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**BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH**

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In the Matter of the Investigation of the Costs and Benefits of PacifiCorp's Net Metering Program	Docket No. 14-035-114
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**PRE-FILED DIRECT TESTIMONY OF RICHARD COLLINS ON BEHALF OF  
VIVINT SOLAR, INC.**

Submitted on behalf of Vivint Solar, Inc.

/s/Stephen F. Mecham

1 **Q. Please state your name and occupation.**

2 A. My name is Richard S. Collins. I am a Professor of Economics and Finance at  
3 Westminster College located at 1840 South 1300 East, Salt Lake City, UT 84108.

4 **Q. On whose behalf are you filing testimony in this Docket?**

5 A. I am testifying on behalf of the Vivint Solar, Inc., a residential solar company  
6 headquartered in Utah with operations throughout the United States.

7 **Q. Have you submitted testimony to this Commission before?**

8 A. Yes. I submitted testimony in Docket Nos.03-035-14, 05-035-08, 05-035-09, 06-035-41  
9 and 06-035-76, 07-035-93 and 08-035-38 and 09-035-23.

10 **Q. Do you have experience in utility regulatory matters?**

11 A. Yes. Prior to my employment at Westminster College, I worked for the Public Service  
12 Commission of Utah ("*Commission*") for approximately thirteen (13) years.

13 **Q. Please describe some of your responsibilities at the Commission.**

14 A. I provided technical advice to the Commission on rate proceedings and a variety of other  
15 issues. I was responsible for tracking PacifiCorp's IRP planning process, avoided cost,  
16 demand-side management, cost of capital, and deregulation issues. In addition, I helped  
17 write orders and wrote or coauthored a series of technical reports on deregulation issues  
18 for the Commission and the legislature.

19 **SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY**

20 **Q: What is the purpose of your testimony in this docket?**

21 A: I will attempt to provide a broader construct in which the Commission can evaluate the  
22 intricacies of the multiple issues in this case and be consistent with the Commission's  
23 overall objective. The Commission's November 10, 2015 Order in this docket provides

24 a framework in which to evaluate the costs and benefits of the net metering program.

25 The aim of this analysis is to provide guidance for any improvements and changes in the  
26 program to insure equity amongst and between rate classes. The Commission must  
27 balance a number of different policy objectives: the promotion of distributive generation  
28 through net metering as outlined in Utah House Bill 256, as well as insuring equity  
29 amongst ratepayers as directed in Utah Statute 54-15-105.1 and 105.2.

30 **Q: What should the goal of the Commission be in this proceeding?**

31 The Commission's statutory mandate is to promote the public interest through its  
32 regulation of Rocky Mountain Power ("**RMP**"), a utility regarded as a natural monopoly.  
33 One of the primary regulatory objectives of the Commission is to insure quality service to  
34 the ratepayers at a reasonable rate while providing the utility the opportunity to earn a fair  
35 and reasonable return on its investment, so as to keep the utility financially healthy. A  
36 financially healthy utility is better able to provide reliable service to its customers. The  
37 Commission should also encourage a diversity of generation resources in order to protect  
38 the ratepayers from future risks that may adversely affect a particular generation source.  
39 It should take this mandate to promote the public interest both seriously and broadly. This  
40 means that the Commission must look at what is best for the ratepayers as a whole while  
41 maintaining its commitment to allow RMP the opportunity to earn a fair and reasonable  
42 return.

43 **Q: Why is this such a difficult case for the Commission?**

44 **A:** This case will require the Commission to be Solomon-like in its decision-making. The  
45 adoption of RMP proposed study and rate design will cripple the solar industry in Utah to  
46 the detriment of Utah citizens and RMP ratepayers. However, an overly generous tariff to

47 the net metered customer could harm other residential customers. The Commission  
48 should strive for an outcome that is fair to all sides and is flexible enough so that changes  
49 can be made to incorporate future events that affect both the costs and benefits of  
50 distributive generation.

51 **Q: What specifically are you recommending?**

52 I recommend that the Commission reject the results of RMP's cost of service study due to  
53 a number of critical errors and faulty assumptions made in their Actual Cost of Service  
54 (ACOS) and Counterfactual Cost of Service Studies, (CFCOS). There are similar issues  
55 with the NEM Breakout analysis. The Commission should either require that RMP  
56 resubmit its analysis with the necessary corrections or the Commission should adopt the  
57 recommendations for revisions of the tariff as contained in Dan Black's and Thomas  
58 Plagemann's testimony.

59 **Q: What are the problems with RMP's analysis?**

60 **A:** RMP has overestimated the costs associated with the net metering program and  
61 underestimated its benefits. There are major problems with RMP load study and its  
62 estimation of the production of net metered customers. The output of the net metered  
63 generation study is the key input into the Grid Model which estimates changes in net  
64 power costs; it is also an input into the calculation of the bill credits. The Commission  
65 should also reject RMP's NEM breakout study and RMP's contention that the Net  
66 Metered customers need a separate tariff and be segregated into a separate rate class.  
67 They should also find that the proposed three-part tariff is unnecessary and overly  
68 detrimental to new net metered customers.

69 This testimony will review RMP's Compliance Filing and the accompanying testimony.

70 I will point out a number of faulty assumptions and inconsistencies in the analysis. My  
71 testimony will also review and critique the Commission's order of November 15, 2016  
72 which sets up the analytical framework for the analysis ordered in Utah Code Section 54-  
73 15-105.1 and the associated rates in 54-15-105.2. Because the Commission's required  
74 analytical framework fails to take into account the long-term benefits of a net metering  
75 program, it does not implement the Legislature's intent. For that, the Commission must  
76 require that long-term benefits of the metering program be included in RMP's analysis.  
77 The Commission should take this into account when rendering its final decision on the  
78 benefits and costs of the net metering program.

79 **BACKGROUND**

80 **Q: Can you give a brief background on the main issues that pertain to this proceeding?**

81 **A:** The electric utility industry is currently experiencing a new phenomenon of customer  
82 generated power that lowers the utility's load and provides a new source of energy for the  
83 utility. This presents a dilemma for the utility in that the distributed generation competes  
84 directly against its own generation and reduces the energy purchased by a residential  
85 solar ratepayer from RMP, due to the amount of energy consumed onsite behind RMP's  
86 meter. If the utility is under a cost of service regulatory regime, distributive generation  
87 will ultimately lower the utility's rate base and thereby lower its overall profits. This  
88 goes against the primary goal of a corporation which has a responsibility to maximize its  
89 profits and the return to its shareholders. However, as a regulated utility RMP is granted a  
90 monopoly franchise in return for providing service to all customers in its service territory,  
91 under Commission approved tariffs. Given RMP's monopoly status, the Commission's  
92 function is to insure that the utility is financially stable so it can provide reliable service

93 to its customers at a reasonable rate for all ratepayers. The Commission is under no  
94 obligation to insure that the utility meets its ultimate goal of maximizing its profits and  
95 shareholders' wealth. The Commission is only obligated to provide the utility the  
96 opportunity to earn a fair and reasonable return on its investment and keep ratepayers'  
97 rates as low as possible given the fair and reasonable return constraint. This is a key  
98 distinction: opportunity for a fair and reasonable return on investment versus maximizing  
99 profits. To maximize profits the utility will need to increase its capital investment or rate  
100 base. Distributive generation represents competition to the utility and thus the utility will  
101 fight tooth and nail to eliminate competition as it presents a roadblock to its ultimate  
102 internal goal to increase profits and shareholder value. The Commission should  
103 recognize this motive as it evaluates the testimony and should remember that it is not the  
104 Commission's duty to protect or promote a utility's future rate base, but to provide the  
105 opportunity for the utility to earn a fair and reasonable return on its rate base, whatever  
106 that level may be.

107 **Q: Do you have any evidence to support this hypothesis of anti-competitive behavior of**  
108 **a regulated utility?**

109 **A:** This reaction of regulated utilities is well known and utilities across the nation have taken  
110 steps to stymie any competition whether it is distributive generation not owned by RMP,  
111 or qualifying facilities (QFs), or Independent Power Producers (IPPs). The trade press  
112 has made numerous comments on Berkshire Hathaway's resistance to net metering  
113 throughout its footprint, as discussed in more detail in Mr. Plagemann's testimony.

