1		I. <u>INTRODUCTION</u>
2	Q.	Please state your name and business address.
3	A.	My name is Stephen Sands. My business address is 4700 Daybreak Parkway, South
4		Jordan, Utah, 84009.
5	Q.	By whom are you employed and what is your position?
6	A.	I am employed by Kennecott Utah Copper LLC ("Kennecott"), where I have worked for
7		more than 18 years. My current title is Manager – Energy Strategy, a title I have held since
8		2019. My current duties and responsibilities include coordination with commercial teams
9		on energy supply, including diesel fuel, natural gas, and electricity; and leading strategic
10		decarbonization efforts at Kennecott. Over the years, I have held various titles, including
11		Director of Business Transformation, Director of External Affairs, and Director of Energy
12		Programs.
13	Q.	Are you the same Stephen Sands who previously submitted direct testimony in this
14		proceeding on behalf of Kennecott?
15	A.	Yes.
16	Q.	What is the purpose of your rebuttal testimony?
17	A.	My rebuttal testimony responds to the direct testimony filed by Rocky Mountain Power
18		("RMP") witness Craig Eller, by the Division of Public Utilities ("DPU") witness Jeffrey
19		S. Einfelt, and by the Office of Consumer Services ("OCS") witness Bela Vastag.
20		Kevin Higgins of Energy Strategies, LLC has also submitted rebuttal testimony on
21		behalf of Kennecott to address some technical aspects in response to testimony submitted
22		by others in this docket. My testimony focuses on the high-level concepts at issue in this
23		docket.

Q. Please summarize your conclusions and recommendations in your rebuttal testimony?

A. I continue to recommend that this Commission direct the parties to submit a contract for
 Commission approval that provides for electric service from RMP to Kennecott at the rates,
 terms, and conditions of Schedule 31.

29 I also propose an alternative recommendation only to the extent that this 30 Commission determines that it must address RMP's assertion that service to Kennecott will 31 result in incremental market purchases. As noted in my testimony below, RMP has not 32 conducted any analysis or performed any studies to quantify the market purchases it claims 33 it must acquire to serve Kennecott that it would not otherwise acquire. Nonetheless, if this 34 Commission determines that it must address this risk, then Kennecott proposes as an 35 alternative to its primary recommendation that the Commission direct the parties to submit 36 for approval a contract that extends the rate-related terms in the current ESA for a period 37 of three years after the Commission's ruling in this docket that then transitions to a contract 38 based on Schedule 31 thereafter.

39 Q. Please summarize RMP's recommendations and proposals as set forth in Mr. Eller's
40 testimony.

A. RMP offers two recommendations to the Commission. It offers a primary recommendation
and, in the event the Commission does not adopt that recommendation, RMP offers a
secondary recommendation.

RMP's primary recommendation is that the Commission decline to adopt
Kennecott's proposal in this docket and, instead, direct the parties to negotiate in good faith
for a new electric service agreement starting January 1, 2026 without issuing any guidance

47 as to what rates, terms, and conditions of service the Commission would deem to be just
48 and reasonable.¹

RMP's secondary recommendation is that, if the Commission is inclined to issue
an order directing that certain rates, terms, and conditions of service apply to RMP's
service to Kennecott, that the Commission decline Kennecott's request for tariff-based
rates and, instead, direct the parties to enter an agreement utilizing rates, terms, and
conditions suggested by RMP.

54 I will address and provide my response to each of these two recommendations in 55 detail below.

56

II. <u>RESPONSE TO RMP'S PRIMARY RECOMMENDATION</u>

57 Q. How do you respond to RMP's primary recommendation that the Commission 58 decline to issue any order regarding rates, terms, and conditions and that it instead 59 order the parties to negotiate in good faith?

60 The Commission should reject RMP's primary recommendation that the parties continue A. 61 to negotiate without any guidance from the Commission on appropriate rates, terms and conditions of service. The parties spent nearly a year prior to the filing of this docket in 62 discussions for a new contract and could not reach agreement. Kennecott engaged in those 63 64 negotiations in good faith and Mr. Eller does not contend otherwise. Unfortunately, those 65 efforts did not result in an agreement between the parties. There is no reason to believe 66 that further discussions without any guidance from the Commission on appropriate rates, 67 terms, and conditions of service would result in a different outcome. Indeed, the very

¹ See Direct Testimony of Craig Eller (RMP) at lines 253-257.

	different proposals submitted by Kennecott and RMP in this docket illustrate just how far
	apart the parties are in their views of what rates, terms, and conditions are appropriate.
Q.	Has Kennecott negotiated in good faith with RMP in an effort to reach agreement on
	a new electric service agreement?
A.	Yes. At multiple points throughout his direct testimony, Mr. Eller requests that the
	Commission direct the parties to meet and negotiate terms in "good faith." ² To the extent
	that Mr. Eller is suggesting that Kennecott's negotiations with RMP were not conducted in
	good faith, I reject that suggestion. Kennecott has already engaged in negotiations with
	RMP in good faith and these efforts did not result in an agreement between the parties.
Q.	What does RMP claim is the basis for its primary recommendation?
A.	RMP asserts that it has no obligation to serve Kennecott after the current ESA terminates
	on December 31, 2025 ³ and that, therefore, RMP should determine the terms of service to
	Kennecott without any guidance from the Commission regarding what terms would be just
	and reasonable. Essentially, RMP's position is that-with respect to Kennecott-it is not
	a public utility with any obligation to serve and that it can demand any rates, terms, and
	conditions it sees fit and that Kennecott can either accept those terms or seek electric
	service from another provider.
Q.	Do you agree that RMP has no obligation to serve Kennecott after the current ESA
	terminates at the end of 2025?
A.	No. I am not a lawyer, but I understand that an electric utility generally has an obligation
	А. Q. Д.

to serve all customers within its service area. That obligation is generally coupled with the

 ² See id. at lines 253-257, 434-437.
 ³ See id. at lines 124-270.

