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Attorneys for UAE

BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH

In the Matter of the Voluntary Request of Rocky Mountain Power for Approval of Resource Decision and Request for Accounting Order

Docket No. 14-035-147

PREFILED DIRECT TESTIMONY AND EXHIBITS OF KEVIN C. HIGGINS

PUBLIC VERSION

[Confidential Testimony Redacted]

The Utah Association of Energy Users (UAE) hereby submits the Public Version of the Prefiled Direct Testimony and Exhibits of Kevin C. Higgins in this docket.

DATED this 17th day of March 2015.

HATCH, JAMES & DODGE

/s/ _____ Gary A. Dodge Attorneys for UAE

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served by email this 17th day of March 2015 on the following:

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/s/	

BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH

)	
In the Matter of the Voluntary Request of)	
Rocky Mountain Power for Approval of)	DOCKET NO. 14-035-147
Resource Decision and Request for)	
Accounting Order)	
)	

Direct Testimony of Kevin C. Higgins

On Behalf of

UAE

PUBLIC VERSION

[Confidential Testimony Redacted]

March 17, 2015

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2	Q.	PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME AND BUSINESS ADDRESS.
3	A.	My name is Kevin C. Higgins. My business address is 215 South State Street, Suite 200,
4		Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111.
5	Q.	BY WHOM ARE YOU EMPLOYED AND IN WHAT CAPACITY?
6	A.	I am a Principal in the firm of Energy Strategies, LLC. Energy Strategies is a private
7		consulting firm specializing in economic and policy analysis applicable to energy
8		production, transportation, and consumption.
9	Q.	ON WHOSE BEHALF ARE YOU TESTIFYING IN THIS PROCEEDING?
10	A.	My testimony is being sponsored by the Utah Association of Energy Users ("UAE").
11	Q.	PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR QUALIFICATIONS.
12	A.	My academic background is in economics, and I have completed all coursework and field
13		examinations toward a Ph.D. in Economics at the University of Utah. In addition, I have
14		served on the adjunct faculties of both the University of Utah and Westminster College,
15		where I taught undergraduate and graduate courses in economics. I joined Energy
16		Strategies in 1995, where I assist private and public sector clients in the areas of energy-
17		related economic and policy analysis, including evaluation of electric and gas utility rate
18		matters.
19		Prior to joining Energy Strategies, I held policy positions in state and local
20		government. From 1983 to 1990, I was economist, then assistant director, for the Utah

Energy Office, where I helped develop and implement state energy policy. From 1991 to

1994, I was chief of staff to the chairman of the Salt Lake County Commission, where I

23		was responsible for development and implementation of a broad spectrum of public
24		policy at the local government level.
25	Q.	HAVE YOU PREVIOUSLY TESTIFIED BEFORE THE UTAH PUBLIC
26		SERVICE COMMISSION ("COMMISSION")?
27	A.	Yes. Since 1984, I have testified in thirty-four dockets before the Utah Public Service
28		Commission on electricity and natural gas matters.
29	Q.	HAVE YOU TESTIFIED PREVIOUSLY BEFORE ANY OTHER STATE
30		UTILITY REGULATORY COMMISSIONS?
31	A.	Yes, I have testified in approximately 160 other proceedings on the subjects of utility
32		rates and regulatory policy before state utility regulators in Alaska, Arkansas, Arizona,
33		Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota,
34		Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma,
35		Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and
36		Wyoming. I have also filed affidavits in proceedings before the Federal Energy
37		Regulatory Commission.
38	Q.	WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR TESTIMONY?
39	A.	My testimony addresses the appropriate ratemaking treatment of the deferrals requested
40		by RMP regarding the transaction to close the Deer Creek Mine and related matters
41		("Transaction"), including the sale of certain mining assets ("Mining Assets").
42	Q.	PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR PRIMARY CONCLUSIONS AND
43		RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING REVENUE REQUIREMENT.
44	A.	I offer the following conclusions and recommendations:

RMP's request for cost deferral is an exercise in single-issue ratemaking, which should be viewed by the Commission with great caution.

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- While I am not at this time challenging the prudence of RMP's actions, I believe it is premature for the Commission to make a prudence finding now in this proceeding, outside a general rate case and prior to all of the Transaction costs being known.
 - I am supportive of RMP's request to flow the change in coal supply costs through the 2015 Energy Balancing Account ("EBA") (and the 2016 EBA, to the extent that it is not included in the rate effective period following the next general rate case) without the 70/30 sharing mechanism, as well as the amortization expense associated with the Deer Creek Mine and the Mining Assets, but only for the portion of the Mining Assets that represents the loss on the sale of those assets, and only if the benefits of the extension of bonus tax depreciation until the end of 2014 are also reflected in the deferral as an offset to any regulatory assets that are established in this docket. In addition, the rate of return on the sold portion of the Mining Assets (that is currently in base rates) should be deferred and credited to customers against the regulatory asset balance that is on the books when new rates go into effect following the next general rate case.
- The revenue requirement in the last general rate case was established using a test period ending June 30, 2015 under the assumption that bonus tax depreciation would terminate on December 31, 2013. However, on December 19, 2014, the Tax Increase Prevention Act of 2014 (Public Law No. 113-295), was signed into law. Among other things, this Act extends 50 percent bonus tax depreciation through the end of year 2014. This extension means that bonus tax depreciation was, in fact, applicable

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to the test period used in the last general rate case, even though the parties to the proceeding had no way of knowing this would be the case at the time the proceeding was conducted. As a result, the revenue requirement in Utah was established using tax assumptions that set the Utah revenue requirement approximately \$2 million - \$3 million too high. If deferred accounting is used to exempt Deer Creek-related amortization expense from the 70/30 sharing mechanism to cure an unintended consequence of ratemaking mechanics, then deferred accounting should also be used to capture the benefits to customers of the extension of bonus tax depreciation through the end of 2014. Absent such a companion deferral, I recommend that RMP's request for waiver from the 70/30 sharing be rejected as unreasonably onesided.

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- RMP is seeking to defer \$3.5 million in Construction Work in Progress ("CWIP") expenditures (Total Company) associated with the Deer Creek Mine, \$0.5 million in CWIP (Total Company) associated with the Preparation Plant, and \$1.6 million in Preliminary Survey and Investigation ("PS&I") expenditures. None of these expenditures are recovered in current rates. As the CWIP expenditures have never been – and never will be – used and useful, I recommend excluding their recovery through the deferral mechanism proposed by RMP. Similarly, with the closure of the Deer Creek Mine, the PS&I expenditures do not now and will never provide customer benefits and also should be excluded from the regulatory asset.
- The Hunter generating facilities served by the Deer Creek Mine and Mining Assets are not owned exclusively by RMP. The portion of any regulatory assets established

due to the Transaction should be adjusted to remove the share attributable to non-RMP ownership.

- RMP is seeking deferral of union supplemental unemployment and medical costs, as well as non-union severance costs. I recommend against deferral of these expenses, which are being incurred during and in close proximity to the test period used in RMP's last general rate case, but which were not identified by the Company in its filing in that case. These costs were within the discretion of the Company, they were not unforeseen, they are not extraordinary, and they do not arise as a result of an unintended consequence of the ratemaking process. Consequently, it is not reasonable to give RMP a "second bite at the apple" by conferring single-issue ratemaking status to these costs.
- RMP is seeking deferral of royalty costs associated with mine closure. Because these costs are imposed on the Company by the United States government as leaseholder, I believe that deferral and amortization of these costs may be appropriate. However, given the highly uncertain nature of RMP's estimates of these costs, I recommend that the Commission require that any ultimate recovery of these costs should be based on the royalties *actually* charged to the closure costs, rather than on the Company's estimate.
- RMP is seeking deferral of a Retiree Medical Obligation settlement loss. As these
 costs would have been amortized to FAS 106 expense absent the settlement, I do not
 object to RMP's proposal for deferral of these costs.
- RMP is seeking deferral of an unrecovered asset retirement obligation ("ARO")
 associated with the closure of the Deer Creek Mine. Because the unrecovered ARO

costs are part of a long-term calculation applied to the asset retirement obligation for a long-lived asset, I believe that deferral and amortization of these costs may be appropriate. Therefore, I do not object to RMP's proposal to defer them.

