

**BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH**

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IN THE MATTER OF THE  
APPLICATION OF QUESTAR GAS  
COMPANY TO INCREASE  
DISTRIBUTION RATES AND  
CHARGES AND MAKE TARIFF  
MODIFICATIONS

)  
) DOCKET NO. 13-057-05  
) DPU Exhibit 1.0 DIR  
)  
) Testimony  
) Douglas D. Wheelwright  
)  
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FOR THE DIVISION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES  
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE  
STATE OF UTAH

Testimony of  
Douglas D. Wheelwright

October 30, 2013

**CONTENTS**

I.	INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY.....	1
II.	BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW.....	2
III.	DIVISION COST OF SERVICE PRINCIPLES.....	5
IV.	INTRODUCTION OF WITNESSES.....	6
V.	CONCERNS WITH THE QUESTAR ANALYSIS.....	7
VI.	COST OF DEBT .....	12
VII.	COST OF COMMON EQUITY .....	13
VIII.	CAPITAL STRUCTURE .....	14
IX.	DIVISION ANALYSIS .....	15
	A.    An Overview of Cost of Common Equity Models .....	15
	B.    Comparable (Proxy) Companies .....	22
	C.    Application of Cost of Equity Models .....	23
	1.    Single-Stage DCF Models .....	23
	2.    Two-Stage DCF Models .....	25
	3.    CAPM Results .....	26
	4.    Risk Premium Results .....	30
	5.    Comparable Earnings .....	31
X.	COMMENTS ON COST OF EQUITY RESULTS .....	33
XI.	CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .....	35

1 **I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY**

2 **Q: Please state your name, business address and title.**

3 A: My name is Douglas D. Wheelwright; my business address is 160 East 300 South, Salt Lake  
4 City, Utah 84114. I am a Technical Consultant with the Division of Public Utilities  
5 (Division).

6 **Q: On whose behalf are you testifying?**

7 A: The Division.

8 **Q: Please describe your position and duties with the Division.**

9 A: As a technical consultant, I examine public utility financial data and review filings for  
10 compliance with existing programs as well as applications for rate increases. I research,  
11 analyze, document, and establish regulatory positions on a variety of regulatory matters. I  
12 review operations reports and evaluate the compliance with the laws and regulations. I  
13 provide written and sworn testimony in hearings before the Utah Public Service Commission  
14 (Commission) and assist in the case preparation and analysis of testimony.

15 **Q: Please summarize your educational and professional experience.**

16 A: I hold a Bachelor's degree in Finance from Weber State University. Prior to working for the  
17 Division I was a financial advisor for 10 years and held SEC Series 7, 9, 10, 63 and 66  
18 licenses. I began working for the Division in 2008 and have attended the NARUC Advanced  
19 Studies Program at Michigan State University and have completed a number of other utility  
20 regulation training courses. I have earned the professional designation Certified Rate of  
21 Return Analyst (CRRA) from the Society of Utility and Regulatory Financial Analysts. I

22 have provided testimony to the Commission and appeared as a Division witness in previous  
23 Questar Gas and PacifiCorp dockets.

24 **II. BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW**

25 **Q: Will you briefly review the background and factual framework surrounding this**  
26 **docket?**

27 A: Yes. On July 1, 2013, the Company filed an application requesting an increase to its Utah  
28 retail rates of approximately \$19.2 million. The primary driver of the requested rate increase  
29 is the anticipated capital investment of \$195 million in 2013 and \$189 million in 2014. The  
30 Company has asked for a continuation of the high pressure feeder line replacement program  
31 and the addition of an intermediate high pressure pipeline replacement program. The  
32 application recommends changes to the current cost of service and rate design, which will  
33 impact customers currently on the TS and IS rate schedules. The proposed rate increase uses  
34 a base year ending December 31, 2012, and a proposed forecasted test period ending  
35 December 31, 2014. If approved, the Company has requested that changes to the rate  
36 schedules become effective March 1, 2014.

37 **Q: What is the purpose of your testimony in this matter?**

38 A: My testimony introduces the Division's witnesses and provides the Division's cost of capital  
39 calculations for the Company. I will present a summary of the Division's overall revenue  
40 requirement recommendation, along with a brief explanation of the adjustments  
41 recommended by each of the Division's witnesses.

42

43 **Q: What is the Division's recommendation for revenue requirement?**

44 A: In the original July filing, the Company identified a revenue deficiency of \$18.9 million on a  
45 Utah allocated basis. During the Division's initial review process, it was determined that the  
46 model provided by the Company was using different Global Insights inflation factors than  
47 the factors provided in the Company testimony causing the Company to update its figures.  
48 At the same time the actual interest rates for two new debt offerings were available and the  
49 Company provided an updated model to reflect both changes. The two updates resulted in an  
50 increase in the revenue deficiency to \$19.3 million. The adjustments proposed by the  
51 Division use the higher \$19.3 million as the starting point for the adjustments.

52 From the \$19.3 million deficiency, the Division has identified \$15.3 million in adjustments  
53 leaving a deficiency of \$4.0 million. The major Division adjustments include a \$7.6 million  
54 reduction based on a lower return on equity (ROE), a \$2.7 million rate base adjustment and a  
55 \$3.8 million reduction due to an update in the pension expense. An additional \$1.2 million  
56 has been identified in other specific dollar adjustments and the netting effect of all the  
57 adjustments combined together. The Division has entered the individual adjustments into the  
58 Questar Gas model to calculate the impact on the total revenue requirement which is  
59 summarized in DPU Exhibit 1.2 DIR. The specific details of the individual adjustments are  
60 discussed in the testimony provided by separate Division witnesses and the calculations are  
61 included in the Divisions adjustments to the Questar model as DPU Exhibit 1.1 DIR.

62 **Q: Do your adjustments include the updated depreciation study identified in the**  
63 **Company's testimony?**

64 A: No. The Company would like to include the new depreciation study as part of this rate case;  
65 however, parties have not had sufficient time to review the contents or the impact of the  
66 study. In the original filing, Mr. Mendenhall's testimony states,  
67 "The (depreciation) study is currently not complete but we anticipate that the  
68 study will be completed sometime in the 4<sup>th</sup> quarter of 2013. At that time I will  
69 supplement my testimony with the new depreciation rates. "<sup>1</sup>  
70 In a technical conference held on August 13, 2013 the Company indicated that the new  
71 depreciation study could be available as early as August or September. While parties  
72 expressed concern at that time, receipt of the report by early September could have allowed  
73 parties additional time for discovery and comments as part of direct testimony. The  
74 Company provided the Division with a spreadsheet summary of the depreciation study on  
75 October 2<sup>nd</sup> and a copy of the full study on October 11<sup>th</sup>. With direct testimony due on  
76 October 30, the schedule does not allow sufficient time for discovery, analysis or comments  
77 to be included. The Division has asked the Commission to set a separate schedule to  
78 consider the Company's proposed depreciation and amortization schedule. On October 28,  
79 2013, the Commission held a duly noticed scheduling conference. At the conference  
80 attending parties agreed to have the Company file its study with supporting evidence under a  
81 different docket. All depreciation issues including implementation of new rates will be dealt  
82 with in that docket.<sup>2</sup> The model provided by Questar and used to evaluate possible  
83 adjustments to the proposed rate increase does not include the information from the 2013  
84 depreciation study.

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<sup>1</sup> Kelly B. Mendenhall, page 10, line 245.

<sup>2</sup> Dunkel and Associates has been hired by the Division to review the 2013 depreciation study.

