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Energy Users (UAE)

BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH

In the Matter of the Application of Rocky Mountain Power to Decrease the Deferred EBA Rate through the Energy Balancing Account Mechanism	Docket No. 16-035-01
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PREFILED DIRECT TESTIMONY OF KEVIN C. HIGGINS

The Utah Association of Energy Users (“UAE”) hereby submits the Prefiled Direct Testimony of Kevin C. Higgins in this docket.

DATED this 18th day of August 2016.

HATCH, JAMES & DODGE

/s/ _____

Gary A. Dodge
Attorneys for the Utah Association of Energy Users

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served by email this 18th day of August 2016 on the following:

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/s/ _____

1 **I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY**

2 **Q. Please state your name and business address.**

3 A. My name is Kevin C. Higgins. My business address is 215 South State
4 Street, Suite 200, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111.

5 **Q. By whom are you employed and in what capacity?**

6 A. I am a Principal in the firm of Energy Strategies, LLC. Energy Strategies
7 is a private consulting firm specializing in economic and policy analysis applicable
8 to energy production, transportation, and consumption.

9 **Q. On whose behalf are you testifying in this proceeding?**

10 A. My testimony is being sponsored by the Utah Association of Energy Users
11 (“UAE”).

12 **Q. Please summarize your qualifications.**

13 A. My academic background is in economics, and I have completed all
14 coursework and field examinations toward a Ph.D. in Economics at the University
15 of Utah. In addition, I have served on the adjunct faculties of both the University
16 of Utah and Westminster College, where I taught undergraduate and graduate
17 courses in economics. I joined Energy Strategies in 1995, where I assist private
18 and public sector clients in the areas of energy-related economic and policy
19 analysis, including evaluation of electric and gas utility rate matters.

20 Prior to joining Energy Strategies, I held policy positions in state and local
21 government. From 1983 to 1990, I was economist, then assistant director, for the
22 Utah Energy Office, where I helped develop and implement state energy policy.

23 From 1991 to 1994, I was chief of staff to the chairman of the Salt Lake County
24 Commission, where I was responsible for development and implementation of a
25 broad spectrum of public policy at the local government level.

26 **Q. Have you previously testified before the Utah Public Service Commission**
27 **(“Commission”)?**

28 A. Yes. Since 1984, I have testified in thirty-seven dockets before the Utah
29 Public Service Commission on electricity and natural gas matters.

30 **Q. Have you testified previously before any other state utility regulatory**
31 **commissions?**

32 A. Yes, I have testified in approximately 180 other proceedings on the
33 subjects of utility rates and regulatory policy before state utility regulators in
34 Alaska, Arkansas, Arizona, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas,
35 Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, New
36 York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
37 Texas, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. I have also filed
38 affidavits in proceedings before the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and
39 prepared expert reports in state and federal court proceedings involving utility
40 matters.

41

42 **Q. What is the purpose of your testimony in this case?**

43 A. My testimony addresses the request by Rocky Mountain Power (“RMP”)
44 for recovery of approximately \$18.9 million in Energy Balancing Account

45 (“EBA”) related costs for the deferral period January 1, 2015 through December
46 31, 2015. The \$18.9 million requested by RMP is comprised of four
47 components: (1) approximately \$11.3 million in Actual EBA Costs in excess of
48 Base EBA Costs (after taking into account the 70/30 sharing mechanism), (2) a
49 credit of approximately \$2.8 million in coal fuel expense savings at the Hunter
50 and Huntington plants related to the Deer Creek mine closure and not subject to
51 the 70/30 sharing mechanism, (3) approximately \$1.3 million in accrued interest,
52 and (4) approximately \$9.0 million representing the Utah-allocated Deer Creek
53 mine amortization expense.

