

January 7, 2022

***VIA ELECTRONIC FILING***

Public Service Commission of Utah  
Heber M. Wells Building, 4<sup>th</sup> Floor  
160 East 300 South  
Salt Lake City, UT 84114

Attention: Gary Widerburg  
Commission Administrator

**Re: Docket No. 21-035-53  
In the Matter of the Application of US Magnesium, LLC for Determination of Long-  
Term Rates, Terms, and Conditions of Interruptible/DSM Electric Service between  
it and Rocky Mountain Power**

Pursuant to the Phase I and II Scheduling Order and Notice of Hearings issued by the Public Service Commission of Utah on October 13, 2021 in the above referenced matter, Rocky Mountain Power hereby submits for filing its Confidential Response Testimony of Craig M. Eller with accompanying exhibits and workpapers.

Rocky Mountain Power respectfully requests that all formal correspondence and requests for additional information regarding this filing be addressed to the following:

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Informal inquiries may be directed to Jana Saba at (801) 220-2823.

Sincerely,



Joelle Steward  
Vice President, Regulation

cc: Service List Docket Nos. 21-035-53

**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

Docket No. 21-035-53

I hereby certify that on January 7, 2022, a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served by electronic mail to the following:

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**REDACTED**

Rocky Mountain Power

Docket No. 21-035-53

Witness: Craig M. Eller

BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION  
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ROCKY MOUNTAIN POWER

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**REDACTED**

Response Testimony of Craig M. Eller

January 2022

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**INTRODUCTION OF WITNESS AND QUALIFICATIONS**

**Q. Please state your name, business address, and present position with PacifiCorp, d/b/a Rocky Mountain Power (“RMP” or the “Company”).**

A. My name is Craig M. Eller. My business address is 1407 West North Temple Street, Suite 310, Salt Lake City, Utah 84116. My present position is Vice President, Business Policy and Development for Rocky Mountain Power.

**Q. How long have you been in your present position?**

A. I have been in my present position since July 2020.

**Q. Please describe your education and business experience.**

A. I have a Bachelor of Science in Mechanical Engineering from the University of Nebraska. I have been employed with PacifiCorp since July 2020 as the Vice President of Business Policy and Development responsible for strategic planning, stakeholder engagement, regulatory support, and development and execution of major transmission projects. Prior to my current role, I worked at Northern Natural Gas Company, an affiliate of the Company, from 2007 through 2020 in various business development, commercial marketing and engineering roles.

**Q. Have you testified in previous regulatory proceedings?**

A. Yes. I have previously filed testimony on behalf of the Company in regulatory proceedings in Utah, Wyoming and Idaho.

**PURPOSE OF TESTIMONY**

**Q. What is the purpose of your testimony?**

A. The purpose of my testimony is to present the Company’s proposal for a new Electric Service Agreement (“ESA”) and Operating Reserve Interruption Agreement (“ORIA”)

24 between the Company and US Magnesium, LLC (“US Magnesium”). In doing so, I  
25 will discuss the relevant background information that informs the Company’s position,  
26 and I will discuss the reasons the Company cannot accept the existing terms and  
27 conditions included in US Magnesium’s current contracts going forward. My testimony  
28 presents the Company’s proposal for a new ESA and ORIA. The Company will directly  
29 address the arguments and proposals presented in US Magnesium’s September 21,  
30 2021 application in direct testimony on April 7, 2022.

### 31 **VALIDITY OF DOCKET**

32 **Q. Do you have any concerns with US Magnesium’s request that the Commission**  
33 **determine the long-term rates and terms and conditions of its contract with the**  
34 **Company?**

35 A. Yes. I do not believe that public utility customers should be allowed to file an  
36 application to compel the Company to enter into a special contract under Commission-  
37 determined terms and conditions. I am not an attorney, but it appears to me that such  
38 an application may not be allowed under the relevant statutes and rules. If this practice  
39 were regularly allowed, it could create a dangerous precedent that may result in  
40 unnecessary and excessive litigation before the Commission and place the Company at  
41 a disadvantage in negotiations. In this unique situation, the Company recognizes the  
42 system benefit of the U.S. Magnesium curtailment product described below. Therefore,  
43 the Company agrees that under the circumstances of this particular case only it will  
44 agree to use a Commission docket to resolve a contract negotiation.