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- RMP is seeking deferral of certain going-forward labor and other miscellaneous costs associated with the closure of the Deer Creek Mine. I recommend against approving deferral of these costs. These costs were not unforeseen, they are not extraordinary, and they do not arise as a result of an unintended consequence of the ratemaking process. Consequently, it is not reasonable to confer single-issue ratemaking status to these costs.
- As RMP's proposed treatment of the 1974 Pension Trust is to continue the annual contribution of \$3 million until a termination value can be determined, this expense can remain in net power costs where it is today, with no adjustment necessary at this time. I recommend that if and when RMP proposes deferral and recovery of a specific termination value, that it be subject to Commission review and approval at that time.
- I agree with RMP's proposal to defer the revenue associated with the return on rate base for the Fossil Rock asset until rates are reset and to offset the unrecovered regulatory assets associated with the other components of the Transaction by this revenue deferral when rates are next reset.
- RMP is proposing to defer and recover certain inventory write-offs it will experience as a result of the Transaction. I do not object to this treatment so long as the Commission also recognizes the reduction in fuel inventory that RMP is projected to experience as a result of the Transaction. The earnings on the reduction in fuel

inventory, which I estimate to be \$5.9 million annually (Total Company), should be deferred and credited against the inventory write-off, and the excess credited against the remaining regulatory assets associated with the Transaction that are approved by the Commission in this case.

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- For those items that are currently being depreciated in rates, it makes sense to amortize these items at the same rate at which they are now being depreciated, as RMP proposes, at least until the next general rate case is conducted. For all other newly-created regulatory assets, it is not necessary to determine the amortization period at this juncture because amortization of these items will not begin until the rate effective period following the next general rate case. The determination of the appropriate amortization period is a matter that is appropriately addressed in the next general rate case, when all rate impacts on customers can be taken into account.
- I disagree with RMP's proposal for carrying costs on its regulatory assets equal to its authorized rate of return, because:
 - There is already an approved carrying cost for deferrals that flow through the EBA, which is set equal to 6%. This rate should be used for the deferrals approved in this case that will flow through the EBA, with the notable exception of the Deer Creek Mine and Mining Asset amortizations.
 - o The carrying cost for Deer Creek Mine and Mining Asset deferrals in the EBA should be set at zero because base rates already provide for a return on the Deer Creek Mine and Mining Assets equal to the Company's authorized rate of return. Any carrying charge applied through the EBA to the amortization of the

158		regulatory assets associated with the Deer Creek Mine and Mining Assets would
159		constitute double recovery.
160		o For all other regulatory assets established in this proceeding, I recommend that
161		the carrying costs should be set at the cost of long-term debt established in the last
162		general rate case (5.2%).
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164		II. OVERVIEW OF RMP'S PROPOSAL
165	Q.	WHAT REGULATORY APPROVALS IS RMP SEEKING IN THIS
166		PROCEEDING?
167	A.	RMP has asked the Commission for authorization to defer for future recovery certain
168		costs associated with the various components of the "Transaction". RMP has also asked
169		the Commission to "approve" the Transaction, 2 and to find that the Company's decision
170		to consummate the Transaction is "prudent and in the public interest" under Utah Code
171		Ann. § 54-17-401 et seq. (the "Voluntary Pre-Approval Statute") and Utah Admin. R746-
172		440-1 et seq. (the "Voluntary Pre-Approval Rules").
173	Q.	WHAT IS YOUR RECOMMENDATION REGARDING RMP'S REQUESTS FOR
174		PRE-APPROVAL, PRUDENCE DETERMINATIONS AND DEFERRED
175		ACCOUNTING?
176	A.	I do not believe it is necessary, desirable or appropriate for the Commission to make

prudence findings or pre-approval of the various Transaction components in this

¹ RMP Application at 2. ² Id. at 1. ³ Id. at 3.

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proceeding, outside a general rate case and prior to all of the Transaction costs being known. I do not oppose consideration of each cost item for deferred accounting. However, while the booking of deferred costs generally carries with it a reasonable expectation of later recovery, it does not presume that such recovery *must* occur, nor does it require that a prudence determination be made at the time of authorization for cost deferral. That said, I am not challenging in this proceeding the prudence of the Company's actions with respect to moving forward with the Transaction, as it is premature to do so.

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WHY DO YOU SUGGEST PRE-APPROVAL UNDER THE VOLUNTARY PRE-Q. APPROVAL STATUTE IS NOT APPROPRIATE?

Speaking from a policy, as opposed to legal, perspective, the Transaction does not appear to be the type of decision to which the voluntary pre-approval process is properly targeted. The Voluntary Pre-Approval Statute and Voluntary Pre-Approval Rules appear more properly directed towards acquisition or construction of proposed resources or programs as to which there is relative assurance as to cost projections and as to which legitimate options still exist.

The series of decisions and transactions contemplated in this docket do not appear appropriate for pre-approval. Many of the cost projections cannot be determined with any degree of precision at this time. Also, the primary decisions as to which pre-approval is sought appear to have already essentially been made and implemented, and realistic alternatives no longer appear viable.

199		Under these circumstances, I recommend that the Commission proceed to
200		evaluate the request for deferred accounting on an item-by-item basis, and not determine
201		prudence or pre-approval at this time. My testimony will proceed in that manner.
202	Q.	PLEASE OUTLINE THE COMPONENTS OF RMP'S PROPOSAL TO CLOSE
203		DEER CREEK MINE.
204	A.	In her Direct Testimony, Cindy A. Crane describes the four major components of the
205		Company's proposed transaction to close the Deer Creek Mine:
206		(1) The permanent closure of the Deer Creek Mine and incurrence of direct closure costs.
207		(2) The withdrawal of RMP's affiliate, Energy West Mining Company ("Energy West"),
208		from the United Mine Workers of America ("UMWA") 1974 Pension Trust and
209		incurrence of a withdrawal liability.
210		(3) The sale of the Mining Assets.
211		(4) And the execution of a replacement coal supply agreement ("CSA") for the
212		Huntington power plant and an amended CSA for the Hunter power plant.
213		Additionally, Energy West has settled its Retiree Medical Obligation related to
214		union participants.
215	Q.	PLEASE BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THE DEER CREEK MINE AND THE PLANTS
216		IT SERVES.
217	A.	The Deer Creek Mine is located in Emery County, Utah, and is operated by PacifiCorp's
218		subsidiary, Energy West. The Deer Creek Mine supplies nearly the entire coal supply
219		obligation to Huntington power plant of 2.8 to 2.9 million tons, and a supplemental
220		portion of Hunter power plant's coal supply needs. The majority of Hunter power plant's
221		coal is supplied by Bowie Resources Partners, LLC ("Bowie"), from its Sufco Mine. The

222 coal reserves at the Deer Creek Mine are scheduled to be depleted in 2019. However, RMP ceased production at the mine at the end of 2014⁴ and is now preparing to close it. 223 224 WHAT ARE THE PRIMARY REASONS CITED BY THE COMPANY FOR Q. 225 CLOSING THE MINE BEFORE FULL DEPLETION OF RESERVES? 226 Ms. Crane explains that continued operation of the mine is uneconomic due to escalating A. 227 mining costs and pension liabilities, and declining volume and quality of coal reserves. 228 Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE INCREASING MINING COSTS AND PENSION 229 LIABILITIES. 230 According to Ms. Crane, Energy West, the mine's operator, has been in a labor dispute A. 231 with the UMWA over labor costs and liability escalations. Energy West also faces 232 increasing healthcare costs for active employees. Recently, Energy West was able to 233 mitigate some of its healthcare liability through a labor settlement that allowed Energy 234 West to transfer its Retiree Medical Liability to the UMWA, in exchange for Energy 235 West transferring \$150 million from its plan's trust to UMWA's trust. However, Energy 236 West has a significant pension liability related to the UMWA 1974 Pension Trust. 237 PLEASE FURTHER DESCRIBE THE 1974 PENSION TRUST. Q. 238 According to the Direct Testimony of Seth Schwartz, the 1974 Pension Trust is a multi-A. 239 employer pension plan that provides retirement benefits to eligible mine workers who 240 retire, who become disabled, and to the surviving spouses of mine workers. Eligible 241 retirees receive benefits from the 1974 Pension Trust based upon their qualifying 242 signatory service, regardless of whether their former employer is currently in business or

⁴ See RMP Response to OCS Data Request 4.6(c), included in UAE Direct Exhibit 1.1.

243		making payments to the trust. Because the number of contributing employers has been
244		declining over time, the contribution rate for participating employers has increased.
245		Further, the financial condition of the 1974 Pension Trust has deteriorated, which will
246		necessitate dramatically higher contributions in the future.
247	Q.	WHAT ARE THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEER CREEK MINE CLOSURE
248		ON ENERGY WEST'S 1974 PENSION TRUST OBLIGATION?
249	A.	Mine closure will trigger Energy West's withdrawal from the 1974 Pension Trust and a
250		withdrawal liability, most recently estimated at \$96.7 million if paid in a lump sum.
251	Q.	PLEASE EXPLAIN THE DECLINING QUALITY OF COAL RESERVES.
252	A.	According to Ms. Crane, significant volumes of high ash and high sulfur coal at Deer
253		Creek Mine have resulted in decreased production and require blending with lower ash
254		coals to meet plant quality specifications.
255	Q.	PLEASE DESCRIBE THE THIRD COMPONENT OF THE PROPOSED
256		TRANSACTION, THE SALE OF CERTAIN MINING ASSETS.
257	A.	Ms. Crane identifies the Mining Assets that RMP intends to sell to Bowie as the
258		Preparation Plant and related assets, the Central Warehouse Facility and related assets,
259		the Trail Mountain Mine and related assets, and the assets of Fossil Rock Fuels LLC, a
260		Company subsidiary.
261	Q.	PLEASE EXPLAIN THE FOURTH COMPONENT OF THE TRANSACTION,
262		THE EXECUTION OF A REPLACEMENT CSA FOR THE HUNTINGTON
263		POWER PLANT AND AN AMENDED CSA FOR THE HUNTER POWER
264		PLANT.

