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BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH

In the Matter of Glen Canyon Solar A, LLC and Glen Canyon Solar B, LLC's Request for Agency Action to Adjudicate Rights and Obligations under PURPA, Schedule 38 and Power Purchase Agreements with Rocky Mountain Power	Docket No. 17-035-36
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REDACTED PREFILED SURREBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF KEEGAN MOYER

Glen Canyon Solar A, LLC and Glen Canyon Solar B, LLC hereby submit the Redacted Prefiled Surrebuttal Testimony of Keegan Moyer in this docket.

DATED this 2nd day of October 2017.

HATCH, JAMES & DODGE

/s/ Phillip J. Russell

Gary A. Dodge
Phillip J. Russell
*Attorneys for Glen Canyon Solar A, LLC &
Glen Canyon Solar B, LLC*

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Docket No. 17-035-36

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served by email this 2nd day of October 2017 on the following:

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Redacted Surrebuttal Testimony of Keegan Moyer

On Behalf of Glen Canyon Solar A, LLC and Glen Canyon Solar B, LLC

October 2, 2017

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

1
2 **Q. Please state your name for the record.**

3 A. My name is Keegan Moyer.

4 **Q. Have you previously filed testimony in this docket?**

5 A. Yes. On behalf of Glen Canyon Solar A, LLC and Glen Canyon Solar B,
6 LLC (collectively, “Glen Canyon Solar”), I filed direct testimony in this docket
7 on June 29, 2017 and rebuttal testimony on September 25, 2017.

8 **Q. What is the purpose of your surrebuttal testimony?**

9 A. I will respond to rebuttal testimony submitted by PacifiCorp witnesses
10 Rick A. Vail and Daniel J. MacNeil.

11 **Q. Please summarize your surrebuttal testimony.**

12 A. In my response to Mr. Vail’s rebuttal testimony I correct Mr. Vail’s
13 characterization of the issue at hand in this proceeding. He wrongly contends that
14 the core of the debate surrounds cost allocation of interconnection facilities, and I
15 clarify that the issue is not who will pay, but rather whether deliverability-driven
16 network upgrades that may be identified in the interconnection study should be
17 avoided in the first place. Glen Canyon Solar will and should pay for facilities
18 required to interconnect its generation resources, and Rocky Mountain Power
19 (“RMP”) is responsible for delivering the interconnected resources to load and in
20 doing so, it should ask PacifiCorp Transmission (“PacTrans”) to avoid the
21 identification of any unnecessary deliverability-driven interconnection facilities,
22 to the extent possible.

23 I also address each of the three “adverse consequences” that Mr. Vail
24 claims would result if PacifiCorp were to consider redispatch in the
25 interconnection studies as requested by Glen Canyon Solar. My comments show
26 that the alleged consequences identified by Mr. Vail are not supported by
27 evidence. They also explain that the relief requested by Glen Canyon Solar is
28 necessary to avoid discrimination. Additionally, I discuss data recently provided
29 by RMP related to the APS agreements that confirm it is possible for PacifiCorp
30 to use existing transmission rights to facilitate the delivery of the Glen Canyon
31 Solar output to loads.

32 My response to Mr. MacNeil’s rebuttal testimony clarifies what appear to
33 be misunderstandings between PacifiCorp and the Division on the topic of
34 redispatch. I agree with Mr. MacNeil’s position that the avoided-cost pricing does
35 not and should not include incremental interconnection and transmission costs.
36 While the avoided-cost model does not directly add costs for QF interconnection
37 or transmission, it does reflect all cost impacts of modeled transmission
38 constraints and thus the model accurately determined avoided cost prices for Glen
39 Canyon Solar by modeling RMP’s transmission rights from Glen Canyon to
40 PACE. PacifiCorp and Glen Canyon Solar have not disputed the accuracy or
41 validity of the pricing or the avoided cost model transmission assumptions in this
42 proceeding.

43

44

45 **Response to Rebuttal Testimony of PacifiCorp Witness Rick A. Vail**

46 **Q. PacifiCorp witness Rick A. Vail states on lines 14-16 of his rebuttal testimony**
47 **that the “core of this dispute” is whether a QF or PacifiCorp’s other**
48 **customers should be required to pay for deliverability-driven network**
49 **upgrade costs identified in an NR interconnection study. Do you agree?**

50 A. No, I strongly disagree with that characterization of the issue in this
51 docket. Mr. Vail and other PacifiCorp witnesses consistently attempt to
52 mischaracterize the dispute so as to pit QF developers and utility customers
53 against each other. That is simply not the case here. Rather, the core of this
54 dispute is whether PacifiCorp’s PURPA and Schedule 38 obligations, and its
55 obligation to act fairly, reasonably and non-discriminatorily to both customers and
56 QF developers, require PacifiCorp to take available steps to avoid any risk that
57 either QFs or PacifiCorp customers will face costs for unneeded and uneconomic
58 deliverability-driven network upgrades in the first place.