45 **EXISTING CONTRACTS**

46 **Q. Please describe US Magnesium’s current agreements with the Company**  
47 **regarding its electric service?**

48 A. US Magnesium and the Company are parties to two agreements regarding US  
49 Magnesium’s electric service. The first pertinent agreement is the ESA dated December  
50 28, 2017, which took effect May 1, 2018, and terminates June 30, 2022, after  
51 amendments which extended the contract term. The ESA details the rates and terms for  
52 US Magnesium’s electric service. Included within the ESA’s terms are two curtailment  
53 options, which I will refer to as “Temperature Pseudo Curtailments”<sup>1</sup> and “Physical  
54 System Reliability Interruption”<sup>2</sup> in my testimony. The terms and conditions also  
55 specify that US Magnesium may purchase “replacement power” or buy through  
56 Temperature Pseudo Curtailments to avoid physical curtailment. I will refer to this  
57 option as a the “Buy Through Option.”<sup>3</sup>

58 The second pertinent agreement is the ORIA dated December 28, 2017, which  
59 took effect May 1, 2018, and terminates June 30, 2022, after amendments which  
60 extended the contract term. The ORIA details rate credits to US Magnesium in return  
61 for operating reserve products associated with both US Magnesium’s load and US  
62 Magnesium’s on-site generation along with various terms and conditions regarding the  
63 operating reserves. I will refer to the operating reserves as “Physical Operating  
64 Reserves” in my testimony.

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<sup>1</sup> Confidential Exhibit RMP\_\_\_(CME-1), Electric Service Agreement Between Rocky Mountain Power and US Magnesium LLC Executed December 28, 2017, Section 4.1.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. Section 4.2.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid. Section 5.

65 For ease of reference, the existing ESA and ORIA contracts are provided with my  
66 testimony as Confidential Exhibit RMP\_\_\_(CME-1).

67 **ESA BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY OF ISSUES**

68 **Q. What does US Magnesium currently pay for retail power and energy that the**  
69 **Company provides under the ESA?**

70 A. Currently, US Magnesium pays only volumetric energy charges that vary based upon  
71 time of use period and season. The winter season runs from October through April and  
72 the summer season runs from May through September. During the winter season, the  
73 On-Peak period is 7:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m., Monday through Friday excluding holidays.  
74 During the summer season, the On-Peak period is 1:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m., Monday  
75 through Friday excluding holidays. The Off-Peak period is during all other times. US  
76 Magnesium is not subject to Customer Service, Power, or Facilities charges like other  
77 large industrial customers. During Temperature Pseudo Curtailment with Customer  
78 Buy-Through Option events, US Magnesium has the option to buy through replacement  
79 power at market-based rates. Confidential Table 1 below summarizes US Magnesium’s  
80 current retail prices that were effective as of January 1, 2021:

81 **Confidential Table 1. Current Retail Prices for US Magnesium**

[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

82 Pricing out US Magnesium’s loads for calendar year 2020 at their current retail rates,  
83 US Magnesium pays about [REDACTED] per MWh before credits from the ORIA.

84 **Q. Does the Company find US Magnesium’s current ESA pricing problematic?**

85 A. Yes. There are three reasons why US Magnesium’s current retail pricing is problematic.  
86 First, the Temperature Pseudo Curtailments with Buy Through Option construct is an  
87 element of US Magnesium’s contract that the Company recommends eliminating.  
88 Second, the average price US Magnesium pays for the power and energy that the  
89 Company provides is too low as it is less than what any other customer class pays and  
90 is lower than US Magnesium’s cost of service, if calculated properly. Third, the actual  
91 structure of US Magnesium’s retail rates with only volumetric energy charges that use  
92 outdated time of use periods is inappropriate.

93 **RECOMMENDATION TO ELIMINATE THE TEMPERATURE PSEUDO**  
94 **CURTAILMENT AND BUY THROUGH OPTION CONSTRUCT**

95 **Q. Why does the Company recommend eliminating the Temperature Pseudo**  
96 **Curtailment and Buy Through Option construct?**

97 A. When Temperature Pseudo Curtailment events are called, US Magnesium chooses to  
98 exercise its Buy Through Option for the vast majority of those events. No physical  
99 curtailment therefore takes place, and the Company’s obligation to serve US  
100 Magnesium and its system costs are not reduced, except inasmuch as the market index-  
101 based price paid exceeds US Magnesium’s otherwise applicable retail rate.  
102 Confidential Table 2 below shows that from January 1, 2019, through June 30, 2021  
103 (the last date in which system peak information is available), US Magnesium continued  
104 taking service from the system during every monthly coincident peak.