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265 A. Under the Huntington CSA, Bowie has agreed to supply all of the coal requirements for 266 the Huntington power plant from the Transaction close date to December 31, 2029, according to certain quality specifications. In connection with the execution of the 267 268 Huntington CSA and the transfer of the Preparation Plant Assets, RMP and Bowie have 269 agreed to amend the existing CSA for the Hunter power plant. 270 271 III. RATEMAKING TREATMENT OF THE TRANSACTION 272 Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE THE COMPANY'S PROPOSED REGULATORY AND 273 ACCOUNTING TREATMENT FOR THE COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE 274 TRANSACTION. 275 According to the Direct Testimony of Douglas K. Stuver, RMP proposes to defer all costs A. 276 associated with the Transaction as a regulatory asset, with a carrying charge on the 277 unamortized balance equal to its authorized rate of return. PLEASE OUTLINE THE ESTIMATED COSTS OF THE TRANSACTION. 278 Q. 279 According to the Mr. Stuver's Direct Testimony, RMP anticipates unrecovered A. 280 investment in Deer Creek Mine of \$86 million, and unrecovered investment in the 281 Mining Assets of . Mine closure costs are estimated to be 282 addition, the Company estimates a Retiree Medical settlement loss of 283 net present value 1974 Pension Trust withdrawal liability of The total Transaction costs, excluding the CSA-related costs, are estimated to be 284 285 Q. WHAT IS YOUR RECOMMENDATION TO THE COMMISSION REGARDING RMP'S REQUEST FOR DEFERRED ACCOUNTING? 286

287	A.	As I am not challenging the prudence of RMP's actions with respect to moving forward
288		with the Transaction in this proceeding, my recommendations concerning deferral are not
289		tied to any questions of prudence, but to what I believe is the most appropriate course of
290		action from a ratemaking perspective. The Company's request for deferred accounting is
291		complex and has quite a few moving parts. As I will discuss in detail below, I believe it
292		is appropriate to defer <i>certain</i> of the costs involved in the Transaction, but I am
293		recommending against authorizing deferral of several others. Finally, I do not agree with
294		RMP's request to earn a carrying charge on its proposed regulatory assets equal to the
295		Company's weighted average cost of capital. I will discuss the appropriate carrying
296		charges later in my testimony.
297	Q.	ON PAGE 21 OF ITS APPLICATION, RMP STATES THAT IN THE ABSENCE
298		OF BEING PERMITTED TO ESTABLISH THE REQUESTED REGULATORY
299		ASSETS AND ASSOCIATED ACCOUNTING TREATMENT, THE COMPANY
300		WOULD CHARGE THE AMOUNTS PROPOSED TO BE DEFERRED
301		GENERALLY TO ACCOUNT 501, FUEL EXPENSE, AND FLOW THE COSTS
302		THROUGH THE EBA. WHAT IS YOUR RESPONSE TO THIS STATEMENT?
303	A.	As I discuss below, a subset of the costs involved in the Transaction are already EBA-
304		eligible. However, I strongly dispute the notion that RMP could simply unilaterally deem
305		all of the remaining costs of the Transaction, including un-depreciated plant balances for
306		assets that are no longer used and useful, as fuel expense to be recovered through the
307		EBA. Such an attempt would certainly be subject to challenge before the Commission.

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Q.	HOW DOES RMP'S REQUEST FOR DEFERRED ACCOUNTING SQUARE
	WITH THE STIPULATION APPROVED BY THE COMMISSION IN THE LAST
	GENERAL RATE CASE?
A.	Paragraph 32 of the Stipulation states that, with the exception of the Step 2 increase and
	other Commission-approved and currently existing rate adjustment mechanisms, RMP
	will not seek any rate increase in Utah prior to January 1, 2016 or with a rate effective
	date prior to September 1, 2016. At the same time, Paragraph 39 provides that the stay-
	out provision will not prevent RMP from seeking deferred accounting orders, for
	potential recovery from or return to customers pursuant to a Commission order in a future
	rate case, of costs related to the impacts of any proposed disposition, through sale,
	closure or other means, of the Deer Creek mine and related mining assets as well as for
	the impacts of the possible sale of the Company's ownership interests in the Craig and
	Hayden generating plants. Thus, the Company's request for deferred accounting
	treatment does not violate the stay-out provision in Stipulation. Yet the Stipulation
	also contains express language that it does not represent an agreement by the Parties
	as to any position to be taken on any request for such deferred accounting orders. In
	short, RMP is free to request deferred accounting related to the Deer Creek Mine
	closure, and the Parties to the Stipulation are free to oppose or support the request on
	its merit.
Q.	HOW SHOULD RMP'S REQUEST FOR DEFERRED ACCOUNTING BE
	EVALUATED FROM A RATEMAKING PERSPECTIVE?

Most requests for deferred accounting are attempts to engage in single-issue ratemaking.

RMP's request for deferral in this proceeding is no exception.

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Q. WHAT IS SINGLE-ISSUE RATEMAKING?

A.

Single-issue ratemaking occurs when utility rates are adjusted or deferred in response to a change in cost or revenue items considered in isolation. Single-issue ratemaking ignores the multitude of other factors that otherwise influence rates, some of which could, if properly considered, move rates in the opposite direction from the single-issue change.

When utility regulatory commissions determine the appropriateness of a cost that a utility seeks to recover from its customers, the standard practice is to review and consider all relevant factors as part of a general rate case, rather than just certain factors in isolation. Considering some costs or revenues in isolation might cause a commission to allow a utility to increase rates or defer costs in the area singled out for attention without recognizing counterbalancing savings in another area. For example, the case at hand focuses on deferring costs associated with the Transaction, which in isolation would raise rates for customers, but without considering that the fuel costs for the Company's vehicle fleet have fallen dramatically relative to the level that was the basis for setting rates in the last general rate case. Because single-issue ratemaking focuses on specific costs in isolation, utility regulatory commissions should view proposals for deferral with great caution.

Q. HOW DOES THIS NEED FOR CAUTION APPLY TO RMP'S REQUEST FOR DEFERRED ACCOUNTING IN THIS CASE?

⁵ The Total Company vehicle fuel expense recovered in rates is \$15 million. For the RMP and Pacific Power business units the projected cost for diesel was \$3.77 per gallon and for gasoline it was \$3.44 per gallon. Obviously, current vehicle fuel prices are much lower than this. See RMP Response to WIEC Data Requests 4.4 and 4.5 in WY PSC Docket No. 20000-464-EA-14, included in UAE Direct Exhibit 1.1.

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When faced with an application like this, it is important to bear in mind that utility ratemaking is not an exercise in expense reimbursement. The opportunity for utility cost recovery is established in the *rates* approved by the Commission. In the case of RMP, the Commission has already established rates that take into account a comprehensive projection of the Company's revenues and costs for the test period ending June 30, 2015. We know that in reality costs and revenues are almost certain to differ from what was projected at the time rates were set. The simple fact that a utility incurs a cost that differs from what was anticipated when rates were set does not create an obligation on the part of the regulator to establish a mechanism for reimbursement. While there may be limited situations in which singling out certain items for deferral is appropriate, as a general matter, costs incurred as a result of actions initiated by the utility and not beyond its control do not create a good case for deferred accounting treatment. WHAT ARE THE TYPES OF LIMITED EXCEPTIONS THAT JUSTIFY COST **DEFERRAL IN YOUR OPINION?** In general, deferred costs should be limited to those that are unforeseen, beyond the control of the utility, and material. The most typical and regularly-permitted deferred costs are associated with fuel adjustors that track deviations in net power costs ("NPC"). Before fuel adjustor mechanisms are adopted by utility regulatory commissions, the

commissions typically consider the extent to which fuel costs are outside the control of

utility management, as well as the materiality of changes in fuel costs and the potential

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impact on the utility's revenue requirement and financial health between rate cases if changes in fuel costs were to go unrecovered.⁶

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In general, I also believe it is reasonable to use deferred accounting in limited cases in which an unintended consequence of ratemaking mechanics would otherwise produce an unjust and unreasonable result. Indeed, I believe that a *portion* of the costs for which RMP is seeking deferral meets this criterion. However, it is my understanding that in Utah, deferred accounting outside a general rate case (other than fuel adjustor mechanisms) is limited to situations in which changes in cost are not only unforeseen, but extraordinary. Thus, it is possible that a particular cost deferral might meet the criterion of curing an unintended consequence of ratemaking mechanics, but yet might not be extraordinary in nature. In this situation, the Commission might elect to deny any special deferral.

