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BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH

In the Matter of Rocky Mountain Power's
Proposed Tariff Revisions to Electric
Service Schedule No. 37, Avoided Cost
Purchases from Qualifying Facilities

Docket No. 17-035-T07

**PREFILED DIRECT TESTIMONY OF
NEAL TOWNSEND
REGARDING SCHEDULED 37
AVOIDED COSTS
FOR QUALIFYING FACILITIES**

The Renewable Energy Coalition, (the “**Coalition**”) hereby submits the attached Prefiled Direct Testimony of Neal Townsend Regarding Scheduled 37 Avoided Costs for Qualifying Facilities on behalf of the Coalition.

Respectfully submitted this 20th day of July, 2017.

SMITH HARTVIGSEN, PLLC

/s/ Adam S. Long

Adam S. Long

Attorney for the Renewable Energy Coalition

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served on this 20th day of July, 2017 upon the following as indicated below:

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BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH

**In the Matter of Rocky Mountain Power's
Proposed Tariff Revisions to Electric Service
Schedule No. 37, Avoided Cost Purchases
from Qualifying Facilities**

Docket No. 17-035-T07

**PREFILED DIRECT TESTIMONY OF
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REGARDING SCHEDULED 37
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DIRECT TESTIMONY OF NEAL TOWNSEND

On behalf of the Renewable Energy Coalition

Docket No. 17-035-T07

July 20, 2017

1 **INTRODUCTION**

2 **Q Please state your name and business address.**

3 A My name is Neal Townsend. My business address is 215 South State Street, Suite 200,
4 Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111.

5 **Q By whom are you employed and in what capacity?**

6 A I am a Principal in the firm of Energy Strategies, LLC. Energy Strategies is a private
7 consulting firm specializing in economic and policy analysis applicable to energy
8 production, transportation, and consumption.

9 **Q On whose behalf are you testifying in this proceeding?**

10 A My testimony is being provided on behalf of the Renewable Energy Coalition (“REC”).

11 **Q Please describe your educational background.**

12 A I received an MBA from the University of New Mexico in 1996. I also earned a B.S.
13 degree in Mechanical Engineering from the University of Texas at Austin in 1984.

14 **Q Please describe your professional experience and background.**

15 A I have provided regulatory and technical support on a variety of energy projects at Energy
16 Strategies since I joined the firm in 2001. Prior to my employment at Energy Strategies, I
17 was employed by the Utah Division of Public Utilities as a Rate Analyst from 1998 to
18 2001. I have also worked in the aerospace, oil and natural gas industries.

19 **Q Have you previously filed testimony before this commission?**

20 A Yes. Since 1997, I have testified in 13 dockets before the Utah Public Service
21 Commission on electricity and natural gas matters.

22 **Q Have you testified before utility regulatory commissions in other states?**

23 A Yes. I have testified in utility regulatory proceedings before the Arkansas Public Service
24 Commission, the Illinois Commerce Commission, the Indiana Utility Regulatory
25 Commission, the Kentucky Public Service Commission, the Michigan Public Service
26 Commission, the New Mexico Public Regulation Commission, the Public Utilities
27 Commission of Ohio, the Public Utility Commission of Oregon, the Public Utility
28 Commission of Texas, the Virginia Corporation Commission, and the Public Service
29 Commission of West Virginia.

30

31 **OVERVIEW AND CONCLUSIONS**

32 **Q What is the purpose of your direct testimony in this proceeding?**

33 A My testimony responds to several changes proposed by Rocky Mountain Power (“RMP”
34 or the “Company”) for calculating avoided cost pricing to Qualifying Facilities (“QFs”)
35 under Schedule 37 within the framework of the Partial Displacement Differential
36 Revenue Requirement (“PDDRR”) method that RMP is advocating be adopted for
37 calculating Schedule 37 rates in this proceeding. I also respond to the Company’s
38 assertion that the 2021 Wyoming Wind project planned by the Company should not be
39 the basis of avoided cost pricing.

40 **Q What are your primary conclusions and recommendations?**

41 A Since renewable resources are included in the 2017 Integrated Resource Plan (“IRP”), it
42 makes sense to recognize that renewable QFs can defer RMP’s renewable generation
43 investments. Therefore, RMP’s proposal to calculate avoided costs for a renewable QF
44 based on the avoided cost of a Company renewable resource is a positive development.

