

27 homes that require a short line extension will be paying more under the new program than
28 would be required under the current program. I would not agree that new homes that require
29 a short service line extension will create a burden on low income customers.

30 I am not exactly sure which customers Utah Home Builders witness Mr. Ross Ford is
31 considering low income customers when he states, “However, the Home Builders
32 Association is concerned that lower-income customers who generally live in lower-end
33 homes will be adversely affected by the proposed changes to the cost allocation.”¹ I do not
34 believe that, for his purposes in this docket, he is discussing the individuals who qualify for
35 the HEAT or other assistance programs but instead he is discussing customers purchasing
36 smaller new homes. Based on the information provided, the average service line extension in
37 2011 was 46 feet, and application of the new method would result in an increased cost to the
38 customer of \$275.54.² This amount does not appear to create an overwhelming burden on a
39 new home buyer. The impact of the line extension policy on urban and rural areas should be
40 considered as well since rural locations may require a longer service line extension than a
41 more urban area.

42 **Q: Do you agree that the cost of the meters should be capitalized by Questar Gas instead of**
43 **being paid for by the customer?**

44 A: No, I disagree with Mr. Ross’ statement.³ The installation of a service meter is a cost that
45 should be paid by the user of the service, not shared by all rate payers. The recovery of these
46 costs over an extended period of time will create additional costs to rate payers if Questar
47 Gas were allowed to earn the allowed rate of return on additional rate base items.

48 **RESPONSE TO QUESTAR GAS**

49 **Q: Do you feel that the rebuttal testimony and exhibits of Mr. Curtis support the 10.35%**
50 **requested ROE?**

¹ Rebuttal Testimony of Ross Ford, lines 116-118.

² Rebuttal Testimony of Ross Ford, Exhibit C.

³ Rebuttal Testimony of Ross Ford, lines 271-273.

51 A: No. I have reviewed the information provided in Mr. Curtis' rebuttal testimony and I do not
52 believe that his original or revised calculations support the recommended 10.35% return on
53 equity. DPU Exhibit 1.1 SR provides a summary of Mr. Curtis' calculations provided in his
54 rebuttal testimony compared with the revised calculations provided by the Division.
55 Averaging the various methods used by Mr. Curtis to calculate the cost of equity results in a
56 9.82% estimate.⁴ Additionally, as will be discussed later in this testimony, I disagree with
57 some of the assumptions used in Mr. Curtis' analysis.

58 **Q: Do you still believe that the appropriate cost of equity for Questar Gas is 9.45% as filed**
59 **in your direct testimony?**

60 A: Yes I do. I have made modifications to my original analysis and have included updated
61 exhibits identified as DPU Exhibits 1.1 – 1.6 SR. The revised exhibits support the DPU's
62 proposed 9.45% return on equity.

63 **Q: Can you provide additional information concerning why you feel the Company's ROE**
64 **analysis is not correct?**

65 A: Yes. There are several items in the Company's analysis that I will discuss in this testimony
66 and which I discussed in my direct testimony that are inconsistent with Questar Gas' prior
67 filings and are not supported by the evidence or analysis provided by Mr. Curtis.

68 **Q: Do you agree that the Commission should consider the recent Alabama Gas**
69 **Corporation allowed return of 10.8% as a comparable to Questar Gas?**

70 A: Not at all. Alabama Gas does not follow the formal rate case process like other gas utilities
71 across the country and the recent award is actually a reduction of the stabilization rate
72 allowed for this utility. As SNL Finance reports,

73 The PSC's rate stabilization and equalization, or RSE, mechanism, does not
74 provide for regular formal rate cases and allowed Alabama Gas, an Energen Corp.
75 subsidiary commonly known as Alagasco, to earn an ROE between 13.15% and
76 13.65% - a range well above the 2012 full-year average ROE of 9.94% for gas
77 utilities nationwide. Commissioner Terry Dunn had expressed concern that the
78 lack of formal rate cases and transparency had allowed the RSE mechanism to
79 become detached from the current economy, but PSC President Twinkle

⁴ DPU Exhibit 1.1 SR.