54 **Q. Please summarize your primary conclusions and recommendations**
55 **concerning RMP’s proposed EBA rate adjustment.**

56 A. I offer the following conclusions and recommendations:

57 (1) The Commission should reduce the Utah-allocated EBA costs by
58 approximately \$2.9 million to account for the full amount of savings resulting
59 from the settlement of the Energy West Retiree Medical Obligation, including the
60 reduction in FAS 106 expense not otherwise reflected in the cost of coal for the
61 Hunter and Huntington power facilities, as explained in the Confidential Direct
62 Testimony of UAE witness Bradley G. Mullins.

63 (2) The Commission should adopt the recommendations of Division of
64 Public Utilities (“DPU”) witness Artie Powell to disallow the interest expense or
65 accrual on the amortization of the unrecovered investment in the Deer Creek
66 mine, which DPU calculates to be \$465,312 for the period January 1, 2016

67 through October 31, 2016. The Commission should also adopt Dr. Powell's
68 recommendation that the Company not be allowed to collect interest on the
69 unrecovered investment balance over the EBA collection or amortization period,
70 November 1, 2016 through October 31, 2017, approximately \$250,216.

71 (3) In light of RMP's failure to adhere to the terms of the settlement
72 stipulation in the Deer Creek case, the Commission should consider *de novo* the
73 recommendation I made in the Deer Creek case to approve a deferral for the
74 benefit of Utah customers of windfall savings by the Company from the extension
75 of bonus tax depreciation. Specifically, the Commission should order RMP to
76 calculate and defer the monthly difference between the revenues collected from
77 customers based on the test period revenue requirement approved by the
78 Commission in the last general rate case and the revenues that would have been
79 collected from customers if a test period revenue requirement had been set that,
80 all other things being held constant, took into account the effects of the extension
81 of 50 percent bonus tax depreciation through the end of the test period in that
82 case, June 30, 2015.

83

84 **II. DEER CREEK MINE SETTLEMENT STIPULATION AND THE EBA**

85 **Q. What is the relationship between the Deer Creek Mine Settlement Stipulation**
86 **and the EBA?**

87 A. On April 29, 2015 the Commission approved a settlement stipulation
88 ("Deer Creek Stipulation") in Docket No. 14-035-147, which responded to RMP's

89 request for approval to close the Deer Creek Mine and a request for deferred
90 accounting treatment for specified components of the associated transaction. The
91 Deer Creek Stipulation was signed by RMP, DPU, the Office of Consumer
92 Services, UAE, and the Sierra Club. The Stipulation has a direct bearing on the
93 EBA because that agreement provides that certain Deer Creek transaction-related
94 costs and benefits would be passed through the EBA. The Deer Creek Stipulation
95 also provides for limited exceptions to the 70/30 sharing mechanism that
96 governed the apportionment of EBA adjustments between customers and the
97 Company since the inception of the EBA pilot until the recent suspension of the
98 sharing mechanism by the legislature effective July 1, 2016.

99 **Q. What aspect of the Deer Creek Stipulation are you addressing in your**
100 **testimony?**

101 A. I am addressing Paragraph 17 of the Stipulation, which states, in relevant
102 part:

103 The Parties agree that the Commission should enter an order authorizing a one-
104 time, non-precedential exception to be made to the 70/30 Energy Balance Account
105 (“EBA”) sharing band for the following items, to be recovered by flowing them
106 through the EBA at 100% without applying the sharing band until the rate effective
107 date of the next general rate case....

108
109 The Parties agree that the sharing band waiver is non-precedential, and the
110 Company agrees to not request any change or elimination of the EBA sharing band
111 to be effective prior to the end of the EBA pilot.
112

113 **Q. Why is this passage relevant to this proceeding?**

114 A. As pointed out by DPU witness Artie Powell, RMP did not keep its
115 commitment “to not request any change or elimination of the EBA sharing band

116 to be effective prior to the end of the EBA pilot.” The EBA pilot had been
117 approved through the 2016 deferral period, which ends December 31, 2016. It
118 has been well documented in the press and I know from personal knowledge that
119 RMP engaged in a major lobbying effort during the 2016 session of the Utah
120 Legislature to eliminate the 70/30 sharing band. The legislation that passed, SB
121 115, eliminated the sharing band for three and one-half years starting July 1,
122 2016. RMP’s instigation of this legislation and its aggressive lobbying efforts to
123 support its passage are clearly inconsistent with the Company’s commitment
124 under Paragraph 17 of the Stipulation.

