, a 20-year experience band might still rely on the full  
1590 placement band but only review the annual retirement activity for the period 1992  
1591 through 2011. By reviewing varying lengths of experience bands, one can identify  
1592 potential trends and changing patterns in life characteristics.

1593 **Q. WHAT EXPERIENCE BANDS DID THE COMPANY SELECT?**

1594 A. Gannett Fleming claims it relied on three experience bands.<sup>70</sup> The three  
1595 experience bands generally employed are the full band, a 1982-2011 band, and  
1596 a 1992-2011 band.

1597

1598 **Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN THE SPR METHOD.**

1599 A. In the SPR method, an Iowa Survivor curve and ASL are selected as a starting  
1600 point of the analysis and its survivor factors applied to the actual annual additions  
1601 to produce a sequence of annual balance totals. These simulated balances are  
1602 compared with the actual balances by statistical analysis. Through multiple  
1603 comparisons, the mortality characteristics (as defined by an ASL and Iowa  
1604 Survivor curve) that are the best match to the property in the account can be  
1605 determined.

1606

1607 The Conformance Index ("CI") is one measure used to evaluate various SPR  
1608 analyses. CIs are also used to evaluate the "goodness of fit" between the actual  
1609 data and the Iowa Survivor curve being referenced. The sum of squares  
1610 difference ("SSD") is a summation of the difference between the calculated  
1611 balances and the actual balances for the band or test year being analyzed. The

---

<sup>70</sup> Response to OCS 1.14, Attachment.

1612 difference is squared and then summed to arrive at the SSD. The SSD is  
 1613 employed to calculate a CI.

1614  
 1615 The retirement experience index ("REI") gives an indication of the maturity of the  
 1616 account and is the percent of the property retired from the oldest vintage in the  
 1617 band at the end of the test year. REIs range from 0 to 100%. An REI of 100%  
 1618 indicates that a complete curve was employed in the simulation process. An REI  
 1619 less than 100% indicates that only a portion of the survivor curve was employed  
 1620 for calculating the CI value. The originator of the SPR method provided ranking  
 1621 ranges of values for CI and REI. The ranking relationship for CI proposed is  
 1622 shown below<sup>71</sup>:

<b>CI Ratios</b>	<b>Value</b>
Over 75	Excellent
50 to 75	Good
25 to 50	Fair
Under 25	Poor

1623

1624 The ranking relationship for REI proposed is shown below:

1625

<b>REI %</b>	<b>Value</b>
Over 75	Excellent
50 to 75	Good
33 to 50	Fair
17 to 33	Poor
Under 17	Valueless

1626  
 1627 Depreciation analysts have used these measures in analyzing SPR results for  
 1628 nearly the past 60 years. Each of these statistics provides the analyst with a  
 1629 different perspective of the comparison between a band of simulated or  
 1630 calculated balances and the observed or actual balances in the account being  
 1631 studied. One statistic is not necessarily superior over the other. REIs should be

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<sup>71</sup> Methods of Estimating Utility Plant Life, Publication No. 51-23 by Edison Electric Institute at page 62.

1632 carefully considered to ensure that a mature curve is being used to estimate life,  
1633 otherwise the results should not be accepted, even if the CIs are “excellent.”  
1634

1635 **Q. DOES THE COMPANY AGREE WITH AND FOLLOW THE RANKING**  
1636 **CRITERIA FOR SPR RESULTS?**

1637 A. Yes, generally.<sup>72</sup> However, Company claims it relied on informed judgment in  
1638 addition to such criteria.<sup>73</sup> Many of the recommended life-curve combinations are  
1639 different from the combination that ranks highest for a particular account. As was  
1640 the case described above for actuarial analysis, the Company declined to provide  
1641 information that it relied upon associated with its claimed informed judgment and  
1642 input from Company personnel other than for Account 364.<sup>74</sup> However, as can be  
1643 seen in the Company’s single illustrative example provided in discovery, it is  
1644 clear that other items of information had an impact at least for Account 364.  
1645