89 utility having the right to serve all customers in that service area to the exclusion of all 90 other utilities or service providers. A utility's service obligations are set forth in statute, 91 including in Utah Cod⁴e § 54-3-1, which states that "[e]very public utility shall furnish, 92 provide and maintain such service . . . as will promote the safety, health, comfort and 93 convenience of its patrons, employees and the public, and as will be in all respects 94 adequate, efficient, just and reasonable." That same statute further states that "[a]ll charges made, demanded or received by any public utility . . . shall be just and reasonable," and 95 that "[e]very unjust or unreasonable charge made or demanded . . . is hereby prohibited 96 97 and declared unlawful." It is my understanding that RMP is a public utility and is bound 98 by these requirements.

99 In Utah Code § 54-3-32 the Utah Legislature created conditions that, if met, RMP 100 would no longer be obligated to serve Kennecott. Specifically, it states that RMP "is not 101 required to furnish or provide electric service to an eligible customer if the eligible 102 customer has transferred service to a nonutility energy supplier in accordance with this 103 section."⁵ The statute then creates certain conditions precedent that must occur before service to Kennecott may be transferred from RMP to a nonutility energy supplier.⁶ 104 105 Pursuant to the statute, RMP remains obligated to provide electric service to Kennecott 106 until these conditions are met. Those conditions have not been satisfied and may not be 107 satisfied before January 1, 2026.

⁴ Utah Code § 54-3-1.

⁵ Utah Code § 54-4-32(2).

⁶ That obligation to serve is not terminated permanently, however. If a customer that receives service from a nonutility energy supplier gives notice that it intends to return as a customer of the utility, the utility must again provide service to the customer within three years after that notice. *See* Utah Code § 54-3-32(10).

108	RMP appears to assert that its statutory right and obligation to serve Kennecott is
109	waived in Sections for the ESA. Specifically, RMP asserts that because
110	Kennecott
111	It is unclear
112	whether a utility's legal obligation to serve or its right to be the exclusive service provider
113	can be waived by contract. This issue is especially unclear in this case because the Utah
114	Legislature has identified the conditions pursuant to which RMP would no longer have the
115	right and obligation to serve and those conditions do not include a contractual waiver and
116	have not been met. If RMP can by contract waive its obligation to serve Kennecott when
117	the statutory requirements of Utah Code § 54-3-32 have not been met, then Kennecott could
118	receive service from a nonutility energy supplier without first satisfying those
119	requirements, which only apply to a customer that seeks to transfer service from RMP to a
120	nonutility energy provider. The ratepayer protections in the statute do not apply when the
121	customer no longer receives power from RMP. It is unclear whether a contractual
122	arrangement could be used to sidestep the requirements of Utah Code § 54-3-32 in this
123	way.
124	If this Commission were to adopt the Company's primary recommendation, it

125 would first have to determine that RMP may by contract (i) waive its general obligation
126 under Utah Code § 54-3-1 to provide electric service in its service area and/or (ii) waive
127 the specific requirements of Utah Code § 54-3-32 that set the conditions in which RMP is
128 no longer obligated to serve Kennecott. It is unclear that RMP may waive these obligations
129 and requirements by contract. RMP has not submitted legal argument to address the
130 question of whether its right and obligation to provide service to customers can be waived

131		by contract, and I am not in a position to address that issue. To the extent the Commission
132		desires to address this issue, I suggest that the Commission direct that the parties provide
133		legal briefing on the issue.
134	Q.	Does the Commission have to resolve this legal issue before it can issue a ruling in this
135		docket?
136	A.	No. Utah law grants to the Commission broad authority "to supervise and regulate" the
137		Company and to "supervise all of the business" of the Company "and to do all things
138		which are necessary or convenient in the exercise of such power and jurisdiction." Utah
139		Code § 54-4-1. This broad grant of authority permits the Commission to direct RMP to
140		provide electric service to Kennecott notwithstanding any contractual arrangements
141		between the parties. In other words, the Commission can determine that RMP must provide
142		service to Kennecott after December 31, 2025 even if RMP could by contract waive its
143		obligation to provide service to Kennecott beyond that point-so long as RMP service to
144		Kennecott beyond December 31, 2025 is in the public interest.
145		Moreover, RMP has asserted in this docket that it "welcomes the opportunity to
146		continue being Kennecott's electric service provider" beyond December 31, 2025. ⁷

⁷ Direct Testimony of Craig Eller (RMP) at lines 260-261.

147 Q. RMP asserts that if the Commission were to deny RMP's primary recommendation
148 in this docket, it would create a "dangerous precedent that customers may abuse the
149 rights afforded in Utah Code § 54-3-32."⁸ Do you agree?

A. No. Kennecott is the only RMP customer to which Utah Code § 54-3-32 could apply.⁹ As
such, the Commission's ruling in this docket will not create any precedent with respect to
Utah Code § 54-3-32.

153 Q. Is service to Kennecott beyond December 31, 2025 in the public interest?

A. Yes. As noted in my direct testimony, the parties to Docket No. 16-035-33, the docket in which the current ESA was approved ("2016 Docket"), agreed—and the Commission found—that RMP's continued service to Kennecott was in the public interest. As RMP noted in the 2016 Docket, "Kennecott has consistently contributed to the Company's fixed costs at levels approved by the Commission."¹⁰ RMP estimated that Kennecott's contribution to RMP fixed costs from 2005 through 2015 were approximately

⁸ *Id.* at lines 265-270.

⁹ See Exhibit 2.1 (RMP Response to KUC Data Requests 1.6).

¹⁰ See Exhibit 2.2 (Docket No. 16-035-33, Direct Testimony of Paul Clements (RMP) at lines 32-34).

¹¹ See CONFIDENTIAL Exhibit 2.2 (Docket No. 16-035-33, Direct Testimony of Paul Clements at line 164).

¹² *Id.* at lines 402-407.

167 Q. Why do you believe it is necessary for the Commission to issue an order determining 168 the rates, terms, and conditions of service to Kennecott?