125 In response to the Company’s failure to adhere to its commitments under
126 Paragraph 17, Dr. Powell recommends the disallowance of the interest expense or
127 accrual on the amortization of the unrecovered investment in the Deer Creek
128 mine, which DPU calculates to be \$465,312 for the period January 1, 2016
129 through October 31, 2016. Additionally, Dr. Powell recommends that the
130 Company not be allowed to collect interest on the unrecovered investment
131 balance over the EBA collection or amortization period, November 1, 2016
132 through October 31, 2017, approximately \$250,216.

133 **Q. Do you support Dr. Powell’s recommendation?**

134 A. Yes, I do.

135 **Q. Do you have any additional recommendations regarding Paragraph 17?**

136 A. Yes. UAE agreed to enter the Deer Creek Stipulation despite the fact that
137 the Stipulation did not incorporate the argument advanced in my direct testimony

138 that if deferred accounting is to be used to exempt Deer Creek-related
139 amortization expense from the 70/30 sharing mechanism, then deferred
140 accounting should also be used to capture the benefits to customers of the
141 extension of bonus tax depreciation through the end of 2014. In my opinion,
142 deferred accounting treatment for the extension of bonus tax depreciation would
143 have been – and continues to be – entirely appropriate. However, UAE decided to
144 enter the Stipulation absent this provision in exchange for the total package that
145 was negotiated – specifically including RMP’s commitment to leave the 70/30
146 sharing mechanism in place through the end of the EBA Pilot Program. In light
147 of RMP’s failure to adhere fully to the terms of the Deer Creek Stipulation, UAE
148 is now requesting that the Commission consider *de novo* the recommendation I
149 made in the Deer Creek case concerning the extension of bonus tax depreciation. I
150 believe that such consideration at this time is fair and in the public interest.

151 **Q. Why is it reasonable to approve deferred accounting treatment for the**
152 **extension of bonus tax depreciation?**

153 A. The revenue requirement in the last general rate case was established
154 using a test period ending June 30, 2015, under the assumption that bonus tax
155 depreciation would terminate on December 31, 2013. However, on December 19,
156 2014, the Tax Increase Prevention Act of 2014 (Public Law No. 113-295), was
157 signed into law. Among other things, this Act extends 50 percent bonus tax
158 depreciation through the end of year 2014. This extension means that bonus tax
159 depreciation was, in fact, applicable to the test period used in the last general rate

160 case, even though the parties to the proceeding had no way of knowing this would
161 be the case at the time the proceeding was conducted. As a result, the revenue
162 requirement in Utah was established using tax assumptions that initially set the
163 Utah annual revenue requirement approximately \$2 million to \$3 million too high.

164 Moreover, bonus tax depreciation was again extended by the Protecting
165 Americans from Tax Hikes (“PATH”) Act of 2015, which was signed into law on
166 December 18, 2015. The PATH Act extends 50 percent bonus tax depreciation
167 through December 31, 2017, and includes a phase down to 40 percent bonus tax
168 depreciation in 2018, and 30 percent in 2019.

169 The PATH Act extension means that test year plant added between
170 January 1, 2015 and the end of the test period on June 30, 2015 *also* qualifies for
171 bonus tax depreciation, unbeknownst to the parties at the time the last general rate
172 case was conducted. This latter development exacerbates the mismatch between
173 the assumptions used regarding Federal tax policy that were used to set rates in
174 Utah using the future test period in the last rate case and the tax policies that
175 actually turned out to be in effect during the test period. In other words, the
176 extension of bonus tax depreciation through the PATH Act further adds to the
177 benefits that should inure to the benefit of Utah customers.