105

**Confidential Table 2. US Magnesium Load During Monthly Coincident Peaks**

[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

106  
107

[REDACTED]

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While the monthly system coincident peaks are not yet available for the period of July 1, 2021, through November 30, 2021, the Company was able to analyze the frequency in which US Magnesium utilized its Buy Through Option and determined that the Buy Through Option was utilized during all Temperature Pseudo Curtailments, and as a result, remained a physical load through each of those monthly coincident peaks as well. I include a confidential workpaper that provides the history of the Temperature Pseudo Curtailments over the past several years.

115

116

Ultimately, the Buy Through Option during Temperature Pseudo Curtailment events ends up being a paper exercise with very little or no value for PacifiCorp's

117 customers. The Company therefore believes that it is appropriate to revise the practice  
118 of eliminating US Magnesium's coincident peak loads and allocate demand-related  
119 costs to US Magnesium according to its actual usage during the 12 coincident monthly  
120 peaks. Making this change to the cost of service provides a clearer delineation between  
121 the cost of serving US Magnesium's load and the value of the interruptible services it  
122 provides.

123 **Q. Does the Company have additional concerns with the existing Buy Through**  
124 **Option construct?**

125 A. Yes. In addition to the concerns above, the Buy Through Option utilizes market-based  
126 index prices to determine the cost of energy during the buy through; however, these  
127 prices do not reflect the costs to serve US Magnesium's continued system usage.

128 **Q. Does the Buy Through Option reasonably represent the cost of power if US**  
129 **Magnesium elects not to physically curtail?**

130 A. No. First, the available market purchases may not be sufficient to meet the requirements  
131 of the Company's other retail customers. Second, the market-based index price is based  
132 on day-ahead expectations and may not accurately reflect costs at the time of delivery.

133 **Q. Does the Company expect to rely on market purchases to meet its resource**  
134 **requirements and provide reliable service to customers?**

135 A. Yes. Because market purchases are for a short duration, generally less than a year, they  
136 can be acquired to address specific shortfalls without incurring the costs associated with  
137 an entire asset. As a result, market purchases are a cost-effective source of capacity for  
138 a portion of the Company's requirements. In the Company's Integrated Resource Plan

139 (“IRP”), these market purchases are referred to as Front Office Transactions (“FOTs”)  
140 and are assumed to be a firm source of capacity.

141 **Q. Are there limits to the market purchases the Company can reliably make during**  
142 **peak periods?**

143 A. Yes. Market purchases ultimately represent excess capacity owned by other parties  
144 elsewhere in the region. This can represent diversity between the loads of different  
145 utilities, for instance a winter-peaking utility may have excess capacity available for  
146 sale during the summer. However, weather can impact loads and hydro conditions faced  
147 by utilities across the region, resulting in increased demand by many utilities at the  
148 same time. Under such conditions, there may not be excess capability available for  
149 purchase in the market.

150 **Q. Has the Company modified its projection of the availability of market purchases?**

151 A. Yes. After remaining relatively constant for many IRPs, the Company reduced FOT  
152 limits in both its 2019 IRP and its 2021 IRP. The reasons behind this change were  
153 discussed in the Company’s 2021 IRP, and ultimately reflect a shrinking region-wide  
154 capacity position as a result of retirements and weather-related uncertainty in load and  
155 generation forecasts.<sup>4</sup>

156 **Q. What FOT limits did the Company assume in its 2021 IRP?**

157 A. The 2021 IRP assumed FOT limits of 500 MW in the summer and 1,000 MW in the  
158 winter.<sup>5</sup> Because of concerns about regional reliability, market purchases at the

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<sup>4</sup> See PacifiCorp’s 2021 IRP: Volume I, Chapter 5: Reliability and Resiliency. Available online at:  
<https://www.pacificorp.com/content/dam/pcorp/documents/en/pacificorp/energy/integrated-resource-plan/2021-irp/Volume%20I%20-%209.15.2021%20Final.pdf>.