169 As noted above, Kennecott and RMP negotiated for approximately a year without guidance A. 170 from the Commission on this issue and weren't able to reach an agreement. The parties 171 were unable to reach agreement in part because the ESA, RMP's existing tariffs, and 172 existing Utah law provide no guidance regarding service to Kennecott after the expiration 173 of the current term of the ESA. I do not believe the parties will be able to reach an 174 agreement if the Commission declines to provide any guidance to the parties on the rates, 175 terms, and conditions of service. Kennecott filed this docket because negotiations with 176 RMP were not successful and because Commission guidance is necessary for the parties to 177 reach an agreement.

Q. Please explain why you say that the ESA and RMP's existing tariffs provide no guidance regarding service to Kennecott.

180 A. First, all parties to this docket agree that there is no existing RMP tariff that applies to 181 Kennecott. Schedule 31 comes closest because it contains terms to address onsite 182 generation resources for large industrial customers like Kennecott. By its own terms, 183 though, Schedule 31 is not available to customers with onsite generation greater than 15 184 MW. It states that "[p]artial requirements service from the Company for customers with 185 more than 15,000 kW of on-site generation shall be provided under contractual arrangements to be negotiated on a case-by-case basis."¹³ Schedule 31 provides no 186 187 guidance as to what these "contractual arrangements" should be. As discussed further

¹³ Exhibit 2.3 (Schedule 31) at Original Sheet No. 31.1

189	can't form the basis of a special contract between RMP and Kennecott, but the limitations
190	to application in Schedule 31 requires that the parties enter into a contract. As such, there
191	is no RMP tariff that applies to Kennecott. It is appropriate for the Commission to set the
192	rates, terms, and conditions of service for Kennecott, just as it is appropriate for the
193	Commission to do so for any class of customers.
194	Second, the ESA similarly provides no guidance to the parties. Section 2.04 states
195	that,
196	
197	As just discussed, there is no
198	that applies to Kennecott. Therefore, the only rate that would have applied to
199	Kennecott under Section 2.04 are
200	In late 2022, Kennecott reached out to RMP to discuss cost of service rates
201	that would apply to service to Kennecott beyond 2025, but even after nearly a year of
202	negotiations the parties did not reach agreement on rates.
203	Third, existing Utah law also provides inadequate guidance. Utah law seeks to
204	ensure that when customers must negotiate with RMP, as Kennecott must here, RMP may
205	not make unjust or unreasonable demands of such customers or subject them to undue
206	discrimination. ¹⁵ These legal requirements have proven to provide insufficient guidance
207	to the parties in this docket.

below, there is no particular reason that the rates, terms, and conditions of Schedule 31

¹⁴ CONFIDENTIAL Exhibit 2.4 (ESA § 2.04).

¹⁵ See, e.g., Utah Code § 54-3-1 ("All charges made, demanded or received by any public utility . . . shall be just and reasonable" and "[e]very unjust or unreasonable charge made, demanded or received for such product or commodity or service is hereby prohibited and declared unlawful."); Utah Code § 53-3-8 ([a] public utility may not (a) as to rates, charges, service facilities or in any other respect, make or grant any preference or advantage to any person, or

208	Q.	RMP criticizes Kennecott for
209		How do you respond?
210	A.	RMP's submissions in this docket emphasize Kennecott's decision not to
211		but fail to provide the relevant context
212		for that decision.
213		Section 2.04 states that
214		
215		
216		
217		Section 2.04 further states that
218		
219		
220		
221		
222		Any customer in Kennecott's position would need to know what electric rates
223		would apply going forward before it could elect early termination under these
224		circumstances. As noted above, however, neither the ESA, nor RMP's tariffs, nor existing
225		Utah law provide any guidance on what rates would apply. There is no
226		that applies to Kennecott. ¹⁷ Kennecott engaged in discussions with RMP
227		to determine if the parties could reach agreement on rates. As noted above, Kennecott

subject any person to any prejudice or disadvantage; and (b) establish or maintain any unreasonable difference as to rates, charges, services or facilities, or in any other respect, either as between localities or as between classes of service.") ¹⁶ CONFIDENTIAL Exhibit 2.4 (ESA § 2.04).

¹⁷ Id.

requested that RMP perform a cost-of-service analysis as discussed above. Kennecott continued to engage in lengthy negotiations with RMP for much of 2023 in the hopes that an agreement could be reached, but those efforts were unsuccessful.

231 Kennecott did not because it did 232 not know and could not know the rates, terms, and conditions of service that would apply 233 to Kennecott starting January 1, 2026 . Kennecott still lacks 234 this necessary information. RMP's position in this docket-asking the Commission to 235 simply send the parties back to the negotiating table with no guidance on rates, terms, or 236 conditions of service—would ensure that Kennecott remains in the dark about how to make 237 that decision.

If the Commission were to grant RMP's primary recommendation and direct the parties to negotiate without any guidance on appropriate rates, the parties will be left in the same position they have been in since late 2022—a position that has not resulted in an agreement. The Commission should reject RMP's primary recommendation.

242 Q. How do other parties in this docket respond to RMP's primary recommendation?

A. On behalf of the OCS, Mr. Vastag testifies that the Office does not agree with RMP's primary recommendation and asserts that the Commission should not simply order the parties to negotiate. In support of this position, Mr. Vastag testifies, "[n]egotiating an individualized solution is inconsistent with the idea of taking standardized tariff rates and making participation available in RMP programs to all industrial customers."¹⁸

¹⁸ See Direct Testimony of Bela Vastag (OCS) at lines 295-301.

