

**-BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH-**

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**IN THE MATTER OF ROCKY MOUNTAIN  
POWER'S APPLICATION FOR  
APPROVAL OF THE 2024 ENERGY  
BALANCING ACCOUNT.**

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**DOCKET No. 24-035-01  
Exhibit No. DPU 1.0 R  
Rebuttal Testimony**

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**Redacted**

FOR THE DIVISION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES  
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE  
STATE OF UTAH

Rebuttal Testimony of

Gary Smith

January 7, 2025

1 **INTRODUCTION**

2 **Q. PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME, EMPLOYER, AND BUSINESS ADDRESS.**

3 A. My name is Gary Smith. I am employed by the Division of Public Utilities (Division or  
4 DPU), State of Utah. My business address is 160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City,  
5 UT 84114.

6 **Q. ARE YOU THE GARY SMITH WHO PREFILED DIRECT TESTIMONY FOR THE**  
7 **DIVISION IN THIS PROCEEDING?**

8 A. Yes.

9 **Q. ON WHOSE BEHALF ARE YOU TESTIFYING?**

10 A. I am testifying on behalf of the Division.

11 **SUMMARY**

12 **Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE THE PURPOSE OF YOUR REBUTTAL TESTIMONY.**

13 A. The purpose of my rebuttal testimony is to reaffirm and clarify the Division's  
14 recommendations presented in my direct testimony after review of the testimony  
15 offered by parties in this matter, including the response testimony of Company  
16 witnesses Michael G. Wilding and Jack Painter. I also present the Division's total  
17 revised recommended adjustment removing the October 11, 2023, Naughton 2  
18 outage totaling \$185,808 detailed in the rebuttal testimony of Division witnesses  
19 Philip DiDomenico and Dan F. Koehler.

20 **RESPONSE**

21 **Q. COMPANY WITNESS, JACK PAINTER, CLAIMS IN HIS RESPONSE TESTIMONY**  
22 **THAT THE COMPANY SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO RECOVER \$4.7 MILLION IN**  
23 **SCHEDULE 137 COSTS IT DID NOT INCLUDE IN ITS DEFERRAL YEARS 2020,**  
24 **2021, AND 2022 ANNUAL EBA FILINGS. HAS THE COMPANY EVER BEEN**  
25 **GRANTED EBA RECOVERY FOR COSTS IT FAILED TO REQUEST IN A PRIOR**  
26 **PERIOD?**

27 A. No, the Division is not aware of any prior request by the Company to recover known  
28 costs it simply failed to include in the correct prior EBA deferral filing year over  
29 multiple years.

30 **Q. MR. PAINTER CLAIMS THAT IT IS COMMON PRACTICE FOR THE COMPANY**  
31 **TO INCLUDE OUT OF PERIOD ADJUSTMENTS IN ITS EBA REQUESTS FOR**  
32 **RECOVERY. IS THE COMPANY'S REQUEST TO RECOVER THE \$4.7 MILLION**  
33 **SCHEDULE 137 COSTS DIFFERENT THAN THE EXAMPLES OF**  
34 **ADJUSTMENTS PROVIDED BY MR. PAINTER?**

35 A. Yes, the prior period schedule 137 cost adjustment the Company is seeking is  
36 different from the expected annual true-up adjustment of the variance between  
37 actual customer collections and the Commission ordered EBA collection; it is also  
38 different than the liquidated damage payments received in the deferral year for prior  
39 year's nonperformance of wind assets mentioned by Mr. Painter.<sup>1</sup> The requested  
40 prior period schedule 137 cost adjustment is not a "common" adjustment. It is the  
41 result of the Company's failure to include them in the proper filing year and not due  
42 to any expected true up or lag in the timing of when costs are known or when

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<sup>1</sup> Response Testimony of Jack Painter at 4:83-5:92.

43 payments are received. Other examples have not been oversights of this type.  
44 Failure of the Company to include its known costs in prior EBA filings is insufficient  
45 justification for cost recovery in periods for which rates have already been finalized  
46 and approved. This request dating back three EBA deferral periods is concerning.  
47 Without some finality to rates the Company could request adjustments for any  
48 additional oversights dating as far back as October 2011.<sup>2</sup> The Division questions  
49 whether the Company would agree to grant other parties the same opportunity to  
50 propose prior period adjusting entries that those parties simply did not notice in  
51 previous cases.