1646 **D. Account Specific**

1647

1648 **Account 354 – Transmission Towers and Fixtures**

1649

1650 **Q. WHAT DOES THE COMPANY PROPOSE FOR ACCOUNT 354 –**  
1651 **TRANSMISSION TOWERS AND FIXTURES?**

1652 A. The Company proposes a 68R4 life-curve combination.<sup>75</sup>  
1653

1654 **Q. WHAT IS THE COMPANY’S BASIS FOR ITS PROPOSAL?**

1655 A. The Company presented its visual curve fit to actuarial results.<sup>76</sup> As previously  
1656 noted, the Company refuses to provide a detailed explanation of its actual  
1657 selection process for life parameters or any significant factors, items of  
1658 information, input from the Company management, etc. that may have had an  
1659 impact on its selection process. Instead of providing the requested account

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<sup>72</sup> Response to OCS 1.14 Attachment.

<sup>73</sup> *Id.*

<sup>74</sup> Response to OCS 1.14 and Attachment.

<sup>75</sup> 2011 Depreciation Study at page III-15.

<sup>76</sup> 2011 Depreciation Study at page III-121.

1660 specific information, the Company references the illustrative example for Account  
1661 356 presented on page II-28 of its depreciation study. There, the Company states  
1662 that its approach is to obtain a “reasonable” fit of the original survivor curve,  
1663 rather than the best fit, and to review industry data in conjunction with  
1664 unidentified input from Company management.

1665

1666 **Q. DO YOU AGREE WITH THE COMPANY’S PROPOSAL?**

1667 A. No. The selection process for life parameters associated with actuarial analysis is  
1668 not to achieve a “reasonable” fit, but rather to obtain the “best” fit of the data prior  
1669 to consideration of other factors. The Company has failed to provide any support  
1670 for a different ASL than that obtained from statistical analyses.

1671

1672 **Q. WHAT IS YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR ACCOUNT 354?**


1673 A. I recommend a 75R3 life-curve combination.

1674

1675 **Q. WHAT IS THE BASIS FOR YOUR RECOMMENDATION?**

1676 A. I have reviewed all actuarial results and performed my own independent curve-  
1677 fitting process. As demonstrated in the graph below, the 78R3 life-curve  
1678 combination is a superior fit to the Company’s proposal at basically all data  
1679 points through the meaningful portion of the OLT, other than a few years  
1680 between 38 and 41 years of age and then again after 50 years of age.

1681



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In comparing standard Iowa Survivor curves and the Company's actual OLT, it is important to note that both the Company's consultant, Gannett Fleming, and I normally rely on a one percent criteria of dollars of exposures at older age brackets compared to the zero age bracket level of exposures in determining whether the curve-fitting process should be considered meaningful beyond a given age.<sup>77</sup> For this account, the one percent criteria is reached at approximately 44 years of age and falls to less than 1/10 of one percent by approximately 58 years of age.<sup>78</sup> The curve-fitting process should attempt to give consideration to data points up to around 44 years of age when performing the curve-fitting process. As can be seen in the graph above, a 78R3 life-curve combination is a superior fit for all but a few instances, compared to the Company's proposal, and therefore represents a better or "best" fitting life-curve combination.

<sup>77</sup> Response to OCS 1.14 Attachment.

<sup>78</sup> 2011 Depreciation Study at pages III-122 and 123 for the full band.

1697 Next, Transmission towers represent the type of investment that can be expected  
1698 to have some of the longest service lives of any of the assets on the Company's  
1699 system. This is borne out by the Company's own recommendation for a 68-year  
1700 ASL. However, Company specific data as presented through actuarial analysis  
1701 indicates an even longer life is appropriate at this time.

1702  
1703 The actuarial results for both the full band and the 1982-2011 experience band  
1704 are almost identical for the meaningful portion of the OLT.<sup>79</sup> This means that  
1705 while a long ASL is indicated by analysis of the overall investment in the account,  
1706 the more current data reaffirms the statistical stability of the long-term indications.  
1707 Therefore, from a statistical actuarial analysis standpoint, the Company's  
1708 proposed 68-year ASL is artificially short based on all band analyses, and must  
1709 be extended.