114 **Q: What is the Commission's role in this proceeding?**

115 **A:** The Commission, based on the evidence on the record, will need to decide whether to

116 change the net metering program and, in making that determination, it must look at all of  
117 the benefits and the costs, both long-term and short-term, of the program and determine  
118 whether other customers are actually harmed under the program's current configuration  
119 and the degree of harm if any, that occurs. I believe that the burden of proof for showing  
120 that the current net metering tariff causes harm lies solely with RMP. Its case must show  
121 that the detrimental impacts of the current program are large enough to warrant a change  
122 in the current program and its tariffs. The Commission should also qualify its decision on  
123 the appropriate analytical framework and acknowledge that all of the benefits and costs  
124 of distributed generation in the long-term are not included in RMP's analysis. The statute  
125 is silent on the time frame for analyzing benefits and costs; it is the Commission who  
126 decided to limit the analysis to short run costs and benefits. The Statute states "The  
127 governing authority shall: (1) determine after appropriate notice and opportunity for  
128 public comment, whether the cost the electrical corporation or other customers will incur  
129 from a net metering program will exceed the benefits of the net metering program or  
130 whether the benefits of the net metering program will exceed the costs, and (2) determine  
131 a just and reasonable charge, credit or ratemaking structure including new or existing  
132 tariffs, in light of the costs and benefits. The Commission's decision to use a cost of  
133 service analysis to determine costs and benefits as a way to establish rates makes sense  
134 only from a strictly administrative perspective, but the Commission should take into  
135 consideration in determining a just and reasonable charge, credit or ratemaking structure  
136 the long-term costs and benefits of the program. Limiting the cost and benefit analysis to  
137 a short-term, 12-month, test period creates a false and inaccurate view of rooftop solar  
138 and the impacts it has on RMP's grid and the ratepayers as a whole.

139 **Q: Could you provide some background on cost of service and rate design?**

140 **A:** The primary objective of a cost of service analysis is to identify the cost of providing  
141 service to each rate class as a function of load and service characteristics. A cost of  
142 service study analysis can provide a useful guideline for assigning cost responsibility to  
143 each customer classification in a way that avoids unjustifiable price discrimination. A  
144 cost of service analysis also provides information useful for designing individual rate  
145 schedules and provides support for justifying rate differentials to retail customers. The  
146 Commission directed RMP to use a cost of service study as the analytical framework for  
147 determining the benefits and costs of the net metering program and to determine an  
148 appropriate rate structure for net metered customers.

149 **Q: What are the fundamental considerations that the Commission should take into**  
150 **account when designing rate structure?**

151 **A:** James Bonbright, utility ratemaking expert, outlines in relative order of importance the  
152 basic criteria for ratemaking as listed below.

<b>Table 1: Bonbright's Criteria for Ratemaking</b>
1. Does the rate provide adequate revenue recovery to the utility?
2. Does the rate promote fairness in cost allocation (equity between customer classes)?
3. Does the rate promote efficient resource use?
4. Is the rate practical to implement (understanding, acceptance)?
5. Is the rate easy to interpret (noncontroversial)?
6. Does the rate provide revenue stability for the utility?
7. Does the rate provide bill stability for customers?



8. Does the rate avoid undue discrimination among customers?<sup>153</sup>

154

155 Bonbright's criteria for rate design are just as relevant today as when he first wrote them.<sup>1</sup>

156 **Q: Please explain the how the net metering tariff performs under the first two criteria**  
157 **of revenue adequacy and fairness between rate classes.**

158 **A:** The establishment of a new rate class for Net Metering customers will not have a major  
159 impact on RMP's ability to collect its revenue requirement. As of this date, less than two  
160 (2) percent of the residential rate class have distributive generation and the allegation that  
161 this small group of ratepayers is not covering its full costs, even if true, does not  
162 materially affect the RMP's ability to earn its authorized rate of return, especially in light  
163 of the increased growth of the residential rate class as a whole. In fact, using RMP's  
164 numbers from its Filing, we see that a residential net metering customer covers  
165 approximately 92% of its total cost of service (which is low due to the limited 12-month  
166 view of benefits) and yet RMP is seeking to obtain an additional \$20 per month for each  
167 residential net metering customer. There is no reason to redesign rates based on  
168 Bonbright's number one criterion because RMP's ability to obtain revenue recovery is  
169 not impacted by residential net metering customers. The second criterion requires the  
170 promotion of equity between classes. The majority of the net metering program's activity  
171 occurs within the residential rate class. Given the small number of residential net  
172 metered customers even if net metered customers are only covering 92% of their cost of  
173 service it would not affect other classes, rather it would primarily impact currently  
174 embedded equity and subsidies that currently exists within the residential rate class. For

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<sup>1</sup> See *Principles of Public Utility Rates* by James C. Bonbright, Albert L. Danielsen, and David R. Kamerschen (Hardcover - Mar 1, 1988).

175 example, according to RMP's Filing an average residential customers, with an average  
176 load, will pay approximately \$999 per year for their service.<sup>2</sup> If rates are set to recover  
177 revenue requirement for the average ratepayer, with an average load, then those  
178 customers that consume less are not paying the full fixed costs of their usage and those  
179 that consume more than the average are paying more than their share of the fixed costs.  
180 In other words, low energy users are being subsidized by high energy users. Therefore, it  
181 is our conclusion that the current residential net metering tariff and its current rate design  
182 meets or surpasses the two most important criteria outlined by Bonbright. The  
183 Commission should recognize the current subsidies that exist in the residential rate class  
184 in a general rate class when it addresses the perceived and unconfirmed subsidies  
185 potentially going to the residential net metered customers.

186 **Q: What about the third criterion, efficient use of resources?**

187 **A:** Concerning the efficient use of resources; the Company's proposed three-part tariff  
188 would effectively destroy the solar industry in Utah, kill thousands of jobs, and impact  
189 economic growth with the state. As discussed in Mr. Plagemann's testimony, the Utah  
190 Public Service Commission should take note of what happened in Nevada. In that state,  
191 the Nevada Public Utilities Commission revised its net metering tariff at NV Energy's  
192 request. After more than a year of political, public, and regulatory turmoil, the Nevada  
193 Legislature took action to correct the Commission's error. In addition, RMP's 2015 IRP,  
194 the only one that has been reviewed and acknowledged by the Commission shows that  
195 when long-term benefits of net metering are included, the Present Value of Revenue

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<sup>2</sup> From data taken from RMM-12 page 1 and RMM-14 page 1 Residential cost from NEM Breakout (non-NEM) = \$749,206,727 and number of non-NEM residential customers = 749,673 thus  $\$749,206,727 / 749,673 = \$999.45$  revenue per non-NEM customer.

196 Requirement (PVRR) is \$706 Million dollars less when the high adoption of solar panels  
197 scenario (case S-05) is compared to the base case (CO5-1).<sup>3</sup> Those benefits averaged  
198 over the twenty (20) year planning horizon translate into \$35 million dollars of benefit to  
199 the ratepayer each year. To adopt a new rate structure that would eliminate these benefits  
200 would violate the criterion of efficiently utilizing resources. The Commission should take  
201 note that in 2015 RMP found a net benefit for residential solar and RMP is now claiming  
202 a net cost, included abandoned revenue resulting from onsite behind the meter  
203 consumption. The Commission must keep RMP out of the residential ratepayer's home  
204 and ensures a customer's actions taken behind the meter stay untouched and unrestricted.

205 **Q: How does RMP's rate design score under the other criteria of interpretation,**  
206 **understanding and implementation?**

207 **A:** The Company's proposed three-part rate does not support the criteria of easy  
208 interpretation and implementation. This rate will not be practical to implement because  
209 the demand charge is difficult to understand and residential customers will not likely  
210 accept such a charge. Traditionally applied to commercial and industrial customers,  
211 demand charges calculate a fee for utility customers based on their peak consumption  
212 each month, usually measured hourly. Since demand charges tend to account for a hefty  
213 portion of a customer's bill, they could provide an incentive for reducing peak usage.  
214 Unfortunately, residential customers have few options to minimize demand, largely  
215 because such customers have little to no visibility into their kilowatt usage in any given  
216 hourly period. Not only do they lack visibility, residential customers lack the  
217 sophistication, resources, and technology to adjust time-based demand habits in any

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<sup>3</sup> See page 216 and 217 In the 2015 Integrated Resource Plan Volume II Appendices

218 meaningful.