Q. CAN YOU EXPLAIN WHAT YOU MEAN BY "UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCE OF RATEMAKING MECHANICS"?

Yes. Occasionally, situations arise in which there is a clear intention to recover or reflect certain costs or revenues in rates, but for unforeseen reasons, the mechanics of the ratemaking process fail to accomplish this. I believe that using deferred accounting to address an unintended consequence of ratemaking mechanics applies to certain of the costs associated with this case, specifically costs that are eligible for recovery in NPC when they are in the form of depreciation expense, but not when these same costs are

⁶ See, for example, Utah PSC Docket No. 09-035-15, *In the Matter of the Application of Rocky Mountain Power for Approval of its Proposed Energy Cost Adjustment Mechanism*, Corrected Report and Order, issued March 3, 2011, page 66.

converted to amortization expense. I will address this issue in greater detail later in my testimony.

Q. WHAT PROCESS DID YOU USE TO EVALUATE THE APPROPRIATENESS OF DEFERRED ACCOUNTING IN THIS PROCEEDING?

A. First, I identified each of the costs for which RMP has requested cost deferral, as well as the current ratemaking treatment of the cost, including whether the cost component is *already* eligible for deferral through the EBA. A list of these costs appears in Table KCH-1, below.

398 Table KCH-1

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Cost Item	Current Ratemaking Treatment
Change in Coal Supply Costs (Bowie Contract)	Not currently in rates, but EBA eligible
Deer Creek Mine	
Depreciation	Recovered in NPC
Return	Recovered in non-NPC
CWIP	Not in rates
PS&I	Not in rates
Preparation Plant/Other Mining Assets (net)	
Depreciation	Recovered in NPC
Return	Recovered in non-NPC
Fossil Rock PHFU Return	Recovered in non-NPC
1974 Pension Trust	Equivalent amount recovered in NPC
Retiree Medical Obligation (Settlement Loss)	N/A
Union Supplemental Unemployment and Medical	N/A
Non-Union Severance	N/A
Inventory Write-Off	N/A
Regulatory Asset - Income Tax	Recovered in NPC
Miscellaneous Closure/Ongoing Labor	N/A
Unrecovered ARO Costs	Unrecovered portion of cost otherwise recovered in depreciation expense in NPC
Royalty Obligations - Closure	N/A

As I noted above, RMP is proposing to exempt certain deferred costs from the 70/30 EBA sharing mechanism. In my evaluation, I consider whether exemption from the 70/30 EBA sharing mechanism is appropriate.

I then turn my attention to the costs that are not EBA-eligible and using the criteria for justified cost deferral I described previously, I consider whether deferral as requested by RMP is appropriate.

A.

Next, I address the question of the appropriate amortization periods for any regulatory assets established in this proceeding, and lastly, I consider the appropriate carrying costs for any costs that I believe are appropriate for deferral treatment.

Q. WHAT TRANSACTION COSTS ARE ALREADY ELIGIBLE FOR DEFERRAL THROUGH THE EBA?

The incremental benefits (or costs) of supplying the Hunter and Huntington plants through the Bowie contract are already eligible for refund (or recovery) through the EBA. Absent special consideration, these benefits (or costs) would flow through the current EBA mechanism and would be subject to the 70/30 sharing mechanism. According to RMP's Response to WPSC Data Request 2.17 in Wyoming PSC Docket No. 20000-464-EA-14, the incremental *benefit* from providing coal from the Bowie contract compared to the status quo is \$14.5 million (Total Company) in 2015, measured on a standalone basis. By "standalone basis," I mean this is the incremental benefit from the Bowie contract prior to taking into account the 2015 amortization expense of the Deer Creek Mine and Mining Assets that are no longer used and useful, but which would still be recovered from ratepayers under the Company's proposal.

⁷ RMP Response to WPSC 2.17 and Attachment WPSC 2.17 in WY PSC Docket No. 20000-464-EA-14 are included in UAE Direct Exhibit 1.1.

421	Q.	PLEASE DESCRIBE RMP'S PROPOSED RATEMAKING TREATMENT FOR
422		THE UNRECOVERED INVESTMENTS IN DEER CREEK MINE AND THE
423		MINING ASSETS IN GREATER DETAIL.
424	A.	The depreciation expense and operating costs of the Deer Creek Mine, based on 2019
425		mine closure, are currently recovered in the Company's base NPC. Regarding the
426		Mining Assets that will be sold to Bowie, current rates reflect the depreciation expense
427		and operating costs of the Preparation Plant (\$19 million net book value), and the
428		depreciation expense associated with the Central Warehouse (\$0.3 million net book
429		value) and the Trail Mountain Mine (\$0.7 million net book value). The Preparation Plant
430		will be sold , while no
431		monetary consideration will be paid for the Central Warehouse property and the Trail
432		Mountain Mine. This will result in a net unrecovered investment in the Mining Assets of
433		, including CWIP. Fossil Rock, which was formed in 2011 for purposes of
434		acquiring the rights to Utah state coal leases, has a plant held for future use book value of
435		, with rate base treatment in Utah. RMP expects to sell the Fossil Rock assets
436		at approximately book value, and proposes to defer the revenue associated with the return
437		on Fossil Rock rate base until such time that rates are reset.
438		For the unrecovered investments in Deer Creek Mine (\$86 million) and the
439		Mining Assets (), RMP proposes to commence amortization as soon as
440		depreciation ceases at an amount equal to the depreciation currently reflected in rates. At
441		the time rates are next reset, the Company proposes to include in rate base any remaining
442		unrecovered investment in the Deer Creek Mine and Mining Assets, to be recovered over
443		a period approved by the Commission.

The depreciation and operating expenses of the Deer Creek Mine and Mining Assets are currently included in NPC, and the Company proposes that these costs, along with the costs or benefits realized for replacement coal supply, be subject to the EBA without application of the 70/30 sharing band.

0.

A.

DO YOU BELIEVE THAT IT IS REASONABLE TO EXEMPT THE INCREMENTAL BENEFITS OR COSTS OF SUPPLYING THE HUNTER AND HUNTINGTON PLANTS THROUGH THE BOWIE CONTRACT FROM THE 70/30 SHARING MECHANISM?

Yes, I believe a limited exception is warranted in combination with the treatment of a portion of the depreciation expense associated with the Deer Creek Mine and the Mining Assets, but only if the Commission also recognizes the benefits of the extension of bonus tax depreciation through the end of 2014, which I will address in detail later in my testimony.

The depreciation expense associated with the Deer Creek Mine and the Mining Assets is currently included in NPC, and thus is part of base NPC in rates. (In contrast, the rate of return on rate base associated with these assets is included in base rates but is not included in NPC.) However, at the time these assets are taken out of service they cease to be included in NPC. Thus, actual NPC, for the purpose of calculating the 2015 EBA, will be reduced by the amount of the depreciation and operating expenses of the Deer Creek Mine and the Mining Assets. Absent any special ratemaking consideration, the EBA mechanism will remove 70% of these costs currently included in base NPC from ultimate recovery from customers, as if they had gone away. In my view, in the case of depreciation expense, such a result would be an unintended consequence of

ratemaking mechanics that would produce an unreasonable result to the detriment of the Company, thus justifying deferred accounting treatment.

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The depreciation expense for these assets is currently included in rates and RMP is proposing to convert the corresponding net plant in service into a regulatory asset that would continue to be amortized on the same schedule that the plant is being depreciated. In general, I believe it is reasonable for RMP to continue to recover its initial investment in the Deer Creek Mine and the "unsold portion" of the Mining Assets at the current level until rates are reset pursuant to the next general rate case. If this amortization expense is deferred through the EBA as proposed by RMP, then it may also be reasonable to exempt it from the 70/30 sharing mechanism in the calculation of the 2015 EBA (and the 2016 EBA, to the extent that it is not included in the rate effective period following the next general rate case), in order to maintain current recovery levels. At the same time, it would also reasonable to exempt the incremental benefits (or costs) of supplying the Hunter and Huntington plants through the Bowie contract from the 70/30 sharing mechanism to place this companion impact on NPC on the same playing field as the treatment of depreciation/amortization expense. That is, it would be unreasonable to exempt the depreciation/amortization expense from the 70/30 sharing (which benefits RMP) without also exempting the incremental benefits of the Bowie contract (which, on a standalone basis, is projected by RMP to benefit customers). PLEASE EXPLAIN YOUR EARLIER STATEMENT THAT A LIMITED

Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN YOUR EARLIER STATEMENT THAT A LIMITED

EXCEPTION TO THE 70/30 EBA SHARING MECHANISM IS WARRANTED

ONLY TO THE EXTENT THAT THE COMMISSION ALSO RECOGNIZES

THE BENEFITS OF THE EXTENSION OF BONUS TAX DEPRECIATION THROUGH THE END OF 2014.