178 While it is reasonable to consider deferred accounting treatment for the
179 extension of bonus tax depreciation on its own merit, this issue has particular
180 relevance for this proceeding because this proceeding implements the deferrals
181 that were approved in the Deer Creek case. In this case, deferred accounting is

182 being used to exempt Deer Creek-related amortization expense from the 70/30
183 sharing mechanism, largely to cure an unintended consequence of ratemaking
184 mechanics. The same principle applies to using deferred accounting to capture
185 the benefits that should be passed on to customers of the extension of bonus tax
186 depreciation through the end of the test period used in the last general rate case.
187 In my direct testimony in the Deer Creek proceeding, I argued that absent such a
188 companion deferral, RMP's request for waiver from the 70/30 sharing should be
189 rejected as unreasonably one-sided. While UAE's recommendation regarding
190 bonus tax depreciation was not included in the Deer Creek Stipulation, RMP's
191 violation of that stipulation in pursuit of its legislative agenda deprives the other
192 parties to the Stipulation, including UAE, of the benefits of their bargain and
193 warrants a fresh examination of UAE's proposal.

194 **Q. What is bonus tax depreciation?**

195 A. Bonus tax depreciation refers to a greatly accelerated tax deduction for
196 depreciation that has been permitted pursuant to several statutes signed into law in
197 recent years to stimulate the economy. Bonus tax depreciation was permitted in
198 the early 2000s and extended for most periods between 2008 and 2013. In their
199 most recent incarnations, these acts permitted a first-year depreciation tax
200 deduction equal to 50 percent of the cost of qualified property. At the time of the
201 most recent general rate case, Docket No. 13-035-184, 50 percent bonus tax
202 depreciation was scheduled to expire on December 31, 2013.

203 **Q. How did bonus tax depreciation factor in to the most recent general rate**

204 **case?**

205 A. The most recent general rate case, which was resolved through a
206 Stipulation approved by the Commission on August 29, 2014, used a projected
207 test period ending June 30, 2015. The Company's filing was made on January 3,
208 2014, and took into account bonus tax depreciation through December 31, 2013,
209 which was the termination date for bonus tax depreciation at the time of the
210 company's filing.

211 After the last rate case was resolved, on December 19, 2014, the President
212 signed into law the Tax Increase Prevention Act of 2014 (Public Law No. 113-
213 295), an Act which, among other things, extended 50 percent bonus tax
214 depreciation through the end of year 2014. The enactment of this extension
215 means that bonus tax depreciation was, in fact, applicable to the test period used
216 in the last general rate case, even though the parties did not know it at the time the
217 case was conducted. The subsequent enactment of the PATH Act in late 2015
218 means that bonus tax depreciation was also applicable to the second half of the
219 test period ending June 30, 2015.

220 **Q. How does bonus tax depreciation impact ratemaking for regulated utilities?**

221 A. Bonus tax depreciation is a form of accelerated tax depreciation. This
222 Commission has long recognized that utility depreciation for tax purposes differs
223 from utility book depreciation used in ratemaking. Generally, the tax benefits of
224 accelerated depreciation are not passed through directly to ratepayers; instead,
225 according to the conventions of income tax normalization, the benefit of a utility's

226 accumulated deferred income tax (“ADIT”) is viewed as a source of zero-cost
227 capital to the utility as part of the ratemaking process. Consequently, the ADIT
228 that results from accelerated tax depreciation is booked as a credit against rate
229 base, thereby reducing revenue requirements for customers.

230 Even though bonus tax depreciation affects rates through the same
231 mechanics as standard accelerated depreciation, its impact is more dramatic than
232 standard accelerated depreciation in the years immediately following the
233 placement of the qualifying plant into service. This is because bonus tax
234 depreciation causes a much greater increase in ADIT, which in turn, produces a
235 much greater credit against rate base for any given amount of new plant in
236 service. This, in turn, typically reduces the revenue requirement relative to what
237 it would have been if bonus tax depreciation were not applicable.

