

BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION
OF QUESTAR GAS COMPANY TO
INCREASE DISTRIBUTION RATES AND
CHARGES AND MAKE TARIFF
MODIFICATIONS

Docket No. 13-057-05

DIRECT TESTIMONY OF
DAVID M. CURTIS
FOR
QUESTAR GAS COMPANY

July 1, 2013

QGC Exhibit 2.0

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1
2
3 **I. INTRODUCTION**

4 **Q. Please state your name and position.**

5 A. David M. Curtis. I am employed by Questar Corporation as Vice President and
6 Controller.

7 **Q. Please state your qualifications and experience testifying before regulatory
8 commissions.**

9 A. My qualifications and experience are provided in QGC Exhibit 2.1.

10 **Q. Attached to your written testimony are QGC Exhibits 2.1 – 2.11. Were these
11 prepared by you or under your direction?**

12 A. Yes.

13 **Q. What is the purpose of your testimony?**

14 A. I will provide testimony supporting the Company's requested rate of return (cost of
15 capital) in this general rate case. The components of a rate of return include: (1)
16 investors' required return on equity, (2) cost of long-term debt, and (3) capital structure.

17 My testimony will discuss the models and factors used in supporting the Company's
18 requested rate of return including: regulatory framework and financial implications;
19 proxy group; discounted cash flow model; capital asset pricing model; comparison of
20 risks between Questar Gas and the proxy group; impact of allowed returns on bond
21 ratings; actual returns of companies in the proxy group; allowed returns in other
22 jurisdictions; cost of long-term debt; and capital structure.

23 **II. RETURN ON EQUITY**

24 **A. *Regulatory Framework and Financial Implications***

25 **Q. Please describe the guiding principles to be used in establishing the authorized
return on equity for a regulated utility.**

26 A. The United States Supreme Court definitively established the guiding principles to be
27 used by regulatory commissions in setting the appropriate authorized return on equity in
28 two cases commonly referred to as *Hope* and *Bluefield*.¹

29 In *Bluefield* the Court said:

30 A public utility is entitled to such rates as will permit it to earn a return on
31 the value of the property which it employs for the convenience of the
32 public equal to that generally being made at the same time and in the same
33 general part of the country on investments in other business undertakings
34 which are attended by corresponding risks and uncertainties; but it has no
35 constitutional right to profits such as are realized or anticipated in highly
36 profitable enterprises or speculative ventures. The return should be
37 reasonably sufficient to assure confidence in the financial soundness of the
38 utility and should be adequate, under efficient and economical
39 management, to maintain and support its credit and enable it to raise
40 money necessary for the proper discharge of its public duties. A rate of
41 return may be reasonable at one time and become too high or too low by
42 changes affecting opportunities for investment, the money market and
43 business conditions generally. (*Bluefield* at 692-93)

44
45 In *Hope* the Court said:

46 From the investor or company point of view it is important that there be
47 enough revenue not only for operating expenses but also for the capital
48 costs of the business. These include service on the debt and dividends on
49 the stock. By that standard the return to the equity owner should be
50 commensurate with returns on investment in other enterprises having
51 corresponding risks. That return, moreover, should be sufficient to assure
52 confidence in the financial integrity of the enterprise, so as to maintain its
53 credit and attract capital. (*Hope* at 603)

54
55 In these cases, the Court unequivocally has determined that returns to investors should
56 be: (1) adequate to assure confidence in the financial soundness of the utility, (2)
57 adequate to support its credit and enable it to raise capital, (3) reasonable in light of
58 current financial market conditions, and (4) commensurate with returns on investments
59 having corresponding risks.

¹ *Bluefield Waterworks & Improvement Company v. Public Service Commission of West Virginia*, 262 U.S. 679 (1923) and *Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co.* 320 U.S. 591 (1944).

60 The United States Supreme Court did not specify a means of arriving at a fair rate of
61 return, but determined that the end result must be “just and reasonable.” (*Hope* at 602)

62 **Q. How do these guiding principles impact your approach to recommending an**
63 **authorized return on equity?**

64 A. I have utilized several different models to estimate a “just and reasonable” authorized
65 return on equity. These models are used in Utah and in many jurisdictions throughout the
66 United States. I compared the results of each of these models with investor expectations
67 as measured by recent allowed returns for natural gas utilities throughout the United
68 States. To the extent that these results are inconsistent, I have weighted the results in
69 arriving at my recommendation. It is not mandated that any particular model be used,
70 rather, it is important that the end result is “just and reasonable.”