219 Tariffs with a demand charge are difficult for residential customers to interpret as they  
220 better understand the concept of energy as measured in kilowatt-hour. Demand measured  
221 in kilowatts represents the capacity to produce energy, a much more difficult concept to  
222 interpret and understand.

223 **Q: What about the criteria of revenue and rate stability?**

224 **A:** With regard to providing revenue stability to the utility, this rate structure might keep  
225 revenue stable in the short run, as customers may not be able to reduce their demand  
226 charges easily. However, in the long run, the demand charge will create incentives to  
227 avoid the demand charge. Although battery storage to reduce kW usage is not currently  
228 economical, once it is economical, customers will adopt it. At some point in the future, a  
229 residential net metering customers will have little use for utility services and may drop  
230 off the system all together, thus losing all revenue derived from the breakaway  
231 customers. This loss of revenue will require the utility to raise rates on remaining  
232 residential customers leading to a revenue and grid stability death spiral. Cutting the cord  
233 to the utility's service will lead to both a loss of reliability for both the residential net  
234 metering customer and RMP itself as it loses a diverse source of near sight generation for  
235 its other customers. The Commission should not encourage or support a rate design that  
236 will motivate ratepayers to disconnect from RMP's grid system.

237 The proposed NEM tariff which separates out residential net metering customers from  
238 other residential ratepayers will not promote rate stability. With such a small population  
239 of residential net metering customers, slight changes in costs will have a large impact on  
240 these ratepayers. A separate rate class must have sufficient numbers and enough diversity

241 to avoid large changes in rates. This is one important reason for the Commission to keep  
242 the residential net metering customers in the same rate class and rate structure as all  
243 residential customers. Diversity within a rate class helps stabilize rates for all residential  
244 rate payers. The proposed three-part tariff for Net metering customers will lead to  
245 volatility in their monthly utility bills as it is much more difficult to control kW use than  
246 kWh use.

247 **Q: What about undue discrimination within the residential class under the current**  
248 **tariffs?**

249 **A:** This is one of the prime arguments utility companies use against residential net metering  
250 programs, that residential net metering customers are not paying their fair share of costs  
251 and that non-net metering customers will pay more than their fair share. To put this  
252 allegation into perspective we must first recognize that the residential class currently has  
253 some customers paying more than their fair share of costs to begin with. As I testified to  
254 earlier, given that RMP's revenue is collected via a customer charge, minimum bill, and a  
255 variable volumetric energy charge, high energy users (those who pay more than \$999 per  
256 year) pay more than their fair share of the fixed costs and low energy users are being  
257 subsidized. Costs associated with residential service include fixed costs of generation  
258 and transmission and distribution along with the variable costs of fuel. The volumetric  
259 rate is intended to collect both a portion of the fixed costs and all of variable costs, so the  
260 average user will pay their fair share of both fixed and variable costs. A smaller than  
261 average user will pay less than their fair share of the fixed costs and a large than average  
262 user will pay more than their fair share of fixed costs. This inequity and subsidy is  
263 exacerbated by the fact that the residential rate schedule has a tiered structure so larger

264 use customers pay an even higher average price than lower use customers. Thus, the  
265 residential rate structure starts out with some known and recognized subsidization and  
266 Commission approved subsidies. Residential net metering customers generally are larger  
267 users of electricity, before they install a residential solar system, compared to non-net  
268 metering customers, as shown in Joelle Steward's Table 4 "Differences in Customer  
269 Characteristics". To the extent that this remains true in the future, which appears to hold  
270 true, the subsidy claimed by RMP of non-net metering customer to net metering customer  
271 will just mitigate the subsidy that is already embedded in the current residential rate  
272 structure. Contrary to RMP's argument, the residential net metering program will help  
273 mitigate discrimination in the long and short-term, not make it worse.

274 **Q: Could separating the residential net metering customers into their own class lead to**  
275 **discrimination within that class?**

276 **A:** RMP's three-part rate design for its proposed Schedule 5 could create undue  
277 discrimination within the residential net metering class because most of the revenue will  
278 be collected through the demand charge with little transparency to the residential net  
279 metering customer. Some commercial and industrial net metering customers may be able  
280 to avoid the demand charge with some capacity management tools while other less  
281 sophisticated customers, such as residential, will not. The fall in revenue from the former  
282 customers will require higher revenues from the other residential net metering customers  
283 leading to some discrimination.

284 **CRITIQUE OF RMP'S COMPLIANCE FILING**

285 **Q: Could you provide a critique of RMP's Compliance Filing?**

286 **A:** There are a number of issues that pertain to RMP's Filing which call into question the

287 reliability of its results. Some issues are quantifiable in dollar terms while other issues  
288 create doubt about whether the Commission can draw conclusions from such an analysis.

289 **Q: Can you provide a brief synopsis of RMP's filing?**

290 **A:** RMP provided two separate analyses as directed by the Commission. The first compares  
291 two cost of service studies over the 2015 test period. The first study measures the Actual  
292 Cost of Service (ACOS) which includes the net metering customers' participation. This  
293 is compared to a Counterfactual Cost of Service study (CFCOS) where RMP estimated  
294 what the cost of service would be without the electricity produced by the net metering  
295 customers. The Commission ordered that the analysis reflect the costs and benefits at the  
296 system, state and customer class levels. The second analysis, known as the NEM  
297 Breakout COS study, segregates the net metering (NEM) customers in the ACOS study  
298 into a separate class and assigns costs to that class of customers. The purpose of this  
299 analysis is to see whether the current tariff for this class collects the costs assigned to it  
300 and how it might impact the non-NEM customer class.

301 **Q: What were the results of RMP's studies?**

302 **A:** RMP concluded that the CFCOS has \$3,722,000 higher net cost than the ACOS on a  
303 system level and a \$1,659,000 increase in net cost on the residential class level. Thus,  
304 RMP concludes that the net metering program as currently constructed places a cost  
305 burden on other non-Net metering customers. RMP's NEM Breakout analysis shows  
306 mixed results depending on the rate schedule, but for the residential class the study shows  
307 that the NEM class is only recovering 60.6% of its costs, when including bill credits  
308 (which is just reduced consumption for behind the meter usage, and credits for exported  
309 energy), compared to the 96.1% of cost recovery for the non-NEM residential class. If

310 bill credits are removed from “costs” to service a residential NEM customer the result is  
311 that a residential NEM customer covers approximately 92% of its cost of service which is  
312 only 4.1% below a residential non-net metering customer. Based on these analyses, RMP  
313 prematurely and incorrectly concludes that the rate schedule for the Net metered  
314 customers must be altered and a separate residential class for net metering customers  
315 should be adopted.

316 **Q: Do you agree with RMP’s conclusion that the net metering program produces a**  
317 **large net cost to the system, state and customer classes?**

318 **A:** No, RMP has made several conceptual errors in their analyses and they have either not  
319 included certain benefits or have overstated costs. In addition, there are several  
320 methodological errors which call into question the validity of key parts of the study. As  
321 such, we recommend that the Commission make no or only incremental changes to the  
322 current residential net metering tariff.

323 **Q: Could you provide some arguments to support your contention that RMP’s ACOS**  
324 **vs. CFCOS overestimates costs or underestimates benefits.**

325 **A:** Yes, but I will limit my analysis to the residential class as it is the class that RMP claims  
326 produces the largest net costs to the system. The residential class also makes up the bulk  
327 of Vivint Solar’s customer base. RMP claims that the net cost of the residential net  
328 metering program at the class cost of service level is \$1,659,000. This includes increased  
329 metering costs, increased engineering and administration costs, increased customer  
330 service/billing costs, net metering bill credits, partially offset by certain benefits,  
331 including lower net power costs. We have problems with the calculation of each  
332 component of the costs listed by RMP. However, the largest problem is with the net



333 metering bill credits, due to RMP's attempt to reach behind the meter and into the  
334 ratepayer's home.

335 **Q: What is the issue regarding the calculation of the net metering bill credits?**

336 **A:** RMP estimates the costs of bill credits as the difference between the actual revenues  
337 collected in the ACOS and the revenues that would have been collected in the CFCOS.

