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BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH

<p><b>In the Matter of the Application of Rocky Mountain Power for Authority to increase its Retail Electric Utility Service Rates in Utah and for Approval of its Proposed Electric Service Schedules and Electric Service Regulations</b></p>	<p>DOCKET No. 24-035-04 PHASE I: REVENUE REQUIREMENT</p>
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**PREFILED DIRECT TESTIMONY OF LOGAN MITCHELL, PH.D.**

**ON BEHALF OF**

**UTAH CLEAN ENERGY**

**PHASE I REVENUE REQUIREMENT**

**OCTOBER 17TH, 2024**

<b>I. INTRODUCTION AND QUALIFICATIONS</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>II. PURPOSE OF TESTIMONY</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>III. TESTIMONY</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>IV. CONCLUSIONS</b>	<b>23</b>

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

### LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Aspects of the US energy system that are vulnerable to the effects of climate change.

Source: Fifth US National Climate Assessment, Chapter 5

Figure 2. Comparison of risk thresholds across Reason for Concern topics across the following Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reports which are represented by the four bars in each subplot: TAR (2001), AR4 (Smith et al., 2009), AR5 (2015), and SR15 (2018).

Figure 3. NOAA's Billion-Dollar weather and climate disasters across the US in 2023.

Figure 4. NOAA's Billion-dollar weather and climate disasters since 1980.

1           **I. INTRODUCTION AND QUALIFICATIONS**

2   **Q. Please state your name and business address.**

3   A. My name is Dr. Logan Mitchell. My business address is 215 S. 400 E., Salt Lake City,  
4       Utah 84111.

5   **Q. By whom are you employed and in what capacity?**

6   A. I am employed by Utah Clean Energy (“UCE”), a non-profit public interest organization  
7       whose mission is to lead and accelerate the clean energy transformation with vision and  
8       expertise. We support the objectives of an affordable, reliable, and clean energy system.  
9       My role at UCE is as their Climate Scientist and Energy Analyst, and I lead our utility  
10      regulatory team.

11 **Q. On whose behalf are you testifying?**

12 A. I am testifying on behalf of UCE.

13 **Q. Please review your professional experience and qualifications.**

14 A. My academic background spans geology, paleoclimate, atmospheric chemistry, air quality,  
15      and analysis of emissions, and has given me a broad understanding of the nexus of energy,  
16      air quality, and climate issues. I have published 40+ peer-reviewed publications (several in  
17      publications like Science, Nature & PNAS), data products, editorials, reports, and white  
18      papers (ORCID<sup>1</sup>, Google Scholar<sup>2</sup>, Research Gate<sup>3</sup>). I have a BS in Geology with a minor  
19      in Oceanography and I obtained my PhD in Geology with a focus on Paleoclimatology in  
20      2013 from Oregon State University. I completed a Postdoc and then was a Research  
21      Assistant Professor in the Department of Atmospheric Sciences at the University of Utah. I

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<sup>1</sup> <https://orcid.org/my-orcid?orcid=0000-0002-8749-954X>

<sup>2</sup> <https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=jhPZAbIAAAAJ&hl=en>

<sup>3</sup> <https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Logan-Mitchell-2>

22 continue to maintain an Adjunct Professor appointment in the Department of Atmospheric  
23 Sciences at the University of Utah. I now lead Utah Clean Energy’s utility regulatory team  
24 and have actively participated in a number of regulatory dockets and working groups,  
25 including Integrated Resource Planning, the Multi State Protocol (“MSP”), wildfire  
26 workshops, time of use rates, and interconnection standards.

27 **II. PURPOSE OF TESTIMONY**

28 **Q. What is the purpose of Utah Clean Energy’s direct testimony in the revenue**  
29 **requirement phase of this rate case?**

30 A. The purpose of Utah Clean Energy’s direct testimony in the revenue requirement phase of  
31 this rate case is to address the growing imbalance of climate-induced costs and risks borne  
32 between Rocky Mountain Power (“the Company” or “PacifiCorp”), its shareholders, and  
33 ratepayers. The Company’s operations emit a substantial amount of greenhouse gases that  
34 are contributing to climate change; however, the Company seeks cost recovery of climate-  
35 induced impacts that would effectively shift the costs of climate-induced risks from the  
36 Company and its shareholders onto ratepayers. This cost- and risk-shifting would occur  
37 through the various mechanisms the Company proposes to address wildfire risks, including  
38 the Insurance Cost Adjustment for excess liability, third-party wildfire liability insurance,  
39 and a fire fund. Several drivers of Net Power Costs are also affected by climate-induced  
40 phenomenon, and the Company again seeks that ratepayers bear the full costs and risks  
41 associated with those impacts. In my testimony I will demonstrate that climate-induced  
42 risks are not exogenous to the Company’s operations, draw on my background as a climate  
43 scientist to explain what is causing climate change, how it is already causing substantial  
44 costs and risks to energy systems and society at large, and how those risks would change in

45 the future depending on future emission pathways. Finally, I will discuss the need for the  
46 Public Service Commission (“the Commission”) to examine the balance of risks held by  
47 the Company and ratepayers to ensure the Company does not shift all climate-induced  
48 costs and risks to ratepayers and thereby has no incentive to address its carbon emissions  
49 that are contributing to climate change.