85

### III. DIVISION'S COST OF SERVICE PRINCIPLES

86 **Q: What are the Division's Rate Design objectives?**

87 A: Based on state statutes, the Division's cost of service and rate design objectives are for rates  
88 to be stable, simple, understandable and acceptable to the public, economically efficient, to  
89 promote fair apportionment of costs among individual customers within each customer class  
90 with no undue discrimination, and to protect against wasteful use of utility services.<sup>3</sup>

91 Consistent with these statutorily defined objectives, the Division has developed a set of  
92 guiding principles. These principles are:

- 93 1. Simplicity— Rates should be as simple as possible in design and easy to  
94 understand and administer. Customers are more likely to accept and  
95 understood relatively simple rates. Tariff descriptions should be clear,  
96 unambiguous, and understandable by the public.
- 97 2. Correct Price Signals—Rates based on costs can incent customers to make  
98 appropriate decisions about energy use including energy conservation. While  
99 some customer classes are better able to understand complicated rates than  
100 others, a complicated rate that is not understood may not provide clear or  
101 correct price signals.
- 102 3. Rate Structures—Three part rates with customer, energy, and demand  
103 components will more fairly apportion the costs among individual customers  
104 than one or two part rates. However, a demand component for the residential  
105 class is normally not recommended since the added cost of demand meters  
106 usually outweighs the benefit of better cost apportionment.
- 107 4. Gradualism—Gradual changes in rates help to promote rate stability and to  
108 minimize impacts on individual customers.
- 109 5. Marginal and Embedded Costs—Regulated rates must be designed to recover  
110 the embedded revenue requirement of a rate schedule. Marginal and average

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<sup>3</sup> See Utah Code Ann. § 54-4a-6)

111 unit embedded costs should be reviewed and taken into account when setting  
112 prices.

113 6. Customer Charges—Costs that generally increase with the number of  
114 customers, but are not caused by each customer should be excluded from the  
115 customer charge and instead be included within the commodity portion of  
116 rates.<sup>4</sup>

117 The Division and its consultant relied on these principles in this case in formulating its cost of  
118 service and rate design proposals.

#### 119 IV. INTRODUCTION OF WITNESSES

120 **Q: Please identify the Division's witnesses for the revenue requirement phase as well as the**  
121 **cost of service/rate design phase of this docket.**

122 A: In addition to my own testimony on the cost of capital calculation, the Division will provide  
123 six additional witnesses covering adjustments to the revenue requirement as well as cost of  
124 service/rate design issues. Mr. Eric Orton, Ms. Carolyn Roll and Mr. Matthew Croft will  
125 address issues related to the infrastructure tracker, rate base and capital expenditures. Mr.  
126 David Thomson and Mr. Clair Oman will address accounting issues and individual  
127 adjustments. In addition to the testimony from Division personnel, the Division has hired  
128 LaCapra and Associates to evaluate the issues related to cost of service and rate design. Ms.  
129 Lee Smith from LaCapra will be providing testimony and analysis on behalf of the Division.  
130 Ms. Smith provided testimony in the Company's previous general rate case and participated  
131 in the previous cost of service task force on behalf of the Division.

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<sup>4</sup> See Commission Order in Docket No. 82-057-15



132 The Division believes that each of the adjustments to the Company's revenue requirement  
133 recommended in testimony filed by Division witnesses, including consultants, is supportable  
134 and represents a reasonable adjustment to the revenue requirement.

135 **Q: Please briefly summarize the work and investigations that has been performed in this**  
136 **case.**

137 A: The Division has reviewed the testimony of the Company witnesses along with the  
138 attachments and exhibits. The Division and its consultant have submitted over 200 data  
139 requests to the Company and have participated in meetings with Company representatives to  
140 obtain additional information and clarification of multiple topics. I have reviewed and  
141 analyzed the testimonies of Company witnesses with specific emphasis on the testimony of  
142 Mr. David M. Curtis and the cost of capital calculations. I have also performed my own  
143 independent analysis and estimate of the cost of capital, particularly with respect to the cost  
144 of equity. In my analysis I used a cutoff date of September 30, 2013 for individual stock  
145 prices and market conditions.

146 **V. CONCERNS WITH THE QUESTAR ANALYSIS**

147 **Q: Do you have any concerns or disagreements with the information presented by the**  
148 **Company in this rate case related to the cost of capital calculation?**

149 A: Yes. The approaches used by Mr. Curtis to estimate the cost of equity in this case are  
150 consistent with previous general rate cases filed by the Company and some are similar to the  
151 approaches used in my analysis. While Mr. Curtis has used similar analysis methods, I have  
152 identified areas of concerns and disagreement with Mr. Curtis' analysis and testimony.

153 1. The selection of the comparable companies is important to the analysis process. I agree  
154 with the original list of 21 companies and the first three criteria used to select the proxy  
155 group. The first criteria require that at least half of the total operating income must come  
156 from the natural gas distribution segment of the business.<sup>5</sup> While I agree with six of the  
157 companies used in the proxy group, two of the companies included in the Company  
158 analysis do not meet the minimum operating revenue requirement. Based on the 2012  
159 SEC 10-K report, only 27.9% of the operating revenue of New Jersey Resources came  
160 from natural gas distribution.<sup>6</sup> WGL Holdings, Inc should also be excluded since only  
161 45.7% of the operating revenue came from the natural gas distribution portion of the  
162 business.<sup>7</sup> Both of these companies have been included in the Company analysis but  
163 should have been eliminated in the first sort. The Division's analysis has excluded both  
164 companies.

165 The Company's analysis has excluded Laclede Gas from the proxy group based on its  
166 pending acquisition of Missouri Gas. However, the pending acquisition does not affect  
167 the historical earnings or dividend payments used in the analysis and does not appear to  
168 have significantly influenced the reported beta or the forecast earning and growth rates.  
169 With the limited number of comparable companies and the limited impact on the forecast,  
170 I disagree with the exclusion of Laclede and have included it in the Division's analysis.

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<sup>5</sup> Direct Testimony of David M. Curtis, Line 110.

<sup>6</sup> New Jersey Resources Corporation, 2012 Form 10-K, Item 8. Financial Statement and Supplementary Data, p. 108

<sup>7</sup> WGL Holdings, Inc., 2012 Form 10-K, Item 6. Selected Financial Data, p. 24.

171 2. In the Company's discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis, Mr. Curtis states that "there may  
172 be a bias for investment analysts to understate earnings growth potential".<sup>8</sup> This  
173 statement is used to justify the use of a higher estimated growth rate calculation in QGC  
174 Exhibit 2.3, page 2. There is no supporting study or information to support this proposed  
175 bias and to justify using a higher rate. Mr. Curtis' conclusion is the exact opposite of the  
176 findings from a recent research study by Thompson Reuters.

177 The findings of this analysis support the conclusions of previous research done in the  
178 development of the StarMine Intrinsic Valuation Model (IV). Analysts tend to  
179 overestimate their annual earnings forecast by about 17% when looking two years  
180 ahead. A year later, this bias falls below 8%. The estimation bias in earnings  
181 estimates is a persistent phenomenon that appears to be mostly related to the general  
182 human trait to be overoptimistic about the future.<sup>9</sup>

183  
184 This would suggest that the proxy group earnings estimates used in Exhibit 2.3 page 2 are  
185 inflated and that while the analysis estimates in Exhibit 2.3 page 1 may already be  
186 optimistic, the estimates are likely more accurate. According to the QGC Exhibit 2.3  
187 page 1, the Company's DCF model has been calculated by the Company at 8.73%.<sup>10</sup> It  
188 should be noted that the analyst forecast for future growth rates are not significantly  
189 different than the historical growth rates for the companies under review. It is interesting  
190 that the narrative portion of Mr. Curtis' testimony referring to Exhibit 2.3, rounds up the  
191 calculated results by 27 basis points to an even 9.0%.<sup>11</sup>

192 Another area of concern relating to the DCF analysis is the use of Company estimated  
193 growth rates from only five of the eight select comparable companies and its use of a

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<sup>8</sup> Direct Testimony of David M. Curtis, p. 7, line 171.