71 **Q. What would be the impact on Questar Gas if the authorized return on equity is not**
72 **“just and reasonable”?**

73 A. Questar Gas needs access to debt and equity capital. Over the next few years, Questar
74 Gas anticipates that it will invest about \$200 million per year in capital projects,
75 including significant investment to replace aging pipeline infrastructure. Replacement of
76 aging infrastructure, as more fully described by Mr. McKay, is necessary to provide safe
77 and reliable natural gas distribution service to customers. Additionally, over the past
78 decade or more, the number of customers served has grown at an average rate of more
79 than 2% per year. Although the customer growth rate has decreased over the past few
80 years because of the economic recession, Questar Gas is seeing the rate of customer
81 growth returning to earlier levels. For these reasons, if the return on equity authorized by
82 the Commission is not “just and reasonable,” bond ratings could be lowered resulting in
83 higher long-term debt costs. Questar Gas also needs to raise new equity capital. Unless
84 the return on equity is deemed adequate, equity investors will not be likely to invest
85 additional capital in the Company.

86

B. Proxy Group

87 **Q. Why have you used a group of proxy companies to help estimate the cost of equity**
88 **for Questar Gas?**

89 A. As a wholly-owned subsidiary of Questar Corporation, Questar Gas' common stock is
90 not publicly traded, so equity-market data does not exist for Questar Gas. Therefore, it is
91 not possible to measure investor expectations of returns for Questar Gas directly. Since
92 the return on equity is a market-based concept, it is necessary to use a group of
93 companies with similar risks that are publicly traded as a proxy for investor expectations
94 for Questar Gas. It would not be appropriate to use the return expected by the market for
95 Questar Corporation since Questar Gas constitutes only a portion of Questar
96 Corporation's business. The risks and investor expectations for Questar Corporation, as a
97 whole, are different from the risks and investor expectations for the natural gas
98 distribution business.

99 In addition, even if Questar Gas' common stock were publicly traded, it would be
100 necessary to use a proxy group to assure that the return on equity authorized for Questar
101 Gas is commensurate with returns on investments of similar risks and to avoid any
102 anomalies in the return expected by investors in Questar Gas. Therefore, the use of a
103 group of publicly traded proxy companies is a common practice in Utah and in
104 jurisdictions throughout the United States.

105 **Q. How did you determine which companies to use in your list of proxy companies?**

106 A. I started with the Yahoo! Finance "Gas Utility" list of natural gas utilities. I excluded
107 private companies, foreign companies, propane companies, transmission companies,
108 gathering companies and storage companies. The remaining 21 companies are shown on
109 QGC Exhibit 2.2. I used the following criteria for inclusion in the proxy group: (1) at
110 least half of total operating income for the company must come from natural gas
111 distribution operations; (2) the company must have an investment grade bond rating; (3)
112 the company must be followed by at least two investment analysts; and, (4) the company
113 must not be in the process of being acquired or acquiring other companies. I utilized
114 these criteria to ensure that the proxy companies matched, as closely as possible, the risk

115 profile of Questar Gas. Thirteen of the companies were eliminated for failing one or
116 more of these criteria. In the past, I included Laclede Group in the proxy group; however
117 it is in the process of acquiring natural gas distribution operations from other companies
118 so I have removed this company from the proxy group.

119 The remaining eight companies in the proxy group are similar to Questar Gas. Each has
120 at least one-half of its operating income from natural gas distribution operations, has an
121 investment grade bond rating, and is actively followed by investment analysts. None of
122 these companies are in the process of being acquired or acquiring other companies.
123 These companies are also similar in size to Questar Gas as measured by the number of
124 customers. I believe that this group of companies constitutes the best available proxy
125 group to measure investor return expectations. I will compare the risks of the companies
126 in the proxy group with Questar Gas' risks later in this testimony.