248 Q. How do you respond to Mr. Vastag's testimony on this point?

- A. I agree with his recommendation that the Commission decline to adopt RMP's primary
 recommendation. Kennecott has negotiated with RMP in good faith and those efforts have
 not been successful. There is no set of tariff rates that expressly apply to Kennecott.
 Perhaps it is possible for the Commission to create a standardized solution to a customer
 like Kennecott, but in the absence of such a standardized solution, the Commission should
- 254 provide guidance as to what rates, terms, and conditions are just and reasonable.
- 255

III. <u>RESPONSE TO RMP'S SECONDARY RECOMMENDATION</u>

- 256 Q. Please summarize RMP's secondary recommendation.
- A. In its secondary recommendation, RMP asserts that the Commission should decline to grant
 Kennecott's request for a contract containing rates, terms, and conditions based on
 Schedule 31. Instead, RMP proposes that the Commission direct the parties to negotiate
 an agreement based on the following rates, terms, and conditions:
- That for a period of six years following the date Kennecott withdraws its notice of
 intent to receive service from a nonutility energy supplier pursuant to Utah Code §
 54-3-32, all "energy" provided to Kennecott by RMP be billed at the *higher of* either (i) Schedule 9 Energy charges, or (ii) a real-time energy cost established by
 the Commission;¹⁹
- That Kennecott be subject to backup demand charges based on the structure of
 Schedule 31, but that these charges be set in a future rate proceeding;²⁰

¹⁹ See Direct Testimony of Craig Eller (RMP) at lines 567-571.

²⁰ See id. at lines 572-577.

268	• That the Backup Contract Power be required to match the nameplate capacity of
269	Kennecott's onsite generation resources and the Supplementary Contract Power be
270	set to match the Total Contract Power, less the Backup Contract Power; ²¹
271	• That Kennecott be required to provide notice six years in advance of installing any
272	additional onsite generation resource(s); ²²
273	• That the parties file updated backup demand rates in the event the capacity of onsite
274	generation resources changes; ²³
275	• That Kennecott be required to provide notice six years in advance of participating
276	in Schedule 32 or Schedule 34; ²⁴
277	• That Kennecott be subject to EBA surcharges starting in 2026; ²⁵ and
278	• That Kennecott not be eligible to receive RBA sur-credits through December 31,
279	2026. ²⁶
280	I respond to RMP's recommendations below. Mr. Higgins also separately addresses
281	portions of RMP's recommendations regarding the energy and demand charges, the
282	appropriate level of backup contract charges, and the propriety of applying Schedule 31
283	rate structures to Kennecott.

²¹ *Id.* at lines 325-328 & 576-577.
²² *Id.* at 578-580.
²³ *Id.* at 581-583.
²⁴ *Id.* at 584-586.
²⁵ *Id.* at 587-588.
²⁶ *Id.* at 589-591.

284

A. <u>Response to RMP Proposed Rates of Service (General)</u>

285 Q. What do you understand to be the basis for RMP's proposal in this docket?

- A. RMP's general assertion in this docket is that it has not planned to serve Kennecott in 2026 or thereafter and that, as a result, providing service to Kennecott in 2026 and for some period of time thereafter would increase the risk of incremental market purchases as compared to a scenario in which RMP does not serve Kennecott in 2026.²⁷ RMP asserts that Kennecott should pay the costs associated with those incremental market purchases.
- 291 In his rebuttal testimony, Kevin Higgins addresses whether RMP's secondary 292 proposal is just and reasonable.

Q. Does RMP provide any study results or offer any analytical support for any portion of its secondary proposal?

- A. No. RMP provides no analytical support for any of its proposals. For example, while RMP claims that serving Kennecott increases the risk of incremental market purchases to serve customers, RMP has not conducted any studies or provided any modeling results that quantify that risk or to project the cost of any incremental market purchases that RMP asserts is required.²⁸ As such, there is no data in this docket upon which this Commission can conclude that service to Kennecott in 2026 and beyond is projected to result in additional market purchases or, more broadly, an increase in net power costs.
- 302 Similarly, RMP's proposal that the Commission reject Kennecott's request for rates
 303 based on Schedule 31 is not supported by any studies intended to determine the projected

²⁷ See id. at 498-500 ("The Company does not have adequate time to acquire incremental resources to serve Kennecott's load in 2026 resulting in an increased risk of market purchases.")

²⁸ See id. at 616-619 (noting that RMP has not performed any cost of service studies regarding service to Kennecott).

cost to serve Kennecott or any demonstration that Schedule 31 rates would be insufficient
to recover the cost of service. As such, RMP's proposal that the Commission require
Kennecott to pay energy rates based on the higher of Schedule 9 energy charges or a realtime energy cost is not supported by any studies that seek to determine the projected cost
to serve Kennecott or how the RMP revenues associated with such a rate structure would
compare to the cost to serve Kennecott.

In addition, RMP's proposal to impose a six-year notice period on energy rates, on the addition of onsite resources, and on the addition of resources pursuant to Schedule 32 or 34 is not based on any studies that would be relevant to those proposals. RMP doesn't offer any study or analysis to support its claim that service to Kennecott in 2026 and beyond would result in an increase in costs to other customers.

315 Q. Has Kennecott requested that RMP perform studies to determine its cost of service?

A. Yes. In 2022, Kennecott reached out to RMP to discuss the potential that Kennecott would enter into a new ESA that would commence after the current ESA expires. In connection with that outreach, Kennecott requested that RMP conduct a study to determine the cost to serve Kennecott in 2026 and beyond. The parties subsequently entered into lengthy negotiations regarding a new contract, but RMP did not provide to Kennecott any analysis regarding its cost of service. This is essentially the same position the parties are in now.

322 Q. Has Kennecott submitted data requests in this docket to obtain information regarding 323 studies or analysis performed by RMP?

A. Yes. Kennecott has submitted numerous data requests for studies or analysis performed
 by RMP that would be helpful in determining the appropriate rates, terms, and conditions

326 for service to Kennecott. RMP has repeatedly responded that it has not conducted the 327 studies or analysis requested by Kennecott.²⁹ 328 Has Kennecott performed any studies or analysis to determine RMP'S cost to serve **Q**. 329 Kennecott? 330 Kennecott does not have access to data sufficient to conduct such a study. RMP must A. 331 perform the relevant studies. It has not done so. 332 **Q**. Does RMP claim that Schedule 31 rates would be insufficient to allow it to recover its 333 costs to serve Kennecott? 334 No. RMP has not conducted studies to determine its cost to serve Kennecott. As a result, A. 335 it cannot-and does not-claim that Schedule 31 rates are insufficient to recover the 336 revenues associated with the cost to serve to Kennecott. On what basis does RMP assert that Schedule 31 rates are inappropriate? 337 **Q**. 338 RMP simply asserts that Schedule 31 does not apply to customers with more than 15 MW A. 339 of onsite resources. RMP has not performed any analysis to suggest that Schedule 31 rates 340 would not allow RMP to recover the cost to serve a customer that, like Kennecott, has more 341 than 15 MW of onsite resources. In his rebuttal testimony, Kevin Higgins discusses the 15 342 MW limitation on onsite resources set forth in Schedule 31 and addresses the question of 343 whether Schedule 31's rates could appropriately apply to Kennecott.