As I explained above, I view a limited exception to the 70/30 sharing as reasonable for curing an unintended consequence of ratemaking mechanics. However, a second unintended consequence of ratemaking mechanics has occurred since the last general rate case, which is not mentioned in RMP's filing, namely the extension of bonus tax depreciation through the end of 2014. If deferred accounting is used to exempt Deer Creek-related amortization expense from the 70/30 sharing mechanism to cure an unintended consequence of ratemaking mechanics, then deferred accounting should also be used to capture the benefits to customers of the extension of bonus tax depreciation through the end of 2014.

Q. WHAT IS BONUS TAX DEPRECIATION?

A.

Α.

Bonus tax depreciation refers to a greatly accelerated tax deduction for depreciation that has been permitted pursuant to several statutes signed into law in recent years to stimulate the economy. Bonus tax depreciation was permitted in the early 2000s and reintroduced nearly every year between 2008 and 2013. In their most recent incarnations, these acts permitted a first-year depreciation tax deduction equal to 50 percent of the cost of qualified property. At the time of the most recent general rate case, Docket No. 13-035-184, 50 percent bonus tax depreciation applied through December 31, 2013.

Q. HOW DID BONUS TAX DEPRECIATION FACTOR IN TO THE MOST RECENT GENERAL RATE CASE?

A. The most recent general rate case, which was resolved through a Stipulation approved by the Commission on August 29, 2014, used a projected test period ending June 30, 2015.

The Company's filing was made on January 3, 2014, and took into account bonus tax depreciation through December 31, 2013, which was the termination date for bonus tax depreciation at the time of the company's filing.

A.

However, on December 19, 2014, the President signed into law the Tax Increase Prevention Act of 2014 (Public Law No. 113-295), an Act which, among other things, extends 50 percent bonus tax depreciation through the end of year 2014. The enactment of this extension means that bonus tax depreciation was, in fact, applicable to the test period used in the last general rate case, even though the parties did not know it at the time the case was conducted.

Q. HOW DOES BONUS TAX DEPRECIATION IMPACT RATEMAKING FOR REGULATED UTILITIES?

Bonus tax depreciation is a form of accelerated tax depreciation. This Commission has long contended with the fact that utility depreciation for tax purposes differs from utility book depreciation used in ratemaking. Generally, the tax benefits of accelerated depreciation are not passed through directly to ratepayers; instead, according to the conventions of income tax normalization, the benefit of a utility's accumulated deferred income tax ("ADIT") is viewed as a source of zero-cost capital to the utility as part of the ratemaking process. Consequently, the ADIT that results from accelerated tax depreciation is booked as a credit against rate base, thereby reducing revenue requirements for customers.

Even though bonus tax depreciation affects rates through the same mechanics as standard accelerated depreciation, its impact is more dramatic than standard accelerated depreciation in the years immediately following the placement of the qualifying plant into

service. This is because bonus tax depreciation causes a much greater increase in ADIT, which in turn, produces a much greater credit against rate base for any given amount of new plant in service. This, in turn, typically reduces the revenue requirement relative to what it would have been if bonus tax depreciation were not applicable.

A.

The accounting for bonus tax depreciation in Utah ratemaking is a standard and routine part of the ratemaking process. The fact that 2014 bonus tax depreciation was not included in the determination of revenue requirement in the most recent general rate case is due solely to the fact that the extension was not enacted until approximately six months after the submission of the Stipulation on June 25, 2014, and approximately four months after the Commission's final order approving that Stipulation on August 29, 2014. Thus, the omission of 2014 bonus tax depreciation from the revenue requirement of the general rate case is the result of the timing of the case and the timing of the passage of the Act, and was subject to actions that were outside the control of the parties at the time the case was conducted.

Q. DO YOU HAVE AN ESTIMATE OF THE IMPACT OF THE EXTENSION OF BONUS TAX DEPRECIATION ON THE UTAH REVENUE REQUIREMENT?

Yes. In a data response filed in Wyoming, which used the same test period ending June 30, 2015 as Utah, RMP calculated the revenue requirement impact of the extension of bonus tax depreciation for that jurisdiction to be a reduction of \$920,000 per year. As the Utah revenue requirement is about 2.7 times that of Wyoming, I estimate the revenue

⁸ See WY PSC Docket No. 20000-446-ER-14, RMP Response to WPSC Data Request 17.1, Attachment WPSC 17.1, included in UAE Direct Exhibit 1.1.

555		requirement reduction in Utah to be between \$2 and \$3 million per year. 9 I note that on
556		March 5, 2015, the Wyoming Public Service Commission ordered RMP to defer the
557		benefits of bonus tax depreciation on the Wyoming revenue requirement effective
558		January 1, 2015.
559	Q.	HOW SHOULD THE BENEFITS OF BONUS TAX DEPRECIATION BE
560		TRACKED AS PART OF A DEFERRAL APPROVED IN THIS CASE?
561	A.	The Commission should order RMP to calculate and defer the monthly difference
562		between the revenues collected from customers based on the test period revenue
563		requirement approved by the Commission in the last general rate case and the revenues
564		that would have been collected from customers if a test period revenue requirement had
565		been set that, all other things being held constant, took into account the effects of the
566		extension of 50 percent bonus tax depreciation until the end of 2014.
567	Q.	WHY SHOULD THE EFFECTS OF BONUS TAX DEPRECIATION BE TAKEN
568		INTO ACCOUNT IN THIS CASE IF THE 70/30 SHARING MECHANISM IS
569		WAIVED FOR CERTAIN DEFERRED COSTS?
570	A.	RMP typically seeks deferred accounting when it benefits the Company's shareholders
571		and remains silent when deferred accounting would benefit customers. It would be
572		unreasonable and asymmetric to cure the unintended consequence of ratemaking
573		mechanics associated with the conversion of Deer Creek Mine-related depreciation
574		expense into amortization expense without also recognizing that the last general rate case
575		suffered from a comparable anomaly, in which an unforeseen and unforeseeable change

⁹ While the impact of bonus tax depreciation is not strictly proportionate to jurisdictional revenue requirement, I believe this estimate provides a useful approximation.

576		in the tax law applicable to the test period revenue requirement occurred after the
577		disposition of the case. Therefore, my support for waiving the 70/30 sharing mechanism
578		as requested by the Company is contingent on the Commission also requiring that the
579		revenue requirement effects of bonus tax depreciation be deferred for the benefit of
580		customers effective January 1, 2015. Absent such a companion requirement, I
581		recommend that RMP's request for waiver from the 70/30 sharing be rejected as
582		unreasonably one-sided.
583	Q.	IN CONDITIONALLY SUPPORTING RMP'S REQUEST FOR EXEMPTION
584		FROM THE 70/30 SHARING FOR CERTAIN SPECIFIC ITEMS, ARE YOU
585		SUPPORTING MORE GENERALLY ANY MODIFICATION OF THE 70/30
586		SHARING CURRENTLY IN PLACE IN THE EBA?
587	A.	Absolutely not. The 70/30 sharing in the EBA provides the Company a critically
588		important incentive to manage its NPC efficiently. The exemptions I am supporting in
589		this case are limited to the special circumstances of the mine closure and to avoid an
590		unintended consequence on the Company's revenue recovery when depreciation expense
591		is converted to an amortization expense. I fully support the 70/30 sharing mechanism in
592		the EBA.
593	Q.	PREVIOUSLY YOU STATED THAT, IN GENERAL, YOU BELIEVE IT IS
594		REASONABLE FOR RMP TO CONTINUE TO RECOVER ITS INITIAL
595		INVESTMENT IN THE DEER CREEK MINE AND "UNSOLD PORTION" OF
596		THE MINING ASSETS AT THE CURRENT LEVEL UNTIL RATES ARE
597		RESET PURSUANT TO THE NEXT GENERAL RATE CASE. ARE THERE

ANY SPECIFIC QUALIFICATIONS TO YOUR SUPPORT FOR THIS

TREATMENT?

A.