52 **Q. MR. PAINTER REFERENCES THE FEBRUARY 16, 2017, ORDER IN DOCKET**  
53 **NO. 09-035-15 IN HIS RESPONSE, WHAT CLARIFICATIONS DOES THE**  
54 **DIVISION HAVE?**

55 A. Mr. Painter included the following statement in his response referring to the  
56 Commission's February 16, 2017, order related to prior period adjustments:

57 Furthermore, the Commission held that not allowing prior period  
58 adjustments would "disallow prudent NPC amounts booked in  
59 accordance with generally accepted accounting principles."<sup>3</sup>

60 The above statement is Mr. Painter's interpretation of an extracted portion of the  
61 order that more fully reads:

62 Furthermore, PacifiCorp states Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-  
63 13.5(2)(c)(ii)<sup>32</sup> provides for reconciliation of EBA accounts and does  
64 not preclude updates when new information becomes available.

65 *According to PacifiCorp, the DPU's proposal would disallow prudent*  
66 *NPC amounts booked in accordance with generally accepted*

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<sup>2</sup> In the Matter of Rocky Mountain Power's Application of Rocky Mountain Power for Approval of its Proposed Energy Cost Adjustment Mechanism, Docket No. 09-035-15, Direct Testimony of David Thomson at 4:81-5:91 and 5:109-6:114 (Sep. 28, 2016).

<sup>3</sup> Response Testimony of Jack Painter at 4:76-82.

67 *accounting principles* and cites examples where estimated or  
68 accrued costs or benefits from prior periods could not be reconciled  
69 with actual costs or benefits until after an audit or until more accurate  
70 information became available.

71 We decline to accept the DPU's recommendation on this issue. We  
72 conclude that Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-13.5 permits the accounting  
73 treatment we approved previously for the EBA pursuant to this section.  
74 Further, consistent with our experience with other balancing accounts,  
75 we find that difficulties exist with closing various transactions within the  
76 deferral period. We anticipate further review and evaluation of this issue  
77 and its materiality at the conclusion of the EBA pilot period.<sup>4</sup>

78 When the Commission stated that “difficulties exist with closing various transactions  
79 within the deferral period” it appears that the Commission was quoting the  
80 Company’s view and focused on specific examples of accounting transactions that  
81 the EBA would normally encounter, like the annual true ups of the Company’s EBA  
82 filings that Mr. Painter refers to.<sup>5</sup> In fact, the Commission addressed the lack of  
83 ability to reconcile amounts without additional information. That case was quite  
84 different from this one. Here, the Company presents no facts involving a lack of  
85 information at the original time of filing that required. Rather than applying new, final  
86 knowledge to past years’ numbers, the Company simply discovered its own  
87 oversight and seeks now to reopen past years to include previously known costs  
88 from those years.

89 **Q. MR. WILDING CLAIMS THAT THE DIVISION SHOULD MORE APPROPRIATELY**  
90 **ADDRESS THE ACQUISITION OF SUFFICIENT RESOURCES IN A DIFFERENT**  
91 **DOCKET. DOES THE DIVISION AGREE?**

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<sup>4</sup> In the Matter of Rocky Mountain Power’s Application of Rocky Mountain Power for Approval of its Proposed Energy Cost Adjustment Mechanism, Docket No. 09-035-15, Order at 14-15 (Feb. 16, 2017).

<sup>5</sup> Response Testimony of Jack Painter at 4:84-5:93.

92 A. In a sense, perhaps. But NPC is almost entirely the result of Company's past  
93 acquisition decisions; it always will be. Adjustments cannot be made in an Integrated  
94 Resource Plan (IRP) docket. And general rate cases do not always include  
95 estimates of costs resulting from Company policies and practices, which change  
96 from time to time. It is not clear where and how the Company believes a utility should  
97 be accountable when it fails to plan properly leading to increased costs for  
98 customers. The Company would seemingly have the Division, other parties, and the  
99 Commission, evaluate only what it does with the position in which it now finds itself,  
100 while ignoring why it now finds itself with insufficient reliable resources to meet  
101 system needs. The Division of course cannot identify a hypothetical resource that  
102 wasn't built because the Company did not consider it. The Division has raised  
103 concerns in IRP dockets as suggested by Mr. Wilding<sup>6</sup>, but these have been largely  
104 ignored by the Company. The Division voiced concerns over the Company's failure  
105 to model natural gas generators.<sup>7</sup> In fact, the Company even performed a modeling  
106 run showing that the inclusion of new proxy gas generation would reduce system  
107 costs.<sup>8</sup> Perhaps natural gas resources from that IRP would not yet be in service, but  
108 there is no way to know that. The Company has the burden to prove its decisions are

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<sup>6</sup> Wilding Response Test. at 19:365:378.