45 However, RMP's proposal to limit the displacement of a renewable resource to resources
46 of the same type as the QF is unduly restrictive and unreasonable. Instead, any
47 renewable Schedule 37 QF should be able to have its avoided cost pricing determined
48 based on displacement of the next renewable resource irrespective of type, with
49 appropriate adjustments for capacity equivalence. The total avoided capacity and energy
50 cost that results from removing the "like for like" restriction will more reasonably reflect
51 the avoided cost of the deferred resource within the framework of the PDDRR method
52 that RMP is advocating be adopted for calculating Schedule 37 rates in this proceeding,
53 and therefore will provide more reasonable pricing for Schedule 37 power within that
54 framework.

55 I further recommend that the Commission rule affirmatively that the 2021
56 Wyoming Wind resource should be considered as an appropriate proxy for the purpose of
57 determining avoided capacity and energy costs for all Schedule 37 renewable QFs. In
58 addition, the Commission should consider whether Schedule 37 renewable QFs should be
59 credited with (the equivalent of) avoided transmission costs given the linkage between
60 development of the 2021 Wyoming Wind resource and the addition of Energy Gateway
61 transmission capability.

62

63 **PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE CALCULATION OF SCHEDULE 37**

64 **Q What is Schedule 37?**

65 A Schedule 37 provides published avoided cost prices approved by the Commission for
66 smaller QFs. Schedule 37 prices are available for cogeneration facilities up to 1 MW in

67 size and for small power production facilities, such as wind, solar, and hydro, up to 3
68 MW.

69 **Q Is RMP proposing any changes to the calculation of Schedule 37 avoided cost**
70 **pricing in this docket?**

71 A Yes. RMP is proposing changes to several avoided cost inputs, including market prices,
72 which were updated using the Company's March 31, 2017 Official Forward Price Curve,
73 as well as integration costs and wind and solar capacity contributions that were updated
74 based on the assumptions and results of RMP's 2017 IRP, which was filed on April 4,
75 2017.

76 In addition to these input updates, RMP is proposing several changes to its
77 Schedule 37 pricing methodology, which are discussed by RMP witness Daniel J.
78 MacNeil. The proposed changes in methodology are the subject of my testimony.

79 **Q What is the current methodology for setting Schedule 37 rates in Utah?**

80 A Schedule 37 rates, which were approved by the Utah Public Service Commission on May
81 27, 2016, are based on sufficiency-period avoided costs that are calculated using two
82 GRID model simulations. The first simulation excludes any new QF resources. The
83 second simulation includes an additional 10-MW baseload QF resource at zero cost and
84 displacement of front-office-transactions. The avoided energy cost is determined by the
85 resulting net power cost difference between the two GRID runs divided by the energy
86 produced by the QF resources. Avoided energy costs during a deficiency period begin
87 coincident with the next deferrable major thermal resource identified in PacifiCorp's
88 most recent IRP or IRP update and are equal to the fixed and variable costs of a proxy
89 resource, which is currently a combined cycle combustion turbine.

90 **Q What changes does the Company proposed to make in its filing?**

91 A As explained by Mr. MacNeil, RMP proposes that Schedule 37 rates specific to each
92 resource type be calculated using the PDDRR method that was approved by the
93 Commission for determining non-standard avoided costs under Schedule 38. The
94 Company proposes that the following specific changes be adopted in combination with
95 the use of the PDDRR method:

- 96 • Renewable resources would displace the next deferrable “like” renewable
97 resource identified in the preferred portfolio of the 2017 IRP, after the queue
98 of potential QFs. For non-renewable resources, or if no “like” renewable
99 resources remain in the 2017 preferred portfolio through the expected term,
100 the next deferrable major thermal resource would be displaced, after
101 accounting for the potential QF queue.
- 102 • Avoided energy costs would be calculated using the expected output of a 10
103 MW resource of each type and would be net of the value of displaced
104 resources from the 2017 IRP preferred portfolio.¹

105 **Q What is your assessment of these proposed changes?**

106 A As I stated above, since renewable resources are included in the 2017 IRP, it makes sense
107 to recognize that renewable QFs can defer RMP renewable generation investments.
108 Therefore, the RMP proposal to calculate avoided costs for a renewable QF based on the
109 avoided cost of a Company renewable resource is a positive step. However, I

¹ Direct testimony of Daniel J. MacNeil, p. 3.