50

51 **XVII. TESTIMONY**


52 **Q. Company testimony from Frank Graves, page 4, line 85, states: “PacifiCorp is facing**  
53 **an exogenous, largely climate-induced fire-risk phenomenon. Growing wildfire risk is**  
54 **similarly afflicting many other electric utilities and society at large.” Are the**  
55 **escalating climate-induced wildfire risks facing PacifiCorp exogenous to the**  
56 **Company?**

57 A. No, climate change is not an exogenous risk to PacifiCorp’s operational activities. As I will  
58 establish in this testimony, carbon emissions from energy production contribute to climate  
59 change and associated climate-induced wildfire risks. PacifiCorp has had substantial  
60 historical and present carbon emissions, and the Company’s most recent 2023 IRP Update  
61 has a substantial increase in carbon emissions that is not in alignment with industry trends.  
62 Therefore, the climate-induced fire risk PacifiCorp is facing is by definition *not* exogenous  
63 to their operations and indeed PacifiCorp’s actions are actively contributing to increasing  
64 climate-induced wildfire risks that are afflicting electric utilities, rate payers and society at  
65 large.

66

67 **Q. In addition to growing wildfire costs and risks, how are carbon emissions and**  
68 **therefore climate change affecting the electric system and rate payers?**

69 A. Climate change has myriad effects on electricity systems, including affecting supply,  
70 delivery, and demand. Electricity supply can be affected by extreme weather events that  
71 disrupt facilities and infrastructure, high temperatures that can derate thermal generation  
72 resources, droughts that affect hydroelectric generation and of course wildfires. Delivery of  
73 electricity is also affected by climate change through impacts from extreme weather events  
74 impacting transmission, distribution lines causing power outages and other impacts, high  
75 temperatures also increase powerline sagging and reduce transmission efficiency and  
76 capacity, as well as again wildfire impacts. Lastly, climate change affects demand directly  
77 through generally higher temperatures as well as increasing the duration and severity of  
78 extreme heat events. The Fifth US National Climate Assessment, Chapter 5 provides an  
79 extensive discussion of these impacts, and includes the following graphical summary of  
80 them.



81

82

Figure 1. Aspects of the US energy system that are vulnerable to the effects of climate change. Source: Fifth US National Climate Assessment, Chapter 5

83

84

85 **Q. Are any of these climate impacts on electricity systems material to this rate case?**

86

A. Yes, climate change is already affecting PacifiCorp’s electricity supply, delivery, and demand, and these additional costs are reflected in rate case Company witness testimony from Ramon Mitchell, who states (line 204-211): *“In calendar year 2022, like 2021, unforeseen weather events again drove increases in actual NPC, such as the multiple heat waves in the region during the summer of 2022 and ongoing drought conditions. These drivers increased peak period power prices and reduced hydro generation availability,*

91



92 *respectively. Similarly, there was a historic cyclone event in the winter of 2022 that*  
93 *impacted power and natural gas prices. For example, average prices at the Opal natural*  
94 *gas trading hub were 424 percent higher in December 2022 as compared to December*  
95 *2021 while peak power prices at the Mid-Columbia trading hub were 380 percent higher.”*  
96 These kinds of events are expected consequences of climate change and should not be  
97 thought of as “unforeseen” weather events. As a case in point, PacifiCorp is now factoring  
98 in climate change assumptions into the IRP planning process to understand how warming  
99 temperatures affect demand, extreme weather, hydroelectric availability and timing, and  
100 other factors. These climate impacts, as noted in Mitchell’s testimony, are driving increases  
101 in actual Net Power Costs (“NPC”), and PacifiCorp expects ratepayers to cover the entirety  
102 of the costs of these climate impacts.