338 The problem is that RMP includes in this difference in revenues the amount of energy  
339 and its attendant revenues that were consumed by the net metering customers' onsite  
340 behind the meter. RMP is trying to collect for lost revenues that they incurred due to the  
341 customer reducing its demand for electricity through its own generation. RMP assumed  
342 in its filing that 44% of all energy produced from the residential solar system was  
343 consumed onsite behind the meter, never exported to the utility grid. Meaning 44% of  
344 RMP's "costs" attributed to bill credits should be considered lost revenue and a direct  
345 result of the ratepayer using less energy.

346 **Q: Why is counting a net metered customer's usage of his own production not  
347 appropriate to consider a cost to RMP?**

348 **A:** RMP's proposed treatment of the usage behind the meter as a bill credit cost is like trying  
349 to collect revenues from a customer because she reduces her demand for electricity by  
350 installing an energy efficiency measure such as a more efficient air conditioner or more  
351 efficient refrigerator or energy efficient lightbulbs. By the same measure, RMP cannot  
352 collect for lost revenues when a family member moves out or there is a change in lifestyle  
353 which reduces energy use for the household.

354 **Q: What is the impact on net costs if RMP was not allowed to collect on lost revenues  
355 from usage behind the meter?**

356 **A:** Eliminating these phantom costs from the calculation of bill credits would reduce the  
357 costs by approximately 44% or from \$2,987,000 to \$1,314,280.

358 **Q: What about the other costs that are attributed to the net metering program such as**  
359 **the additional metering costs?**

360 **A:** RMP has estimated that the additional costs associated with the meters for Net metering  
361 customers is \$162 per meter. This meter will measure the flow of energy bi-directionally,  
362 so it will measure the energy coming into the home and the excess energy flowing from  
363 the home into the grid. A uni-directional residential meter costs approximately \$107<sup>4</sup>.  
364 The issue is that RMP just calculates the costs of the new meters and does not  
365 acknowledge or quantify the offsetting benefits of redeployment of the uni-directional  
366 meter to other customers in the RMP service territory or its salvage value if it cannot be  
367 redeployed. With meter redeployment, the metering costs associated with the Net  
368 metering customers should be the additional costs of the meter, not its full costs. This  
369 will lead to a cost savings of \$25,152 under the following assumptions:

- 370 • Redeployed meters:
- 371 ○ 60% of meters are redeployed
  - 372 ○ 50% remaining useful live
  - 373 ○ Implies a 30% (60% x 50%) reduction in net capital cost
- 374 • Scrapped:
- 375 ○ 40% of meters are scrapped
  - 376 ○ Scrap value of 10%
  - 377 ○ Implies a 4% reduction in net capital cost

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4 See Table 4, page 20 of Joelle Steward's Direct testimony

- 378           • Capital cost of scrapped/redeployed meters versus bi-directional meters is 66%
- 379           • Total assumed savings of 22%  $((30\% + 4\%) \times 66\%)$  or \$25,152 of total residential
- 380           metering cost of \$112,000)

381   **Q:   What about the engineering/administrative costs assigned to the net metering**

382   **program.**

383   **A:**   These costs are estimated to be \$369,000 per year for the test year and it is based on the

384   fully loaded hourly cost of a field engineer multiplied by the number of hours per

385   application. The problem with this method is there are some fixed costs associated with

386   the engineer and administrative functions and these costs should not be included in the

387   analysis because they do not vary with the number of applications and connections.

388   Average fixed costs will decline as more applications are processed and thus average

389   total costs will also decline. The use of a fixed cost per hour for an engineer will

390   overstate the incremental costs of serving an application and installation of a NEM

391   customer. Another weakness of the method is that it does not recognize that there will be

392   efficiency gains through learning by doing. As more applications and connection studies

393   are done, workers will become more efficient at processing them and thus average costs

394   will decline.

395   **Q:   What about the \$72,000 in additional billing costs associated with the net metering**

396   **program?**

397   **A:**   The main issue with this estimation of costs is that RMP expects to automate its net

398   metering billing system in the future and when they do, the costs associated with billing

399   NEM customer will be a fixed cost that will not change with additional residential Net

400   metering customers. Thus, the estimate for the average costs associated with the billing of

401 net metered customers will decline in the future and the current estimate will  
402 overestimate future billing costs.

403 **Q: What are the benefits identified by RMP of the net metering program?**

404 **A:** The benefits associated with the net metering program include lower net power costs,  
405 lower line losses, and lower inter-jurisdictional cost allocation. RMP did not try to  
406 quantify other measureable benefits, such as lower risk associated with meeting stricter  
407 environmental regulations and avoidance of fuel prices volatility. To be clear, RMP has  
408 recognized the following as benefits (i) avoided plant O&M costs, (ii) avoided  
409 transmission and distribution costs, (iii) avoided capacity investment, and (iv) increased  
410 grid resiliency; however, RMP did not take them into account in its analysis.

411 **Q: How did RMP calculate the value of net power costs that are avoided by the net  
412 metering program?**

413 **A:** RMP used its Grid Model to estimate the value of the energy that was provided by the  
414 residential Net metering customers. But first it had to estimate the amount of power that  
415 was generated by the customer owned solar panels. Once the distributed generation from  
416 solar panels was estimated, the Grid Model was run assuming the power generated by the  
417 residential NEM customer would have to be produced or purchased by RMP. RMP then  
418 compared the net power costs of this counterfactual world with a base case Grid model  
419 that was submitted on April 30, 2015 for its Schedule 37 (QF) filing. The difference  
420 between these two Grid runs produces the net power costs savings as a result of the net  
421 metering program.

422 **Q: How did RMP estimate the amount of power generated from the Net metering  
423 customers.**

424 **A:** RMP estimated the NEM power by installing special meters that measured the output  
425 from the solar panels. There were 36 customers, i.e., observations for this portion of the  
426 study. The data derived from the production profile studies form the basis for residential  
427 NEM customer production data that is replaced in the CFCOS study. This production  
428 data is one of the primary inputs into the Net Power Cost analysis which derives the value  
429 (benefit) of NEM customer solar generation.

430 **Q: Were there any problems or issues associated with this generation study?**

431 **A:** Yes, there were a number of problems or inconsistencies with the generation study that  
432 would call into question the validity of the results. They include a ridiculous and faulty  
433 sampling and RMP's decision not to weather normalizes the results is equally faulty.  
434 Failure to normalize for weather when the year had abnormal weather conditions and a  
435 different system peak can lead to inaccurate forecast of NEM generation. It would be  
436 better if RMP had at least two or three years of data on solar production and a broader  
437 scope and larger sample size.

438 **Q: Can you elaborate on the sampling issue?**

439 **A:** Yes. The 62 sample was originally selected so it was representative of the variety of  
440 different usage levels or strata in the general population of Net metering customers as a  
441 whole. This was the original sample of the load study. However, the sample was  
442 reduced to 52 to eliminate wind generated Net metering customers and it is unknown  
443 whether the 52 sample is representative or not in terms of the strata. Second, the sample  
444 that was used to establish the generation and production profile of solar net metered  
445 customers was only 36 observations. The sample for the actual production measurements  
446 was taken from different counties and then the sample production profile observations

447 were weighted by the number of Net metering customers in each county. However, in  
448 some cases there was only one metered customer in the county, from a statistical  
449 perspective one observation might be an outlier and not representative of the population  
450 in that particular county. This issue is exacerbated by the weighting process. This could  
451 lead to an inaccurate estimate of the power production profile. Further, if stratification of  
452 usage was employed correctly, the sample would have to have usage strata for each  
453 county; the sample clearly does not do that.

454 **Q: What about lack of weather normalization of the load study?**

455 **A:** In its response to Vivint Solar’s Data Request 2.12 (b), RMP stated that “normalization  
456 was not necessary because actual 2015 data was used which was a representation of  
457 actual weather results.” However, we note actual weather in 2015 differed from “normal”  
458 weather based on a number of measurable factors:

459 One: Heating degree days for Salt Lake City in 2015 were 20% below norm<sup>5</sup>;

460 Two: Cooling degree days for Salt Lake City in 2015 were 36% above norm; and

461 Three: Rainfall (as well as cloud cover) was significantly above the recent monthly

462 means in several months, including some months that are the most productive from a

463 solar generation perspective, according to NREL. In the testimony of Robert M. Meredith

464 (exhibit RMP\_ (RMM-3), page 2), it was noted that “the residential distributed

465 generation production curve during the months of May and December is lower than

466 PVWatts® curve.” A possible explanation provided was cloud cover on an hourly basis.

467 The five-year averages for May and December were 55% and 60%, respectively, whereas


468 actuals during the study for May and December were 67% and 66%, respectively. An

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5 Source: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (“NOAA”)

469 analysis of monthly rainfall (as a proxy for cloud cover) also demonstrates variances in  
 470 weather from recent historical “norms”. The figure below shows monthly rainfall in  
 471 2015 as a percentage of monthly averages for January 2000 through April 2017<sup>6</sup>. These  
 472 percentages were compared against the monthly expected generation from residential  
 473 rooftop solar according to NREL PVWatts® for Salt Lake City<sup>7</sup>. This figure  
 474 demonstrates some significant variances from historical averages—both positive and  
 475 negative—including in May, as noted above.