<sup>5</sup> See PacifiCorp’s 2021 IRP: Volume I, Chapter 5: Reliability and Resiliency. Table 5.8. Available online at:  
<https://www.pacificorp.com/content/dam/pcorp/documents/en/pacificorp/energy/integrated-resource-plan/2021-irp/Volume%20I%20-%209.15.2021%20Final.pdf>.

159 California-Oregon Border (“COB”), Nevada-Oregon Border (“NOB”), and Mona  
160 market hubs were eliminated during the summer, as these points have direct ties to  
161 California and may not have excess supply depending on conditions in California.  
162 These markets provide capacity in the winter. The only market with assumed summer  
163 FOT capacity is Mid-Columbia (“Mid-C”), as the Pacific Northwest is generally winter  
164 peaking. While the Mid-C market allows for both summer and winter FOTs, the limit  
165 is smaller in the winter and smaller than in past IRPs.

166 **Q. Have actual operations provided evidence of reduced market availability and**  
167 **reliability concerns?**

168 A. Yes. The California Independent System Operator (“CAISO”) experienced resource  
169 shortfalls that resulted in the curtailment of firm load outside of the Company’s service  
170 territory on several days in 2020. While regional resource availability was sufficient to  
171 meet load in 2021, this largely reflects less adverse conditions than 2020, rather than  
172 an improvement in supply.

173 **Q. Does capacity scarcity result in higher market prices?**

174 A. Yes. The Company has seen significant increases in market prices and higher price  
175 volatility during periods when regional supply has the potential to become constrained.

176 **Q. Do higher prices ensure adequate supply?**

177 A. No. Higher prices can encourage some parties to rely on more expensive energy  
178 sources, such as high-heat rate peaking units. However, when multiple utilities have  
179 unmet requirements and no alternatives, no amount of money will create additional  
180 capacity. In such situations, organized markets may invoke administrative pricing  
181 provisions or price caps, and this occurred during recent events. The CAISO even

182 increased its administrative pricing cap to encourage incremental supply, but the  
183 potential sellers and volume available at these price points are limited.

184 **Q. Will regional resource adequacy programs increase supply?**

185 A. Not directly. Regional resource adequacy programs are expected to allow for more  
186 efficient use of existing supplies, and potentially better notice of potential shortfall  
187 conditions. Under existing operations, where utilities are independently responsible for  
188 their own customers, they have a disincentive to sell resources that might be necessary  
189 to serve their customers if their load increases unexpectedly or a resource is forced  
190 offline, even if market prices are very high. They may be willing and able to sell non-  
191 firm energy to utilities that are facing a shortfall, but it would be withdrawn if that  
192 capacity was needed to serve their own customers. The coordination under a regional  
193 resource adequacy program would allow for pooling of the region's incremental supply  
194 so that capacity can be deployed when and where it is needed. For example, the  
195 diversity among regional loads and resources can allow for a single asset to meet the  
196 requirements of two utilities, so long as they don't both need that capacity at the same  
197 time. However, while regional coordination can reduce the likelihood of shortfall  
198 events, it does not directly create incremental supply. It remains to be seen whether  
199 forward-looking requirements will impact resource development.

200 **Q. Should the Company use the flexibility and relatively low cost of market purchases**  
201 **to provide benefits to all of its retail customers?**

202 A. Yes. In light of the limits on market purchase availability, allowing a single customer  
203 to monopolize the Company's access to the market would necessarily reduce the market  
204 purchases available for serving other retail customers.

205 **Q. Is US Magnesium’s existing contract predicated on the concept that supply can be**  
206 **bought from the market at the market index price?**

207 A. Yes.

208 **Q. What is the basis for the market index price in the existing contract?**

209 A. The price for the Buy Through Option in the existing contract is based on a day-ahead  
210 market index. While this provides pricing certainty at the time US Magnesium elects  
211 to purchase under the Buy Through Option, conditions at the time of delivery may be  
212 very different from those contemplated the previous day. In particular, unexpected  
213 changes in load and/or generation may result in supply shortfalls or substantial  
214 increases in price.

