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-BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH-

In the Matter of the Investigation of the
Costs and Benefits of Pacificorp's Net
Metering Program

Docket No. 14-035-114

REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF THOMAS PLAGEMANN FOR VIVINT SOLAR, INC.

July 25, 2017

Submitted on behalf of Vivint Solar, Inc.

/s/Stephen F. Mecham

1 **Q. Please state your name and business address.**

2 A. My name is Thomas Plagemann. My business address is 1800 West Ashton Boulevard
3 Lehi, Utah 84043.

4 **Q. For whom are you testifying in the proceeding?**

5 A. Vivint Solar, Inc. (“*Vivint Solar*”).

6 **Q. Have you testified previously in this proceeding?**

7 A. Yes, I previously filed direct testimony in this docket on June 8, 2017.

8 **Q. What is the purpose of your rebuttal testimony?**

9 A. The purpose of my rebuttal testimony is to rebut or support certain aspects of testimony
10 filed by the Office of Consumer Services (the “*Office*”) and the Division of Public
11 Utilities (the “*Division*”).

12 **Q. Please provide a summary of the items discussed in this testimony.**

13 A. A summary of the items addressed in this testimony are as follows:

14 i. Grandfathering of net metering (“*NEM*”) customers;

15 ii. Separate rate class for NEM customers;

16 iii. NEM program;

17 iv. Netting period and export credit rate; and

18 v. Facilities fee.

19 **Grandfathering**

20 **Q. Please briefly summarize the Office’s and Division’s filed testimony on**
21 **grandfathering?**

22 A. The Office’s position on grandfathering for current and future NEM customers is found
23 on lines 571-575 of Michele Beck’s testimony, as well as in several other places

24 throughout her pre-filed direct testimony. The Office recommends establishing a
25 transition period of approximately twelve years, with existing NEM customers being
26 grandfathered only for that specific transition period.

27 The Division's position on grandfathering current and future NEM customers is found on
28 lines 508-516 of Dr. Artie Powell's testimony, as well as in several other places in his
29 pre-filed direct testimony. The Division recommends that the NEM program be closed,
30 starting January 1, 2018, and all customers transition to a new unknown rate regime after
31 approximately seven years. The transition period ends on January 1, 2025 under the
32 Division's proposal. The Division argues that given the Commission initiated the current
33 docket with its notice of a technical conference, dated August 29, 2014, current NEM
34 customers will have been on notice of possible changes in the NEM program for more
35 than ten years. Vivint Solar disagrees that NEM customers were "on notice" since 2014,
36 particularly because at that time the considered change to the NEM program was a small
37 monthly charge which ultimately was rejected by the Commission. Based on the scope
38 of the proposed change and the subsequent denial, it would not be reasonable to expect
39 that NEM customers (and prospective NEM customers who may not have even been
40 interested in solar in 2014) should have foreseen the scope of the changes, or complete
41 elimination of NEM, currently before the Commission. Changing the NEM program
42 prospectively for new participants is very different from changing the NEM program
43 retroactively to affect participants under the original NEM program – there is no amount
44 or "notice" that justifies retroactively changing the rules of a NEM program. The NEM
45 program was available to customers for almost 12 years prior to any proposed changes
46 and the NEM cap of 20% of the 2007 peak demand provided clear guidance to consumers

47 that it would continue to be available for many years to come. Regardless of whether
48 new customers were “on notice,” changing the NEM program prospectively for new
49 participants is very different from changing the NEM program retroactively to affect
50 participants under the original NEM program – there is no amount of “notice” that
51 justifies retroactively changing the rules of a program that was created as an incentive to
52 homeowners to make an investment in solar. Vivint Solar strongly disagrees with the
53 Office and the Division because both grandfathering time-frames are not adequate in
54 giving current NEM customers an adequate time frame to achieve the potential benefits
55 envisioned when they made their investments in 30-year solar energy generation assets.