<sup>7</sup> In his Direct Testimony, Division witness David Williams noted that "in the 2021 IRP, the Division requested that the Company run a sensitivity where new natural gas plants were allowed. This resulted in the S-04 sensitivity, described in '2021 IRP – Supplemental Sensitivity Modeling Results' which was filed on the RMP website." Williams Direct Test. at 25:564-67. The sensitivity is available at: [https://www.pacificorp.com/content/dam/pcorp/documents/en/pacificorp/energy/integrated-resource-plan/PacifiCorp\\_2021\\_IRP\\_Sensitivity\\_Cases.pdf](https://www.pacificorp.com/content/dam/pcorp/documents/en/pacificorp/energy/integrated-resource-plan/PacifiCorp_2021_IRP_Sensitivity_Cases.pdf) (p. 5).

<sup>8</sup> Williams Direct Test. at 25:567-68: "That sensitivity showed a benefit of \$159 million as compared to P02-MM CETA, which was the preferred portfolio."

109 prudent. Answering this question involves more than merely reviewing the  
110 Company's present condition.

111 **Q. MR. WILDING CLAIMS THAT MARKET PURCHASE ACTIVITY TAKES PLACE IN**  
112 **THE WEST BECAUSE THESE POINTS OF DELIVERY HAVE HISTORICALLY**  
113 **EXHIBITED GREATER LIQUIDITY. DOES MR. WILDING DISCUSS OR**  
114 **COMPARE PRICING AT ANY AVAILABLE POINT OF DELIVERY?**

115 A. No. Although the Division appreciates Mr. Wilding's limited comparative analysis of  
116 liquidity at select points of delivery in the east and west balancing authorities, he  
117 does not offer any similar analysis on pricing. Even if liquidity is relevant, it does not  
118 answer broader questions, such as whether the Company can effectively move  
119 resources across its territory in ways that serve Utah.

120 **Q. HAS THE DIVISION REVIEWED MR. WILDING'S CONFIDENTIAL WORKPAPER**  
121 **DATA AND COMPARED HISTORICAL PRICING AT MID-C AND PALO VERDE?**

122 A. Yes. The Division took the historical data from Mr. Wilding's response testimony  
123 workpapers and ran comparative analyses on hourly pricing for the calendar years  
124 2019 through 2023 and actual trades for calendar years 2018 through 2023.  
125 Understandably, the results contain a large amount of data, so DPU TABLE 1 and  
126 DPU TABLE 2 provide a summary view. Full details are included as DPU Exhibit 1.1  
127 R.

128 In DPU TABLE 1, hourly pricing for Mid-C was summed up on an annual basis and  
129 compared with an annual summation of hourly pricing at Palo Verde. The Division  
130 noted that hourly pricing at Palo Verde was overall lower than at Mid-C. The Division  
131 noted that in the third quarter of each year, hourly pricing at Palo Verde commonly

132 exceeded Mid-C (Not shown on this chart, but available in DPU Exhibit 1.1 R).  
133 Hourly pricing overall decreased during the EBA deferral year 2023.

**TABLE 1**

**MID-C vs. Palo Verde Hourly Pricing**

	MID-C Hourly Pricing			Palo Verde Hourly Pricing		
	\$/MWh			\$/MWh		
2019	\$	310,322.65		\$	286,941.64	
2020	\$	269,363.83	<b>-15.21%</b>	\$	279,383.49	<b>-2.71%</b>
2021	\$	446,807.86	<b>39.71%</b>	\$	424,249.52	<b>34.15%</b>
2022	\$	724,046.59	<b>38.29%</b>	\$	726,723.78	<b>41.62%</b>
134 2023	\$	541,816.20	<b>-33.63%</b>	\$	505,325.28	<b>-43.81%</b>