103 **Q. What is the main driver of climate change?**

104 A. The Fourth US National Climate Assessment (“NCA”) states: *“Many lines of evidence*  
105 *demonstrate that human activities, especially emissions of greenhouse gases from fossil*  
106 *fuel combustion, deforestation, and land-use change, are primarily responsible for the*  
107 *climate changes observed in the industrial era, especially over the last six decades.”*<sup>4</sup>

108 **Q. How much of the observed warming can be attributed to human activities?**

109 A. Again, the Fourth NCA examined all of the known factors that affect the climate and found  
110 that: *“Over the last century, changes in solar output, volcanic emissions, and natural*  
111 *variability have only contributed marginally to the observed changes in climate. No*  
112 *natural cycles are found in the observational record that can explain the observed*  
113 *increases in the heat content of the atmosphere, the ocean, or the cryosphere since the*

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<sup>4</sup> <https://nca2018.globalchange.gov/chapter/2/>

114 *industrial era. Greenhouse gas emissions from human activities are the only factors that*  
115 *can account for the observed warming over the last century; there are no credible*  
116 *alternative human or natural explanations supported by the observational evidence.”* The  
117 report then quantifies the amount of warming that can be attributed to human activities and  
118 found that: *“Observed warming over the period 1951–2010 was 1.2°F (0.65°C), and*  
119 *formal detection and attribution studies conclude that the likely range of the human*  
120 *contribution to the global average temperature increase over the period 1951–2010 is*  
121 *1.1°F to 1.4°F.”*<sup>5</sup> In other words, formal attribution studies have found that human  
122 activities contribute 104% of the observed global average temperature increase. That  
123 means that, in the absence of human activity, the climate system would be expected to be  
124 very gradually cooling, and instead virtually all of the rapid warming we have observed in  
125 recent decades is attributed to human activities.

126 **Q. Is there scientific consensus about how human activities including energy generation**  
127 **are causing climate change?**

128 A. Yes, there is broad scientific consensus that human activities are causing climate change.  
129 Virtually every leading scientific organization worldwide has issued public statements  
130 endorsing that position. NASA maintains a select list of these organizations and their  
131 statements on their website.<sup>6</sup>

132 **Q. What levels of climate warming pose risks for society?**

133 A. The climate system is incredibly complex, so to facilitate judgement about societal risks,  
134 the “reasons for concern” (“RFC”) framework was developed in 2001. The RFC  
135 framework illustrated societal risks using a “burning embers” diagram across five topic

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<sup>5</sup> <https://nca2018.globalchange.gov/chapter/2/>

<sup>6</sup> <https://science.nasa.gov/climate-change/scientific-consensus/>

136 areas: Unique and threatened systems; Extreme climate events; Distribution of impacts;  
137 Aggregate impacts; and Large-scale discontinuities. Since 2001 the RFC framework has  
138 been periodically updated in scientific assessment reports. Over time as the scientific  
139 understanding of the societal risks of climate change increased, the level of risk has shifted  
140 towards lower temperatures. The following figure<sup>7</sup> shows how the RFC framework has  
141 changed across the following Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”)  
142 reports: TAR (2001)<sup>8</sup>, AR4 (Smith et al., 2009)<sup>9</sup>, AR5 (2014)<sup>10</sup>, and SR15 (2018)<sup>11</sup>. The  
143 dashed lines in the figure below connect the midpoints between undetectable and moderate  
144 risks, and moderate and high risk. There are two key points to understand about this figure.  
145 First, the scientific understanding over time has shifted towards finding higher societal  
146 risks at lower amounts of climate warming. Second, the upper dashed line between  
147 moderate and high risk occurs between 1.5°C and 2°C across all of the RFC areas of  
148 societal risk.

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<sup>7</sup> Zommers, Zinta, Philippe Marbaix, Andreas Fischlin, Zelina Z. Ibrahim, Sean Grant, Alexandre K. Magnan, Hans-Otto Pörtner, et al. “Burning Embers: Towards More Transparent and Robust Climate-Change Risk Assessments.” *Nature Reviews Earth & Environment* 1, no. 10 (October 2020): 516–29. <https://doi.org/10.1038/s43017-020-0088-0>.

<sup>8</sup> IPCC, 2001: Summary for policymakers. In *Climate Change 2001: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change* (McCarthy, J. J., Canziani, O. F., Leary, N. A., Dokken, D. J. & White, K. S., eds) (Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA) <https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar3/wg2/>

<sup>9</sup> Smith, Joel B., Stephen H. Schneider, Michael Oppenheimer, Gary W. Yohe, William Hare, Michael D. Mastrandrea, Anand Patwardhan, et al. “Assessing Dangerous Climate Change through an Update of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) ‘Reasons for Concern.’” *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 106, no. 11 (March 17, 2009): 4133–37. <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0812355106>.

