

Hayet OCS – 1D

BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH

Rocky Mountain Power’s Application for) Docket No. 24-035-01
Approval of the 2023 Energy Balancing)
Account) Direct Testimony
) of Philip Hayet
) On behalf of the Utah
) Office of Consumer Services

December 6, 2024

1 **Q. WHAT IS YOUR NAME, TITLE, AND BUSINESS ADDRESS?**

2 A. My name is Philip Hayet. I am the Vice President and a Principal of J.
3 Kennedy and Associates, Inc. (“Kennedy and Associates”), whose address
4 is 570 Colonial Park Drive, Suite 305, Roswell, Georgia, 30075.

5 **Q. PLEASE PROVIDE A SUMMARY OF YOUR QUALIFICATIONS AND**
6 **EXPERIENCE?**

7 A. I have included a summary of my education, experience, and expert
8 testimony appearances in Exhibit OCS 1.1D. I have previously testified
9 before the Utah Public Service Commission (“PSC”).

10 **Q. ON WHOSE BEHALF ARE YOU APPEARING?**

11 A. I am appearing on behalf of the Utah Office of Consumer Services (“OCS”).

12 **Q. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THIS TESTIMONY?**

13 A. The purpose of my testimony is to discuss the OCS’s findings and
14 recommendations regarding Rocky Mountain Power’s (“RMP”) Energy
15 Balancing Account (“EBA”) filing covering the period of January 1, 2023
16 through December 31, 2023. As part of our evaluation, OCS reviewed
17 RMP’s EBA application and testimony, the recommended adjustments
18 proposed by the Utah Division of Public Utilities (“DPU”) in its direct
19 testimony and in the accompanying audit report that was filed on November
20 5, 2023, as well as discovery responses that were filed in the docket.

21 **Q. PLEASE PROVIDE A SUMMARY OF YOUR CONCLUSIONS AND**
22 **RECOMMENDATIONS.**

23 A. As a general matter, the DPU's 2024 EBA Audit Report for Rocky Mountain
24 Power ("Audit Report") appears to be a detailed audit of RMP's EBA filing
25 and deferral balance covering the period of January 1, 2023 to December
26 31, 2023. In particular, I agree with the DPU and believe their
27 recommendations regarding the Schedule 137 prior period adjustments and
28 the Washington Climate Commitment Act adjustments are reasonably
29 supported based on the Audit Report and the DPU's testimony that was filed
30 in this proceeding. OCS also agrees with the DPU's concern that the EBA
31 deferral balance has grown significantly over time due to PacifiCorp's
32 reliance on power purchases, and this observation is consistent with EBA
33 issues raised in the currently ongoing rate case (Docket No. 24-035-04).
34 The OCS's recommended adjustments are discussed below, and OCS
35 reserves the right to address other issues that will be raised in additional
36 testimony filed in this proceeding.

37

38 **Schedule 137 Out-of-Period Adjustment**

39 **Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE DPU'S ADJUSTMENT FOR SCHEDULE 137**
40 **OUT OF PERIOD ADJUSTMENTS.**

41 A. Schedule 137 relates to exports credits paid for customer-owned
42 generation. Witness Smith describes the adjustment in direct testimony,
43 noting that the adjustment reflects the prior period impacts of the program:

44 The Company's request to recover \$4.7 million with interest,
45 in Schedule 137 costs for the prior periods January 2020
46 through December 2022 are not the result of any difference in
47 operating and accounting periods. The reason for the

48 Schedule 137 cost recovery now is simply because the
49 Company has not yet recovered them and mistakenly did not
50 include them in the proper accounts in prior periods. This is
51 insufficient justification for recovery in periods for which rates
52 have already been finalized.

53 The Division recommends the removal of approximately \$4.8
54 million (including interest) in Schedule 137 costs incurred in
55 the years prior to the 2023 deferral year.¹

55 **Q. HAS RMP PREVIOUSLY ARGUED THE PSC SHOULD NOT ALLOW**
56 **OUT OF PERIOD ADJUSTMENTS?**

57 A. Yes. In the last EBA proceeding (2023 EBA for costs incurred January
58 through December 2022), RMP argued against affording stakeholders the
59 opportunity to present adjustments in a future EBA related to a previous
60 EBA deferral period. RMP opposed preserving this right by arguing:

61 However, the DPU and other parties should only be able to
62 propose adjustments that relate to calendar year 2023
63 deferred costs that are presented in the 2024 EBA. The
64 Company is only opposed to the DPU's request to be able to
65 preserve the ability to propose adjustments to costs related to
66 calendar year 2022 deferrals in the 2024 EBA.²

67 Furthermore, in that same testimony, RMP cited Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-
68 13.5(2)(l)(ii) and explained that the statute only permits a 300-day period
69 when EBA costs may be evaluated, and a final order issued.³ The costs

¹ Docket No. 24-035-01 DPU Direct Testimony of Gary Smith, November 5, 2024, p. 6, l. 104

² Docket No. 23-035-01 Response Testimony of Jack Painter, December 7, 2023, p. 7, l. 125.

