BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH

Rocky Mountain Power's Application for)	Docket No. 20-035-01
Approval of the 2020 Energy Balancing)	
Account)	Sur-surrebuttal Testimony
)	of Philip Hayet
)	For the Office of
)	Consumer Services

REDACTED

February 8, 2021

REDACTED

1 Q. WHAT IS YOUR NAME, OCCUPATION AND BUSINESS ADDRESS?

- 2 A. My name is Philip Hayet and I am a Vice President and Principal of J. Kennedy
- and Associates, Inc. ("Kennedy and Associates"). My business address is 570
- 4 Colonial Park Drive, Suite 305, Roswell, Georgia, 30075.

5 Q. HAVE YOU PREVIOUSLY FILED TESTIMONY IN THIS CASE?

- 6 A. Yes, I previously filed response testimony on behalf of the Utah Office of
- 7 Consumer Services ("OCS") on December 10, 2020 and surrebuttal testimony on
- 8 January 15, 2021.

9 Q. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THIS TESTIMONY?

- 10 A. Pursuant to the Commission's Order of January 26, 2021 this testimony addresses
- 11 the Root Cause Analysis ("RCA") performed by Ronald Halpern of Generator
- 12 Consulting Specialists ("GCS") and Neil Kilpatrick of GenMet, LLC ("GenMet")
- regarding the Lake Side 2 Unit 3 Outage starting on August 18, 2019. Collectively
- the two consulting experts will be referred to in this report as GCS/GenMet, and
- the RCA they produced will be referred to as the GCS/GenMet RCA.

16 Q. HOW DID YOU ANALYZE THE GCS/GENMET RCA?

- 17 A. I read the GCS/GenMet RCA and compared its findings with the findings in the
- Siemen's RCA. I also prepared discovery questions and reviewed the responses
- along with the responses to the Division of Public Utility's ("DPU") discovery
- questions. I supplemented that with additional research of my own.

21 Q. WHAT IS YOUR INITIAL REACTION TO THE GCS/GENMET RCA?

22	A.	After reviewing this document, subsequent discovery information and Mr.
23		Ralston's Surrebuttal Testimony and Exhibits, I have concluded Rocky Mountain
24		Power (RMP) has not been transparent in this proceeding regarding the purpose of
25		the GCS/GenMet RCA. It was misleading for RMP to even call it the "Second
26		RCA" and imply it was intended to find the cause of the outage after Siemens failed
27		to do so. In fact, GCS was hired to two days after the outage
28		occurred (hired 8/20/19), and Mr. Halpern was
29		days after the outage occurred (8/22/19). Furthermore, GCS began working
30		on the RCA before RMP was even aware Siemens planned to prepare an RCA.1
31	Q.	ARE THERE ANY POLICY IMPLICATIONS THAT ARE IMPORTANT
31 32	Q.	ARE THERE ANY POLICY IMPLICATIONS THAT ARE IMPORTANT IN REGARD TO THE LAKE SIDE 2 OUTAGE INVESTIGATIONS?
	Q . A.	
32		IN REGARD TO THE LAKE SIDE 2 OUTAGE INVESTIGATIONS?
32 33	A.	IN REGARD TO THE LAKE SIDE 2 OUTAGE INVESTIGATIONS? Yes. OCS witness Michele Beck addresses those in her testimony.
32 33 34	A.	IN REGARD TO THE LAKE SIDE 2 OUTAGE INVESTIGATIONS? Yes. OCS witness Michele Beck addresses those in her testimony. WHAT APPEARS TO BE RMP'S PURPOSE IN CONDUCTING THE
32 33 34 35	A. Q .	IN REGARD TO THE LAKE SIDE 2 OUTAGE INVESTIGATIONS? Yes. OCS witness Michele Beck addresses those in her testimony. WHAT APPEARS TO BE RMP'S PURPOSE IN CONDUCTING THE GCS/GENMET RCA?
32 33 34 35 36	A. Q .	IN REGARD TO THE LAKE SIDE 2 OUTAGE INVESTIGATIONS? Yes. OCS witness Michele Beck addresses those in her testimony. WHAT APPEARS TO BE RMP'S PURPOSE IN CONDUCTING THE GCS/GENMET RCA? The purpose of the GCS/GenMet RCA was apparently to determine whether

¹ OCS 4.9d and DPU 16.10 in attached Confidential OCS Exhibit 1.1SSR.