<sup>9</sup> Estimates Too High, Low? Check the Calendar, Thompson Reuters, Fundamental Research, February 11, 2013.

<sup>10</sup> QGC Exhibit 2.3, page 1, line 11, column N.

<sup>11</sup> Direct Testimony of David M. Curtis, p. 8, line 202.

194 midpoint value of 6.42% compared to the average of 5.67%. The calculation also  
195 includes a sixth company, Questar Gas, to calculate the estimated industry growth rate.<sup>12</sup>  
196 No explanation is provided for why estimates for the other comparable companies were  
197 not included or why Questar Gas has been included in the calculation to determine the  
198 appropriate growth rate for Questar Gas.

199 3. The CAPM model calculation includes an add-on for a small company premium to the  
200 individual companies based on company size. While the Questar calculation adds the  
201 small company premium, it ignores the industry premium estimate provided by Ibbotson  
202 for natural gas distribution companies (SIC Code 4924). The industry premium for  
203 natural gas distribution companies is -2.44%<sup>13</sup> but has been excluded from the Company  
204 analysis. Including the industry premium in the Questar Gas calculation would reduce  
205 the average from 9.82%<sup>14</sup> to 7.38%.

206 4. Mr. Curtis states that the “The requested allowed return on equity of 10.35% is consistent  
207 with the returns authorized in other jurisdictions in recent rate cases.”<sup>15</sup> QGC Exhibit  
208 2.10 is a chart of the authorized returns from 2009 through 2012 but does not include the  
209 most recent commission decisions for 2013. The 10.06% average return used in the  
210 Company analysis is the four year average from 2009 through 2012. Using only the four  
211 year average ignores the downward trend in the approved returns in more recent periods  
212 which will be described in more detail later in this testimony. There have been 18

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<sup>12</sup> QGC Exhibit 2.3, page 2.

<sup>13</sup> 2013 Ibbotson SBBI Valuation Yearbook, Table 3-5, page 37.

<sup>14</sup> QGC Exhibit 2.5, line 11, column I.

<sup>15</sup> David M. Curtis, page 17, line 433.

213 commission decisions on the authorized return for natural gas companies through  
214 September 2013. Information available from SNL Financial indicates that the average  
215 approved ROE for the first nine months of 2013 was 9.51% with the highest allow return  
216 of 9.80%.<sup>16</sup> The requested 10.35% is not consistent with the returns authorized in other  
217 jurisdictions as claimed by Mr. Curtis.

218 5. Mr. Curtis' testimony has a lengthy discussion of how the Company would be hurt if the  
219 bond rating were to be reduced to below investment grade.<sup>17</sup> While this is an interesting  
220 discussion, the information presented in QGC Exhibit 2.8 indicates that even with a 100  
221 basis point reduction in the ROE, the bond rating would not be affected and would not  
222 cause Questar Gas bonds to drop below investment grade. A reduced ROE has no impact  
223 on four of the other ratios calculated by the Company and remain in the A rating range  
224 identical to the 2012 year end calculation. The debt/EBITA ratio referred to in Mr.  
225 Curtis' testimony remains BBB as it was as of year-end 2012. None of the calculations  
226 provided in Exhibit 2.8 indicate that a reduction in the ROE of the size that might be  
227 contemplated in this rate case would drop the bond rating to below investment grade.

228 6. The DCF model calculation in QGC Exhibit 2.3 does not use the 75% earnings growth  
229 and 25% dividend growth calculation as ordered in the 2002 Questar General Rate Case.

230 7. The comparable earnings analysis provided in QGC Exhibit 2.9 uses a 10 year average of  
231 the comparable companies in order to calculate the 11.50% average ROE<sup>18</sup>. Mr. Curtis

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<sup>16</sup> DPU Exhibit 1.4a DIR, SNL Financial, Rate Case History.

<sup>17</sup> David M. Curtis, page 15, line 395.

<sup>18</sup> QGC Exhibit 2.9, column K, line 35.

232 states “the proxy companies are earning returns consistent with or higher than the  
233 requested allowed return on equity of 10.35%”.<sup>19</sup> The exhibit does not provide a  
234 calculation of the 10 year average ROE for Questar Gas for comparison and includes two  
235 companies that should be eliminated based on the Company’s selection criteria. New  
236 Jersey Resources, one of the companies that should have been eliminated, has as 10 year  
237 average return of 15.3%.<sup>20</sup> As will be described later in my testimony, the exclusion of  
238 New Jersey Resources and WGL Holdings reduces the historical average for the  
239 comparable companies and shows that the ROE for Questar Gas has been comparable  
240 with the peer group. Furthermore, regulation and a commission allowed ROE provide a  
241 utility with the right to earn a fair return but does not guarantee a specific return.

## 242 VI. COST OF DEBT

243 **Q: Do you have a comment about the cost of debt included in the application?**

244 A: Yes. The original application provided the specific interest rates for the existing debt  
245 obligations and an estimated interest rate for \$150 million in new debt that was about to be  
246 issued. Shortly after filing, the Company provided an update with the actual rate of 4.78%  
247 for \$90 million and 4.83% for \$60 million. The rate on the new debt compares favorably  
248 with the 1.11% premium above long term treasuries for regulated utilities.<sup>21</sup>

249 **Q: What did you conclude regarding the cost of long-term debt?**

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<sup>19</sup> David M. Curtis, page 16, line 420.

<sup>20</sup> QGC Exhibit 2.9, column E, line 35.

<sup>21</sup> 2013 Ibbotson SBBI Valuation Yearbook, table 9-6, page 121.

250 A: The cost of long-term debt appears to be reasonable. The Company does not appear to have  
251 any difficulties in the current credit markets and has the ability to issue debt at favorable  
252 interest rates.

253 **VII. COST OF COMMON EQUITY**

254 **Q: Will you summarize the Return on Equity amount the Division is recommending for**  
255 **this case?**

256 A: Yes. I have completed and included the calculations for the various models and believe that  
257 the appropriate cost of equity for Questar Gas is 9.45%. The Division's recommendation is  
258 near the mid-point of the calculated range of 7.59% to 11.04% and is based on an average of  
259 the Ibbotson Risk Premium model, Discounted Cash Flow model and the Comparable  
260 Earnings model.<sup>22</sup> The recommended rate is fair to the ratepayers and to the Company and  
261 is comparable with the 9.51% average authorized return for natural gas companies in 2013.<sup>23</sup>  
262 The results of the Division's calculations are summarized in DPU Exhibit 1.3 DIR, which  
263 includes a comparison of the calculations and recommendation provided in Mr. Curtis'  
264 testimony. The details of the calculations from the various models will be explained later in  
265 my testimony.

266 **Q: How does the Division recommendation compare to the information filed by the**  
267 **Company?**

268 A: A similar averaging of the Company calculations for the Risk Premium Model, Discounted  
269 Cash Flow, and Comparable Earning model produces an average of 9.72%. It is unclear to

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<sup>22</sup> DPU Exhibit 1.3 DIR.

<sup>23</sup> DPU Exhibit 1.4a DIR.

270 the Division how the Company came to the final recommendation of 10.35% identified in  
271 Mr. Curtis' testimony. The Company has not provided information or a reason for weighting  
272 one method over the others and has not provided a reason to select the high end of the  
273 calculated range. I will discuss some of my concerns with Mr. Curtis' analysis and  
274 recommendation later in my testimony.