³ Id. p. 7, l. 131.

70 from as early as January 2020 through December 2022 are well outside of
71 the 300-day period.

72 **Q. WHY WERE THE SCHEDULE 137 COSTS NOT INCLUDED IN PRIOR**
73 **EBAS?**

74 A. The EBA Audit report explained the reason the costs were not previously
75 included as follows:

76 The reason for the Schedule 137 cost recovery now is simply
77 because the Company has not yet recovered them and
78 mistakenly did not include them in the proper accounts in prior
79 periods. This is insufficient justification for recovery in periods
80 for which rates have already been finalized.⁴

81 RMP has had years to identify these costs, and RMP's mistake does not
82 provide a sufficient reason to allow for an out of period adjustment.
83 Furthermore, these were not unknown or unknowable costs, they were just
84 overlooked, which means RMP is expecting current customers to now pay
85 for costs that should have been assigned in some cases to a different set
86 of customers. The OCS agrees with the DPU and recommends removal of
87 approximately \$4.8 million (including interest) in Schedule 137 costs
88 incurred in the years prior to the 2023 deferral year.
89

90

91 **Washington Climate Commitment Act (WA CCA) Adjustment**

92 **Q. PLEASE DESCRIBE THE DPU'S ADJUSTMENT RELATED TO THE**
93 **WASHINGTON CLIMATE COMMITMENT ACT.**

⁴ Docket No. 24-035-01 DPU Audit Report, p. 8.

94 A. DPU Witnesses DiDomenico and Koehler explained the adjustment in direct
95 testimony and noted that the adjustment was based on costs that were
96 incurred based on a state-specific initiative.

97 Actual NPC was impacted by the Washington Cap & Invest
98 program of the Climate Commitment Act, which required the
99 Company to purchase allowances to cover greenhouse gas
100 emissions related to Washington-based fossil fuel-fired
101 generation at Chehalis and certain short-term firm market
102 sales into Washington. Utah customers should not bear the
103 costs of the Washington Cap & Invest program, a state-
104 specific initiative designed to benefit Washington customers
105 while shielding Washington customers from program costs.
106 The \$42.1 million (total Company) spent on allowances
107 should be situs-assigned to Washington and should be
108 removed from Utah-allocated NPC. We recommend that
109 RMP's requested recovery of deferred EBAC should be
110 reduced by \$19,413,361 on a Utah-allocated basis, including
111 interest ⁵

112 **Q. DO YOU AGREE WITH THE DPU'S WA CCA ADJUSTMENT?**

113 A. Yes. This adjustment is designed to make a situs assignment of a state
114 specific cost (allowance costs) to the state that will receive the benefits
115 (allowance revenues). It is unreasonable to expect Utah customers to
116 overpay for Chehalis energy benefits, in order to allow citizens in
117 Washington State to reap the rewards of those overpayments. The OCS
118 agrees with the DPU and recommends removal of approximately \$42.1
119 million (total for PacifiCorp including interest) from the 2023 deferral year,
120 as those costs should be situs assigned to Washington.

121

⁵ Docket No. 24-035-01 DPU Direct Testimony of DiDomenico and Koehler, p. 10, l. 136

122 **Reliance on Market Power Purchases**

123 **Q. DID THE DPU RECOMMEND AN ADJUSTMENT ATTRIBUTED TO**
122 **PACIFICORP’S INCREASED RELIANCE ON MARKET POWER**
123 **PURCHASES?**

124 A. Yes, and I am also troubled by the magnitude of PacifiCorp’s 2023 deferral
125 request and agree with the DPU’s finding that there is a “.... concerning
126 trend in the annual EBA deferral size due mostly to increases in power
127 physical purchases.....,”⁶ and that “.... the need for such a large amount of
128 purchases is, at least in part, the product of past planning failures.”⁷