80 Cavanaugh and Commissioner Jeremy Oden have not supported instituting formal
81 rate cases. But even without a formal rate case, the commission decided Nov. 5 to
82 lower Alagasco's authorized ROE range to 10.5% to 10.95%, with a 10.8%
83 adjusting point.⁵

84 DPU Exhibit 1.2 SR provides a summary of the authorized returns for natural gas companies
85 through December 27, 2013. This information updates the information provided in my direct
86 testimony as DPU Exhibit 1.4 DIR. It appears that Mr. Curtis updated his authorized returns
87 for comparable companies through June 2013 but then selectively included only the Alabama
88 decision from November. Including only the November Alabama stabilization decision
89 provides an incorrect comparison to other general rate case decisions. Because the rate
90 setting process in Alabama is different, SNL Financial does not include the Alabama decision
91 in its summary of the 2013 rate case decisions.

92 In addition, the Company's update does not mention other rate cases that were concluded
93 between June and November with allowed returns of 9.60%, 10.20%, 9.84%, 10.25 and
94 9.5%.⁶ Since June 2013 there have been 17 natural gas rate case decisions. The Company
95 continues to fails to note the downward trend in the allowed rate of return in recent years. As
96 identified in DPU Exhibit 1.2 SR, the average allowed return for 2013 was 9.66%, with a
97 high of 10.25% and a low of 9.08%. The 2013 average is down from the 9.94% average in
98 2012, and 9.92% in 2011.

99 The last column of DPU 1.2 SR provides a comparison of the requested ROE and the
100 authorized ROE for natural gas companies from January 2011 through December 2013. A
101 comparison of the requested ROE and the authorized ROE indicates an average reduction of
102 81 basis points in 2013 and 83 Basis points in 2011 and 2012.⁷ If the average 81 basis point
103 difference between the requested and allowed ROE were applied to this Questar Gas case,
104 the authorized ROE would be reduced from 10.35 to 9.54%. This calculation compares
105 favorably to the Division's recommended 9.45%.

⁵ SNL Financial, Alabama PSC finds common ground, drops Alagasco ROE closer to national average, November 5, 2013.

⁶ DPU Exhibit 1.2 SR.

⁷ DPU Exhibit 1.2 SR.

106 **Q: Do you agree that a lower allowed rate of return will cause a downgrade in the bond**
107 **rating?**

108 A: No. In the rebuttal testimony provided as QGC Exhibit 2.3R, Mr. Curtis provided an
109 estimate of the impact to net income under the Company's proposed 10.35%, the Division's
110 recommended 9.45%, and the Office of Consumer Service's (Office) recommended 9.30%.
111 Mr. Curtis states, "Questar Gas will need to manage its financial affairs very tightly to avoid
112 a down grade in its bond ratings."⁸ While the different allowed returns do slightly change
113 the key ratio calculations, the lower ROE amounts do not change the indicated ratings when
114 compared to those calculated under the Company's higher ROE amount. Standard & Poor's
115 Research issued a credit rating of A / Stable for Questar Gas in January 23, 2013, noting
116 "supportive regulation, a growing service area with a mostly residential customer base, low
117 operating risks and lack of competition characterize the utility's excellent business risk
118 profile."⁹

119 The Company's assessment of a pending down grade does not match the recent decision by
120 Moody's to possibly upgrade many of the regulated utilities in the United States including
121 Questar Gas and Questar Corp. Moody's reported:

122 New York, November 08, 2013 -- Moody's Investors Service placed the ratings of
123 most regulated utilities and utility holding companies in the United States on
124 review for upgrade, affecting approximately \$400 billion of debt. These
125 companies have been placed on review because Moody's has adopted a generally
126 more favorable view of the relative credit supportiveness of the US regulatory
127 environment, as detailed in our September 23, 2013 Request for Comment:
128 "Proposed Refinements to the Regulated Utilities Rating Methodology and our
129 Evolving View of US Utility Regulation."

130 RATINGS RATIONALE

131 "Our placement of these issuers on review considers improving regulatory trends
132 in the US, including better cost recovery provisions, reduced regulatory lag, and
133 generally fair and open relationships between utilities and regulators, " said
134 Moody's Managing Director Larry Hess. We believe that many US regulatory
135 jurisdictions have become more credit supportive of utilities over time and that

⁸ Rebuttal Testimony of David M. Curtis, page 5, line 124.

⁹ Standard & Poor's Research, Questar Gas Co., January 23, 2013.

136 our assessment of the regulatory environment that has been incorporated into
137 ratings may now be overly conservative.