215 **Q. Is it still reasonable for US Magnesium to use market index costs for financial**  
216 **settlement of its Buy Through Options?**

217 A. No. While the Company remains convinced that the entire Temperature Pseudo  
218 Curtailment and Buy Through Option construct should be eliminated, any future  
219 iteration that includes this or a similar construct must utilize the actual highest cost of  
220 energy during the curtailment event to represent the true marginal cost of energy.

221 **Q. In the event that US Magnesium elects not to utilize its Buy Through Option, does**  
222 **the Company see reduced value from its Physical Operating Reserves?**

223 A. Yes. When the Company identifies a curtailment hour and US Magnesium opts to  
224 curtail its load, the Company must replace the non-spinning operating reserve  
225 capability US Magnesium would have provided. While the Company’s load is then  
226 reduced, it typically must back down an otherwise economic generating resource to  
227 replace the Physical Operating Reserves otherwise available from US Magnesium. As

228 a result, the cost difference between US Magnesium's energy charge and the variable  
229 cost of the generating resource that is backed down to hold reserves can represent an  
230 added cost to customers. While reserves are held on the resource with the highest  
231 variable cost, this is often significantly lower than market and may be lower than US  
232 Magnesium's energy charge.

233 **Q. Does the Company also recommend elimination of the Physical System Reliability**  
234 **Interruption?**

235 A. No, the Physical System Reliability Interruption provides valuable physical reserve  
236 products to the system and the Company recommends the provision be continued in  
237 the future agreements; however, the Company believes this product is more  
238 appropriately contained within the ORIA than the ESA. As a result, proposed valuation  
239 of the existing Physical Operating Reserves and Physical System Reliability  
240 Interruption in the proposed ORIA is detailed later in my testimony.

241 **RMP RECOMMENDATION FOR US MAGNESIUM COST OF SERVICE**  
242 **TREATMENT**

243 **Q. How should US Magnesium be treated in class cost of service studies?**

244 A. In the Company's class cost of service studies, the allocation practice has been for US  
245 Magnesium's coincident peak usage to be removed if a curtailment event is called in  
246 that particular month. Depending upon the year, coincident peak usage for US  
247 Magnesium is eliminated for between five to six of the 12 months of the year.  
248 Elimination of these peaks provides a large reduction to US Magnesium's cost of  
249 service, which the Company believes is no longer justified.

250 **Q. Has the Company prepared a cost of service study where US Magnesium is**  
251 **allocated its actual coincident peak usage?**

252 A. Yes. The Company prepared a cost of service study based upon the 2020 General Rate  
253 Case that incorporated the final revenue requirement decision and allocated US  
254 Magnesium demand-related costs for its usage during the 12 coincident peaks. This  
255 cost of service study indicates that US Magnesium would need a [REDACTED] percent increase  
256 to be at cost of service or would need to pay [REDACTED] per MWh on average before credits  
257 from the ORIA.

258 **ESA RATE STRUCTURE RECOMMENDATION FOR US MAGNESIUM**

259 **Q. What does the Company recommend for US Magnesium’s retail pricing in the**  
260 **ESA?**

261 A. The Company recommends that US Magnesium be put on the Company’s existing  
262 Electric Service Schedule No. 31, Partial Requirements Service – Large General  
263 Service – 1,000 kW and Over (“Schedule 31”) with supplemental service priced at  
264 Electric Service Schedule No. 9, General Service – High Voltage (“Schedule 9 “). I will  
265 refer to this proposed rate treatment throughout the remainder of my testimony as  
266 “Schedule 31/9”. These are the rates that would be applicable to any other similarly  
267 situated customer. Confidential Exhibit RMP\_\_\_(CME-2) and the supporting  
268 confidential workpaper shows US Magnesium’s revenue under its current rates using  
269 calendar year 2020 loads as well as revenue under Schedule 31/9. The Company  
270 assumed that US Magnesium would not require back-up service for its onsite  
271 generation and all of its load requirements would be considered supplemental service.  
272 In actual practice, this could be subject to change depending upon how US Magnesium



273 operates its generation and facilities. Under Schedule 31/9, US Magnesium would pay  
274 on average \$ [REDACTED] per MWh. This would be a fair and reasonable outcome, since US  
275 Magnesium would still be paying about [REDACTED] percent less than what the Company  
276 calculates its individual cost of service should be, while receiving payments fairly  
277 compensating it for the interruptible services that it provides. Paying these retail rates  
278 is also in the public interest, because US Magnesium would be subject to demand-based  
279 charges and modernized time of use periods, which would send better price signals to  
280 this large customer.