<sup>10</sup> IPCC, 2014: Topic 2 – Future climate changes, risk and impacts. In *Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change* (Core writing team, Pachauri, R. K. & Meyer, L. A., eds) (IPCC, Geneva, Switzerland) <https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/syr/>

<sup>11</sup> Matthews, J. B. R. in *Global Warming of 1.5°C. An IPCC Special Report on the Impacts of Global Warming of 1.5°C Above Pre- industrial Levels and Related Global Greenhouse Gas Emission Pathways, in the Context of Strengthening the Global Response to the Threat of Climate Change, Sustainable Development, and Efforts to Eradicate Poverty* (eds Masson- Delmotte, V. et al.) 539 – 562 (IPCC, 2018).




Fig. 3 | Comparison of risk thresholds across Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change assessments. Burning embers link the global mean surface temperature increase to estimates of risk to unique and threatened ecosystems (panel a), extreme climate or weather events (panel b), distribution of impacts (panel c), aggregate impacts (panel d) and large-scale discontinuities (called large-scale singular events in the Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) and the Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5 Degrees (SR15)) (panel e). All burning embers are presented with the same colour and temperature scale, removing technical details that varied between the original publications. Grey areas at the top of each column correspond to temperatures above the assessed range in the corresponding report. Dashed lines connect the midpoints between undetectable and moderate risk, and moderate and high risk. Risks transitions have generally shifted towards lower temperatures with updated scientific understanding. See Supplementary Information for details. TAR, Third Assessment Report. Figure produced using the Ember Factory online application.

149

150 Figure 2. Comparison of risk thresholds across Reason for Concern topics across the following

151 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reports which are represented by the four


152 bars in each subplot: TAR (2001), AR4 (Smith et al., 2009), AR5 (2015), and SR15 (2018).

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154

155 **Q. What are some examples of how moving from moderate to high level of risk in the**  
 156 **chart above can be related to real world impacts?**

157 A. Take the RFC “Extreme climate events” category for example that assesses risks to human  
 158 health, livelihoods, assets, and ecosystems from weather and climate extreme events such  
 159 as heat waves, hurricanes, heavy rain, drought, flooding, and wildfires. At a global surface  
 160 temperature warming of 1.1°C (average in 2011-2020)<sup>12</sup>, we are already experiencing  
 161 impacts that are causing a sharp rise in the number of climate related billion-dollar weather  
 162 and climate disasters. In 2023 the US experienced the highest number of billion-dollar  
 163 disasters on record, 28 in total<sup>13</sup> as illustrated in the figure below.




164

165 Figure 3. NOAA’s Billion-Dollar weather and climate disasters across the US in 2023.

<sup>12</sup> IPCC, 2023: Summary for Policymakers. In: Climate Change 2023: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Core Writing Team, H. Lee and J. Romero (eds.)]. IPCC, Geneva, Switzerland, pp. 1-34, doi: 10.59327/IPCC/AR6-9789291691647.001

<sup>13</sup> <https://www.noaa.gov/news/us-struck-with-historic-number-of-billion-dollar-disasters-in-2023>

166 NOAA also provides a time series showing how these billion-dollar weather and climate  
 167 disasters are increasing in frequency and cost:



168  
 169 Figure 4. NOAA’s Billion-dollar weather and climate disasters since 1980.

170 Up-to-date counts of billion-dollar disasters for 2024 are currently not available because  
 171 hurricane Helene, which was itself made more extreme by climate change<sup>14</sup>, has recently  
 172 been severely impacted NOAA’s climate and weather data repository, the National Center  
 173 for Environmental Information that is located in Asheville, NC. These are the kind of  
 174 extreme climate impacts that we are seeing at a global surface warming level of 1.1°C,  
 175 which I will note is in the “moderate” level of risk for Extreme climate events in the  
 176 Reasons for Concern burning embers figure above.

177

<sup>14</sup> <https://yaleclimateconnections.org/2024/10/climate-change-made-hurricane-helene-and-other-2024-disasters-more-damaging-scientists-find/>.

178 **Q. What are some examples of the climate fueled societal impacts in the other “Reasons**  
179 **for Concern” areas?**