56 **Q. Why are these grandfathering time-frames not adequate?**

57 A. While there is agreement among the Division, the Office, and Vivint Solar in principle
58 that current NEM customers should be grandfathered, the time-frames proposed by the
59 Office and the Division are insufficient and inconsistent with the original intent of
60 establishing the NEM program. Solar assets have a 30-year useful life and any
61 investment in solar energy generation (whether made by a residential customer, a
62 residential solar company such as Vivint Solar, or a utility such as Rocky Mountain
63 Power (“*RMP*”) under an IRP) requires some level of certainty, transparency, and the
64 expectation of a consistent framework for a 20 to 30-year period to recover that long-term
65 investment. Note that this is not the same thing as guaranteeing prices for fuel and
66 operating costs, or energy rates generally, or removing the risk to the investor for asset
67 performance. The NEM framework does not guarantee owners of solar energy systems a
68 specific economic outcome, because the residential class rate, which they are credited,
69 can go up, stay flat, or go down – each of which would have different economic

70 outcomes for the solar owner. Owners of a solar energy system are also exposed to
71 weather and other operating and performance risks for the 30-year life of the solar energy
72 generation asset. Rewriting NEM rules in the middle of that 30-year investment, when
73 NEM was enacted to incentivize rooftop solar investment, is akin to yanking the rug out
74 from under these customers and could be viewed as a public taking of private property by
75 significantly devaluing a customer's 30-year asset. Any effort to revoke, reverse, or
76 substantially amend the rules established to incentivize solar infrastructure investment is
77 inherently anti-business and has the potential to stunt private investment. Private
78 investors, who are taking the risk of residential class rates changing, were clearly
79 incentivized to construct and operate a rooftop solar energy system based on the bargain
80 struck when the NEM rules were implemented. Therefore, grandfathering customers for
81 less than 20 to 25 years would (i) be against the public interest, (ii) be anti-private
82 investment, and (iii) expose NEM customers to the potential of a stranded investment by
83 hindering a NEM customer from recouping and benefiting from their 30-year solar
84 investment. The Commission should ensure that NEM Customers remain on the rate
85 regime that existed at the time the NEM customer made their long-term investment. For
86 additional context please see Dan Black's pre-filed rebuttal testimony.

87 **Q. Why should a residential customer's long-term investment in a solar energy system**
88 **be grandfathered?**

89 A. It is a significant financial decision for a residential customer to invest in a solar energy
90 system; one that is not without many risks beyond the regulatory rate regime (see above).
91 Other than their home, and depending on the size and cost of the system, it may be one of
92 the most expensive purchases a customer makes in their life. Utah's solar market has a

93 very low level of penetration and is still in its infancy, with most of the installations
94 occurring in the last few years. NEM customers are clearly the state's early technology
95 adopters. Their faith in an enduring NEM program is what convinced them, in part, to
96 pay an initially higher price for their systems, which in turn allowed the solar industry to
97 scale in Utah, which will benefit future NEM customers and the economy of Utah. These
98 customers had no reason to believe that RMP would try eliminate the NEM program in
99 an effort to suppress competition, eliminate consumer choice, and protect RMP's
100 shareholders from potential stranded costs. The grandfathering periods offered by the
101 Division and Office are not in line with fundamental principles that are required to
102 support long-term infrastructure investments relied on in the capital markets for
103 financing.

104 To be clear, a typical solar customer does not save money by installing a solar energy
105 system in the first 12 years of their investment. Many NEM customers make their long-
106 term investment with an expectation that they will achieve an adequate benefit from their
107 solar system investment over its 30-year useful life, and often savings are more heavily
108 weighted to the back-end of the solar energy generation asset's life, after the investment
109 cost has been amortized and the customer is receiving power with no incremental
110 payments. To be clear, in such a scenario, even with 20 years of grandfathering under the
111 current regulatory regime (retail NEM), a NEM customer is exposed to significant
112 uncertainty in the final years of the assets useful life, specifically during years 21 through
113 30.