138 The US utility sector's low number of defaults, high recovery levels, and
139 generally strong financial metrics from a global perspective provide additional
140 corroboration for our view that ratings should generally be higher.

141 We expect that most upgrades will be limited to one notch, and that the reviews of
142 the affected companies will be completed within approximately 90 days.
143 Although we anticipate that most of the utilities placed under review will be
144 upgraded, there may be selected instances where ratings will not be upgraded
145 following the completion of our review.

146 We note that several regulated utilities and utility holding companies were not
147 placed on review due to issuer specific circumstances that would preclude an
148 upgrade at this time. These exclusions include utilities that are engaged in
149 substantial construction programs for new generation or other large capital
150 projects, currently have a Negative Outlook or are under potential downward
151 rating pressure, are characterized by material concentration or event risk, face
152 market or regulatory risks specific to their particular jurisdictions, or are part of a
153 corporate family that has significant non-utility operations.¹⁰

154 Within the past six months, Questar Gas has issued new long term bonds at interest rates of
155 4.78% and 4.83%. This recent bond activity indicates that Questar Gas is able to obtain
156 financing and issue debt at favorable interest rates. The Division agrees with the Company
157 that lower rated debt will have a higher interest rate, however no information has been
158 presented to indicate that the 9.45% recommended ROE will result in a lower bond rating.

159 **Q: Do you agree with Mr. Curtis that Questar Gas has a higher level of risk than the proxy**
160 **group and should require a higher rate of return?**

161 A: No. As noted above, the Company has access to debt offering at favorable rates and has
162 access to equity infusion from Questar Corporation. Due to the current regulatory
163 requirements, most if not all of the natural gas distribution companies are completing
164 infrastructure upgrades requiring capital expenditures. In response to the suggested five
165 basis point reduction due to the infrastructure recovery mechanism, Mr. Curtis stated: "The
166 other Companies in the proxy group have similar revenue stabilization mechanisms and

¹⁰ Moody's Investors Service, Rating Action: Moody's places rating of most US regulated utilities on review for upgrade, November 8, 2013.

167 similar risks which are already included in the return on equity calculation.”¹¹ This
168 statement would indicate that the other comparable companies have similar risk, not lower
169 risk, and therefore should have a similarly rate of return.

170 Another measurement of risk for investors is the stability and predictability of future
171 earnings. DPU Exhibit 1.6 SR provides a summary of the return on equity for the
172 comparable companies and for Questar Gas from 2004 through 2012. With the exception of
173 2004, Questar Gas has had more stable earnings than the industry average and significantly
174 more stable earnings than Northwest Natural and Piedmont Natural Gas. The more stable
175 earnings pattern suggests a lower risk of volatile future earnings for investors. There has
176 been no information presented that would indicate that Questar Gas has a higher level of risk
177 than the proxy group.

178 **Q: Do you still believe that New Jersey Resources and WGL Holdings should be excluded**
179 **from the selected proxy group?**

180 A: No. I believe that they both should be included. While both companies generate a
181 significant portion of their total income from non-regulated operations, they do generate over
182 50% of their operating income from regulated natural gas distribution. I have included
183 updates to the DCF, CAPM, and comparable earnings models as DPU Exhibits 1.3 SR
184 through DPU Exhibits 1.6 SR to include New Jersey Resources and WGL Holdings. I have
185 included both companies in the revised exhibits, however it does not materially change the
186 calculations or the outcome of the analysis from my original calculations. The revised DPU
187 exhibits also include the updated stock price through December 26, 2013. A summary of the
188 revised DPU analysis has been included as DPU 1.1 SR. This summary includes the revised
189 calculations provided in the QGC rebuttal exhibits.

190 **Q: Do you still believe that Laclede should be included in the comparable group?**

191 A: Yes. As I stated in my direct testimony, much of the peer group analysis is based on the
192 historical earnings growth and dividend payments. The historical information has been
193 compared to the projected earnings and dividend growth rates. The merger of Missouri Gas

¹¹ Rebuttal Testimony of David M. Curtis, page 9, line 218.

194 with Laclede was announced in December 2012 and was approved by the Missouri Public
195 Service Commission on July 17, 2013. As analysts prepare forecast growth rates, they will
196 consider known facts and circumstances that may impact future earnings. It is likely that
197 analysts and investors have already included the merger in forecast growth rates and
198 therefore should be included in the analysis.