110 recommend that the “like for like” eligibility *restrictions* proposed by the Company be
111 rejected.

112 Under the Company’s proposal, a renewable Schedule 37 QF could only be
113 credited with avoiding the cost of a renewable resource of the same type, i.e., a wind QF
114 could only be credited with deferring a wind plant in the IRP, a solar QF could only be
115 credited with deferring a solar plant in the IRP, and so on. The implication of this
116 restriction is that a renewable QF using a resource whose next deferability occurs
117 relatively late in the IRP, such as solar, would be precluded from being credited with
118 deferring any renewable facilities that are deferrable earlier in the IRP, such as wind.
119 Similarly, a renewable resource such as small hydro, which does not appear as a
120 deferrable resource in the 2017 IRP, could conceivably be precluded from receiving
121 capacity credit for deferring any renewable resources at all.

122 These restrictions are unreasonable because they prevent a renewable QF from
123 being fairly compensated for its ability to defer renewable plants that the Company is
124 planning to add, solely because the QF’s resource type differs from the resource type that
125 the Company determines is deferrable sooner in its IRP. Implicit in RMP’s advocacy for
126 these restrictions is the notion that the Company is somehow unable to partially (or
127 wholly) defer a wind plant when a renewable QF using a different technology timely
128 comes on line.

129 This premise strikes me as highly implausible. When considering adding new
130 resources in its IRP, the Company must consider the impact of long-term QF contracts on
131 the need for Company-owned capacity after taking account of the capacity characteristics

132 of the QF resources. This evaluation must be performed irrespective of QF resource type.
133 The idea, say, that new solar QF contracts would have no influence on whether
134 Company-owned wind resources need to be added in the future is unreasonable and
135 objectionable.

136 **Q Does RMP explain its rationale in limiting renewable displacements to “like for**
137 **like” situations?**

138 A No. The Company offers no justification for this restriction in its testimony in this case.

139 **Q Are you aware of any situations in Utah in which avoided costs are determined on a**
140 **“like for like” basis?**

141 A Yes, capacity payments for renewable QF resources under Schedule 38 are based on the
142 capital costs of the next “like” deferrable renewable resource, so long as such a cost-
143 effective renewable resource is present in the Company’s planned resources.²

144 **Q Since “like for like” renewable deferrals are currently approved for Schedule 38,**
145 **why should the “like for like” restriction proposed by RMP for Schedule 37 be**
146 **rejected in this proceeding?**

147 A In this proceeding, RMP is seeking a change in methodology for calculating Schedule 37
148 avoided costs. Therefore, it is appropriate to consider at this time whether the restrictions
149 proposed by RMP in the “like for like” approach are reasonable. I believe these
150 restrictions are *not* reasonable.

151 It is one thing to *allow* “like for like” renewable deferrals as an alternative to
152 requiring pricing for renewable QFs to be based on deferring *thermal* units, which is what
153 occurs today under Schedule 38; having the “like for like” alternative available for
154 pricing renewable QF capacity is an improvement over basing avoided costs for

² Docket No. 12-035-100, Order at 20.

155 renewable QFs solely using thermal deferrals. However, it is problematic for the “like
156 for like” concept to be used restrictively to preclude the capacity from a solar QF, say,
157 from being priced based on displacing a Company wind plant.

158 **Q If a solar QF is credited with partially displacing a Company wind plant, doesn’t**
159 **that create a mismatch between the capacity of the deferred wind plant and the**
160 **solar QF?**

161 A It is true that solar and wind plants have different capacity availabilities and that
162 difference needs to be taken into account in determining the QF’s capacity credit. But, of
163 course, capacity-equivalence calculations are already used when renewable QFs displace
164 thermal units. Determining the capacity equivalence when solar or another renewable
165 resource displaces wind is a logical extension of this current practice.