1710  
1711 While a 78-year period places the Company near the high end of the industry  
1712 range of values, this value is still appropriate from both an ASL standpoint and a  
1713 maximum life standpoint. The Company's consultant, Gannett Fleming, has  
1714 proposed 70- to 75-year ASLs for a number of other utilities<sup>80</sup>and has  
1715 recommended life-curve combinations that produce maximum life values  
1716 equivalent to the 78R3 life-curve combination. Therefore, from an industry  
1717 comparative standpoint, the actuarially based 78R3 life-curve combination is  
1718 confirmed as a realistic value.

1719  
1720 While the 78R3 life-curve combination appears to be the most appropriate value,  
1721 in order to present a conservative alternative and reflect a degree of gradualism,  
1722 I am recommending limiting the increase above the Company's proposal to a 75-  
1723 year ASL with the same corresponding R3 dispersion pattern. As shown on the  
1724 graph below, a 75R3 life-curve combination is still a superior fit to the Company's  
1725 proposed 68R4 life-curve combination.


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<sup>79</sup> 2011 Depreciation Study at pages III-122 through 125.

<sup>80</sup> Response to OCS 1.3 Attachment.



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1727

1728

1729 **Q. WHAT IS THE IMPACT OF YOUR RECOMMENDATION?**

1730 A. My recommendation results in a total Company \$1.6 million and \$2.1 million  
 1731 reduction in depreciation expense for plant as of December 31, 2011 and 2013,  
 1732 respectively. The corresponding Utah jurisdictional reductions are \$669,000 and  
 1733 \$871,000, respectively.

1734

1735 **Account 355 – Transmission Poles and Fixtures**

1736

1737 **Q. WHAT DOES THE COMPANY PROPOSE FOR ACCOUNT 355 –**  
 1738 **TRANSMISSION POLES AND FIXTURES?**

1739 A. The Company proposes a 60R2 life-curve combination.<sup>81</sup>

1740

<sup>81</sup> 2011 Depreciation Study at page III-126.

1741 **Q. WHAT IS THE BASIS FOR THE COMPANY'S PROPOSAL?**

1742 A. This is one of the accounts where the Company states that "the information  
1743 external to statics led to no statistical departure from the indicated survivor  
1744 curves."<sup>82</sup> The Company performed its actuarial analysis and apparently chose a  
1745 "reasonable" fit of the OLT compared to various life-curve combinations that it  
1746 investigated. However, when asked in discovery, the Company did not provide  
1747 any additional information supporting its proposal.<sup>83</sup> The only other basis that can  
1748 be derived from the illustrative example provided in the depreciation study, which  
1749 the Company claims is consistent with its approach for all accounts, is that it  
1750 reviewed industry information and took into account unidentified input from  
1751 Company management.

1752

1753 **Q. DO YOU AGREE WITH THE COMPANY'S PROPOSAL?**

1754 A. No. The Company's proposal results in an artificially short ASL.

1755

1756 **Q. WHAT IS YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR ACCOUNT 355?**

1757 A. I recommend a 64R1.5 life-curve combination.

1758

1759 **Q. WHAT IS THE BASIS FOR YOUR RECOMMENDATION?**


1760 A. Based on my independent review of the actuarial results, I determined that a  
1761 64R1.5 life-curve combination is a superior fit to the historical statistical data than  
1762 is the Company's proposal. As shown on the graph below, my recommendation  
1763 results in a better fit to the historical data through the meaningful portion of the  
1764 OLT, with the exception of a handful of years from approximately 41 years of age  
1765 through 45 years of age where a crossover occurs.

1766

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<sup>82</sup> 2011 Depreciation Study at page II-25.

<sup>83</sup> Response to OCS 1.14 and 1.16.



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It is important to again note that the Company’s consultant, Gannett Fleming, normally relies on a one percent criteria associated with dollars of exposures to determine the meaningful portion of the OLT to be fitted. The one percent criteria means that when the dollar level of exposures at any given age bracket declines to approximately one percent of the zero age bracket dollar level of exposures, then the data becomes statistically unsound and should be given little to no weight in the curve-fitting process. When reviewing the graphical comparison for this account, it is important to note that the one percent criteria is reached at approximately 55 years of age for the full band analysis and approximately 56 year of age for the shorter experience band analysis performed by Gannett Fleming.<sup>84</sup> The one percent criteria identifies the more important points to be fitted in the curve comparison process are those that occur prior to approximately

<sup>84</sup> 2011 Depreciation Study at pages III-127 through 131.