114 When NEM customers made the financial decision to invest long-term in a solar energy
115 system, they did so with a reasonable expectation that the then current regulatory regime

116 (retail NEM) would continue to be available. On lines 214 to 215 of Dr. Powell’s direct
117 testimony he states “customers make rational decisions assuming reasonable stability and
118 predictability of electric service rates”. Vivint Solar strongly agrees. Each of these NEM
119 customers made a rational long-term investment decision assuming just that, reasonable
120 stability and predictability of their electric rates as well as the enduring applicability of
121 the NEM program. While customers understood that their utility rates (volumetric
122 charge, minimum bill, and fixed charge) would change, over time, with the entire
123 Schedule 1 residential class, they had no reason to believe the entire NEM rate regime
124 could change, creating a new financial playing field for their long-term investment. The
125 policies implemented by the Commission and the State of Utah supported and
126 encouraged a customer’s long-term investment in a solar energy system, consumer
127 choice, and energy independence.

128 **Q. How has the State of Utah encouraged investment in solar and participation in the**
129 **NEM program?**

130 A. In 2002, through legislative action, the state enacted a NEM bill. The NEM statute reads
131 “(2) An electrical corporation *may discontinue making a net metering program available*
132 *to customers not already participating in the program* if: (a) the cumulative generating
133 capacity of customer generation systems in the program equals at least .1% of the
134 electrical corporation's peak demand during 2007” (emphasis added).¹ This language
135 strongly suggests that customers in the NEM program would remain in the program, even
136 once the NEM cap was reached. This implied that the legislative understanding was that
137 NEM customers would be provided a period of time to recoup and benefit from their

¹ Utah Code 54-15-103 (2)

138 investment in a solar energy system and the legislative intent to provide a regulatory
139 regime which allowed that to occur. Consistent with all long-dated infrastructure
140 investment, it is likely that the intent was to provide the necessary period of time to
141 recoup such an investment - the entire 30-year useful life of the solar energy generation
142 asset. In 2009, the Commission chose to increase the NEM cap to 20% of 2007 peak
143 demand, a clear signal to the market that NEM was encouraged. Additionally, the 2009
144 order specifically stated “whatever cap we select is not a target or a goal, rather it is
145 simply a point at which the utility may discontinue the net metering program *going*
146 *forward*”² (emphasis added). This specifically suggests once again that customers in the
147 NEM program would be grandfathered under the NEM rate regime that existed at the
148 time they made their long-term investment. This decision was relied upon by both
149 customers and the solar industry to form a reasonable expectation that an investment in a
150 rooftop solar energy system was encouraged and protected by the Commission and the
151 State of Utah. Currently, in Utah, where the residential customer base is rapidly growing,
152 there is less than 2% residential solar penetration. Even when one includes commercial
153 rooftop projects, the state is not even 20% of the way to achieving the current NEM cap,
154 as set by the Commission in 2009.

155 Up until the most recent legislative session, a \$2,000 state income tax credit was
156 available to any resident who purchased and installed a solar energy system at their
157 residence. With no sunset date initially, the state legislature encouraged continued
158 investment by its residents in solar energy systems that participated in the NEM program.

² Utah Public Service Commission Order, Docket No. 08-035-78, issued February 12, 2009.

159 The purpose of each of these policies was to support and encourage customers to make a
160 long-term rational financial decision to invest in a solar energy system. Enticing
161 customers to invest in a solar energy system with policies that make the investment
162 economically viable over a 20 or 30-year horizon and then dramatically altering the
163 regulatory regime without adequate grandfathering, amounts to a bait and switch.

164 **Q. Why is 20 to 25 years, as a minimum, the necessary length of time to grandfather**
165 **NEM customers?**