59 What Glen Canyon Solar is requesting is for the interconnection studies to
60 be performed by PacifiCorp’s transmission function in a manner that will allow
61 for the elimination of deliverability-driven network upgrades that would be
62 rendered unnecessary if PacifiCorp simply uses existing transmission rights to
63 deliver the output of the Glen Canyon QF projects. As my previous testimony in
64 this docket shows, RMP has sufficient existing transmission rights to allow it to
65 deliver the Glen Canyon Solar generation without the need for deliverability-
66 driven network upgrades and in a manner consistent with the pricing assumptions

67 in the avoided cost model.

68 I agree with Mr. Vail’s statement that the QF developer is responsible for
69 interconnection costs. Schedule 38 makes that obligation clear and Glen Canyon
70 Solar has always intended to pay interconnection costs. Where I strongly disagree
71 with Mr. Vail, however, is in his notion that “interconnection” costs to be paid for
72 by a QF should include unnecessary “deliverability network upgrades.”¹ Glen
73 Canyon Solar has repeatedly asked—in its Request for Agency Action, in its
74 Motion for Preliminary Injunction, and its prior testimony submitted in this
75 case—for a Commission order requiring that PacifiCorp Transmission consider
76 the use of Rocky Mountain Power’s available transmission rights when it
77 conducts interconnection studies. Such an order should result in interconnection
78 studies that avoid deliverability-driven network upgrades that are unnecessary and
79 uneconomic.

80 PacifiCorp Transmission has not yet completed its interconnection studies
81 related to the Glen Canyon Solar QF projects. This Commission will not be in a
82 position to assess whether that study was properly performed or whether it
83 properly identified interconnection costs to be paid by Glen Canyon Solar unless
84 the relief requested by Glen Canyon Solar is granted. It is undisputed that this
85 Commission has jurisdiction over interconnection studies and the allocation of
86 interconnection costs for QF projects. However, the Commission will not be in a
87 position to determine appropriate interconnection costs to be assigned to Glen

¹ See Rebuttal Testimony of Rick A. Vail at 1:9-16.

88 Canyon Solar unless the interconnection studies clearly distinguish between
89 *interconnection-driven* facilities and network upgrades required for
90 interconnection itself and *deliverability-driven* facilities and network upgrades
91 that will not be necessary if PacifiCorp uses its existing and available
92 transmission rights for the Glen Canyon Solar QF resources. Thus, the issue here
93 is whether deliverability-driven network upgrades are necessary in the first
94 instance, which can only be determined if PacifiCorp Transmission properly
95 performs interconnection studies that contemplate the use of existing transmission
96 rights. Since RMP is responsible for arranging delivery of the project's output,
97 avoiding these upgrades through the using of existing transmission rights allows
98 RMP to discharge this responsibility prudently and in conformance with PURPA,
99 and to act in its customers' best interest.

100 **Q. The Division concluded that the request of Glen Canyon Solar for**
101 **PacifiCorp's transmission function to study these QFs assuming the use of**
102 **existing transmission and dispatch rights is reasonable and innocuous. Mr.**
103 **Vail disagrees. How do you respond?**

104 A. I agree with the Division and disagree with Mr. Vail. The request for
105 reasonable and meaningful interconnection studies designed to identify the extent
106 to which deliverability-driven network upgrades can be avoided and to eliminate
107 the risk that *anyone* will be required to pay for unnecessary and uneconomic
108 upgrades is certainly reasonable and innocuous. It is PacifiCorp's refusal to
109 ensure that the studies are performed in this manner that is unreasonable.

110 **Q. How do you respond to Mr. Vail’s contention that Glen Canyon Solar’s**
111 **innocuous and reasonable request will produce “adverse consequences”?**

112 A. The “consequences” suggested by Mr. Vail are neither accurate nor
113 adverse.

114 **Q. The first “adverse consequence” suggested by Mr. Vail is that the**
115 **“redispatch tool” would be expanded beyond the “scope and terms” of the**
116 **NOA. Do you agree with this characterization?**

117 A. No. As I explained in my Rebuttal Testimony, the concept and principle
118 of resource redispatch is not new or unique to the NOA Amendment. My prior
119 testimony cited extensively the FERC Application for approval of the NOA
120 Amendment because it did such a good job—in PacifiCorp’s own words—of
121 explaining why the use of redispatch is so reasonable and necessary to avoid the
122 risk of unnecessary network upgrades in a QF context. That is the very same
123 argument Glen Canyon Solar is making in this docket. However, the concept of
124 resource dispatch is not new or restricted to the NOA Amendment. The concept
125 of redispatching generation resources to accommodate QF resources has been
126 used for many years in determining avoided costs.