166 **Q Since solar resources generally have higher capacity availabilities than wind**
167 **resources, wouldn’t allowing solar QFs to displace Company wind plants result in**
168 **capacity payments to solar QFs that are too high?**

169 A No. Because solar resources generally have higher capacity availabilities than wind
170 resources, it stands to reason that when an avoided wind capacity value is translated into
171 a payment structured as “per-MW of solar capacity,” the avoided capacity price, in
172 isolation, may appear high at first glance. However, examining avoided capacity prices
173 in isolation is misleading because, in accordance with the PDDRR the method, capacity
174 and energy prices for any QF are inextricably linked. If both are considered in tandem,
175 then the combined result will temper the impact of capacity pricing viewed in isolation.

176 Capacity pricing and energy pricing must be considered in tandem because the
177 GRID runs used to determine avoided energy costs also take into account the
178 displacement of the output from the deferred resource. So, for example, if a 1 MW east-

179 side tracking solar facility were to displace 3.8 MW of east-side wind in the
180 determination of avoided capacity price, then the GRID run (starting in the deferral year)
181 would remove 3.8 MW worth of wind resources in the “with QF” case.³ This means that
182 the tracking solar resource – which would produce 2,716 MWh per year in this example –
183 would be responsible for displacing 13,715 MWh per year of nearly free energy (at the
184 margin) from the deferred wind plant.^{4,5} The net effect of such a displacement is a
185 minimal, or even negative, avoided energy cost (in isolation) for a tracking solar QF
186 when tracking solar displaces wind. Further, if the displaced wind plant is eligible for
187 production tax credits (“PTCs”), the foregone benefit from the PTCs will be included in
188 the avoided cost calculation.⁶ Combining the very low or negative avoided energy cost
189 with the seemingly “too-high” avoided capacity cost – and taking into consideration
190 foregone PTCs when applicable – produces a *total* avoided cost that reasonably
191 represents the true avoided cost of the displaced wind plant within the framework of the
192 PDDRR method. So while, in isolation, both the avoided capacity cost *and* avoided
193 energy cost may appear to be unreasonable (one too high, the other too low), taken
194 together, they produce an accurate avoided cost result within the PDDRR framework.

195 Ultimately, it is RMP’s costs that are being avoided through the PDDRR
196 calculation. So long as the all-in price paid to the renewable QF reasonably reflects the

³ The 3.8 MW of east-side wind displacement is derived by applying the ratio of the capacity contribution of each resource type. The IRP east-side tracking solar capacity contribution is 59.7%; the IRP east-side wind capacity contribution is 15.8%. The ratio is $59.7\%/15.8\% = 3.8$.

⁴ IRP east-side tracking solar energy = 1 MW x 31% capacity factor x 8,760 = 2,716 MWh.

IRP east-side Wyoming wind energy = 3.8 MW x 41.2% capacity factor x 8,760 = 13,715 MWh.

⁵ The wind energy is not entirely free because wind integration costs must also be taken into account.

⁶ For planning purposes, RMP treats PTCs as a negative fixed cost, and thus an offset against capacity costs.

197 costs avoided by the Company after taking into account the capacity equivalence and
198 energy displacement provided by the QF resource, it should not matter whether the
199 Company's next deferrable renewable plant is being deferred by a wind QF, solar QF, or
200 a renewable QF using another technology.

201 **Q Does RMP's proposal to limit the deferral of a renewable resource to resources of**
202 **the same type as the QF have real implications, or are your concerns primarily**
203 **theoretical?**

204 A There are real-world ramifications to the Company's proposal to restrict the deferral of a
205 renewable resource to resources of the same type as the QF. According to Mr. MacNeil's
206 testimony, the next deferrable resource for a Schedule 37 wind resource occurs in 2031,
207 whereas for a Schedule 37 solar QF it does not occur until 2035.⁷ The implication of
208 PacifiCorp's proposal in this case is that wind QFs potentially could be credited with
209 deferring a 2031 renewable resource, but a solar QF would not be given credit for
210 deferring any renewable resources until 2035. In this situation, the capacity value of a
211 solar deferral would be delayed for an additional four years relative to a wind deferral,
212 significantly delaying the capacity recognition for a solar QF relative to wind. For other
213 types of renewable QFs, i.e., those using technologies not utilized by RMP in the IRP,
214 there might not be any recognition of deferrable renewable capacity at all.

215 The Company's "like for like" restrictions are arbitrarily restrictive and therefore
216 are unreasonable.

217 **Q Please summarize your recommendation to the Commission on the question of**
218 **whether avoided cost calculations for renewable resources should be limited to**
219 **deferring resources of the same type.**

⁷ Direct testimony of Daniel J. MacNeil, p. 11.