275 **VIII. CAPITAL STRUCTURE**

276 **Q: Do you agree with the Company's proposed capital structure?**

277 A: The Division has no disagreement with the Company's requested capital structure of 52.1%  
278 common equity and 47.9% long-term debt. The proposed levels are similar to the 2012  
279 levels of 52.3% equity and 47.7% debt and matched the Company's ten year historical  
280 average levels of 52.1% and 47.9%. DPU Exhibit 1.4 DIR shows the historical equity and  
281 debt structure for Questar and the comparable companies from 2010 through 2012 along with  
282 the five and ten year averages. The average equity position for the comparable companies  
283 has increased 1.2% over the past ten years compared to the 0.2% increase for Questar. The  
284 proposed capital structure results in the weighted average cost of capital of 7.44% for the  
285 proposed test year.

286



	Rate	Capital Structure	Weighted Rate
Common Stock	9.45%	52.07%	4.92%
Long-term Debt	5.25%	47.93%	2.52%
Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC)		100.00%	7.44%

287

288

## IX. DIVISION ANALYSIS

289

### A. AN OVERVIEW OF COST OF COMMON EQUITY MODELS

290 **Q: What methods did you look at in order to estimate the current market cost of equity for**

291 **Questar Gas?**

292 A: I used similar models to those used in previous rate cases before the Commission and similar

293 to those used in Mr. Curtis' analysis. I have included both a simple or single stage DCF

294 model and a two-stage DCF model. Within the models I have considered the projected

295 growth rates from multiple sources. I have included multiple Risk premium models,

296 including the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) and the Ibbotson model with and without

297 industry or size adjustments. I have also included a comparable earnings model for

298 comparison to the proxy group of companies.

299 **Q: Please briefly describe the single-stage DCF model.**

300 A: The single-stage DCF model assumes that the value of ownership in a common stock is

301 based upon the returns the stockholder expects to receive into perpetuity. It incorporates the

302 current dividend and the prospects for growth in that dividend over time. Among other

303 things, the model assumes that the expected price-to-earnings ratio for the company's stock

304 will remain constant at the current level. In the single-stage model it is assumed that there

305 exists a growth rate “g” that is constant. That is, this “g” will adequately serve as a surrogate  
306 for the growth in dividends for all periods of time in the future. The formula used is

307 
$$k_e = D_0*(1+g)/P_0 + g$$

308 Where:  $k_e$  is the cost of common equity  
309  $D_0$  is the current dividend  
310  $P_0$  is the current stock price  
311  $g$  is the (constant) growth rate  
312

313 **Q: Please describe Two-Stage DCF models.**

314 A: Two-stage DCF models are based upon the same principles and assumptions that the single-  
315 stage models are premised upon, except that for an initial period of years, usually five to ten  
316 years, the dividends are explicitly forecast. Following this initial period, a “terminal value”  
317 or lump-sum price is calculated, which represents the estimated present value of the future  
318 dividends following the initial period. A discount rate is found for the explicitly forecast  
319 initial period dividends and the terminal value such that the present value of the forecast  
320 dividends and terminal value equals the current stock price. This discount rate is the cost of  
321 equity in the two-stage DCF model.

322 **Q: What are the strengths and weaknesses of the DCF models?**

323 A: Briefly, the strengths of the models are their simplicity and ease of application, particularly in  
324 the single-stage version of the model. DCF models are derived directly from the financial  
325 theory that the price of a common stock is equal to the present value of the future cash flow  
326 available to stockholders. Two of the three principal components of the model are directly  
327 observable in the market: the dividend and the stock price. The future growth rate is  
328 necessarily an estimate, and thus can be controversial. The single-stage model can be faulted

329 because of its assumption that there is a single growth rate that will apply to the company  
330 into the indefinite future (theoretically, forever). Non-constant and multi-stage DCF models  
331 can handle changing growth rates in the future and even changing discount rates, but they are  
332 increasingly complex.

333 **Q: As you mentioned earlier, in the 2002 Questar Gas general rate case the Commission**  
334 **adopted a 75 percent weighting on earnings growth estimates and a 25 percent**  
335 **weighting on dividend growth estimates. Do you have any comments on this weighting**  
336 **scheme?**

337 A: For a single-stage model this weighting appears reasonable to me. It gives consideration to  
338 the fact that the model is theoretically about dividends and not earnings, but also reflects that  
339 dividend growth is related to earnings growth. Also implicit is the concept that differences  
340 between dividend growth and earnings growth rates in the near-term have a greater effect on  
341 the cost of equity than any such differentials in the long-term. I believe the current weighting  
342 scheme is reasonable and should continue to be used.

343 **Q: Do you have any comments comparing single-stage DCF models with two-stage models?**

344 A: Yes I do. The main advantage of two-stage (and even three-stage, or more) models is simply  
345 the ability to separate out the estimate into two or more components. If the analyst has a  
346 good basis for the specific separation of future cash flows into two or more components and  
347 has a good basis for the length of time of the initial stage(s) as well as the growth  
348 differentials for different components, then these models can be very useful. They would  
349 also be useful if the goal was to develop “what if” scenarios. However, in the case of cost of  
350 equity estimates for a company in a mature industry, the time periods used and the growth

351 rate differentials tend to be subjective and even arbitrary. The analyst has to make more  
352 judgments and assumptions, including: (1) the length of the periods of different growth rates;  
353 (2) the growth rates for different periods; (3) the calculation of the terminal value (if any);  
354 and (4) whether to assume the discount rate should remain constant and, if not, how it should  
355 be estimated. Given these complexities with two-stage or higher multi-stage DCF models, it  
356 is difficult to imagine that they will generally be better estimators of cost of capital.

357 The results of a two- or more stage DCF model have a single-stage equivalent with a growth  
358 rate that is unlikely to be much different from the growth rates used in a multi-stage model  
359 especially in a mature and price-regulated industry such as the gas utility industry. For these  
360 reasons, I do not believe two-stage DCF models currently add a lot of new information to the  
361 estimate of cost of equity for gas utilities. However, further theoretical developments or  
362 better data, or both, for multi-stage models may increase the usefulness of these types of  
363 models.

364 **Q: Please briefly describe the capital asset pricing model (CAPM).**

365 A: The CAPM is a type of risk premium model. CAPM grew out of theoretical work in modern  
366 portfolio theory in the 1960s. Modern portfolio theory has shown that diversified portfolios  
367 could reduce the variability in the value of those portfolios and that a risk factor called “beta”  
368 could be used to estimate the relative variability of a portfolio to the market portfolio. The  
369 theory of CAPM is that the cost of equity is equal to the risk free rate plus a market risk  
370 premium adjusted by the risk factor beta. The market risk premium is the additional return  
371 over the risk free rate that a portfolio of all risky investments, i.e. the “market,” would expect  
372 to earn. One of the theoretical underpinnings of CAPM is that investors through a diversified

373 portfolio could virtually eliminate risk specific to a particular investment such that if the  
374 investor were sufficiently diversified, he would only face the risk of the market, which is also  
375 called systematic risk. Beta is a measure of the volatility of an investment's value compared  
376 to the market as a whole and will indicate to an investor how a given investment will affect  
377 the systematic risk of his portfolio. Under CAPM theory investors are not rewarded for the  
378 specific risks of a particular investment because these risks can be diversified away. The  
379 only reward the investor receives is the systematic risk, represented by the beta that an  
380 investment brings with it to the portfolio.