²⁹ See Exhibit 2.1 (RMP Response to KUC Data Requests 1.5, 2.1-2.3 & 2.5-2.6)

345 0. How does RMP's proposal regarding energy charges differ from Schedule 31? 346 For a transmission voltage customer like Kennecott, Schedule 31 energy charges are equal A. 347 to the energy charges in Schedule 9. RMP proposes that, from January 1, 2026 through 348 the date that is six years following the date Kennecott withdraws its notice of intent to 349 receive service from a nonutility energy supplier. Kennecott should pay energy rates that 350 are the *higher of* either (a) Schedule 9 energy rates or (b) a real-time market rate to be 351 determined by the Commission. 352 Q. Does RMP offer any justification for its recommendation that Kennecott pay the 353 *higher of* either (a) Schedule 9 energy charges or (b) a real-time market rate? 354 A. RMP's proposal is not based on any analysis that these charges are necessary to allow RMP 355 to recover its cost to serve Kennecott. 356 Kevin Higgins addresses RMP's proposed "higher of" energy charge proposal in 357 his rebuttal testimony, including whether the proposal is just and reasonable. 358 Q. Would RMP's proposal regarding energy charges increase Kennecott's costs as 359 compared to what it pays pursuant to the ESA? 360 Yes, RMP's proposal would significantly increase Kennecott's costs over the current ESA. A. 361 Pursuant to the ESA, Kennecott pays 362

Response to RMP's Proposed Rates of Service (Energy Charges)

344

363

B.


365 366 RMP does not acquire While 367 day-ahead market products to serve Kennecott's Block 2 load. Instead, RMP serves all 368 load, including Kennecott's load, through a least-cost dispatch process in which it 369 dispatches system resources or acquires market products based on the lowest cost resources available to meet load requirements.³¹ RMP may serve load, including Kennecott's load, 370 371 using system resources or market products, some or all of which may be less expensive than the price Kennecott pays under the ESA. The revenues that RMP receives from 372 Kennecott are sufficient to ensure that RMP recovers its costs to serve Kennecott.³² RMP 373 374 has never stated otherwise and has not provided any analysis in this docket to indicate that 375 it is under-recovering its costs.

RMP's proposal to require Kennecott to pay the "higher of" Schedule 9 energy charges or real-time market prices would significantly increase the revenues that RMP recovers from Kennecott. Kennecott is currently exposed to fluctuating market prices and pays those market prices whether they are higher or lower than Schedule 9 energy charges. There are significant periods of time when Kennecott pays very high market prices for energy. This exposure to high market prices is mitigated somewhat by periods when market prices are low. Under RMP's proposal, Kennecott would continue to pay market

³⁰ See CONFIDENTIAL Exhibit 2.4 (ESA § 5.01).

³¹ See Exhibit 2.1 (RMP response to Kennecott DR 2.7).

³² See Exhibit 2.2 (Docket No. 16-035-33, Direct Testimony of Paul Clements (RMP) at lines 32-34).



³³ See CONFIDENTIAL Exhibit 2.4 (ESA § 5.01).

³⁴ See Direct Testimony of Craig Eller (RMP) at lines 599-611.

- 404 the next rate case. Kennecott simply proposes that those charges, whatever they are for all
 405 Schedule 31 customers at any given time, apply to Kennecott.
- 406 Kevin Higgins offers rebuttal testimony regarding RMP's proposal on power 407 charges and I defer to him on that issue.

408 Q. RMP asserts that Kennecott's Backup Contract Power must match the nameplate 409 capacity of its onsite generation resources.³⁵ Do you agree?

- 410 A. No. Kevin Higgins addresses this issue in his rebuttal testimony. In that testimony Mr.
- 411 Higgins addresses his understanding of operations at Kennecott's smelter and its associated
- 412 cogeneration system, which I will address here. When the smelter is not operating, the 413 smelter cogeneration system is not generating electricity. Instead, the loss of load from the 414 smelter being down matches or exceeds the loss of generation. In this scenario, Kennecott 415 does not require backup service from the utility to replace the lost capacity of the smelter's

417 Q. How should the Commission rule with respect to RMP's proposal regarding demand 418 costs?

A. The Commission should adopt Kennecott's proposal and direct the parties to enter an agreement utilizing the rates, terms, and conditions of Schedule 31. In the event the Commission adopts Kennecott's proposal regarding Schedule 31 rates, it should reject RMP's proposal to require backup contract demand to match the nameplate capacity of Kennecott's onsite resources.

⁴¹⁶ onsite generation facility because its load needs have been reduced.

³⁵ See id. at lines 323-328.