127 **C. Discounted Cash Flow Model**

128 **Q. Describe the discounted cash flow model for measuring investor expectations.**

129 A. The discounted cash flow model starts with the assumption that a company's stock price
130 is the present value of future expected cash flows discounted at the required return on
131 equity. This model is represented by the following formula:

132
$$P_0 = \frac{D_1}{(1+k)} + \frac{D_2}{(1+k)^2} + \frac{D_3}{(1+k)^3} + \dots + \frac{D_\infty}{(1+k)^\infty}$$

134
135 Where P_0 represents the current stock price, $D_1 \dots D_\infty$ represent the expected stream of
136 future dividends, and k is the discount rate or required return on equity. If you assume
137 that the dividend growth rate is constant, then this equation can be rearranged and
138 simplified to give the following equation:

139
$$k = \frac{D_0(1+g)}{P_0} + g$$

140
141

142 This formula is the “Constant Growth DCF” model in which the first term is the expected
143 dividend yield and the second term is the expected long-term growth in dividends.

144 **Q. How did you calculate the expected dividend yield?**

145 A. The dividend yield is calculated based on the 50-day moving average stock prices and
146 dividend payments. Data on QGC Exhibit 2.3 pages 1 and 2 shows the current dividend
147 yields using two different approaches. For each of the proxy group companies I obtained
148 the current annual dividend per share. I also obtained the 50-day moving average stock
149 price. I used an average price over the last 50 trading days to even out short-term
150 fluctuations in the stock market. I divided the current dividend per share by the 50-day
151 moving average stock price to arrive at a current dividend yield. Since the model uses a
152 dividend yield at the end of the first year, I multiplied this dividend yield by one plus the
153 growth rate. The average adjusted dividend yield for these eight proxy companies is
154 3.74% or 3.81% depending on the version of the model.

155 **Q. How did you calculate the growth rates?**

156 A. The growth-rate assumption has the largest impact on this model, yet it is the assumption
157 that has the least certainty.

158 I prepared one version of this model using expected growth rates from investment
159 analysts. I averaged growth rates as reported by Yahoo! Finance, Zacks, US Capital
160 Advisors, Bloomberg and CNN Money. Yahoo! Finance uses growth estimates as
161 reported by Thompson Financial Network. This version is one that has often been
162 considered in setting rates of return. However, these growth rates typically only look out
163 five years, while the DCF model requires a growth rate for perpetuity. There may also be
164 some bias from the investment analysts to underestimate the growth projections. The
165 results of this model as shown on QGC Exhibit 2.3 page 1 of 2 show an average required
166 return on equity of 8.73%, with a low of 7.96% and a high of 9.50%.

167 I prepared a second version of the DCF model using an average of actual 5-year historical
168 earnings growth for each company, actual 10-year historical earnings growth for each
169 company and an average projected industry earnings growth rate as reported to investors

170 by individual companies. I believe that this version of the DCF model corrects for a
171 systematic bias from investment analysts in understating earnings growth projections.

172 This second growth rate is shown on QGC Exhibit 2.3 page 2 of 2. The average expected
173 return on investment using these growth rates is 10.75% with a low of 6.19% and a high
174 of 12.59%.

175 **Q. Why do you believe the growth rates as reported by investment analysts have a**
176 **systematic understatement bias?**

177 A. The natural gas distribution business has demonstrated earnings growth of nearly 10%
178 per year over the past 10 years even with the 2008 recession. Earnings have increased
179 from a combination of investment in infrastructure replacement and customer growth.
180 Going forward, companies are projecting earnings growth rates of 6% to 7% per year.
181 Investment analysts are reporting forecast earnings growth rates averaging 5% per year. I
182 believe this reflects a conservative understatement bias in the investment analyst
183 projections.

184 For this reason, I prepared a version of the Discounted Cash Flow model using historical
185 earnings growth rates and company forecast earnings growth rates. I believe this model
186 may be more reflective of actual investor expectations than the model using reported
187 investment analyst growth rates for five years.

188 **Q. What are the deficiencies in the Discounted Cash Flow model?**

189 A. Though this model is straightforward and easy to understand, it is based on significant
190 assumptions that are not always accurate over time. For example, this model assumes
191 dividends grow at a constant rate in perpetuity, the dividend payout ratio remains
192 constant, investors require a constant return in perpetuity, and the growth assumption is
193 knowable.

194 The main problem with this model is that we really do not know what investors expect in
195 future growth rates.

196 Because of the weaknesses in this model, it should not be used alone. This model should
197 be used in context with the results of other models and capital market conditions.