476 Figure 1: Monthly 2015 Rainfall as a % of 2000 – 2017 Monthly Actuals vs. Expected  
 477 Residential Rooftop PV Generation per NREL



478  
 479 Based on the foregoing, we contend that actual 2015 weather differed from what would  
 480 be a “normal” weather year, particularly in months of relatively high solar production,  
 481 and, as such, should not be used as the basis for rate policy or rate setting.

482 **Q: You have identified problems with the generation and load studies that provide**

6 Source: National Centers for Environmental Information (Climate at a Glance for Salt Lake City)

7 Based on standard NREL residential solar configuration (TMY2 data, system size of 4 kW, fixed array, array tilt of 20 degrees, array azimuth of 180 degrees).

483 **critical inputs to the GRID model, are there any other issues with the GRID's Net**  
484 **Power Cost calculations?**

485 **A:** Yes, there are three issues. First, RMP did not include all of the costs associated with the  
486 additional generation required to replace the residential NEM generated power that was  
487 included in the CFCOS. Second, the Commission did not include a capacity value that  
488 the net metering program provided to the system. Third, RMP includes an integration  
489 adjustment that is not appropriate.

490 **Q: Please explain how RMP estimates the power costs that were included in the**  
491 **CFCOS and identify what costs were excluded.**

492 **A:** In order to determine Net Power Costs, one of the quantified benefits of rooftop solar,  
493 RMP used its Generation and Regulation Initiative Decision Tools ("GRID") production  
494 cost model to calculate the cost of generation and/or net market purchases that would be  
495 necessary to replace the estimated generation from rooftop solar systems owned by  
496 residential NET METERING customers. According to RMP, the assumed variable costs  
497 of production in the GRID model are based solely on: (1) delivered fuel costs and (2) unit  
498 heat rate. The model did not assume other variable production costs that would normally  
499 be included in unit dispatch costs including, but not limited to, variable O&M costs,  
500 consumables (i.e., water, etc.), ash disposal, etc. According to the Energy Information  
501 Administration, the assumed non-fuel variable costs of production for coal-fired  
502 generation and gas-fired combined cycle units are \$4.74/MWh<sup>8</sup> and \$3.42/MWh<sup>9</sup>,  
503 respectively. The dollar impact of this exclusion for residential customers is estimated to

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8 Source: EIA Updated Capital Cost Estimates for Utility Scale Electricity Generation Plants, April 2013. Amounts expressed in 2012\$ escalated at 2.0% inflation.

9 Source: EIA Cost and Performance Characteristics of New Generating Technologies, Annual Energy Outlook 2016



504 be \$45,000.

505 **Q: The Net Power Cost analysis estimated the energy value of generation from net**  
506 **metering customers in the CFCOS. Is there capacity value from net metering**  
507 **generating systems that should also be included?**

508 **A:** Yes. Throughout its Compliance filing, RMP repeatedly states that since “the peak  
509 energy output of these solar systems occurs in the middle of the day prior to the timing of  
510 both the system and class level peaks...the peak demand is either unchanged or reduced  
511 very modestly” (Direct testimony of Joelle Steward, lines 346 – 350). As such, RMP  
512 provides little to no value to the capacity of the solar resource, However, the generating  
513 capacity of rooftop solar does have value as a capacity resource and we have estimated  
514 the market value of that capacity in 2015. According to the 2015 IRP, PacifiCorp was  
515 projected to sell 942 MW of capacity in 2015<sup>10</sup>. Further, according to a PacifiCorp and  
516 CAISO study entitled “Regional Coordination in the West: Benefits of PacifiCorp and  
517 California ISO Integration” dated October 2015 (PacifiCorp/CAISO Technical Study), at  
518 the time of the study, PacifiCorp had 982 MW of transfer capability into CAISO. This  
519 capability represented the amount of transfer rights then held by PacifiCorp. The  
520 capacity of the rooftop solar system (i.e. the reduction of peak load) frees up capacity that  
521 PacifiCorp could otherwise monetize through capacity sales. The existence of  
522 incremental available transfer rights into California suggests the ability to monetize this  
523 excess capacity. The value of this capacity in 2015 was estimated as follows:

524

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<sup>10</sup> 2015 Integrated Resource Plan, Volume 1, Table 8.8, page 197 (combined capacity sales for PacifiCorp East and PacifiCorp West)

525

**Table 1: Value of Net Metering Capacity in CFCOS**

Description	Value	Source
Average number of residential customers (2015)	4,390	RMP_(RMM-5)
Average residential system size	5.5 kW	RMP Compliance Filing
Total average capacity (2015)	24.15 MW	
Capacity value (%)	53%	2017 IRP (average for fixed tilt in UT) <sup>11</sup>
Eligible capacity (MW)	12.80 MW	
Capacity pricing (\$/kW-yr)	\$34.80	Value of California RA Capacity for 2012-2016 per the CPUC as reported in the PacifiCorp/CAISO Technical Study (page 12)
Value of net metering capacity (\$000)	\$445	

526

527 As calculated above, the value of the capacity associated with residential net metering  
 528 customers in 2015 was estimated to be approximately \$445K annually.

529 **Q: What is your concern about the integration costs that are included in RMP’s**  
 530 **analysis?**

531 **A:** RMP decreased the value of residential solar generated power because it stated that this  
 532 solar power needs to be integrated into the system, thus lowering the value of the  
 533 residential solar generated energy by \$2.83 per MWh, this estimate of integration costs  
 534 did not come from an actual study rather it was the Commission accepting a proposal  
 535 from the Division. In Utah PSC Docket 12-035-100, Order on Phase II Issues issued  
 536 August 16, 2013; the Commission decided that “Given the absence of a solar integration  
 537 study, we accept the Division’s proposal to respectively apply 65 percent and 50 percent  
 538 of the wind integration cost in PacifiCorp’s 2012 WIS to Fixed Solar and Tracking Solar

<sup>11</sup> Capacity value for solar PV per RMP 2017 IRP documents. Refer to Public Input Meeting 4, September 22-23, 2016, page 54. Refer to additional discussion related to the NEM Breakout Study.

539 resources. We therefore direct PacifiCorp to apply a solar integration charge of \$2.83 per  
540 megawatt hour for Fixed Solar resources...”. Thus, the calculation of Net Power Costs  
541 includes the cost to integrate solar resources due to the variability in solar generation  
542 from cloud cover and the need to ramp resources up and down in response. The \$2.83  
543 per megawatt hour was used in the calculation of Net Power Costs in the CFCOS.  
544 However, other filings by RMP suggest that the costs of solar integration are likely  
545 significantly lower.

546 In its FERC Form 714 filing for 2015 (Part II, Schedule 6), PacifiCorp states that:  
547 *"PacifiCorp does not calculate a system lambda. The PacifiCorp West balancing*  
548 *authority area carries a significant amount of its regulating margin on hydro resource,*  
549 *which do not have a fuel pricing component to contribute to a meaningful system lambda.*  
550 *The PacifiCorp East balancing authority area utilizes the same hydro resources as*  
551 *incremental regulating margin through dynamic transfers, also precluding a meaningful*  
552 *system lambda calculation."*

553 Given the presence of significant hydro resources on the margin and their availability for  
554 regulation that lack a fuel pricing component to the point that precludes a “meaningful  
555 system lambda, the actual cost to integrate solar resources is nominal. The benefit of  
556 excluding this integration cost is up to \$45,000 for residential customers (excluding the  
557 43.6% of generation that is behind the meter).