40		The RCA document was marked as suggesting it
11		was prepared in The experts were hired with the
12		understanding they might be required to regarding their findings. ²
43		Review of the GCS shows that RMP
14		t ³ belying Mr. Ralston's previous claim that the GCS/GenMet RCA was
45		an additional, neutral investigation.
46 47 48 49		Due to the significance of the event, the Company hired and is working with a neutral third-party contractor to perform an additional RCA investigation in pursuit of a root cause. This report is expected to be completed by end of 2020. (Ralston Rebuttal Testimony, Docket No. 20-035-04, lines 61-64)
51 52		RMP has not provided the report nor decided how it will proceed
53		.4 Regardless of how RMP proceeds with the GCS/GenMet RCA, the
54		PSC should see it as evidence that RMP is conflicted with respect to seeking
55		recovery of the costs of the Lake Side 2 outage. If RMP believes the blame for the
56		outage lies with it would not be proper for RMP to seek to have customers
57		pay those costs.
58 (Q.	HAVE YOU CHANGED YOUR RECOMMENDATION THAT THE PSC
59		SHOULD DISALLOW THE COST OF REPLACEMENT POWER FOR
60		THE LAKE SIDE 2 OUTAGE IN THE 2019 EBA TRUE UP?

OCS 4.3, Consulting Agreement, Exhibit A Scope of Work, see Confidential OCS Exhibit 1.1SSR.
 Id., Monthly invoices.
 DPU 16.7, in Confidential OCS Exhibit 1.1SSR.

61	A.	No. While the GCS/GenMet RCA from the Siemens RCA in the emphasis
62		it places on the role of a as the potential cause of
63		the outage, it does not present a conclusive alternative determination as to the
64		ultimate cause of the outage. Indeed, both RCA's reach the same ultimate finding:
65		there is no conclusive cause of the outage.
66		but differ on their assessment of the likelihood of that scenario.
67		GCS/GenMet ranks the above the
68		while Siemens ranks the as the most likely cause. Each of these
69		scenarios points to imprudent actions by RMP or the manufacturer which means
70		that ratepayers should not be held responsible for the costs of the outage and I
71		continue to recommend that the Utah Public Service Commission (PSC) disallow
72		recovery of these costs in the 2019 EBA.
73	Q.	WHAT IS THE PRIMARY DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO RCA
74		STUDIES CONCERNING THE FO SCENARIO?
75	A.	Both identify a cause of the outage. However, Siemens and
76		GCC/GenMet view the possibility of a differently. GCS/GenMet asserts that:
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81		It is implicit that Siemens does not In fact, in both of the Lake Side
82		RCA's performed by Siemens (the first being a 2009 Lake Side outage event) and
83		the 2019 outage currently under investigation, the Siemens experts did not identify
84		any In both cases, Siemens examined

85		numerous potential causes for the outage, and found that all had a
86		however, in both cases (2009 and 2019) Siemens found that the
87		was the leading candidate as the cause of the outage. GCS/GenMet
88		asserts that a the same of the
89		Indeed, the GCS/GenMet investigation actually discusses a scenario
90		which could give rise to a being
91		present in the generator from initial construction that could cause a short, deep
92		.5 RMP failed to respond meaningfully to a question regarding
93		whether a misplaced light-weight FO would necessarily leave
94		inside the generator. RMP stated it had "insufficient expertise to answer this
95		question."6
96	Q.	NO WAS FOUND IN THE INVESTIGATION. DOES THE
97		GCS/GENMET RCA SUPPORT THE HYPOTHESIS THAT A FO COULD
98		HAVE BEEN ?
99	A.	Yes. The GCS/GenMet report leans heavily on the presence of "near the
100		site of the failure. Chemical analysis determined that the
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102		.7 RMP contended it did not know the inside the generator at
103		the time of the fault. ⁸ However the must

DMR-1S, at 44 of 106.
 OCS 4.12 in Confidential OCS Exhibit 1.1SSR.
 DMR-1S, at 54 of 106.

⁸ OCS 4.14 in Confidential OCS Exhibit 1.1SSR.