127 Moreover, in the context of transmission service, PacifiCorp’s FERC
128 filing confirmed that resource redispatch as contemplated in the NOA
129 Amendment is just a “form” of the planning redispatch concepts already in the
130 OATT.² All the NOA Amendment did was confirm the existence, reasonableness

² FERC NOA Filing, attached as Exhibit 1 to my direct testimony, at 8.

131 and necessity of redispatching other generation resources when possible to avoid
132 costly and unnecessary network upgrades for QF resources whenever possible.
133 Glen Canyon Solar is not attempting to expand PacifiCorp's use of the NOA
134 Amendment beyond the context of network transmission service. Rather, it is
135 asking that PacifiCorp be required, first and foremost, to assume in preparing
136 interconnection studies that RMP will use all available transmission rights,
137 including re-dispatching other resources when necessary, in moving the Glen
138 Canyon Solar QF resources to load. Note that moving the power from the point of
139 interconnection to load is indeed the responsibility of RMP under PURPA.

140 In any event, Mr. Vail wholly misses the point by focusing narrowly on
141 only the "transmission-service redispatch tool" discussed in the NOA
142 Amendment. The real point is that RMP has available transmission rights that it
143 can use to move Glen Canyon Solar resources to load. In utilizing those existing
144 rights, on occasions when it may be necessary for PacifiCorp to redispatch other
145 resources, the NOA Amendment confirms its ability to do so when analyzing the
146 deliverability component for these QF resources, including on those rare
147 occasions when redispatch might be necessary to accommodate the APS
148 agreements.

149 **Q. How can you be sure that RMP has sufficient transmission rights to fully**
150 **utilize the Glen Canyon Solar resources?**

151 A. My direct and rebuttal testimony provide several bases for this conclusion.
152 For example, as explained in my direct testimony, RMP holds 95 MW of firm

153 transmission rights on the relevant transmission path that precisely match the
154 maximum output of the Glen Canyon Solar QF facilities. In addition, my direct
155 and rebuttal testimony demonstrate that there is substantial unused available
156 transfer capability available in almost all hours of the year for the Glen Canyon
157 Solar QF resources.³ Moreover, those same rights can be used in connection with
158 the APS agreements.

159 **Q. Have you received information from PacifiCorp since you filed your rebuttal**
160 **testimony that confirms that RMP’s transmission rights are sufficient for**
161 **delivery of Glen Canyon Solar resources?**

162 A. Yes. On Wednesday, September 27, 2017, two days after filing my
163 rebuttal testimony, I received CDs containing PacifiCorp’s supplemental
164 responses to some Glen Canyon Solar data requests.⁴ Those data requests asked
165 about the power exchanges between Arizona Public Service Company (“APS”)

³ Lines 570 – 620 of my rebuttal testimony explains that significant unused capacity is available on the Glen Canyon – PACE path in almost all hours of the year. That observation remains correct, but I need to correct an error in that testimony, Lines 570 – 575 referred to average firm and non-firm ATC on this path since 2014. I have since learned that the data provided to me as referenced therein was incomplete. Lines 570-575 of my rebuttal testimony should thus be revised read as follows:

“In addition to the flow data above, I have reviewed documents produced by PacifiCorp showing hourly non-firm ATC for the PACE - GLENCANYON2 transmission contract path since June of 2014 and since that time over three years ago, the path has had on average 243 MW of non-firm ATC that has been available for use in the operating horizon.”

This correction does not affect my testimony or opinions, in that it continues to demonstrate significant availability of transmission rights in all hours to deliver Glen Canyon Solar QF output to RMP’s load.

⁴ Specifically, on September 27, 2017 I received one CD containing a supplemental response to Glen Canyon Solar Data Request No. 1.13 and another CD containing a supplemental response to Glen Canyon Solar Data Request No. 5.2.

166 and Rocky Mountain Power pursuant to the transmission contracts between those
167 companies. Glen Canyon Solar Data Request No. 5.2 sought the last five years of
168 APS's firm and non-firm hourly transmission schedules on the Glen Canyon to
169 PACE transmission path.