199 **Q: Do you believe that the Company has used the correct growth rates in its revised DCF**
200 **analysis?**

201 A: No. Two of the three principal components in the DCF model are directly observable in the
202 market: the dividend payment and the current stock price. The third component or future
203 growth rate is necessarily an estimate, and is the key component of the analysis. Mr. Curtis'
204 states in his rebuttal testimony that "Traditionally, the most common source of earning
205 growth rate expectations has been from published analyst reports".¹² While acknowledging
206 the use of published growth rates, the Company analysis uses a growth rate that is
207 significantly higher than the published rates. The growth rate is the key component of the
208 DCF analysis and by using a higher growth rate the Company model overstates the expected
209 rate of return. The differences between the published growth rates and the growth rates used
210 in the Company analysis are summarized below.

| | <u>Average</u> | <u>Midpoint</u> |
|--------------------------------------|----------------|-----------------|
| 211 Yahoo, Reuters and Zacks | 4.61% | 4.60% |
| 212 Value Line | 6.00% | 5.50% |
| 213 Questar Analysis Growth Estimate | 6.94% | |

215 The Company model uses a 6.94% growth rate derived by averaging the historical five year
216 earnings growth for each company, the historical 10 year earnings growth for each company
217 and a calculated industry midpoint based on the forecast of six companies. No explanation
218 has been provided as to why the industry midpoint is used or why the industry calculation is
219 different from the comparables used in the other analysis. One of the six companies selected
220 to calculate the industry earning growth estimate is Questar Gas. It is inappropriate to
221 include an internal growth forecast for Questar Gas to calculate an industry comparable ROE

¹² Rebuttal Testimony of David M. Curtis, page 10, line 239.

222 for Questar Gas. The Company has not provided any explanation as to why company growth
223 estimates for only five of the comparable companies have been used to calculate an industry
224 average and why the higher midpoint was used instead of the average.

225 The updated DCF model included as DPU Exhibit 1.3a SR uses the published growth rates
226 from Reuters, Zacks and Yahoo and results in an estimated cost of equity of 8.21%. DPU
227 Exhibit 1.3b SR uses the published growth rates from Value Line and results in an estimated
228 cost of equity of 9.26%. The difference of 1.05% between the two models demonstrates the
229 importance of selecting an appropriate growth rate. The revised exhibits indicate a reduction
230 from the estimated cost of equity calculated in my direct testimony. The Value Line growth
231 rates have been used in the summary report to estimate the appropriate rate for Questar Gas.

232 Updated two-state DCF models have been included as DPU Exhibit 1.4a SR and 1.4b SR.
233 The updated models include New Jersey Resources and WGL Holdings and include updated
234 stock prices through December 26, 2013. The revised exhibits indicate a reduction from the
235 estimated cost of equity calculated in my direct testimony.

236 **Q: Have you modified your calculation of the CAPM model from your rebuttal testimony?**

237 A: Yes. I have reviewed the Ibbotson calculation model and have removed the industry
238 adjustment that was included in my direct testimony. In addition, the revised model includes
239 New Jersey Resources and WGL Holdings in the comparable list and uses the current 30 year
240 US Treasury rate of 3.94%. The key assumptions used in calculating the CAPM model are
241 the beta value and the risk premium. The risk premium is calculated as the difference
242 between the market returns and the risk free returns over various time periods. DPU Exhibit
243 1.5a SR uses the average of the Yahoo, Reuters and Zacks beta values and DPU Exhibit 1.5b
244 SR uses the Value Line beta values. DPU Exhibit 1.5a SR calculates an investor expected
245 return of 8.53% and DPU Exhibit 1.5b calculates the investor expected return of 10.04%.
246 The only difference between the two models is the published beta value since Value Line
247 uses a different method to calculate the beta value.

248 As mentioned in my direct testimony, the use of size and industry adjustments can be

249 controversial. DPU Exhibit 1.1 SR includes the Ibbotson Risk Premium calculation without
250 adjustments which calculates an expected market return of 8.48% using the current risk free
251 rate, the Value Line beta and the 87 year average risk premium. Calculations for the
252 expected returns using the 15, 20, 30, 40 and 50 year average risk premiums have been
253 include at the bottom of Exhibits 1.5a SR and 1.5b SR.