Yes. There are several qualifications to my support. First, through its proposal, RMP is seeking to recover \$3.5 million in CWIP (Total Company) associated with the Deer Creek Mine and \$0.5 million in CWIP (Total Company) associated with the Preparation Plant. These expenditures are not recovered in current rates. Similarly, RMP is seeking to recover \$1.6 million in PS&I expenditures, which is for a surface exploration drilling program outside the boundaries of the leases currently controlled by PacifiCorp. These PS&I expenditures are also not recovered in current rates. ¹⁰ As the CWIP expenditures have never been – and never will be – used and useful, I recommend excluding their recovery through the deferral mechanism proposed by RMP. Similarly, with the closure of the mine, the PS&I expenditures will not provide customer benefits and also should be excluded from the regulatory asset. I do not believe that the circumstances of this Transaction warrant deviation from the Commission's typical requirement that costs can be collected from customers only for assets that are used and useful and that provide benefits to customers.

Secondly, the Hunter generating facilities are not owned exclusively by RMP.

Other parties own shares in Hunter Units Nos. 1 and 2 that together represent 14.88% of the aggregate operating capacity of the three Hunter units. Currently, the costs of the Deer Creek Mine and Mining Assets allocated to the other owners are recovered from the share of the cost of coal charged to the other owners.¹¹ With Deer Creek coal production

¹⁰ See RMP Responses to UAE Data Request 3.1(a) through (f), included in UAE Direct Exhibit 1.1.

¹¹ See RMP Response to UAE Data Request 3.2(a), (b) and (d), included in UAE Direct Exhibit 1.1.

discontinued, this vehicle for recovery of the Deer Creek Mine and Mining Assets costs from the non-RMP owners no longer exists. And, indeed, the Company's filing appears to contemplate fully recovering all Transaction costs from retail customers, without recognizing that a portion of these facilities served a non-RMP ownership interest. I disagree with such an approach. My support for RMP to recover its initial investment on the Deer Creek Mine and unsold portion of the Mining Assets extends only to the share of costs reasonably allocable to the Company's retail customers. To identify this share, it is necessary to first remove the portion of the assets that were required to serve the non-RMP-owned Hunter plant. In discovery, RMP prepared a table that identifies the portion of the Transaction costs the Company believes is allocable to retail customers after the portion of the assets required to serve non-RMP ownership interests is removed. This adjustment results in a reduction of applied to the proposed regulatory assets associated with the Deer Creek Mine, the loss on the Mining Assets, closure costs, and Retiree Medical settlement loss, as well as an adjustment to the 1974 Pension Trust regulatory asset.¹² I believe this adjustment is reasonable, with the exception of the loss on the Mining Assets, for which the adjustment should be closer to fact that the Preparation Plant is primarily used in support of the Hunter units. To the extent any of these regulatory assets are approved in this proceeding, the regulatory asset values should reflect these removals.

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Third, the deferral and regulatory asset should reflect the value received for the sale of the Preparation Plant.

¹² See RMP Response to UAE Data Request 3.3 and Confidential Attachment UAE 3.3, included in UAE Direct Exhibit 1.1, and Confidential UAE Direct Exhibit 1.2, respectively.

Q. HOW SHOULD THE SALE OF THE PREPARATION PLANT BE TREATED?

A.

RMP will receive for the Preparation Plant, which is less than the net book value of the Mining Assets, including the Preparation Plant CWIP. I am recommending that the depreciation/amortization expense associated with the Mining Asset loss, excluding CWIP, be permitted to flow through the EBA (without the 70/30 sharing) but that the depreciation/amortization expense associated with the sale be *removed* entirely from NPC (also without 70/30 sharing). There is no longer any reason for customers to pay for the depreciation of the portion of net book value for which RMP has been compensated through the sale. Based on my review of RMP's Confidential Response to OCS Data Request 4.4, ¹³ and confirmed by RMP's Response to WIEC Data Request 8.1 in Wyoming PSC Docket No. 20000-464-EA-14, ¹⁴ it is clear that RMP is <u>not</u> intending to remove these "ex-costs" from the EBA deferral. I recommend that the Commission not allow RMP to include depreciation/amortization corresponding to the "sold" portion of the Mining Asset in the 2015 EBA for recovery from customers.

In addition, the rate of return on the sold portion of the asset (that is currently in base rates) should be deferred and credited to customers against the regulatory asset balance that is on the books when new rates go into effect following the next general rate case. Based on my review of RMP's workpapers, and confirmed by RMP's Response to

¹³ RMP's Response to OCS Data Request 4.4 is included in UAE Direct Exhibit 1.1, and Confidential Attachment OCS 4.4 is included in Confidential UAE Direct Exhibit 1.2.

¹⁴ RMP Response to WIEC Data Request 8.1 in WY PSC Docket No. 20000-464-EA-14 is included in UAE Direct Exhibit 1.1.

559		WIEC Data Request 8.2 in Wyoming PSC Docket No. 20000-464-EA-14, ¹⁵ it is clear
560		that RMP is not intending to credit this return to customers.
561	Q.	HAVE YOU PREPARED AN EXHIBIT THAT SUMMARIZES THE
562		ADJUSTMENTS YOU ARE RECOMMENDING FOR THE PROPOSED
563		REGULATORY ASSETS CONCERNING THE REMOVAL OF CWIP AND
564		PS&I, AND ACCOUNTING FOR THE NON-RMP OWNERSHIP OF ASSETS
565		SERVED BY THE DEER CREEK MINE?
566	A.	Yes. The impacts of my recommended adjustments are shown in Confidential UAE
567		Direct Exhibit 1.3.
568	Q.	WHAT IS YOUR RECOMMENDED RATEMAKING TREATMENT FOR THE
569		FOSSIL ROCK PLANT HELD FOR FUTURE USE?
570	A.	As I discussed above, RMP states that it expects to sell the Fossil Rock assets at
571		approximately book value at the time the Transaction closes, with no accounting gain or
572		loss resulting. The Company proposes to defer the revenue associated with the return on
573		rate base until rates are reset and to offset the unrecovered regulatory assets associated
574		with the other components of the Transaction by this revenue deferral when rates are next
575		reset. 16 I agree with this proposed treatment. 17
676	Q.	PLEASE DESCRIBE RMP'S PROPOSED TREATMENT OF CLOSURE COSTS.


¹⁵ See RMP Response to WIEC Data Request 8.2 in WY PSC Docket No. 20000-464-EA-14, included in UAE Direct Exhibit 1.1.

¹⁶ See Direct Testimony of Douglas K. Stuver, page 11, lines 241-247.

¹⁷ Arguably, a portion of the Fossil Rock asset was being held for the benefit of non-RMP ownership interests in Hunter Nos. 1 and 2, but as it turns out, the entirety of the carrying cost of this Plant Held for Future Use is charged to retail customers (see RMP Response to UAE Data Request 3.2(c), included in UAE Direct Exhibit 1.1). Thus, it is appropriate for the entire credit to inure to the benefit of retail customers.

6//	A.	RMP will incur closure costs associated with removing everything from within the mine
678		workings, installing bulkheads in the coal seams and sealing the mine portals, labor-
679		related costs, and certain royalties. RMP proposes that all closure costs, currently
680		estimated at, be deferred in a regulatory asset with a carrying charge equal to
681		the Company's authorized rate of return. At the time rates are reset, RMP proposes to
682		include the unamortized regulatory asset in rate base and recover the costs over a period
683		to be approved by the Commission.
684		In Confidential RMP Exhibit_(DKS-1), RMP identifies the following categories
685		of costs associated with closure of the Deer Creek Mine:
686		Union supplemental unemployment and medical
687		Nonunion severance
688		• Royalties
689		• Inventory write-off
690		• Unrecovered reclamation (ARO) costs
691		Income tax regulatory asset
692		Miscellaneous, including on-going labor
693	Q.	WHAT IS YOUR RECOMMENDED RATEMAKING TREATMENT FOR THE
694		UNION SUPPLEMENTAL UNEMPLOYMENT AND MEDICAL COSTS AND
695		NON-UNION SEVERANCE COSTS?
696	A.	I recommend against deferral of these expenses, which are being incurred during and in
697		close proximity to the test period used in RMP's last general rate case, but which were
698		not identified by the Company in its filing in that case. Today's rates are the result of a

699		Stipulation approved by the Commission in the last general rate case, Docket No. 13-035-
700		184. That case began with RMP's own projections of what those costs would be. RMP
701		chose to time that case and its forecast so as to <u>not</u> include the Transaction in it. In my
702		opinion, absent a compelling special circumstance, it is unreasonable to give RMP "two
703		bites at the apple" insofar as its 2015 costs are concerned: one through its publicly-
704		released forecast in its last general rate case and a second one that reflects isolated costs
705		incurred in support of a Transaction that was not part of the Company's filing at the time
706		the last general rate case was conducted. The union supplemental unemployment and
707		medical costs and non-union severance costs were within the discretion of the company,
708		they were not unforeseen, they do not have a material impact on the Company's financial
709		integrity, and they do not arise as a result of an unintended consequence of the
710		ratemaking process. Consequently, it is not reasonable to confer single-issue ratemaking
711		status to them.
712	Q.	ARE YOU SUGGESTING THAT THE UNION SUPPLEMENTAL
713		UNEMPLOYMENT AND MEDICAL COSTS AND NON-UNION SEVERANCE
714		COSTS WERE IMPRUDENT?
715	A.	No. Rather, I am stating that I do not believe that deferred accounting is the appropriate
716		ratemaking treatment for these expenditures. As I stated above, utility ratemaking is not
717		based on a system of simple cost reimbursement.
718	Q.	WHAT IS YOUR RECOMMENDED RATEMAKING TREATMENT
719		REGARDING THE ROYALTY OBLIGATION ASSOCIATED WITH PLANT
720		CLOSURE?