381 The calculation of the CAPM cost of equity for a company is straight forward and is based  
382 upon readily available information. This model is widely taught in the academic literature  
383 and is widely used in industry.<sup>24</sup>

384 The formula for the CAPM is as follows:

385 
$$k_e = RFR_0 + \beta * (MR - RFR)$$

386 Where:  $k_e$  is the cost of common equity  
387  $RFR_0$  is the current risk free rate  
388  $\beta$  is beta, the risk adjustment factor  
389 (MR-RFR) is the market risk premium which can be decomposed  
390 into two factors: The overall market return, MR, and the  
391 RFR that is compatible with the way the MR was  
392 estimated.  
393

394 **Q: Please briefly discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the CAPM.**

---

<sup>24</sup> Modern portfolio theory and the capital asset pricing model are discussed in detail in texts on corporate finance and investment valuation. See, for example:

Brealey, Richard A., Stewart C Myers and Franklin Allen. (2006). *Principles of Corporate Finance 8<sup>th</sup> ed.* New York: McGraw-Hill Irwin.

Brigham, Eugene F. and Joel F. Houston. (2007). *Fundamentals of Financial Management 5<sup>th</sup> ed.* Mason, Ohio: Thomson South-Western.

Damodaran, Aswarh. (2002). *Investment Valuation.* New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

Parcell, David C. (1997). *The Cost of Capital – A Practitioners Guide.*

395 A: The strengths include a firm theoretical basis for the model, its relative simplicity and  
396 intuitive appeal. The model is widely taught and widely used in corporate America. The  
397 downside of the model is that there is little consensus on how each of the factors are  
398 developed and how the model is implemented.

399 Different analysts will choose different risk free rates, which will affect the outcome as I  
400 demonstrate in my application. Academics sometimes favor using a Treasury Bill rate as the  
401 most nearly true risk free security, while practitioners favor longer-term bond rates to match  
402 the apparent holding period of the asset. Beta is calculated in various ways using different  
403 base periods, market proxies and other measurement differences such as the frequency of the  
404 observations and even the day of the week the observations are made. Some services offer  
405 “adjusted” betas that “correct” the calculated or “raw” beta to account for the apparent  
406 tendency of betas to revert to a mean over time. The available services assume that the mean  
407 that the betas revert to is the market beta, 1.0.

408 Perhaps the most hotly debated factor is the market risk premium; that is, the premium return  
409 investors demand from stocks over the risk free rate. Some practitioners support the use of  
410 the arithmetic average of the difference between historical stock market returns (with the  
411 Standard & Poor’s 500 Index as a proxy) and long-term (approximately 20 years) treasury  
412 bond returns since 1926 as popularized by Ibbotson Associates over the last 30 years or so.<sup>25</sup>  
413 This approach has been criticized by academics and others on a number of grounds. Some  
414 say the historical time period is too long, reaching back to a much different economy than we  
415 have today. Others have cited technical problems with the data Ibbotson compiled. One

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<sup>25</sup> Stocks, Bonds, Bills, and Inflation (SBBI), any edition, published annually by Ibbotson Associates.

416 technical problem is referred to as “survivor bias.” Survivor bias refers to the fact that the  
417 underlying Ibbotson data is composed of companies that were successful; losers are not  
418 included. Studies indicate that this bias inflates the Ibbotson-based market risk premiums by  
419 about 1 to 2 percentage points.<sup>26</sup> Another issue is the use of arithmetic averages versus  
420 geometric averages. Ibbotson Associates, Brealey, Myers, and Allen among others, argue  
421 that arithmetic averages produce the appropriate unbiased estimates of returns. The use of  
422 arithmetic averages significantly overstates the actual returns an investor would have actually  
423 received over a long historical period of time, a time period in which the geometric average  
424 accurately reflects the actual experiences of investors. For this reason and others, some  
425 experts advocate geometric returns.<sup>27</sup> In short there is great dispute about how the market  
426 risk premium should be estimated. I have used the Ibbotson Associates data because it is  
427 readily available and widely used.

428 Empirical studies of stock returns have turned up anomalies that have suggested flaws in the  
429 CAPM. In order to correct for these anomalies (and save the basic theoretical construction)  
430 additional factors have been specified for the model such as the Fama-French three-factor  
431 model or add-ons to the model such as adjustments for size or industry. None of these  
432 adjustments have avoided controversy. The practical implementation of the CAPM has  
433 resulted in controversy and disagreement. Despite these problems the CAPM is widely used

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<sup>26</sup> Brigham, Eugene F. and Joel F. Houston. (2007). *Fundamentals of Financial Management* 5<sup>th</sup> ed. Mason, Ohio: Thomson South-Western. p. 272.

<sup>27</sup> For a discussion of geometric versus arithmetic averages, see Damodaran Aswarh. (2002). *Investment Valuation*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. pp. 161-162 and PPC’s *Guide to Business Valuations*, Volume 1, paragraph 502.8, Practitioners Publishing Company, Fort Worth Texas, February 2006.

434 and has an established theoretical basis. The fact of its widespread use necessitates that an  
435 analyst at least consider the CAPM in evaluating a cost of equity problem.

436 **B. COMPARABLE (PROXY) COMPANIES**

437 **Q: What are the “comparable companies” you referred to and how were they chosen?**

438 A: One of the first steps in the estimate of cost of equity was the selection of publicly traded  
439 “comparable,” or “proxy” companies whose market returns and characteristics would be  
440 studied in order to infer from them what the appropriate cost of equity should be for Questar  
441 Gas. The selection and use of comparable companies is obviously critical since Questar Gas  
442 itself is not an independent, publicly traded company. Even if Questar Gas were publicly  
443 traded it would be advisable to compare it with closely related companies in its industry.

444 The Company’s witness, Mr. Curtis, chose eight companies as cited in his testimony. These  
445 companies were selected from the Yahoo! Finance list of “Gas Utilities” and then selected  
446 based upon the following criteria: (1) at least half of the total operating income must come  
447 from natural gas distribution operations; (2) the company must have an investment grade  
448 bond rating; (3) the company must be followed by at least two investment analysts; and (4)  
449 the company must not be in the process of being acquired or acquiring other companies. As  
450 stated previously, based on the first criteria for total operating income, New Jersey Resources  
451 and WGL Holdings should have been excluded from the comparable selection. The last  
452 selection criteria for no pending mergers or acquisitions has not been used in previous rate  
453 cases and appears to be an arbitrary criteria to exclude Laclede Group from the list of  
454 comparable companies.



455 **Q: Does your selection criteria and comparable company list differ from the list presented**  
456 **by Mr. Curtis?**

457 A: Yes, although my selection criteria differ, many of the companies selected are the same. The  
458 comparable companies I selected were based upon the following criteria; (1) at least 60% of  
459 the total revenue is generated from gas utility operations; (2) the company must have an  
460 investment grade bond rating; and (3) the company must be followed by at least two  
461 investment analysts. Five of the companies selected are identical to the comparables used by  
462 Mr. Curtis, however, my list excludes New Jersey Resources and WGL Holdings and  
463 includes Laclede Group. DPU Exhibit 1.6 DIR lists my selection of comparable companies  
464 along with summary data supporting the selection. Of the seven comparable companies used  
465 in the analysis, Northwest Natural Gas and Piedmont Natural Gas have the closest operating  
466 similarity to Questar Gas since nearly all of the revenue of these two companies is derived  
467 from natural gas distribution.

468 **C. APPLICATION OF COST OF EQUITY MODELS**

469 **1. Single-Stage DCF Models**

470 **Q: Please describe how you developed the Single-Stage DCF models.**

471 A: First, I calculated the current dividend yield for each of the comparable companies. The  
472 dividend was based upon annualizing the latest quarterly dividend. I considered both a spot  
473 price as of the September 30, 2013, and a 30-trading day average closing price. The 30-  
474 trading day average closing price was used to smooth out random fluctuations that might  
475 exist in the stock price data. The historical price information was obtained from Yahoo!