180 A. Here is a brief explanation of the kinds of climate fueled societal impacts in the RFC  
181 areas<sup>15</sup>. RFC1 is Risks to unique and threatened systems, which encompass ecological and  
182 human systems that have restricted geographic range by climate-related conditions, such as  
183 coral reefs, mangrove ecosystems, biodiversity hotspots, and tropical glaciers. RFC2 is  
184 Extreme climate events including extreme temperature and precipitation events, such as  
185 those tracked by NOAA’s billion-dollar weather and climate disasters discussed above.  
186 RFC3 is Risks associated with uneven distribution of impacts, such as diverging impacts  
187 across geographic locations, income and wealth, gender, age, or other physical and  
188 socioeconomic characteristics. An example of the uneven distribution of impacts is the  
189 widespread flooding in Pakistan in 2022<sup>16</sup>, where around 10% of the entire country was  
190 flooded, affecting 33 million people in that developing nation. The floods were caused by  
191 heavier than usual monsoon rains, melting glaciers, and a severe heat wave, all of which  
192 are linked to climate change. RFC4 is Risks associated with aggregate impacts, which  
193 reflect globally aggregated metrics such as lives affected, monetary damage, number of  
194 species at risk of extinction, or global scale ecosystem degradation. RFC5 is Risks  
195 associated with large-scale singular events or tipping points in the climate system that are  
196 large, relatively abrupt, sometimes irreversible changes in physical, ecological, or social  
197 systems. Examples of this include disintegration of Greenland or the West Antarctic ice  
198 sheets leading large and rapid sea level rise, sudden loss or dieback of the Amazon forest

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<sup>15</sup> O’Neill, Brian C., Michael Oppenheimer, Rachel Warren, Stephane Hallegatte, Robert E. Kopp, Hans O. Pörtner, Robert Scholes, et al. “IPCC Reasons for Concern Regarding Climate Change Risks.” *Nature Climate Change* 7, no. 1 (January 2017): 28–37. <https://doi.org/10.1038/nclimate3179>.

<sup>16</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2022\\_Pakistan\\_floods](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2022_Pakistan_floods)

199 or coral reefs, triggering widespread arctic permafrost melting, or collapse of the Atlantic  
200 Meridional Overturning Circulation that would change climate patterns globally. Any of  
201 the RFC5 risks pose systemic risks to society because they would cause severe and  
202 widespread global economic and ecosystem disruptions.

203 **Q. Given the enormous risks posed by climate change to society, what efforts are being**  
204 **taken to limit emissions?**

205 A. Since climate change poses enormous risks to society, in recent years there have been  
206 efforts to develop a global framework to reduce emissions. These negotiations culminated  
207 in 195 countries ratifying the Paris Agreement which seeks to avoid the worst impacts of  
208 climate change by keeping warming well below 2°C, and pursuing efforts to limit warming  
209 below 1.5°C<sup>17</sup>. These targets are based on the scientific understanding of the societal risks  
210 posed by climate change discussed above. So, regardless of the political considerations of  
211 specific international agreements, the underlying science of climate change clearly  
212 establishes that to avoid the worst impacts of climate change, we need to immediately  
213 reduce emissions to limit future warming. Under the Paris Agreement, individual countries  
214 submit national climate plans, known as Nationally Determined Contributions (“NDCs”).  
215 Over time as technology develops, NDCs are refined and tightened. The US’s NDC to the  
216 Paris Agreement targets economy-wide greenhouse gas emissions reductions of 50-52% by  
217 2030, using a 2005 emissions baseline<sup>18</sup>.

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<sup>17</sup> <https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement>

<sup>18</sup> <https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/NDC/2022-06/United%20States%20NDC%20April%2021%202021%20Final.pdf>



219 **Q. How much would emissions need to be reduced in the electricity sector to achieve US**  
220 **economy-wide greenhouse gas emission reductions of 50-52% by 2030?**

221 A. This was recently examined in a research study that used six coupled energy-economy  
222 models to investigate sectoral emission reductions needed to reach the economy wide  
223 emission reduction target<sup>19</sup>. The electricity sector is the simplest and most cost-effective  
224 system to decarbonize, and this report found that the most cost-effective near-term  
225 emission reductions come from the electricity sector. To achieve US economy wide  
226 emission reduction of 50-52% in 2030, the electricity sector must reduce greenhouse gas  
227 emissions by 80% by 2030. This analysis provides critical guidance to the entire electricity  
228 sector in the US about the amount of emission reductions needed to address climate  
229 change.

230 **Q. What percent of greenhouse gas emissions does the electricity sector contribute at the**  
231 **national level and in Utah?**

232 A. According to the EIA, the US Electric Power sector accounts for 30% of total US energy  
233 related greenhouse gas emissions in 2023<sup>20</sup>. Within Utah, the electricity sector has a  
234 significantly higher share of the state's total greenhouse gas emissions at 48% in 2021.<sup>21</sup>

235 **Q. Do PacifiCorp's carbon emissions contribute to climate change?**

236 A. Yes, PacifiCorp's carbon emissions contribute to climate change. In 2023, 63.8% of  
237 PacifiCorp's electricity generation is from the burning of fossil fuel resources<sup>22</sup> that emit  
238 carbon dioxide and contribute to climate change.