129 The DPU partly attributed the reason for the past planning failures to
130 the fact that in recent IRPs, PacifiCorp prevented natural gas resources
131 from being considered as selectable proxy resource types,⁸ which led the
132 PSC to decide that because PacifiCorp had “failed to substantially comply
133 with the regulatory guidelines governing development of its 2021 Integrated
134 Resource Plan, we decline to acknowledge it.”⁹

135 The OCS is concerned about other planning deficiencies, as well
136 including PacifiCorp’s cancellation of the 2022 All Source RFP (“2022AS
137 RFP”), PacifiCorp’s tendency to rely on unidentified and uncommitted front
138 office transactions to satisfy firm capacity obligations, and the breakdown
139 of the Multi-State Process (“MSP”) negotiations. Without effective planning

⁶ Docket No.24-035-01 DPU Direct Testimony of Gary Smith, p. 6, l. 114.

⁷ Docket No.24-035-01 DPU Direct Testimony of Gary Smith, p. 7, l. 122.

⁸ Docket No. 21-035-09 Order PacifiCorp’s 2021 IRP, June 2, 2022, p. 5.

⁹ *Id.*, at p. 1.

140 and timely resource procurement, PacifiCorp has in the past and likely will
141 in the future have to rely extensively on market purchases for energy
142 required to serve the system.

143 **Q. DID THE DPU CONCLUDE THAT PACIFICORP'S PLANNING AND**
144 **COST RECOVERY OBJECTIVES ARE MISALIGNED?**

145 A. Yes. In RMP's 2024 Rate Case proceeding, DPU witness Smith concluded
146 that:

147 The EBA, as now implemented, misaligns the Company's
148 incentives in forecasting and managing NPC and in overall
149 operational efficiency. The EBA has contributed to and been
150 a mechanism perpetuating recent cost increases that are
151 forecast to continue.¹⁰

152 **Q. WHAT REASON DID PACIFICORP GIVE FOR CANCELLING THE**
153 **2022AS RFP?**

154 A. In its April 3, 2024 letter providing notice of cancellation of the 2022AS RFP,
155 PacifiCorp recited the history that led to the cancellation of the RFP.
156 PacifiCorp stated that, "On September 23, 2023, the Company notified the
157 Commission that it was suspending the 2022AS RFP PacifiCorp in order to
158 evaluate changing conditions while making critical decisions for the long-
159 term benefit of its system and customers."¹¹ PacifiCorp concluded from

¹⁰ Docket No. 24-035-04 Direct Testimony of Gary Smith, October 17, 2024, I. 569.

¹¹ Docket No. 21-035-52, Notice of Cancellation of 2022AS RFP, April 3, 2024, p. 1,
<https://pscdocs.utah.gov/electric/21docs/2103552/333141RMPNtcCncitn2022RFP4-3-2024.pdf>

160 evaluations conducted in its 2023 IRP that the 2022AS RFP should be
161 cancelled, as it stated:

162 The 2023 IRP Update preferred portfolio demonstrates that
163 with limited procurement of battery resources in the near-
164 term, which can be achieved outside of a request for
165 proposals process, there is a material benefit to scaling down
166 and delaying resource acquisition until after 2030.¹²

167 PacifiCorp's letter did not state what was meant by material benefits or how
168 the benefits would be derived, and it is debatable that customers have
169 benefitted from the cancellation of the RFP. Furthermore, besides the
170 suggestion that PacifiCorp will acquire batteries, PacifiCorp's resource
171 plans typically show that any near term gaps will be filled with uncommitted
172 front office transactions ("FOT") so that capacity obligations and reliability
173 requirements are met. PacifiCorp's letter concluded that any further
174 resource acquisition decisions will be informed by the 2025 IRP. This will
175 likely push out any significant resource acquisitions until after 2030.

176 **Q. YOU MENTIONED THAT PACIFICORP'S RESOURCE PLANS**
177 **TYPICALLY FILL GAPS WITH FOTS. PLEASE DISCUSS THAT**
178 **FURTHER.**

179 A. PacifiCorp's 2023 IRP and 2023 IRP Updates both required that PacifiCorp
180 maintain a 13% planning reserve margin target ("PRM") to meet reliability
181 requirements.¹³ To prove it would be able to maintain a 13% PRM,

¹² *Id.* at p. 1.