1781 55 years of age.<sup>85</sup> As can be seen in the graph above, my recommendation  
1782 results in a far superior fit through the meaningful portion of the OLT.

1783  
1784 From an industry comparative standpoint, both the Company's proposal and my  
1785 recommendation are near the high end of the industry range. It should be noted  
1786 that the Company's consultant, Gannett Fleming, has recommended ASLs as  
1787 high as 70 years for the investment in this account. Therefore, from the  
1788 standpoint of industry comparative data, my recommendation is appropriate.

1789  
1790 **Q. WHAT IS THE IMPACT OF YOUR RECOMMENDATION?**  
1791 A. My recommendation results in a total Company reduction of \$1.2 million and \$1.3  
1792 million in depreciation expense for plant as of December 31, 2011 and 2013,  
1793 respectively. The corresponding Utah jurisdictional values are a reduction of  
1794 \$509,000 and \$565,000, respectively.

1795  
1796 **Account 356 – Transmission Overhead Conductors and Devices**  
1797

1798 **Q. WHAT DOES THE COMPANY PROPOSE FOR ACCOUNT 356 –**  
1799 **TRANSMISSION OVERHEAD CONDUCTORS AND DEVICES?**  
1800 A. The Company proposes a 60R3 life-curve combination.<sup>86</sup>

1801  
1802 **Q. WHAT IS THE BASIS FOR THE COMPANY'S PROPOSAL?**  
1803 A. This is an account where the Company provided some limited detail in support of  
1804 its proposal. In particular, the Company's consultant, Gannett Fleming, uses  
1805 Account 356 as an illustration of the manner in which it conducted its study.  
1806 Gannett Fleming performed two separate actuarial analyses, one reflecting the  
1807 full band of available data and the second one reflecting the experience band  
1808 from 1982-2011. Based on visual fitting of the actuarial results, Gannett Fleming  
1809 concluded that a 60R3 life-curve combination "is a reasonable fit of the original

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<sup>85</sup> It should also be noted that data points at or around 55 years of age also have less statistical significance than prior data points.

<sup>86</sup> 2011 Depreciation Study at page III-15.

1810 survivor curve.”<sup>87</sup> In the depreciation study, Gannet Fleming further notes that the  
1811 60-year life “reflects the Company’s plan to replace conductors consistently in the  
1812 future as has been retired historically, which has been based on load demands  
1813 and failure.”<sup>88</sup> Gannett Fleming’s statements, presented for illustrative purposes,  
1814 are consistent with its other general reference listing this account as one of the  
1815 accounts where “the information external to statistics led to no significant  
1816 departure from the indicated survivor curves.”<sup>89</sup> These statements represent the  
1817 entirety of the Company’s support for its recommendation for Account 356,  
1818 despite being asked to specifically provide a detailed narrative identifying  
1819 significant items of information used in developing its proposal.

1820

1821 **Q. DO YOU AGREE WITH THE COMPANY’S PROPOSAL?**

1822 A. No. The Company’s proposal is artificially short.

1823

1824 **Q. WHAT IS YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR ACCOUNT 356?**

1825 A. I recommend a 64R1.5 life-curve combination.

1826

1827 **Q. WHAT IS THE BASIS FOR YOUR RECOMMENDATION?**

1828 A. While I relied on the Company specific results associated with its actuarial  
1829 analysis, I identified more appropriate results. As shown on the graph below, a  
1830 64R1.5 life-curve combination is a superior fit to the Company’s proposal through  
1831 the first 40 years of age, then for a handful of years the Company’s proposal is  
1832 slightly superior but almost identical to the 64R1.5 life-curve combination.  
1833 Beginning around age 48, my recommendation again is superior to the  
1834 Company’s curve yet still somewhat similar until approximately 56 years of age.  
1835 At that point, the data being matched is no longer statistically meaningful due to  
1836 the one percent criteria previously discussed.


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<sup>87</sup> 2011 Depreciation Study at page II-28.

<sup>88</sup> *Id.*

<sup>89</sup> *Id.* at page II-25.