170 My rebuttal testimony demonstrated that the Glen Canyon to PACE
171 transmission path—into which the Glen Canyon Solar QF projects seek to
172 interconnect and which would be used to transmit their output to Rocky Mountain
173 Power's load—has historically been extremely underutilized.⁵ It further
174 demonstrated that, while Rocky Mountain Power holds 95 MW of firm
175 transmission rights in the northbound direction on this transmission path,
176 northbound power is almost never scheduled on this path.⁶ I noted in my rebuttal
177 testimony that I had not yet received the requested data from RMP to verify the
178 exact number of MWh scheduled in the northbound direction under the Power
179 Exchange and Restated Transmission Agreements between APS and PacifiCorp
180 specifically. I was, however, able to summarize the *total* MWh scheduled in the
181 northbound direction on the Glen Canyon to PACE transmission path in my
182 rebuttal testimony.

183 Data provided by Rocky Mountain Power in its Supplemental Response
184 includes the specific number of hours over the last five years in which APS has
185 actually utilized its "call option" under the Restated Transmission Agreement to
186 schedule northbound power for delivery to Idaho on the Glen Canyon to PACE

⁵ See *Rebuttal Testimony* at 26:539-28:537.

⁶ See *id.* at 28:588-30:620.

187 transmission path. The data shows that, in the last five years, APS has scheduled
188 power northbound along the Glen Canyon to PACE transmission path [REDACTED]
189 [REDACTED], for a grand total of only [REDACTED]. This means
190 that, over the last five years, APS utilized its call option to deliver power to the
191 Glen Canyon substation for delivery northwards to PACE in only [REDACTED] of the
192 available hours, and that this call option went unused along the Glen Canyon to
193 PACE path in [REDACTED] of all hours. It is also notable that on that [REDACTED], a
194 maximum of only [REDACTED] of the total transfer capability of the Glen Canyon to
195 PACE transmission path was utilized to transmit APS power pursuant to the
196 Restated Transmission Agreement.

197 The data included in my rebuttal testimony confirmed that, when
198 considering *all* northbound flows and schedules on the Glen Canyon to PACE
199 transmission path, the path is significantly underutilized and sufficient capacity
200 exists to accommodate the Glen Canyon Solar QF projects. That testimony
201 demonstrated that the 285 MW of total transfer capability south-to-north on the
202 Glen Canyon to PACE transmission path has been physically used in the past five
203 years only 10% of the hours on average and, in those rare instances in which there
204 are south-to-north flows, they rarely exceed 50 MW.⁸ South-to-north schedules
205 on the path average between 64 and 91 MWs over the last five years, depending

⁷ See 1st Supplemental Response to Glen Canyon Solar Data Request No. 5.2, attached as Confidential Exhibit 1.

⁸ See Rebuttal Testimony of Keegan Moyer at 26:541-27:555 & Table 1.

206 on the season.⁹ The new data recently provided by Rocky Mountain Power further
207 demonstrates that, on those very rare instances in which power actually flows
208 south-to-north on the Glen Canyon to PACE path, [REDACTED] of that power is
209 scheduled under the Restated Transmission Agreement between APS and
210 PacifiCorp. Indeed, that has happened [REDACTED] in the past five years. The data
211 thus confirms that transmission paths are available to deliver [REDACTED] of the output
212 of the Glen Canyon Solar QF projects south-to-north on the Glen Canyon to
213 PACE transmission path in all operating hours.

214 Indeed, even in the unlikely event that the sum of Glen Canyon Solar
215 output and APS nominations on the Glen Canyon to PACE path in any given hour
216 exceeded 95 MW, Rocky Mountain Power could use the remaining non-firm
217 available transfer capability on that same path, averaging over 240 MW over the
218 past five years, or its significant rights from Four Corners to PACE, or other
219 available options, to use the Glen Canyon Solar QF output and deliver the APS
220 energy to Idaho.

221 **Q. Mr. Vail also claims in the first “adverse consequence” that use of the**
222 **“redispatch tool” would “shift costs to PacifiCorp’s retail and third-party**
223 **transmission customers.” To your knowledge, has PacifiCorp provided any**
224 **evidence to support this purported cost shift?**

225 A. No. I have not seen any evidence that supports the suggestion that
226 assuming in an interconnection study that RMP will use redispatch when

⁹ See *id.* at 29:604-30:613.

227 necessary and appropriate to utilize the Glen Canyon Solar QF output would
228 result in costs for other customers that have not been properly accounted for in the
229 avoided cost prices.