281 **Q. Are there any adjustment schedules that US Magnesium is currently not subject**  
282 **to?**

283 A. Yes. Currently, US Magnesium is not subject to the following Electric Service  
284 Schedules:

- 285 • Schedule 193 – Demand Side Management Cost Adjustment
- 286 • Schedule 198 – Electric Vehicle Infrastructure Program Cost Adjustment
- 287 • Schedule 98 – REC Revenue Adjustment.

288 **Q. What adjustment schedules does the Company recommend apply to US**  
289 **Magnesium in the future?**

290 A. Under the Company's recommended treatment, US Magnesium would be subject to the  
291 following adjustment schedules:

- 292 • Schedule 91 – Surcharge To Fund Low Income Residential Lifeline Program
- 293 • Schedule 94 – Energy Balancing Account
- 294 • Schedule 98 – REC Revenue Adjustment
- 295 • Schedule 197 – Federal Tax Act Adjustment

- Schedule 198 – Electric Vehicle Infrastructure Program Cost Adjustment

296  
 297 The Company recommends that US Magnesium remain exempt from Schedule 193 –  
 298 Demand Side Management Cost Adjustment while also being ineligible from  
 299 participating in any associated programs. Currently, US Magnesium provides the  
 300 Company with a confidential report of the annual energy efficiency projects, which the  
 301 Company provides to the Division of Public Utilities and Office of Consumer Services  
 302 each December. The Company recommends continuation of this reporting process.

303 **ORIA**

304 **Q. What does the Company currently pay for the Physical Operating Reserves that**  
 305 **the US Magnesium provides under the ORIA?**

306 A. Presently, the Company provides US Magnesium a credit of \$ [REDACTED]/kW-month times  
 307 [REDACTED]  
 308 [REDACTED] for the Physical Operating Reserves. Based on US  
 309 Magnesium’s 2020 operations, US Magnesium would receive an annual credit of \$ [REDACTED]  
 310 million or about \$ [REDACTED] per MWh at the current credit amount resulting in a net cost of  
 311 approximately \$ [REDACTED] per MWh between the ESA and ORIA.

312 **Q. Does the Company find US Magnesium’s current ORIA pricing problematic?**

313 A. Under the existing terms and conditions, no; however, if the ESA modifications  
 314 proposed by the Company are adopted, the Commission should make two  
 315 modifications to the ORIA pricing. First, the Physical System Reliability Interruption  
 316 should be removed from the ESA and added to the ORIA. Second, the credit received  
 317 for the Physical Operating Reserves should be [REDACTED] to \$ [REDACTED]/kW-month to reflect  
 318 the elimination of the Temperature Pseudo Curtailments with Buy Through Option

319 construct, the addition of the Physical System Reliability Interruption to the ORIA, and  
320 use of an existing tariff schedule for the retail rates instead of utilizing a reduced retail  
321 rate.

322 **Q. How did the Company determine the recommended credit for the proposed**  
323 **ORIA?**

324 A. The confidential workpapers provided with the Company's 2021 IRP in Docket No.  
325 21-035-09 identified hourly operating reserve credit values for the PacifiCorp east  
326 balancing authority area. The Company evaluated the hours and expected reserve  
327 values assuming a maximum marginal cost of \$300/MWh to better reflect the  
328 Company's expected market reliance over the proposed contract term as [REDACTED]

329 [REDACTED]  
330 [REDACTED] These transactions reduce the  
331 Company's risk of reserve shortfalls and its marginal cost of reserves relative to the  
332 2021 IRP assumptions underlying the hourly operating reserve credit values. In  
333 addition, the purchases made are less than the assumed \$300/MWh cost cap used in the  
334 Company's analysis of the curtailment credit value. The resulting two-year average  
335 value is \$ [REDACTED] /kw-month as shown in Confidential Exhibit RMP\_\_(CME-3) and  
336 supporting confidential workpaper included with this filing. Based on US Magnesium's  
337 2020 operations, US Magnesium would receive an annual credit of \$ [REDACTED] million or  
338 about \$ [REDACTED] per MWh at the recommended credit amount resulting in a net cost of  
339 approximately \$ [REDACTED] per MWh between the ESA and ORIA.