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As can be seen in the graph above, a 64R1.5 life-curve combination is an overall superior fit to the OLT compared to the Company’s proposal and, absent other meaningful information, presents a more appropriate selection.

Lastly, industry comparative information confirms that a 64R1.5 life-curve combination is reasonable. The Company’s consultant, Gannett Fleming, has proposed longer ASLs in many instances, including up to 72 years.<sup>90</sup>

Another consideration is the fact that I am also recommending longer ASLs for Accounts 354 and 355 – Transmission Towers and Poles. Since conductors hang from the towers and poles, the 64-year ASL recommended for this account better reflects the interrelationship with the longer lives I recommend for Transmission Towers and Poles. In other words, the necessary correction to the

<sup>90</sup> Response to OCS 1.3 Attachment.

1853 life selection process used by the Company that under estimated the life for  
1854 towers and poles is also applicable to this account.

1855

1856 **Q. WHAT IS THE IMPACT OF YOUR RECOMMENDATION?**

1857 A. My recommendation results in reductions in depreciation expense on a total  
1858 Company basis of \$2.0 million and \$2.3 million for plant ending as of December  
1859 31, 2011 and 2013, respectively. On a Utah jurisdictional basis, the values  
1860 corresponding values are \$850,000 and \$950,000, respectively.

1861

1862 **Account 367 – Distribution Underground Conductors and Devices**

1863

1864 **Q. WHAT DOES THE COMPANY PROPOSE FOR ACCOUNT 367 –**  
1865 **DISTRIBUTION UNDERGROUND CONDUCTORS AND DEVICES?**

1866 A. The Company proposes a 50R2 life-curve combination.<sup>91</sup>

1867

1868 **Q. WHAT IS THE BASIS FOR THE COMPANY'S PROPOSAL?**

1869 A. The Company provides no specific basis for its proposal for Account 367. The  
1870 Company failed to provide specific information when asked to identify significant  
1871 items of information obtained from Company personnel, as well as a detailed  
1872 narrative identifying the basis for its proposal.<sup>92</sup> Rather, the Company chose to  
1873 reference its illustrative example for Account 364 presented at page II-28 of its  
1874 depreciation study, and indicated that the Company's proposal for this account is  
1875 based on similar considerations. For Account 364, the Company identifies that it  
1876 relied on SPR analyses and did a simulated curve analysis on the 20-year period  
1877 1992-2011. The Company then performed graphical comparisons between actual  
1878 balances and simulated balances, and stated that its proposal "produces  
1879 simulated plant balances that conform very closely to the actual book balances."  
1880 The Company then presented a wide range of industry comparative values and  
1881 noted that its recommendation is within the "typical" range. It concludes by

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<sup>91</sup> 2011 Depreciation Study at page III-17.

<sup>92</sup> Response to OCS 1.14 and 1.16.

1882 stating that its recommendation is strongly supported by SPR analysis. Again, it  
1883 must be noted that the only basis the Company was willing to present for its  
1884 proposal for Account 367 is that associated with the illustrative information for  
1885 Account 364. Therefore, it can only be concluded that the above noted  
1886 information is also applicable to the Company's basis for Account 367.

1887

1888 **Q. DO YOU AGREE WITH THE COMPANY'S PROPOSAL?**

1889 A. No. Based on the available information and taking into account the type of  
1890 investment in the account, a longer ASL is warranted.

1891

1892 **Q. WHAT IS YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR ACCOUNT 367?**

1893 A. I recommend a 55R3 life-curve combination.

1894

1895 **Q. WHAT IS THE BASIS FOR YOUR RECOMMENDATION?**

1896 A. Reliance on historical SPR analyses is less appropriate for this account than for  
1897 many other accounts. There have been significant changes in the type of  
1898 underground cable used by the industry as technological advancements have  
1899 significantly increased life expectations. Those utilities that relied on direct buried  
1900 cable and older technology underground cable in their depreciation analyses  
1901 often propose ASLs in the upper-20 to mid-30-year range.<sup>93</sup> ASLs of this nature  
1902 are normally reflective of older analyses and companies that have not  
1903 appreciably improved the type of underground conductor for their systems.  
1904 Alternatively, when utilities rely on more current technology for their underground  
1905 conductor or have a higher percentage of investment in underground conductor  
1906 in conduit rather than in direct buried cable, ASLs in the 50- to 60-year range are  
1907 more common.<sup>94</sup> In any instance, sole reliance on the review of historical SPR  
1908 analyses should be tempered with the fact that such analyses will underreport  
1909 the life expectation for current and future investment in this account (i.e., newer  
1910 and better cable).