220 A For the purpose of avoided cost pricing using the PDDRR method, the deferral of a
221 renewable resource in the IRP by a Schedule 37 renewable QF should not be limited to
222 resources of the same type. Rather, any renewable QF should be able to have its avoided
223 cost pricing determined based on deferral of the next renewable resource irrespective of
224 type, with appropriate adjustments for capacity equivalence. The total avoided capacity
225 and energy cost that results will reasonably reflect the avoided cost of the deferred
226 resource and therefore is a reasonable basis for pricing power produced by renewable
227 QFs.

228

229 **TREATMENT OF THE 2021 WYOMING WIND RESOURCE IN SCHEDULE 37**

230 **PRICING**

231 **Q Do you have any comments regarding RMP's assertion that the next deferrable**
232 **wind resource does not occur until 2031?**

233 A Yes. The preferred portfolio in the Company's 2017 IRP calls for 1,100 MW of
234 Company wind resources to be added in 2021. However, Mr. MacNeil states that:

235 The addition of a Utah wind QF project would not defer the new wind and
236 transmission planned to come online by the end of 2020 in PacifiCorp's 2017 IRP
237 preferred portfolio. Given the net benefits these projects provide to PacifiCorp's
238 retail customers, it will pursue these projects even if new QF projects were added
239 to the system in Utah.⁸

240 **Q What is your reaction to this assertion?**

241 A This is a very interesting statement. RMP is essentially saying that the Company
242 considers the 2021 Wyoming Wind resource to be such a good deal for customers that the

⁸ Id., p. 11.

243 Company will acquire as much of it as it physically can, irrespective of the availability of
244 other supplies such as QF power, limited only by the transfer capability of the
245 transmission system to deliver the 2021 Wyoming Wind to load (after taking into account
246 the Energy Gateway transmission upgrade the Company is proposing). This is
247 tantamount to declaring that the Company's demand for long-term power supply at the
248 price of this resource is open-ended over some significant range. That being the case, the
249 2021 Wyoming Wind project clearly represents a reasonable basis for determining the
250 avoided cost for renewable QFs under Schedule 37. Since, by its own admission, RMP's
251 demand for long-term power at this price is open-ended over a significant range, it stands
252 to reason that Schedule 37 renewable QFs that can provide long-term resources at the
253 same cost RMP is incurring should be paid that same price. Notably, because of the
254 unusual, open-ended nature of RMP's demand for long-term power at this price, it should
255 not be necessary for the QF to actually displace the 2021 Wyoming Wind to qualify for
256 this price, since RMP has declared the 2021 Wyoming Wind as "non-displaceable"
257 (because the Company considers it to be such a good deal.).

258 In addition, the Company's assertion regarding the 2021 Wyoming Wind raises
259 the question as to whether a Schedule 37 renewable QF should be credited *additionally*
260 with (the equivalent of) avoided transmission costs, since the 2021 Wyoming Wind
261 resource apparently requires incremental transmission investment from the Company in
262 order to get built.

263 **Q What is your recommendation to the Commission regarding the treatment of the**
264 **2021 Wyoming Wind resource in the determination of Schedule 37 avoided costs?**

265 A I recommend that the Commission rule affirmatively that the 2021 Wyoming Wind
266 resource should be considered as an appropriate proxy for the purpose of determining
267 avoided capacity and energy costs for all Schedule 37 renewable QFs.

268 In addition, the Commission should consider whether Schedule 37 renewable QFs
269 should be credited with (the equivalent of) avoided transmission costs given the linkage
270 between development of the 2021 Wyoming Wind resource and the addition of Energy
271 Gateway transmission capability.

272 **Q In recommending that the 2021 Wyoming Wind resource should be considered for**
273 **the purpose of determining avoided capacity and energy costs, are you also attesting**
274 **to the reasonableness of the Company's preferred portfolio in its 2017 IRP?**

275 A No. My recommendation is based on the principles of avoided cost pricing within the
276 context of the PDDR method, which relies on the Company's IRP. I am not taking a
277 position on whether the IRP itself or the 2021 Wyoming Wind project and the associated
278 Energy Gateway transmission investment are reasonable.

279 **Q Does this conclude your direct testimony?**

280 A Yes, it does.