198 **Q. What is your overall result from the discounted cash flow model?**

199 A. I believe that the combined results from the two models should be used in setting the
200 allowed return on equity. The model using reported investment analyst growth rates
201 shows on average a dividend yield of 4% plus an earnings-growth rate of 5% to arrive at
202 an overall average required return on equity of about 9%. The model using historical
203 earnings growth rates shows on average a dividend yield of 4% plus an earnings growth
204 rate of 7% to arrive at an overall average required return on equity of about 11%. I
205 believe these two models support a required return on equity of 10.35%. The Capital
206 Asset Pricing model and other comparisons support this conclusion.

207 **D. *Capital Asset Pricing Model***

208 **Q. Describe the capital markets line.**

209 A. QGC Exhibit 2.4 shows the capital markets line as derived from the Morningstar
210 Ibbotson SBBI 2013 Valuation Yearbook. The vertical axis shows the average return to
211 investors for various asset classes for the years 1926 through 2012. The horizontal axis
212 shows the annual standard deviation of returns for these asset classes. This graph
213 illustrates the financial assumption that investors require higher rates of return for asset
214 classes that have more risk. The level of risk can be measured by the variability of
215 returns. For example, this graph shows that returns on US Government treasury bills
216 have averaged about 4% for this long time period. The variability of returns for treasury
217 bills as measured by the standard deviation has also been low at about 3%. In contrast,
218 small company stocks had an average return of 17% for this same long time period.
219 However the standard deviation of returns for small company stocks was 32%.

220 This capital markets line makes intuitive sense because of the different risks associated
221 with each asset class. Smaller companies are riskier than larger companies because of
222 smaller market share of the various goods and services and fewer economies of scale.
223 Common equity is riskier than long-term debt because of residual risk of loss and debt

224 investors have a priority claim on the assets of the company. Long-term debt is riskier
225 than short-term debt because of interest rate risk and longer exposure to credit risk.
226 Corporate debt securities are riskier than US government debt securities because of credit
227 risk.

228 **Q. How can this theory be used in estimating the cost of equity capital?**

229 A. Various models have been developed that estimate the cost of equity capital based on the
230 risk premium for equity over debt. Investors insist on being paid for risk. The higher the
231 level of risk, the higher the required return. The relationships between required returns
232 tend to be relatively stable over time.

233 I have used the Capital Asset Pricing Model to estimate the required return on equity.

234 **Q. Describe the Capital Asset Pricing Model.**

235 A. The Capital Asset Pricing Model estimates the cost of equity for a given company using
236 the risk-free rate of return and a risk premium to compensate the investor for additional
237 risks associated with the company. This is calculated as follows:

238
$$k = r_f + \beta(r_m - r_f)$$

239 where:

240 k = the required return on equity

241 β = Beta of an individual security

242 r_f = the risk free rate of return

243 r_m = the required return on a market as a whole.

244 In this formula, the term $(r_m - r_f)$ represents the risk premium of the United States stock
245 market over the risk free rate of return. The risk free rate of return commonly used is the
246 yield on U.S. government 30-year Treasury bonds.

247 Beta is a measure of the risk of an individual security relative to the market as a whole.
248 Beta is defined as:

249
$$\beta = \text{Covariance}(r_e, r_m) / \text{Variance}(r_m)$$

250 The variance of the market return is a measure of the uncertainty of the market. The
251 covariance between the return of a specific security and the market as a whole is a
252 measure of the extent to which the return on a security will respond to a change in the
253 market.

254 **Q. Is the Capital Asset Pricing Model a reasonable approach to help establish a utility's**
255 **return on equity?**

256 A. The Capital Asset Pricing Model has been a measure considered by the Utah Commission
257 as well as commissions in many other jurisdictions throughout the United States. The
258 Capital Asset Pricing Model is used by investors and analysts. It is commonly used in
259 other applications such as asset valuations for levying property taxes. The underlying
260 principles of risk premium and risk-free rate of return are sound.

261 However, as with the Discounted Cash Flow Model, the Capital Asset Pricing Model is
262 not an exact tool. The assumption that the risk of an individual security can be measured
263 by the Beta of that security relative to the market as a whole is theoretical at best. Many
264 items can influence the Beta not directly related to risk such as how active the security is
265 traded in the market and size of the company.