 ¹⁸ See RMP Response to OCS Data Request 2.23, included in UAE Direct Exhibit 1.1. Abandonment royalty estimate source: RMP Response to DPU Data Request 1.1, Confidential Attachment DPU 1.1, EW Fin Model 12-15-14, 'EW FRF Pro Forma Closure Sale', "Royalties" tab, included Confidential UAE Direct Exhibit 1.2.
 ¹⁹ See RMP 1st Supplemental Response to WPSC Data Request 2.16 in WY PSC Docket No. 20000-464-EA-14, included in UAE Direct Exhibit 1.1. Recovery-based royalty estimate source: RMP Response to DPU Data Request 1.1, Confidential Attachment DPU 1.1, EW Fin Model 12-15-14, 'EW FRF Pro Forma Closure Sale', "Royalties" tab, included in Confidential UAE Direct Exhibit 1.2.

its authorized rate of return on its value. RMP's fuel inventory for facilities impacted by the Transaction is projected to decline significantly in 2015 relative to what is included in rates. See Table KCH-2, below.

743 **Table KCH-2**

Coal Fuel Stock Ba	lances Related to T	ransaction	
	GRC Pro Forma	Current Projection	Difference
	13-mo. av.	13-mo. av.	(Current Projection
Fuel Stock Site	Jun 14-Jun 15 ²⁰	Dec 14-Dec 15 ²¹	- GRC Pro Forma)
Hunter	71,019,205	50,645,174	(20,374,031)
Huntington	36,696,551	28,594,235	(8,102,316)
Deer Creek Mine	235,624	5,298	(230,327)
Preparation Plant	35,098,446	5,091,901	(30,006,546)
Rock Garden	14,360,259	17,633,011	3,272,752
Total	157,410,085	101,969,619	(55,440,466)

744 Q. IN ITS APPLICATION, DID RMP INCLUDE A CREDIT TO CUSTOMERS FOR

A REDUCTION IN FUEL INVENTORY AS A RESULT OF THE

746 TRANSACTION?

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A. No. In its Application, the Company did not recommend that any reduction in fuel inventory be recognized as a benefit to customers as part of its proposed deferral. I disagree with this exclusion. If RMP is to receive the benefit of deferred accounting for many of the costs it is incurring as a result of the Transaction, including an inventory write-off, then the savings to customers in fuel inventory carrying costs should also be reflected. The earnings on the reduction in fuel inventory for Calendar Year 2015, which

²⁰ Data Source: RMP Response to OCS Data Request 29.1, Attachment OCS 29.1, in Docket No. 13-035-184, included in UAE Direct Exhibit 1.1.

²¹ Data Source: RMP Response to OCS Data Request 4.6, Attachment OCS 4.6, included in UAE Direct Exhibit 1.1.

I estimate to be \$5.9 million (Total Company)²², should be deferred and credited against the inventory write-off, and the excess credited against the remaining regulatory assets associated with the Transaction that are approved by the Commission in this case. In the alternative, if it is argued that this deferral cannot properly be considered on the technical grounds that it was not included in RMP's Application, then the equivalent value should simply be deducted from the regulatory assets recognized for deferral in this case. This can be accomplished by denying deferral of the inventory write-off and a portion of the other regulatory assets that I am otherwise recommending for approval, up to a total value of \$5.9 million (Total Company). Q. WHAT IS YOUR RECOMMENDED RATEMAKING TREATMENT REGARDING THE UNRECOVERED ARO COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH **PLANT CLOSURE?** The ARO costs represent the difference between what has been recovered in rates for A. final reclamation and the present value of final reclamation costs.²³ Because the unrecovered ARO costs are part of a long-term calculation applied to the asset retirement obligation for a long-lived asset, I believe that deferral and amortization of these costs may be appropriate. Therefore, I do not object to RMP's proposal to defer them.

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Q.

WHAT IS YOUR RECOMMENDED RATEMAKING TREATMENT

REGARDING THE INCOME TAX REGULATORY ASSET?

²² The \$5.9 million Total Company estimate was derived using the Commission Integrated Allocation Model 12-2-14 from Docket No. 13-035-184. The Utah revenue requirement impact determined in the model (~\$2.5 million) was divided by the Utah system energy (SE) factor (41.972%) to derive the estimated Total Company impact.

²³ See RMP Response to OCS Data Request 2.19, included in UAE Direct Exhibit 1.1.

A. RMP's request to establish an income tax regulatory asset related to the Transaction is not well articulated in the Company's filing. Much greater detail is presented in RMP's Response to WIEC Data Request 4.3 in Wyoming PSC Docket No. 20000-464-EA-14. That response explains that in the earlier years of the mine, the benefits of accelerated depreciation had been flowed through directly to customers, prior to the adoption of income tax normalization.²⁴ The response goes on to state:

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As it relates to the Company's application for approval of the transaction for closure of Deer Creek mine and a deferred accounting order, a request has been made to establish a regulatory asset for the balance of the unrecovered Utah mining assets for which recovery would be provided through inclusion in cost of service amortization of the unrecovered investment regulatory asset in place of depreciation of the Utah mining assets. Specifically, customers have received the income tax benefits associated with the Utah mining assets over the life of the assets. Upon retirement of the Utah mining assets, deferred income taxes will be removed from the ASC 980-740 regulatory assets. Those deferred income taxes relate to depreciation occurring in the last part of the mine's life. Had depreciation of the mine continued, the Company would have recovered the deferred income taxes by excluding the income tax benefits from cost of service arising from the reversal of the deferred income tax liability. This recovery will not occur with the early retirement of the Utah mining assets as the unrecovered plant will be transferred to a regulatory asset, and absent approval of the Company's request, the income tax regulatory asset would receive a corresponding income tax benefit in cost of service as the regulatory asset is amortized. This would in effect provide a duplicative benefit to customers; once through the provision of the current income tax benefit through flowthrough accounting and again through the deferred income tax benefit through normalized accounting on the unrecovered investment regulatory asset. The request in this application with respect to the income tax regulatory asset on the unrecovered plant is to avoid this duplicative benefit and allow for the depletion of the income tax regulatory asset based upon amortization of the regulatory asset for the unrecovered plant included in cost of service in place of depreciation of the unrecovered plant thereby matching the underlying reclassification of the unrecovered plant out of property, plant and equipment regulatory asset.

The first part of this passage refers to the Company's inability to recover the deferred taxes that had been flowed through to customers in past years due to the earlier-

²⁴ See also RMP Response to DPU Data Request 3.2 and Confidential Attachment DPU 3.2-1, included in UAE Direct Exhibit 1.1 and Confidential UAE Direct Exhibit 1.2, respectively.

than-expected retirement of the mine. By itself, I do not find this reasoning persuasive for establishing a regulatory asset: after all, in ratemaking, not everything works out as planned. However, the Response goes on to assert that customers would receive a duplicate income tax benefit if the regulatory asset is not established as proposed by the Company.

A.

Due to the complexity of this issue and the relatively short amount of time for review, I am not challenging RMP's assertion regarding the duplicate income tax benefit at this time. Therefore, I am not objecting to RMP's proposal for deferral of this item to the extent it offsets what would otherwise be a duplicate tax benefit to customers. However, I intend to further evaluate and potentially make recommendations regarding the proper recovery, if any, by the Company of this deferred asset in future ratemaking proceedings.

Q. WHAT IS YOUR RECOMMENDED RATEMAKING TREATMENT REGARDING THE MISCELLANEOUS COSTS, INCLUDING LABOR COSTS, ASSOCIATED WITH PLANT CLOSURE?