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<sup>93</sup> Response to OCS 1.3 Attachment.

<sup>94</sup> *Id.*



1911 Turning to the actual SPR analyses, one finds that the results for an R2 Iowa  
1912 Survivor curve proposal by the Company ranges from 75 to 76 years. Those  
1913 values are noticeably different than the 50-year ASL proposed by the  
1914 Company.<sup>95</sup> Therefore, when the Company tries to rely on its illustrative example  
1915 for Account 364 and claims that its SPR analysis resulted in balances that  
1916 conformed very closely to the actual book balances, the Company is wrong. The  
1917 statistically best-fitting R2 ASLs, as set forth in the Company's analyses, are  
1918 much longer than proposed in the depreciation study. Moreover, the SPR  
1919 analysis for this account clearly demonstrates that excellent CIs and REIs are  
1920 obtained with R2.5 to R3 Iowa Survivor curve patterns and yield ASL values  
1921 ranging between 50 and 61 years. Therefore, whether viewed from the  
1922 Company's proposed R2 Iowa Survivor curve pattern or excellent-fitting R2.5 and  
1923 R3 dispersion patterns, an ASL greater than 50 years proposed by the Company  
1924 is warranted.

1925  
1926 In addition, the Company's claimed basis that the graphical comparison between  
1927 the actual and simulated balances produces results that conform very closely to  
1928 the actual book balances is again incorrect. As set forth on page III-509 of the  
1929 Company's depreciation study, it can be seen that the simulated balance  
1930 understates actual balance values from the very beginning through 2011, and in  
1931 fact grows to greater differentials as one gets closer to 2011. This again would be  
1932 indicative of underestimation of ASL, which is confirmed by the actual statistical  
1933 results obtained from the SPR analyses.

1934  
1935 While an ASL of approximately 60 years is justified both from SPR analyses and  
1936 industry data, I conservatively recommend an increase only to 55 years, with a  
1937 corresponding R2.5 Iowa Survivor curve. This recommendation not only  
1938 recognizes the concept of gradualism, but is made in conjunction with a  
1939 recommendation noted at the end of my direct testimony that the Commission

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<sup>95</sup> Response to DPU 2.2 Attachment 16.

1940 order the Company to provide full and complete justification for its proposals in  
1941 the next depreciation study.

1942

1943 **Q. WHAT IS THE IMPACT OF YOUR RECOMMENDATION?**

1944 A. My recommendation results in a Utah jurisdictional reduction of \$915,000 in  
1945 depreciation expense for plant as of 2011, and a corresponding \$113,000  
1946 reduction in depreciation expense based on plant as of 2013.

1947

1948 **Account 368 – Distribution Line Transformers**

1949

1950 **Q. WHAT DOES THE COMPANY PROPOSE FOR ACCOUNT 368 –**  
1951 **DISTRIBUTION LINE TRANSFORMERS?**

1952 A. The Company proposes a 45R0.5 life-curve combination.<sup>96</sup>

1953

1954 **Q. WHAT IS THE BASIS FOR THE COMPANY'S PROPOSAL?**

1955 A. As was the case for Account 367, the Company did not provide any specific  
1956 information associated with its proposed 45R0.5 life-curve combination. Rather,  
1957 the Company relied on references to the illustrative information for Account 364  
1958 presented in its depreciation study at page II-28. As such, the only identifiable  
1959 basis the Company is willing to present is that it relied on the same process as  
1960 identified for Account 364 with no additional significant input that would result in a  
1961 change in life parameters from that obtained from SPR analyses.

1962

1963 **Q. DO YOU AGREE WITH THE COMPANY'S PROPOSAL?**

1964 A. No. The Company's proposal understates the appropriate ASL.

1965

1966 **Q. WHAT IS YOUR RECOMMENDATION FOR ACCOUNT 368?**

1967 A. I recommend a 50R0.5 life-curve combination.

1968

1969

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<sup>96</sup> 2011 Depreciation Study at page III-17.