266 The accuracy of the Capital Asset Pricing Model has also been significantly influenced
267 by recent changes in the capital markets. Each of the components of the Capital Asset
268 Pricing Model has declined since the crisis in the capital markets began in mid-2008.
269 The yield on the 30-year Treasury bond is near an all time low because of relaxed
270 monetary policy used to stimulate the economy, including the Federal Reserve's
271 quantitative easing programs to actively repurchase government bonds. The dramatic
272 declines in the stock market during 2008 had a significant influence on the market risk
273 premium even though 2008 was only one year out of 87. Paradoxically, years like 2008

274 will cause investors in equity investments to demand higher returns over fixed income
275 investments because the risk of investing in equity investments has proven to be much
276 higher after the capital market performance in 2008. Also the natural gas distribution
277 utilities stock prices did not decline as significantly as the overall market, so the Betas for
278 the proxy companies declined.

279 **Q. Discuss the components of the Capital Asset Pricing Model.**

280 A. My calculation of the required return on equity using the Capital Asset Pricing Model is
281 shown on QGC Exhibit 2.5.

282 The adjusted Beta (Column E) used in the model was calculated by Value Line using
283 historical market trading data for each of the companies in the proxy group. Value Line
284 adjusts the raw Beta by averaging the historical result with 1.0 to reflect the tendency of
285 the Beta to regress to the market mean of 1.0 over time. Value Line weights the raw Beta
286 by 0.67 and the market (or 1.0) by 0.33. Failure to adjust the raw Beta will underestimate
287 the cost of capital for relatively low raw Beta companies such as regulated utilities.
288 Value Line also rounds the Beta result to the nearest 0.05.

289 I used the yield on the 30-year Treasury bond (Column F) as the risk free rate of return.
290 Because the rate-effective period for this general rate case begins in 2014, I used a 2014
291 forecast yield on the 30-year Treasury bond. IHS Global Insight's March 2013 forecast
292 for the 2014 30-year Treasury bond yield was 3.69% and Wells Fargo US Economic
293 March 2013 forecast for the 2014 30-year Treasury bond yield was 3.83%. An average
294 of these two forecasts was 3.76%. On June 24, 2013, the yield on the 30-year Treasury
295 bond was 3.57%.

296 The market risk premium (Column G) was taken from Ibbotson Associates data using
297 returns from 1926 through 2012. Large company common stocks had an average return
298 over this period of 11.8%. Long-term government bonds had an average annual yield of
299 5.1% from 1926 to 2012. The market risk premium is therefore 6.7%.

300 The Capital Asset Pricing Model has been adjusted for the size of the company. Smaller
301 companies have a higher investor return requirement because of higher volatility. The
302 Morningstar Ibbotson SBBi 2013 Valuation Yearbook reports historical size premium for
303 each decile of in the stock market. I have identified the appropriate size decile for each
304 of the proxy companies. The size premium is added to the results of the model.

305 **Q. What are the results from the Capital Asset Pricing Model using the 30-year**
306 **Treasury bonds?**

307 A. The Capital Asset Pricing Model using the 30-year Treasury bonds showed a required
308 return on equity ranging from a minimum of 9.51% to a maximum of 10.49% with a
309 mean of 9.82% as shown on Exhibit 2.5, lines 10-12.

310 My recommended allowed return on equity is consistent with the top range of this model.
311 I believe that the top end of this model is appropriate because yields on long-term
312 government bonds (even as forecast for 2014) are historically and artificially low because
313 of continuing fiscal stimulus, including significant open-market purchases on bonds by
314 the Federal Reserve.

315 **Q. Can you demonstrate that government bond yields are at historical lows?**

316 A. QGC Exhibit 2.6 page 1 is a graph of annual yields on 10-year Treasury Bonds for the
317 period 1962 through 2012. (Note: I used the history for the 10-year Treasury bond since
318 the US Government has not continuously issued 30-year Treasury Bonds.) As shown on
319 the graph, the yield on the 10-year Treasury bond was below 2% in 2012, the lowest
320 point during this historical period.

321 **Q. Why do you believe this yield is artificially low?**

322 A. QGC Exhibit 2.6 page 2 also compares the yield on the 10-year Treasury bond with
323 inflation as measured by the Consumer Price Index. As can be seen on the graph, the
324 inflation rate is roughly the same as the yield on the 10-year Treasury bond in 2012. In
325 other words, investors are receiving a zero percent real return on their money for
326 investing in 10-year Treasury bonds. I believe that this level of interest rates is
327 unsustainable.