166 A. The Commission should consider how a shorter grandfathering period affects the existing
167 financing contracts for residential solar energy projects. For a 7-kW rooftop solar
168 system, the cost to the customer will be approximately \$30,000. While a cash purchase is
169 always an option for those customers that have \$30,000 readily available to invest, more
170 often, customers will elect to finance their solar energy systems for 20 years.
171 Alternatively, in 2015 to 2016, a customer could enter into an arrangement where Vivint
172 Solar owns the rooftop solar system and the customer “leases” the use of the rooftop solar
173 system for 20 years. Vivint Solar was the only provider in the state of Utah to offer
174 customers the lease financing option and currently has hundreds of owned assets
175 deployed throughout Utah. Should the grandfathering period be less than 20 to 25 years,
176 with an economic framework such as RMP has proposed, it could significantly
177 undermine the economic value to these customers, as the benefits they receive would
178 shrink relative to the fixed costs they are incurring, thus increasing the probability of
179 customers defaulting on their financing arrangement, whether loan or lease. In addition
180 to the negative impacts this would have on the customer, it would have a substantial
181 impact on the financing company, loan providers, and investors. Failure to provide an

182 adequate grandfathering period consistent with the various financing vehicles would
183 undermine the ability of lenders to continue to offer financing for distributed generation
184 in the state, because it sends a clear signal to the capital markets that the State of Utah
185 does not adequately protect the rights given to investors under a program like NEM.

186 **Q. Do other states protect consumers through grandfathering provisions?**

187 A. Yes, as detailed in Dan Black’s testimony, grandfathering customers for 20 years or more
188 is common in states who have moved beyond a traditional NEM program. Utah will be
189 the national outlier and certainly be at risk for harsh public outcry, which occurred in
190 Nevada when prior NEM customers were not grandfathered for 20 years and instead were
191 placed on a transitional rate plan. Note that Nevada Energy is a sister company to RMP
192 and both are owned and controlled by Berkshire Hathaway Energy (“Berkshire”), a
193 company with an \$85 billion balance sheet and had operating cash flows of \$6 billion in
194 2016. We believe that Berkshire, a company heavily invested in regulated utilities and in
195 contracted renewable generation under long-term contract in other utility service
196 territories (supported by the ratepayers of those utilities), is acting in its own narrow
197 interests and not in the best interests of the ratepayers of Utah and the general public
198 interest.

199 **Separate Rate Class**

200 **Q. What is the Division’s recommendation on creating a separate rate class for NEM**
201 **customers?**

202 A. On lines 58 to 61 of Dr. Powell’s direct testimony it states that the evidence regarding
203 whether NEM customers should be a separate class is “mixed.” The Division
204 recommends that if the Commission determines that NEM customers belong in a separate

205 rate class that it should be done inside of a general rate case and not in the current
206 proceeding. In direct contrast, the Division’s witness, Mr. Faryniarz, on lines 576 to 590
207 and 610 to 618 provided a load factor and unit cost analysis (respectively) which showed
208 minor differences in the cost of service for NEM customers versus non-NEM customers,
209 which support the position that segregation is unnecessary.

210 **Q. Which of the Division’s positions does Vivint Solar support?**

211 A. Vivint Solar strongly supports the Division’s expert witness and agrees that segregating
212 NEM customers into a separate rate class is unnecessary and unwarranted. The results are
213 not “mixed”, because there are minor differences in the cost of service between NEM and
214 non-NEM customers. Furthermore, if in fact NEM customers create different load
215 factors and unit costs, it would have to be proven that those variances fall outside of the
216 “normal” variances that can be found in any set or subset of residential customers. It
217 would be discriminatory to create a separate rate class for residential customers by virtue
218 of their efforts to reduce their own energy usage.

219 **Q. What is the Office’s recommendation on creating a separate rate class for NEM
220 customers?**

221 A. Ms. Beck, as testified on lines 70 to 74 and 70 to 706, does not believe that a separate rate
222 class is necessary. Ms. Beck also proposed an alternative rate design which would not
223 require a new segregated NEM rate class, further supporting the Office’s position.

224 **Q. Does Vivint Solar support the Office’s position?**

225 A. Yes, Vivint Solar agrees with the Office that it is unnecessary to segregate NEM
226 customers into their own rate class.