230 **Q. The second “adverse consequence” claimed by Mr. Vail is that the “highly**
231 **regulated nature” of interactions between PacifiCorp’s merchant and**
232 **transmission functions is being ignored. How do you respond to that claim?**

233 A. This claim makes no sense to me. Mr. Vail does not reference any aspect
234 of the Code of Conduct that would supposedly be violated by the relief requested
235 in this docket, and I am aware of none. My understanding is that FERC adopted
236 codes of conduct for integrated utilities in an effort to diminish a utility’s ability
237 to discriminate in favor of its merchant function and against others. That concern
238 is certainly not implicated here. Indeed, the opposite appears true. Unless Glen
239 Canyon Solar is granted the relief it has requested, PacifiCorp will likely refuse to
240 study the Glen Canyon Solar QF interconnections in a fair and non-discriminatory
241 manner in comparison to how it deals with its own resources.

242 PacifiCorp appears to be trying to use the FERC-mandated wall between
243 its merchant and transmission functions notwithstanding consent to the contrary
244 and in an effort to avoid reasonable communications designed to ensure
245 compliance with PURPA and a reasonable, non-discriminatory outcome.
246 However, I have reviewed a waiver signed by Glen Canyon Solar expressly
247 authorizing contact between PacifiCorp’s merchant and transmission functions
248 with respect to these projects. Moreover, this Commission can certainly issue an

249 order directing PacifiCorp Transmission to consider RMP's use of existing
250 transmission rights and redispatch options in its interconnection studies. Such an
251 order would not require RMP to engage in any inappropriate or unauthorized
252 communication with PacifiCorp Transmission.

253 **Q. Why do you believe the relief requested by Glen Canyon Solar is necessary to**
254 **avoid discriminatory treatment of the Glen Canyon Solar QFs?**

255 A. Based on my review of testimony filed by PacifiCorp employees in
256 another docket, as well as information available online regarding the PacifiCorp
257 Transmission interconnection queue, it appears that PacifiCorp plans to deal with
258 wind resources that it hopes to construct in Wyoming in a very different manner
259 than it is dealing with the Glen Canyon Solar QFs.

260 **Q. Please explain.**

261 A. At its core, the request of Glen Canyon Solar in this docket is for the
262 PacifiCorp Merchant and Transmission functions to communicate and coordinate
263 in such a manner that the interconnection studies for the Glen Canyon Solar QF
264 resources will identify as necessary only those deliverability-driven network
265 upgrades, if any, that are legitimately needed after RMP has first utilized all other
266 available transmission rights and options, including the use of RMP's existing
267 transmission rights and redispatch of other resources, minimizing the cost to
268 deliver the QF resource to RMP load. Despite requests to this effect, and the
269 filing of this docket, that has still not occurred.

270 Contrast how the Glen Canyon Solar QFs are being treated with

271 PacifiCorp's plans for new transmission and wind resources that it hopes to build
272 in Wyoming. In prefiled testimony in Docket 17-035-40, PacifiCorp witnesses
273 have explained that PacifiCorp intends to redispatch its Jim Bridger units, and
274 perhaps others, to allow it to maximize the use of transmission rights and add as
275 much new wind resources as possible. Mr. Vail, for example, explained that the
276 planned modifications to the facilities included:

- 277 • Modification to the Jim Bridger remedial action scheme will be
278 needed due to the *re-dispatch of Jim Bridger generation*
279 *necessary to accommodate new wind* generation in eastern
280 Wyoming, while maintaining the 2,400 MW rating on the Bridger
281 West transmission path....¹⁰
282

283 Later, Mr. Vail explained:

284 When the Transmission Projects are complete, the Company
285 estimates that it can interconnect up to approximately 1,270 MW of
286 additional wind facilities east of the Bridger/Anticline substation. The
287 assumed level of new wind resources is higher than the assumed
288 incremental transfer capability of the transmission facilities because wind
289 resources do not generate at their full capability in all hours of the year. *At*
290 *times when wind resources in southeastern Wyoming are operating near*
291 *full output, other resources in the area can be re-dispatched to*
292 *accommodate PTC-producing wind generation.* Installing more variable
293 resources in an area relative to total transmission capacity allows for more
294 efficient use of the transmission system and the ability to use the most
295 cost-effective resources to meet customer demand.¹¹
296

297 PacifiCorp witness Rick Link made the same point in the following exchange:

298 Q. Why did PacifiCorp assume new wind resource capacity in excess of
299 the assumed incremental transfer capability of the Aeolus-to-
300 Bridger/Anticline Line in this initial sensitivity?

301
302 A. The Aeolus-to-Bridger/Anticline Line can enable new resource

¹⁰ Docket 17-035-40, Redacted testimony of Rick A. Vail, page 10, lines 237-241, June 2017 (emphasis added).