I recommend against approving deferral of these costs as incurred prior to the test period in the next general rate case. While a case can be made that deferral is appropriate due to the end-of-life nature of these expenditures, the merits of this argument must be weighed against the proximity of the incurrence of these costs to the test period in the general rate case that was completed last year using a test period ending June 30, 2015. As I stated above, the basis for today's rates began with RMP's own projections of what those costs would be in the last general rate case. RMP chose to time that case and its forecast so as to not include the Transaction in it. With the Transaction clearly underway during the

828		pendency of the last general rate case, RMP opted not to withdraw the case and submit a
829		new filing that included the impact of the Transaction, but instead pursued that case using
830		its initial forecasts. Now, with the rate case concluded, the Company seeks single-issue
831		ratemaking treatment for the Transaction. These costs were not unforeseen, they are not
832		extraordinary, and they do not arise as a result of an unintended consequence of the
833		ratemaking process. Consequently, it is not reasonable to confer single-issue ratemaking
834		status to these costs.
835	Q.	PLEASE EXPLAIN RMP'S PROPOSED TREATMENT OF THE RETIREE
836		MEDICAL SETTLEMENT LOSS.
837	A.	Energy West settled its Retiree Medical Obligation by transferring assets to the UMWA
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839		, which serves to reduce the current unrecognized actuarial losses
840		reflected in the Company's regulatory assets. My understanding is that under GAAP,
841		RMP must accelerate recognition of a portion of the remaining unrecognized actuarial
842		losses. The estimated settlement loss of represents accelerated recognition of
843		actuarial losses that would also have been amortized to FAS 106 expense absent the
844		settlement. The Company proposes to defer the settlement loss for future recovery over a
845		period to be determined by the Commission.
846	Q.	WHAT IS YOUR RECOMMENDED RATEMAKING TREATMENT FOR THE
847		RETIREE MEDICAL OBLIGATION SETTLEMENT LOSS?
848	A.	Because these are costs that would have been amortized to FAS 106 expense absent the
849		settlement, I do not object to RMP's proposal for deferral.

Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN RMP'S PROPOSED TREATMENT OF THE 1974 PENSION TRUST WITHDRAWAL.

Α.

1974 Pension Trust contributions by Energy West of \$3 million are currently charged to fuel expense and included in base NPC. At the time of Trust withdrawal, Energy West has the option to make either a lump-sum payment to satisfy its withdrawal obligation or to make annual installment payments. RMP states that Energy West intends to negotiate with the 1974 Pension Trust to elect the most economical choice – annual or lump sum. For the plan year ending June 30, 2014, the withdrawal liability for Energy West was estimated to be \$125.6 million. However, for the plan year ending June 30, 2015, the withdrawal liability estimate for Energy West has been reduced to \$96.7 million. ²⁵

My understanding is that GAAP requires that these types of losses be recorded at their present value using a risk-free rate. In its filing, RMP uses a net present value of approximately for the withdrawal liability, apparently based on the estimate for the plan year ending June 30, 2014. RMP proposes continuation of the ongoing estimated \$3 million annual payment already reflected in rates to cover the annual withdrawal payments, and deferral of the accounting loss. Neither the regulatory asset nor the withdrawal liability would adjust over time since the \$3 million would not contribute towards a reduction in principal. At some future date, when the plan terminates or the accrual of future benefits is frozen, this liability and associated regulatory asset could be quantified and amortized.

²⁵ See RMP 1st Supplemental Response to OCS Data Request 2.9c, included in UAE Direct Exhibit 1.1.

870		In the alternative, if RMP successfully negotiates a more economical one-time
871		payment, the Company proposes that the amount be deferred until rates are next reset,
872		with rate base treatment of the unrecovered amount.
873	Q.	WHAT IS YOUR RECOMMENDED RATEMAKING TREATMENT FOR RMP'S
874		CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE 1974 PENSION TRUST IN THIS CASE?
875	A.	As RMP's proposed treatment is to continue the annual contribution of \$3 million until a
876		termination value can be determined, this expense can remain in NPC where it is today,
877		with no adjustment necessary at this time. I recommend that if and when RMP proposes
878		deferral and recovery of a specific termination value, that it be subject to Commission
879		review and approval at that time.
880	Q.	HAVE YOU PREPARED A TABLE THAT SUMMARIZES YOUR
881		RATEMAKING RECOMMENDATIONS WITH RESPECT TO RMP'S
882		PROPOSED DEFERRALS?
883	A.	Yes. This summary is presented in Confidential Table KCH-3, below.

Confidential Table KCH-3

Cost Item	RMP Projected Regulatory Asset Value (\$ in millions)	UAE Recommended Treatment
Change in Coal Supply Costs (Bowie Contract)	(\$14.5)	Allow EBA recovery with no sharing, conditional on deferral of benefit from extension of bonus tax depreciation.
Deer Creek Mine		
Plant in Service	\$81	No objection to recovery of amortization in 2015 EBA without sharing, conditional on deferral of benefit from extension of bonus tax depreciation. Going-forward regulatory asset should be adjusted to remove non-RMP portion.
CWIP	\$3.5	Deny regulatory asset.
PS&I	\$1.6	Deny regulatory asset.
Preparation Plant/Mining Assets (net)		No objection to recovery of amortization of loss on sale in 2015 EBA without sharing, conditional on deferral of benefit from extension of bonus tax depreciation, but the "sold" portion of asset should be excluded from amortization. Approve regulatory asset for "unsold" balance excluding CWIP, but adjust to remove non-RMP portion. Return on "sold" portion in 2015 should be credited against regulatory asset balance.
Fossil Rock PHFU		Approve credit proposed by RMP.
1974 Pension Trust Retiree Medical Obligation		Allow \$3 million annual expense as proposed by RMP. Any specific termination value must be subject to future Commission approval.
(Settlement Loss)		Approve regulatory asset.
Union Supplemental Unemployment and Medical		Deny regulatory asset.
Non-Union Severance		Deny regulatory asset.
Inventory Write-Off		Approve regulatory asset, but offset with credits from 2015 fuel inventory reduction.
Regulatory Asset - Income Tax		Approve regulatory asset to the extent it offsets a duplicate benefit.
Miscellaneous Closure/Ongoing Labor		Deny regulatory asset.
Unrecovered ARO Costs		Approve regulatory asset.
Royalty Obligations - Closure		Approve regulatory asset.

^{*} Data sources: CONFIDENTIAL Exhibit DKS-1, and RMP Response to UAE Data Request 3.1.

885	Q.	WHAT AMORTIZATION PERIOD IS RMP RECOMMENDING FOR THE
886		REGULATORY ASSETS THAT MAY BE ESTABLISHED IN THIS CASE?
887	A.	As I understand RMP's proposal, based on my review of RMP's Response to DPU Data
888		Request 3.2, Confidential Attachment DPU 3.2-1, ²⁶ the Company is suggesting an
889		amortization period of five years for most items starting on the rate effective date of the
890		next rate case. However, for those items that are currently being depreciated in rates (and
891		which would be converted into regulatory assets that would be amortized) the Company
892		is suggesting an amortization schedule that would remain concurrent with the existing
893		depreciation schedules.
894	Q.	WHAT IS YOUR RECOMMENDATION CONCERNING THE AMORTIZATION
895		PERIODS FOR THE REGULATORY ASSETS THAT MAY BE ESTABLISHED
896		IN THIS CASE?
897	A.	For those items that are currently being depreciated in rates, it makes sense to amortize
898		these items at the same rate at which they are now being depreciated, as RMP proposes,
899		until the next general rate case is conducted, subject to the qualifications discussed earlier
900		in my testimony. For all other newly-created regulatory assets, it is not necessary to
901		determine the amortization period at this juncture because amortization of these items
902		will not begin until the rate effective period following the next general rate case. The
903		determination of the appropriate amortization period is a matter that is appropriately
904		addressed in the next general rate case, when all rate impacts on customers can be taken
905		into account. At that time, the Commission can consider whether the amortization

²⁶ RMP Response to DPU Data Request 3.2 is included in UAE Direct Exhibit 1.1 and Confidential Attachment DPU 3.2-1 is included in Confidential UAE Direct Exhibit 1.2.

e Commission may consider extending the amortization with the time horizon of the Transaction. (The time horizon 2029 because that is the term of the Bowie contract.) The period to 2029 may be preferable because it would help to the Transaction over the duration of its life. NG WITH RESPECT TO CARRYING COSTS ON ATORY ASSET BALANCES?
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recommendation is not reasonable for several reasons. oved carrying cost for deferrals that flow through the EBA,
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HE COMPANY'S RECOMMENDATION ON

the carrying costs should be set at the cost of long-term debt established in the last

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general rate case (5.2%). Using the authorized rate of return for this purpose as proposed

by RMP is excessive. The regulatory assets proposed by RMP in this proceeding consist

in significant part of plant that is no longer used and useful and other assorted losses as a

result of the Transaction. I urge the Commission to refrain from awarding the benefit of

an equity return on this incremental cost burden to customers. Moreover, as far as this

proceeding is concerned, the cost of the regulatory assets needs to be carried only until

the next general rate case. The rate of return on any regulatory assets established in this

proceeding can be revisited in that context along with the appropriate amortization

periods.

Q. DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR DIRECT TESTIMONY?

939 A. Yes, it does.

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