227 **Q. Why is separating NEM customers into their own class problematic?**

228 A. NEM customers reduce their reliance on RMP because NEM customers self-generate a
229 large portion of their power needs and, as a result, reduce load and demand for RMP's
230 product. This poses a potential threat to RMP's shareholders because, as a result of this
231 behavior, revenue is reduced and ROE is potentially lower. RMP has an incentive to
232 maintain its monopoly power and extract as much revenue from NEM customers as
233 possible to discourage additional customers from adopting a new, innovative, and lower
234 cost technology. Punishing NEM customers for reducing their consumption of RMP's
235 product by placing them in a segregated rate class would not only be discriminatory, it
236 would also deal a blow to innovation and the rights of Utah customers to exercise their
237 right to energy choice.

238 **NEM Program**

239 **Q. What were the recommendations from the Office and the Division regarding the**
240 **NEM program and NEM capacity limit?**

241 A. The Division recommended in Dr. Powell's direct testimony on lines 89 to 99 and 462 to
242 466, that the NEM cap should be reduced to a level equal to the estimated interconnected
243 capacity as of January 1, 2018, and all new customers would transition over a 7-year
244 period to the new program for small-scale residential solar.

245 The Office recommended, in Ms. Beck's direct testimony, two options on where to set
246 the NEM cap limit (i) on lines 323 to 331, Ms. Beck proposed reducing the NEM cap
247 down from 20% to 10% of 2007 peak demand and (ii) on lines 618 to 625, Ms. Beck
248 proposed, in conjunction with the Office's proposed rate design and transition plan, to set
249 the NEM cap at the anticipated level for the rate effective period for the next general rate
250 case or January 1, 2020.

251 **Q. What is Vivint Solar’s position on these proposals?**

252 A. Vivint Solar is supportive of reducing the NEM cap to 10% of 2007 peak demand,
253 anticipating that by that time a successor program would be adequately developed and
254 communicated to customers to ensure transparency. This would provide time for a proper
255 evaluation of the long-term benefits of a solar energy system to RMP’s grid and
256 ratepayers as a whole, while allowing the industry to adapt to the changing regulatory
257 landscape without encountering a regulatory cliff. For additional context please see
258 Richard Collins’ pre-filed rebuttal testimony.

259 Due to the small penetration level of residential NEM customers, relative to the
260 residential class, we believe that there is no need to rush into a new rate design and agree
261 with Ms. Beck’s statement on lines 116 to123 that the Office does not agree with the
262 “magnitude and urgency” of the problem suggested by RMP. It is highly improbable that
263 a docket to determine the value of exported energy would be concluded, or even
264 substantially progressed, by January 1, 2018, thus creating an unnecessary category of
265 customers who would be required to transition to a new compensation rate without any
266 knowledge of what that rate will be, or even what items would be considered for their
267 new export credit rate. That level of regulatory uncertainty and lack of consumer
268 transparency would be problematic for prospective solar customers and the health of the
269 solar industry.

270 **Netting Period and Export Credit**

271 **Q. What were the recommendations from the Office and the Division regarding**
272 **changes to the netting period?**

273 A. Both the Division and the Office recommend moving away from a monthly netting
274 period to an hourly netting period or less. The Division believes “monthly netting too
275 crude a tool to properly recover costs and compensate customers” (lines 457 to 459 of Dr.
276 Powell’s direct testimony), but does not explicitly recommend a new interval of
277 measurement for exported energy.

278 The Office, as part of its proposed “post net metering rate design,” advocates to
279 “[m]easure excess energy to receive this new compensation on an hourly or smaller,
280 reasonably metered interval” (lines 367 to 368 of Ms. Beck’s direct testimony).

281 **Q. What challenges does an hourly or less interval pose for distributed generation**
282 **customers and developers?**

283 A. The primary challenge of shifting the distributed generation paradigm from monthly
284 intervals to hourly or less is the lack of available data at those intervals. Residential
285 customers are billed based on a monthly basis and the usage data available to customers,
286 and in turn solar installers, is provided in monthly periods. There is no available insight
287 into a customer’s hourly, or less, usage patterns and load profiles, which makes it very
288 difficult (i) for a customer to understand, due to the lack of transparency, hourly netting
289 and (ii) for a solar installer to properly design a system for a customer.