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<sup>19</sup> Bistline, John, Nikit Abhyankar, Geoffrey Blanford, Leon Clarke, Rachel Fakhry, Haewon McJeon, John Reilly, et al. "Actions for Reducing US Emissions at Least 50% by 2030." *Science* 376, no. 6596 (May 27, 2022): 922–24. <https://doi.org/10.1126/science.abn0661>.

<sup>20</sup> <https://www.eia.gov/environment/emissions/carbon/>

<sup>21</sup> <https://www.eia.gov/environment/emissions/state/>

<sup>22</sup> Form EIA-930, accessed from <https://www.eia.gov/electricity/gridmonitor/about>

239 **Q. How is climate change related to cumulative carbon emissions?**

240 A. The level of warming that is driving climate impacts is directly related to cumulative  
241 carbon emissions. Once CO<sub>2</sub> is emitted from a power plant, it will remain in the  
242 atmosphere for 300 to 1000 years, or the duration of many human lives<sup>23</sup>. Because of its  
243 long lifetime in the atmosphere, the amount of warming in the climate system is  
244 proportional to cumulative carbon emissions, meaning that every ton of carbon emitted  
245 leads to more climate warming. Chapter 5 of the IPCC Sixth Assessment Report (AR6)  
246 states “*There is a near-linear relationship between cumulative CO<sub>2</sub> emissions and the*  
247 *increase in global mean surface air temperature (GSAT) caused by CO<sub>2</sub> over the course of*  
248 *this century for global warming levels up to at least 2°C relative to pre-industrial.*”<sup>24</sup>.

249 **Q. What are PacifiCorp’s past, present, and future projected CO<sub>2</sub> emissions?**

250 A. Rocky Mountain Power reports its emissions as a function of its six-state parent  
251 corporation, PacifiCorp. Between 2011 and 2022, PacifiCorp’s system wide cumulative  
252 CO<sub>2</sub> emissions were 560 million metric tons (MMT), or on average 48.35 MMT CO<sub>2</sub> per  
253 year, according to PacifiCorp’s 2023 IRP. For comparison purposes, total economy wide  
254 CO<sub>2</sub> emissions for Utah were 62.1 MMT in 2021. PacifiCorp’s 2023 Integrated Resource  
255 Plan projects that between 2023 and 2050, PacifiCorp will emit a cumulative 293 MMT of  
256 CO<sub>2</sub>. In its 2023 IRP Update, PacifiCorp increased their projected cumulative CO<sub>2</sub>  
257 emissions to 407 MMT of CO<sub>2</sub>, which represents a 39% increase in cumulative CO<sub>2</sub>  
258 emissions compared to the 2023 IRP. Since there is a near-linear relationship between  
259 cumulative CO<sub>2</sub> emissions and warming, the most recent 2023 IRP Update that would

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<sup>23</sup> <https://science.nasa.gov/earth/climate-change/greenhouse-gases/the-atmosphere-getting-a-handle-on-carbon-dioxide/>

<sup>24</sup> <https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg1/chapter/chapter-5/#Remaining>

260 begin to be implemented during the Test Period of this rate case will exacerbate future  
261 warming. Additionally, during the Test Period, PacifiCorp is not making the investments in  
262 new zero fuel cost, low-carbon emitting resources that would be needed to reduce their  
263 carbon emissions, even though doing so would also reduce their exposure to fuel supply  
264 disruptions and price volatility that are also driving increased costs in this rate case.

265 **Q. How does PacifiCorp’s emissions trajectory compare to the electricity sector guidance**  
266 **of 80% emission reduction by 2030?**

267 A. In PacifiCorp’s 2023 IRP, the company projected that they would reduce their CO<sub>2</sub>  
268 emissions by 78% in 2030 compared to a 2005 baseline, which is largely in line with  
269 achieving the amount of electricity sector emission reductions needed to meet the US goal  
270 of 50-52% economy wide emission reductions. However, PacifiCorp’s 2023 IRP Update  
271 projected significantly lower deployment of low-carbon resources and as a result, the  
272 updated emission reduction plan only reduces emissions by 63% in 2030. That plan,  
273 enabled by cost recovery in this rate case, would put PacifiCorp out of alignment with the  
274 rest of the US electricity sector’s emission reduction target.

275 **Q. Will addressing climate change meaningfully affect future wildfire risks?**

276 A. Yes, increasing wildfire risks are directly related to the changing climate. This question has  
277 been addressed in several recent studies. Jones et al. 2022 summarized it succinctly in one  
278 of their Key Points: “*The frequency and severity of fire weather has increased in recent*  
279 *decades and is projected to escalate with each added increment of warming.*”<sup>25</sup> Another

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<sup>25</sup> Jones, Matthew W., John T. Abatzoglou, Sander Veraverbeke, Niels Andela, Gitta Lasslop, Matthias Forkel, Adam J. P. Smith, et al. “Global and Regional Trends and Drivers of Fire Under Climate Change.” *Reviews of Geophysics* 60, no. 3 (2022): e2020RG000726. <https://doi.org/10.1029/2020RG000726>.