¹¹ *Id.*, page 15, lines 332-341 (emphasis added).

303 interconnections in excess of the transfer capability of the line.
304 PacifiCorp’s preliminary sensitivity in the 2017 IRP assumed the
305 Aeolus-to-Bridger/Anticline Line would support at least 900 MW of
306 new resource interconnections. The assumed level of new wind
307 resources is higher than the assumed incremental transfer capability of
308 the transmission line because wind resources do not generate at their
309 full capability in all hours of the year. At times when wind resources in
310 southeastern Wyoming are operating near full output, other resources
311 in the area can be re-dispatched to accommodate PTC-producing wind
312 generation.¹²

313
314 PacifiCorp thus plans to redispatch its Jim Bridger units, and perhaps other
315 resources, to maximize use of the transmission system and minimize new
316 transmission upgrades that will be needed.

317 Before PacifiCorp announced its intention to build these new wind and
318 transmission resources, QF developers asking to interconnect with PacifiCorp’s
319 Wyoming transmission facilities in this area were told that they could do so only
320 if the Gateway West and Gateway South transmission segments were built—at a
321 reported cost of billions of dollars.¹³ In contrast, non-QF developers who
322 requested Energy Resource (“ER”) interconnection service in southern Wyoming
323 were not required to build the full Energy Gateway segments.¹⁴ Recent

¹² Docket 17-035-40, Redacted testimony of Rick T. Link, page 7, lines 137-148, June 2017.

¹³ See, e.g., Large Generator Interconnection Facilities Study Report Final Completed for (“Interconnection Customer”) Q0409, May 23, 2016, page 2, available here: <http://www.oasis.oati.com/PPW/PPWdocs/Q409FS.pdf>. (“The Energy Gateway West (2024) and Energy Gateway South (2024) projects are assumed to be in service; the Dave Johnston to Amasa (future) to Heward to Aeolus 230 kV line is assumed to be rebuilt as part of the Gateway projects. Note that these dates are inconsistent with the Q0409 Project’s planned in-service date.”).

¹⁴ See, e.g., Large Generator Interconnection Facilities Study Report Final Completed for (“Interconnection Customer”) Q0707, March 6, 2017, page 2, available here: <http://www.oasis.oati.com/PPW/PPWdocs/Q707FS.pdf>.

324 interconnection requests in this area, which I believe may include some of
325 PacifiCorp's planned Wyoming wind benchmark bids, have asked to be studied as
326 both ER and Network Resource (“NR”) interconnections.¹⁵ This will allow
327 separate identification of interconnection-related facilities and upgrades that must
328 be constructed to accommodate interconnection of the new wind resources and
329 deliverability-related facilities and upgrades that can be avoided through the use
330 of existing transmission rights and redispatch of other resources, while still
331 permitting the new wind resources to be added as Designated Network Resources
332 (“DNR”)—the precise result being requested by Glen Canyon Solar in this
333 docket.

334 It is clear that PacifiCorp intends to avoid spending billions of dollars to
335 construct the entire Gateway South and Gateway West transmission segments in
336 order to interconnect and secure DNR status for its new Wyoming wind projects.
337 Rather, it intends to redispatch other resources as needed to avoid the cost of
338 additional transmission upgrades. In some manner or another it clearly has or will
339 communicate that intention to its transmission function to ensure that the
340 interconnection studies will not require construction of all of the Gateway
341 segments to provide interconnection service and DNR designation. That
342 communication may be implicit in requests for interconnection studies for the
343 benchmark projects, in that they have or will be asked to be studied as ER

¹⁵ See, e.g., Interconnection Queue numbers 947, 948 and 949, shown on PacifiCorp Transmission's OASIS, available here: <http://www.oasis.oati.com/PPW/PPWdocs/pacificorplgiaq.htm>.

344 interconnections or NR/ER interconnections. In that manner, PacifiCorp
345 Transmission will identify the interconnection costs, and the interconnection-
346 related network upgrades, necessary for interconnection itself, and separately the
347 deliverability-related network upgrades that would be required for network
348 interconnection service, but that can be avoided through PacifiCorp's redispatch
349 of other generation resources and existing transmission rights.