424		To the extent that the Commission concludes that Kennecott is to be treated as the
425		marginal customer and should pay the incremental cost to serve it, then it should reject
426		RMP's effort to impose demand costs on Kennecott. As noted above, the current ESA-
427		
428		ensures that Kennecott contributes to fixed costs at or
429		above historical levels. RMP's proposed demand charges (and "higher of" energy charges)
430		would ensure that RMP over-collects from Kennecott and would not be just and reasonable.
431		D. <u>Response to RMP's Proposed Rates of Service (Six-Year Waiting Period)</u>
432	Q.	RMP proposes that Kennecott pay the "higher of" energy charges for a period ending
433		six years after it withdraws its notice of intend to take service from a nonutility energy
434		supplier. What justification does RMP cite for this six-year waiting period?
435	A.	RMP asserts that "it would take approximately four to six years to add additional
435 436	A.	RMP asserts that "it would take approximately four to six years to add additional generation to meet Kennecott's load without reliance on incremental market purchases." ³⁶
	A.	
436	A.	generation to meet Kennecott's load without reliance on incremental market purchases."36
436 437	A.	generation to meet Kennecott's load without reliance on incremental market purchases." ³⁶ RMP's bases this time period on the time it estimates it would take to submit a solicitation
436 437 438	А. Q.	generation to meet Kennecott's load without reliance on incremental market purchases." ³⁶ RMP's bases this time period on the time it estimates it would take to submit a solicitation for new resources, select resources from that solicitation, and then for those resources to
436 437 438 439		generation to meet Kennecott's load without reliance on incremental market purchases." ³⁶ RMP's bases this time period on the time it estimates it would take to submit a solicitation for new resources, select resources from that solicitation, and then for those resources to be constructed. ³⁷
436 437 438 439 440	Q.	generation to meet Kennecott's load without reliance on incremental market purchases." ³⁶ RMP's bases this time period on the time it estimates it would take to submit a solicitation for new resources, select resources from that solicitation, and then for those resources to be constructed. ³⁷ How do you respond to this proposed six-year waiting period?

context. Even then, RMP asserts that the waiting period applicable to Kennecott should be

³⁶ *Id.* at lines 233-235. ³⁷ *Id.* at lines 235-239.

six years when the "estimated" resource procurement window is four to six years. RMP
can and does acquire resources outside of Commission-approved resource solicitations but,
even focusing only on those solicitations, RMP does not explain why Kennecott should be
required to wait six years when RMP estimates that it can obtain resources in four years.

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450

Q. Is RMP required to obtain resources through a Commission-approved procurement process?

451 A. No. RMP can and does obtain resources outside of a resource procurement process. Very 452 recently, RMP submitted its 2023 IRP Update in which it states that RMP will seek to procure battery resources "outside of a request for proposals process."³⁸ RMP has also 453 454 quite recently, and outside of a procurement process, entered into an agreement with the 455 Green River Energy Center—a solar and storage project in Utah—to increase battery capacity from 400 MW to 1,600 MW.³⁹ In the past several years, RMP has also acquired 456 457 the 240 MW Pryor Mountain Wind Project and the 120 MW Cedar Springs III wind project 458 outside of a procurement process. RMP testified in the 2020 general rate case that it 459 acquired the Pryor Mountain project after becoming aware of the opportunity in October 460 of 2018, and that the project was expected to reach commercial operation by December of 461 2020.⁴⁰ COVID-related delays pushed the COD of the full capacity of the project into the 2nd Quarter of 2020,⁴¹ but this timeline remains much shorter than the six year notice 462 463 provision RMP proposes to impose on Kennecott.

³⁸ See Ex. 2.5 (Excerpt from 2023 IRP Update at 14).

³⁹ See Ex. 2.6 (Energy Storage News & Salt Lake Tribute articles).

⁴⁰ Ex. 2.7 (Docket No. 20-035-04 Direct Testimony of Robert Van Engelenhoven at lines 49-75).

⁴¹ Ex. 2.8 (Docket No. 20-035-04 Rebuttal Testimony of Robert Van Engelenhoven at lines 13-50).

464		Similarly, RMP acquired the 120 MW Cedar Springs III wind project outside of a
465		resource procurement. RMP became aware of the opportunity to acquire the output of the
466		Cedar Springs III project in November of 2018. It subsequently entered into a PPA for that
467		project and the project reached commercial operation in December of 2020. ⁴² Again, this
468		timeline is much shorter than the six-year notice provision RMP proposes to impose on
469		Kennecott.
470		In short, RMP has the ability to acquire resources outside of a procurement process
471		and there is no rational basis to impose a six-year notice period on Kennecott.
472	Q.	RMP proposes that Kennecott be subject to this same six-year waiting period before
473		being permitted to install onsite resources or to acquire resources pursuant to
474		Schedules 32 or 34. ⁴³ Is the six-year period reasonable in either of these contexts?
474 475	A.	
	A.	Schedules 32 or 34. ⁴³ Is the six-year period reasonable in either of these contexts?
475	A.	Schedules 32 or 34. ⁴³ Is the six-year period reasonable in either of these contexts? No. RMP's proposal that Kennecott be required to give six years' notice before installing
475 476	A.	Schedules 32 or 34. ⁴³ Is the six-year period reasonable in either of these contexts? No. RMP's proposal that Kennecott be required to give six years' notice before installing onsite resources or acquiring resources through Schedules 32 or 34 is based on the same
475 476 477	A.	Schedules 32 or 34. ⁴³ Is the six-year period reasonable in either of these contexts? No. RMP's proposal that Kennecott be required to give six years' notice before installing onsite resources or acquiring resources through Schedules 32 or 34 is based on the same rationale for RMP's proposed six-year "waiting period" discussed above, tied to RMP's
475 476 477 478	A.	Schedules 32 or 34. ⁴³ Is the six-year period reasonable in either of these contexts? No. RMP's proposal that Kennecott be required to give six years' notice before installing onsite resources or acquiring resources through Schedules 32 or 34 is based on the same rationale for RMP's proposed six-year "waiting period" discussed above, tied to RMP's Commission-approved solicitation processes.
475 476 477 478 479	Α.	Schedules 32 or 34. ⁴³ Is the six-year period reasonable in either of these contexts? No. RMP's proposal that Kennecott be required to give six years' notice before installing onsite resources or acquiring resources through Schedules 32 or 34 is based on the same rationale for RMP's proposed six-year "waiting period" discussed above, tied to RMP's Commission-approved solicitation processes. If in the future Kennecott were to bring additional generation capacity by adding
475 476 477 478 479 480	A.	Schedules 32 or 34. ⁴³ Is the six-year period reasonable in either of these contexts? No. RMP's proposal that Kennecott be required to give six years' notice before installing onsite resources or acquiring resources through Schedules 32 or 34 is based on the same rationale for RMP's proposed six-year "waiting period" discussed above, tied to RMP's Commission-approved solicitation processes. If in the future Kennecott were to bring additional generation capacity by adding more onsite resources or acquiring resources through Schedules 32 or 34, RMP would not

⁴² See Ex. 2.9 (WY PSC Docket No. 20000-545-ET-18, May 2019 Rebuttal Testimony of Mark Tourangeau at page 12, line 9 through page 13, line 20).
⁴³ See Direct Testimony of Craig Eller (RMP) at lines 457-461.