476 Finance. Next, I took earnings and dividend growth rates from the latest Value Line reports  
477 for each comparable company as well as the latest updates on Value Line's web site accessed  
478 October 2, 2013. This information was combined with the consensus earnings growth  
479 estimates reported on the Yahoo! Finance, Zack's and Reuters web sites for each comparable  
480 company. The Yahoo! Finance, Zack's and Reuters web sites were accessed after the  
481 markets closed on October 2, 2013. DPU Exhibit 1.7 DIR is a summary of the growth  
482 estimates from the various sources used in my analysis.

483 I considered several different growth rate estimates for the single-stage models. First I  
484 calculated growth rates based upon a weighted-average by applying a 75 percent weight to  
485 the average earnings growth rate from Value Line, Zack's, Reuters, and Yahoo!, and 25  
486 percent weight to the dividend growth rate (from Value Line) in compliance with the  
487 Commission's decision in Questar Gas., Docket No. 02-057-02. DPU Exhibit 1.8a DIR  
488 provides the calculation of the DCF model using the average of Reuters, Zacks and Yahoo  
489 reported earnings growth rates and the 30-day average stock price. This calculation results in  
490 an estimated cost of capital range of 7.23% to 10.04% with an average of 8.52%.

491 Exhibit 1.8b DIR provides the same calculation of the DCF model using the Value Line  
492 earnings and dividend growth rates. The results of the single stage DCF model using the 30  
493 day average stock price and the Value Line earnings and dividend growth rates calculates an  
494 estimated cost of capital range of 7.98% to 12.20% with an average of 9.71%. The results  
495 from the DCF models along with the other models are summarized on DPU Exhibit 1.3 DIR.

496

497 **2. Two-Stage DCF Models**

498 **Q: Please describe the Two-Stage DCF models you developed for this case.**

499 A: In developing two-stage DCF models I forecast the current dividends of each comparable  
500 company out five years a couple of different ways. First, I assumed that the dividends grew at  
501 the dividend growth rate forecast by Value Line. Second, I assumed that the dividends grew  
502 at the simple average of the average earnings and dividend growth rates. In each case for  
503 discounting purposes the dividends were assumed to occur in the middle of the year. A  
504 “sixth” dividend was forecast to occur at the end of the fifth year. This sixth dividend was  
505 used as a factor to estimate the terminal value. The terminal value was calculated by  
506 dividing the sixth dividend by the cost of equity less the terminal growth rate. The terminal  
507 growth rate was assumed in the first instance to equal the 75-25 percent weighted average of  
508 the earnings and dividend forecast growth rates. In the second instance the terminal growth  
509 rate was assumed to be the earnings forecast growth rates. DPU Exhibit 1.9a DIR provides  
510 the calculation of the two-stage DCF model using the average of Reuters, Zacks and Yahoo  
511 reported earnings growth rates and the 30-day average stock price. This calculation results in  
512 an estimated cost of capital range of 6.73% to 9.64% with an average of 8.48%.

513 Exhibit 1.9b DIR provides the same calculation of the two-stage DCF model using the Value  
514 Line earnings and dividend growth rates. The results of this model using the 30 day average  
515 stock price and the Value Line earnings and dividend growth rates calculates an estimated  
516 cost of capital range of 8.14% to 12.46% with an average of 9.81%. The results from the  
517 two-stage DCF models along with the other models are summarized on DPU Exhibit 1.3  
518 DIR.

519 **3. CAPM Results**

520 **Q: How did you develop your CAPM models?**

521 A: I looked at the CAPM model using different risk free rates, time periods, betas, and market  
522 risk premiums. I did this to look at how the variable factors affect the outcome of the CAPM  
523 estimate. As stated earlier, there is no consensus on precisely how the components of the  
524 CAPM should be estimated.

525 **Q: What risk-free rates did you choose?**

526 A: To calculate the CAPM, I chose the 30-year Treasury bond, which was reported as 3.69% as  
527 of September 30, 2013. I have used the longer-term rates in order to match the holding  
528 period of the asset under consideration. As mentioned above, the selection of the risk free  
529 rate represents just one of the difficulties in calculating the CAPM. The 30 year treasury is  
530 the same index used in the Company analysis with a slight difference in the rate due to a  
531 different selection date.

532 **Q: What beta estimates did you use?**

533 A: I have calculated the CAPM using the beta from Value Line and the average beta as reported  
534 by Reuters, Zacks and Yahoo! Finance. The Value Line beta is adjusted to converge toward  
535 1.0 whereas the other betas are not adjusted. The VL formula is  $(adj\ beta) = .67*(raw\ beta) +$   
536  $.33$ . The individual beta estimates for each company can be seen in DPU Exhibit 1.7 DIR.

537 **Q: Please describe the market risk premiums you used?**

538 A: All of my market risk premiums are derived from historical data published by Ibbotson  
539 Associates. These historical averages have been the subject of criticism for a number of

540 reasons, some of which were cited above. I consider the 87-year “Ibbotson period” to be  
541 problematic since it includes market situations much different than today. The most obvious  
542 examples are the rise of mutual funds for small investors and more recently the internet  
543 making publicly available information almost instantaneously available anywhere in the  
544 world. There are also institutional changes since 1926, such as the creation of the Securities  
545 and Exchange Commission, changes in accounting rules, and Sarbanes-Oxley. Furthermore,  
546 there have been suggestions and studies to indicate that investors’ expectations may change  
547 over time. Thus a long historical period may not accurately reflect today’s market and  
548 expectations.

549 **Q: What historical period would you recommend?**

550 A: I feel most comfortable with a 30- to 50-year time period. A 30- to 50-year period is long  
551 enough to smooth out the sometimes wide fluctuations in the data, but short enough to focus  
552 on the more recent data of the modern financial markets. At the bottom of the CAPM  
553 calculations included as DPU 1.10 DIR Exhibits, I have provided the risk premiums for 15,  
554 20, 30, 40 and 50 year averages. Since there can be discussions on which of the time periods  
555 to use, I have included them for reference. It is interesting to note the 50 year risk premium  
556 of 4.50% is substantially different than the 87 year average of 6.70%.

557 **Q: Why does your exhibit use the 87 year risk premium in the CAPM calculation?**

558 A: This time period has been widely promoted by Ibbotson and others as the “correct” time  
559 period, I did not want to exclude it completely from my analysis. I also wanted to use the  
560 higher risk premium to partially compensate for the historically low interest rates in the  
561 current economy.

562 **Q: What were your results for your CAPM calculation?**

563 A: DPU 1.10a DIR provides the calculations for the CAPM using the average beta as reported  
564 by Reuters, Zacks and Yahoo, the 30 year treasury rate and the 87 year average risk  
565 premium. Using only these variables, the average expected market return is 6.71%. To this  
566 amount the Ibbotson Industry Premium estimate of -2.44% and the average size premium of  
567 1.52% have been added for a calculated investor expectation of 5.79%. This result appears to  
568 be inconsistent with the other models and has not been included in the recommended ROE  
569 for Questar Gas. As mentioned above, the 30 to 50 year averages are probably a better  
570 indication of the current conditions. The calculations for the 15 to 50 year averages have  
571 been included at the bottom of the exhibit and result in even lower estimates for the cost of  
572 capital calculation.

573 DPU 1.10b DIR provides the calculations for the CAPM using the using the Value Line beta,  
574 the 30 year treasury rate and the 87 year average risk premium. Using only these variables,  
575 the average expected market return is 8.24%. To this amount the Ibbotson Industry Premium  
576 estimate of -2.44% and the average size premium of 1.52% have been added for a calculated  
577 investor expectation of 7.32%. As with the previous model, after making the industry and  
578 size adjustment, the results appear to be inconsistent with the other models and have not been  
579 included in the recommended ROE for Questar Gas. The calculations for the 15 to 50 year  
580 averages have been included at the bottom of the exhibit for reference but have not been  
581 considered.