290 The implications from this lack of data transparency, at the appropriate interval level,
291 poses very real practical problems for solar customers and solar installers, and has the
292 potential for leading customers to make investment decisions based on incomplete or
293 inaccurate assumptions. Currently, the monthly customer usage totals provide an
294 adequate amount of data to properly size a customer’s system given the monthly netting
295 periods and annual cancellation of credits to prevent over-sizing. Without hourly data

296 available, designing systems to meet the customer's needs and minimize exporting
297 energy to the grid is much more difficult and may be prone to error, exposing future
298 customers to risk. The combination of an hourly period and an export credit rate below
299 the retail rate will require the solar installer and customer to have clear and transparent
300 hourly usage data.

301 The move to an hourly period would be a major change that introduces a large amount of
302 volatility to the economics of a distributed generation system. Even if the appropriate
303 interval data was available to customers so that systems could be designed with better
304 guidance, the potential variability in a customer's hourly usage behavior over the 30-year
305 life will create incremental risk for rooftop solar investment.

306 An hourly netting period also does not allow a customer to make behavioral changes to
307 minimize the export of solar energy to the grid and maximize their instantaneous onsite
308 behind-the-meter consumption of self-produced solar energy. A customer will never
309 know in the moment that they are using energy where that energy is coming from and
310 whether it is economically advantageous for them. Currently, there is no transparency
311 provided to the customers to understand and handle an hourly netting period.

312 **Q. What did the Office and Division recommend regarding setting the export credit**
313 **rate?**

314 A. The Division, in Dr. Powell's testimony, recommends that the value of the export credit
315 rate be determined in a separate docket (lines 479 to 487). Until the conclusion of the
316 export credit rate docket, the Division recommends that, if necessary, a transitional
317 export credit rate could be set halfway between the retail rate and avoided costs
318 (approximately 7 cents). The Office, in Ms. Beck's testimony, suggests that the export

319 credit rate could be set in either (i) a GRC or (ii) a separate export credit docket (lines
320 391 to 403). Vivint Solar strongly supports setting the export credit rate in a separate
321 export credit docket, where the long-term net benefits of solar can accurately be captured
322 and calculated.

323 **Q. Why does Vivint Solar support determining the export credit rate in a separate**
324 **proceeding?**

325 A. Vivint Solar believes that the COS framework used in the current proceeding is
326 inadequate to develop a long-term export credit formula and rate. As discussed at length
327 in previous testimony filed by many parties, the COS suffered from several irredeemable
328 flaws, including; (i) a 1 year test period, (ii) treating lost revenue from behind-the-meter
329 consumption as a cost, (iii) failure to account for a number of quantifiable benefits of
330 distributed generation, and (iv) an inadequate NEM production and load sample size, see
331 Richard Collins' direct testimony for more detail. Even the Division's expert witness,
332 Mr. Faryniarz, addresses the potential benefits that were not included or properly
333 captured in RMP's COS framework and analysis (lines 914 to 948 of Mr. Faryniarz's
334 direct testimony). Any analysis of the costs and benefits of residential solar must take a
335 long-term view and Vivint Solar would recommend a minimum of 20 years, provided
336 that such costs and benefits are supported by evidence.

337 **Q. Are there other concerns regarding the export rate?**

338 A. Yes, one possible concern arose from the Office's post NEM rate design which mandated
339 time-of-use ("**TOU**") rates for solar customers (Ms. Beck, lines 377 to 380), and from the
340 Division's recommendation of a TOU rate option (Dr. Powell, lines 80 to 81). The
341 concern is that the scenario could arise that the export rate would be set as a flat rate for