280 study, Jain et al. 2024,<sup>26</sup> examined the record breaking 2021 fire weather season that was  
281 initiated by a large regional heat dome in the Pacific Northwest that also affected Utah.  
282 This study is important because it explains in detail the mechanistic connection between  
283 climate change and wildfire risks. It explains: “*There is a well-established link between*  
284 *large-scale (ie. synoptic) atmospheric patterns—such as the large amplitude ridge that*  
285 *caused the heat dome — and surface fire weather conditions that contribute to fire spread.*  
286 *Specifically, synoptic-scale weather analyses have shown that ridge-like patterns in upper-*  
287 *air tropospheric flow are frequently associated with atmospheric blocking events and that*  
288 *such events promote fuel aridity and fire activity.” The study then quantifies the  
289 amplification of the heat dome due to climate change by using the implicit relationship  
290 between warming and geopotential heights. It found that the heat dome was 59% longer,  
291 34% larger, had 6% higher maximum amplitude and was overall 86% stronger than the  
292 same event would have been without climate change. The study concludes: “*Climate*  
293 *change will continue to magnify heat dome events, increase fire danger, and enable*  
294 *extreme synchronous wildfire in forested areas of North America.” In another very recent*  
295 analysis<sup>27</sup>, Curasi et al. 2024 examined wildfire burned area in Canada across differing  
296 future greenhouse gas emission scenarios. Under elevated emission scenarios, wildfire  
297 burned areas increased about five times modern norms by the century's end. However,  
298 under a reduced emission scenario that holds global temperatures to below 2°C, wildfire  
299 burned area and associated impacts at the end of the century would remain similar to*

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<sup>26</sup> Jain, Piyush, Aseem Raj Sharma, Dante Castellanos Acuna, John T. Abatzoglou, and Mike Flannigan. “Record-Breaking Fire Weather in North America in 2021 Was Initiated by the Pacific Northwest Heat Dome.” *Communications Earth & Environment* 5, no. 1 (April 22, 2024): 1–10. <https://doi.org/10.1038/s43247-024-01346-2>.

<sup>27</sup> Curasi, Salvatore R., Joe R. Melton, Vivek K. Arora, Elyn R. Humphreys, and Cynthia H. Whaley. “Global Climate Change below 2 °C Avoids Large End Century Increases in Burned Area in Canada.” *Npj Climate and Atmospheric Science* 7, no. 1 (October 1, 2024): 1–11. <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41612-024-00781-4>.

300 modern conditions. While this analysis focused on Canada, their findings are indicative of  
301 what we would expect to observe across North America forest ecosystems.

302 **Q. Does shifting of climate-induced costs and risks from the Company that is**  
303 **contributing to climate change to ratepayers create a moral hazard situation?**

304 A. Yes, shifting of the costs and risks posed by climate impacts from the Company that is  
305 contributing to those impacts to rate payers creates a moral hazard situation. Mirriam-  
306 Webster defines a moral hazard situation as: “a situation in which a party is incentivized to  
307 risk causing harm because another party is obligated to remedy the consequences of the  
308 harm caused.”

309 **Q. What specifically is the moral hazard situation in this rate case?**

310 A. The moral hazard in this case arises from PacifiCorp's handling of climate-induced risks.  
311 As my testimony has established, the Company’s carbon emissions contribute to climate  
312 change. Climate change in turn escalates a wide range of climate costs and risks, including  
313 wildfire risks and other climate-induced drivers of Net Power Costs. Yet PacifiCorp  
314 expects ratepayers to shoulder the financial burden of these risks via higher wildfire  
315 insurance premiums, the Wildfire Mitigation Balancing Account, and higher Net Power  
316 Costs driven by climate related events. If ratepayers are expected to bear these climate-  
317 induced costs and risks alone, the Company lacks incentive to reduce its emissions and  
318 mitigate its own contributions to risks facing its system. Notably, there is no mention of  
319 reducing carbon emissions as a strategy to address climate change and its impact on  
320 wildfire risks in the testimonies of either Ms. Steward or Mr. Berreth. This is even though  
321 climate-driven wildfire risk is by itself a major factor driving the Company's cost increases  
322 in this rate case.