¹³ Docket No. 23-034-10 PacifiCorp's 2023 IRP Amended, May 31, 2023, Volume 1, Chapter 6, p. 147, , https://www.pacificorp.com/content/dam/pcorp/documents/en/pacificorp/energy/integrated-resource-plan/2023-irp/2023_IRP_Volume_I_Final_5-31-23.pdf and 2023 IRP Update, April 1, 2024, Chapter 4, p. 44, https://www.pacificorp.com/content/dam/pcorp/documents/en/pacificorp/energy/integrated-resource-plan/2023_IRP_Update.pdf

182 PacifiCorp's normal practice for many years has been to identify front office
183 transactions, also referred to as "Market Purchases," when a deficiency
184 occurred. For instance, this can be seen in Table 4.2 from the 2023 IRP
185 Update, which contains a summer load and resource balance report prior
186 to including PacifiCorp's Preferred Plan incremental resources.

187 At the final section of the report (Table 4.2) showing results for the
188 System, PacifiCorp's table can be interpreted to mean that unless
189 PacifiCorp were to plan to acquire new incremental resources as part of its
190 Preferred Plan, the System would have to rely on "Uncommitted FOTs to
191 meet remaining capacity needs, ranging from 1,513 MW in 2024 to 1,000
192 MW in 2042."¹⁴ In fact, PacifiCorp did plan to acquire new incremental
193 resources, and Table 6.4 in the 2023 IRP Update report shows that the
194 System would still have to rely on Market Purchases to meet remaining
195 capacity needs, even after accounting for the new incremental resources
196 associated with PacifiCorp's Preferred Plan. Table 6.4 indicates that
197 PacifiCorp would still have to acquire Market Purchases ranging from 1,413
198 MW in 2024 to 348 MW in 2039 to meet Summer capacity needs on the
199 west side of the System.¹⁵ Without actually identifying firm resources that

¹⁴ *Id.*, Docket No. 23-034-10 PacifiCorp's 2023 IRP Update, p. 45.

¹⁵ *Id.*, Docket No. 23-034-10 PacifiCorp's 2023 IRP Update, p. 93.

200 PacifiCorp will either construct and own, or purchase as part of a firm
201 contract, PacifiCorp's customers will continue to be exposed to unhedged
202 market energy purchase costs that will have to be recovered through the
203 EBA.

204 **Q. HAS PACIFICORP ALSO HAD DIFFICULTY IN NEGOTIATING MULTI-
205 STATE COST ALLOCATIONS AND BALANCING STATE SPECIFIC
206 PRIORITIES, WHICH HAVE LED TO CHALLENGES IN IRP PLANNING?**

207 A. Yes. PacifiCorp provided notice to the PSC on July 11, 2024, that it was
208 terminating negotiations on the Post-Interim Period Method agreement
209 ("New Agreement"), as it determined it would be unlikely that a New
210 Agreement could be reached by the sunset date of the 2020 PacifiCorp
211 Inter-Jurisdictional Allocation Protocol ("Current Agreement") on December
212 31, 2025. PacifiCorp stated, "[i]t has become apparent to the Company that
213 the complexities of achieving a negotiated agreement with sufficient time to
214 seek required approvals is unlikely."¹⁶ PacifiCorp now plans to propose its
215 own allocation method in a filing it will make to the PSC and will seek
216 approval through a docketed proceeding. PacifiCorp has not yet made such
217 a filing, which is somewhat concerning, as there is only about a year that
218 remains before the Current Agreement is set to expire.

¹⁶ Docket No. 23-035-20 Rocky Mountain Power's Notice, July 11, 2024
<https://pscdocs.utah.gov/electric/23docs/2303520/334665RMPNtc7-11-2024.pdf>

219 **Q. GIVEN PACIFICORP'S RELIANCE ON MARKET PURCHASES**
220 **STEMMING FROM PLANNING DEFICIENCIES, WHAT DOES THE OCS**
221 **RECOMMEND CONCERNING THIS ISSUE?**

222 A. Given the planning deficiencies I discussed above, I am greatly concerned
223 by the risks and the costs customers are being forced to bear entirely, and
224 the OCS recommends that the PSC open a new docket to address whether
225 or not the EBA mechanism is appropriately acting as a risk sharing
226 mechanism, or if it is acting as a backstop to PacifiCorp's failed planning
227 processes. This docket should investigate more thoroughly the reasons
228 deferral costs have increased so dramatically, market purchases have
229 increased significantly, planning deficiencies have occurred, and also,
230 how the EBA should be changed such that customers would have greater
231 protections than currently exist.

232 **Q. DOES THIS COMPLETE YOUR TESTIMONY?**

233 A. Yes, it does.