558 **Q: Were class allocations adjusted to account for changes otherwise made to the cost /**  
559 **benefit analysis?**

560 **A:** Yes. As previously noted, it was recommended to reduce the total amount of residential  
561 bill credits by the amount of the credits attributable to behind-the-meter generation and

562 consumption, which was estimated to be 43.6% of self-generation. In order to adjust for  
563 energy-related expense allocations (and not double-count the benefit of behind-the-meter  
564 generation in the allocation of energy-related expenses), the monthly amount of net  
565 energy for residential (Sch 001) customers in the CFCOS study was reduced by the  
566 estimated behind-the-meter generation. The adjustment in kWh terms was calculated as  
567 the difference in monthly net energy between the ACOS and CFCOS multiplied by  
568 43.6%. After making the adjustment in energy usage and running it through the CFCOS  
569 model, the result was a reduction in the cost of service for the CFCOS study (as  
570 adjusted). This also reduced the difference in expense allocations between the ACOS and  
571 CFCOS (as adjusted) by \$288K. Thus, the benefit associated with lower class allocation  
572 cost was reduced by the \$288K and double counting of the residential net metering  
573 customer's usage behind the meter was avoided.

574 **Q: Your adjustment to the Bill credits required an adjustment for the**  
575 **interjurisdictional, state and class allocation factors, doesn't it require an**  
576 **adjustment to the estimate net power costs estimates?**

577 **A:** Yes, it does. We used the same methodology for net power costs by adjusting the results  
578 of the GRID Model to adjust for the behind the meter usage of the net metered customers.  
579 We simply reduced the amount of the savings by the behind the meter percentage or  
580 43.6%

581 **Q: Have you been able to quantify the differences between RMP's estimate of the net**  
582 **cost of the residential net metering program and the estimate of costs of the**  
583 **program that include your corrections?**

584 **A:** Yes. Once we incorporate the corrections to RMP's estimates, the net cost to the

585 residential class resulting from the net metering program is \$416,366 or \$14.71 per MWh  
586 and \$94.84 per customer per year. These estimated costs shifts are substantially lower  
587 than RMP's estimate and given the benefits of the program that were not included in the  
588 analysis, there is no justification for changing the net metering tariff or the program.

589 **Q: Are there other issues with the ACOS and CFCOS analysis?**

590 **A:** Yes, there might be. As described below in our discussion of the NEM Breakout  
591 analysis, RMP appears to underestimate the peak shaving abilities of roof-top solar.  
592 Although we have not been able to quantify the impact of this in the ACOS and CFCOS,  
593 if indeed they used a 7% peak reduction rather than a 47% peak reduction in their cost of  
594 service studies it would over allocate generation and transmission costs at the  
595 jurisdictional, state and class level. Given our estimation of the impact in the NEM  
596 Breakout study, this could have a major effect on the net cost calculation.

597 **NEM Breakout Analysis**

598 **Q: Can you describe how RMP performed the second analysis where they broke out a**  
599 **separate rate class for residential Net metering customers?**

600 **A:** The Commission ordered RMP to perform a second analysis "to segregating net metering  
601 customers from the class in which they presently participate and reflect the resulting class  
602 cost of service to the net metering customers as a separate class and show the impact their  
603 segregation has on the class in which they would other participate." 12 RMP started with  
604 the class ACOS study and separated classes for net metering customers. The  
605 characteristics of their cost of service were identified, removed from the overall class  
606 they were separated from and placed in their own NEM class. The characteristics include

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12 November 2015 Order

607 different customer counts, revenues, energy values, system coincident peak demand  
608 values, distribution coincident peak demand values, non-coincident peak demand values,  
609 number of customers per transformer and metering costs.

610 **Q: Based on your review of the NEM Breakout Study did you find any issues with**  
611 **respect to the key assumptions and/or findings?**

612 **A:** Yes. The primary issues surround the ability of rooftop solar to reduce peak demand.  
613 RMP claims throughout its Compliance Filing that rooftop solar generation has little to  
614 no impact on peak reduction.

615 *“This solar generation often does not coincide with RMP’s peak load, thus only*  
616 *minimally reducing that load. Company witness Mr. Marx testifies that a net metering*  
617 *customer’s peak production occurs during the spring months while their peak load, and*  
618 *that of other customers occurs during the summer months.”<sup>13</sup>*

619 *“In addition, because peak solar generation often does not coincide with the time of*  
620 *RMP’s peak load, net metering customers’ private generation systems have only a*  
621 *modest ability to reduce peak load.”<sup>14</sup>*

622 *“The peak energy output of these solar systems occurs in the middle of the day prior to*  
623 *the timing of both the system and class level peaks. As a result of this output, the energy*  
624 *requirements for these customers are reduced, but the peak demand is either unchanged*  
625 *or reduced very modestly.”<sup>15</sup>*

626 *“My testimony demonstrates that rooftop solar generation does not reduce the peak*  
627 *demand on the distribution system to a degree that could warrant a reduction in*

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13 RMP Compliance Filing, page 13 (Discussion, section B)

14 RMP Compliance Filing, page 9 of direct testimony of Gary W. Hoogeveen, lines 192 - 196

15 RMP Compliance Filing, page 19 of direct testimony of Joelle R. Steward, lines 346 - 350

628 *infrastructure.*”<sup>16</sup>

629 However, these assertions are materially different from other estimates of the capacity  
 630 value (or peaking shaving capability) of solar PV resources. For instance, in its “Solar  
 631 Energy and Capacity Value” fact sheet (September 2013), NREL states that “in the  
 632 western United States, the capacity value of PV plants can be in the range of 50% to 80%  
 633 of their alternating current (AC) rating...”. NREL also lists several specific studies  
 634 which had capacity values ranging from 20% to 78.3%, with most in the range of 40 –  
 635 60%.

Utility District Studied (Authors)	Summary of Methodology	Reported Capacity value
Arizona Public Service (APS 2013)	Performance data from installed system in service territory, load profiles from 2003 to 2007; single-axis tracking; deployment projections for 2015; ELCC simulations for existing capacity and next 100 MW built	45.9%–48.4%
Nevada Energy (Lu et al. 2012)	Nevada Energy southern system generation fleet in the 2007 study year; ELCC calculation using LOLE of 1 day in 10 years	57.4%
Nevada Power (Perez et al. 2008a)	Satellite-derived resource data to simulate output; simulated 2% PV deployment; 30° SW-facing fixed systems; ELCC calculation	71%
New York ISO (Perez et al. 2009b)	South-facing fixed slope; ELCC calculation for simulated 2% PV grid penetration using 2007 generation and load data	44.3–78.3%
Portland General Electric (Perez et al. 2008a)	Satellite-derived resource data to simulate output; simulated 1% PV deployment; 30° SW-facing fixed systems; ELCC calculation	31%
Public Service Colorado (Xcel 2013)	2009-2010 historic load and solar generation; single-axis tracking; ELCC calculation using LOLE of 1 day in 10 years	41%–47%
TriState (TriState 2010)	LOLP method, with expected capacity availability during peak load hour; unclear assumptions for generation and load data	20%–57%

636

637 **Q: Are there other filings by RMP which suggest a different conclusion to the capacity**  
 638 **value and peak-shaving ability of solar PV?**

639 **A:** Yes. According to PacifiCorp’s 2017 Integrated Resource Plan filings<sup>17</sup>, the capacity

<sup>16</sup> RMP Compliance Filing, page 2 of direct testimony of Douglas Marx, lines 27 - 29  
<sup>17</sup> Public Input Meeting 4, September 22-23, 2016, page 54

640 contribution results for solar are assumed to be 51.0% in Milton, UT and 53.0% for  
641 average fixed tilt solar in Utah. That is, there is an estimated 47.0% reduction (1 –  
642 53.0%) in peak load for each unit of fixed tilt solar added in Utah on average. This  
643 suggests that the capacity contribution for solar based on the IRP analysis is significantly  
644 higher than RMP’s testimony in the Compliance Filing would suggest.