323 **Q. Given that wildfires and other costs associated with carbon emissions are *not***  
324 **exogenous to PacifiCorp’s operations, what should the Commission do to address this**  
325 **issue in this rate case?**

326 A. It is my recommendation that the Commission evaluate and consider the imbalance of  
327 costs and risks shared between ratepayers and the Company and shareholders for recovery  
328 of proposed costs associated with climate risk. A key step is to recognize that these costs  
329 and risks, particularly those linked to wildfires and other climate-induced factors, are not  
330 external or exogenous to the Company’s operations, but are, in part, driven by the  
331 company’s carbon emissions. This is especially important to consider and evaluate when  
332 developing new regulatory tools that transfer climate risks borne by the Company and  
333 shareholders onto ratepayers. This would include the Insurance Cost Adjustment and any  
334 Fire Funds as discussed by Company witnesses Steward, Coleman, and Graves. The  
335 Commission should also weigh the balance of these risks when evaluating the Wildfire  
336 Mitigation Balancing Account as discussed by Company witnesses Steward.

337 **Q. Outside of this current rate case, are there strategies that the Commission could take**  
338 **to incentivize the Company to balance climate costs and risks among shareholders**  
339 **and ratepayers?**

340 A. Yes. Many state utility regulators already adopt incentive regulation frameworks that tie  
341 cost recovery to utility performance.<sup>28</sup> The Commission could explore a similar approach  
342 regarding the Company’s costs associated with climate and wildfire risk by encouraging  
343 cost-effective emission reductions as a prerequisite to recovery of those costs. Aligning the

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<sup>28</sup> Joskow & Schmalensee, Incentive Regulation for Electric Utilities, 4 YALE J. ON REG.1 (1986) available at [https://openyls.law.yale.edu/bitstream/handle/20.500.13051/8344/05\\_4YaleJonReg1\\_1986\\_1987\\_.pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y](https://openyls.law.yale.edu/bitstream/handle/20.500.13051/8344/05_4YaleJonReg1_1986_1987_.pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y).

344 Company’s financial incentives to actions that reduce emissions, while maintaining an  
345 affordable and reliable system addresses the root causes of the increasing climate-related  
346 costs and risks that PacifiCorp is facing. Through this type of strategy or mechanism, the  
347 Commission could maintain reliability and affordability goals while ensuring that  
348 PacifiCorp and its shareholders bear some responsibility for mitigating its contribution to  
349 the risks facing its system, rather than passing these ever-increasing costs and risks onto  
350 ratepayers.<sup>29</sup>

351

## 352 XVIII. CONCLUSIONS

### 353 Q. Please summarize your conclusions.

354 A. The Company is facing increased climate and wildfire risks to its system, which exposes  
355 the Company and ratepayers to increased costs. However, these risks are not exogenous to  
356 the Company’s operations since carbon emissions from human activities, particularly from  
357 the burning of fossil fuels for energy production, are driving climate change. The changing  
358 climate system then in turn increases wildfire induced costs and risks as well other climate  
359 fueled utility related costs for ratepayers and utilities. PacifiCorp seeks to manage these  
360 risks to its system by passing their costs and risks onto ratepayers via mechanisms such as  
361 the Insurance Cost Adjustment and third-party liability funds, as well as through the  
362 Wildfire Mitigation Balancing Account. Yet PacifiCorp bears responsibility to help  
363 shoulder some of those costs because the fossil fuels on its system contribute to climate

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<sup>29</sup> Inara Scott, Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks: Adapting Public Utility Commissions to Meet Twenty-First Century Climate Challenges, 38 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 371, 375–76 (2014), available at <https://ir.library.oregonstate.edu/downloads/3b591b75v>; see also Jonas J. Monast, Ratemaking as Climate Adaptation Governance, *Frontiers of Climate J.*, (2021) available at [https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1560&context=faculty\\_publications](https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1560&context=faculty_publications).

364 change and hence contribute to climate related risks and costs. If PacifiCorp is permitted to  
365 shift climate-induced risks and costs onto ratepayers without addressing its emissions, then  
366 it has no incentive to mitigate the activities contributing to the factors increasingly  
367 impacting its system. When evaluating higher NPC tied to climate events and new  
368 balancing accounts or similar regulatory mechanisms that pass costs and risks on to  
369 ratepayers, it is prudent to carefully examine those costs and risks and ensure there is some  
370 balance between the Company, its shareholders, and ratepayers. Therefore, I recommend  
371 that the Commission evaluate the distribution of climate-induced costs and risks, and in  
372 particular wildfire risk, between ratepayers and PacifiCorp's shareholders in this rate case.  
373 I also recommend that in future proceedings the Commission explore options that would  
374 ensure the Company is incentivized to mitigate its contribution to the climate risks facing  
375 its system by tying cost recovery mechanisms for wildfire and other climate fueled costs to  
376 cost-effective emission reductions.

377 **Q. Does that conclude your testimony?**

378 A. Yes.