582 The CAPM and other valuation models should not be used in isolation. I believe that  
583 including the industry and size adjustments is questionable and results in calculations that are  
584 outside the range of reasonableness.

585 **Q: Your calculation of the CAPM is significantly different from the calculation used by the**  
586 **Company. Can you explain the differences?**

587 A: The Division and the Company have both used the same risk premium as provided by  
588 Ibbotson and both have used the 30 year US Treasury as the risk free rate to calculate an  
589 expected market return. There is a small difference in the Treasury rate used in the  
590 calculations due to the different dates used in the analysis. To this amount, the Company and  
591 the Division have added a size premium as provided by Ibbotson. The primary difference  
592 between the Division model and the Company model is the specific industry adjustment.  
593 This information is provided by Ibbotson but was not included in the Company calculation.  
594 The industry adjustment for natural gas distribution companies is -2.44%.<sup>28</sup>

595 **Q: You have included an additional calculation for the CAPM. Can you explain the source**  
596 **of the information and your reasons for including it with your analysis?**

597 A: Exhibits 1.10c DIR and 1.10d DIR are calculations using a historical risk premium as  
598 calculated by Dr. Aswath Damodaran. Dr. Damodaran is a Professor of Finance at the Stern  
599 School of Business at New York University. His research interests are in valuation,  
600 portfolio management and applied corporate finance. His papers have been published in the  
601 Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, the Journal of Finance, the Journal of  
602 Financial Economics and the Review of Financial Studies. He has written four books on

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<sup>28</sup> 2013 Ibbotson SBBI Valuation Yearbook, table 3-5, page 37, SIC Code 4924.

603 equity valuation (*Damodaran on Valuation, Investment Valuation, The Dark Side of*  
604 *Valuation, The Little Book of Valuation*) and two on corporate finance (*Corporate Finance:*  
605 *Theory and Practice, Applied Corporate Finance: A User's Manual*).

606 Dr. Damodoran has calculated the average historical equity risk premium for stocks minus  
607 the U. S. Treasury Bonds at 5.88% from 1928 to 2012 and 3.91% from 1963 to 2012.<sup>29</sup>

608 Using the Damodoran historical risk premium and the Value Line beta produces a range of  
609 6.69% to 9.55% with the average of 7.93%. This result is slightly higher than the adjusted  
610 Ibbotson calculation of 7.32% in DPU Exhibit 1.10b DIR. The results of the CAPM using  
611 Dr. Damodoran's averages have been included for reference but have not been included in  
612 the calculation for Questar Gas.

#### 613 **4. Risk Premium Results**

614 **Q: What do the risk premium results suggest to you?**

615 A: The risk premium results are low compared to the other models used and compared to recent  
616 commission orders. I believe the CAPM model is returning low values due to the current  
617 low interest rate environment caused by the current monetary policy.

618 **Q: You have included an Ibbotson risk premium without any adjustments in your average**  
619 **to calculate your recommended ROE for Questar Gas. Can you explain why you**  
620 **included the calculation in your analysis?**

621 A: Yes. I wanted to provide a simple calculation of the current 30 year US Treasury bond plus  
622 the long term risk premium for comparison. The simple calculation provides a range from

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<sup>29</sup> Equity Risk Premiums (ERP): Determinants, Estimation and Implications – The 2013 Edition, Updated March 2013, Aswath Damodaran, Stern School of Business, page 29.



623 7.71% to 8.72% with an average of 8.24%. This calculation is slightly higher than the values  
624 calculated in the CAPM and has been included as a reasonableness test. This calculation is  
625 low compared to the other valuation models and once again is influenced by the current low  
626 interest rate environment. The existence of the small cap effect is disputed by some  
627 researchers, such as Dr. John Kania.<sup>30</sup> Others, like Brigham and Houston, suggest that the  
628 effect might be less than one finds in Ibbotson Associates' publications.<sup>31</sup> Since the  
629 additional adjustments are suspect, I have included the CAPM expected market return of  
630 8.24% without adjustments for industry or size as one of the factors to calculate a return for  
631 Questar Gas. As stated above, the summary and comparison of each valuation model has  
632 been included in DPU Exhibit 1.3 DIR

## 633 **5. Comparable Earnings Analysis**

634 **Q: Can you comment on the comparable earnings model?**

635 A: Yes. I have calculated return on equity for each of the comparable companies from 2004  
636 through 2012 along with the 3 and 5 year averages. The return on common equity is  
637 calculated as the net profit of each of the comparable companies divided by the value of the  
638 common equity. DPU Exhibit 1.11 DIR provides a multi-year comparison of the historical  
639 return on equity calculation for the comparable companies and for Questar Gas. Since  
640 Questar Gas, Northwest Natural Gas and Piedmont Natural Gas generate nearly all of their

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<sup>30</sup> Kania, John J. "The small firm risk premium remains largely a myth," Shannon Pratt's Business Valuation Update, Vol. 9, No. 11, November 2003. The essence of Dr. Kania's argument is that "smallness" is incorrectly specified as market capitalization, i.e. the market value of a company's stock. When other measures of size such as revenues or total assets are used, the size effect vanishes.

<sup>31</sup> Brigham, Eugene F. and Joel F. Houston, Fundamentals of Financial Management Concise 3<sup>rd</sup> Ed., Harcourt College Publishers, Orlando FL, 2002. Brigham and Houston conclude (p. 491) "In general, the cost of equity appears to be one or two percentage points higher for small firms (those with market values less than \$20 million) than for large NYSE firms with similar risk characteristics."

641 revenue from natural gas distribution, I have shaded the respective lines for comparison.

642 A comparison of each year indicates that Questar Gas had a lower ROE than the peer group  
643 from 2006 through 2010 but had a higher ROE than the peer group in 2011 and 2012. In  
644 addition to looking at each year individually, I have provided a three and five year average to  
645 help reduce the volatility of a single year. When comparing the longer term ROE, the three  
646 year average for Questar Gas is 20 basis points higher than the peer group and is nearly  
647 identical for the five year average.

648 The charts included at the bottom of the exhibit provide a visual comparison of the ROE for  
649 Questar Gas compared to the peer group average. The annual return for Questar Gas follows  
650 a similar pattern to the returns for the comparable companies. This is somewhat comforting  
651 in that it suggests that the selected companies are good comparables to use with Questar Gas  
652 and that Questar Gas is near the industry average for comparable returns. The second chart  
653 on the right is a comparison of the three primary natural gas distribution companies, Questar  
654 Gas, Northwest Natural Gas and Piedmont Natural Gas. This has been included to show the  
655 more stable earnings pattern for Questar compared to the other natural gas distribution  
656 companies. More stable and consistent earnings would generally indicate lower risk for  
657 investors.

658 **Q: How does your analysis compare to the comparable earnings model provided by Mr.**  
659 **Curtis?**

660 A: The comparable ROE calculations provided by the Company in QGC Exhibit 2.9 includes a  
661 slightly different set of comparable companies. As mentioned above, the comparables used

662 in the Company analysis include New Jersey Resources and WGL Holdings and exclude  
663 Laclede Group. This different combination of companies calculates an average ROE of  
664 10.58% for 2012 compared to the Division's comparable selection and comparable average  
665 of 9.99%. The narrative portion of the testimony references a rounded up 10.6% industry  
666 average compared to the Questar 10.2 (rounded down from 10.24%) for 2012 and does not  
667 comment on any of the other time periods or use a 3 or 5 year average. Based on the  
668 information for 2012 only, Mr. Curtis draws the conclusion that the lower return for Questar  
669 Gas indicates a higher risk.<sup>32</sup>

670 **Q: Do you agree with the conclusion of the comparable earnings model used by the**  
671 **Company?**

672 A: No. Including companies that have a greater percentage of non-utility income and looking at  
673 a 10 year average does not provide a comparable earnings analysis for comparison to Questar  
674 Gas. I also do not agree that a lower return indicates a higher risk and therefore justifies a  
675 higher authorized return. As mentioned above, the Commission authorized rate of return  
676 provides the opportunity to earn a fair return but does not guarantee that the Company will  
677 earn the specified rate of return.