104		have been at least 5,000 degrees Fahrenheit, which is approximately the boiling (or
105		vaporization) points of both copper and iron. While a FO may not have been the
106		source of the
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108	Q.	DOES THE GCS/GENMET RCA IDENTIFY A "MOST LIKELY" CAUSE
109		OF THE OUTAGE?
110	A.	Yes. GCS/GenMet considers
111		as the most probable cause of the outage
112		although the experts indicate that no evidence of was actually found:
113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124		(Exhibit DMR-1S, page 66 of 106, emphasis added)
125 126	Q.	WOULD A DETERMINATION THAT WAS THE CAUSE OF
127		THE OUTAGE PROVE THAT THE OUTAGE WAS NOT THE RESULT
128		OF IMPRUDENCE OR NEGLIGENCE BY RMP?
129	A.	If the cause of the outage was core failure due to, as hypothesized by the
130		GCS/GenMet RCA, that does not imply that ratepayers should bear the costs of the
131		outage. RMP had a device made by

Siemens in place which might have detected a problem in advance. According to a Siemens document found from an internet search, the purpose of an FOVM is specifically to "Help to avoid costly outages related to vibrations in generators before massive winding damage occurs." See OCS Exhibit 1.2SSR, page 2, which is brochure produced by Siemens that discusses the purpose of an FOVM device. However the Lake Side FOVM stopped working long before the 2019 outage and had still not been at the time of the outage. (Exhibit DMR-1S, page 79 of 106). As a result, data for were not available for the evaluation of vibration issues prior to or at the time of the August 2019 outage. RMP has indicated it does not know if the FOVM would have detected the vibrations related to fretting because the installed vibration monitor equipment was not working.⁹ The significance of this is that RMP had a potentially relevant monitoring device that was apparently not . This certainly casts doubt on whether RMP's claims of prudent operating procedures are actually always practiced in the field. DOES THE GCS/GENMET RCA PROVIDE ANY FURTHER EVIDENCE REGARDING THE LIKELIHOOD OF A Yes. The report contains an excerpt from an internet forum of owners of turbine

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generators. The question was posed as to whether similar failures of Siemens

⁹ OCS 5.2, see attached OCS Exhibit 1.3SSR.

151		generators had occurred. There was one case of a related failure reported that
152		caused.10
153	Q.	WOULD DENIAL OF REPLACEMENT POWER COST RECOVERY IN
154		THIS CASE DISINCENTIVIZE RMP TO PERFORM RCA'S IN THE
155		FUTURE?
156	A.	No. I believe it would have quite the opposite effect. It would put RMP on notice
157		that without conducting a conclusive RCA, RMP would not be able to meet its
158		burden of proof and it would be denied cost recovery. After any significant outage
159		occurs, it is standard utility practice to find the cause of the event and to take steps
160		to prevent it from happening again. In this case, RMP has not found the cause, and
161		therefore it may be susceptible to similar failures happening in the future.
162	Q.	PLEASE DESCRIBE CONFIDENTIAL OCS EXHIBIT 1.1SSR, OCS
163		EXHIBIT 1.2SSR, AND OCS EXHIBIT 1.3SSR.
164	A.	Confidential Exhibit OCS 1.1SSR provides copies of confidential data response
165		answers provided by RMP, which document the footnoted statements listed above.
166		Exhibit OCS 1.2SSR contains the FOVM brochure discussed above, and Exhibit
167		OCS 1.3SSR contains a non-confidential data response answer provided by RMP
168		based on one of the footnoted statements listed above. These provide the evidence
169		in support of the passages in question.

¹⁰ DMR-1S at 99. Also see OCS 4.6 in Confidential OCS Exhibit 1.1SSR.

1/0	Q.	PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR OVERALL CONCLUSIONS FROM YOUR
171		ANALYSIS OF THE GCS/GENMET RCA.
172	A.	Overall, I conclude:
173	•	The GCS/GenMet RCA commenced before RMP even knew whether Siemens
174		would perform an RCA. It appears to have been prepared with the intent to be
175		used in
176	•	The GCS/GenMet RCA, like the Siemens RCA, is inconclusive and cannot
177		support RMP's claim that it acted prudently to avoid this catastrophic outage.
178	•	If the PSC believes that might be the cause of the outage, then RMP could
179		be at fault because it did not system when it failed in
180		. In any event the
181		failure to identify that the
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183	•	I continue to recommend that the PSC disallow RMP's recovery of the costs of
184		the Lake Side 2 outage in the 2019 EBA true up.
185	Q.	DOES THIS COMPLETE YOUR TESTIMONY?
186	A.	Yes.