342 all energy exported, regardless of the time (peak, mid-peak, or off-peak) it was provided
343 to RMP's grid, while the energy billed to the customer would be time-differentiated.
344 Vivint Solar is supportive of decoupling the import and export rates, however, both rates
345 should still be fundamentally compatible with the overall rate regime. Meaning, that if
346 the time at which energy is drawn from the grid impacts the cost of that consumed grid
347 energy (consistent with all residential customers), so should the time the solar energy is
348 exported to the grid impact the value for that exported solar energy (assuming the full
349 solar value stack of that exported power). Currently, under the tiered rate structure a flat
350 export credit rate is reasonable, but under a TOU rate it may require time-differentiated
351 solar export rates. TOU rates are designed to create an incentive for customers to adjust
352 their behavior to lower the overall class peak, thus if a solar customer can adjust their
353 behavior that allows them to export solar energy and reduce the residential class peak,
354 that solar customer should be compensated at a higher rate than if the energy is being
355 exported during an off-peak period. It would be fundamentally irrational and unfair to
356 customers to simultaneously hold contradictory positions on whether the timing matters
357 regarding imports and exports of energy. Additionally, this is reasonable if the goal is to
358 develop cost-based rates for both the import and export of energy. Finally, consistent
359 with prior statements made, TOU rates should not be applied to solar customers any
360 different than from other residential class customers when it comes to the power that
361 solar customers import from the grid to avoid discriminating against solar customers. In
362 other words, if TOU is mandatory for NEM customers it should also be mandatory for all
363 residential customers. As previously described in Richard Collins' pre-filed direct

364 testimony, RMP and the Commission must consider all of the long-term net benefits of
365 residential rooftop solar.

366 **Facilities Fee**

367 **Q. Where was a facilities fee proposed, and what is Vivint Solar’s position on the**
368 **proposed fee?**

369 A. A facilities fee was proposed as part of the Office’s rate design and transition plan, from
370 Ms. Beck’s testimony on lines 576 to 585 with 576 to 579 quoted below:

371 “Implement a facilities fee for net metering customers. The fee would be
372 calculated on a per installed kW basis and be designed to collect all appropriate
373 costs associated with serving the net metering customers.”

374 Vivint Solar does not agree that a facilities fee would be an efficient or fair mechanism
375 for recovering costs from NEM customers. The facilities fee is problematic because (i)
376 decoupling rates for imported and exported energy should allow for adequate cost
377 recovery, especially with the mandatory time-of-use rates proposed by the Office, (ii)
378 fixed fees are an inefficient price signal, (iii) the “appropriate costs” are undefined and
379 thus impossible to support, and (iv) assessing a fee based on system size has no
380 correlation to actual costs to RMP.

381 Fixed fees provide an inefficient price signal to customers and they are providing a
382 problematic incentive to utilities. In short, increases in fixed fees alter the risk-reward
383 formula for utilities as they guarantee fixed-cost recovery, which effectively means they
384 guarantee profits because a utility’s authorized rate of return is a component of fixed
385 costs. This is a clear example of “de-risking”, as further explained in Mr. DeRamus’s
386 direct testimony. Fixed charges provide the utility with less risk and less accountability,

387 which can lead to waste and unnecessary costs being born by each ratepayer. As such,
388 increases in fixed fees, such as the proposed facilities fee or increase in the customer
389 charge, should be evaluated thoroughly.

390 Additionally, assessing a per kW facilities fee based on a system size is not an efficient
391 way to recover costs to RMP. System size is based on a variety of factors (usage, home
392 size, optimal roof space, financing limitations) which do not necessarily correlate to
393 added costs for RMP. For example, an 8-kW system for one customer may export less
394 energy to the grid than a 4-kW system for a different customer because their usage and
395 load profiles are different, but the customer with the 8-kW system will be paying a higher
396 facilities fee. As previously discussed in Richard Collins' pre-filed direct testimony and
397 in my pre-filed direct testimony, an arbitrary fixed charge, as suggested by the Office, is
398 not an appropriate mechanism to recover the actual cost to serve a customer. Vivint Solar
399 strongly disagrees with the Office's proposed facilities fee.

400 **Q. Does this conclude your rebuttal testimony?**

401 A. Yes.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on July 25, 2017, I sent a true and correct copy of the foregoing pre-filed rebuttal testimony of Thomas Plagemann of Vivint Solar, Inc. in Docket No. 14-035-114 by email to the following:

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