350 PacifiCorp's 2017R RFP does not require bidders or benchmarks to have
351 an NR Interconnection, but they must be capable of being designated as Network
352 Resources.¹⁶ Thus, ER interconnections—which will not require deliverability-
353 related network upgrades—are acceptable, but the resources will still be
354 designated as DNRs through redispatching of other resources. This effect is
355 exactly what Glen Canyon Solar is seeking here, i.e. interconnection studies and
356 agreements that contemplate a redispatch of other resources in order to
357 accommodate a new renewable resource while avoiding unnecessary
358 deliverability-driven network upgrades. Failure to achieve this result will, in my
359 opinion, result in discrimination in the manner in which interconnection studies
360 are conducted and interconnection costs are allocated in comparison to

¹⁶ See PacifiCorp Renewable Request for Proposals (2017R RFP) Issued Wednesday, September 27, 2017, pages 18-19. For example, page 19 of the RFP states: "All proposals will require firm transmission to PacifiCorp's network transmission system and proposed resources must be able to be designated by PacifiCorp's Energy Supply Management (ESM) function as a Network Resource under the network service contract between PacifiCorp Transmission (www.oasis.pacificorp.com) and PacifiCorp ESM.

The 2017R RFP is available here:
http://www.pacificorp.com/content/dam/pacificorp/doc/Suppliers/RFPs/2017R_RFP/2017R_RFP_docs/Main_Document/RFP_2017R_RFP_MAIN_DOCUMENT.pdf

361 PacifiCorp's own resources. My reading of PURPA regulations is that this type
362 of discrimination is not allowed.

363 **Q. Mr. Vail's third claim is that the requested relief would result in**
364 **interconnection and transmission services being "blended into one**
365 **intermingled request and study process." Do you agree?**

366 A. No, that claim is clearly incorrect. No one in this case is confusing the
367 nature of the services required for a generation resource to interconnect with a
368 transmission system with the separate services required for the purchaser to
369 deliver that output to its load. However, as explained in prior testimony, given
370 the manner in which PacifiCorp studies a NR interconnection request, such a
371 study necessarily involves components of both *interconnection* and *deliverability*.
372 It is proper, and indeed necessary, for an interconnection study to reflect accurate
373 assumptions about how the resource will in fact be delivered to load. Failure to
374 do so can result in improper results surrounding the need for deliverability-related
375 upgrades, when in fact those deliverability-related upgrades are avoidable given
376 existing and available transmission rights that can be used by the buyer to deliver
377 a resource to load. The avoidance of such improper study results about
378 unnecessary deliverability-related upgrades is the core purpose of Glen Canyon
379 Solar's request in this docket.

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383 **Response to Rebuttal Testimony of PacifiCorp Witness Daniel J. MacNeil**

384 **Q. PacifiCorp witness Daniel J. MacNeil disagrees with the Division’s**
385 **conclusion that PacifiCorp should evaluate interconnection costs based on**
386 **the assumption that other resources can be redispached, as is also assumed**
387 **in the avoided cost model. What is your response?**

388 A. First, Mr. MacNeil mischaracterizes the Division’s testimony by claiming
389 that Mr. Peterson said that PacifiCorp’s avoided cost pricing model assumes that
390 PacifiCorp will use the NOA’s “transmission-service redispach tool.” That was
391 not Mr. Peterson’s testimony. Rather, Mr. Peterson said: “What Glen Canyon
392 wants the Company’s merchant function to do—that is, to ask the Company’s
393 transmission function to evaluate the interconnection costs assuming that the
394 Company can re-dispatch its own or controlled generation plants—seems to the
395 Division to be reasonable and innocuous. Reasonable and innocuous because that
396 is what the Company’s model does in determining the avoided costs for the Glen
397 Canyon projects.”¹⁷

398 Mr. Peterson is correct. PacifiCorp’s avoided cost model does model the
399 cost impacts of dispatching other generation resources in a different manner in
400 light of transmission rights and constraints in order to utilize QF power at any
401 given location. Mr. Peterson is also correct that it is “reasonable and innocuous”
402 to require PacifiCorp to make similar assumptions about the use and dispatch of
403 its resources in determining the existence of any deliverability-related network

¹⁷ Docket 17-035-36, Direct Testimony of Charles E. Peterson, page 6, lines 134-139, August 31, 2017.

404 upgrades that should be included in interconnection costs.

405 In addition, as discussed above, Mr. MacNeil, like Mr. Vail, misses the
406 point by focusing narrowly on the “transmission-service redispatch tool” reflected
407 in the NOA Amendment as opposed to the general concept or principle of re-
408 dispatching resources as need to accommodate QF resources as used in the
409 avoided cost model.