Kennecott is willing to provide adequate and reasonable notice in the event it brings
additional resources onto the system. To Kennecott's knowledge, no other customer is
required to provide six years of notice before adding additional resources. Kennecott asks
that this Commission reject any proposal that imposes restrictions that do not apply to other
RMP customers.

489 E. <u>Response to RMP's Testimony re: EBA, RBA, REC Purchases, Demand Response</u>

490 Q. In your direct testimony, you recommend that the Commission order that Kennecott
491 not be subject to the Schedule 94 (Energy Balancing Account) surcharge for a period
492 of time after the conclusion of the current ESA. Please explain your position on this
493 matter.

A. Kennecott's position is that it should not be subject to the Schedule 94 surcharges intended
to true up the difference between base EBA costs and actual EBA costs during the years in
which the current ESA applies. In Docket No. 16-035-33, the docket in which the
Commission approved the current ESA between Kennecott and RMP, all parties to this
docket stipulated that the "Kennecott will not be subject to any Energy Balancing Accountrelated rate changes effective after December 1, 2016 and through the term of the
Kennecott Contract."⁴⁴

501The EBA is intended to true up the difference between the projected net power costs502included in RMP's tariff rates and the actual net power costs it incurs to serve customers.503Pursuant to the ESA,

504 As such, it is not subject to EBA surcharge. The term of the ESA concludes on December

⁴⁴ Ex. 2.10 (Docket No. 16-035-33 Oct. 7, 2016 Settlement Stipulation ¶ 12 and Nov. 28, 2016 Order (approving ESA as amended by Settlement Stipulation)).

505 31, 2025 but the EBA surcharges intended to true up the difference between base and actual 506 EBA costs during the term of the ESA will continue beyond the end of the ESA. The true-507 up for costs incurred in 2024 will be collected from customers from July 1, 2025 through 508 June 30, 2026. The true up for costs incurred in 2025 will be collected from customers 509 from July 1, 2026 through June 30, 2027.

510It does not make sense to impose EBA surcharge costs on Kennecott that are511intended to true up the difference between base and actual net power costs that are incurred512during a time when Kennecott is not paying tariff rates. Kennecott proposes to pay tariff513rates starting January 1, 2026 and, therefore, should pay the EBA base rates at that time.514Kennecott should begin to pay the true-up surcharge to be imposed starting in July of 2027515that seeks to true-up the difference between projected and actual EBA costs for calendar516year 2026.

517 Q. RMP asserts that Kennecott should be subject to the EBA surcharge but not the 518 Schedule 98 REC balancing account credit. How do you respond?

A. RMP's assertion that Kennecott should be subject to Schedule 94 EBA surcharges is, presumably, limited to a circumstance in which Kennecott is paying Schedule 31 rates only. RMP states that delaying application of the EBA surcharge as Kennecott suggests in this docket "is inconsistent with all other Schedule 31 customers as well as for all new customers to the Company's system which immediately begin service at the then-existing tariff rates."⁴⁵ RMP's proposals in this docket do not purport to treat Kennecott as a Schedule 31 customer or even on par with new customers and, as such, Kennecott assumes

⁴⁵ Direct Testimony of Craig Eller (RMP) at lines 351-353.

526 RMP's recommendation is limited to a circumstance in which the Commission adopts527 Kennecott's primary recommendation.

528 Kennecott further notes that RMP's position on the applicability of Schedule 94 529 EBA surcharges is logically inconsistent with its position regarding Schedule 98 RBA 530 credits. RMP states that Kennecott should not be eligible for Schedule 98 credits "until the 531 rates that reflect REC revenue true-up for 2026 since the REC revenue true up prior to 2026 will include revenue [from] Kennecott that pays for system RECs under the Non-Gen/REC 532 533 Agreement."⁴⁶ RMP's position that the RBA credits should not apply to Kennecott because 534 Kennecott revenues are included in the RBA should, if adopted and if applying the same 535 logical basis, result in a finding that the EBA surcharge should not apply to Kennecott until 536 the EBA surcharge to true-up for 2026 EBA costs is imposed in 2027. This is because 537 revenues that RMP collects from Kennecott under the ESA are included in the EBA just as 538 revenues that RMP collects from Kennecott under the REC Agreement are included in the 539 RBA. Kennecott agrees that it makes sense that it should not receive the RBA credit in 540 2026. For the same reason, though, it should not be subject to EBA charges in 2026, either. 541 Q. Your direct testimony also referenced a request dealing with the purchase of RECs. 542 Can you state your position on that issue? 543 Kennecott currently has a REC purchase agreement in place with RMP and may in the A.

544 future seek to satisfy decarbonization goals through the purchase of RECs. To the extent 545 that RECs are available, Kennecott requests the opportunity to purchase them from RMP.

⁴⁶ *Id.* at lines 354-357.

546	Q.	Your direct testimony also referenced a request dealing with the possibility that
547		Kennecott could provide a demand response product. Does the Commission need to
548		issue a ruling on that issue?
549	A.	No. My direct testimony simply indicated that Kennecott seeks the same opportunities as
550		other customers with respect to providing demand response products. The Commission
551		need not address this point in this docket.
552		IV. <u>KENNECOTT'S ALTERNATIVE RECOMMENDATION</u>
553	Q.	What is Kennecott's Primary Recommendation?
554	A.	Kennecott's primary recommendation continues to be the one set forth in my direct
555		testimony-that this Commission order the parties to enter into a contract for a term from
556		January 1, 2026 through December 31, 2032 that (other than the timing of the imposition
557		of the EBA and RBA sur-charges and -credits as discussed herein) utilizes the rates, terms,
558		and conditions of Schedule 31.
559	Q.	Does Kennecott offer an alternative recommendation in the event the Commission
560		does not adopt its primary recommendation?
561	A.	Yes. As an alternative, and only if this Commission determines that it must treat Kennecott
562		as the "marginal customer" for some period of time, I propose that the Commission direct
563		the parties to enter into a new contract for the same term that extends the rates, terms, and
564		conditions of the existing ESA for a period ending three years after Kennecott withdraws
565		its notice of intent to take service from a nonutility energy supplier and then, thereafter,
566		utilizes the rates, terms and conditions of Schedule 31 (with the same caveat about the
567		timing of the imposition of EBA surcharges as discussed herein).