328 *E. Risk Comparison between Proxy Group and Questar Gas*

329 **Q. How do Questar Gas' risks compare to the proxy group?**

330 A. QGC Exhibit 2.7 is a comparison of the risks associated with Questar Gas' operations
331 and the risks of the companies in the proxy group. My conclusions are as follows:

332 Bond ratings – Questar Gas' bond ratings are A3 from Moody's and A from Standard &
333 Poor's. These ratings are consistent with the range of bond ratings of the proxy
334 companies

335 Interest coverage – Questar Gas' 2012 interest coverage was 4.1X, lower than the
336 average of 5.5X for the proxy companies. This indicates that Questar Gas has higher
337 financial risk.

338 Actual return on equity – Questar Gas' 2012 financial return on equity was 10.2%, lower
339 than the 10.6% average for the proxy companies. The lower return for Questar Gas
340 indicates higher risk.

341 Capital expenditures – Questar Gas' 2012 capital expenditures were 12.7% of net
342 property, plant & equipment, higher than the 12.4% average for the proxy companies.
343 Questar Gas has higher risk because of the need to reinvest a larger percentage of its
344 capital.

345 Number of customers – Questar Gas had 931,000 customers at the end of 2012 compared
346 to an average of 1,636,000 customers for the proxy group. Questar Gas' smaller size
347 increases its risk due to lower economies of scale and access to capital.

348 **Q. What are the implications of this risk comparison?**

349 A. This analysis shows that Questar Gas has slightly higher risk as compared to the average
350 risk of the proxy companies. Therefore, an allowed return higher than the proxy group
351 average is appropriate.

352 ***F. Impact of Allowed Returns on Bond Ratings***

353 **Q. What are Questar Gas' current long-term debt ratings?**

354 A. Questar Gas' senior unsecured long-term debt is currently rated A3 by Moody's and A by
355 Standard and Poor's.

356 **Q. What impact does an allowed return on equity have on bond ratings?**

357 A. The bond rating agencies use a variety of quantitative and qualitative measures to
358 establish ratings on securities. Moody's publishes their methodologies while Standard
359 and Poor's keeps their methodologies proprietary.

360 In a report provided to Questar in November 2011, Moody's lays out the following
361 measures in establishing bond ratings for regulated gas utilities: (1) regulatory
362 framework; (2) ability to recover costs and earn returns; (3) diversification; and (4)
363 financial strength, liquidity and key financial metrics. The first three measures are
364 qualitative in nature but are significantly influenced by actions of regulators. The fourth
365 measure is based on a cash-flow from operations interest coverage test, two cash-flows
366 from operations to debt tests, and a capital structure test. All of these tests are impacted
367 by the allowed rate of return.

368 **Q. How do Questar Gas' results map to Moody's and Standard & Poor's objective
369 rating criteria?**

370 A. QGC Exhibit 2.8 shows a comparison of Questar Gas' actual 2012 results with the
371 Moody's and Standard & Poor's objective rating criteria. Also shown are pro forma
372 Questar Gas 2012 results if the company were to receive a 50 basis point or a 100 basis
373 point reduction in allowed return on equity. Note that these pro forma results are
374 hypothetical and may differ from forecast results.

375 As can be seen in the table, the Questar Gas metrics support the current bond ratings from
376 Moody's and Standard & Poor's. While a decrease in allowed return may not result in a
377 decrease in bond ratings, the metrics would decrease significantly if the allowed return
378 were reduced below the current level. In particular, Questar Gas' metric for

379 debt/EBITDA already indicates a Standard & Poor's rating of BBB. Any significant
380 reduction in allowed return would push this metric into solid BBB range.

381 **Q. How would Questar Gas be impacted by a decrease in bond ratings?**

382 A. The obvious impact on Questar Gas of a bond ratings downgrade would be on the cost of
383 debt. Questar Gas' capital expenditures are expected to exceed cash flow for the
384 foreseeable future. Questar Gas will need to raise investment capital to fund these capital
385 expenditures. The interest rate spread due to lower bond ratings can be significant.
386 During the recent capital markets crisis the credit spread between investment grade credit
387 and noninvestment grade credit reached record highs. At times during this capital
388 markets crisis, funds were not available for noninvestment grade credit at any price. A
389 decline in bond ratings could have a significant impact on the future cost of capital and
390 limit access to debt capital markets.