678 **X. COMMENTS ON COST OF EQUITY RESULTS**

679 **Q: Do you have any other comments about the testimony provided by Mr. Curtis?**

680 A: Yes. The testimony indicates that Questar Gas has slightly higher risk compared to the proxy  
681 group and therefore the allowed return should be higher than the average. This statement

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<sup>32</sup> David M. Curtis, page 13, line 338.

682 does not match with what industry analysts have said about the Company concerning the  
683 level of risk. The current Standard and Poor's research report dated January, 23, 2013 states  
684 the following:

685 The rating on Questar Gas Co. (QGC) reflect the consolidated credit profile of its  
686 parent, U.S. natural gas company Questar Corp. (A/Stable A-1). The ratings on  
687 Questar Corp. include what Standard and Poor's Rating Services considers an  
688 "excellent" business risk profile and an "intermediate" financial risk  
689 profile.....Supportive regulation, a growing service area with a mostly residential  
690 customer base, low operating risks and lack of competition characterize the  
691 utility's excellent business risk profile. The business risk profile also benefits  
692 from strong access to gas supply and storage and from its relationship with  
693 Wexpro, the company's cost-of-service exploration and production operation that  
694 provides natural gas to the QGC utility at cost plus a fixed return.

695 QGC's constructive relationship with the Utah Public Service Commission, which  
696 covers more than 95% of its customer base, has resulted in a supportive rate  
697 design that provides stable cash flows largely insulated from fluctuations in gas  
698 prices, weather, and usage. QGC also has a decoupling mechanism and an  
699 infrastructure tracker to recover about \$45 million per year associated with  
700 replacement of high-pressure feeder lines. Its relationship with Wexpro, which  
701 minimizes gas supply risk with cost-of-service natural gas reserves, provides an  
702 operational advantage over other gas utilities.<sup>33</sup>

703 Based on the evaluation from Standard and Poor's and the comparable earnings evaluation, I  
704 believe Questar Gas has similar to lower risk than other natural gas distribution companies.

705 **Q: Does your analysis imply that Questar Gas deserves a premium cost of equity compared**  
706 **with the average of the comparable companies?**

707 A: No, there is no such indication.

708 **Q: Do you have any comments on the CET calculation proposed by the Company?**

709 A: Yes. The Conservation Enabling Tariff (CET) is based on the forecast DNG revenue in the  
710 GS customer class. The calculation is based on the projected monthly revenue divided by the

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<sup>33</sup> Standard & Poor's Research, Questar Gas Co., January 23, 2013.

711 projected number of customers in each month of the test year. A calculation of the CET has  
712 been included in the testimony of Mr. Summers but is based on the revenue requirement  
713 proposed by the Company. If the Commission approves a revenue requirement that is  
714 different than the original application, a revised CET will need to be calculated.

715 **VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

716 **Q: What conclusions have you reached with respect to cost of equity?**

717 A: The first conclusion is that the DCF models using the Value Line growth forecasts form a  
718 reasonable basis for a cost of equity estimate. There is a significant difference in the DCF  
719 calculation using the Reuter, Zacks and Yahoo average growth factor of 4.84% compared to  
720 the 6.43% average comparable growth factor from Value Line. I have used the higher Value  
721 Line growth rate to calculate the ROE for Questar Gas, which has increased the  
722 recommended ROE. The results from the two stage DCF model were similar to the single  
723 stage and were heavily influenced by the selection of the Value Line growth rates. The  
724 CAPM model including the size and industry adjustments did not add to the analysis and  
725 appeared to be on the low end of the reasonable range. The unadjusted risk premium model  
726 provides some support for the recommendation but appears to be low in relation to the other  
727 models. The comparable earnings model provides good comparison with the average return  
728 for the selected companies near the historical return for Questar Gas. In averaging the results  
729 of the various models, I have calculated a range from 7.93% to 11.46% with an average of  
730 9.44%. This supports my recommendation that the appropriate cost of equity for Questar  
731 Gas is 9.45%.

732 **Q: How does your recommendation compare with other commission decisions?**

733 A: DPU Exhibit 1.4a is a summary of the rate case decisions for natural gas companies from  
734 2010 through 2013. DPU Exhibit 1.4b is a slight modification of QGC Exhibit 2.10. While  
735 the information for 2010 – 2012 is the same, I have added the 2013 commission decisions  
736 and included a trend line. The trend line indicates that the authorized ROE has been moving  
737 lower. As mentioned previously, for the first nine months of 2013, the highest allowed ROE  
738 was 9.80% and the average was 9.51%. This is lower than the 9.93% average for 2012 and  
739 indicates a downward trend.

740 The Division recommended ROE of 9.45% for Questar Gas is lower than the 9.80% currently  
741 authorized by the Utah Commission for PacifiCorp. The difference between the two  
742 companies is appropriate given the different time periods and the different level of risk.  
743 While the recommended ROE is lower than the amount the Company requested, it is  
744 noticeably and appropriately higher than the 9.16% authorized for Questar Gas by the  
745 Wyoming Commission.

746 **Q: Please discuss some of the implications of your weighted cost of capital estimate and**  
747 **specifically your cost of equity estimate.**

748 A: In arriving at a decision on cost of capital the Commission needs to consider principles and  
749 issues set forth in the well known U.S. Supreme Court decisions commonly referred to as the  
750 Bluefield<sup>34</sup> and Hope<sup>35</sup> cases. I am not an attorney, so I will discuss these cases from  
751 economic and financial points of view.

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<sup>34</sup> Bluefield Water Works and Improvement Company v. Public Service Commission of the State of West Virginia, 262 U.S. 679 (1923).

<sup>35</sup> Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Company, 320 U.S. 591 (1942).

752 The Bluefield and Hope cases established economic and financial principles for proper  
753 regulation. These principles included: (1) that the utility be allowed to earn a return on its  
754 utility property generally equal to returns earned by other companies of similar risk; (2) this  
755 return should assure confidence in the financial soundness of the utility; (3) this allowed  
756 return should maintain and support the credit of the company and allow it to attract capital;  
757 (4) recognition that a return that is “right” at one time may become high or low by changes in  
758 the economy regarding alternative investments; and (5) particularly in Hope, what is  
759 important is that the “end result” of the rate order be just and reasonable—it is less important  
760 how that result is achieved.

761 **Q: Do you believe your conclusions and recommendations arrive at a just and reasonable**  
762 **result that is in the public interest?**

763 A: Yes. The capital structure as proposed by the Company is consistent with historical levels  
764 and is similar to the levels of the comparable companies. The cost of debt has been provided  
765 by the Company and has been confirmed by the recent issue of new long term debt. It is  
766 assumed that any future debt will be issued at the current market rates at the time of issuance.  
767 I have demonstrated that my cost of equity estimates are calculated using standard financial  
768 models and using comparable company information. The Division’s recommended ROE has  
769 also been compared to the recent decisions for natural gas distribution companies in other  
770 jurisdictions.

771 **Q: Can you summarize your final conclusion and recommendation?**

772 A: Based on my analysis, I believe that the appropriate cost of equity for Questar Gas is 9.45%  
773 with an overall weighted average cost of capital of 7.44%. I believe that the cost of capital

774 estimate is just and reasonable and in the public interest.

775 **Q: Does this conclude your testimony?**

776 A: Yes.