410 **Q. Mr. MacNeil also states on lines 26 through 31 of his rebuttal testimony that**
411 **the Commission-approved avoided-cost pricing methodology does not**
412 **include any costs related to transmission service or interconnection service.**
413 **Do you agree?**

414 A. I agree that the Commission-approved QF avoided-cost pricing
415 methodology does not directly include costs of interconnecting a QF facility or
416 delivering QF output to load. However, I disagree to the extent Mr. MacNeil’s
417 testimony might be read as suggesting that the QF pricing model does not reflect
418 pricing implications of transmission constraints or limitations that affect delivery
419 of QF output.

420 **Q. Please explain.**

421 A. Mr. MacNeil’s rebuttal testimony is offered in response to direct
422 testimony submitted by Division witness Charles Peterson to the effect that
423 PacifiCorp had “darkly” suggested or implied that the avoided-cost prices for the
424 Glen Canyon Solar QF projects may not reflect all costs associated with

425 interconnection or delivery of the Glen Canyon Solar projects.¹⁸ I believe Mr.
426 Peterson misunderstood PacifiCorp. To my understanding, neither Mr. MacNeil
427 nor any other PacifiCorp witness has claimed or suggested that there are other
428 energy or transmission costs associated with the Glen Canyon Solar projects that
429 are not—but that should be—included in the avoided cost pricing model. Rather,
430 Mr. MacNeil suggests that, while avoided energy and capacity costs are properly
431 determined in the avoided cost pricing model, interconnection and transmission
432 costs are dealt with elsewhere.

433 I agree with this characterization. In other words, there is no issue as to
434 whether the avoided cost models properly calculated avoided energy and capacity
435 costs for these projects. The 95 MW transmission link between the Glen Canyon
436 area and RMP load was the appropriate assumption. Rather, the dispute is over
437 whether PacifiCorp can properly include the cost of unnecessary and avoidable
438 delivery-related network upgrades as interconnection costs to be assigned to Glen
439 Canyon Solar. A second dispute—not directly at issue here—is, to the extent
440 PacifiCorp attempts to include avoidable and unnecessary deliverability-related
441 network upgrades as part of interconnection costs, would those costs ultimately be
442 assigned back to PacifiCorp and its transmission customers under relevant federal
443 regulations and precedent? This issue is not before the Commission and that risk
444 can be wholly avoided if PacifiCorp is simply directed to conduct its
445 interconnection studies based on proper deliverability-based assumptions.

¹⁸ *Id.*, page 46, lines 92-96.

446 **Q. How do the QF pricing models reflect cost implications of transmission**
447 **constraints?**

448 The Commission-approved QF avoided-cost pricing methodology includes
449 price components for avoided generation capacity and for avoided energy
450 production costs. Avoided capacity costs are based on the capital cost of a
451 deferrable resource as identified in the Company's IRP. Avoided energy costs are
452 determined by production cost studies using PacifiCorp's GRID model. Neither
453 avoided capacity nor avoided energy prices directly reflect costs related to
454 interconnection or transmission of a QF facility. However, the GRID model *does*
455 take into account the pricing impacts of all known transmission constraints that
456 may affect delivery of QF output to load. As such, the avoided-cost pricing given
457 to QFs does reflect the cost impacts of transmission constraints and limitations.

458 The history of the Glen Canyon Solar QF projects provides a good
459 example of how transmission assumptions in the QF pricing model work. As
460 noted in my direct testimony, Glen Canyon Solar initially considered a 240 MW
461 non-QF project. That project was later withdrawn and interconnection and QF
462 pricing requests were submitted for a 136 MW project. Rocky Mountain Power's
463 avoided-cost pricing for the 136 MW project showed that Rocky Mountain Power
464 held only 95 MW of firm transmission rights on the Glen Canyon to PACE
465 transmission path, and that output above 95 MW would be curtailed on a regular
466 basis. Glen Canyon Solar thus downsized its project to 95 MW to match Rocky
467 Mountain Power's 95 MW of firm transmission rights represented in the model.

468 Thus, while the avoided-cost model does not—and should not—directly add costs
469 associated with QF interconnection or transmission, it does reflect all cost or
470 pricing implications of transmission constraints.

471 The implicit assumption in the GRID model that 95 MW of Glen Canyon
472 Solar QF resources can be accommodated in all hours is clearly reasonable and
473 verifiable given flexibility in the APS agreements to schedule APS power on
474 either the Glen Canyon to PACE or Four Corners to PACE paths, and particularly
475 in light of the extremely limited south-to-north use of the Glen Canyon to PACE
476 path generally [REDACTED]. The GRID
477 model thus accurately determined avoided cost prices and accurately reflects all
478 impacts of available transmission rights and limitations.

479 **Q. Does this conclude your surrebuttal testimony?**

480 **A.** Yes, it does.