

# APPENDIX 1

1 Clark.

2 EXAMINATION

3 BY MS. HAYES:

4 Q. Good morning, Dr. Abdulle. In your  
5 direct testimony at line 58--

6 A. Page?

7 Q. I don't know.

8 A. I got it.

9 Q. Oh, thank you. You say, "The Division  
10 believes that with the exception of some  
11 simplifications that are already in place, all QFs  
12 should be treated equally and their avoided costs  
13 should be calculated the same way regardless of  
14 their sizes." Could you tell me what are those  
15 simplifications already in place?

16 A. Indifferent here in the Schedule 37 from  
17 Schedule 38 given the fact that Schedule 37  
18 customers are small. Those simplifications are  
19 outward silent to remove the burden and say from  
20 Schedule 37 customers.

21 Q. So would you agree that the size of the  
22 resource modeled in the grid run is one of those  
23 simplifications?

24 A. That's the differentiation between two  
25 schedules is the time.

1 Q. And also that the supply curve of the  
2 resource model and grid?

3 A. I'm not sure what you mean.

4 Q. I'll make it clearer. I'm sorry. I'll  
5 get to that. Can I lead you to your rebuttal  
6 testimony at line 42? You say capacity payments  
7 during the sufficiency period when an FOT is  
8 displaced, which includes a capacity payment,  
9 would overcompensate the QF contrary to the  
10 ratepayer indifferent standard; is that correct?

11 A. Correct.

12 Q. I would like to ask you some questions  
13 about how energy payments in the resource  
14 sufficiency period are calculated under Schedule  
15 37 and 38 and how they're different.

16 A. Yeah.

17 Q. So under Schedule 38, avoided energy  
18 costs in the sufficiency period are calculated on  
19 differential grid runs and the QF resource is  
20 modeled with the supply curve based on its actual  
21 supply characteristics; is that correct?

22 A. I'm not sure what that's asking, but the  
23 way I understand it and the intent I had about  
24 this statement is the fact that when running the  
25 grid, when the QF is grazing the front of

1 transaction, that--the grid model captures the  
2 whole avoided cost because it included the  
3 capacity costs that were there. So adding it  
4 again would overcompensate the--

5 Q. Sure. But I just want to ask you some  
6 questions about how Schedule 37 and Schedule 38  
7 differ. So in Schedule 38, the proxy resource, if  
8 you will--although I may be conflating my  
9 methods--but was it the resource modeled for it to  
10 calculate energy payments in the sufficiency  
11 period is based on the QFs that has approached the  
12 company? So, for example, if I'm a solar QF  
13 developer and I'm approaching Rocky Mountain Power  
14 for a Schedule 38 contract, in order to figure out  
15 avoided cost energy prices in the sufficiency  
16 period, the Company will model a grid run with the  
17 supply curve of--that corresponds with the type of  
18 resource I'm proposing, size and supply curve; is  
19 that correct?

20 A. Correct.

21 Q. And, as you were saying, the Commission  
22 found that to the extent the QF supply curve  
23 displaces front office transactions in that grid  
24 run, the avoided costs compensate for avoided  
25 capacity costs as a component of the avoided front

1 office transactions; is that correct?

2 A. Correct.

3 Q. So under Schedule 37, energy costs in the  
4 sufficiency period are based on the addition of a  
5 zero cost ten average megawatt resource; is that  
6 correct?

7 A. Correct.

8 Q. And that resource is added as a flat  
9 decrement to load, correct?

10 A. Correct.

11 Q. So the energy price based on this flat  
12 decrement to load is an average energy price that  
13 does not take into consideration the supply  
14 characteristics of unique QF resources or the  
15 resources that an actual QF would displace; is  
16 that correct?

17 A. It does not include the unique  
18 characteristics of the QF.

19 Q. So it's possible, isn't it, that the  
20 Schedule 37 energy price does not offset  
21 summertime front office transaction capacity to  
22 the same extent that a solar QF's actual supply  
23 curve would offset summertime front office  
24 transaction capacity; is that correct?

25 A. I don't agree with that. When you spread

1 your front office transactions because of the size  
2 of the qualifying facility that's offsetting, the  
3 grid model will calculate what avoided cost would  
4 be or should be. And that's the number that would  
5 be--the number we would use in avoided cost. And  
6 that includes capacity costs of the facility.

7 Q. But do you agree that an actual solar  
8 supply curve may displace more front office  
9 transactions than a flat decrement to load?

10 A. A comparison between flat decrement load  
11 and a solar?

12 Q. Supply curve would--produces most of its  
13 energy in the summertime?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. So a QF that produces most of its energy  
16 in, for example, third quarter heavy load hours  
17 would not get compensated or would displace more  
18 front office transactions than a ten megawatt flat  
19 load decrement? I think that's what I just asked,  
20 sorry.

21 And so to the extent that an actual solar  
22 QF produces most of its energy in those  
23 high--those heavy load hours, it does not get  
24 compensated to the same extent under Schedule 37  
25 as an actual solar supply curve would get

1 compensated under Schedule 38; is that correct?

2 A. There are so many different small QFs  
3 that are out there, solar, wind, whatever you call  
4 it, and each one if they go on we use the specific  
5 characteristics of those things and they negotiate  
6 prices Schedule 38 would be, that would put a lot  
7 of burden to these small QFs.

8 So these changes, these differences we're  
9 talking about now, are the reasoning--are the  
10 difference between the two. And those--that  
11 specific QF, small QF, would be different than the  
12 other one. And different than the other one.  
13 They are all different. So that's why we're  
14 choosing the price to avoid all those problems.

15 Q. Right. So would you agree that by  
16 simplifying the method, Schedule 37 QFs are not  
17 compensated in the same way or to the same extent,  
18 for example, under Schedule 38, which models the  
19 actual supply curve?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. So if simplifications to Schedule 37  
22 prices have the affect of artificially reducing 37  
23 prices compared to Schedule 38 prices, do Schedule  
24 37 prices discriminate against small QFs relative  
25 to large QFs?

1           A. I don't think so. The simplifications  
2 are cost saving for these small QFs, not cost  
3 burden on them. So they're not going to be  
4 undercompensated based on these calculations that  
5 are put there in the grid model and the  
6 calculations for avoided costs. I don't think  
7 that they are under.

8           Q. Even though they're compensated less for,  
9 for example, their energy and capacity based on  
10 the way energy prices are calculated?

11          A. The fact that we are posing a price that  
12 would be applicable to all small QFs, it's  
13 not--that price as we're quoting may not be the  
14 same if we have to calculate each one of them  
15 individually.

16          Q. Hasn't--oh--

17          A. Go ahead.

18          Q. Go ahead. Sorry, I didn't mean to cut  
19 you off.

20          A. I'm finished.

21           MS. HAYES: Okay. I have no further  
22 questions. Thank you.

23           THE HEARING OFFICER: Mr. Dodge?

24           MR. DODGE: Thank you.

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