1970 **Q. WHAT IS THE BASIS FOR YOUR RECOMMENDATION?**

1971 A. Unlike the Company's proposal, my recommendation precisely corresponds with  
1972 the results of the Company's SPR analyses. While the Company claims that its  
1973 SPR analyses yielded a 45R0.5 life-curve combination, it is wrong. Specifically,  
1974 the full band and 30-year band SPR analyses both resulted in 51-year ASLs  
1975 corresponding to an R0.5 Iowa Survivor curve, and for the 20-year SPR band  
1976 analysis, the Company's result was a 50-year ASL corresponding to an R0.5  
1977 Iowa Survivor curve.<sup>97</sup> Therefore, the Company's proposal bears no relationship  
1978 to the results of its own analyses.

1979  
1980 Next, the SPR results for the 20-year band produce both an excellent CI and REI  
1981 corresponding to a 51R0.5 life-curve combination. In the other two SPR analyses  
1982 performed by the Company, the best-fitting results in each had excellent REIs but  
1983 the CIs declined to the good to fair categories. However, those values were still  
1984 the best-fitting results out of all Iowa Survivor curves analyzed.

1985  
1986 In addition, the Company's graphical presentation of the simulated and actual  
1987 balances from 1992-2011, as set forth on page III-511 of its depreciation study,  
1988 clearly demonstrates that its proposed 45-year ASL understates the comparison  
1989 with the actual balance in basically all years.

1990  
1991 While the Company specific SPR results clearly demonstrate that a 50-year ASL  
1992 is appropriate for this account, it is still reasonable to perform a confirmation of  
1993 such value with industry information. The Company's consultant, Gannett  
1994 Fleming, has a database indicating that 50-year ASLs are within the range of  
1995 values recommended by Gannett Fleming elsewhere in the industry.<sup>98</sup> This  
1996 confirmation only reinforces the understatement of ASL by the Company, which  
1997 is also contrary to its own SPR analyses. Therefore, the results of the statistical

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<sup>97</sup> Response to DPU 2.2 Attachment 16.

<sup>98</sup> Response to OCS 1.3 Attachment.

1998 analysis of Company specific information should be relied on in setting the ASL  
1999 for Account 368.

2000

2001 **Q. WHAT IS THE IMPACT OF YOUR RECOMMENDATION?**

2002 A. My recommendation results in a \$991,000 and \$2.9 million reduction for plant as  
2003 of December 31, 2011 and 2013, respectively, on a Utah jurisdictional basis.

2004

2005 **Q. DO YOU HAVE A FINAL RECOMMENDATION FOR THE COMMISSION?**

2006 A. Yes. Given the Company's failure in this case to explain and provide detailed  
2007 support for its life selections for most accounts in the mass property area, I  
2008 recommend that the Commission order the Company to provide a clear and  
2009 complete basis for each of its life and net salvage selections in future  
2010 depreciation studies. The Commission and parties are entitled to know with  
2011 reasonable specificity how each life and net salvage parameter was determined,  
2012 along with the supporting documentation. While the Company did provide a  
2013 significant amount of documents with its request, it still failed to provide many  
2014 critical items of information that demonstrate how it actually arrived at its various  
2015 proposals.

2016

2017 **Q. REGARDING THE COMPANY'S RESPONSES TO DATA REQUESTS AND  
2018 CERTAIN WORKPAPERS REFERENCED IN YOUR DIRECT TESTIMONY,  
2019 DID YOU PREPARE AN EXHIBIT THAT INCLUDES THESE DOCUMENTS?**

2020 A. Yes. OCS Exhibit 2.2 (Direct) includes the Company's responses to data  
2021 requests and other materials referenced in my direct testimony.

2022

2023 **Q. DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR DIRECT TESTIMONY?**

2024 A. Yes. However, to the extent I have not addressed an issue, method, procedures,  
2025 or other matter relevant to the Company's proposals in its filed depreciation case,  
2026 it should not be construed that I am in agreement with the Company's proposed  
2027 issue, method, or procedures.