568 Q. What would this alternative proposal look like in practice?

A. In this alternative proposal, the new electric service agreement that would have two phases,
each with different rates for service. Rates during Phase 1 would be consistent with an
extension of the rates in the current ESA,

All other terms and conditions of service in the current ESA would apply during Phase 1, except for those provisions related to the term and those that suggest or indicate that Kennecott will not be a RMP customer at the conclusion of Phase 1. Phase 1 would start on January 1, 2026 and would conclude on the three-year anniversary of Kennecott's withdrawal of its notice of intent to take service from a nonutility energy supplier.

578 Phase 2 would begin when Phase 1 ends and would apply for the remainder of the 579 new agreement. Phase 2 rates will be consistent with rates set for all Schedule 31 580 customers. All other terms and conditions of Schedule 31 would also apply during Phase 581 2, except that, consistent with my discussion regarding EBA surcharges above, Kennecott 582 would not be subject to EBA true-up surcharges that true-up calendar year EBA costs for 583 periods when Kennecott is exposed to market rates.

Q. Please explain why extending the current rate-related terms of the ESA for three
years beyond the date that Kennecott withdraws its notice addresses the concerns
raised by the parties and makes sense in this context.

 587
 A.
 This alternative proposal results in the same outcome that would have resulted had

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 Kennecott selected

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593		As discussed herein,
594		Kennecott was not in a position because it did not
595		and could not know the rates it would pay for service from RMP after the three-year notice
596		period expired. This alternative proposal would provide the certainty that has been lacking
597		during the entire time that Kennecott and RMP have been engaged in discussions regarding
598		a new contract and would, therefore, permit Kennecott to withdraw its notice of intent to
599		take service from a non-utility energy supplier.
600		RMP states throughout its direct testimony that Kennecott's decision not
601		has reduced the time for RMP to plan to serve
602		Kennecott. Others, including OCS witness Bela Vastag, have raised concerns that RMP
603		has insufficient time to plan to serve Kennecott. This alternative proposal addresses that
604		point by ensuring that RMP has the same time period to plan as is contemplated in the ESA.
605	Q.	If either Kennecott's primary or alternative proposal is adopted, when would
606		Kennecott plan to withdraw its notice of intent to take service from a nonutility
607		energy supplier?
608	A.	Kennecott cannot make the decision to withdraw its notice unless and until it knows the
609		rates it would pay for electric service from RMP. If either of Kennecott's primary or
610		alternative proposal is adopted, Kennecott expects that it would withdraw its notice of

 $^{^{47}}$ CONFIDENTIAL Exhibit 2.4 (ESA § 2.04).

611 intent to take service from a nonutility energy supplier as soon as possible after a final 612 Commission order approving the resulting contract is entered and is no longer appealable. V. 613 **RESPONSE TO OCS TESTIMONY** 614 What does the OCS recommend in response to the proposals submitted by Kennecott Q. 615 and RMP? 616 The OCS recommends that the Commission decline to adopt either Kennecott's primary A. 617 proposal or either of RMP's primary or secondary proposal. 618 Q. What concerns does the OCS raise regarding Kennecott's primary proposal? 619 The OCS expresses two main concerns. First, it expresses a concern about utilizing the A. 620 rates in Schedule 31 for Kennecott on the grounds that Schedule 31 rates were designed 621 for customers with up to 15 MW of onsite resources and Kennecott's onsite resources exceed 15 MW.⁴⁸ Second, it is concerned that RMP has not had an opportunity to plan to 622 623 serve Kennecott and that Schedule 31 rates may not be sufficient to protect other ratepayers 624 from the risk of incremental market purchases in the event that RMP serves Kennecott starting in 2026.49 625

626 Q. How do you respond to these concerns?

A. With respect to the OCS's first concern, Kennecott acknowledges that Schedule 31 expressly excludes customers with onsite generation greater than 15 MW, but that categorical exclusion does not mean that the rate components would necessarily fail to allow RMP to recover its cost of service for a customer like Kennecott. This is addressed in the rebuttal testimony filed by Kevin Higgins. Kennecott supports the OCS's position

⁴⁸ See Direct Testimony of Bela Vastag (OCS) at lines 69-78.

⁴⁹ See id. at lines 79-95.

633		If such a tariff rate existed, Kennecott could have made a rational economic decision
634		But no such tariff rate
635		currently exists and creating one would take far too long to address the current issue before
636		the Commission regarding service starting in 2026.
637		With respect to OCS's second concern, Kennecott restates its position that it is
638		willing to pay its cost of service but that there is no data in this docket to support a
639		conclusion regarding what that cost of service is or a conclusion that Schedule 31 rates are
640		insufficient to recover those costs. Kennecott has requested that information but has not
641		received it. If, despite the lack of data, the Commission finds that Schedule 31 rates will
642		not allow RMP to recover its cost of service to Kennecott, Kennecott's alternative proposal
643		addresses this point.
644		VI. CONCLUSION
645	Q.	Your rebuttal testimony does not respond to all of the points and issues raised by all
646		other witnesses. Does this mean that Kennecott agrees with those points?
647	A.	No. My silence on any issue raised by others should not be interpreted as support for those
648		positions.
649	Q.	Does this conclude your direct testimony?

that the Commission should create a tariff rate schedule that would apply to Kennecott.⁵⁰

650 A. Yes.

⁵⁰ See id. at lines 62-65 ("There should always be an option for tariffed service instead of relying on a special contract. When a customer is taking service under an existing ESA, that customer should be able to move to tariffed rates when its ESA ends.").