135 In DPU TABLE 2, the weighted average price of actual trades occurring at Mid-C  
136 was compared to the weighted average price of trades at Palo Verde for calendar  
137 years 2018 through 2023. The Division noted that the weighted average price for  
138 trades transacted at Mid-C was generally lower than those at Palo Verde until the  
139 deferral year 2023. The calendar year 2023 saw decreases in weighted average  
140 price at Palo Verde that averaged over 30% from 2022. Mid-C saw a much lower  
141 decrease averaging 4% in 2023.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>9</sup> Of course, constructing comparative prices for the times of each of the Company’s Mid-C transactions would be much more involved than my analysis here. But this is the sort of analysis that should be expected from the Company. It has not, across multiple dockets, provided sufficient information to evaluate whether different procurement strategies might have proven more or less expensive than the program it has undertaken.



**TABLE 2**

**MID-C vs. Palo Verde Day Ahead Pricing**

	<b>MID- C PEAK</b>			<b>Palo Verde PEAK</b>		
	<b>Wtd avgprice \$/MWh</b>			<b>Wtd avgprice \$/MWh</b>		
2018	\$	9,205.30		\$	10,449.91	
2019	\$	9,502.94	<b>3.13%</b>	\$	8,059.74	<b>-29.66%</b>
2020	\$	6,214.67	<b>-52.91%</b>	\$	11,876.70	<b>32.14%</b>
2021	\$	14,718.11	<b>57.78%</b>	\$	15,402.31	<b>22.89%</b>
2022	\$	22,271.07	<b>33.91%</b>	\$	23,474.68	<b>34.39%</b>
2023	\$	21,268.11	<b>-4.72%</b>	\$	17,630.90	<b>-33.15%</b>

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143 **Q. DOES THE DIVISION HAVE ANY REVISIONS TO ITS RECOMMENDED WEST**  
 144 **TRADE ADJUSTMENT RELATED TO ITS HEDGING ACTIVITIES?**

145 A. Yes. As detailed in the Division’s surrebuttal testimony of Trevor Jones filed in  
 146 Docket 24-035-04, the Division recommends reducing the allocation of hedging  
 147 costs to Utah from 44% to 20% rather than removing the cost of the hedges  
 148 occurring in PAC West.<sup>10</sup> This revised allocated amount was then further reduced by  
 149 the Company’s hedging sales. These changes reduced the Division proposed  
 150 adjustment from \$129.8 million to \$72.3 million as shown in DPU TABLE 3.

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<sup>10</sup> 24-035-04, In the Matter of the Application of Rocky Mountain Power for the Authority to Increase its Retail Electric Service Rates in Utah and for Approval of it proposed Electric Service Schedules and Electric Service Regulations, Trevor Jones Surrebuttal Test. at 13:311-315.



161 million to \$72.3 as detailed in my testimony above. The Division now recommends a  
162 revised \$97.1 million reduction from the approved interim rate amount, resulting in a  
163 recommended revised adjusted total recovery of \$334.5 million as follows:

164

<b>May 2024 Requested Deferral (all numbers Utah allocated)</b>	<b>\$454,953,425</b>
2023 Accrued Interest Correction Adjustment	\$826,579
Removal of Forecast Interest - July 2024 - June 2026	(\$24,201,822)
Interim Ordered Recovery (subject to adjustment and true-up)	\$431,578,182
<b>REVISED - Total Outage Adjustment</b>	<b>(604,448)</b>
<b>REVISED - Total Outage Adjustment - Accrued Interest</b>	<b>(24,514)</b>
Total WA CCA Adjustment	(\$18,482,085)
Total WA CCA Adjustment - Accrued Interest	(\$931,275)
Total Sch 137 Prior Period Adjustment	(\$4,703,793)
Total Sch 137 Prior Period Adjustment - Accrued Interest	(\$126,926)
<b>REVISED - Total West Trade Adjustment</b>	<b>(\$72,250,029)</b>
<b>REVISED - Net Adjustment (Post Interim Rate)</b>	<b>(\$97,123,070)</b>
<b>REVISED - Net Adjusted DPU Total Recommended Recovery</b>	<b><u>\$334,455,112</u></b>

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166 **Q. DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR REBUTTAL TESTIMONY?**

167 **A. Yes.**