645 **Q: Why is the amount of assumed peak shaving or capacity value of solar PV**  
646 **important?**

647 **A:** The NEM Breakout Study was intended to take RMP’s actual 2015 cost of service and  
648 allocate them to various customer classes, with separate class breakouts for Net metering  
649 customers, including residential. According to RMP, most of the costs to serve  
650 residential customers are fixed, not variable, in nature. Based on Company estimates,  
651 approximately 63% of all residential cost of service was deemed to be demand-related”<sup>18</sup>.  
652 Demand-related charges in the NEM Breakout Study are allocated based on system  
653 coincident peak and state distribution coincident peak. According to RMP, “most of  
654 RMP’s costs are allocated in class cost of service studies based on demand-based  
655 measurements because the system is designed to serve load at different peaks.”<sup>19</sup> As  
656 such, accurately estimating the reduction of peak load driven by solar PV is very  
657 important to cost allocation.

658 **Q: What is the estimated impact on the NEM Breakout Study of using a reduction of**  
659 **peak load consistent with RMP’s prior IRP filings with the Commission?**

660 **A:** To estimate the impact of additional demand reduction on the NEM Breakout Study, we  
661 reduced the assumed system coincident peak and the distribution coincident peak in the

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18 RMP Compliance Filing, page 20 of the direct testimony of Joelle R. Steward, table 5.  
19 RMP Compliance Filing, page 20 of direct testimony of Joelle R. Steward



662 “ACOS UT Dec 2015 NEM Breakout” model by the estimated incremental reduction  
663 suggested by RMP’s IRP filing. The actual amount of peak demand reduction for system  
664 coincident peak and distribution coincident peak was not expressly disclosed in the RMP  
665 Compliance Filing but, based on other testimony cited above; this reduction was deemed  
666 “modest”. We do note that the “Distribution Rooftop Solar Study”, a study conducted by  
667 RMP in 2014 on a single circuit, noted that the reduction in circuit peak demand was  
668 approximately 7%. As such, we used this as a proxy for the modeled reduction in both  
669 system coincident and distribution coincident peak demand. The revised peak reduction  
670 was based on the peak reduction implied by RMP’s IRP filing for average Utah fixed tilt  
671 solar of 47.0%. The adjustment to monthly system peaks in the NEM Breakout Study  
672 model for ‘Sch 001 NEM’ residential customers (‘Demand’ worksheet, line 155 for  
673 system coincident peaks) was  $X * (1.07) * (1 - .47)$ .<sup>20</sup> This was intended to gross up  
674 peak load by the assumed reduction modeled and then reduce that amount by the  
675 reduction implied from RMP’s IRP filings. We also adjusted the peak load for ‘Sch 001’  
676 residential (non-Net metering customers) so that the sum of the ‘Sch 001 NEM’ and ‘Sch  
677 001’ peaks were consistent with the respective monthly peaks for residential customers in  
678 the 2015 ACOS model.

679 The filed NEM Breakout Study suggested a subsidy of NEM residential customers by  
680 non-NEM residential customers of approximately \$1.1 million<sup>21</sup>. Modeling a reduction  
681 in system coincident peak consistent using the IRP peak reduction of 47% results in  
682 lowering the calculated subsidy by \$408K to \$687K.

683 **Q: Did you note any potential issues with the load study that may have contributed to**

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20 From ACOS UT 2015 NEM Breakout Model

21 RMP Compliance Filing, page 26 of the direct testimony of Robert M. Meredith and Exhibit RMP\_(RMM-13).


684 **the discrepancy in peak demand reduction under the load study relative to RMP's**  
685 **IRP-related filings?**

686 **A:** Yes. Potential issues identified include the following:

- 687 • The 2015 load study does not appear to have been weather normalized.
- 688 • The number of samples within individual strata may be lower than targeted sample size,  
689 thereby potentially skewing results.
- 690 • For some counties there appears to be just one observation.

691 **Q: Could you discuss why the issue of weather normalization is a problem?**


692 **A:** The NEM load does not appear to have been normalized. According to RMP testimony,  
693 the peak month (in the load study) was June 2015<sup>22</sup>, however, the peak load is normally  
694 July<sup>23</sup>. As noted below, the summer months in 2015 were warmer than usual,  
695 particularly, June which had more than twice the number of cooling degree days as  
696 normal.



697

22 RMP Compliance Filing, page 11 of the direct testimony of Robert M. Meredith testimony, line 223.  
23 RMP Compliance Filing, page 4 of the direct testimony of Douglas L. Marx, line 70.

698 In fact, late June 2015 temperatures reached temperatures of 104 degrees, approaching  
699 record highs and far exceeded normal highs for June and July.



700

701

702 **Q: Given these issues with the NEM Breakout Study, what is your recommendation for**  
703 **the Commission?**

704 **A:** Given the multiple uncertainties surrounding this study, we recommend that the  
705 Commission disregard the study's conclusion and order RMP to redo the analysis after  
706 correcting for the errors. The Commission should not use the conclusions RMP draws  
707 from this study to make findings in this case. The load study should cover multiple years.

708 **Q: What is your opinion on RMP's proposed tariff, Schedule 5 for residential**  
709 **customers?**

710 **A:** The proposed schedule 5 with its three-part tariff will have a chilling effect on the solar  
711 industry in Utah. It will kill the residential solar industry and deny Utah ratepayers the  
712 opportunity to economically install solar energy system. The tariff is composed of three  
713 parts: the customer charge of \$15 per month and a demand charge of \$9.02 on-peak and  
714 an energy charge of \$.03814 for all kWh. The most onerous part of the tariff is the

715 demand charge as it creates a disincentive to invest in roof top solar. The demand charge,  
716 as testified to earlier, is difficult for residential consumer to interpret and understand.  
717 Therefore it will be difficult to implement. RMP argues that the tariff more closely aligns  
718 with cost causation and therefore is necessary, but this is true for non-NEM residential  
719 customers also. Given residential consumers' uncertainty surrounding the nature of  
720 demand charges and how distributive generation could avoid them, the likely outcome  
721 will be for residential consumers to forego self-generation. The relatively low and flat  
722 energy rate creates a disincentive to save on energy. The past dozen or so IRPs have  
723 shown that demand-side efficiency is one of the most cost effective resources available to  
724 the system.

725 **Q: What are your concerns about the \$15 per month customer charge?**

726 **A:** The \$15 customer charge was derived by including the \$8 charge based on traditional  
727 costs of the customer services, meters and line services plus the cost of transformers. This  
728 was RMP's justification for the higher charge and it adds an additional \$7.00 to the  
729 customer charge for Net metering customers.

730 **Q: Why are transformers included in the calculation of the NEM residential customer**  
731 **charge, while transformers are not included for non-Net metering customers?**

732 **A:** Witness Marx argues that Net metering customers use the electrical grid differently than  
733 non-Net metering customers and put a greater cost burden on the grid system because not  
734 only do they receive power from the grid but also export power to the grid. Citing the  
735 inverse relationship between ambient temperatures and PV output, Marx argues that net  
736 zero Net metering customers could export more power to the grid compared to its peak  
737 load demand. Thus, he argues in May the maximum exported power could be as much as

738 50% more than the maximum imported power in July. However, this argument is a red  
739 herring and only applies in limited cases. First, Marx assumes that the NEM customer  
740 sizes his solar system for zero consumption of energy; next he assumes that all customers  
741 on the transformer are also zero net energy Net metering customers. If one or two  
742 customers on the transformer are a non-NEM customer or less than full zero net energy  
743 customer then the exported power from the NEM customer will simply negate the inflow  
744 of power to the non-Net metering customers. Marx's argument appears to be an unlikely  
745 scenario given the current penetration levels of solar panels on the system and the fact  
746 that only 13% of all net metered customers are zero net energy. Based on two modeling  
747 studies in the Northeast #16 circuit and the Bingham #11 circuit, he concludes that solar  
748 panels will only offset 7% of peak demand on a given circuit. This may be true for the  
749 present equipment on the circuit, but it may delay the need for future upgrades to the  
750 circuits.

751 **Q: Witness Steward was asked about the potential impacts of the costs shift to other**  
752 **residential customers if net metering is not addressed, do you care to comment.**

753 **A:** Yes, she states that according to RMP's analysis, for 2015 the net cost to other residential  
754 customers is \$1.8 million and it is estimated to be \$6.5 in 2017 and will increase to \$78  
755 million per year in when the program meets the 20% cap. She also states that the  
756 cumulative cost shift will be approximately \$667 million over a 20 year period.  
757 However, as our analysis indicates, RMP's analysis overestimates the costs and  
758 underestimates the benefits of the net metering program. In regards to her statement that  
759 the cumulative costs are \$667 million, we assume these total cumulative costs do not take  
760 into account the time value of money. But more importantly, if we are going to look at

761 the 20 year horizon, then we should look at the net benefits of the net metering program  
762 over that same period which the 2015 IRP indicates are \$706 Million dollars in present  
763 value revenue requirement which does take into account the time value of money.