391 A decrease in bond ratings could have additional indirect impacts on Questar Gas that
392 may exceed the direct impact on interest costs. Questar Gas relies on relationships with
393 suppliers of goods and services to operate its business. The credit strength of Questar
394 Gas is a key part of these relationships. Questar Gas would not be able to rely on
395 supplier credit to run its business if its bonds were downgraded below investment grade.

396 For example, Questar Gas' natural gas purchases are significant during an average winter
397 month. Without an investment grade bond rating, Questar Gas' suppliers may not extend
398 the necessary credit to Questar Gas to make these essential purchases. Instead, Questar
399 Gas may be required to prepay for this gas supply, significantly increasing the working
400 capital requirement. Some of these suppliers may have internal policies that would even
401 prevent them from selling to Questar Gas under the same pricing terms received today.

402 Questar Gas has an insurance program that includes a self-insured retention. Without an
403 investment grade bond rating, other parties that Questar Gas conducts business with
404 would be unwilling to accept the self-insured retention, which would increase Questar
405 Gas' costs of doing business.

406 In summary, the loss of an investment grade bond rating would significantly increase the
407 cost of business for Questar Gas and would increase the cost-of-service to customers.

408 **G. Actual Returns Earned by Proxy Companies**

409 **Q. What actual returns on equity have the proxy companies earned?**

410 A. QGC Exhibit 2.9 is a summary of actual financial returns on equity earned by each of the
411 proxy companies from 2002 through 2012. I have averaged these returns both by
412 company and by year. The average annual return on equity earned by the proxy
413 companies was 11.5% over this period. By year this ranged from a low of 9.7% in 2005
414 to a high of 15.3% in 2006. The 10-year average by company ranged from a low of 8.2%
415 for Southwest Gas to a high of 15.3% for New Jersey Resources. Also shown on this
416 Exhibit is a calculation of the 10-year and 5-year compound annual growth rate in
417 earnings as used in QGC Exhibit 2.3 page 2 of 2.

418 **Q. What implication does an analysis of actual financial returns on equity have in
419 setting an allowed rate of return?**

420 A. This Exhibit shows that the proxy companies are earning returns consistent with or higher
421 than the requested allowed return on equity of 10.35%. An allowed return lower than this
422 level would result in results significantly worse than the proxy group and could have
423 implications in raising the necessary capital to fund customer growth and system
424 improvements.

425 **H. Allowed Return in Other Jurisdictions**

426 **Q. What allowed returns on equity have other jurisdictions been authorizing for
427 natural gas distribution companies?**

428 A. QGC Exhibit 2.10 is a graph of rate cases completed for natural gas distribution
429 companies from January 2009 through December 2012 as compiled by SNL and AGA.
430 A total of 117 cases during this time period had a return on equity identified in the rate-
431 case order. The authorized returns for 2009 through 2012 ranged from 8.83% to 11.35%
432 with a mean of 10.06%. For the year 2012, the authorized returns ranged from 9.06% to

433 10.50% with a mean of 9.93%. The requested allowed return on equity of 10.35% is
434 consistent with the returns authorized in other jurisdictions in recent rate cases.

435 **Q. Why is it important for the Utah Commission to acknowledge the returns**
436 **authorized by other jurisdictions?**

437 A. As was stated earlier, Questar Gas needs to raise debt and equity capital in order to
438 continue to provide safe and reliable natural gas service. Questar Gas accesses the same
439 capital markets as other natural gas utilities. These markets are aware of the authorized
440 returns granted utilities. If Questar Gas' authorized return is lower than comparable
441 companies, the market will consider Questar Gas to have higher operating risks and will
442 likely raise the cost of capital. This will have a direct impact on the cost of providing
443 service to customers.