238 The accounting for bonus tax depreciation in Utah ratemaking is a
239 standard and routine part of the ratemaking process. The fact that 2014 bonus tax
240 depreciation was not included in the determination of revenue requirement in the
241 most recent general rate case is due solely to the fact that the extension was not
242 known or knowable while the rate case was being resolved because it was not
243 enacted until approximately six months after the submission of the Stipulation on
244 June 25, 2014, and approximately four months after the Commission’s final order
245 approving that Stipulation on August 29, 2014. Thus, the omission of 2014 bonus
246 tax depreciation from the revenue requirement of the general rate case is the result
247 of the timing of the case and the timing of the passage of the Act, and was subject

248 to actions that were outside the control of the parties at the time the case was
249 conducted.

250 **Q. Do you have an estimate of the impact of the extension of bonus tax**
251 **depreciation on the Utah revenue requirement?**

252 A. Yes. On March 5, 2015, the Wyoming Public Service Commission
253 ordered RMP to defer, effective January 1, 2015, the benefits of the extension,
254 through December 31, 2014, of bonus tax depreciation on the Wyoming revenue
255 requirement. Similar to the situation in Utah, the Wyoming Commission had
256 approved rates using a test period ending June 30, 2015 that did not reflect the
257 2014 extension of bonus tax depreciation, which was signed into law after the
258 record was closed in RMP's 2014 Wyoming general rate case.¹ The deferral for
259 the period January 1, 2015 through December 31, 2015 in Wyoming amounted to
260 \$927,000.² As the Utah revenue requirement is about 2.7 times that of Wyoming,
261 I estimate the revenue requirement reduction in Utah to be between \$2 and \$3
262 million per year for the *initial* extension of bonus tax depreciation through
263 December 31, 2014.³ The subsequent extension of bonus tax depreciation
264 beyond 2014 implemented through the PATH Act would add to that amount.

265 **Q. How should the benefits of bonus tax depreciation be tracked as part of a**
266 **deferral approved in this case?**

¹ Wyoming Public Service Commission, Docket No. 20000-446-ER-14.

² This amount was authorized for recovery through Bonus Depreciation Schedule 92, approved in RMP's 2015 Wyoming general rate case, Docket No. 20000-469-ER-15.

³ While the impact of bonus tax depreciation is not strictly proportionate to jurisdictional revenue requirement, I believe this estimate provides a useful approximation.

267 A. The Commission should order RMP to calculate and defer the monthly
268 difference between the revenues collected from customers based on the test period
269 revenue requirement approved by the Commission in the last general rate case and
270 the revenues that would have been collected from customers if a test period
271 revenue requirement had been set that, all other things being held constant, took
272 into account the effects of the extension of 50 percent bonus tax depreciation
273 through the end of the test period in that case, June 30, 2015.

274 It would be unreasonable and asymmetric to have cured the unintended
275 consequence of ratemaking mechanics associated with the conversion of Deer
276 Creek Mine-related depreciation expense into amortization expense without also
277 recognizing that the last general rate case suffered from a comparable anomaly, in
278 which an unforeseen and unforeseeable change in the tax law applicable to the
279 test period revenue requirement occurred after the disposition of the case.

280 **Q. When should the deferral period begin?**

281 A. In fairness to Utah customers, the deferral reasonably should be calculated
282 starting January 1, 2015, as I proposed in my direct testimony filed in the Deer
283 Creek proceeding. Alternatively, the deferral could start on March 17, 2015, the
284 day on which my direct testimony proposing the deferral was filed in the Deer
285 Creek case. If for some reason the Commission were to conclude that it cannot or
286 chooses not to initiate the deferral on a date in the past, the deferral should under
287 all circumstances be implemented prospectively as soon as reasonably practicable.

288 **Q. Does this conclude your direct testimony?**

289 A. Yes, it does.