764 **Q: Can you discuss the general framework for analysis that the Commission required**  
765 **of RMP when calculating the benefit and costs of the net metering program?**

766 **A:** Yes, the Commission took an incorrect view and misinterpreted the Legislature's intent.  
767 By restricting the analysis to a cost of service study that takes the revenue requirement as  
768 a given and then assigns costs to the various classes based on the cost causation principle,  
769 the Commission has mistakenly left out important costs and benefits of the net metering  
770 program by requiring the analysis to take place solely within twelve month cost of service  
771 allocation study.

772 **Q: What logic did the Commission use to restrict the analysis to a one year period used**  
773 **in a cost of service allocation study?**

774 **A:** I believe that the Commission made a fundamental error in its logic. The Commission  
775 confused cost of service regulation with a cost of service allocation study. On page 15 of  
776 their July 1, 2014 order in this docket, they state:

777 "In sum, we interpret Subsection One in a manner consistent with its plain  
778 language and the Commission's traditional role as utility regulator. As a matter of  
779 law, we conclude Subsection One requires the Commission to consider costs and  
780 benefits that accrue to the utility or its non-net metering customers in their  
781 capacity as ratepayers of the utility. It necessarily follows that any cost or benefit  
782 to be included in the Subsection One analysis must be a cost or benefit that has

783 *some impact on the utility's cost of service.*"<sup>24</sup>

784 The traditional method of utility regulation is to set rates base on the utility's cost of service  
785 which includes a fair rate of return on investment. Cost of service regulation consists of three  
786 separate parts: the determination of revenue requirement, the cost of service allocation study and  
787 rate design. The Commission is well aware of the process to determine all three stages so I will  
788 not go into in detail here. However, what the Commission has done by adopting a cost of service  
789 allocation study methodology to evaluate the cost and benefits of a net metering program is to  
790 leave out of the analysis what is arguably the most important stage, the determination of revenue  
791 requirement.

792 **Q: Why is it important to distinguish between cost of service regulation and cost of service**  
793 **allocation study?**

794 **A:** Like I alluded to above, using a cost of service allocation study which allocates costs amongst the  
795 different classes based on the costs each class places on the system fails to evaluate what costs or  
796 benefits that the net metering program contributes to the overall revenue requirement. RMP's  
797 2015 IRP explicitly finds that a scenario that assumes a higher penetration of net meter customers  
798 has a lower present value revenue requirement than the base case. Surely, the legislature did not  
799 intend for the Commission to ignore such future benefits or costs.

800 **Q: But those benefits occur in the future not today, so they are irrelevant to today's ratepayer.**

801 **A:** Today's ratepayer will be tomorrow's ratepayer unless they move out of RMP's jurisdiction or  
802 die. To ignore an action today that will provide future benefits because it does not benefit us  
803 immediately is short sighted and will lead to a diminished future. It's like a young worker telling  
804 his investment advisor that he won't save for his retirement because he will not see any benefits  
805 in the next (test) year.

806 **Q: How will the Commission be able to set rates for net metering customers if it does not use a**

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<sup>24</sup> Italics not in the original order.

807 **test year?**

808 **A:** The Commission should first determine the costs and benefits of the net metering program by  
809 looking at the impact the program will have on ratepayers and RMP. If the long term benefits of  
810 the program outweigh the long run costs, the Commission should take no action. But if the long-  
811 term costs are greater than the long-term benefits than the Commission should take action and use  
812 test year data to set rates that will equate costs and benefits.

813 **Q: Are any there any other long-term benefits of net metered generation that can be**  
814 **quantified?**

815 **A:** Yes, we have identified two possible long term benefits; the first is Renewable Energy Credits  
816 (RECs) RMP will not have to purchase and second is the avoidance of any future carbon  
817 reduction expense, i.e., a carbon tax.

818 **Q: Please explain how NEM generation will avoid the purchase of RECs and if possible**  
819 **quantify this benefit.**

820 **A:** Yes, although the “green” attributes of the NEM generation do not accrue to RMP (absent a  
821 negotiated agreement per Commission direction), the generation that is produced and consumed,  
822 on site will be a cost-savings to RMP in future years when the Utah RPS goal becomes effective.  
823 With the enactment of “The Energy Resource and Carbon Emission Reduction Initiative”  
824 (SB202) in March of 2008, the state of Utah adopted an RPS goal of 20% of adjusted retail sales  
825 from renewable resources (as defined) by 2025. According to Exhibit RMP\_ (RMM-4), 12,341  
826 MWhs are generated and consumed onsite by NEM residential customers. If this generation was  
827 not produced and consumed, RMP would be required to procure 2469 (20% of the total) RECs  
828 annually. Based on RMP’s 2015 IRP, the economic break-even price for unbundled RECs in  
829 Oregon, according to RMP’s System Optimizer, was \$18/MWh. Using this value as a proxy for  
830 unbundled RECs in Utah yields an annual benefit of \$44k/year.

831 **Q: What about if there is a carbon reduction program?**



832 **A:** Similarly, upon implementation of a carbon reduction program, the onsite generation from the net  
833 metering program yields significant benefits. Without this generation, RMP would have to either:  
834 (a) pay a carbon-tax on replacement thermal generation from Company resources or (b) pay  
835 higher prices for replacement power from the market (assuming thermal resources are on the  
836 margin), since the variable carbon costs would be included in unit dispatch costs. We calculated  
837 the economic benefit of this generation using the following assumptions:

- 838 ○ Carbon emissions rates:
  - 839 ■ Coal: 215 lbs/mmbtu (per EIA)
  - 840 ■ Gas: 117 lbs/mmbtu (per EIA)
- 841 ○ Heat rates (assumed)
  - 842 ■ Coal: 10,000 btu/kwh
  - 843 ■ Gas: 7,200 btu/kwh
- 844 ○ Carbon prices (per RMP 2015 IRP, Volume 1, page 146)
- 845 ○ Coal / gas mix: 81.7% / 18.3% (calculated from the relationship of coal-fired generation  
846 and gas-fired generation replacement power in the Net Power Cost Analysis)

847 Based on the foregoing, the average cost savings to RMP over the forecast period 2015 to 2034 is  
848 \$391K.

849 **Q: Could you summarize your testimony?**

850 **A:** Yes, we have analyzed the Company's Compliance Filing and have found that there are too many  
851 errors and faulty assumptions that were made which exaggerates the costs imposed on the  
852 Company and other customers by the net metering program. The Filing also underestimates the  
853 benefits. This is not to be unexpected as distributive generation such as net metering represents a  
854 competitive force utilities would rather not deal with and if possible put at a competitive  
855 disadvantage.

856 There are a number of flaws in the study; the load and generation studies have inadequate

857           sampling and too few numbers of observations to render a reliable statistical inference. It should  
858           be noted that these questionable studies provide key inputs into both cost of service studies: the  
859           ACOS and CFCOS study and the NRM Breakout study. Without confidence in critical inputs to  
860           a study, one can have little confidence in the output of the results. They also counted in the bill  
861           credit cost, , the net metered customers use of their own generation which is inappropriate. They  
862           improperly assigned costs of transformers to NEM customers. They don't properly evaluate  
863           capacity value of net metering program and there are numerous other errors in the study that are  
864           described in my testimony. They have sponsored a tariff that will be hard for customers to  
865           understand and the tariff will destroy the solar industry in the state of Utah like it did in Nevada.  
866           The Company has asked for a change in a tariff that will bring in more revenue, but has done so  
867           outside a general rate case while RMP appears to be earning its authorized return. I strongly  
868           recommend that you keep the net metering program as is, order the Company to make corrections  
869           to it load and generation studies of net metered customers and continue the study for more years  
870           and finally revisit this issue only during a general rate case.

871   **Q.    Does this conclude your direct testimony?**

872   **A.    Yes.**

**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify that on June 8, 2017, I sent a true and correct copy of the pre-filed direct testimony of Richard Collins representing Vivint Solar, Inc. by email to the following:

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