340 **CONTRACT TERM AND EXTENSION PROVISIONS**

341 **Q. Does the Company recommend a specific term for the ESA and ORIA?**

342 A. Yes, while the Company does not believe the Commission has the authority to dictate  
343 a specific contract term, the Company is comfortable providing an initial contract term  
344 of two years (i.e., July 1, 2022 through June 30, 2024).

345 **Q. Does the Company have a recommendation for how to value the ESA and ORIA**  
346 **in the future?**

347 A. Yes. For the ESA, all future renewals can leverage Schedule 9/31 as a reasonable basis  
348 for the retail electric service. This ensures the retail portion of US Magnesium’s  
349 contract has an approved starting point that is shared with other large industrial  
350 customers with on-site generation. For the ORIA, the Company recommends having  
351 US Magnesium bid the Physical Operating Reserves and the Physical System  
352 Reliability Interruption products into one of the Company’s upcoming Request for  
353 Proposals for demand side resources (“DSM RFP”). Participation in a future DSM RFP  
354 for future ORIA negotiations would provide multiple benefits to both US Magnesium  
355 and the rest of the Company’s customers.

356 First, US Magnesium would be able to offer any curtailment products that fit  
357 its needs. This could include the products outlined above, modifications to the terms  
358 and conditions based on the future needs of US Magnesium, or new products that US  
359 Magnesium chooses to offer. Second, US Magnesium would be able to bid at a term  
360 length for the ORIA products that meet its needs. Third, US Magnesium could offer  
361 multiple tiers of products at various rates to reflect its business needs (such as higher  
362 operational costs for additional Physical Operating Reserves hours). And finally, US

363 Magnesium would be able to dictate pricing levels in its bid to ensure that it receives  
364 adequate economic compensation for the products it offers to the Company.

365 The Company's other customers would see benefits from this approach as well  
366 because the products would be evaluated simultaneously with the Company's decisions  
367 to purchase additional DSM products and other resources, extending the benefits of the  
368 request for proposals process to the US Magnesium ORIA. This ensures that the  
369 selected portfolio of resources contribute to the least-cost and least-risk resource mix  
370 for serving retail customers. In addition, the approach provides a level playing field  
371 versus other market offerings providing added competition and potentially lower costs.

372 **CONCLUSION**

373 **Q. What is your recommendation for the Commission in this proceeding?**

374 A. I recommend that the Commission reject US Magnesium's proposed terms and  
375 conditions and enter an order establishing just and reasonable rates, terms, and  
376 conditions of interruptible/DSM service for US Magnesium, consistent with my  
377 testimony above. Specifically, I request that the Commission's decision:

- 378 • Recognize that the Company has voluntarily consented to participate in this  
379 docket due to the unique facts of the negotiations with US Magnesium and that  
380 there is no established process for a customer to compel the Company to enter  
381 into a special contract under Commission-determined terms and conditions.
- 382 • Eliminate the Temperature Pseudo Curtailments with Buy Through Option  
383 construct.
- 384 • Establish ESA rates under Schedule 31/9 and the Company's recommended  
385 adjustment schedules.

386                   • Establish a credit of \$ [REDACTED] /kW-month in the ORIA.

387                   • Establish an initial term of two years for the ORIA.

388   **Q.    Does this conclude your response testimony?**

389   **A.    Yes.**

**REDACTED**

Rocky Mountain Power  
Exhibit RMP\_\_ (CME-1)  
Docket No. 21-035-53  
Witness: Craig M. Eller

BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION  
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ROCKY MOUNTAIN POWER

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**REDACTED**

Exhibit Accompanying Response Testimony of Craig M. Eller

US Magnesium Revenue Summary

January 2022

**THIS EXHIBIT IS CONFIDENTIAL  
AND IS PROVIDED UNDER  
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**REDACTED**

Rocky Mountain Power  
Exhibit RMP\_\_ (CME-3)  
Docket No. 21-035-53  
Witness: Craig M. Eller

BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION  
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**REDACTED**

Exhibit Accompanying Response Testimony of Craig M. Eller

ORIA Recommended Rate Calculation

January 2022

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Rocky Mountain Power  
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