254 **Q: Do you agree with the Company's calculation of the buildup method identified in Mr.**
255 **Curtis' rebuttal testimony?**

256 A: Yes. As mentioned in Mr. Curtis rebuttal testimony, an additional calculation model or
257 buildup method can be used to estimate the expected return. The key to this model is also the
258 equity risk premium that is used in the calculation. Consistent with the other models, the
259 Company uses the 87 year average risk premium from 1926 – 2012.

260 Using a 30 year Treasury bond rate of 3.94% and the 87 year average risk premium of
261 6.70%, the estimated cost of equity would be 9.93%. I have included the calculation using
262 the 50 year average risk premium below for comparison.

| | | |
|-----|---|--------------|
| 263 | Risk Free Rate | 3.94% |
| 264 | Equity Risk Premium (50 Yr Avg) ¹³ | 4.50% |
| 265 | Industry Discount or Premium ¹⁴ | -2.44% |
| 266 | Firm Size Premium | <u>1.73%</u> |
| 267 | Estimated Questar Gas Cost of Equity | 7.73% |

268 If the 50 year average risk premium of 4.50% is used instead of the 87 year average, the
269 expected return drops to 7.73%. Changing only one variable can have a significant change in
270 the calculation so the selection of the appropriate risk premium is very important to the
271 analysis. As I stated in my direct testimony, I am more comfortable with the 50 year
272 average but have used the higher 87 year average to compensate for the current low interest
273 rate environment.

274 **Q: With the addition of New Jersey Resources and WGL Holdings, have you provided an**
275 **update to the comparable earnings model?**

¹³ 2013 Ibbotson SBBI Valuation Yearbook, Table A-1, page 147.

¹⁴ 2013 Ibbotson SBBI Valuation Yearbook, Table 3-5, page 37, SIC Code 4924.

276 A: Yes. DPU Exhibit 1.6 SR provides a summary of the historical return on equity from 2004
277 through 2012 for all of the comparable companies and for Questar Gas. The last three
278 columns calculate the three and five year average returns and the nine year standard
279 deviation. Including the two additional companies increases the three year average return
280 from 10.34% in my direct testimony to 10.71% primarily due to the high return attributed to
281 New Jersey Resources of 13.87%. The revised analysis indicates that Questar Gas has
282 earned a 0.16% lower return over the past three years than the comparable companies.

283 The last column on DPU Exhibit 1.6 SR calculates the standard deviation of the returns on
284 equity over the 2004-2012 time period. Standard deviation is a common statistical measure
285 of variability; the higher the standard deviation, the more risk there is to the expected return,
286 and vice versa. Questar Gas has a standard deviation that is one-third of the average. Only
287 Atmos Energy had a lower standard deviation than Questar Gas. This analysis further
288 supports the idea that Questar Gas has less risk than a typical company in the proxy group.

289 **Q: Is there any recent information that you want the Commission to be aware of as it**
290 **considers the authorized return on equity for Questar Gas?**

291 A: Yes. On January 3, 2014 PacifiCorp filed a new rate case application with the Commission
292 (see Docket No. 13-035-184). In its application PacifiCorp requested a return on equity of
293 10.0 percent, or 35 basis points (0.35 percent) below what Questar Gas is requesting.

294 **Q: Will you summarize the Return on Equity amount the Division is recommending for**
295 **this case?**

296 A: Yes. I have completed and included the revised calculations for the various models and
297 maintain that the appropriate cost of equity for Questar Gas is 9.45%. The Division's
298 recommendation is near the mid-point of the calculated range of 7.93% to 11.47% and is
299 based on an average of the Ibbotson Risk Premium model, Discounted Cash Flow model and
300 the Comparable Earnings model.¹⁵ The recommended rate is fair to the ratepayers and to
301 the Company and is slightly lower than the 9.66% average authorized return for natural gas

¹⁵ DPU Exhibit 1.1 SR.

302 companies in 2013¹⁶ but higher than the 9.16% allowed return for Questar Gas by the
303 Wyoming Commission. The results of the Division's calculations are summarized in DPU
304 Exhibit 1.1 SR.

305 **Q: Does this conclude your testimony?**

306 A: Yes.

¹⁶ DPU Exhibit 1.2 SR.