444 **I. Recommendation**

445 **Q. Summarize your analysis of allowed return on equity.**

446 A. The following table summarizes the results of my models and analysis of allowed return
447 on equity.

	Minimum	Mean	Maximum
Discounted cash flow model			
Investment analysts' growth estimate	7.96%	8.73%	9.50%
Company growth estimate	6.19%	10.75%	12.59%
Capital asset pricing model	9.51%	9.82%	10.49%
Actual earned financial returns on equity by proxy companies from 2002 - 2012	8.20%	11.50%	15.30%
Recent authorized returns	8.83%	10.06%	11.35%

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450 **Q. What is your recommendation for an authorized return on equity?**

451 A. Based on my analysis, I recommend that the Utah Commission authorize a return on
452 equity of 10.35%. This is the same as the Utah Commission authorized in the previous
453 general rate case. Questar Gas needs access to capital markets in order to fund customer

454 growth and replace aging infrastructure. This level of return would allow Questar Gas to
455 continue to obtain the necessary financing and would be consistent with the returns
456 currently authorized by other commissions.

457 **III. COST OF LONG-TERM DEBT**

458 **Q. What is Questar Gas' cost of long-term debt?**

459 A. The Company expects the long-term cost of debt will decrease in 2014. QGC Exhibit
460 2.11, shows the cost of debt for 2013 and 2014. Questar Gas' cost of long-term debt is
461 expected to be 5.16% at the end of 2014 assuming a new \$150 million 30-year financing
462 anticipated in December 2013 and a new \$50 million 10-year financing anticipated in
463 December 2014. These financings are necessary to refinance maturing debt and fund
464 capital expenditures. Questar Gas' overall cost of long-term debt is a weighted average
465 of all issues currently outstanding, including amortization of debt issuance costs and loss
466 on reacquired debt.

467 **Q. How did you determine the cost of the new 30-year notes to be issued in December**
468 **2013?**

469 A. Questar Gas has signed an engagement letter and is negotiating the terms of a \$150
470 million private placement debt issuance. Questar Gas expects to lock in the terms for this
471 issuance shortly, with a delayed draw in December 2013. We have assumed an interest
472 rate of 4.80% for the 30-year notes to be issued in December 2013. This rate is based on
473 estimates obtained from Questar Gas' agents. Because this debt issuance will have a
474 significant impact on the overall cost of debt, we recommend that the general rate case
475 filing be updated with actual terms as soon as they are known. This is expected within
476 the next several weeks.

477 **Q. How did you determine the cost of the new 10-year notes to be issued in December**
478 **2014?**

479 A. Questar Gas expects that it will need to raise additional debt capital in 2014 to fund
480 capital expenditures. We have assumed a \$50 million private placement of 10-year notes

481 in December 2014. We have assumed an interest rate of 4.50% for this issuance based on
482 current market conditions as reported from our agents.

483 **IV. CAPITAL STRUCTURE**

484 **Q. What is Questar Gas' expected capital structure?**

485 A. QGC Exhibit 2.11 also shows the Questar Gas' expected capital structure as of December
486 31, 2014. This is based on actual results through December 31, 2012 plus expected
487 changes in equity and debt for 2013 and 2014. Questar Gas plans to receive equity
488 contributions of \$90 million in 2013 and \$30 million in 2014 from its parent company,
489 Questar Corporation. These contributions are necessary to fund capital expenditures and
490 maintain an adequate equity portion of capital as Questar Gas issues additional long-term
491 debt.

492 The capital structure is estimated as follows:

	% of Capital		
	Dec. 31, 2013	Dec. 31, 2014	Average
Long-term debt	47.88%	47.98%	47.93%
Common shareholder's equity	52.12%	52.02%	52.07%

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495 **Q. Is this capital structure reasonable?**

496 A. Yes, I believe that the Questar Gas capital structure is reasonable. It is consistent with
497 previous Commission orders and in line with the capital structure of the proxy group.

498 **V. RATE OF RETURN RECOMMENDATION**

499 **Q. What is your overall recommendation for rate of return?**

500 A. The following table summarizes my recommendation:

501

	Percent of Capital	Cost of Capital	Weighted Cost of Capital
Long-term debt	47.93%	5.23%	2.50%
Common shareholder's equity	52.07%	10.35%	5.39%
Rate of return			7.89%

502

503 **Q. Does this conclude your testimony?**

504 **A. Yes.**

State of Utah)
) ss.
County of Salt Lake)

I, David M. Curtis, being first duly sworn on oath, state that the answers in the foregoing written testimony are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information and belief. Except as stated in the testimony, the exhibits attached to the testimony were prepared by me or under my direction and supervision, and they are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information and belief. Any exhibits not prepared by me or under my direction and supervision are true and correct copies of the documents they purport to be.

David M. Curtis

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO this 1st day of July 2013.

Notary Public